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Charles F. Daly

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THE
HISTORY
OF
ANCIENT GREECE,

ITS
Colonies and Conquests,

FROM

THE EARLIEST ACCOUNTS TILL THE DIVISION OF THE MACEDONIAN
EMPIRE IN THE EAST:

INCLUDING

THE HISTORY

OF

LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE FINE ARTS.




BY JOHN GILLIES, LL.D. F.A.S.

PHILADELPHIA:

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1829.



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TO THE KING.

SIR,

THE History of Greece exposes the dangerous turbulence of Democracy, and arraigns the despotism of Tyrants. By describing the incurable evils inherent in every form of Republican policy, it evinces the inestimable benefits, resulting to Liberty itself, from the lawful dominion of hereditary Kings, and the steady operation of well-regulated Monarchy. With singular propriety, therefore, the present Work may be respectfully offered to your Majesty, as Sovereign of the freest nation upon earth; and *that* Sovereign, through whose discerning munificence, the interest of those liberal arts, which distinguished and ennobled Greece beyond all other countries of antiquity, has been more successfully promoted in Your Majesty's dominions, than during any former period in the British annals. That Your Majesty may long reign the illustrious Guardian of public freedom, and the unrivalled Patron of useful learning, is the fervent prayer of

YOUR MAJESTY'S

Most dutiful Subject and Servant,

JOHN GILLIES.

LONDON, }
Feb. 10, 1786. }

PREFACE.

THE following History commences with the infancy of Greece, and describes its gradual advancement towards civilization and power. But the main design of my Work is confined to the space of seven centuries, which elapsed from the settlement of the Ionians in Asia Minor till the establishment of the Macedonian empire in the East; during which memorable period, the arts and arms of the Greeks, conspiring to excite the admiration and terror of the ancient world, justly merit the attentive study of the present age, and posterity. In the general revolutions of their national confederacy, which, though always loose and imperfect, was never altogether dissolved, I have interwoven the description and principal transactions of each independent republic, however small or inconsiderable; and, by comparing authors seldom read, and not frequently consulted for historical materials, have endeavoured to trace the intricate series, and to explain the secret connection, of seemingly detached events, in order to reduce the scattered members of Grecian story into one perpetual unbroken narrative; a design difficult indeed, and new, yet evidently well calculated to promote the great purposes of pleasure and utility.

In the view which I have taken of my subject, the fluctuation of public affairs, and the vicissitudes of war and fortune, appears scarcely the most splendid, and surely not the most interesting portion of Grecian history. By genius and fancy, not less than by patriotism and prowess, the Greeks are honourably distinguished among the nations of the earth. By the Greeks, and by them alone, Literature, Philosophy, and the Fine Arts, were treated as important concerns of state, and employed as powerful engines of policy. From their literary glory not only their civil, but even their military transactions, derive their chief importance and dignity. To complete, therefore, my present undertaking, it seemed necessary to unite the history of arts with that of empire, and to combine with the external revolutions of war and government, the intellectual improvements of men, and the ever-varying picture of human opinions and manners.

In the execution of this extensive plan, might I assume any merit to myself, it would be that of having diligently studied the Greek writers, without adopting their prejudices, or copying their narratives with servility. Many events, highly interesting to the citizens of Athens or of Sparta, now interest no more; concerning many important transactions, anciently too familiar to be explained, the Modern Reader will reasonably expect information. On some occasions, therefore, I found it necessary to concentrate and abridge; on others, to dilate and expatiate; but have never sacrificed that due relation of parts to the whole, and to each other, or violated that unity of design which I was ambitious to attain in the present History, by condescending to copy or translate. In the Work throughout, I have ventured to think for myself; and my opinions, whether well or ill founded, are, at least, my own.

The present History was undertaken, and a considerable part of it written, many years ago, by the advice of some persons of taste and learning; who, having read my historical Introduction to the Orations of Lysias and Isocrates, wished to see the whole series of Grecian story, treated on the same plan. My situation, and my leisure, enabled me to meet their wish; but before my manuscript was prepared for the Press, my studies were interrupted by the only employment, not enjoined by some positive duty, which I should have *allowed* (such are the sanguine hopes of authors!) to suspend my literary labours. During that long interval, different portions of Grecian history have been ably treated in English, as well as in *foreign languages. Yet, as most of those works still remain incomplete, and as none of them embrace the whole extent of my subject, or at all pre-occupy my plan, I venture to offer the present History, deeply sensible as I am of its imperfections, to the indulgence of the Public.

* Among the foreign works, I distinguish with pleasure those of Mr. Meiners of Gottingen. To the author of this History it would be very flattering to find the opinions which he hazarded in his introduction to Lysias, confirmed in a subsequent work of such an admired scholar as Mr. Meiners (see his *Geschichte des Luxus der Athenienser*, Lemgo, 1782,) were it not extremely natural that writers, who draw from the same sources, should advance the same facts, and deduce similar conclusions. In the following History, my views of the *Pythagorean* *band*, and of the *Platonic philosophy*, though sufficiently remote from vulgar opinion, nearly coincide with those of Mr. Meiners in his *Geschichte des Ursprungs, Fortgangs, und Verfalls der Wissenschaften in Griechenland*; that is, "the History of the Origin, Progress, and Decay of Philosophy in Greece;" a work not yet completed, but which, as far as it extends, I will venture to recommend as one of the most valuable and accurate treasures of Greek learning contained in any modern tongue.

CONTENTS.

CHAP. I.

View of the Progress of Civilization and Power in Greece, preceding the Trojan War—History of that War—Its consequences . . . Page 11

CHAP. II.

Religion—Government—Arts—Manners, and Character . . . 22

CHAP. III.

Distracted State of Greece—The Heraclidæ conduct the Dorians into Peloponnesus—Divide their Conquests in that Peninsula—The Eolic, Ionic, and Doric Migrations—Establishment of Colonies in Thrace, Macedon, Africa, and Magna Græcia—Influence of the Ionic Colonies in Asia on the Affairs of the Mother Country—The Abolition of Monarchy in Greece—New Disorders in that Country—Four Institutions which tended to remove them—The Amphictyonic Council—The Oracle of Delphi—The Olympic Games—The Spartan Laws . . . 32

CHAP. IV.

State of Greece after the Abolition of Royalty—Description of Laconia and Messenia—Causes of the War between those States—Invasion of Messenia—Distress of the Messenians—The horrid Means by which they endeavour to remedy it—They obtain assistance from Argos and Arcadia—Their Capital taken by the Spartans—Issue of the first Messenian War—State of Greece—The Colony of Tarentum founded—The second Messenian War—Character and Exploits of Aristomenes—The Distress of the Spartans—They obtain Assistance from Athens—The Poet Tyrteus—Subjugation of Messenia—Future Fortunes of its Citizens—Their Establishment in Sicily . . . 48

CHAP. V.

State of the Peloponnesus after the Conquest of Messenia—Of the Northern Republics of Greece—Of the Grecian Colonies—Revolutions in Government—Military Transactions—The first Sacred War—Destruction of the Crissean Republic—Restoration of the Pythian Games—Description of the Gymnastic and Equestrian Exercises—History of Grecian Music . . . 61

CHAP. VI.

The Grecian Bards—Heroic Poetry—Change of Manners—Iambic or Satire—Elegy—Tyrteus, Calinus, Minnermus—Life of Archilochus—Terpander—Lyric Poetry—The Nine Lyric Poets—Sappho, Alceus, Anacreon, Myrtis, Corinna, Pindar—Effects of the Sacred Games—Strength—Courage—Contempt of Prejudices—Taste—Moral Principle—Intellectual Powers—Genius . . . 71

CHAP. VII.

State of the Grecian Colonies—The Ionians flourish in Arts and Arms—Their Wars with the Lydians—The Asiatic Greeks subdued by Cræsus—Splendour of the Lydian Court—Foundation of the Persian Monarchy—Causes of its rapid Grandeur—Which alarms Cræsus—His Alliance with the Lacedæmonians—He invades the Persian Dominions—Measures of his Allies—Cræsus defeated by Cyrus—End of the Lydian Monarchy . . . 81

CHAP. VIII.

Cyrus threatens the Asiatic Colonies—Their Measures—The Spartans remonstrate against his Design—Conquests of Harpagus—Migrations of the vanquished Greeks—Cyrus takes Babylon—Cambyses subdues Egypt—Receives Tribute from the African Greeks—Reign of Darius—Final Settlement of the Persian Empire—Degeneracy of Manners—Revolt of Ionia—State of Greece—The Ionian revolt abetted by the Athenians and Eretrians—who burn Sardis—The Asiatic Greeks defeated by Sea and Land—Their Condition under the Persian Government . . . 91

CHAP. IX.

Resentment of Darius against Greece—Maritime Expedition of Mardonius—Invasion of Greece by Datis and Artaphernes—Battle of Marathon—Transactions in the Interval between that Battle and Xerxes's Invasion—The Invasion of Xerxes—Battle of Thermopylæ . . . 104

CHAP. X.

Sea Fight off Artemisium—Xerxes ravages Phocis—Enters Attica—Magnanimity of the Athenians—Sea Fight off Salamis—Xerxes leaves Greece—His miserable Retreat—Campaign of Mardonius—Battles of Plataea and Mycalé—Issue of the Persian Invasion . . . 120

CHAP. XI.

Military Glory of Greece—Enemies to whom that Country was exposed—Foundation and Growth of Carthage—The flourishing Condition of Magna Græcia—Excites the Jealousy of the Carthaginians—Who enter into a League with Xerxes—The Object of this Alliance—Causes of the singular Prosperity of Magna Græcia—History of Pythagoras, and of his Philosophy—The Carthaginians invade Sicily—Their Disasters—Glory of Gelon—His Treaty with the Carthaginians—Causes of the Decay of Magna Græcia . . . 136

CHAP. XII.

Glory of Athens—Military Success of the Confederates—Athens rebuilt and fortified—Extent of its walls and Harbours—The Confederates take Byzantium—Conspiracy of Pausanias—Banishment of Themistocles—Virtue of Aristides—Cimon assumes the Command—His illustrious Merit and Success—Revolt of Egypt—War in Cyprus—Peace with Persia—Domestic Transactions of Greece—The Athenian Greatness—Envy of Sparta, Thebes, and Argos—Earthquake in Sparta—Revolt of the Helots—War between the Elians and Pisans—The Temple and Statue of Olympian Jupiter—Dissensions in Argolis—Revolt in Bæotia—Truce of Thirty Years—Character of Pericles—Subjection of the Athenian Allies and Colonies—Spirit of the Athenian Government . . . 147

CHAP. XIII.

Transition to the internal State of Athens—Laws of Draco—Solon—Pisistratus—Clisthenes—Aristides—Pericles—Final Settlement of the Athenian Government—View of the Athenian Empire—The combined Effect of external Prosperity and democratic government on manners—Arts—Luxury—

History of Grecian Literature and Philosophy—Singular Contrast and Balance of Virtues and Vices—The sublime Philosophy of Anaxagoras and Socrates—The unprincipled Captiousness of the Sophists—The moral Tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides—The licentious Buffoonery of Aristophanes—The imitative Arts employed to the noblest Purposes—and abused to the most infamous—Magnificence of public Festivals—Simplicity in private Life—Modest Reserve of Athenian Women—Voluptuousness, Impudence, and Artifices of the School of Aspasia . . . 161

CHAP. XIV.

History of the Arts of Design—Superiority of the Greeks in those Arts—Causes of that Superiority—Among the Asiatic Greeks—Who communicated their Inventions to Europe—Bathyctes the Magnesian—Dipenus and Scyllis—Imitated in Greece, Italy, and Sicily—The Athenians surpass their Masters—Sublime Style of Art—Works of Phidias, Polygnotus, &c.—Characteristic Excellence of Grecian Art—Different Impressions made by Painters and Poets—Depended on the Nature of their respective Arts . . . 176

CHAP. XV.

Causes of the Peloponnesian War—Rupture between Corinth and its Colony Corcyra—Sea Fights—Insolence and Cruelty of the Corcyreans—They provoke the Resentment of the Peloponnesians—Obtain the Protection of Athens—are defeated by the Corinthians—Who dread the Resentment of Athens—Their Scheme for rendering it impotent—Description of the Macedonian Coast. It revolts from Athens—Siege of Potidæa—General Confederacy against Athens—Peloponnesian Embassy—Its Demands firmly answered by Pericles—His Speech to the Athenians—The Thebans surprise Platæa—Preparations for War on both Sides—Invasion of Attica—Operations of the Athenian Fleet—Plague in Athens—Calamitous Situation of that Republic—Magnanimity of Pericles—Firmness of his last Advice—His Death and Character . . . 181

CHAP. XVI.

Subsequent Events of the War—Platæa taken—Revolt of Lesbos—Description and History of that Island—Nature of its political Connection with Athens—Address of Lesbos—Its Capital besieged by the Athenians—Measures of the Peloponnesians for relieving it—Mitylené surrenders—Deliberations in Athens concerning the Treatment of the Prisoners—Resettlement of the Affairs of Lesbos—The Corinthians foment Factions in Corcyra—Sedition in that Island—The contending Factions respectively supported by the Athenians and Peloponnesians—Progress, Termination, and Consequences of the Sedition . . . 194

CHAP. XVII.

Physical Calamities conspire with the Evils of War—Athenian Expedition into Ætolia—Victories of Demosthenes—He fortifies Pylus—Blocks up the Spartans in Sphacteria—The Spartans solicit Peace—Artifices and Impudence of Cleon—His unmerited Success—Ridiculed by Aristophanes—Athenian Conquests—Battle of Delium—Commotions in Thrace—Expedition of Brasidas—Truce for a Year—The War renewed—Battle of Amphipolis—Peace of Nicias—Dissatisfaction of the Spartan Allies . . . 203

CHAP. XVIII.

Discontents fomented by the Corinthians—The Argive Alliance—To which Athens accedes—Birth and Education of Alcibiades—His Friendship with Socrates—His Character—And Views—Which are favoured by the State of Greece—He deceives the Spartan Ambassadors—Renewal of the Peloponnesian War—Battle of Mantinæa—Tumults in Argos—Massacre of the Scioncans—Cruel Conquest of Melos . . . 212

CHAP. XIX.

Alcibiades promotes the Sicilian Expedition—Revolutions in that Island—Embassy to Athens—Extravagant Views of Alcibiades—Opposed by Nicias—The Athenians prepare to invade Sicily—Their Armament beheld with Suspicion by the Italian States—Deliberations concerning the Mode of carrying on the War—Alcibiades takes Catana by Stratagem—His Intrigues in Messenê—He is unseasonably recalled to Athens—Charged with Treason and Impiety—Escapes to Sparta—Nicias determines to attack Syracuse—Description of that City—The Athenians prevail in a Battle—Return to Catana and Naxos . . . 219

CHAP. XX.

Preparations for the ensuing Campaign—The Athenians begin the Siege with Vigour—Distress and Sedition in Syracuse—Arrival of Gylippus—Who defeats the Athenians—Transactions in Greece—A second Armament arrives at Syracuse—Its first operations successful—The Athenians defeated—Prepare to raise the Siege—Naval Engagement in the Great Harbour—Despondency of the Athenians—Stratagem of Hermocrates—The Athenians raise their Camp—Melancholy Firmness of Nicias—Demosthenes capitulates—Nicias surrenders—Cruel Treatment of the Athenian Captives—Singular Exception . . . 228

CHAP. XXI.

Consequences of the Athenian Misfortunes in Sicily—Formidable Confederacy against Athens—Peculiar Resources of free Governments—Naval Operations—Battle of Miletus—Intrigues of Alcibiades—The Athenian Democracy subverted—Tyrannical Government of the Four Hundred—Battle of Eretria—Democracy re-established in Athens—Naval Success of the Athenians—Triumphant Return of Alcibiades—The Eleusinian Mysteries—and Plynteria . . . 239

CHAP. XXII.

Character of Lysander—His Conference with Cyrus—He defeats the Athenian Fleet—Disgrace of Alcibiades—Lysander succeeded by Callicratidas—His Transactions with the Persians—with the Spartan Allies—Battle of Arginusæ—Trial of the Athenian Admirals—Eteonicus checks a Mutiny of the Peloponnesian Troops—Lysander resumes the Command—Battle of Ægos Potamos—Spartan Empire in Asia—Siege and Surrender of Athens—Humiliation of the Athenians . . . 251

CHAP. XXIII.

Rapacity and Cruelty of the Spartan Government—The Thirty Tyrants in Athens—Persecution of Lysias and his Family—Theramenes opposes the Tyrants—Sanguinary Speech of Critias—Death of Theramenes—Persecution and Death of Alcibiades—Thrasybulus seizes Phylé—Defeats the Tyrants—Memorable Speech of Thrasybulus—Oath of Amnesty—not faithfully observed . . . 262

CHAP. XXIV.

Accusation of Socrates—Artifices of his Accusers—His Defence—Condemnation—Address to the Judges—His Conversation in Prison—and Death—Transient Persecution of his Disciples—Writings of Cebes—Æschines—State of Philosophy—Of the Fine Arts—Of Literature—Herodotus—Thucydides—Xenophon—Transition to the public Transactions of Greece—The Spartans invade Elis—The Messenians driven from Greece—History of Cyrene—Of Sicily—War with Carthage—Siege of Agrigentum—Reign of Dionysius—Sicily the first Province of Rome . . . 269

CHAP. XXV.

Death of Darius Nothus—Cyrus disputes the Succession with his elder Brother Artaxerxes—Character of Cyrus—State of Lower Asia under his Administration—His Strength and Resources—His expe-

dition into Upper Asia—Describes the vast Army of his Brother—Battle of Canaxa—Death of Cyrus—His Grecian Auxiliaries victorious—Their Treaty with Tissaphernes—Perfidious Assassination of the Grecian Generals—Artaxerxes sends to the Greeks to demand their Arms—Conference on that Subject 281

CHAP. XXVI.

Consternation of the Greeks—Manly Advice of Xenophon—Their Retreat—Difficulties attending it—Surmounted by their Skill and Perseverance—Their Sufferings among the Carduchian Mountains—They traverse Armenia—First behold the Sea from Mount Theches—Defeat the Colchians—Description of the southern Shore of the Euxine—Transactions with the Greek Colonies there—The Greeks arrive at Byzantium—Enter into the Service of Seuthes—His History—Conjunct Expeditions of the Greeks and Thracians—The Greeks return to the Service of their Country 289

CHAP. XXVII.

Tissaphernes makes War on the Greeks, by Order of Artaxerxes—Attacks the Æolian Cities—Expedition of Thimbron—He is succeeded by Dercyllidas—His Treaty with Tissaphernes—Agésilas King of Sparta—Cinadon's Conspiracy—Agésilas Commander of the Grecian Forces in Asia—His Success—Tissaphernes succeeded by Tithraustes—Great Views of Agésilas—War rekindled in Greece—League against Sparta—Campaign of Lysander in Bœotia—His Death 297

CHAP. XXVIII.

Recal of Agésilas from the East—He invades Bœotia—Views of Evagoras king of Cyprus—His Friendship with Conon—The latter entrusted with the Persian Fleet—He defeats the Lacedæmonians—Battle of Coronæa—The Corinthian War—Conon rebuilds the Walls and Harbours of Athens—Conquests of Conon and Thrasybulus—Peace of Antalcidas 305

CHAP. XXIX.

Reflections upon the Peace of Antalcidas—Ambitious Views of Sparta—State of Arcadia—Siege of Mantinée—Olynthian Confederacy—The Spartans make War on Olynthus—Submission of that Republic—Pella becomes the Capital of Macedon—Phæbidas seizes the Theban Citadel—The Measure approved by Agésilas—Conspiracy of the Theban Exiles—The Theban Democracy restored 313

CHAP. XXX.

The Bœotian War—Unsuccessful Attempt of Sphodrias against the Piræus—Doubts concerning Xenophon's Account of that Transaction—Agésilas invades Bœotia—Military Success of the Thebans—Naval Success of the Athenians—Congress for Peace under the Mediation of Artaxerxes—Epaminondas, Deputy from Thebes—Cleombrotus invades Bœotia—Battle of Leuctra—State of Greece—Jason of Thessaly—His Character and Views—Assassinated in the midst of his Projects 321

CHAP. XXXI.

Tumults in the Peloponnesus—Invasion of Laconia—Epaminondas rebuilds Messenæ—Foundation of Megalopolis—Archidamus restores the Fortune of Sparta—Affairs of Thessaly and Macedon—Negotiations for Peace—The Pretensions of Thebes rejected—Epaminondas invades the Peloponnesus—Revolutions in Achaia—Speech of Archidamus in the Spartan Council—Designs of Thebes—Disconcerted by Athens—Pelopidas's Expedition into Thessaly—The Arcadians seize the Olympic Treasure—Battle of Mantinée—Agésilas's Expedition into Egypt 332

CHAP. XXXII.

State of Greece after the Battle of Mantinée—The Amphictyonic Council—Returning Prosperity of

Athens—Vices resulting from its Government—Abuses of the judiciary Power—Of the Theatre—Degeneracy of Grecian Music—Extreme Profligacy of the Athenians—The Vices of Chares render him the Idol of the Multitude—The Social War—Banishment of Timotheus and Iphicrates—Disgraceful Issue of the War—Philosophy—Statuary—Praxiteles—The Cnidian Venus—Painting—Pamphilus, Nicias, Zeuxis—Literature—Xenophon—His Military Expeditions—Religious and Literary Retreat—Lysias—Isocrates—Plato—His Travels—He settles in the Academy—His great Views—Theology—Cosmogony—Doctrine of Ideas—Of the Human Understanding—The Passions—Virtues—State of Retribution—Genius and Character 351

CHAP. XXXIII.

History of Macedon—Reign of Archelaus—Series of Usurpations and Revolutions—Perdiccas defeated by the Illyrians—Distracted State of Macedon—First Transactions of Philip—State of Thrace and Pœonia—Philip defeats Argæus and the Athenians—His Treatment of the Prisoners—His military Arrangements—He defeats the Illyrians—His Designs against Amphipolis—He prevents an Alliance between Athens and Olynthus—Amuses the Athenians—Takes Amphipolis—His Conquests in Thrace—The Mines of Crenidæ—Philip marries Olympias—His Letter to Aristotle 365

CHAP. XXXIV.

Philip's Prosperity—Imprudent Measures of the Amphictyonic Council—The Phocian, or Sacred War—Philomelus seizes the Temple of Delphi—Takes the Field against the Thebans and their Allies—Defeat and Death of Philomelus—Affairs of Thrace, Macedon, and Attica—Onemarchus takes the Command of the Phocians—Encounters Philip in Thessaly—He is defeated and slain—Philip's Designs against Olynthus and Byzantium—Traversed by the Athenians—Phayllus takes the Command of the Phocians—Philip marches towards Thermopylæ—Anticipated by the Athenians—Demosthenes's first Philippic—Philip's Occupations at Pella—His Vices and Policy. 374

CHAP. XXXV.

Negligence and Licentiousness of the Athenians—Philip's Intrigues in Eubœa—Phocion defeats the Macedonians and Eubœans—Philip invades the Olynthian Territory—Demosthenes's Orations in favour of the Olynthians—Expedition of Chares—Philip takes Olynthus—Celebrates the Festival of the Muses at Dium—Commits naval Depredations on Attica—His Embassy to Athens—The Athenian Embassy to Philip—Character of the Ambassadors—Their Conference with the King—Differently reported to the Senate and Assembly—Philip's Conquests in Thrace—The Phocian War—Negotiations—Philip's Intrigues—Decree of the Amphictyons against Phocis—Executed by Philip—Macedon acknowledged the principal Member of the Amphictyonic Council 383

CHAP. XXXVI.

Foundation of Philippopolis and Cabyla—Philip's Expedition to Illyria—Alexander receives the Persian Ambassadors—Affairs of Greece—Demosthenes unmasks the Designs of Philip's Expedition to the Peloponnesus—to Epirus—to Thrace—Diopeithes opposes him with Vigour—The Athenians recover Eubœa—Siege of Perinthus—Philip's Letter to the Athenians—Expedition of Chares—of Phocion—who retrieves the Athenian Affairs in Thrace—Philip's Scythian Expedition—The incendiary Antiphon—Philip's Intrigues embroil the Affairs of Greece—The third Sacred War—Philip General of the Amphictyons—Confederacy against that Prince—He seizes Elatæa—Battle of Chæroneæ—His Moderation in Victory—Demosthenes's Oration in Honour of the Slain 400

CHAP. XXXVII.

Liberal Spirit of the Macedonian Government—Philip appointed General of the Greeks—Rebellion of Illyria—Assassination of Philip—His Character—Accession of Alexander—His Expedition against the Illyrians and Triballi—He passes the Danube—Rebellion in Greece—Destruction of Thebes—Heroism of Timoclea—Alexander crosses the Hellespont—State of the Persian Empire—Battle of the Granicus—Siege of Miletus and Halicarnassus—Bold Adventure of two Macedonian Soldiers—Alexander's judicious Plan of War—Arts by which he secured his Conquests—The Battle of Issus—The Virtues of Alexander expand with his Prosperity 421

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Siege of Tyre—Desperate Resistance of Gaza—Easy Conquest of Egypt—Foundation of Alexandria—Alexander visits the Temple of Jupiter Ammon—Marches into Assyria—Battle of Gaugamela—Darius betrayed and slain—Alexander pursues the Murderers of Darius—Bactrian and Scythian War—Siege of the Sogdian Fortress—Surrender of Chorienes—Commutations in Greece—Checked by Antipater—The Cause of Ctesiphon and Demosthenes—Æschines banished—State of Greece during Alexander's Reign 436

CHAP. XXXIX.

Alexander's Indian Expedition—Route pursued by

the Army—Aornus taken—Nysa and Mount Meros—Alexander passes the Indus and Hydaspes—Defeats Porus—Founds Nicæa and Bucephalia—Passes the Acesines and Hydraotes—Sangala taken—Eastern Boundary of Alexander's Conquests—He sails down the Hydaspes—Takes the Mallian Fortress—His March through the Gedrosian Desert—Voyage of Nearchus—Alexander improves the internal State of his Conquests—Incorporates the Barbarian Levies with the Greeks and Macedonians—Intermarriages of the Europeans and Asiatics—Artifices to prevent Alexander's Return to Babylon—His Death and Character—Division of his Conquests—Subsequent History of Egypt and Syria—The Western Division of Alexander's Empire conquered by the Romans—State of Greece after the age of Alexander 448

CHAP. XL.

State of Literature in the Age of Alexander—Poetry—Music—Arts of Design—Geography—Astronomy—Natural History—Works of Aristotle—Philosophical Sects established at Athens—Decline of Genius—Tenets of the different Sects—Peripatetic Philosophy—Estimate of that Philosophy—Its Fate in the World—Coincidence in the Opinions of Zeno and Epicurus—The Stoic Philosophy—Estimate of that Philosophy—The Epicurean Philosophy—Character of Epicurus—Philosophy of Pyrrho—Conclusion 463

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

View of the Progress of Civilisation and Power in Greece, preceding the Trojan War—History of that War—Its Consequences.

IN the infancy of society, men are occupied with the business of the present hour, forgetful of the past, and careless of the future. They possess neither ability nor inclination to contemplate their public transactions in the impartial light of history, far less to treasure and to record them. Their recent victories over hostile tribes are celebrated in the artless song,¹ or commemorated by the rude monument; but to preserve any regular series of connected events, is a design, which they enjoy not the means to execute, scarcely the capacity to comprehend.

Their simple and obscure adventures, which thus pass unremembered by themselves, rarely excite the inquisitive curiosity of their more cultivated neighbours. In remote ages of the world, one people became an object of attention to another, only as they became considerable; for until the full maturity of Grecian refinement, the most polished nations of antiquity attempted not to investigate the nature and powers of man in the untutored efforts of savage life. The daring spirit, and fierce incursions, of the barbarians in the east of Europe, excited terror and consternation among the more civilized and more effeminate inhabitants of Lesser Asia;² but the luxurious pride of the latter never condescended to examine the origin and history of the people who were occasionally the object of their fears. The only circumstantial information concerning both the Asiatics and the Europeans, must be derived from the early historians of Greece; and when we reflect on the innumerable causes which conspire to bury in oblivion the exploits of rising communities, there is reason to wonder that we should know so much concerning the ancient state of that country, rather than to regret that our knowledge is imperfect.

It must be allowed, however, that our materials for the first portion of Grecian history, are rather copious than consistent.³ The subject,

indeed, is such, as a very cautious writer would choose entirely to avoid, since, whatever authorities he follows, his narrative must, in some parts, be liable to objection.⁴ Yet it seems es-

inquirer into the antiquities of his country. If we admit the common chronology, there is reason to believe that the scattered fragments of Grecian history were preserved during thirteen centuries by oral tradition. The tales or rhapsodies of the *αοιδοι*, or bards, were succeeded by those of the Cyclic poets, of whom an account is given in Casaubon *Athenæum*, l. vii. c. 4. Salmas. in *Solin. et Schwarzius Altdorf in Diss. de Poetis Cyclicis*. Composition in prose began with the use of alphabetic writing about six centuries before Christ. *Plin. Nat. Hist. l. v. c. 29*. The first prose writers, or more properly the first *writers*, were, Pherecydes of Syros; Acusilaus of Argos; Hellanicus of Lesbos; Hecataeus and Dionysius, both of Miletus; the last of whom flourished in the 65th Olymp. 520. B. C. and immediately preceded Herodotus. From the work of Herodotus, which forms, as it were, the shade between Epic Poetry and History, we may judge of the writings of his predecessors; from whom, together with the Cyclic poets, Anaximenes of Lampacus, who lived in the time of Alexander the Great, and Diodorus Siculus, who lived in the time of Julius Cæsar, compiled the first books of their very extensive but inaccurate collections. Apollodorus, Hyginus (and many others, whose works are now lost,) combined the more ancient records, whether in prose or verse, with the additions and embellishments of the lyric and tragic poets. When the Greek learning became known to the Romans, this compound of history and fable furnished the subject and the incidents of innumerable tragedies to Ennius, Accius, Livius Andronicus, &c. After the downfall of Rome, learning took refuge in the eastern world. The antiquities and early history of Greece again became objects of study among the natives of that country; but the heterogeneous mass of truth and fiction was rather amalgamated, than purified, by Malala, Cedrenus, Tzetza, Constantinus Manasses, and other Greeks of the middle ages. See Heine, *Not. ad Æneid. II.* and Vossius *de Historic. Græcis*. With few exceptions, the Greek writers may be pronounced extremely careless in matters of chronology. Herodotus, who has been emphatically styled the father of profane history, commonly reckons by the ages of men. The accurate histories of Thucydides and Xenophon, where the time of each event is precisely ascertained, comprehend no more than a period of seventy years. Even in their time, chronology seems not to have been cultivated as a science, since the first specimen of that kind is said to have been given by Demetrius Phalerius, in his *αρχοντων αναγγελια*, about the middle of the fourth century before Christ. The labours of Demetrius were corrected and extended by Philochorus in his *Ατθικ.* The historian Timæus, who flourished in the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, first arranged his narrative in the order of Olympiads, which began 776 B. C. His contemporary Sosibius gave a work, entitled *Χρονων Αναγγελια*; Apollodorus wrote the *συνταξις χρονικη*; and on such chronologers rests the credit of all later compilers, as well as of the Arundelian marbles, which were composed only 264 years before Christ.

4 What Strabo (l. ix.) says of the first historians of Attica, "that they differed widely from each other (*πολλὰ διαφεροντες*)," may be applied to all profane histories of those early times.

¹ Tacit. *Annal. l. iv. c. 43*.

² The Lydians, Phrygians, &c. History and fable attest the early civilization, the wealth, and wickedness, of those nations. See particularly Herodotus, l. i. c. 93. & seq. and Strabo, l. xi. p. 532. & seq. and l. xii. & xiii. p. 572.

³ It is sufficient to read Thucydides's introduction to his admired history of the Peloponnesian war, to perceive how little correct information could be obtained by that diligent

essential to the integrity of the present work, to explain from what assemblage of nations the Greeks were formed, and by what fortunate steps they arrived, from feeble beginnings, to that condition of manners and society in which they are described by Homer; whose immortal poems, like a meteor in the gloom of night, brighten the obscure antiquities of his country.

The traditions of the Greeks agree with the authentic records of sacred history, in representing the countries afterwards known by the names of Thrace, Macedon, and Greece, as peopled at an earlier period than any other portion of the western world. The southern corner of Europe, comprehended between the thirty-sixth and forty-first degrees of latitude, bordering on Epirus and Macedonia towards the north, and on other sides surrounded by the sea, was inhabited, above eighteen centuries before the christian era, by many small tribes of hunters and shepherds, among whom the Pelasgi and Hellenes were the most numerous and powerful.¹ The barbarous Pelasgi venerated Inachus, as their founder; and for a similar reason, the more humane Hellenes respected Deucalion. From his son Hellen, they derived their general appellation, which originally denoted a small tribe in Thessaly;² and from Dorus, Eolus, and Ion,³ his more remote descendants, they were discriminated by the names of Dorians, Eolians, and Ionians.⁴ The Dorians took possession of that mountainous district of Greece, afterwards called Doris; the Ionians, whose name was in some measure lost in the illustrious appellation of Athenians, settled in the less barren parts of Attica; and the Eolians peopled Elis and Arcadia, the western and inland regions of the Peloponnesus.⁵ Notwithstanding many partial migrations, these three original⁶ divisions of the Hellenes generally entertained an affection for the establishments which had been preferred by the wisdom or caprice of their respective ancestors; a circumstance which remarkably distinguished the *Hellenic* from the *Pelasgic* race. While the former discovered a degree of attachment to their native land, seldom found in barbarians, who live by hunting or pasturage, the latter disdaining fixed habitations, wandered in large bodies over Greece, or transported themselves into the neighbouring islands; and the most considerable portion of them gradually removing to the coasts of Italy and Thrace, the remainder melted away into the Doric and Ionic tribes. At the distance of twelve centuries, obscure traces of the Pelasgi occurred in several Grecian cities; a district of Thessaly always retained their name; their colonies continued, in the fifth century before Christ, to inhabit the southern coast of Italy, and the shores of the Hellespont; and in those widely separated countries, their ancient affinity was recognised in the uniformity of their rude dialect and barbarous manners, extremely dissimilar to

the customs and language of their Grecian neighbours.⁷

Greece, when delivered from the turbulence of a rugged race of men, who never attained much consideration, either in the territories where they originally dwelt, or in those to which they afterwards removed, was not left to be slowly civilized by the progressive ingenuity of the Hellenic tribes. The happy position of a country, which, forming as it were the frontier of Europe with Asia, is divided only by a narrow extent of sea from Egypt and Syria, and situate within reach of those parts of the east which were anciently most flourishing and populous, naturally invited the visits of travellers, and attracted the establishment of colonies. These transient visits, or temporary settlements, were marked by many signal benefits, the memory of which was long preserved by the gratitude of Greece, and their merit probably exaggerated by her fondness for panegyric. Even those Grecian communities, which justly claimed the honour of superior antiquity, acknowledged themselves indebted to strangers for the most important discoveries, not only in religion, but in agriculture and the arts; and contented themselves with the glory of having diffused a borrowed light over the melancholy gloom of ignorance which overspread their neighbours.⁸ But national vanity at length produced a material change in the tradition. When the refined descendants of the rude Greeks viewed with complacency their own superiority in arts and arms to all the nations around them, they began to suspect that the gods alone were worthy to have reared the infancy of a people, who eminently excelled the rest of mankind. To the gods they transferred the merit of the many useful inventions communicated by the generous humanity of their ancient visitants; an ostentatious fiction coloured by a faint semblance of truth, since the worship of several divinities was introduced at the same time, and by the same persons,⁹ who made known the arts most subservient to the purposes of human life.¹⁰

While fable thus disguised the benefits conferred by the first transitory voyages into Greece, history preserved the memory of four successive establishments erected there by foreigners. From the middle of the sixteenth, to the middle of the fourteenth century before Christ, an inundation of Egyptians, Phœnicians, and Phrygians, overflowed the Hellenic coasts. The causes assigned for these emigrations are extremely consonant to the manners of remote antiquity, as described by sacred and profane authors: hatred of a rival, impatience of a superior, in one instance the persecution of a brother and an enemy, and, in general, that uneasy restlessness of disposition, which universally prevails among men, who have become sensible of their own powers, without having sufficiently learned to direct them to the happy pursuits of arts and industry.¹¹ The principal

1 Marm. Oxon. epoch. 6. Apollodor. Biblioth. l. ii.

2 Thucyd. l. i. c. 23.

3 Strabo, l. viii. p. 383.

4 Herodot. l. i. c. 56. and l. vii. c. 94.

5 Diodor. Siculus, l. v.

6 Heraclid. Pont. apud Athenæum, l. xiv.

7 Herodot. l. i. Dionys. Halicarn. l. i. Pausan. l. viii.

8 Isocrat. Panegy. passim.

9 The Tyrians, Idæi Dactyli, Triptolemus, &c. Compare Diodor. Sicul. l. v. and Isocrat. Panegy.

10 Diodor. Sicul. l. v. Isocrat. Panegy.

11 Isocrat. Hellen. sub. initio. Pind. Olymp. l.

colonies were conducted, by Cecrops,¹² and A. C. Danaus, Egyptians, who respectively settled in Athens and Argos; Cadmus,¹³ 1556. a Phœnician, who founded Thebes in 1485. Bœotia, and Pelops, a Phrygian,¹⁴ whose 1493. descendants, intermarrying with those 1350. of Danaus, king of Argos, and Tyndareus, king of Lacedæmon or Sparta, acquired, in the person of Agamemnon, so powerful an ascendant in the Peloponnesus.¹⁵ The family of Deucalion still reigned in Thessaly; but Thebes, Athens, Argos, and Sparta, which in all ages were regarded as the principal cities of Greece, thus fell under the dominion of four foreign lines of princes, whose exploits, and glory, and misfortunes, are immortalised by the first and noblest productions of Grecian genius.¹⁶

The countries, which these adventurers abandoned, had not, according to modern ideas, attained a very high degree of maturity in laws and government. Yet it cannot be doubted, that the natives of Egypt and the east were acquainted with many improvements unknown to the Hellenic tribes. Conjectures are not to be placed in the rank of facts; yet, in matters so ancient and obscure, we may be allowed to conjecture from the only facts on record, that the invaders of Greece introduced into that country the knowledge of the Phœnician alphabet; improved the practice of agriculture; multiplied the rites of religion; discovered to the Greeks several uses of the metals; but, on the other hand, gradually adopted, in their turn, the Grecian language, and generally conformed to the Grecian customs and institutions.¹⁷

The introduction of the Phœnician alphabet was an improvement too delicate and refined to be immediately attended with any important consequences. The gross understandings of the Hellenes could not easily comprehend the utility of such an ingenious invention. The knowledge of it was acquired and preserved by a few individuals¹⁸ of more enlightened minds: but the far greater part of the nation long contented themselves with the ancient mode of picture-writing, which, however limited in its application, seemed sufficient to express the simplicity of their rude ideas.

The Phœnicians were well acquainted with the precious metals as the medium of ex-

change. But the uniform transactions of the Greeks, as yet required not any such nicety of refinement. Even during the Trojan war, cattle, being the commodity of most general demand, was universally regarded as the most convenient measure of value.¹⁹ It is not easy to determine whether gold or iron be more advantageous to man, the one by exciting his industry, the other by seconding that industry in all the variety of useful arts. The discovery of iron in Greece afforded the necessary implements of agriculture, the gradual extension of which alike improved the sterility of the soil, and the rudeness of the inhabitants. Before the arrival of Egyptian colonies, the cultivation of the ground might occasionally employ the divided industry of scattered families; but this valuable art was not considered as an object of general concern. Cecrops first engaged the wandering hunters or shepherds of Attica to unite in villages of husbandmen. Corn, wine, and oil, rewarded their useful labours;²⁰ and these productions being acquired by common toil, were regarded, with the ground itself, as a common property.²¹

The idea of an exclusive and permanent right to all the uses of a piece of land, whether belonging to communities or to individuals, is one of the most important steps in the progress of society. In Greece, this valuable right was immediately followed by such institutions as tended to secure its enjoyment, and to check the injustice of man, who is seldom willing to acquire, by slow labour, what he can ravish by sudden violence. The salutary influence of religion was employed on this necessary occasion. We are told by several writers, that the practice of agriculture, and the rites of religion, were introduced at the same time.²² But the same authors inform us, that their pretended founders of religious worship abolished the use of living sacrifices;²³ a custom, which evi-

19 In a well known passage, Homer, after mentioning other articles, with which the Greeks purchased wine, adds, *αὐτοῖσι βοῦσι*, "with oxen themselves." Some scholiasts and commentators have imagined, that the *βούς* of Homer was a coin stamped with the figure of an ox, said to have been introduced by Theseus. Vid. Plut. in Theseo. But were it allowed, which is very improbable, that Theseus had a mint, it would still be improbable that Homer meant such a coin; for in the episode of Glaucus and Diomed, he says, that the former gave his golden armour, worth a hundred oxen, for the brazen armour of the latter, worth only nine. Now we know from Pollux Onomast. l. ix. c. 7. that the coin *βούς*, at whatsoever time it was introduced, continued to be valued at two drachmas. Diomed's arms therefore, upon the supposition of the scholiasts, must have been worth about nine shillings; and Glaucus's, which were of massy gold, worth only nine pounds. Talents of gold are often mentioned by Homer. They were proposed as prizes to combatants, and offered as dedications in temples, but too valuable to serve as current specie. Homer and Herodot. *passim*. *Νομισμα*, money, is derived from *νομος*, law, because, as Aristotle says, *οὐ φυσικόν, ἀλλὰ νομικόν*, "the origin of money is not natural, but conventional and arbitrary." But in Homer's time, the word *νομος* was used in a quite different sense: *νομισμα* must therefore have been derived from it at a later period. Com. Iliad. l. xx. v. 249. and Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. l. v. c. 5.

20 Pausan. l. iii. Æschyl. Eumen.

21 The *τεμινός*, or cut of ground so often mentioned in Homer, as bestowed by general consent on admired kings and chiefs, might have suggested this observation, which seems to have escaped notice, though attended, as we shall find, with very important consequences.

22 Diodor. Pausan. Apollod.

23 *Θεοὺς κερμαῖς ἀγαλλεῖν ζῶν μὴ σφινθεῖν*. Porph. de Abstin.

12 Strabo, l. ix. and Plut. in Theseo.

13 Strabo, *Ibid.* and Isocrat. Hellen.

14 Isocrat. Panathen. Thucyd. l. i. Diodor. l. 4.

15 Thucyd. l. i. Diodor. l. 4. Isocrat. Panathen.

16 The works of Homer and Pindar, and the writings of the Greek tragedians. In these, and scarcely any where else, the stories of Cadmus, Semele, Bacchus, Amphitryon, Hercules, Œdipus, &c. may be read with pleasure and advantage; for, as Strabo, l. ix. says, "All there is monstrous and tragic land."

17 Compare Herodotus, l. v. c. 59. l. vii. *passim*. Montfaucon, *Palaograph. Græc.* l. ii. Plin. l. v. c. 56 and 57. Hyginus, Fab. 274. and Ephorus apud Diodor. l. v.

18 Herodotus mentions three inscriptions on three tripods, consecrated in the temple of Iaménian Apollo. The first, of Amphitryon; the second, of the son of Hippocoon; the third, of Laodamus the son of Eteocles. The inscriptions on the shields of the heroes who besieged the capital of Eteocles, are noticed by Æschylus, in his tragedy entitled, "The Seven against Thebes." Yet we know from Homer, Iliad vi. that when Prætus sent Bellerophon to the king of Lycia, he gave him, not a written letter, but *σηματὰ λυγρὰ*, mournful signs. Writing could not be common till many centuries afterwards, since the first written laws were given in Greece only six centuries before Christ. Herodot. l. ii. Strabo, l. vi.

dently supposes the prior establishment of an ancient and more bloody superstition. Yet in this humane prohibition, we may perhaps discern a laudable attempt to correct the barbarity of the Greeks, and to raise the new profession of agriculture above the ancient employment of hunting.

Before and during the time that the Hellenic tribes received continual accessions of population from distant countries, they were no less diligent in sending forth their own colonies. As they originally subsisted by hunting, fishing, and pasturage, a large extent of territory was requisite to supply them with the necessities of life. They were not afflicted by the oppressive terrors of despotism; they were long unacquainted with the gentle, but powerful, operation of regular government; and without being subject to the one or the other, it is scarcely possible for men to live together in large societies. When any of their communities seemed inconveniently numerous, they divided it into several portions, of which the principal kept possession of their original seats, while the others occupied and peopled the surrounding territories. It was thus the Eolians dispersed through many parts of the Peloponnesus; the unfortunate Sisyphus,¹ who founded the city of Corinth, being a descendant of Eolus, and the ancestors of the wise Nestor, who reigned in sandy Pylos, being sprung from the same Eolic race.² A considerable division of the Ionians settled along the southern shores of the Corinthian gulf, in the province which, eighty years after the Trojan war, changed the name of Ionia for that of Achaia.³ The territory beyond the Corinthian isthmus was parcelled out among innumerable subdivisions of the Hellenic tribes.⁴ When the continent of Greece seemed sufficiently populous, the Athenians gave inhabitants to the isle of Eubœa; and many centuries before the famous establishments formed by the Greeks on the coasts of Asia Minor, of Italy, and of Thrace, the Dorians had sent a colony to Crete,⁵ and the Eolians, under the conduct of Dardanus, had planted the eastern banks of the Hellespont.⁶ During the Trojan war, the inhabitants of those various and widely separated countries spoke the same language that was used among the Hellenes, and acknowledged the general influence of the same principles and manners. Unless it is supposed, therefore, that not only the Phrygians, but the Phœnicians and Egyptians originally spoke the same Hellenic tongue, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the colonies conducted by Cecrops, Cadmus, and Danaus, gradually adopted the language of the aborigines of Greece.⁷

¹ Καὶ Σίσυφον ἱστίδων κρείττεα κλέγεα ἔχοντα. Homer *Odys.*

² Pausan. in Corinth. et Messen.

³ Strabo, l. vii.

⁴ Id. ib. Pausan. et Diodor.

⁵ Diodor. *ibid.* Strabo, l. vii. p. 496.

⁶ Servius in *Æneid.* III.

⁷ Herodotus, l. v. c. 58. says, that the colony of Cadmus changed their speech, being surrounded by the Ionians, a Hellenic tribe. He says further, that together with their language, they changed the power of some of their letters. He acknowledges that the Cadmeians, or Phœnicians, communicated to the Ionians the use of letters; but the Ionians, he says, adapted the Phœnician alphabet to the sounds of

A single reflection appears sufficient to prove, that they likewise conformed to the Grecian institutions of government. The inflexible rigour of despotism, which has in all ages prevailed in Egypt⁸ and the east, was unknown to the conquerors of Troy. Since the absolute power of kings was not acknowledged during a long period of war and danger, requiring the strictest military subordination; and since the Greeks preserved their freedom, after the increasing wealth of many centuries had a tendency to prepare them for servitude; it cannot reasonably be imagined, that an oriental system of oppression should have prevailed in the more early ages of poverty and independence.⁹

The Phœnicians being considered as the principal navigators and merchants of the ancient world, it is commonly believed that the example of the Phœnician colonies first taught the Greeks to brave the dangers of the sea, and to maintain a commercial intercourse with each other, as well as with foreign nations. But it is sufficient to throw a glance on the geography of Greece, to perceive how naturally commerce, without foreign aid, might have arisen spontaneously in that highly favoured country. The continent itself, washed on three sides by the sea, is surrounded by innumerable islands, abounding in excellent harbours. The variety of soils and productions is greater, perhaps, than in any other part of the world, of an equal extent. All the shores of the Mediterranean, comprehending the most beautiful, and, anciently, the most flourishing part of the earth, are more accessible to Greece than to any neighbouring country. Yet it appears from the light of history, that the Greeks did not early avail themselves of their fortunate situation, or of the supposed lessons of their Phœnician instructors.

Many circumstances conspired to prolong the infancy of their nation, and to retard, during several centuries, their improvement in commerce, as well as in agriculture, and the other useful arts. The surface of Greece is more indented by creeks and rivers, and more roughened by mountains and promontories, than that of any other part of Europe. These natural divisions kept the different communities in a

their own language. The eastern tongues are in general extremely deficient in vowels. It is, or rather was, much disputed whether the ancient Orientals used any characters to express them. Their languages, therefore, had an inflexible thickness of sound, extremely different from the vocal harmony of the Greek, which abounds not only in vowels but in diphthongs. The circumstance denotes, in the Greeks, organs of perception more acute, elegant, and discerning. They felt such faint variations of liquid sounds, as escaped the dulness of Asiatic ears, and invented marks to express them. They distinguished, in this manner, not only their articulation, but their quantity, and afterwards their musical intonation, as shall be explained hereafter, in treating of the Grecian music and poetry.

⁸ The government of the Egyptians, as well as the Asiatics, is uniformly represented in scripture as an absolute monarchy. Herodotus and Diodorus mention some laws of the Egyptians, which seem to circumscribe the power of their kings. But these laws, if well examined, will confirm the observation in the text. They were established, not in favour of the nation at large, but of the priests and soldiers. The throne of Egypt was supported by the altar, and defended by the sword; and what despotism can be upheld but by the same means?

⁹ See the principles established by Tacitus de Mor. German

state of separation and hostility. The ideas of their ancient consanguinity and common origin were weakened or effaced by the recent confluence of foreigners. They could not travel beyond their own narrow districts without being exposed to the insults of enemies. These insults excited resentment; mutual injuries were offered and retorted; each city was at war with all its neighbours: thus did the smallness of the Grecian states, a circumstance which, during the happy ages that form the subject of the present history, tended to break the force of custom and opinion, and to encourage that noble emulation so favourable to the progress of virtue and science, produce, in less fortunate times, an effect of the most opposite nature, choke the seeds of order, and repress the feeble shoots of arts and humanity.

The metals, originally destined to promote the peaceful labours of man, were converted into powerful instruments of destruction; and while the land was ravaged by the sword, the sea was covered with pirates. The Phœnicians, the Carians, and the inhabitants of the Greek islands in general, considered navigation, not as the means of uniting nations by mutual intercourse and commerce, but as a happy expedient for enabling the poor and the brave to plunder the rich territories of their less warlike neighbours. The coasts of Greece, though in early times their bleak forbidding aspect might have repelled the avarice of freebooters, yet on account of the proximity of their situation, and the valuable cargoes of hardy slaves in which they abounded, were continually infested by naval depredations. The unfortified places near the shore surrendered without resistance; the fruits of their painful industry were plundered or destroyed, and the most valuable portion of their inhabitants dragged into captivity. The practice of piracy and invasion was not a temporary resource of war, prompted by necessity, or a just revenge; it grew into an ordinary profession, which was so far from being deemed dishonourable, that it conferred much glory and renown on those who exercised it with skill and bravery.¹⁰

During this disordered state of society, the arts of peace were almost entirely neglected, and Greece was ready to be plunged into the grossest barbarism, by its domestic dissensions. The irruptions of the Thracians, Amazons, and other northern savages, threatened to accelerate this melancholy event, and to complete the ruin of the unhappy Hellenes.¹¹ But it may be observed in the affairs of human life, that any extraordinary measure of good or evil commonly leads men to dread, or to expect, a sudden revolution of fortune; a natural sentiment which, though liable to be abused by credulity and superstition, is founded on the firm basis of experience. The rudiments of the most useful designs are suggested always by necessity, often by calamity. The inroads of the

wild mountaineers of Thrace, and of other barbarians more remote, whose destructive cruelty may be understood by the unexampled ravages with which even the feeble sex¹² carried on the ravages of war, occasioned the first institution which restored some degree of present tranquillity to Greece, and laid the foundation of its future grandeur.

The northern districts of Thessaly being peculiarly exposed to the dangerous fury of invaders, the petty princes of that province entered into a confederacy for their mutual defence.¹³ They assembled in spring and autumn at Thermopylæ, a place afterwards so illustrious, and then governed by Amphictyon, a descendant of Deucalion, whose name is immortalized in the Amphictyonic council. The advantages which the confederates derived from this measure, were soon perceived by their neighbours. The central states gradually acceded to their alliance; and, about the middle of the fourteenth century before Christ, Acrisius king of Argos, and other princes of the Peloponnesus, were allowed to share the benefits and security of their useful association.

A. C. 1263. After this event, the Amphictyons appear to have long confined themselves to the original purpose of their institution. The states, whose measures were directed by this assembly, found sufficient occupation in defending their own territories; and near a century elapsed, before they undertook, by common consent, any distant expedition. But it was not to be expected that their restless activity could be always exhausted in defensive war. The establishment of the Amphictyons brought together the chiefs most distinguished by birth and bravery. Glory and emulation prompted them to arms, and revenge directed those arms against the barbarians. Jason, Admetus, and other chieftains of Thessaly,¹⁴ having equipped a small fleet in the neighbouring harbour of Iolcus, and particularly the ship Argos, of superior size and construction to any before known, were animated with a desire to visit foreign lands, to plant colonies in those parts of them that appeared most delightful, and to retort on their inhabitants the injuries which Greece had suffered from strangers.¹⁵ The princes of the north having proclaimed this spirited design over the central and southern provinces, the standard of enterprise and glory was speedily surrounded by the flower of the Grecian youth,¹⁶ who eagerly embraced this honourable opportunity to signalize their manly valour. Peleus, Tydeus, Telamon, and, in general, the fathers of those heroic chiefs, who in the succeeding age, shone with distinguished lustre in the plains of Troy, are numbered among the leaders of the Argonauts. They were accompanied by the chosen warriors, and by the vene-

¹² The Amazons. See Lysias Orat. Funeb. and Herodotus passim. Yet the existence of these warlike females was doubted as early as the days of the emperor Hadrian, as we learn from Arrian: but what is said by that judicious and manly historian, seems sufficient to dispel the doubt. See Arrian Exposit. Alexand. l. vii. p. 156.

¹³ Marm. Oxon. E. 5.

¹⁴ Their names are mentioned by Apollodorus, Diod. Siculus, Pindar, Apollonius, &c.

¹⁵ Herodot. l. i. Diodor. Sicul. l. iv.

¹⁶ Pindar, Pyth. iv.

¹⁰ Thucyd. l. i. οἱς πόρος καὶ τὸ δέμας. The explanation in the text seems more consonant to Grecian manners, in those ages, than that of the scholiast, which is translated by Mr. Rochford, "Chez qui la piraterie étoit exercée avec une certaine probité." M. de l'Acad. v. 30.

¹¹ Lysias Orat. Funeb.

rable prophets, of their respective tribes; by an Esculapius, the admired father of the healing art, and by the divine Orpheus,¹ whose sublime genius was worthy to celebrate the amazing series of their adventures.

These adventures, however, have been too much adorned by the graces of poetry, to be the proper subjects of historical composition. The designs of the Argonauts are veiled under the allegorical, or at least doubtful, phrase, "of carrying off the golden fleece;" which, though easily explained, if we admit the report that the inhabitants of the eastern banks of the Euxine extended fleeces of wool, in order to collect the golden particles which were carried down by the torrents from Mount Caucasus,² is yet described in such various language by ancient writers, that almost every modern who examines the subject, thinks himself entitled to offer, by way of explanation, some new conjecture of his own. But in opposition to the most approved of these conjectures, we may venture to affirm, that the voyage to Colchis was not undertaken with a view to establish extensive plans of commerce,³ or to search for mines of gold, far less to learn the imaginary art of converting other substances into that precious metal;⁴ all such motives supposing a degree of speculation and refinement unknown in that age to the gallant but uninstructed youth of Thessaly. The real object of the expedition may be discovered by its consequences. The Argonauts fought, conquered, and plundered;⁵ they settled a colony on the shores of the Euxine;⁶ and carried into Greece a daughter of the king of Colchis, the celebrated Medea,⁷ a princess of Egyptian extraction, whose crimes and enchantments are condemned to eternal infamy in the immortal lines of Euripides.

Notwithstanding many romantic fictions that disfigure the story of the Argonauts, their undertaking appears to have been attended with a considerable and a happy effect on the manners and character of the Greeks. From the era of this celebrated expedition, we may discover not only a more daring and more enlarged spirit of enterprise, but a more decisive and rapid progress towards civilization and humanity. The sullen and unsociable chiefs, whose acquaintance with each other most commonly arose from acts of mutual hostility, hitherto gave full scope to the sanguinary passions which characterize barbarians.⁸ Strength and courage were almost the only qualities which they admired: they fought and plundered at the head of their respective tribes, while the inhabitants of the neighbouring districts were regarded as fit objects only to excite their rage, and gratify their

rapacity. But these gloomy warriors, having exerted their joint valour in a remote expedition, learned the necessity of acquiring more amiable virtues, as well as of adopting more liberal notions of the public interest, if they pretended to deserve the esteem of their equals. Military courage and address might alone procure them the respect of their immediate followers, since the safety of the little community often depended on the warlike abilities of the chieftain; but when several tribes had combined in a common enterprize, there was less dependence on the prowess of any single leader. Emulation and interest naturally rendered all these leaders as jealous of each other, as desirous of the public applause; and, in order to acquire this applause, it was necessary to brighten the lustre of martial spirit by the more valuable⁹ virtues of justice and humanity.

When this glorious field first opened to the ambition of the Greeks, they cultivated it with a degree of industry equally ardent and successful. Innumerable were the exploits of Hercules, of Theseus, and of the divine sons of Leda,¹⁰ and undertaken with infinite toil and danger, to promote the interest and safety, not of their particular tribes, but of the general confederacy. The Grecian woods and mountains abounded in lions, boars, and other fierce animals,¹¹ that often roamed from their haunts, and spread terror and desolation through the adjoining valleys. The valleys themselves teemed with men of brutal strength and courage, who availed themselves of the weakness of government to perpetrate horrid deeds of violence and cruelty. The first worthies of Greece, animated rather with the daring and useful, than with the romantic spirit of chivalry, set themselves with one accord to remedy evils which threatened the existence of society. Their adventures have, doubtless, been embellished by the elegant fancy of poets and orators; but they will remain eternal monuments of generous magnanimity, which sacrifices the instinctive love of ease and pleasure to the acquired taste for glory and renown.¹²

⁹ Hesiod marks this change of manners. It happened between the expedition of the Argonauts and the siege of Thebes, since the latter was the first exploit in which his new race of men, γένος δίκαιοτερον καὶ ἀρίστον were engaged. See Hesiod Oper. et Di. l. i. v. 155—165.

¹⁰ "In order to obtain the immortal fruits of merit," says Aristotle, in his beautiful Ode to Virtue;

ο δῖος Ἡρακλῆς,
Ληδᾶς τε κόρυς, πολλὰ ἀνέτασεν,
ἔργοις σὺν ἀγροῦντες δυνάμιν·
σοῖς δὲ ποθοῖς Ἀχιλλεύς,
Αἰῶς τ' Αἰδῶ δόμον ἤλθεν.

This ode, which is preserved in Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. and in Athenæus, l. xv. c. 16. proves the mind of the Stagyrite to have been as lofty as capacious: and while it comprehended the whole circle of science, capable of reaching, in lyric poetry, the highest flights of Pindar and Horace. The latter, probably had Aristotle in view in ode 3. b. 3.

Hæc arte Pollux, et vagus Hercules
Innixus, arces attigit igneas.

But in the order of his names, he is not so faithful to chronology.

¹¹ In the shield of Hercules, Hesiod describes a boar fighting with a lion, and almost prevailing in the combat. That animal was no less terrible on the opposite coast of Asia than in Greece, as we learn from Herodotus, l. i. c. 34. et seq.

¹² Pausan. l. i. Isocrat. Hellen. Encom. et Panegyri. Lysias et Demosthen. Orat. Funeb.

¹ The testimony of Plato de Repub. l. x. of Isocrates in Busirid. sufficiently attest the poetical fame of Orpheus. The Argonautica, and other works ascribed to him, are collected by Eschenbachius, and published at Nuremberg, 1702. That these, however, are the productions of a much later age, appears from innumerable circumstances, some of which are mentioned by Fabricius, Bib. Græc. vol. i. p. 120.

² Strabo, l. xi. p. 499.

³ Eustach. in Homer.

⁴ Suidas, Memoires de l'Academ. v. 9. Exped. Argon.

⁵ Diodor. ibid.

⁶ Xenoph. Anab.

⁷ Euripid. Med.

This was the brazen age described by Hesiod. Oper. et Di. l. i. p. 142—155. and by Plutarch in the life of Theseus.

A. C. The laws of war and peace gradually improved with the progress of humanity; and the first general enterprise, which succeeded the expedition of the Argonauts, proves that whole communities, as well as individuals, had begun to respect the virtues most essential to public happiness. The war of Thebes has deserved, therefore, to be recorded; while the more ancient hostilities between the Hellenic tribes, of which justice was not even the pretence, but lust or avarice the only cause, and wealth or beauty the only prize, are universally condemned to oblivion. Contempt of an ancient oracle, the involuntary crimes of Œdipus, and the unnatural cruelty of his sons, involved the royal family of Thebes in that maze of calamities, appropriated in all ages, from Sophocles¹³ to Voltaire, as favourite subjects of the Tragic Muse. Eteocles and Polynices (these were the miserable sons of Œdipus) having hastened the death, and drawn down the maledictions, of their unhappy father, agreed to sway, by turns, the Theban sceptre. Eteocles, the elder brother, reigned during the first year; but his ambitious temper, corrupted by the honours of royalty, refused to resign the throne at the appointed term of his command. His rival, Polynices, married the daughter of Adrastus, king of Argos, who enabled his son-in-law to assert, by force of arms, his just pretensions to the alternate inheritance. The allied princes, reinforced by Tydeus, Capaneus, and three other chiefs, marched to Thebes at the head of seven bands of armed followers, who invested the seven gates of the city. The Thebans, impatient of confinement within the walls of a place ill provided in supplies, yielded to the martial ardour of Eteocles, and repelled the assailants by a vigorous sally, in which the most illustrious combatants fell on both sides, and the wretched brothers perished by mutual wounds. The cause of the war being removed by this horrid catastrophe, the Argives craved leave to bury their dead; but the Thebans, exasperated against the daring invaders of their country, returned them an answer, which, according to the principles of that age, bid defiance to the dictates of nature, and the precepts of religion. In this extremity, Adrastus, the only chief who survived the battle, had recourse to the humane piety of the Athenians, who, uninfluenced by motives of ambition or interest, took arms in defence of public justice, and compelled the cruel obstinacy of the Thebans to grant the last melancholy honours to the ashes of their deceased enemies.¹⁴ At the distance of ten years, the more fortunate sons of the chiefs who had fallen before the Theban walls, resented, with the fury of religious rage, the indignities that had been impiously offered to the manes of their fathers. They again laid siege to the guilty city, destroyed the lives and property of many of the inhabitants, dragged many into captivity, and compelled the re-

mainder to acknowledge, as their king, the infant son of the injured Polynices.¹⁵

In their progress towards civilization, the Greeks perceived the advantage of political confederacy, before they became fully sensible of the benefits of civil union. The necessity of providing for defence against the assaults of foreign enemies, and the natural dictates of interest and ambition, unfolded the idea of a federal association between different communities, before the members of any one state had been sufficiently united in the system of domestic policy. Various clusters of towns and villages, situate in winding valleys, divided by lofty mountains, acknowledged the authority of kings or chieftains, who led forth their warlike youth to glory and danger. Summoned to arms against foreign enemies, they readily flocked to the standard of their king, and received, with implicit submission, his commands in the field: but when no common cause roused their emulation, or excited their valour, the inhabitants of each little township aspired at independent jurisdiction, and the nominal subjects of the same prince often terminated their differences by the decision of the sword.¹⁶

To cement such disorderly communities by laws and government, required an acquaintance with some more civilized people, among whom the effects of this happy union visibly prevailed. Such an example fortunately occurred in the wise institutions and policy of the Cretans, which are represented not only as the most ancient, but the best regulations, that ever were established in any portion of the Grecian territory.¹⁷ The celebrated island, which fable has dignified with the imaginary honour of giving birth to some of the gods¹⁸ of Greece, possessed the real merit of communicating to that country many useful improvements. It had been early planted, as we had occasion already to observe, by a colony of Dorians. This colony, which received various¹⁹ accessions from Greece, enjoyed two advantages above their brethren on the continent. Their insular situation left them exposed, indeed, to naval depredations, but delivered them from those fierce incursions by land, which often disfigured and desolated the mother country. A favourable gale wafted the unskilful mariners of antiquity from the shores of Crete to the capital of Egypt. The facility of communication thus introduced between the two countries an habitual intercourse, from which the barbarous islanders had nothing to lose, and every thing to gain. Rhadamanthus,²⁰ and others of their early kings or chieftains, whom interest or curiosity carried into Egypt and the East, appear to have had sagacity to observe, and dexterity to employ, several of the inventions and institutions of those

¹³ I might have said Æschylus whose "Seven against Thebes" is founded on the history related in the text. But the name of Sophocles will bring to the mind of every reader of taste and humanity, the Œdipus Tyrannus, and particularly the Œdipus Coloneus.

¹⁴ Lysias Orat. Funeb.

¹⁵ Confer. Homer. l. iv. v. 337. et passim. Hesiod. Op. et Di. Æschyl. Septem contra Thebas. Lysias Orat. Funeb. Statius Thebaid. Apollod. l. iii. Diodor. l. iv. Pausan. in Bæotic.

¹⁶ Thucyd. l. i. Plut. in Theseo.

¹⁷ Plat. de Leg. et in Minos. Aristot. Pol. l. ii. Plat. in Lycurg.

¹⁸ Hesiod. Theog.

¹⁹ Homer. Iliad. l. xix. v. 172, &c.

²⁰ Strabo, l. x. p. 480.

powerful and civilized kingdoms, for the useful purpose of confirming their own authority, and bridling the fierce passions of their countrymen.

The elder Minos is peculiarly distinguished for promoting this beneficial design. The doubtful appellation of Son of the Ocean, which, perhaps, he might derive from his numerous voyages, leaves it uncertain whether he was a native Cretan, or a foreigner. In the countries which he had visited, he observed certain families invested, from time immemorial, with unbounded honours, as the immediate vicegerents of the divinity. The uncultivated, but freeborn genius of Greece, always rejected this odious profanation; yet it seemed possible to Minos to acquire that respect for his office, which he would have vainly solicited for his person. We are not informed by what virtues, civil or military, he acquired, before the establishment of his laws, an extraordinary influence among the Cretans. But as slaves multiplied to such a degree in the island during his reign, that agriculture and the mechanic arts were exercised by them alone, there is reason to conjecture that he had been extremely successful in war against his neighbours, and no less equitable in dividing the booty among the various Cretan tribes who followed the fortune of his arms. However this may be, it appears from the general evidence of antiquity, that Minos had address to persuade men, prone to wonder and to believe, among whom, whatever dazzled the imagination announced the presence of a divinity, that their favourite hero was admitted to the familiarity of the gods.¹ From them he pretended to derive an invaluable system of laws, which he was enjoined to engrave on tables of brass. From Jupiter he received the regal sceptre, which entitled him to administer these laws, but obliged him to respect them. By command of the same god, he founded the cities of Cnossus, Cydonia, and Phœstus, and united the distant subjects of his wide-extended domain, by such regulations as served alike to support the authority of the prince, and to maintain the rights of the people.²

The beautiful arrangement of this political edifice struck the discerning eye of Theseus, the illustrious son of Ægeus, king of Athens, in his celebrated expedition to 1234. Crete, during the reign of the second Minos. The last-mentioned prince joined the splendour of military renown to the famed wisdom of his revered ancestor. His maritime force exceeded the united strength of his neighbours; he subdued several of the circumjacent isles; and while he permitted his own subjects to ravage the coasts of Greece, under pretence of lawful war, he effectually checked the piratical depredations of the Carians, Lycians, and Phœnicians, which had hitherto proved so frequent and so destructive.³ Athens experienced the effects of his power and ambition, and reluctantly submitted to a disgraceful tribute of

seven youths, and as many virgins,⁴ which was cruelly exacted by a nation who subsisted on the labour of slaves. The tributary captives were drawn by lot from the body of the people, who trembled at the annual return of the Cretan vessel. Discontents arose against the government of Ægeus, who seemed to bear the indignity with too much tameness; when his heroic son, with a patriotism congenial to his character, generously offered his life in the service of his country.⁵ The fame of Theseus had already reached the ears of Minos, who respected his virtues; and this respect was converted into admiration, on beholding the Athenian prince a voluntary captive. Minos treated him with the affectionate kindness of ancient hospitality; gave him his daughter Ariadne in marriage; and declared the Athenians thenceforth free from a contribution equally cruel and ignominious. Theseus reaped great glory from this transaction. The vessel, in which he sailed, continued to be annually sent, for more than eight centuries afterwards, to return thanks to Apollo, in his favourite island of Dellos;⁶ and the fortunate voyage to Crete was celebrated by sacrifices, and other ceremonies, handed down to the latest times of the Athenian republic.⁷

Many extraordinary circumstances, invented by the poets, disfigure events, which are otherwise sufficiently authenticated. The unnatural amours of the abominable Pasiphae, and the bloody feasts of the monstrous Minotaur,⁸ have been faithfully transcribed, from one age to another, in the tiresome compilations of injudicious mythologists; but it seems not to have occurred to those writers, that the expedition to Crete laid the foundation of the improvements afterwards introduced by Theseus into the Athenian government. The institutions and manners of that island presented a picture of more regular composition, and more harmonious colouring, than could be seen in any part of the Grecian continent. Various societies of freemen, all united under one government, all equal among themselves, and all served by slaves; no private property in land; the men eating at public tables, and the families subsisting from the common stock; the youth regularly trained to the gymnastic exercises, navigation, and war; a severe morality enforced by law; honour the reward of age and merit; and the whole community acknowledging the prerogative of a hereditary king, who derived his authority from Jupiter, but who was no longer entitled to the divine protection than he continued to observe justice, and to maintain the unalienable privileges of his subjects.⁹ Impressed with the salutary institutions which he

4 *Odyss.* l. xi. v. 320. et *Virgil*, *Æn.* 6.

Tum pendere pœnas
Cecropidæ jussi, miserum! septena quotannis
Corpora natorum.

5 Ipse suum Theseus pro caris corpus Athenis
Projicere optavit.— Catullus.

6 *Plato*. *Phædo*. 7 *Plut.* in *Theseo*.

8 Hic crudelis amor tauri, suppositaque furto
Pasiphae, &c.

The judicious *Virgil* places these strange stories in the sculptured porch of an ancient temple.

9 *Aristot.* *Polit.* l. ii. c. 9, &c. *Strabo*, *ibid.* *Plato* de leg.

1 Διὸς μεγάλου εὐεργιστής. *Odyss.* l. xix. v. 179. which *Horace* translates,

Jovis arcanis Minos admissus. *L.* i. Ode 28.

2 *Strabo*, l. x. p. 480. *Plato* in *Minos*. *Diod.* l. v.

3 *Thucyd.* l. i.

beheld in this flourishing island, Theseus, upon his accession to the throne of his father, was ambitious to introduce them into his native country. The rudeness of the Athenians, indeed, admitted not the introduction of written laws. But the scattered villages of Attica were persuaded to embrace the regulations of the capital;¹⁰ to unite in common ceremonies of religion; to acknowledge the reciprocal obligations of subjects; and, while they asserted the right of citizens, to respect, during peace and war, the sacred prerogative of royal majesty.

The improvements in domestic policy, thus introduced into Attica by the example of Crete, and the wisdom of Theseus, were gradually adopted by the neighbouring provinces.¹¹ At the commencement of the Trojan war, all the Grecian states had embraced one uniform system of government, uniting the independent spirit of European freedom with the respectful veneration of Egyptian and Asiatic superstition.¹² This singular frame of policy, composed of materials seemingly incapable of alliance, was peculiarly well adapted to great and generous undertakings; and unless the divine, though limited authority of kings, had fortified the other institutions which served to tame the ferocity of the Greeks, there is reason to doubt whether their leaders could have engaged above a hundred thousand stubborn barbarians to undertake a distant and difficult enterprise, much less have detained their reluctant impatience during ten years in the siege of Troy.

Before we examine the causes and incidents of this celebrated siege, to which the exploits hitherto related seem but unworthy preludes, it may be proper to take a short view of the strength and resources of the two nations, who were eager to shock in a conflict, that totally destroyed the one, and proved extremely ruinous to the other. Exclusive of the provinces of Epirus and Macedonia, which long remained barbarous and uncultivated, the continental possessions of the Greeks were nearly equal to Scotland in extent, marked with still bolder features, and blessed with a warmer sun. In its length, the whole country is almost equally divided by two opposite gulfs, compressing between them a mountainous neck of land, to the breadth of only five miles, into the peninsula of Peloponnesus, and the territory extending northwards, from the extremity of the Corinthian isthmus to the southern frontier of Macedonia.¹³ The Peloponnesus, a hundred and sixty miles in length, and scarcely one hundred in breadth, is every where intersected by mountains, particularly the towering ridges of Zarex and Taygetus. During the flourishing ages of Greece, this small peninsula contained seven independent communities, of unequal power and fame, which ranked in the following order: The comparatively large, and highly diversified territory of Laconia; the fruitful vale of Argos; the extensive coast of Achaia; the narrow but commercial isthmus of Corinth; the central and mountainous region of Arcadia; together with the more level

countries of Elis and Messinia, which are throughout better adapted to tillage than any other provinces of the Peloponnesus.¹⁴ The Grecian possessions beyond the Corinthian isthmus were more considerable, extending above two hundred miles from east to west, and one hundred and fifty from north to south. They were naturally divided, by the long and intricate ridges of Olympus, Pindus, Oeta, and Ossa, into nine separate provinces; which, during the celebrated ages of Grecian freedom, were occupied by nine independent republics. They comprehended the extensive and fertile plains of Thessaly and Bœotia, both of which were, in early times, much exposed to inundations; and the latter, abounding in subterranean caverns, was peculiarly subject to earthquakes; the less fertile, but more secure territory of Attica; the western provinces of Ætolia and Acarnania, encompassed on one side by dangerous seas, and confined on the other by almost impassable mountains; and the four small rocky districts of Phocis, Doris, Locria, and Megara.¹⁵

It has been observed, that these names and divisions, which remained to the latest times, are pretty accurately marked by Homer, whose poems continued, through succeeding ages, to be the approved standard and legal code, to which neighbouring communities appealed, in adjusting their disputed boundaries.¹⁶ This observation, however, must be qualified chiefly by two exceptions. During the Trojan war, the extensive province of Thessaly sent forth above a fourth part of the whole Grecian strength, and was divided among many warlike leaders. It might naturally be expected, while agriculture and pasturage were the principal occupations subservient to human life, that a country, abounding in plains and meadows, should excel in population and in power.¹⁷ When commerce, navigation, and the mechanic arts enriched and adorned the middle and southern divisions of Greece, the northern district of Thessaly lost its ancient pre-eminence. The second exception arose from the extensive power of the house of Pelops, which, as already mentioned, had, by fortunate marriages and rich successions, acquired dominion over the northern and eastern parts of the Peloponnesus, formerly containing several independent principalities, and, after the misfortunes of Agamemnon and his family, again divided into the immortal republics of Sparta, Argos, Corinth, and Achaia.

From this general view of the country, it will not appear remarkable, that, in an age when every able-bodied man was a soldier, Greece should have raised an army of a hundred and two thousand men. The Acarnanians alone, for reasons unknown, sent no forces to Troy. But the continent was assisted by the generous efforts of Crete, of Rhodes, and of many smaller islands, which were subject to their respective princes, or governed by the wide-extended dominion of Agamemnon. The vessels collected for transporting these

¹⁰ Thucyd. i. ii. Plut. in Theseo.

¹¹ Dionys. Halac. l. v.

¹² Strabo, l. vii.

¹³ Homer passim.

¹⁴ Strabo, *ibid.* et Pausan. Messen.

¹⁵ Strabo, l. vii.

¹⁷ Plato in Menon.

¹⁶ Plut. in Solon.

forces to Asia amounted to twelve hundred sail. They were equipped at little expense, and built with little ingenuity, moved by only one bank of oars, and entirely unprovided with decks or anchors. Their complement varied in different vessels; some contained a hundred and twenty, others only fifty men, who appear to have been equally acquainted with the military art, as practised in that remote age, and with the rude simplicity of ancient navigation.¹

The celebrated kingdom of Priam, against which this armanent was directed, occupied the eastern banks of the Hellespont, the southern coast of the Propontis, and the northern shores of the Ægean. From the river Esepus to the promontory of Lectum, the Trojan dominions extended in length two hundred miles; but their breadth was far less considerable, being irregularly compressed between three seas, and the lofty ridges of mount Ida. This delightful and picturesque country, which excelled Greece in fruitfulness of soil and softness of climate,² was distinguished by the epithet of Hellespontian, from the large inland province, which bore the common name of Phrygia.³ The Lesser, or Hellespontian Phrygia, was planted, according to a tradition, by a Grecian colony, about two hundred years before the Trojan war. The similarity of religion, language, and manners, sufficiently justified that opinion, and seems to have induced the most diligent inquirers of antiquity to regard not only the Trojans, but the Lycians and Pamphylians, as scattered branches of the Hellenic nation,⁴ which distance of place had gradually cut off from all communication with the trunk. The Asiatic Greeks were exposed to none of those unfavourable circumstances already mentioned, which long retarded the improvement of their brethren in Europe. The fertile and extensive plains of Asia offered them the materials of more powerful kingdoms than Greece could afford; and, instead of being harassed and endangered by the continual incursions of northern savages, they enjoyed the vicinity of the Phrygians and Lydians, nations described as flourishing in wealth and peace from the remotest antiquity.⁵ From the prevalence of the Grecian language and customs on the one hand, and the name of the country on the other, it is not unreasonable to suppose, that the Trojans were a mingled race of Greeks and Phrygians, collected by Dardanus, ancestor fifth in degree to old Priam.

This adventurer, whose parentage Homer leaves uncertain, by calling him son of Jupiter,⁶ founded a city on one of the many western branches of mount Ida, commanding a beautiful and fertile plain, and watered by the immortal rivers Simois and Scamander.⁷ The new settlement flourished under his son, the wealthy Erichthonius, who, by the judicious management of his mares and stallions, supplied the neighbouring kingdoms with

horses of a superior breed. His successor, Trös, communicated his name to the territory, which was often called Troas, and to the celebrated city Ilion, which his son Ilus, having removed his residence from the mountain, built on the adjoining plain. Laomedon, the successor of Ilus, fortified the town of Ilion, or Troy, with walls of such uncommon strength, that, in the language and belief of the times, they were deemed the work of the gods.⁸ Whether he defrauded his supposed auxiliaries of their promised rewards and sacrifices, or supplied the expense of this undertaking by despoiling their sacred shrines, it is certain that the guilt of Laomedon was believed to entail calamity on his unhappy descendants.

His son Priam, however, long enjoyed the deceitful gifts of fortune, before he was overtaken by the vengeance of heaven. Having attained old age in the undisturbed possession of a throne, he was surrounded by a numerous and flourishing family, beloved by his subjects, and respected by his neighbours. Yet this amiable, but too indulgent prince, was destined to feel the sharpest pangs of human misery.

Hereditary feuds subsisted between the ancestors of Priam and those of Agamemnon, when the latter quitted their establishments in Asia, to seek new settlements in Greece. The insult offered to Ganymede, a beautiful Trojan youth, by the brutal fury of Tantalus,⁹ was retorted on Menelaus, the fourth in descent from this infamous prince, by the rape and detention of his queen, the celebrated Helen. Paris, the ill-fated son of Priam, was the author of this new injury. But resentment for the wrongs of his house formed not the only motive which engaged the youthful levity of Paris to dishonour the sister-in-law of Agamemnon. Helen was the daughter of Tyndareus, king of Sparta. The illustrious honours of her family were adorned by the generous magnanimity of her brothers, Castor and Polydeuces, whose exploits shone conspicuous in all the military expeditions of that gallant age. But the native lustro of Helen needed not the aid of foreign ornament. Even in the tender age of childhood, her opening charms had inflamed the heart of Theseus,¹⁰ the most admired and the most virtuous of the Grecian chiefs. The fame of her beauty increased with her ripening age, and her person became an object of eager contention among those who, by birth or merit, were entitled to aspire at the invaluable prize. Tyndareus, solicitous to prevent the violence of a second lover (for, agreeably to the manners of his age, Theseus had carried her off by force,) bound the various suitors by an oath to defend the honour of his daughter, and to secure the possession of her charms to the man who should be honoured with her choice.¹¹ The princely mien and insinuating manners

¹ Thucyd. *ibid.* Homer, *passim*.

² Hippocrat. *de Loc.*

³ Strabo, l. xiii.

⁴ Herodot. l. vii. Strabo, l. xiv.

⁵ Herodot. l. i. Dionys. Halic. l. i. Suidas in *voc.* *Αρναίος*.

⁶ *Iliad*, xx. v. 215.

⁷ *Ibid.* xx. v. 216, &c. Strabo lxi.

⁸ Homer, *Iliad*, xx. v. 216, &c. Strabo, lxi.

⁹ It has been observed, that the story of Tantalus, father of Pelops, was probably the invention of a later age. It is certain that, whatever might prevail in Phrygia, the unnatural passion, which disgraced the later times of Greece, was unknown in that country during the heroic ages. Natal. Com. l. ix. c. 13.

¹⁰ *Plut.* in *Theseo*.

¹¹ Thucyd. l. i. c. 9.

of Menelaus, were preferred to the more solid qualities of his numerous competitors. Having married the heiress of Tyndareus, he succeeded, in her right, to the Spartan throne.¹² The graceful pair had not long enjoyed the honours of royalty, and the sweets of conjugal union, when their happiness was interrupted by the arrival of the son of Priam, the handsomest man of his age, and singularly adorned with the frivolous accomplishments that often captivate the weakness of a female mind. Though a soldier of no great renown, Paris had strongly imbibed the romantic spirit of gallantry which prevailed¹³ in the heroic ages, and was distinguished by an ardent passion for beauty, which, notwithstanding the general softness of his unwarlike character, prompted him to brave every danger in pursuit of his favourite object. Animated by the hope of beholding the inimitable model of what he most adored, he seized the opportunity afforded him by a voyage of Menelaus into Crete, visited the dominions of his hereditary enemies, and solicited the rights of hospitality at the Spartan court.

His person, his accomplishments, his address, and still more the voluntary hardships which he had endured for her sake, seduced the inconstant affections of the Grecian queen. Enamoured of the elegant stranger, she abandoned her country and her husband, and having transported her most valuable treasure within the Trojan walls, defied the resentment of Greece, and the vengeance of heaven.

It was now the time for Menelaus to crave the stipulated assistance of his ancient rivals. His demand was enforced by the authority of Agamemnon.¹⁴ At the summons of the two brothers, the confederates assembled at Ægium, the capital of Achaia; confirmed the obligation of their former promise; settled the proportion of troops to be raised by each prince; determined the time and place of their departure; and named Agamemnon, the most powerful among them, to the chief command, in an expedition which so deeply concerned the honour of his family.

Aulis, a sea port of Bœotia, was appointed for the place of rendezvous and embarkation.¹⁵ Before the whole armament sailed from thence, Ulysses king of Ithaca, and, what may seem extraordinary, the injured Menelaus, undertook a solemn embassy to Troy, in order to demand restitution and reparation; but returned highly disgusted with their reception and treatment. Some members of the Trojan council had the barbarity to propose putting them to death. Their just indignation increased the warlike ardour of their associates. But contrary winds long retarded their departure. The Trojans had time to strengthen their ramparts, to collect arms and provisions, and to summon the assistance of their distant allies. The martial

spirit of the age, together with a sense of common danger, brought many powerful auxiliaries to Priam. His cause was defended by the hardy mountaineers who covered the back of his kingdom; by the Carians, Lycians, and other nations of Asia Minor, extending from the mouth of the river Halys to the southern extremity of Cilicia; and by the Pelasgi, Thracians, and Pæonians, fierce barbarians who inhabited the European side of the Hellespont and Propontis. Confiding, however, rather in their domestic strength, than in foreign assistance, the Trojans determined to defend their native shores against hostile invasion. The debarkation of the Greeks was purchased by much blood. Having effected a descent, they encamped on the Trojan plains, but lost the only opportunity which they enjoyed during many years, of crushing at once the power of their enemies; who immediately shut themselves up within their impenetrable walls, leaving the city open only on the side of mount Ida, from which they received corn, cattle, and other necessary supplies.

Agamemnon, as there was reason to expect from the manners of his age, had been more industrious in collecting a great army, than provident in contriving means by which it might keep the field. The provisions, transported from Greece, were speedily consumed, while the operations of the siege promised little hope of success, the Greeks being unacquainted with any military engines fitted to make an impression on the Trojan walls. With such a numerous army, they might have converted the siege into a blockade; but scarcity of supplies compelled the greater part of them to quit the camp. The resource of ravaging the adjacent country soon exhausted itself. Many betook themselves to cultivating the rich vales of the Chersonesus, whose industrious inhabitants had recently been expelled, or destroyed, by the fierce incursions of the barbarous Thracians.¹⁶ Others had recourse to piracy, scourged the neighbouring seas, ravaged the unprotected coasts of the Hellespont and Ægean, and plundered or demolished such unfortified places as acknowledged the dominion, or assisted the arms of Troy.¹⁷ These ravages excited the rage of the Asiatics, and rendered them more hearty in the cause of their confederates. In this manner nine summers and winters elapsed, without affording the nearer prospect of a decision to the contest; but, in the tenth year of the war, the seeming misfortunes of the Greeks precipitated the downfall of the proud city of Priam. A dreadful pestilence invaded the camp of the besiegers, and long continued to rage with unabating fury. This calamity was followed by the well-known quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles, which deprived the Grecian army of its principal strength and ornament. The Trojans derived new spirits from the misfortunes of their enemies; they ventured to abandon the protection of their walls, boldly assailed the Grecian camp, and risked several engagements, in most of which they were victorious. In the last of these, the beloved friend

¹² Pausan. Lacon.

¹³ Perseus had carried off the African Medusa; Jason, Medea of Colchis; Theseus, the Amazon Antiope; Hercules, Megara, Iole, Deaneira, &c. The historical poets of the heroic ages might have said, with Ariosto,

Le donne, i cavalieri, l'arme, gli amori,

Le cortesie, l'audaci imprese io canto.

¹⁴ Thucyd. l. i. c. 9.

¹⁵ Hesiod, *Oper. et Dies*.

¹⁶ Thucyd. l. i.

¹⁷ Homer, *passim*.

of Achilles was slain by the arm of Hector, the bravest and most generous of the Trojan race. This event, which was infinitely more dreadful than death to the affectionate ardour of the Grecian chief, stifled his hitherto inexorable resentment against the proud tyranny of Agamemnon. His return to the camp restored the declining fortune of the Greeks; and the indignant fury of his rage was quenched in the detested blood of Hector, whose patriotic valour had long been the firmest bulwark of his father's kingdom. The destruction of Troy¹ soon followed the death of her darling hero. The city, whether taken by storm or by surprise, was set on fire during night; most of the citizens perished by the sword, or were dragged into captivity; and only a miserable remnant escaped through the confused horror of raging flames and expiring kinsmen.

The burning of Troy happened eleven hundred and eighty-four years before the christian era. Neither the city nor territory ever assumed in any succeeding age, the dignity of independent government.² The sea-coast was planted, eighty years after the Trojan war, by new colonies from Greece; and the inland parts submitted to the growing power of the Lydians, whose arms overspread and conquered all the finest provinces of lesser Asia.³

The Greeks had recovered possession of the

admired beauty of Helen; they had taken complete vengeance on the family and⁴ nation of her unhappy seducer; but the misfortunes, which were the natural consequence of the Trojan expedition, left them little reason to boast of their victory. Of five Boeotian commanders, only one remained, and the siege had been proportionably fatal to the leaders of other tribes, as well as to their warlike followers. Those who lived to divide the rich spoils of Troy, were impatient to set sail with their newly-acquired treasure, notwithstanding the threatening appearance of the skies. Many of them perished by shipwreck; the rest were long tossed on unknown seas; and when they expected to find in their native country the end of their calamities, they were exposed to suffer greater calamities there, than any which they had yet endured. The thrones of several of the absent princes had been usurped by violence and ambition; the lands of various communities had been occupied by the invasion of hostile tribes: even the least unfortunate of those adventurers found their domains uncultivated, or their territories laid waste; their families torn by discord, or their cities shaken by sedition. And thus the most celebrated enterprise of combined Greece tended to plunge that delightful and once happy country into barbarism and misery.⁵

CHAPTER II.

Religion—Government—Arts—Manners, and Character.

THE ancient Greeks had strongly imbibed an opinion, that the country in which they lived was peculiarly favourable to the dignity of human nature. The voluptuous climates of Asia produced invention and ingenuity, but softened the tempers of men into a fitness for servitude. The rigorous severity of European skies gave strength and agility to the limbs, and hardy boldness to the mind, but chilled the fancy, and benumbed the finer feelings of the soul. The inhabitants of the east and south were degraded below the condition of huma-

nity, by an unfortunate abuse of power, while the turbulent sons of the north and west were incapable, from ignorance and indocility, of submitting to any regular system of government. The Greeks alone, possessing an intermediate situation between the extremes of cold and heat, united courage and capacity; tempered the stern and manly, with the gentler virtues; and enjoyed the double advantage of liberty and laws.⁶

This splendid observation is too flattering to the dictates of national vanity to be hastily adopted by a cautious inquirer into truth, who will be apt to ascribe the superior lustre of Grecian manners, rather to the elegant imagination of authors, than to the intrinsic merit of their subject. Yet it must be acknowledged, several circumstances would lead us to believe, that the great poet to whom we owe our principal information concerning the ancient state of Greece, copied from nature only. The majesty of Virgil, the splendour of Tasso, and the sublimity of Milton, are not sufficient to conceal an effort in those noble writers to maintain the tone which they have assumed; a desire to embellish the manners which they describe; an

¹ We should probably know something more of the history of the Trojan war, if the works of Pisander remained. Macrobius, in speaking of the plagiarisms of the Romans from Greek writers, has the following passage: "Quæ Virgilius traxit a Græcis, dicturumne me putetis, quæ vulgo nota sunt? . . . vel quod eversionem Trojæ cum Sinone suo et equo ligneo, ceterisque omnibus, quæ librum secundum faciunt, a Pisandro pene ad verbum transcripserit, qui inter Græcos poetas eminet," &c. Macrobi. l. v. c. 2.

² I have carefully examined the evidence given by Bochart (Epist. num. Æneas unquam fuit in Italia,) and by Mr. Wood (Essay on the original Genius of Homer,) to prove that the descendants of Æneas reigned in Troy. But notwithstanding the learned ingenuity of a profound, and the plausible criticism of an elegant scholar, the matter seems still too doubtful to warrant contradicting the popular opinion.

³ Herod. l. ii. Thucyd. l. i. Justin, l. xviii. Strabo, l. iii.

⁴ I dwell not on a subject which has been handled by the great masters of the passions. See Virgil: Forsitan et Priami fuerint quæ fata requiras, &c.

⁵ Plato de Leg. l. iii. Thucyd. l. i. p. 9.

⁶ Aristot. Politic. l. vii. c. 7. Isocrat. Govern. Athen. Panegyric. et Panathen.

ambition to elevate and to adorn their poems by the use of a marvellous machinery, which had not its foundation in the experience, and (as to Virgil and Tasso) scarcely in the belief of their own age. In Homer there is neither embellishment, nor effort, nor disguise of any kind; he relates what he has seen and heard with unaffected simplicity; his ideas and sentiments are not only clothed in the graces of poetry, but arrayed in the charms of truth; and an amazing diversity of characters, preserving amidst innumerable shades of discrimination a general air of resemblance, distinguish the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* above other poetical compositions, and prove them to have been copied, not from the limited combinations of human invention, but from the wide variety of impressions in the rich store-house of nature. In some descriptive parts of his poem, Homer doubtless yielded to the pleasing dictates of his inimitable fancy; but it seems plain from internal evidence only, that he delineates with minute accuracy the geography, mythology, history, and manners of Greece; and that his observations concerning all these subjects are perfectly agreeable to the opinions and belief which universally prevailed among his countrymen. If this matter required the aid of foreign evidence, it might be fully confirmed by the testimony of the Greek historians, who support in every instance the veracity of the poet; asserting not only the authenticity of the facts which he relates, but the influence of the causes to which he ascribes them.⁷

It may be observed, however, by those who would repress the ebullitions of Grecian vanity, that admitting the poems of Homer as complete evidence concerning the ancient state of his country, all the advantage that could follow from this supposition is, that the Greeks have been accurately described at an earlier period of their society than most other nations; but the silence of those nations cannot reasonably be interpreted as a proof of their inferiority to the Greeks in manners or in policy. The masterly description of a philosophic historian has rescued the antiquities of one other people from oblivion; and the generous spirit of their simple but manly institutions, as painted by his expressive pencil, is scarcely disgraced by a comparison with the boasted customs of the heroic ages.

In the preference of military glory to all other advantages, in the freedom of debate in the public assemblies, and in the protection afforded to the rights and liberties of the meanest citi-

zen, the treatise of Tacitus will equally apply to the Germans and to the Greeks. But there is one material circumstance wanting in the German which adds peculiar beauty to the Grecian character. Among the rude inhabitants of ancient Germany, the offices of priest and king were not united in the same person. The rites of religion were administered by a particular order of men, who might abuse the superstitious fears of the multitude to promote their own selfish designs; and the dread of superior powers, though sometimes employed to enforce the dictates of nature, and to promote the operations of government, might also, with equal success, be employed to weaken the impressions of the one, and to resist the authority of the other. Besides this unfavourable circumstance, the superstition of the Germans was of a dark and gloomy kind, little connected with the ordinary duties of society, recommending principally the practice of courage, the only virtue which there was not any occasion to recommend; and promising as the reward of what was deemed the highest excellence in life, the enjoyment of an infamous paradise of immortal drunkenness after death.⁸

The mythology of the Greeks was of a more agreeable, and of a far more useful nature. The sceptre, which denoted the connection of civil power with sacred protection, was conferred on those who, while they continued the humble ministers of the gods, were appointed to be the chief, but accountable guardians of the people.⁹ The same voice that summoned the warriors to arms, or that decided, in time of peace, their domestic contentions, conducted the order of their religious worship, and presided in the prayers and hymns addressed to the divinity. These prayers and hymns, together with the important rite of sacrifice (which likewise was performed by royal hands,) formed the ceremonial part of the Grecian religion. The moral was far more extensive, including the principal offices of life, and the noblest virtues of the mind. The useful quality of courage was peculiarly acceptable to the stern god of war; but the virtues of charity and hospitality were still more pleasing to the more amiable divinities.¹⁰ The submission of subjects to their prince, the duty of a prince to preserve inviolate the rights of his subjects,¹¹ the obedience of children to their parents,¹² the respect of the young for the aged, the sacred laws of truth, justice, honour, and decency, were inculcated and maintained by the awful authority of religion. Even the most ordinary transactions of private life were consecrated by the plety of the Greeks. They ventured not to undertake a voyage or a journey, without soliciting the propitious aid of their heavenly protectors. Every meal (and there

7 The nature and transactions of the gods, which justly shock the feelings of the modern reader, are perfectly conformable to the belief of the Greeks. The continual interposition of these ethereal beings in the affairs of human life, is justified by Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and all succeeding writers. Herodotus, l. i. c. 131. explains the reason why the Persians erected neither temples, nor images, nor altars, by saying, *οτι ουκ ανθρωποειδους νομισαν τους θεους, καταπερ οι Ελληνες ειναι*, "because they did not, like as the Greeks, believe the gods to partake of a human nature, or form." That the gods often appeared in a human shape, is taken for granted by Pausanias in *Arcad.* and Plutarch, *de Musica*. The same opinion was firmly maintained by Julian, an orthodox pagan, in a later age. See Gibbon, vol. II. Many instances will occur in the following history, to prove the exact conformity of Homer's descriptions to the general belief of his country.

8 Tacit. *de Morib. German.* Mr. Gibbon's *Roman Empire*.

9 *Ποιμενικος πατρις*.

10 ——— *προς γαρ Διός εστιν πατρις*

Ειπυοι τε πτωχοι τε

All strangers and beggars come from Jove.

Odys. xiv. 56.

11 *Iliad*, xvi. v. 385.

12 It is not humanity, but the fear of the gods, that is mentioned as the reason by *Telemachus* for not sending away his mother. *Odys.* 2.

were three¹ in a day) was accompanied with a sacrifice and libation. The common forms of politeness, the customary duties of civility, were not decided by the varying taste of individuals, but defined by the precise voice of the gods.²

It would have served little purpose to oppose salutary laws to the capricious license of barbarians, without guarding those laws by very powerful sanctions. Whether these sanctions be founded on opinion or on fact, is, with respect to their influence on the mind, a matter of little moment. The dread vengeance of imaginary powers may be equally effectual with the fear of the axe and halter. The certainty of this vengeance was firmly established in the Grecian creed; and its operation was supposed to be so immediate and palpable, that it was impossible for the inattention of men to overlook, or for their address to elude its force.³ The daring violations of the sacred law⁴ were speedily overtaken by manifest marks of the Divine displeasure. "The insolence and violence of the corrupted youths," says Homer,⁵ "cried aloud to heaven, whose decrees were soon executed by the avenging hands of Ulysses." The judgments inflicted on guilty communities were so familiar to the minds of men, that the poet introduces them by way of similes;⁶ and it is evident from his writings throughout, that every important event, prosperous or adverse, which happened either to individuals or to nations, appeared to the pious resignation of the Greeks, the reward of their religion and virtue, or the punishment of their irreligion and vice.⁷ The merit of the father was often acknowledged in the protection of the son; and the crimes of a guilty progenitor were often visited on his descendants to the third and fourth generation.⁸

¹ Ἀριστον δειπνον δαετος.

² The king of the Phæacians does not detain Ulysses longer than he chooses, lest he should offend the gods, *Odys.* viii. See also the behaviour of Ulysses and Telemachus, in the cottage of Eumæus, *Odys.* xiv. and xvi.

³ See the first book of Hesiod's poem "Of Works and Days," throughout: and particularly

Ὡς ἴσθης σὺ δ' αὖτις δεικνὺς μὴδὲ ὑβρίν σφίλλει, from v. 110 to v. 242: and again,

Τονδὲ γὰρ ἀνδραποισί νομον διατάξει Κρονίων, from v. 244 to v. 291.

⁴ Θιμισίας Διός, Homer, *passim.* ⁵ *Odys.* i.

⁶ See a beautiful example of this, *Iliad*, xvi. v. 385. The expression of Hesiod is remarkable:

Πᾶντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμός, καὶ πάντα νοήσας
καὶ νῦν ταδὲ αἰὲς ἐδίδρακε, ἐπιδρακεται, &c.

"The eye of Jove, that beholds all, and observes all, looks upon these transactions, when he pleases; nor does it escape his notice what kind of justice is rendered in the city."

⁷ The success of the Greeks against Troy proves both parts of the proposition. All the misfortunes of the Grecian chiefs were inflicted as punishments. Oilean Ajax was slain for his presumption, by Neptune (*Odys.* iv.) and Ajax, the son of Telamon, was a memorable example of the same vice. When Minerva offered him her assistance, he desired her to go to others, for the enemy would never attempt to penetrate where Ajax fought. Before his departure for Troy, Telamon prayed that the gods would give valour to his son; when the proud son aspiring above the condition of humanity, said, "That any man might be brave and victorious by the assistance of the gods; for his part, he expected to obtain glory by his own merit: the gods punished him with madness, and, after exposing him to the ridicule of his enemies, made him fall by his own hands. See the Ajax of Sophocles, from v. 700 to v. 800.

⁸ Minerva protected Telemachus on account of his father's merit. *Odys.* *passim.* The misfortunes of the

These observations are confirmed, not only by the writings of Homer and Hesiod throughout, but by almost every page of Herodotus, of Pindar, as well as of the Greek tragedians and historians; and yet they seem to have escaped the notice of some of the most ingenious inquirers into the opinions of antiquity. The authority of Greek writers strongly opposes two systems, which have been supported with great ability, and which have gained considerable credit in the world. The first, that the religion of the ancients had little or no connection with morality: the second, that the governments of Greece could not have been supported without the doctrine of a future state.⁹ The connection between religion and morality is clearly asserted in the various passages to which we have had occasion to allude; and the belief of a future state of retribution cannot, according to the principles of the learned author of the Divine Legation of Moses, be reckoned necessary to the government of men, who are fully persuaded of the actual and immediate interposition of Divine wisdom and justice, to regulate, by temporal rewards and punishments, the affairs of the present life.¹⁰

As this persuasion had such general and happy effects on the manners of the Greeks, it may be proper to consider its origin, and to describe more particularly the nature and genius of the superstition to which it gave birth: a superstition which, two thousand years after losing its imaginary authority over the useful occupations of men, still preserves a real power over their most elegant amusements.

It belongs not to the design of this work to search for the mythological tenets of Greece in the opinions of other nations: a subject of inquiry upon which much learned conjecture and much laborious ingenuity have already been very laudably, but I fear not very successfully, employed.¹¹ By the dim light of etymo-

royal families of Thebes and Argos, described in the many tragedies of Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, abundantly prove the truth of the last observation.

⁹ See Hume's *Natural History of Religion*, and Warburton's *Divine Legation of Moses*. The eleventh book of the *Odyssey*, which the ancients called the *Νηχερμαντία*, is the obscurest, and, in my opinion, the least agreeable part of Homer. The ghosts are all condemned to a melancholy and dreary state; even the greatest heroes are very miserable and dejected; and there is not any mention of the place of reward for the virtuous. Homer speaks of the Elysian fields but once (*Odyssey* iv. ver. 563.) Proteus tells Menelaus, that he is not *destined to die at Argos*, and that the gods would send him *εἰς Ἠλυσιὸν πεδίων καὶ πειρητὰ γαίης*; so that, if the language is not metaphorical, Homer's Elysium was only a delicious spot on this earth, and situated, according to Strabo's conjecture, on the southern coasts of Spain. Strabo, l. iii. Ulysses (*Odys.* ii. ver. 600.) sees the image of Hercules in Tartarus, but the hero himself, as the poet informs us, was feasting with the immortal gods. I have never met with any intelligible explanation of this passage, the absurdity of which appeared a proper subject of ridicule to Lucian, in *Diogen.* and *Hercul.*—Hesiod's Elysium is more agreeable.

¹⁰ The gods, indeed, are sometimes engaged in very unwarrantable transactions; but these are only means to compass some wise and just end, which the will of providence, the *Διὸς βούλη*, or fate, had previously determined. Examples also may be brought from Homer, of men attempting to obtain, by costly sacrifices, the assistance of the gods in acts of injustice and cruelty. This must be allowed to be an inconsistency in Grecian superstition, or rather in the passions which gave it birth.

¹¹ Bochart's *Geograph.* Bryant's *New Analysis*. Fourmant, *Le Clerc*, de la Pluche, &c. Their doctrine is opposed in the extraordinary work of Vico Neapolitano, en-

logy and tradition, and the deceitful glare of legend and fable, inquisitive men have endeavoured to trace the corrupted streams of Pagan worship to the pure fountain of the Jewish dispensation.¹² But the majesty of Jehovah is very feebly represented by the united power of Homer's divinities: and the mythology of the Greeks is of such a peculiar texture, that, whencesoever originally derived, it must have undergone a particular modification in the Grecian soil; nor is it easy to concur with the opinion of writers who bring it immediately from Egypt, Chaldea, or Lesser Asia, when we consider that there is not the smallest vestige in Homer of the judicial astrology which prevailed so strongly in the two first,¹³ or of the worshipping of idols, which almost universally predominated in the last.¹⁴

The difficulty of giving such an historical deduction of the Grecian faith as would not be exposed to innumerable objections, obliges us to trace its origin in the natural passions of the human heart, the hopes, the fears, the wants, the misery of man, which have in all ages rendered him a prey to the terrors of superstition.¹⁵ This miserable passion, which, in the civilized countries of modern Europe, operates only at distant intervals, and chiefly in the unfortunate moments of disease and danger, maintains a constant and uninterrupted power over the minds of barbarians. The disproportionate force of the same principle among rude and among civilized men, is ascribed by a common proverb to the gross ignorance of the former; but it may, with more propriety perhaps, be deduced from their precarious and unhappy manner of life, the continual dangers to which their existence is exposed, and the dreadful calamities in which the whole society is too frequently involved.¹⁶ Even among polished nations, the power of reason and philosophy, however highly it may be extolled when the gentle current of life flows with placid tranquillity, always proves too feeble to resist the mountain torrent and the storm of winter. Under the pressure of sudden or inextricable calamity, all those, who are not more or less than men, have recourse to the immediate assistance of invisible powers; and in the splendid abodes of wealth and power, as well as in the American village or Tartar horde, the era of a famine, a pestilence, or an earthquake, is marked by sincere expressions of faith, and commemorated by signal monuments of piety.¹⁷

titled "Principi di Scienza nuova d'intorno alla comune Natura delle Nazioni." The third edition of this work was published at Naples, in 1744.

¹² The general doctrine of providence, the rebellion in heaven, the state of innocence, the fall of man, atonement by sacrifice, a future state of retribution, for which the present life is only preparatory: all, or some of these tenets, are found in the traditions of all nations, Greeks and Barbarians. See Hesiod Oper. et Di. ver. 110 and ver. 165. and Theog. ver. 725. and ver. 290.

¹³ Diodorus Sicul. l. ii. Exod. chap. vi. Plin. l. xxx.

¹⁴ The Old Testament, passim.

¹⁵ Πάντες δὲ θίων χάρισται ἀνθρώποις—"All men stand in need of the gods." Hom. Odyssey, iii.

¹⁶ Δυστυχίας πίπτεις καὶ στερρίας ἀπογυνώσκεις τοὺς θεούς. Schol. in Homer. Tum præcipuus votorum locus est, cum spei nullus est. Plin. l. viii. c. 16.

¹⁷ In most men, true religion itself must, from the nature of human passions, have the greatest, because an undi-

The great pillar of superstition, raised by the anxious passions of men, was fortified in Greece by a circumstance incidental to all nations at a certain stage of their political progress. There is a period when nations emerging from barbarity, but not yet corrupted by the narrow pursuits of avarice, nor yet softened by the mean pleasures of luxury, or contracted by the dangerous refinements of a selfish philosophy, enjoy a peculiar sensibility of character, which exerts itself in the ardour of social affection, and strengthens, by a thousand associations, their belief of invisible and intelligent powers. To men, thus disposed to wonder and to believe, whatever dazzles the imagination, announces the presence of a deity; dreams and celestial appearances are deemed sacred and infallible admonitions; the silence and thick shade of a forest fills the soul with religious awe; and persons, distinguished by justice and piety, easily persuade themselves and others, that, as the beloved favourites of heaven, they are frequently honoured with holy inspirations, and sometimes indulged with the visible presence and happy intercourse of their Divine protectors.¹⁸ Not only the religion but the ancient language and manners of Greece, sufficiently attest the existence of this excessive sensibility, which, in those early times, gave an easy victory to the indulgent powers of fancy, over the severe dictates of reason.

The nature, the characters, and the occupations of the gods, were suggested by the lively feelings of an ardent, rather than by the regular invention of a cultivated, mind. These celestial beings were subject to the blind passions which govern unhappy mortals. Their wants, as well as their desires, were similar to those of men. They required not the gross nourishment of meat and wine, but they had occasion to repair the waste of their ethereal bodies by nectar and ambrosia; and they delighted in the steam of the sacrifices, which equally gratified their senses and flattered their vanity.¹⁹ The refreshment of sleep was necessary to restore their exhausted strength,²⁰ and with the addition of a superior, but limited degree of power, and wisdom, and goodness, the gods of the heroic ages were nothing more than immortal men.

What was wanting in the dignity and perfection, was supplied by the number of the

vided, influence over the mind, in seasons of inextricable calamity.

¹⁸ Pausan. (in Arcad.) calls them ξῖνοι καὶ ομογεγενητοί, guests and companions at the same table. Plutarch, in his Treatise on Music, cites as authorities Anticles and Iatro, two ancient authors, who wrote concerning the apparitions of the gods. All that has reached the present times respecting this curious subject, is collected in a dissertation of John Gottlob Nimptsch (Leipsic, 1720,) in which he treats of the number of the divinities who appeared most commonly to men; of the form under which they appeared; the usual time, and general causes, of their appearing, and the ordinary circumstances accompanying it. See also Memoires de l'Academie, vol. ix. Mem. sur les Mœurs des Siecles Heroïques.

¹⁹ These observations naturally result from Homer; but the doctrine of sacrifices, as expiations for crimes, so universally diffused over the ancient and modern world, would perhaps still merit the examination of an able divine.

²⁰ Mercury says to Calypso, he would not have fatigued himself by travelling over such a length of sea and land, without a very powerful reason. Odys.

gods.¹ Homer only describes the principal and reigning divinities; but Hesiod, who gives the genealogical history of this fanciful hierarchy, makes the whole number amount to thirty thousand. Among these, every virtue had its protector, every quality of extensive power in human life had its patron, and every grove and mountain and river its favourite inhabitants. Twelve divinities² of superior rank presided over the active principles of the universe, and the leading virtues of the mind: but even these distinguished beings were subject to the unrelenting power of vengeance³ and the fates, "who pursue the crimes of men and gods, and never cease from their wrath till they have inflicted just punishment on the guilty sons of earth and heaven."⁴

The materials which fancy had created, poetry formed into beauty, and policy improved into use. The creed of the Greeks, thus adorned and enlarged, became the happiest antidote against the furious resentment, the savage cruelty, and the fierce spirit of sullen independence, which usually characterize the manners of barbarians.⁵ Yet these dreadful passions sometimes forced their way through every mound which wisdom had erected in order to oppose their course. Laws, sacred and profane, were feeble barriers against the impetuosity of their rage. The black vengeance of the heart was exerted in deeds of horror. The death of an enemy could not satisfy their inhuman cruelty. They burned with desire to drink his hated blood, to devour his quivering limbs, and to expose his mangled remains to indignities equally odious and abominable in the sight of gods and men.⁶ The powerful influence of religion was directed against the wild excesses of this sanguinary temper. The brave Tydeus lost for ever the protection of his adored Minerva by a single act of savage ferocity. Humanity was inculcated by every precept of reason, and enforced by the strongest motives of hope and fear. It was a firm article of belief, that hands stained with blood, even in the exercise of honourable war, were unworthy, till purified by lustration, to be employed in the most ordinary functions of sacred worship.⁷

It would require a volume completely to illustrate the salutary effects of this ancient and venerable superstition, which was distinguished above most other false religions, by the uncommon merit of doing much good, without seemingly occasioning any considerable harm to society. The Grecian tenets,

while they inculcated profound respect to the gods, tended not to break the spirit, or to repress the courage, of their warlike votaries. The ancient heroes addressed their heavenly protectors in an erect posture, with the unfeigned sincerity of manly freedom. They expected to avert the calamities threatened by the anger of their divinities, not by inflicting on themselves such tortures as could be acceptable only to the mean resentment of weak and wicked beings, but by repairing the wrongs which they had committed against their fellow-citizens, or compensating, by new attentions, for the neglect shown to the ceremonies of their national worship. In their estimation, the doing of injuries to men, and the omitting of prayer to the gods, were the principal causes of the divine displeasure; the incurring of which, being justly considered as infinitely greater than all other misfortunes, they were solicitous to avert it, not only by an exact performance of external rites, but by a diligent practice of moral duties. The dangerous power of oracles, the abused privileges of asylums, the wild raptures of prophetic enthusiasm, the abominable ceremonies of the Bacchanalia, and the horrid practice of human sacrifice, circumstances which cover with deserved infamy the later periods of paganism, were all unknown to the good sense and purity of the heroic ages; nor is there to be discovered the smallest vestige of any of these wild or wicked inventions either in the writings of Homer, or of his contemporary Hesiod.

The amiable simplicity of their religious system was communicated to the civil and military institutions of the Greeks, to the laws of nations as well as to the regulations of internal policy, and to the various duties of domestic as well as of social life. The sentiments of natural reason, supported by the supposed sanction of Divine authority, generally directed the conduct of men in the wide variety of these complicated relations; and from one great and luminous principle, deeply impressed on the mind, there resulted a uniform system of unaffected propriety of conduct, the contemplation of which will always be agreeable to every taste that is not perverted by the false delicacy of artificial manners, or the illiberal prejudices of national vanity. In order to give the clearer explanation of the several parts of this beautiful system, we shall examine the political, the civil, and the domestic condition of the Greeks; that is, the relation of the governors to the governed, and of the governed to one another, whether considered as subjects of the same state, or as branches of the same family. We shall combine the effect of these relations with that of the ordinary occupations and favourite amusements of this celebrated people, and from the whole endeavour to deduce the general estimate of their virtues and defects, of their happiness and misery.

The common observation, that power follows property, though not altogether correct,⁸

¹ *Fragilis et laboriosa, mortalitas in partes ista digesta, infirmitates sunt memores, ut portionibus quisque celeret, quo maxime indigeret.* Plin. ii. 7.

² The Roman religion was mere plagiarism, so that Ennius might well translate two lines of an ancient Greek poet, which includes the names of the principal divinities of Greece and Italy:

Juno, Vesta, Minerva, Ceres, Diana, Venus, Mars, Mercurius, Jovi, Neptunus, Vulcanus, Apollo.

ENNIUS apud Apuleium.

³ *Νεμεσις.*

⁴ Hesiod. Theog.

⁵ *Impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer,*

Negans jura tibi facta, nihil non arrogans armis—

HORAT.

will be found the general character of all barbarous nations.

⁶ See Iliad, iv. ver. 25. Ibid. xxii. ver. 347. Ibid. xxiv. ver. 312.

⁷ Homer, passim.

⁸ The same property possessed by one, or by a few, confers much greater political consideration and influence, than it would confer if diffused among the multitude.

affords perhaps the best succedaneum to written laws, for determining the real strength and influence of the different members of society. If we examine by this rule the policies of the heroic ages, we shall find that they deserve the title of republics, rather than that of monarchies. When a warlike tribe sallied from its woods and mountains, to take possession of a more fertile territory, the soldiers fought and conquered, not for their leaders, but for themselves.⁹ The land acquired by their united valour was considered as a common property. It was cultivated by the joint labour and assiduity of all the members of the tribe, who assembled at a public table, celebrated together their religious rites, and, at the end of harvest, received their due shares of the annual produce of the ground, for the maintenance of their respective families.¹⁰ Superior opulence gave not to one a title to despise another, nor was there any distinction known among them, but what was occasioned by the difference of personal merit and abilities. This difference, however, had naturally raised a chief or leader to the head of every society; the frequent necessity of employing his valour, or his wisdom, rendered his merit more conspicuous and more useful; and his superior usefulness was rewarded, by the gratitude of his tribe, with a valuable portion of ground,¹¹ separated from the common property. This was cultivated, not by the hands of his martial followers, who laboured only for the community, but by the captives taken in war, of whom a considerable number were always bestowed on the general.¹² Being accustomed to command in the field, and to direct the measures, as well as to decide the quarrels, of his associates, he naturally became the judge of their civil differences; and as the peculiar favour of the gods always attended on superior virtue, he was also invested with the honourable office of presiding in their religious solemnities. These important functions of priest, judge, and general, which had naturally been conferred on the best and bravest character of each particular tribe, were upon the union of several tribes into one state or nation, conferred on the best and bravest of all the different leaders. Before the various states of Greece had united in a general confederacy, the resources derived from the domains appropriated to the prince (which, unless there was some particular reason to the contrary, were transmitted to his descendants,) had enabled the several kings and leaders to extend their influence and authority. Their comparative power and splendour did not entirely arise from the merit of personal abilities, but was determined in part by the extent and value of their possessions: and Agamemnon was appointed to the command of combined Greece, as much on ac-

count of his superior opulence, as of his many princely qualities.¹³ But whether we examine the pre-eminence that Agamemnon enjoyed over the other princes of the confederacy, which is fully explained in the *Iliad*, or the authority with which each prince was invested in his own dominions, which is clearly illustrated in the *Odyssey*, or the influence of a warlike chief over the several members of his tribe, which we have already endeavoured to delineate, we shall every where discover the limited power of kings, and the mild moderation of mixed government. As in the general confederacy, the councils¹⁴ of princes controlled the resolves of the monarch, and the voice of the assembly¹⁵ was superior to that of the council; so in each particular kingdom, the decisions of the senate prevailed over the will of the prince, and the acknowledged majesty of the people¹⁶ governed the decisions of the senate.¹⁷ If we descend still lower, we shall find the same distribution of power in every particular village,¹⁸ which afforded a picture, in miniature, of a kingdom, while a kingdom itself afforded a similar picture of the whole confederacy.

The same simplicity which regulated the political system, maintained the civil rights of the Greeks. As the price of submitting to the restraints of society, a man was secured in the enjoyment of his life and property;¹⁹ his moveables were equally divided, at his death, among his descendants; and the unnatural right of primogeniture, which, in order to enrich the eldest son, reduces the rest of the family to want and misery, was altogether unknown to the equal spirit of the Grecian institutions.²⁰ Causes respecting property were decided by the first magistrate, or by judges of delegated authority. The prosecution of murderers belonged to the relations of the deceased; they might accept a compensation in money for the loss which the family had sustained;²¹ but if this was not tendered them by the criminal, or if their resentment was too violent to admit of any such composition, they were entitled to the assistance of all the members of their tribe, who either punished the murderer by death, or compelled him to leave the society.²² These usages, doubtless, prove the ideas of the Greeks, concerning criminal jurisdiction, to have been very

13 Thucyd. i. i.

14 In matters of importance, Agamemnon is generally determined by the council of chiefs, many of whom, on various occasions, treat him with little respect.

15 It is referred to the general assembly, whether it would be better to return to Greece, or to prosecute the siege of Troy. *Iliad*, ii. ver. 110. See also *Aristot. Ethic.* i. iii. c. 5.

16 Several of the nobles of Ithaca even aspired to the crown. *Odys.* 21.

17 In the *Odyssey*, Telemachus threatens to appeal to the public assembly, of the injustice of the suitors, among whom were the principal nobles of Ithaca.

18 *Plutarch in Theon.* *Odys.* *ibid.*

19 *Iliad*, xii. *Pind. Pyth. Ode* iv.

20 *Odys.* xiv. If there were no children, the nearest relations, by the father's side, divided the moveable property: *παρθεβίμενον δὲ διὰ κτήσιν διατίονται χημεῖται.* *Hesiod. Theogon.* The same observation is made by Homer, *Iliad*, v.; but there is no mention of succession to land or moveable property.

21 *Iliad*, ix. Ajax blames the obstinacy of Achilles, who refuses such compensation for an affront, as a man sometimes accepted for the murder of a son or a brother.

22 There are examples of this in the 14th, 15th, and 23d. *Iliad.*

9 The *Odyssey* furnishes innumerable proofs of the limited power of kings. Ulysses, on most occasions, puts himself on an equal footing with his followers. It is commonly decided by lot, whether he shall be one of those who undertake any adventure attended with fatigue and danger. *Odys.* *passim.*

10 *Isocrat.* in *Archidam.*

11 *Iliad*, i. xii. ver. 310.

12 In the description of the shield of Achilles, Homer clearly distinguishes the domain of the king from the land of the community. *Iliad*, xviii. ver. 542.

rude and imperfect: but this disadvantage was in some measure compensated by their ignorance of those legal cruelties, which in civilized nations are too frequently exercised, under the specious pretence of justice. "In later times," says Thucydides, "punishments became more severe, but crimes were not, on this account, less frequent." The powerful or wealthy offender (he might have added) frequently eluded the vengeance of those severe laws; whereas in the heroic ages, there was not any respect of persons, princes themselves being subject to the same moderate penalties,¹ which were justly inflicted on their offending subjects.

The perfection of civil and political institutions, which was produced in Greece by the influence of religion, is found in most countries to be proportional to their improvements in arts, and their attainments in knowledge; while the happy effects of domestic union are frequently most numerous and most considerable among the rudest and least cultivated nations. The reciprocal duties of the governor and governed, as well as the mutual obligations of subjects, are gradually unfolded and enlarged by the progressive ideas of utility; but the tender connections of husband and wife, of father and son, of brothers and kinsmen, excite without reflection, the warmest feelings of the heart, and at once inspire the affectionate sentiments of love and friendship, of kindness and gratitude. The dictates of nature alone sufficiently maintain the duties which correspond to the several relations of blood; her voice is strong and positive, in asserting their obligation; and there is greater danger that these sacred ties should be weakened, or perverted, by the artificial refinements of polished life, than that their influence should continue altogether unknown, or be feebly felt, in the early periods of society.

Agreeably to these observations, we find in the history of the heroic ages, the most interesting pictures of conjugal love, of parental affection, and of filial duty. These sentiments, suggested by nature, and confirmed by reason, were still farther strengthened by the precepts of religion; and their force, thus augmented, became so strong and irresistible, that it can scarcely be conceived by men, among whom fashion, and vanity, and interest, have usurped the place of more generous and manly principles.

The comforts of a family were anciently considered as equal to the benefits derived from social union. To be destitute of the one, was deemed no less miserable than to be deprived of the other. And the total baseness of a man's character was expressed by saying, that he deserved not to enjoy the rights of a citizen, the protection of a subject, or the happiness of domestic life.²

Marriage was a necessary step in order to attain this happiness, and the institution of marriage was ascribed by remote tradition to the

bounty of the gods. The Greeks of the heroic ages, among whom the rights of weakness and beauty were as much respected as they afterwards were despised by their degenerate descendants, celebrated the conjugal union with all the pomp of religious festivity. The joyous band, carrying the nuptial torches, marched in pomp through the city, to the sound of the hymeneal song;³ the lustral waters were drawn from the sacred fountain Calliroe, and many revered ceremonies rendered the connection of husband and wife equally respectable and binding.⁴

Adultery was considered as a crime of the blackest dye, and is always mentioned with the same horror as murder. Persons guilty of these atrocious enormities purchased impunity,⁵ and more frequently escaped death, by voluntary banishment; but in many cases they were punished by the united vengeance of the tribe which had received the injury. Second nuptials were not absolutely forbidden; but so strong and sacred was the matrimonial tie, that even the death of one of the parties was scarcely thought sufficient to dissolve it; and the survivor, by entering into a new connection, suffered a diminution of fame, and submitted to a considerable degradation of character.⁶

Two circumstances chiefly have rendered it difficult to explain the rank and condition of women in the heroic ages. The Greek word denoting a wife, is borrowed from a quality which equally applies to a concubine, and the same term is used indifferently to express both. But the women who in ancient Greece submitted to the infamy of prostitution, were generally captives taken in war, who were reduced by the cruel right of arms to the miserable condition of servitude. Hence it has been erroneously inferred, that in ancient Greece, wives as well as concubines were the slaves of their husbands. This mistaken notion, it has been attempted to confirm, not only by insisting on the humiliating condition of the fair sex in the later ages of Greece, but by expressly asserting, that, in ancient times, they were purchased by their husbands.⁷ But this is to support one error by another. Before entering into the state of wedlock, it was customary for a man to make a mutual exchange of presents with his intended father-in-law. The Greeks had particular terms to express the present which he bestowed, as well as that which he received.⁸ The former, which has no corresponding term in the modern languages, is translated by the more general word "price," which has given rise to the false notion of the purchase and servitude of women; but the latter which may with propriety be translated "dower,"⁹ was given as a provision for the wife, both during marriage and after its dissolution,¹⁰ and was

³ *Iliad*, l. xxiii.

⁴ Thucydides, l. ii. Meursius *Feris Græcorum*, and the authors there cited.

⁵ *Odys.* viii.

⁶ Penelope was restrained from marrying a second husband: *αἰδομένην, οὐκ ἔτι ποτὶς, δημοῖο τῆς γῆμις*. *Il.* xv.

⁷ Lord Kaime's *Sketches*, Thomas sur la Condition des Femmes, &c.

⁸ *Εἶδος*.

⁹ *Πρόξ*.

¹⁰ *Odys.* ii. Telemachus says, that if his mother should be sent from the house, he would be obliged to return her dower to her father Icarus.

¹ Thus Midon, the brother of Ajax, was obliged to fly to Phylace, *Il.* xv. Patroclus, for a similar offence, took refuge with the father of Achilles, *Il.* 23. Pausanias (in *Eliac.*) gives examples of the same kind in two kings of the *Ætolians*; and these facts are agreeable to the nature of the kingly office in the heroic ages, as described by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, l. ii. *Hist. Rom.*

² *Ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ πόλιν καὶ οἶκον*. *Iliad*, *passim*.

sufficient to deliver her from that supposed state of dependence on the husband, which never had any existence but in the imagination of the systematic writers of the present age.

In the modern countries of Europe, women are generally excluded from the serious occupations of life, but admitted to an equal share in its gayest amusements. During the heroic ages, they were not absolutely debarred from the former, although it was impossible to associate their natural delicacy and timidity to the warlike labours and pleasures which formed the principal employments of their husbands. The intercourse between the sexes, therefore, was less frequent and general, than would suit the refined softness of modern manners.

The attention of women was chiefly confined to domestic cares, or to the practice of such arts as required neither strength, nor courage, nor wisdom, but only the patient exertions of mechanical dexterity.¹¹ Our natural respect for the honour of the sex is offended at hearing them as much extolled for their skill in the labours of the loom, as for their beauty and virtue; but it deserves to be considered, that weaving and embroidery being, like all other arts, less extensively diffused in Greece than in improved commercial countries, were on this account more highly valued, and therefore better adapted to confer distinction on those who excelled in them. They were practised by ladies of the highest rank, and even by queens, who also thought it an honour to be entrusted with the education of their children, till they became fit for the society of their fathers.¹² Besides these employments, the women were permitted to join in the celebration of religious rites and ceremonies, and many of them were consecrated to the service of particular divinities.¹³ In the seasons of public festivity, they mixed more freely than on ordinary occasions in the society of the other sex. This was sometimes attended with such inconveniences as might naturally be expected to arise in consequence of the usual restraints imposed on their behaviour. "The beautiful Polymela," says Homer,¹⁴ "dancing in the chorus of Diana, was embraced by Mercury; but she had no sooner brought forth a son, than one of the principal citizens offered her his hand." The institutions of the heroic ages promoted, with admirable propriety, the modest reserve of women, while they permitted not one excusable error to cover an amiable character with indelible infamy. The crime of having too tender a heart was not deemed inexpiable; and, as the consequences of female weakness were imputed to the affectionate ardour of some amorous divinity, they were so far from obscuring the charms of beauty, that they adorned it with new graces and more conspicuous splendour.

The simplicity of the ancient Greeks was equally remote from the cruel tyranny of sa-

vages, which condemns women to servitude, and the interested refinement of luxury and vice, which regards them as mere instruments of pleasure. The natural equality between the sexes suggested by the voice of sentiment, asserted by the dictates of reason, and confirmed by the precepts of religion, produced the most delicate affections that can inspire a susceptible heart: hence those moving scenes so admirably delineated by Homer, which retrace the most perfect image of domestic felicity; hence those pleasing pains, those anxious solitudes of tenderness and love, which frequently degenerate into melancholy presages of the loss of a union to which nothing was wanting but that it should prove immortal.¹⁵

The sentiments of parental affection were proportionably strong and ardent with those of conjugal love. The mutual tenderness of the husband and wife was communicated to their offspring; while the father viewed in his child the charms of its mother, and the mother perceived in it the manly graces of its father. Independently of the delicacy of sentiments, there are, doubtless, in all countries, savage and civilized, innumerable instances of paternal kindness, which, indeed, is the most simple and natural expansion of self-love. But in the heroic ages alone, we find sincere and complete returns of filial duty. In the lowest state of savage life men are, for the most part, little acquainted with this respectful affection: they fear and obey, but without any mixture of love, those who are wiser and stronger than themselves. When they become wise and strong in their turn, they disregard the trembling hand that reared their tender years, or if any faint emotions of gratitude are feebly felt, they discover them in the preposterous kindness of delivering their aged parents from what appears to their own juvenile impatience the wretched load of life.¹⁷ Among nations, on the other hand, who are sunk in the corruptions incident to excessive luxury and refinement, the ties of nature are perverted or effaced; the young despise the admonitions, and avoid the company of the aged; and the duties, as well as the business of society, are degraded into a miserable traffic of interest or pleasure. But as the Greeks had emerged from the melancholy gloom of the first situation, and had not yet declined into the foul vapours of the second, they displayed the meridian splendour of the domestic virtues.¹⁷ The reverence of children for their parents approached their veneration for the gods. The most violent and impetuous heroes submitted, without reluctance, to the severest dictates of paternal authority. In such delicate concerns as might seem to affect themselves alone, they relinquished their favourite inclinations, disavowed any will of their own, and committed their dearest concerns to the experienced wisdom

¹¹ Homer, *passim*.

¹² Thus, Thetis educated Achilles. Hesiod says poetically, that in the age of silver, the children continued, during an infancy of a hundred years, under the care of their mothers.

¹³ Theano was priestess of Vulcan, &c. *Iliad*.

¹⁴ *Iliad*, xvi.

¹⁵ See the interview with Hector and Andromache, and other examples. *Iliad*, ix. and *Odys.* vi.

¹⁶ Voyage du Pere Charlevoix. *Lastan Mœurs des Sauvages*.

¹⁷ There is, perhaps, no other language that can express, without a circumlocution, what the Greeks meant by *θεσπια*, the obligations of children to repay the maintenance, the education, and the tender cares of their parents.

and known goodness of their fathers. The amiable expressions of filial respect were extended into a more general sentiment of regard for the infirm and aged. Even among brothers who were nearly of the same age, the younger was obliged to yield in every instance to the elder; and it was an acknowledged principle of religion, that the Furies defended, by their stern authority, the sacred rights of superior years.¹

The occupations of the ancient Greeks, whether of war or peace, were, for the most part, directed by the same sacred influence which governed their behaviour in the various relations of domestic and social life. War was their principal employment; and in the field they both displayed their noblest qualities, and discovered the greatest defects of their character. They were unacquainted with those disciplined evolutions which give harmony and concert to numerous bodies of men, and enable whole armies to move with the activity and address of single combatants. What was wanting in skill they supplied by courage. They marched to the field in a deep phalanx, rushed impetuously to the attack, and bravely closed with their enemies. Each warrior was firmly buckled with his antagonist, and compelled by necessity to the same exertions of valour, as if the fortune of the day had depended upon his single arm. Their principal weapon was the spear, resembling the Roman pilum, which, thrown by the nervous and well-directed vigour of a steady hand, often penetrated the firmest shields and bucklers. When they missed their aim, or when the stroke proved ineffectual through want of force, they drew their swords, and, summoning their utmost resolution, darted impetuously on the foe. This mode of war was common to the soldiers and generals, the latter being as much distinguished in the day of action by their strength and courage, as by their skill and conduct. The Greeks had bows, and slings, and darts, intended for the practice of distant hostility; but the use of these weapons, which were much employed in the military pastimes of the heroic ages, was confined in the field to warriors of inferior renown.² Their defensive armour was remarkably complete: a bright helmet, adorned with plumes, covered the head and face, a firm corslet defended the breast, greaves of brass descended to the feet, and an ample shield loosely attached to the shoulders turned in all directions, and opposed its firm resistance to every hostile assault.

The close compact combats of the Greeks were fitted to excite the most furious passions of the heart, and to embitter national animosity by personal hatred and revenge. A battle consisted of so many duels, which exasperated to the utmost the hostility of the contending parties; each soldier knew the antagonist from whom he had received, or on whom he had inflicted the severest injuries. They fought with all the keenness of resentment, and often sullied the honours of victory by those licentious cruelties which are too natural to men in the

giddy moment of triumph over a detested adversary.

It is partly to this unfortunate circumstance, and partly to the ancient mode of appropriating the warlike plunder to those who first acquired it, that we are to ascribe the shocking enormities which were sometimes committed by the bravest and most generous of the Grecian chiefs.

That the severities exercised towards the conquered proceeded not from the barbarism of the age, and an ignorance of the rights of humanity, is plain from the observances deemed necessary, in order to obtain the favour of the gods, in carrying on any military expedition, or in enjoying the fruits of victory. These observances, which were confirmed by the laws of nations among the Greeks, were practised before the commencement of hostilities, during their continuance, and after their conclusion. Before any war could be lawfully undertaken, it was necessary to despatch ambassadors, who might explain the injury that had been done, demand immediate and complete satisfaction, and if this was refused, denounce in form the resolution of their community, to prosecute its claim by force of arms.³ After they had begun to execute their fatal purpose, the characters of heralds, those sacred ministers of kings, were equally respected by friends and foes. They travelled in safety through the midst of embattled hosts, proclaimed to the silent warriors the commissions with which they were intrusted, or demanded a truce for burying the dead, which could not be refused without the most enormous impiety.⁴ The use of poisoned weapons⁵ was forbidden, under pain of the divine displeasure. It was agreeable to the will of the gods that the life should be spared, when a sufficient ransom was promised.⁶ And after a treaty of peace was concluded between hostile nations, without any apparent ratification but the honour of the contracting parties, the perfidious wretches who betrayed the sanctity of their engagements, were devoted, amidst solemn sacrifices and libations, to the fury of the terrible goddesses.⁷

From the arts of peace, the Greeks had acquired the necessaries, and procured the accommodations, but had not obtained the luxuries of life. Pasturage and agriculture supplied them with the most indispensable articles of food, and with the principal materials of clothing. The implements of husbandry were extremely imperfect; the plough itself, the most useful of them all, being composed entirely of wood,⁸ which arose rather from the scarcity of iron, than from any defect of mechanical ingenuity.⁹ They employed, in the time of Hesiod, the invention of shears, for depriving the sheep of their wool, having formerly waited the season of its annual separation by nature.¹⁰ Barley was the principal

³ See chap. i. p. 43.

⁴ Homer, *passim*.

⁵ Illus refused Ulysses poisoned arrows, since he revered the immortal gods,

ἔπειτα νηπιόχρηστο δίδουσι καὶ ἰσχυράς.

Odys.

⁶ Iliad, i. Ibid. vi. 24.

⁷ Iliad, iii.

⁸ Hesiod, *Oper. et Dies*.

⁹ Homer, *passim*.

¹⁰ Hesiod *ibid*

¹ *Ἡ ἡρώδης ἐπὶ τῷ Πάρι.* Homer, *passim*.

² Teucer is more than once upbraided in the Iliad as vain archer.

produce of their fields, and furnished the ordinary food both of men and of horses. The invention of mills was unknown, and the grain underwent several tedious operations, in order to facilitate the bruising of it between two large stones with the hand.¹¹ Although the Greeks cultivated the olive, they were unacquainted with the benefit derived from the fruit of this plant, so well adapted to cheer the melancholy gloom of night.¹² The Grecian soil was naturally favourable to the grape; but the long and operose process by which the juice of it was separated and prepared, rendered wine scarce and dear.¹³

Of the mechanic arts, weaving was the best understood; yet this, as well as all the other professions which are qualified by the appellation of sedentary, were practised by the Greeks standing upright¹⁴ which seems to indicate an imperfect state of improvement. The hatchet, wimble, plane, and level, are the tools mentioned by Homer, who appears to have been unacquainted with the saw, the square, and the compass.¹⁵ The art of cutting marble, which afterwards furnished Grecian ingenuity with the materials of those inimitable productions which are still the wonder of the world, was as yet undiscovered; nor did the polished lustre of this valuable stone adorn the habitations of the Greeks.¹⁶

Homer mentions not the orders of architecture, which were invented in a later age; and pillars are the only ornaments assigned to the edifices which he describes. The houses of the great were surrounded by a wall, that consisted of two floors: the lower of which was distributed into four apartments, which we have translated by the names of hall,¹⁷ portico, antichamber, and bedchamber, which express the same relative situation, rather than any other point of resemblance. The roofs were flat, and the doors opened towards the surrounding wall, while the gates of the wall itself opened towards the road or street.¹⁸ The invention of enamelling metals had been cultivated with singular success: and though painting, properly so called, was rude and unformed during the age of Homer, the genius of the divine poet has described the rudiments of his kindred art with such graces as would adorn¹⁹ its most refined

state of perfection. Music was much practised among the early Greeks. It was not of the learned kind, and therefore the better adapted to touch the heart. The effects ascribed to it are wonderful, but not incredible, because the ancient music was not merely an agreeable succession of melodious, unmeaning sounds, but an imitation and a heightening of the simple, natural, and pathetic tones and cadences of a beautiful and expressive language.²⁰

In the heroic ages men had neither leisure nor inclination to attend to the speculative sciences. All the knowledge that they possessed or esteemed was of the practical kind. From arithmetic they learned such simple calculations as suited the narrow sphere of their transactions. Astronomy taught them to observe the constellations most necessary to direct the adventurous course of the mariner: but their navigation was still so imperfect that they seldom abandoned the coast; and the only stars mentioned by Homer are the Great and Little Bear, the Pleiades, the Hyades, Orion, and the Dog star. The metaphysics, ethics, and politics of the ancient Greeks have been explained under the article of religion, from which they were originally derived, and with which they long continued to be inseparably connected. The main objects proposed in the education of the young warriors, were, that they should learn to excel in the military exercises of the age, especially those of throwing the lance and of driving the chariot, and to command the attention of the senate, or assembly, by delivering their opinion in a perspicuous, elegant, and manly style.²¹

It was not only in the council and in the field that these superior accomplishments solicited and obtained their well-merited rewards. Each community presented, in time of peace, the picture of a large family. The Greeks lived in continual society with their equals, enjoyed common pleasures and amusements, and had daily opportunities of displaying their useful talents in the sight of their fellow-citizens. The frequent disputes between individuals occasioned litigations and trials, which furnished employment for the eloquence and abilities of men, in the necessary defence of their friends. The funeral games, and those celebrated in commemoration of several important events, both of a civil and sacred kind, opened a continual source of entertainment. There the

11 Pfin. l. xviii. c. xiv.

12 The Greeks had not discovered any other contrivance for that purpose, than the burning of great fires of wood. The torches mentioned by Homer consisted of branches of any resinous tree, split at the end, and lighted at the fire. Odyss. l. vi. ver. 307. l. xviii. ver. 306. et ver. 309.

13 Odyss. l. vii. ver. 192.

14 Eustach. in Iliad, i. ver. 31.

15 Odyss. l. v. ver. 234, &c.

16 In the palace of Alcinoüs, which shone with gold, silver, brass, and amber, there is no mention of marble. Odyss. l. iv. ver. 72.

17 Η τειχίς οὐτως; ἑκάς περὶ οὐ πύλαι, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἑκίον αἰετὶ, μετὰ κτ., αἰετὸς, οὐ πύλαι, καὶ θαλάμος. Pollux Onomast.

18 Odyss. l. i. ver. 441.

19 The nobler kinds of painting are all illustrated in the shield of Achilles; and each picture discovers a wonderful degree of invention, expression, and composition, Iliad, xviii. Perrault and Terrasson, who thought it impossible to place so many pictures in the circumference of a shield, were answered by Boivin, who supposed a great many concentric circles. This opinion was adopted by Pope, who pretends that all the branches of painting, even aerial perspective, may be found in Homer's shield. "That he was

no stranger to aerial perspective, appears from his expressly marking the distance from object to object," &c. But this observation only proves that Pope, who practised painting, was little acquainted with the theory of that art; since aerial perspective has nothing to do with the diminution of objects in proportion to their distance, and relates entirely to the changing and weakening of colours, according to the condition of the medium through which they are seen. The objections of Perrault and Terrasson, and the concentric circles of Boivin, are equally frivolous. The shield of Homer contains, in fact, but ten pictures. The enumeration by the particles μὲν and δὲ fixes the number. But the poet not only describes these ten pictures actually represented on the shield, but also mentions their antecedents and consequents. This is the chief superiority of poetical imitation above painting, that it can describe, in a few pages, what many galleries of pictures could not represent. But of this more hereafter.

20 Odyss. iii. ver. 267, et passim. This subject will be treated fully hereafter.

21 Μῦθον τὰ ῥήματα ἱμῶναι περὶ τῶν τε ἰσχυρῶν.

young and vigorous contended in the rapid race; wielded the massy cæstus or ponderous quoit; and exerted equal efforts of strength and skill in the other manly exercises which confirm the vigour of the body, and the fortitude of the mind. Nor were the aged and infirm allowed to languish for want of proper objects to rouse their emulation, to flatter their pride, and to employ their remaining activity. It belonged to them to offer their wise counsels, to interpose their respected authority, and to decide the quarrels, as well as to determine the merit, of the young candidates for fame. The applause and rewards bestowed on him whose counsels and decisions were most generally approved, consoled the weakness of his declining years, while his rivals, though disappointed for the present, expected, on some future occasion, to obtain the same honourable marks of the public esteem.¹

After this general review of the Grecian manners and institutions, should we endeavour to estimate their value, they would probably rise in our esteem, by being compared, either with the rude customs of savage life, or with the artificial refinements of polished society. The Greeks had advanced beyond that uniform insipidity of deportment, that sullen ferocity of manners, and that hardened insensibility of heart, which universally characterise the savage state. They still possessed, however, that patient intrepidity, that noble spirit of independence, that ardent attachment to their friends, and that generous contempt of pain and danger and death, which render the description of the wild tribes of America so interesting to a philosophic mind. Of two principal enjoyments of life, study and conversation, they were little acquainted, indeed, with the consolations and pleasure of the first, the want of which was compensated by the sincerity, the confidence, the charms of the second. Their social affections were less comprehensive in their objects,

but more powerful in their effects, than those of polished nations. A generous chief rushes to certain death, to revenge the cause of his friend; yet refuses to the prayers of an aged parent the melancholy consolation of interring the remains of his favourite son; till the corresponding image of his own father strikes his mind, and at once melts him to pity.² The imaginary wants and artificial passions which are so necessary to urge the hand of industry, and to vary the pursuits of men, in improved commercial societies, were supplied to the Greeks by that excessive sensibility, which interested them so deeply in the affairs of their community, their tribe, their family, and their friends, and which connected them by the feelings of gratitude even with the inanimate objects of nature. As they were not acquainted with the same diversity of employments, so neither were they fatigued with the same giddy round of dissipated pleasures which augment the splendid misery of later times. Though ignorant of innumerable arts which adorn the present age, they had discovered one of inestimable value, to render the great duties of life its most entertaining amusement. It will not, perhaps, be easy to point out a nation who united a more complete subordination to established authority with a higher sense of personal independence, and a more respectful regard to the dictates of religion with a more ardent spirit of martial enterprise. The generous equality of their political establishments, and their imagined intercourse with the gods, conspired to raise them to a certain elevation of character which will be for ever remembered and admired. This character was rendered permanent, in Sparta, by the famous laws commonly ascribed to the invention of Lycurgus, but which, as will appear in the subsequent chapter, were almost exact copies of the customs and institutions that universally prevailed in Greece during the heroic ages.

CHAPTER III.

Distracted State of Greece—The Heracleidæ conduct the Dorians into Peloponnesus—Divide their conquests in that Peninsula—The Eolic, Ionic, and Doric Migrations—Establishment of Colonies in Thrace, Macedon, Africa, and Magna Græcia—Influence of the Ionic Colonies in Asia on the Affairs of the Mother Country—The Abolition of Monarchy in Greece—New Disorders in that Country—Four Institutions which tended to remove them—The Amphictyonic Council—The Oracle of Delphi—The Olympic Games—The Spartan Laws.

GREECE triumphed over Troy, but it was a melancholy triumph. The calamities of war were followed by disasters at sea, by discord among the chiefs, by ruin to the confederacy; yet these evils were less afflicting than the intestine animosities and sedition excited by the license of the people, and fomented by the ambition of the nobles during the long and unfortunate absence of their kings. The vic-

torious Agamemnon had scarce set foot on his native land, when he was cut off by an adulterous spouse and a perfidious assassin.³ His son Orestes found protection in Athens against the resentment of an usurper. In the eighth year of his exile he returned with his partisans, and took just vengeance on the abominable Egys-theus and Clytemnestra.⁴ He reigned in Ar-

¹ Iliad, xviii. Ibid. xxiii

² Iliad, xxiv.

³ Odys. l. i. ver. 29.

⁴ Odys. l. iii. ver. 196. and ver. 305, et seq.

ges, but with far less glory than his father; nor did that kingdom ever thenceforth assume its ancient pre-eminence.

The wanderings and woes of Ulysses are too well known to be described.⁵ His patient fortitude regained the kingdom of Ithaca, but not without wading through the blood of his most

From A. C. 1184. illustrious subjects.⁶ If his-
till 777. tory minutely recorded the

domestic feuds which prevailed in other states, it would probably exhibit a disgusting picture of fraud and cruelty, and a continual repetition of similar crimes and calamities would equally fatigue the attention, and offend the humanity, of the modern reader. But though it would be neither entertaining nor useful to describe the particular and transitory consequences of these disorders, it is of importance to remark their general and lasting tendency to prolong the weakness of Greece; whose obscure transactions, during the four following centuries, ill correspond with the splendour of the Trojan, or even of the Argonautic expedition.

The history of this long period is very confusedly and imperfectly related by ancient authors, and the chronology is throughout very inaccurately ascertained; yet such events as are either interesting in themselves, or had any permanent influence on the memorable ages of Greece, which form the subject of the present work, may be clearly explained, and reduced to a narrow compass. In order to preserve an unbroken narrative, we must consider three series of events, which naturally followed each other, and which all tended to the same goal. In this view, we shall first examine the migrations of different tribes or communities within the narrow bounds of Greece; secondly, the establishment of new colonies in many distant parts of Europe as well as of Asia and Africa; and thirdly, the internal changes produced in the several states, by their adopting, almost universally, the republican, instead of the monarchical, form of government.⁷ In the fluctuation of these commotions we must, then, seek for the seeds of order and stability, and endeavour to trace, amidst extensive migrations, general revolutions, and unceasing hostilities, the origin and improvement of those singular institutions which tended to unite, to polish, and to adorn the scattered and still spreading branches of the Grecian race through every part of the world.

The migrations, which soon followed the Trojan expedition, are mentioned, but not explained, by historians. Their general cause may be discovered in Homer, whose poems, no less instructive than agreeable, can alone enable us to travel with equal security and pleasure in the dark regions of Grecian antiquity. Domestic dissension, and, still more, the unsettled tenure of landed property, as described by that immortal poet, naturally engaged the Grecian tribes, notwithstanding their acquaintance with agriculture, often to change their respective

habitations. The idea of a separate property in land is the principal tie which binds men to particular districts. The avarice of individuals is unwilling to relinquish the fields, which it has been the great object of their industry to cultivate and to adorn, and their pride is averse to a separation from their hereditary establishments. These passions, which cover the black heaths and inhospitable mountains of the north with fair and populous cities, while far more inviting regions of the earth still remain destitute of inhabitants, could not have much influence on a people, who regarded land as the property of the public, rather than of individuals. In such

A. C. a nation, men are connected with the
1124. territory which they inhabit, only as members of a particular community; and when exposed to any slight inconvenience at home, or allured by fairer prospects from abroad, they issue forth with one accord to acquire by their united valour, more secure or more agreeable settlements. Governed by motives of this kind, a tribe of Bœotians, soon after the Trojan war, seized the rich vale of Thessalian Arne. The same restless spirit urged a warlike band of Thessalians to quit the seats of their ancestors. The new emigrants poured down with irresistible violence on the unprepared Bœotians, who were thus reluctantly compelled, sixty years after the taking of Troy, to rejoin their brethren in the ancient kingdom of Cadmus.⁸

Twenty years after this event, a more extensive migration totally changed the affairs of the Peloponnesus; and in its consequences, gave new inhabitants to the whole western A. C. coast of Asia Minor. The rival families
1104. of Perseus and Pelops anciently contended for the dominion of the Grecian peninsula. The fortune of the Pelopidæ prevailed; but their superiority led them rather to persecute, than to forgive, their enemies. The descendants and partisans of the great Hercules, the most illustrious hero of the Perseid line, were divested of their possessions, and driven into banishment. The exiles were first received by the Athenians, whose more humane, or more enlarged policy, rendered Attica, ever since the reign of Theseus, the ordinary resource of the miserable.⁹ Their leader Hyllus was afterwards adopted by Epalius, the aged king of Doris; and the death of their benefactor soon made the Heracleidæ masters of that mountainous province.¹⁰ But the wilds of Cæta and Parnassus were little fitted to satisfy men, whose ancestors had enjoyed far more valuable possessions. Their natural ambition was long repressed by the growing greatness of the Pelopidæ, and the glory of Agamemnon. After the unexpected disasters of that prince, they twice attempted, unsuccessfully, to break through the Corinthian isthmus, and to recover their ancient dominion in Argos and Lacedæmon.¹¹

Instructed by past miscarriages, Temenus, Cresphontes, and Aristodemus, descendants in

⁵ *Odyss. passim.*

⁶ *Odyss. l. xxii. ver. 220, et seq.*

⁷ *Volæius Patercul. l. i*

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⁸ *Thucyd. l. i. p. 9. et 10. Diodor. l. iv. Strabo, l. ix. p. 630. Pausan. l. ix. c. xl.*

⁹ *Lysias Orat. Funeb.*

¹⁰ *Strabo, l. ix. p. 427.*

¹¹ *Herodot. l. ix. c. xxvi. Apollodor. l. iii. c. v. et vi.*

the fifth degree from Hercules, finally abandoned the hopeless design of entering the Peloponnesus by land. But determining to use every exertion for regaining their hereditary establishments, they set themselves, with great industry, to prepare transports in a convenient harbour, at the northern extremity of the Corinthian gulf, which, in consequence of this transaction, received, and thenceforth retained, the name of Naupactus. The warlike and rapacious Ætolians, whose leader Oxylus was nearly related to the family of Hercules, readily assisted their labours, with a view to share the booty that might accrue from the expedition. The Dorians, who inhabited the neighbourhood of mount Pindus, cheerfully deserted the gloomy solitude of their woods, in order to seek possessions in a more agreeable and better cultivated country. Animated by these reinforcements, the Heracleidæ redoubled their diligence. All necessary preparations were made for the invasion; yet their confidence in arms excluded not the use of artifice. By secret intrigues they gained a party in Lacedæmon; and, before setting sail, they prudently detached a body of light armed troops, whose appearance at the Isthmus drew the strength of the enemy towards that quarter.¹ Meanwhile their armament was carried by a favourable gale towards the eastern coast of the Peloponnesus. The Heracleidæ landed their followers without opposition, and assailed the defenceless territories, to which they had long laid claim, comprehending the whole peninsula, except the central province of Arcadia, and the maritime district of Achaia. The five other provinces were conquered at the same time, though by different means. Laconia was betrayed to the invaders;² Argos acknowledged their authority; Corinth, Elis, and Messenia submitted to their arms. The revolution was complete, and effected with little bloodshed, but not without great oppression of the ancient inhabitants, many of whom emigrated, and many were reduced to slavery.³

The Heracleidæ, agreeably to the custom of that age, divided their new acquisitions by lot. The kingdom of Argos fell to the share of Temenus; Cresphontes obtained Messenia; and as Aristodemus then happened to die, Laconia was set apart for his infant sons, the twin-brothers, Eurysthenes and Procles. Corinth was bestowed on their kinsman Alotes; and Elis given to Oxylus, their brave Ætolian ally.⁴ This distribution, however, referred only to the royal dignity, then extremely limited, and to an appropriated domain to the several princes in their respective allotments. The rest of the territory was divided among the warlike Dorians and Ætolians, who had conquered for themselves, not for their leaders;⁵ and who, having over-run, without opposition, the finest provinces of the Peloponnesus, could not willingly return to lead a life of hardship and misery on their native mountains.

Before this important revolution, Argos and Lacedæmon were subject to Tisamenus, grandson of Agamemnon; Messenia was governed by Melanthus, a descendant of the celebrated Nestor. These princes had not so far degenerated from the glory of their ancestors, as to submit to become subjects in the countries where they had long reigned. On the first false alarm of invasion occasioned by the appearance of light troops at the Isthmus, Tisamenus and Melanthus had taken the field with the flower of the Argive and Messenian nations. But while they prepared to repel the expected inroads from the north, they received the melancholy intelligence that their kingdoms had been attacked on another side, on which they thought them secure. Instead of returning southward to dispossess the Heracleidæ, an enterprise too daring to afford any prospect of success, Tisamenus turned his arms against the Ionians, who inhabited the southern shore of the Corinthian gulf. An obstinate battle was fought, which proved fatal to Tisamenus; but his followers obtained a decisive victory, and, having expelled or enslaved the ancient inhabitants, took possession of that valuable province, so famous in later times under the name of Achaia. Melanthus enjoyed better fortune. Accompanied by his faithful Messenians, he resorted to Attica, then engaged in war with the neighbouring kingdom of Bœotia. The Bœotian prince proposed to decide the contest by single combat. Thymætes, though descended from the heroic Theseus, declined the challenge. Melanthus accepted it, prevailed in the conflict, and the sceptre of the deposed Thymætes was his reward.⁷

The fermentation occasioned in Greece by so many expulsions and migrations, expanded itself through the islands and coasts of Asia Minor. Many Peloponnesian fugitives who beheld with indignation the calamities inflicted on their country, flocked to the standard of Penthilus,⁸ a younger brother of Tisamenus, who had taken refuge in Eubœa. Others followed the banners of Cleues and Malaus,⁹ also descendants of Agamemnon. The partizans of all these princes having unsuccessfully traversed the northern parts of Greece in quest of new settlements, finally yielded to the dictates of their enterprising spirit, crossed the Hellespont eighty-eight years after the taking of Troy, and established themselves along the shore of the ancient kingdom of Priam. They gradually diffused their colonies from Cyzicus on the Propontis to the mouth of the river Hermus;¹⁰ which delightful country, together with the isle of Lesbos, thenceforth received the names of Eolis, or Eolia, to denote that its inhabitants belonged to the Eolian branch of the Hollenic race.¹¹

Consequences still more important resulted from the expulsion of the Achæans by the followers of Tisamenus. The ancient inhabitants

¹ Pausan. l. ii. c. xviii.

² Strabo, l. viii. p. 365.

³ Herodot. l. vi. c. lii. Polyb. l. ii. p. 178. Strabo, l. viii. p. 363. Pausan. Argolic. & Isocrat. Panathen.

⁴ Pausan. *ibid.*

⁵ Isocrat. in Archidam.

⁶ Pausan and Strabo, *ibid.*

⁷ Strabo, l. ix. p. 393. Herodot. l. v. c. lxx.

⁸ Strabo, l. ix. p. 402.

⁹ Idem, l. xiii. p. 582, et seq.

¹⁰ Idem, *ibid.* et Herodot. l. i. c. cii.

¹¹ Herodot. l. i. c. cli.

of Achaia, being themselves Ionians, took refuge with their kinsmen in Attica. The Messenian fugitives under Melanthus had sought protection in the same country. The Athenians readily accepted these new accessions of strength, being inspired with a well-founded jealousy of the Dorian conquerors of Peloponnesus, whose ambition early produced that memorable rivalry between the Doric and Ionic race, which

A. C. subsisted to the latest times of the Grecian republic.¹² In the reign of Codrus, 1089.

son of Melanthus, the Dorians had already encroached on the Athenian frontier, and seized the territory of Megara, on the northern coast of the Saronic gulf.¹³ Issuing from their strong holds in that rocky district, from which it was long impossible to dislodge them, they harassed the Athenians in a cruel war, concerning which a superstitious rumour prevailed, that they should finally remain conquerors, provided they abstained from injuring the person of the Athenian king. Codrus, hearing the report, was inspired with the spirit of heroism congenial to his family. Disguising himself in the habit of a peasant, he proceeded to the quarters of the enemy; insulted a Dorian soldier; a combat ensued; Codrus fell;¹⁴ his body was recognised; and the superstitious Peloponnesians, now despairing of success, suspended their hostilities. The inimitable merit of a prince, who had devoted himself to death

A. C. for the safety of his country, furnished the Athenians with a pretence for abolishing the royal authority. None of the 1068.

human race, they declared, was worthy to succeed Codrus; and none but Jupiter should thenceforth reign in Athens.¹⁵ Medon, the eldest son of that admired prince, was appointed first magistrate of the republic, under the humbler title of archon. His brothers Neleus and Androclus, probably dissatisfied with these transactions, determined to leave their country. Their design was approved by the Achæan

A. C. and Messenian refugees, and by many Athenian citizens, who complained that 1055.

Attica was too narrow and barren to maintain the increasing numbers of its inhabitants. The restless spirits in Phocia, Bœotia, and other neighbouring provinces, eagerly joined the emigrants. They sailed to Asia Minor, expelled the ancient inhabitants, a mixed race of Lydians, Carians, and Pelasgi, and seized the central and most beautiful portion of the Asiatic coast.¹⁶ Their colonies were gradually diffused from the banks of the Hermus to the promontory of Posideion. They afterwards took possession of Chios and Samos; and all these countries were united by the common name of Ionia, to denote that the Ionians composed the most numerous division of the colony.¹⁷

During the same turbulent ages, intestine sedition, foreign invasion, or the restless spirit of adventure and rapine, occasioned other import-

ant extensions of Grecian colonization. The most numerous colonies occupied the isles of the Ionian and Egean seas, the southern coast of Italy almost intersected by the former, and the winding shores of Asia Minor¹⁸ so beautifully diversified by the latter. The larger islands of Sicily, Sardinia, and Cyprus, were very anciently planted by Greeks. While the Hellenic stock pushed forth these vigorous shoots towards the east and west, very considerable branches extended towards the north and south. The maritime parts of Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace, themselves abounding in Greek settlements, poured forth new colonies along the European shores of the Propontis and Euxine:¹⁹ and emigrants from Peloponnesus having early established themselves on the opposite coast of Africa, were gradually diffused from the confines of Egypt to the Syrtic gulf.²⁰ The history of all these colonies, some of which rivalled in arts, and others in arms, the glory of the mother country, will merit our attention, in proportion as they emerge from obscurity, and take a station in the general system of Grecian politics.

The Asiatic Greeks, whose affairs first be-

A. C. came intimately connected with those of the mother country, received a con- 994.

siderable accession of strength in consequence of the renewal of hostilities between the Athenians and Dorians. The latter were finally expelled from many of their strong holds in Megara. Disdaining after this misfortune to return into the Peloponnesus, many of them sailed to the islands of Rhodes and Crete, already peopled by Doric tribes; while others transported themselves to the peninsula of Caria, which, in honour of their mother country, received the name of Doris.²¹

In consequence of this establishment, which was formed two hundred and forty years after the Trojan war, the western coast of Asia Minor was planted by the Eolians in the north, the Ionians in the middle, and the Dorians in the south. These original divisions of the Hellenic race retained in their new settlements the peculiarities of accent and dialect, by which they had been respectively distinguished in Europe;²² and which, at the time of their several emigrations, prevailed in Bœotia, Attica, and Lacedæmon. The Bœotians and Lacedæmonians, who claimed the first honours, the one of the Eolic, and the other of the Dorian name, adhered, with little variation, to their ancient dialects: but the Athenians, more ingenious, or fonder of novelty, made such considerable alterations in their writing and pronunciation, as remarkably distinguished them from their Ionian brethren; and thus the same language came to be modified into four subdivisions,²³ or dialects, which may be still recognised in the invaluable remains of Grecian literature.

Of all these innumerable colonies, the Ionians

12 Herodot. et Thucyd. passim.

13 Strabo, l. ix. p. 363.

14 Pausan. l. vii. c. xxv. Justin. l. ii.

15 Pausan. l. vii. c. ii.

16 Herodot. l. i. c. cxlii.

17 Strabo, l. xiv. p. 632. et seq. Pausan. l. vii. c. ii.

18 Thucyd. l. i. et Strabo, passim.

19 Herodot. l. ii. et l. 4.

20 Herodot. l. iv. c. cxlvii. Strabo, l. x. et l. xvii.

21 Strabo, et Pausan. et Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxiii.

22 Herodot. Pont. apud Athenæum, l. xiv.

23 Strabo, l. viii.

will demand our earliest and most studious attention. They settled in a country of great extent and fertility, enjoying the most delicious climate, and peculiarly adapted to a commercial intercourse with the most improved nations of antiquity. Favoured by so many advantages, they silently flourished in peace and prosperity, till their growing wealth and numbers excited the avarice or the jealousy of the powers of Asia. They were successively conquered by the Lydians and Persians, but never thoroughly subdued. Having imbibed the principles of European liberty, they spurned the yoke of Asiatic bondage. In their glorious struggles to re-assume the character of freemen, they solicited and obtained the assistance of their Athenian ancestors, and occasioned that memorable rivalry between the Greeks and Persians, which, having lasted two centuries, ended in the destruction of the Persian empire. In this illustrious contest, the first successor of the Greeks against enemies far more powerful, and incomparably more numerous than themselves, inspired them with an enthusiasm of valour. Their exploits merited not only praise, but wonder,¹ and seemed fit subjects for that historical romance, which, in the progress of literature, naturally succeeds to epic poetry.

The writers who undertook to record and to adorn the trophies of Marathon and Platea, had occasion to look back to the transactions of more remote times. But in taking this retrospect, they discovered, or at least we may discover by their works, that their inquiries began too late to afford much authentic information on that important subject. Yet, imperfect as their relations necessarily are, they serve to explain by what concurrence of favourable circumstances and causes the Greeks adopted those singular institutions, acquired that sense of national honour, and attained those virtues of policy and prowess, which enabled them, by the most splendid series of exploits recorded in history, first to resist, then to invade, and finally to subdue the monarchy of Cyrus.

During the prevalence of those generous, though romantic opinions, which characterised the heroic ages, the authority of kings was founded on religion, supported by gratitude, and confirmed by utility. While they approved themselves worthy ministers of Heaven, they were entitled to due and hereditary honours;² but in the exercise of the regal office, they were bound to respect the rights, the sentiments, and even the prejudices of their subjects. The fatal dictates of ambition and avarice led them to transgress the prescribed limits, and to trample on those laws which their predecessors had held sacred.³ The minute division of landed property, which had already taken place, not only, as above mentioned, in the Peloponnesus, but in the north-

ern provinces of Greece, rendered the nobles and people more sensible of these encroachments, which they must at once boldly resist, or submit for ever to the yoke of oppression. Reduced to this alternative, the Greeks were inclined by disposition, and enabled by situation, to prefer and to maintain the most honourable part. The prerogatives of royalty were not as yet supported by the exclusive right of the sword, by which a particular class of men might intimidate and control the resolutions of their fellow-subjects. The more independent and illustrious citizens, who had been accustomed from the earliest times to come armed to the council or assembly, communicated their grievances, and took proper means to remove them.⁴ Miltas, the fourth Argive prince in succession to Temenus, was condemned to death for usurping absolute power. Monarchy expired more honourably in Attica; it perished still more disgracefully in Arcadia, but was gradually abolished in every province of Greece, except Sparta alone, from the southern extremity of Peloponnesus to the northern frontier of Thessaly.⁵

The important, though remote consequences of this revolution, will be explained in the sequel. Its immediate tendency served only to multiply the evils which it was designed to remedy. Greece, oppressed by its kings, was still more oppressed by its archons, or magistrates;⁶ and, already too much divided under the ancient government, was still more subdivided under the new form of polity. Many inferior cities disdained the jurisdiction of their respective capitals. Several of them affected separate and independent sovereignty. Each town, each district, maintained war with its neighbours; and the fanciful state of nature, according to the philosophy of Hobbes, was actually realized in that distracted country.⁷

From these accumulated disorders, which seemed scarcely capable of augmentation, it is time to turn our view to those events and causes which operated in a contrary direction, and gradually introduced union and happiness. The Dorian conquest of Peloponnesus, otherwise productive of much confusion and bloodshed in that peninsula, greatly extended, however, the salutary influence of the Amphictyonic council. In the northern parts of Greece, this institution, which had been originally intended to prevent foreign invasion, had been found equally useful in promoting domestic concord. The Dorians being constituent members of the council, continued to attend its meetings after they had settled beyond the mountainous isthmus of Corinth. All the provinces which they conquered gradually assumed the same privilege. The Amphictyons thus became a representative assembly of the whole Grecian name, consisting not only of the three original tribes of Ionians, Dorians, and Eolians, but of the several subdivisions of these tribes, and of the various communities

¹ Τα ἔργα μεγάλα καὶ θαυμάσια. Herodot. p. 1. The exploits which he relates, still more than his manner of relating them, render the work of Herodotus the intermediate shade between poetry and history, between Homer and Thucydides.

² Ἐπὶ ἑτοίς γενεαὶ πατρὶ καὶ βασιλείαι. Thucyd. i. i.

³ Thucyd. i. i. p. 10.

⁴ Aristot. Polit. l. iv. c. 13.

⁵ Thucyd. i. i. p. 10.

⁶ Aristot. Polit. l. iv. c. 13. Plut. in Solon.

⁷ Thucyd. ibid.

formed from their promiscuous combination.⁸ Each independent state had a right to send two members, the Pylagoras⁹ and Hieromnem¹⁰ respectively entrusted with the civil and religious concerns of their constituents. The abolition of royalty rendering the independent communities more numerous, increased the number of Amphictyons to about a hundred persons.¹¹ The central city of Delphi, so famous from causes that will be immediately explained, was chosen as a convenient place for holding their vernal assembly; the autumnal was still held at Thermopylæ. An oath, guarded by the most solemn imprecations, was administered to each member, "that he would never subvert any Amphictyonic city, nor stop the courses of its running water, but punish to the utmost of his power those who committed such outrages."¹² Their constituents, however, discovered, on innumerable occasions, that they thought themselves but imperfectly bound by this sacred promise. Every excess of animosity prevailed among the Grecian republics, notwithstanding the interposition of the Amphictyons. Yet it cannot be doubted that their authority tended sometimes to appease, sometimes to moderate contention; and that this respected tribunal, though deficient in coercive power, had a considerable effect to suppress discord, and restrain the barbarities of war.¹³

The Amphictyons gained much consideration, by declaring themselves protectors of the Delphic oracle, which had been growing to importance since the Dorian conquest, and which thenceforth gradually acquired a singular influence on the affairs of Greece. It is seldom possible to explain the rise of institutions derived from the natural passions of men, or founded on prejudices as ancient as the world. The most probable information concerning the origin of Grecian oracles was conveyed to Herodotus,¹⁴ in a thin allegorical veil, by the priests of Dodona, and explained to that inquisitive and ingenious traveller by the priests of Jupiter in Egypt. In the fanciful style of antiquity, a black pigeon flew from the temple of Egyptian Thebes, to Thesprotia in Epirus, perched on a spreading oak, proclaimed with a human voice, that an oracle of Jupiter should be established; and the inhabitants of the

neighbouring hamlet of Dodona obeyed the divine admonition. In plainer language, a female attendant belonging to the temple of Thebes on the Nile, was transported to Epirus by Phœnician pirates, and there sold as a slave. Her Egyptian complexion deserved the epithet of black among the mountaineers of Thesprotia, bordering on the Illyric hordes, who were remarked by the Greek historians for their blooming complexions, active vigour, and longevity.¹⁵ She was said to speak the language of birds, before she understood the Grecian tongue, often distinguished by the appellation of human speech.¹⁶ The enterprising female, though reduced to captivity among those whom she must have regarded as barbarians, did not yield to despair, but dexterously availed herself of the advantages which she derived from her education and her country. In Egypt, superstition had been already reduced into system; and a pretension to prophecy was one of the most successful artifices by which the priests of Thebes long governed the opinions and resolutions of prince and people. Her attendance on the temple had taught her some of the arts by which this pretension was maintained. She chose the dark shade of a venerable oak; delivered mysterious answers to the admiring multitude; her reputation increased; success gained her associates; a temple rose to Jupiter, and was surrounded by houses for his ministers.

This singular institution was imitated, at a very early period, in many provinces of Greece. The various and inconsistent accounts of similar establishments abundantly confirm the antiquity of their origin, and the multiplicity of temples, groves, grottoes, and caverns, in which the favourites of innumerable divinities declared their will to men, proves them no less universal than ancient.¹⁷ During the heroic ages, indeed, as illustrious and pious men believed themselves, on important occasions, honoured with the immediate presence and advice of their heavenly protectors, the secondary information of priests and oracles was less generally regarded and esteemed. But in proportion as the belief ceased that the gods appeared in a human form, or the supposed visits at least of these celestial beings seemed less frequent and familiar, the office of priest became more important and respectable, and the confidence in oracles gradually gained ground. At length, these admired institutions, being considered as the chief and almost only mode of communication with supernatural powers, acquired a degree of influence capable to control every other principle of authority, whether civil or sacred.¹⁸

But these various oracles, though alike founded on ignorance, and raised by deceit, were not equally supported by power and policy. The crafty Cretans (apt scholars of Egypt,) who instituted the worship of the Delphian Apollo,¹⁹ gradually procured the credit

8 The principle divisions were,—1, Ionians, among whom the Athenians held the first rank.—2, The Dorians, among whom the Lacedæmonians held the first rank.—3, The Eolians, among whom the Boeotians held the first rank.—4, Thessalians.—5, Magnesians.—6, Achæans.—7, Phthiotæ.—8, Phœciæ.—9, Malians.—10, Ænians or Cætians.—11, Dolopians.—12, Locrians. Confer Pausan. in Phœciæ. et Æschin. de Falsa Legat.

9 Demosth. de Coron. sect. 51.

10 Suidæ, ad voc.

11 Thirty-one Amphictyonic cities undertook the defence of Greece in the Persian war. (Plutarch. in Themistocl.) The one half of Greece, on that memorable occasion, remained neutral, or sided with the enemy. (Herodot. et Diodor.) If each city sent two members to the Amphictyons, the whole would amount to one hundred and twenty-four. But as some cities enjoyed the right of being represented in that council only in conjunction with others, this might diminish the number of members to that mentioned in the text.

12 Æschin. de Falsa Legat. sect. 35.

13 Plut. in Cimon.

14 Herodot. l. ii. c. 54.

15 Lucian in Macrob.

16 Homer, passim.

17 Strabo, l. viii. p. 352. et p. 418. et Strabo et Pausan. passim.

18 Herodot. Thucyd. et Xenoph. passim.

19 Homer, Hymn. ad Apollin.

of superior veracity to the predictions of the god whom they served. Favourable circumstances concurred; the central situation of Delphi; the vernal session of the Amphictyons; the lustre derived from the immediate protection of that assembly; above all, the uncommon and awful aspect of the place itself, fitted to excite wonder in ages less addicted to superstition.

That branch of the celebrated mount Parnassus, which divides the districts of Phocis and Locris, contained, towards its southern extremity, a profound cavern, the crevices of which emitted a sulphureous vapour, that, powerfully affecting the brain, was deemed capable of inspiring those who breathed it with religious frenzy, and prophetic enthusiasm.¹ Around the principal mouth of the chasm, the city of Delphi arose in the form of a theatre, upon the winding declivity of Parnassus, whose fantastic tops overshadowed it, like a canopy, on the north, while two immense rocks rendered it inaccessible on the east and west, and the rugged and shapeless mount Cirphis defended it on the south.² The foot of the last-named mountain is washed by the rapid Plistus, which discharges itself into the sea at the distance of only a few leagues from the sacred city. This inaccessible and romantic situation, from which the place derived the name of Delphi,³ was rendered still more striking, by the innumerable echoes which multiplied every sound, and increased the ignorant veneration of visitants for the god of the oracle. The artful ministers of Apollo gradually collected such objects in the groves and temple, as were fitted to astonish the senses of the admiring multitude. The splendour of marble, the magic of painting, the invaluable statues of gold and silver, represented (to use the language of antiquity) not the resemblance of any earthly habitation, but rather expressed the image of Olympus, adorned and enlightened by the actual presence of the gods. During the age of Homer, the rich magnificence of Delphi was already proverbial;⁴ and when Xerxes undertook his memorable expedition against Greece, the dedications in this pious treasury, accumulated from the superstition and vanity of Greeks and Barbarians, were held equivalent⁵ to the revenues of the monarch of Asia, who covered the broad Ægean with his fleet, and transported into Europe two millions of armed men.

The protection and superintendence of this precious depository of riches and superstition belonged to the Amphictyons. But the inhabitants of Delphi, who, if we may use the

expression, were the original proprietors of the oracle, always continued to direct the religious ceremonies, and to conduct the important business of prophecy.⁶ It was *their* province alone to determine at what time, and on what occasion, the Pythia should mount the sacred tripod, to receive the prophetic steams, by which she communicated with Apollo. When overflowing with the heavenly inspiration, she uttered the confused words, or rather frantic sounds, irregularly suggested by the impulse of the god; the Delphians collected these sounds, reduced them into order, animated them with sense, and adorned them with harmony. The Pythia, appointed and dismissed at pleasure, was a mere instrument in the hands of those artful ministers, whose character became so venerable and sacred, that they were finally regarded, not merely as attendants and worshippers, but as the peculiar family of the god.⁷ Their number was considerable, and never exactly ascertained, since all the principal inhabitants of Delphi, claiming an immediate relation to Apollo, were entitled to officiate in the rites of his sanctuary; and even the inferior ranks, belonging to that sacred city, were continually employed in dances, festivals, processions, and in displaying all the gay pageantry of an airy and elegant superstition.

The subsequent history of Greece attests the important and salutary influence of the Delphic oracle, which no sooner attained splendour, than it confirmed, by its awful sanction, two institutions, the first religious, the second civil, and both accompanied with very extraordinary consequences. The Olympic games, and Spartan laws, were respectively established by Iphitus and Lycurgus, contemporaries,⁸ friends, both animated by the true spirit of patriotism, and unquestionably the most illustrious characters of the age in which they lived;⁹ yet the roads which they pursued for reaching the same goal, the safety of their respective territories, were so widely different, that while the Olympic games rendered Elis the most pacific, the laws of Lycurgus made Sparta the most warlike, of all the Grecian communities.

It was held an ancient and sacred custom, in the heroic ages, to celebrate the funerals of illustrious men by such shows and ceremonies as seemed most pleasing to their shades. The tombs, around which the melancholy manes were supposed to hover, naturally became the scene of such solemnities. There the fleeting ghosts of departed heroes were entertained and honoured by exhibitions of bodily strength and address;¹⁰ while the gods, though inhabiting

1 Diodor. Sicul. l. xvi. c. 26. et Strab. l. ix. p. 419.

2 Homer has rather painted than described the situation of Pytho, Apollo's temple, at Delphi:

Αὐτὰρ ὑπὲρ θιν
Πύθῃ ὑποκείμεται, πολλὰ δ' ὑποδίδραμι θύοντα, etc.
Hymn. ad Apollin.

3 Δελφός is explained in the glossaries by synonymous words, signifying *solitary*, *alone*.

4 Οὐδ' ὅσσ' αἰνέειν οὐδὲς ἀφ' ἡμετέρων ἐνός πέγνυται.

5 See Dissert. sur l'Oracle de Delph. par Mr. Hardion, Mem. de l'Academ. The comparison was, doubtless, an exaggeration of the wealth of Delphi, which was little known till later times, when the Phocians plundered the temple of near a million sterling, without exhausting its treasures. But of this more hereafter.

6 Strabo, l. ix.

8 Lucian Phalar.

9 Phlegon apud Euseb. Chronic. et Aristot. apud Plutarch. in Lycurg.

10 Lycurgus and Iphitus are commonly supposed to have instituted the Olympic games 108 years before the period to which the Olympiads could be regularly traced. This was 776 years before Christ, when Corcebus won in the foot-race. See Pausan. v. Sir Isaac Newton considers the chronology preceding the victory of Corcebus as so extremely uncertain, that he proposes striking off the imaginary interval between him and Iphitus; which appears the more reasonable, because history is totally silent with regard to any occurrences that must have happened in the intermediate space of 108 years.

11 Iliad, l. xxiii.

7 Strabo, l. ix. p. 419.

the broad expanse¹¹ of heaven, were yet peculiarly worshipped by prayers and sacrifices, in the several places, which sometimes the wildness, and sometimes the elegance of fancy, had assigned for their favourite, though temporary, residence on earth. The lofty chain of Olympus separating the barbarous kingdom of Macedon from the fertile plains of Thessaly, is distinguished by several circumstances, which seemed justly to entitle it to that honour. This long and lofty ridge ascends above the regions of storms and tempests. Its winding sides are diversified by woods, and intersected by torrents. Its fantastic tops, towering above the clouds, reflect, during day, the rays of the sun, and sometimes brighten the gloom of night, with the lambent splendours of the aurora borealis.¹² Olympus came, therefore, to be naturally regarded as the principal terrestrial habitation of the gods; along the recesses of this mountain¹³ each divinity had his appropriate palace; on its highest summit Jupiter often assembled the heavenly council; and from thence, veiled in a white gleam, the protectors of mankind descended, and were visibly manifested to mortal eyes.¹⁴

While Olympus was considered as the general rendezvous of these fanciful beings, it was natural to imagine that the partiality of particular divinities might select other favourite spots of the earth for their separate abode. The singular aspect of Delphi, or Pytho, which recommended it as the seat of the oracle of Apollo, and afterwards of the Pythian games, has already been described. The Corinthian territory was particularly consecrated to Neptune;¹⁵ for where could the god of the sea be more properly worshipped, than on the narrow isthmus, whose shores were adorned by grateful monuments of delivered mariners, and which had continued, from early times, the principal centre of Grecian navigation?

A tradition prevailed, that even before the Dorian conquest, the fruitful and picturesque banks of the Alpheus, in the province of Elis, or Eleia, had been consecrated to Jupiter.¹⁶ It is certain that athletic sports, similar to those described by Homer at the funeral of Patroclus, had been on many occasions exhibited in Elis, by assembled chiefs, with more than ordinary solemnity.¹⁷ The Dorian conquerors are said to have renewed the consecration of that delightful province. But the wars which early prevailed between them and the Athenians, and the jealousies and hostilities which afterwards broke out among themselves,¹⁸ totally interrupted the religious ceremonies and exhibitions with which they had been accustomed to honour their common gods and heroes. Amidst the calamities which afflicted or threatened the Peloponnesus, Iphitus, a descendant

of Oxylus, to whom the province of Eleia had fallen in the general partition of the peninsula, applied to the Delphic oracle. The priests of Apollo, ever disposed to favour the views of kings and legislators, answered agreeably to his wish, that the festivals anciently celebrated at Olympia, on the Alpheus, must be renewed, and an armistice proclaimed for all the states willing to partake of them, and desirous to avert the vengeance of heaven.¹⁹ Fortified by this authority, and assisted by the advice of Lycurgus, Iphitus took measures, not only for restoring the Olympic solemnity, but for rendering it perpetual. The injunction of the oracle was speedily diffused through the remotest parts of Greece, by the numerous votaries who frequented the sacred shrine. The armistice was proclaimed in Peloponnesus, and preparations were made in Eleia, for exhibiting shows and performing sacrifices. In the heroic ages, feats of bodily strength and address were destined to the honour of deceased warriors; hymns and sacrifices were reserved for the gods. But the flexible texture of Grecian superstition, easily confounding the expressions of respectful gratitude and pious veneration, enabled Iphitus to unite both in his new institution.

The festival, which lasted five days, began and ended with a sacrifice to Olympian Jove. The intermediate time was chiefly filled up by the gymnastic exercises, in which all freemen of Grecian extraction were invited to contend, provided they had been born in lawful wedlock, and had lived untainted by any infamous immoral stain. The preparation for this part of the entertainment was made in the gymnasium of Elis, a spacious edifice, surrounded by a double range of pillars, with an open area in the middle. Adjoining were various apartments, containing baths, and other conveniences for the combatants. The neighbouring country was gradually adorned with porticoes, shady walks and groves, interspersed with seats and benches, the whole originally destined to relieve the fatigues and anxiety of the candidates for Olympic fame; and frequented, in later times, by sophists and philosophers, who were fond to contemplate wisdom, and communicate knowledge, in those delightful retreats. The order of the athletic exercises, or combats, was established by Lycurgus, and corresponded almost exactly to that described by Homer, in the twenty-third book of the *Iliad*, and eighth of the *Odyssey*. Iphitus, we are told, appointed the other ceremonies and entertainments; settled the regular return of the festival at the end of every fourth year, in the month of July; and gave to the whole solemnity that form and arrangement, which it preserved with little variation above a thousand years; a period exceeding the duration of the most famous kingdoms and republics of antiquity.²⁰

Such is the account of Grecian writers, who have, doubtless, often ascribed to positive institution many inventions and usages naturally

¹¹ Οὐρανός, ἰστέον. Homer, *passim*.

¹² See the inimitable description in the 6th book of the *Odyssey*, ver. 42.

¹³ Κατὰ πτυχὰς Ὀλύμπου. Along the foldings of Olympus.

¹⁴ Homer, *passim*; and particularly *Iliad*, l. xix. ver. 40.

¹⁵ Pausan. *Corinth. et Strabo*, p. 392.

¹⁶ Pausan. l. v. *passim*, et l. vi. p. 436.

¹⁷ *Iliad*, ii. ver. 697, et *Iliad*, ix. ver. 623.

¹⁸ Pausan. l. v.

¹⁹ Phlegon. apud Euseb.

²⁰ See the authors cited by West, in his *Dissertation on the Olympic Games*.

resulting from the progressive manners of society. When we come to examine the Elia games in their more improved state, together with the innumerable imitations of them in other provinces of Greece, there will occur reasons for believing, that many regulations referred, by an easy solution, to the legislative wisdom of Iphitus or Lycurgus, were introduced by time or accident, continued through custom, improved by repeated trials, and confirmed by a sense of their utility. Yet such an institution as the Olympiad, even in its least perfect form, must have been attended with manifest advantages to society. It is sufficient barely to mention the suspension of hostilities which took place, not only during the celebration of the festival, but a considerable time both before and after it. Considered as a religious ceremony, at which the whole Grecian name were invited, and even enjoined, to assist, it was well adapted to facilitate intercourse, to promote knowledge, to soften prejudice, and to hasten the progress of civilization and humanity. Greece, and particularly Peloponnesus, was the centre from which the adventurous spirit of its inhabitants had diffused innumerable colonies through the surrounding nations. To these widely separated communities, which, notwithstanding their common origin, seem to have lost all connection and correspondence, the Olympiad served as a common bond of alliance, and point of reunion. The celebrity of this festival continually attracted to it the characters most distinguished¹ for genius and enterprise, whose fame would have otherwise been unknown and lost in the boundless extent of Grecian territory. The remote inhabitants, not only of European Greece, but of Asia and Africa, being assembled to the worship of common gods, were formed to the sense of a general interest, and excited to the pursuit of national honour and prosperity. Strangers of similar dispositions might confirm in Elis the sacred and indissoluble ties of hospitality. If their communities were endangered by any barbarous power, they might here solicit assistance from their Grecian brethren. On other occasions they might explain the benefits which, in peace or war, their respective countries were best qualified to communicate. And the Olympic festival might thus serve the purpose of resident ambassadors, and other institutions alike unknown to antiquity.

Iphitus did not, probably, foresee the manifold advantages destined to result from his plan. His main aim was to protect the small principality of Elis against the dreaded invasion of more powerful neighbours. This he effectually accomplished by fencing it round with a wall of sanctity, while his more daring associate fortified Sparta with disciplined valour. Yet Lycurgus had further ends in view, when he proposed those celebrated laws, which were universally admired, but never imitated. Greece in that unfortunate age presented a gloomy picture of domestic discord. The elevated, though romantic, sentiments of

antiquity had ceased to prevail; the heroid character was effaced; and the generous, but often destructive expeditions into foreign lands, were interrupted by less daring, but still more fatal undertakings. The introduction of separate wealth had introduced inequality and ambition. Each petty prince was desirous to exalt his prerogative, and to extend his dominions. The passions of neighbouring princes balanced his desire of conquest. The resistance of his subjects counteracted his usurpations. Every kingdom, almost every city, was torn by a double conflict; dangers threatened on all sides; subjects expelled their kings, and kings became tyrants.²

During these tumultuary scenes, Lycurgus, of the line of Procles, and commonly reckoned the tenth in descent from Hercules, received the Spartan sceptre upon the death of his elder brother Polydectes; but the widow of Polydectes declaring herself pregnant, he resigned the crown, and assumed the title of protector. This delicate attention to justice, rare in that turbulent age, excited just admiration for Lycurgus, which was enhanced by contrast. The ambitious princess, more solicitous to preserve the honours of a queen than desirous to know the tender cares of a mother, secretly intimated to the protector, that, if he consented to marry her, she would engage that no posthumous son of his brother should disappoint his hopes of the succession. Lycurgus feigned to enter into this unnatural project, but exhorted her not to endanger her health by procuring an abortion. When her delivery drew near, he sent trusty persons to attend her, with orders that if she brought forth a son, the infant should be immediately carried to him. This command was obeyed, while he supped with the principal magistrates of the republic. He received the child in his arms, saying, "Spartans, a king is born to you!" Joyous congratulations followed, to commemorate which, the infant was named Chaerelaus, "the people's joy." Notwithstanding the fame redounding to Lycurgus from this transaction, the intrigues of the slighted queen raised a powerful faction against him. He withdrew himself from the gathering storm; and, being yet in early manhood, indulged his inclination for visiting foreign countries; an inclination strongest in liberal minds, and most commendable in ages of rudeness and ignorance, when the faint rays of knowledge must be collected from an extensive surface.

The renowned Island of Crete, which had given birth to the gods and governments of Greece, first attracted his regard. The Cretans still partially adhered to the laws of Minos; but their island never resumed its pristine lustre after the fatal war of Troy. From Crete he sailed to Egypt, and carefully examined the civil and religious polity of that ancient kingdom. Despising the terrors of the sea, as well as the fatigues and dangers of unexplored journeys through barbarous or desert countries, he is said to have reached the populous and flourishing kingdoms of the east:

¹ Pindar, *passim*.

² Thucyd. l. i. Plut. in *Lycurg.*

nor, could we trust the partial evidence of his countryman Aristocrates,³ did the remote provinces of India escape his observation. He returned by the coast of Asia Minor, and observed, with equal astonishment and satisfaction, the numerous Greek colonies that had risen with such sudden splendour on the western coast of that valuable peninsula. The numerous advantages derived from this extensive view of men and manners, moulded by such a wide variety of religious, political, and military institutions, were all eclipsed by one discovery—the immortal poems of Homer, unknown to the Dorian conquerors of Peloponnesus, but carefully preserved among the Eolians and Ionians, whose ancestors they celebrated. Lycurgus collected these invaluable compositions; arranged the several parts; transcribed and transported them to Sparta,⁴ where, after two centuries of wars and revolutions, the customs as well as the sentiments described by the divine poet had been obliterated and forgotten.

Neither the astonishing invention of Homer, nor his inimitable fancy, nor the unrivalled copiousness, energy, and harmony of his style, so powerfully excited the discerning admiration of Lycurgus, as the treasures of his political and moral knowledge, which, being copied from the bright originals of a heroic age, might be employed to reform the abuses of a degenerate indeed, but not totally corrupted, nation. By restoring, in particular, the moderate spirit of policy which prevailed in happier times, the Spartan legislator might avert the most imminent dangers that threatened his family and his country. The royal families of Argos, Athens, and Thebes, had been reluctantly expelled by the resentment or caution of their injured or jealous subjects, who regretted that the regal power was so apt to degenerate into a system of oppression. The misfortunes which had abolished the honours, and almost extinguished the race of Atreus, Œdipus, Theseus, and so many other kings and heroes of antiquity, must pursue, and might soon overtake, the descendants of Hercules, whom the seasonable laws of Lycurgus maintained, during seven centuries, on the Spartan throne. The accumulation of private wealth, together with the natural progress of arts and luxury, would gradually render the possessions of the Greeks more tempting prizes to rapacity and ambition, in proportion to the decay of that courage and discipline, which were requisite to their defence. The fertile plains of Laconia might

again be ravaged by the arms of some uncultivated, but warlike tribe; Sparta might suffer similar calamities to those which she afterwards inflicted on Messene, and the alternative of dominion or servitude depended on the early institutions that should be respectively embraced by so many neighbouring and independent, and therefore rival, communities.

The sagacity of Lycurgus thus contemplating the relations and interests of his country and his family, regarded martial spirit and political liberty as the great ends of his legislation. These important objects had been attained by the primitive institutions so faithfully described by Homer. Lycurgus determined to imitate the simple beauty of that illustrious model; and, to the end that the Spartan constitution might enjoy a degree of permanence and stability which the *heroic policies* had not possessed, he resolved to avoid the rocks on which *they* had shipwrecked, to extinguish the ambition of distant or extensive conquest, to level the inequality of fortune, to crush the baneful effects of wealth and luxury; in one word, to arrest the progress of what is called the refinement, but what seemed to the manly discernment of this legislator, the corruption, of human society.

To form such a design was the work of no vulgar mind; to carry it into execution required the most strenuous exertions of perseverance and courage. Yet, even at this distance of time, we may discover several favourable circumstances, which seasonably conspired with the views of Lycurgus; we may discover in the gradual display of his system, how the first institutions naturally paved the way for those which succeeded them; and while we admire the genius and the virtue, we must also acknowledge the dexterity and the fortune, of the Spartan legislator.

The experience of history (and particularly the history which we have undertaken to record) attests the extraordinary revolution which one bold, wise, and disinterested man may produce in the affairs of the community of which he is a member. The domestic disorders which multiplied in Sparta after the departure of Lycurgus, obliged all ranks of men to look up to his abilities for protection. The animated declamations of Thales, a poet whom he had carried with him from Crete, and who rehearsed, with rapturous ecstasy, the verses of Homer and his own, singularly disposed the minds of men for adopting his proposed regulations.

But neither these propitious circumstances, nor the merit of ten years travel in pursuit of moral knowledge and improvement, nor the ties of blood, of friendship, and of gratitude, which confirmed the influence of Lycurgus among the principal inhabitants of Sparta, could have enabled this great man to establish his plan of government, without the friendly co-operation of the Delphic oracle; which, since the decay of the heroic opinions and belief, had become the sovereign umpire of Greece. The Pythia addressed him in terms of the highest respect; hesitated whether to call him a god or a man, but rather deemed him a divinity; approved the general spirit of the institutions which he pro-

³ Apud Plutarch. in Lycurg.

⁴ This fact is generally acknowledged; yet Plutarch tells us, that some writers were absurd enough to relate that Lycurgus lived soon after Homer, and others, that he had actually seen the divine poet. Homer describes the Peloponnesus with such accuracy, that the geographer Strabo follows him, as it were, step by step, through that peninsula. It is incredible, therefore, that he, who was so perfectly acquainted with that part of Greece, should have been totally forgotten there soon after his own times. Homer, it has been often observed, preserves a remarkable silence about himself; yet his antiquity, were it not sufficiently evident from the internal proofs above mentioned, might be proved from *Odys.* l. i. ver. 351. and particularly from *Iliad* l. xx. ver. 308. He flourished before the return of the *Heracleidae*, eighty years after the taking of Troy; a revolution which, had it happened before his time, could not have escaped his notice.

posed to establish; and promised to furnish him, as occasion might require, with such additional regulations, as (when adopted by the Spartans) would render their republic happy and immortal. Fortified by this authority, Lycurgus proceeded with a daring yet skilful hand, first, to new-model the government; secondly, to regulate wealth and possessions; thirdly, to reform education and manners: judiciously pursuing this natural order of legislation, because men are less jealous of power than tenacious of property, and less tenacious of property itself, than of their ancient usages and customs.¹

The first rhetra,² or laws which he established, tended to restore the mild moderation of mixed government, which distinguished the heroic ages. They confirmed the hereditary honours, but abolished the despotism,³ of kings: they enforced the dutiful obedience, but vindicated the liberty, of subjects. Of the reigning princes, Chærelaus owed to Lycurgus his throne and his life, and Archelaus deemed it dangerous to oppose his projects. Instructed by the fatal experience of neighbouring tyrants, they were both easily prevailed on to prefer a secure, though limited, to an absolute, but precarious reign. The superstition of the people could not decline the authority of the legislator, when confirmed by the respected command of Apollo; and the interest of the nobles engaged them unanimously to promote his measures. With this illustrious body, consisting of twenty-eight chiefs, the most distinguished in the tribes and cities of Lyconia, Lycurgus consulted by what means to prevent the political dissensions from settling in the despotism of kings, or in the insolence of democracy. By his new regulations the ancient honours of the nobility were confirmed and extended. They were formed into a permanent council, or senate, which examined all matters of government before they were proposed to the deliberation of the people. The kings were entitled, as in the heroic ages, to be the hereditary presidents of this national tribunal; which, as in all important questions, it possessed a negative before debate; as the members were chosen for life; and as, on the decease of any senator, his son or nearest kinsman was naturally substituted in his stead, might have soon arrogated to itself the whole legislative as well as executive authority.

In order to counteract this dangerous tendency, Lycurgus instituted the ephori,⁴ five annual magistrates, invested with a temporary power to inspect and control the administration of government, and to maintain the spirit and vigour of the established constitution. To the ephori

it belonged to convoke, prorogue, and dissolve the greater and lesser assemblies of the people, the former composed of nine thousand Spartans, inhabitants of the capital, the latter of thirty thousand Lacedæmonians, inhabitants of the inferior towns and villages. By frequently convening such numerous bodies of men, who had arms in their hands, they rendered them sensible of their own strength. The Lacedæmonians felt themselves entitled not only to execute the just, but to thwart the unjust, orders of the senate. Nor was their liberty endangered by the limited prerogative of the kings, who monthly exchanged with the ephori solemn oaths; the former swearing for themselves to observe the laws of Sparta, the latter⁵ for the people whom they represented, to maintain the hereditary honours of the Herculean race, to respect them as ministers of religion, to obey them as judges in peace, and to follow them as leaders in war.⁶

This equitable distribution of power was accompanied, we are told, with an exact division of property. At the distance of five centuries it was the current tradition in Greece, that Lycurgus had totally altered the situation and circumstances of his countrymen, by the introduction of an agrarian law, similar to that which has been so often, but always so ineffectually, proposed in other republics, as the surest foundation of liberty and happiness. Yet the equal division of lands, or, in other words, the community of landed property, and the annual partition of the harvest, took place among the original inhabitants of Greece, as well as among the freeborn warriors of ancient Germany. It may be supposed therefore, with a high degree of probability, that the Spartans, in the time of Lycurgus, still preserved some traces of their primitive institutions, and that their minds were comparatively untainted with the vices of avarice and luxury. To bring them back, however, to the perfect simplicity of the heroic ages, and to prevent their future degeneracy, the territory of Laconia was divided into thirty-nine thousand portions, each producing eighty-two medimni, or bushels, of barley, with a proportional measure of fruits, wine, and oil. The rich pasture ground was probably left in common. The kings, as in the age of Homer, enjoyed their separate⁷ domain, conferred by the voluntary gratitude of their subjects. The senators, contented with an increase of power and honour, neither obtained nor desired any pre-eminence of fortune. Their moderation in this respect afforded a salutary example to the people, the greater part of whom would naturally be gainers by the agrarian law, while the few who were rich, for that relative term always implies the

1 The only dangerous opposition that he met with, was occasioned by his laws respecting these objects. A tumult being excited, the insolent Alcander wounded him in the face, by which Lycurgus lost the sight of an eye. But the persuasive eloquence of the legislator quelled the sedition, and his moderation converted Alcander from a violent opposer to a strenuous partisan. Plut. in Lycurg.

2 The word is synonymous with oracula, fata; by which names his laws were distinguished as the immediate dictates and inspirations of heaven.

3 The difference between the βασιλεια, or royalties of the heroic ages, and the τυραννις of succeeding times, is explained by Aristot. Politic. et Xenoph. Repub. Spart.

4 Their name, denoting overseers, or inspectors, properly describes their office.

5 The authority of Herodotus, l. i. and of Xenophon de Repub. Spart. refutes Aristot. Polit. l. ii. c. 5. and Plutarch, in Lycurg. The last mentioned writers refer the institution of the ephori to Theopompus, who lived 130 years after Lycurgus. But this assertion only proves that neither Aristotle nor Plutarch had sufficiently entered into the views of the Spartan legislator. The ephori, as it appears from Xenophon and Herodotus, and from the whole transactions of Sparta, formed an essential part of his plan.

6 Xenoph. Ibid.

7 The τειμενος. Xenophon tells us, that it was always well watered; it probably consisted, as in Homer's time, φυτὰ ληνς καὶ μεσσηες, of plantations and corn land.

smaller number, submitted without resistance to the wisdom of Lycurgus, and the authority of Apollo.

The equal division of land seemed not alone sufficient to introduce an equality in the manner of life, and to banish the seeds of luxury. The accumulation of moveable, or what the Greeks called invisible property,⁸ might enable the rich to command the labour of the poor, and, according to the natural progress of wants and inventions, must encourage the dangerous pursuit of elegance and pleasure. The precious metals had long been the ordinary measures of exchange in Sparta, and, could we credit a very doubtful tradition, had greatly accumulated in private hands. Lycurgus withdrew from farther circulation all this gold and silver, a considerable part of which probably repaid his gratitude to the Delphic oracle, while the remainder increased the splendour of the Lacedæmonian temples. Instead of these precious metals, the Spartans received pieces of iron, which had been heated red in the fire, and afterwards quenched in vinegar, in order to render them brittle, and useless for every other purpose but that of serving as the current specie.

Astonishing, say Xenophon and Plutarch, were the effects of this operation. With the banishment of gold and silver were banished all the pernicious appetites which they excite, and all the frivolous arts which they introduce and nourish. Neither fortune-teller, nor physician, nor sophist, were longer to be seen in Sparta; gaudy trinkets and toys, and all useless finery in dress and furniture, at once disappeared; and the innocence and dignity of Spartan manners corresponded with the primitive simplicity of the iron money. But to reduce to the standard of truth or probability this very fanciful description, it may be observed, that the usefulness and scarcity of iron rendered it, in early times, a very ordinary and convenient measure of exchange. As such it was frequently employed, in the heroic ages;⁹ as such it long continued at Byzantium,¹⁰ and other Grecian cities.¹¹ The necessity of cooling it in acid, in order to diminish its worth, indicates its high value even in the time of Lycurgus. The alteration of the specie, therefore, probably appeared not so violent a measure as later writers were inclined to represent it; nor could the abolition of gold and silver abolish such elegances and refinements as surely had no existence in Greece, during the age of the Spartan legislator. But it may reasonably be believed, that the use of iron money, which continued permanent in Sparta alone, after the vices of wealth and luxury had polluted the rest of Greece, necessarily repelled from the republic of Lycurgus the votaries of pleasure, as well as the slaves of gain, and all the miserable retinue of vanity and folly.

That wealth is little to be coveted, even by the most selfish, which neither gratifies vanity, nor flatters the desire of power, nor promises

the means of pleasure. Upon the smallest abstraction, if avarice were at all capable of abstraction, the most sordid might sympathize with the contempt for superfluous riches, which could never be applied to any purpose, either useful or agreeable. What effort could the generosity of that people require (if the indifference of the Spartans deserve the name of generosity,) among whom all valuable objects were equally divided, or enjoyed in common?¹²—among whom it was enjoined by the laws and deemed honourable by the citizens, freely to communicate their arms, horses, instruments of agriculture and hunting; to eat together at common and frugal tables, agreeably to the institutions of Crete, as well as the practice of the heroic ages; to disregard every distinction but that of personal merit; to despise every luxury but that of temperance; and to disdain every acquisition but that of the public esteem?

The general and firm assent to the divine mission of Lycurgus might excite the most generous and manly sentiments in the minds of his countrymen. The persuasive force of his eloquence, assisted by the lyric genius of Thales, a poet worthy of Apollo and his missionary,¹³ might enable the legislator to complete his beneficial and extensive plan. But there was reason to apprehend lest the system of Lycurgus, like most schemes of reformation, should evaporate with the enthusiasm which produced it, unless the mortifications which it enjoined were rendered habitual to practice, and familiar to fancy. His laws were few and short; for the sake of memory they were conceived in verse; they were not consigned to writing, but treasured in the hearts of his disciples as the immediate dictates of heaven. The Lacedæmonians were severely prohibited from the contagious intercourse of strangers, except at the stated returns of religious solemnities. Lycurgus, who had assisted Iphitus in restoring the Olympic games, instituted similar, though less splendid, festivals in his native country. When unemployed in the serious business of war, the Lacedæmonians were continually engaged in assemblies for conversation and the gymnastic exercises, or in religious and military amusements. Agriculture and the mechanic arts were left to the servile hands of the Helots, under which appellation were comprehended (as will be explained hereafter) various hostile communities that successively fell under the dominion of Sparta, and whose personal labour was regarded as the common property of the public.¹⁴ The sciences of war and government were recommended by the laws of Lycurgus, as the only pursuits deserving the attention of free-men.

In the knowledge and practice of war, the Lacedæmonians (if we believe Xenophon, who had fought with and against them) far excelled all Greeks and barbarians. Courage, the

⁸ Οὐραία ἀφάρτης. See Lysias, *passim*.

⁹ Homer, *passim*.

¹⁰ Aristoph. *Nubes*.

¹¹ Plut. in *Lysand*.

¹² Xenoph. in *Lysand*. c. vi.

¹³ Plut. in *Lycurg*.

¹⁴ Καὶ τρεπὸν τινὰ δημοσίου εἶχον δούλους. "And in some measure, they," the Lacedæmonians, "had public slaves" Strabo. See likewise Aristot. *Repub*. l. ii. c. 5.

first quality of a soldier, was enlivened by every motive that can operate most powerfully on the mind, while cowardice was branded as the most odious and destructive of crimes, on the principle that it tended, not like many other vices, merely to the hurt of individuals, but to the servitude and ruin of the community. The Spartans preserved the use of the same weapons and defensive armour that had been adopted in the heroic ages; shortening only the length, and thereby improving the form of the sword, which was two-edged, pointed, massy, and fitted either by cutting or thrusting to inflict a dangerous wound.¹ Their troops were divided into regiments, consisting of five hundred and twelve men, subdivided into four companies, and each of these into smaller divisions, commanded by their respective officers; for it was peculiar to the Lacedæmonian armies to contain, comparatively, few men not entrusted with some share of subordinate command.² The soldiers were attended by a multitude of artisans and slaves, who furnished them with all necessary supplies, and accompanied by a long train of priests and poets, who flattered their hopes, and animated their valour. A body of cavalry always preceded their march; sensible of the weakness of angles, they encamped in a circular form: the order of their guards and watches was highly judicious; they employed, for their security, outposts and videttes; and regularly, every morning and evening, performed their customary exercises. Xenophon has described with what facility they wheeled in all directions; converted the column of march into an order of battle; and by skilful and rapid evolutions, presented the strength³ of the line to an unexpected assault. When *they* found it prudent to attack, the king, who usually rose before dawn, to anticipate, by early prayer and sacrifice,⁴ the favour of the gods, communicated his orders to charge in a full line, or in columns, according to the nature of the ground, and the numbers and disposition of the enemy. In the day of battle, the Spartans assumed an unusual gayety of aspect; and displayed, in their dress and ornaments, more than their wonted splendour. Their long hair was arranged with simple elegance; their scarlet uniforms, and brazen armour, diffused a lustre around them. As they approached the enemy, the

king sacrificed anew; the music struck up; and the soldiers advanced with a slow and steady pace, and with a cheerful but deliberate countenance, to what they were taught to regard as the noblest employment of man. Proper officers were appointed to receive the prisoners, to divide the spoil, and to decide the contested prizes of valour. Both before and after, as well as during, the action, every measure was conducted with such order and celerity, that a great captain declares, that when he considered the discipline of the Spartans, all other nations appeared but children in the art of war.⁵

But that continual exercise in arms, which improved the skill and confirmed the valour, must gradually have exhausted the strength of Sparta, unless the care of population had formed an object of principal concern in the system of Lycurgus. Marriage was directly enjoined by some very singular institutions;⁶ but still more powerfully encouraged by extirpating its greatest enemies, luxury and vanity. But Lycurgus, not contented with maintaining the populousness of Sparta, endeavoured to supply the past generation with a nobler and more warlike race, and to enlarge and elevate the bodies and minds of men to that full proportion of which their nature is susceptible. The credulous love of wonder has always been eager to assert, what the vanity of every age has been unwilling to believe, that the ancient inhabitants of the world possessed a measure of size and strength, as well as of courage and virtue, unattainable and unknown amidst the corruptions and degeneracy of later times. The frequent repetition of the same romantic tale renders giants and heroes familiar and insipid personages in the remote history of almost every people: but from the general mass of fable, a just discernment will separate the genuine ore of Homer and Lycurgus. The laws of the latter brought back the heroic manners which the former had described; and their effects, being not less permanent than salutary, are, at the distance of many centuries, attested by eye-witnesses, whose unimpeached veracity declares the Spartans superior to other men in the excellences of mind and body.⁷

Of this extraordinary circumstance, the evidence of contemporary writers could scarcely convince us, if they had barely mentioned the fact, without explaining its cause. But in describing the system of Lycurgus, they have not omitted his important regulations concerning the intercourse between the sexes, women, marriage, and children, whose welfare was, even before their birth, a concern to the republic. The generous and brave, it is said, produce the brave and good; but the physical qualities of children still more depend on the constitution of their parents. In other coun-

¹ Vid. Pollax, voc. ζυγλον.

² Thucydides, who remarks this peculiarity, l. v. p. 390. assigns the reason of it, that the care of the execution might pertain to many. The whole Lacedæmonian army, except a few, consisted, he says, in *μεχοντες; μεχοντων, και το επιμελις του δρωμενου πολλοις προσηκει*. It is necessary to observe, that the account given by Thucydides, in this passage, of the composition of the Lacedæmonian armies, differs materially from that of Xenophon. I have preferred the latter, first, because Xenophon writes expressly on the subject, of which Thucydides speaks incidentally in describing a particular battle; secondly, because the observations of Xenophon relate to the age of Lycurgus, those of Thucydides to the time of the Peloponnesian war; thirdly, because, as will appear in the sequel, Xenophon had a better opportunity than any other stranger, of being thoroughly acquainted with the affairs of Lacedæmon.

³ The Lacedæmonian tactics will be explained more particularly hereafter.

⁴ Ον χει παννυχιον ιουδιν βουλευμενον ποδεν

Οι λοχοι ιερισταιροφισται και τωσση μιμηται.

Lycurgus, never losing sight of Homer, converted his advice into laws.

⁵ Xenoph. de Repub. Spart.

⁶ Bachelors were debarred from assisting at the female dances. They were compelled to walk naked through the streets in the winter solstice, singing a ludicrous song, which confessed the justice of their punishment.

⁷ As to the mind, the Spartans were, says Xenophon, *ιυπισθιστοι, και παιδαμονιστοι, και αυδοι ευχεστιστοι*. Ib. c. lii. And as to the body, *Διαφερωντας και κατω μεγαθος και κατω ισχυον αυδρας εν Σπαρτη απιστοι*. Ib.

tries of Greece, the men were liberally formed by war, hunting, and the gymnastic exercises; but the women were universally condemned to drudge in sedentary and ignoble occupations, which enfeebled the mind and body. Their chief employment was to superintend, more frequently to perform, the meanest offices of domestic economy, and to prepare, by the labour of their hands, food and raiment for themselves and families. Their diet was coarse and sparing; they abstained from the use of wine; they were deprived of liberal education, and debarred from fashionable amusements. Women, thus degraded by servility, appeared incapable of giving good sons to the republic, which Lycurgus regarded as the principal duty of the Lacedæmonian females. By the institutions of Sparta, therefore, the working of wool, the labours of the loom and needle, and other mean mechanical arts, were generally committed to servile hands. The free-born women enjoyed and practised those liberal exercises and amusements, which were elsewhere considered as the peculiar privilege of men; they assisted at the public solemnities, mingled in general conversation, and dispensed that applause and reproach, which dispensed by them, are always most effectual.⁸ Hence they became not only the companions but the judges of the other sex; and, except that their natural delicacy was not associated to the honours of war, they enjoyed the benefit, without feeling the restraint, of the Spartan laws.

The restoration of the natural rights of women restored moderation and modesty in the intercourse between the sexes. Marriage, though enjoined as a duty, could only be contracted in the full vigour of age; and these simple institutions had a more salutary influence on the physical improvement of the Spartans, than either the doubtful expedient, which prevailed among them to the latest times, of adorning the women's apartments with the finest statues of gods and heroes, that, by frequently contemplating these graceful images, they might produce fairer offspring; or the unnatural and detestable cruelty of exposing delicate or deformed children, a practice strongly recommended by Lycurgus, and silently approved, or faintly blamed, by the greatest philosophers of antiquity.

Even in a moral view, the character of Spartan mothers must have been highly beneficial to their sons; since much of the happiness of life depends on the first impressions of our tender years. When boys were emancipated from the jurisdiction of women, they were not entrusted, as in other parts of Greece, to the mercenary tuition of slaves, who might degrade their sentiments, and corrupt their morals. The education of youth, as an office of the highest confidence, was committed to those who had enjoyed, or who were entitled to enjoy, the most splendid dignities of the

republic; after the example of ancient times, when Phoenix educated Achilles, and when it was reasonably required that the master should himself possess the virtues with which he undertook to inspire his disciples. The Spartan youth were taught music and drawing: the former of which comprehended the science not only of sounds, but of number and quantity: they were taught to read and speak their own language with graceful propriety; to compose in prose and in verse; above all, to think, and in whatever they said, even during the flow of unguarded conversation, to accommodate the expression to the sentiment.⁹ Their sedentary studies were relieved by the orchestric and gymnastic exercises, the early practice of which might qualify them for the martial labours of the field. For this most important business of their manhood, they were still further prepared, by being inured, even in their tender years, to a life of hardship and severity. They wore the same garment, summer and winter; they walked bare-footed in all seasons; their diet was plain and frugal, and for the most part so sparing, that they lost no opportunity to supply the defect. What they were unable to ravish by force, they acquired by fraud. When their theft (if theft can be practised where separate property is almost unknown) was discovered, they were severely punished; but if their dexterous deceit escaped observation, they were allowed to boast of their success, and met with due applause for their activity, vigilance, and caution; which indicated a character well fitted to excel in the useful stratagems of war.¹⁰

After attaining the ordinary branches of education, youth are frequently left the masters of their own actions. Of all practical errors, Lycurgus deemed this the most dangerous. His discernment perceived the value of that most important period of life, which intervenes between childhood and virility; and the whole force of his discipline was applied to its direction and improvement. Instead of being loosened from the usual ties of authority, the Spartans, at the age of adolescence, were subjected to a more rigorous restraint; and the most extraordinary expedients were employed to moderate the love of pleasure, to correct the insolence of inexperience, and to control the headstrong impetuosity of other youthful passions. Their bodies were early familiarized to fatigue, hunger, and watching; their minds were early accustomed to difficulty and danger. The laborious exercise of the chase formed their principal amusement; at stated times, the magistrates took an account of their actions, and carefully examined their appearance. If the seeds of their vicious appetites had not been thoroughly eradicated by a life of habitual toil and temperance, they were subjected to corporal punishment, which it was their custom to endure with patient fortitude. The maxims

⁸ This, likewise, was the business of women in the heroic ages.

Ἀλλὰ πολλὰ αἶνεος
Αἰδῶμαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρῳάδας ἰλαρίστους,
Αἶμα, καὶ ὡς, ὑσφιν αὐτοκτεζὸν πολέμοιο.

Il. i. vi. ver. 443.

⁹ In the smart pithy sentences, or apophthegms, for which the Spartans were famous, the thought is sometimes elegant, and sometimes ingenious; but their merit depends for the most part on the observance of the rule in the text. See Plat. Apoph.

¹⁰ Besides Xenophon and Plutarch, see, for the Spartan education, Plato in Protagor.

of honour were instilled by precept, and enforced by example. The public tables, which were frequented by all ages, served as so many schools of wisdom and virtue, where, on ordinary occasions, but more particularly on days of festivity, the old related their ancient exploits, and boasted their past prowess; those in the vigour of life displayed the sentiments which their manly courage inspired; and the young expressed a modest confidence that, by steadfastly adhering to the precepts of Lycurgus, they might be enabled in due time to equal, perhaps to surpass, the glory of both.

But the desire of emulating the fame of their illustrious ancestors was not the most ardent principle that animated the minds of the rising generation. They were taught to vie with each other in every agreeable and useful accomplishment. As they were publicly educated in separate classes, according to their respective ages of childhood, adolescence, and puberty,¹ their characters were exactly ascertained and fully known; and the rewards and honours gradually bestowed on them, were apportioned to the various degrees of excellence which they had previously discovered. When they attained the verge of manhood, three youths of superior merit were named by the ephori, that they might respectively choose, each a hundred of their companions, who should be entitled to the honourable distinction of serving in the cavalry. The reasons of preference and rejection were openly explained; and the youths who had been set aside, became, from that moment, the rivals and opponents both of the electors and of the elected. At home and abroad, in the assemblies for conversation and exercise, in the gymnastic and musical contests, in their military expeditions, as well as their martial amusements, the two parties displayed the utmost emulation and ardour, the one to regain the equality which they had lost, the other to maintain their ascendant. They seldom rencountred in the streets or walks, without discovering their animosity in mutual reproaches, and sometimes in blows. But these quarrels were not dangerous, either to the safety of the public, or to the persons of individuals, because the combatants were obliged to separate (under the pain of punishment and disgrace) at the peaceful summons of every by-stander; and the respected admonitions of age controlled, on such occasions, the youthful fermentation of turbulent passions.

The reverence of aged wisdom, which formed the prevailing sentiment of the heroic times, was restored by the legislation of Lycurgus, and employed as a main pillar of his political edifice. The renovation of limited government, the equal partition of lands, and the abolition of wealth and luxury, had removed the artificial sources of half the miseries and disgrace of human kind. But Lycurgus considered his system as incomplete, until he levelled not only the artificial, but many of the natural inequalities, in the condition of his fellow-citizens.

¹ I have chosen these words to express the successive ages of the *παις*, *νεανίσκος*, *εφηβος*. They continued *νεανίσκος* till 46, which was reckoned by the Greeks and Romans the beginning of old age. Vid. Cic. de Senectute.

The fears and infirmities of the old were compensated by honour and respect; the hopes and vigour of the young were balanced by obedience and restraint. The difference of years thus occasioned little disproportion of enjoyment; the happiness of every age depended on the practice of virtue; and as all adventitious and accidental distinctions were removed, men perceived the importance of personal merit, and of its reward, the public esteem, and eagerly grasped the advantages which glory confers; the only exclusive advantages which the laws of Lycurgus permitted them to enjoy. The paternal authority,² which maintained the discipline, and promoted the grandeur of Rome, was firmly established at Sparta, where every father might exercise an unlimited power, over not only his own, but the children of others, who were all alike regarded as the common sons of the republic. This domestic superiority naturally prepared the way for civil pre-eminence; the elective dignities of the state were obtained only by men of experienced wisdom; and it required sixty years of laborious virtue to be entitled to a seat in the senate-house, the highest ambition of the Spartan chiefs. Such regulations, of which it is impossible to mistake the spirit, had a direct tendency to produce moderation and firmness in the public councils, to control the too impetuous ardour of a warlike people, to allay the ferment of domestic faction, and to check the dangerous ambition of foreign conquest. The power of the magistrate was confounded with the authority of the parent; they mutually assisted and strengthened each other, and their united influence long upheld the unshaken fabric of the Spartan laws, which the old felt it their interest to maintain, and the young deemed it their glory to obey.

Such were the celebrated institutions of Lycurgus, which are eminently distinguished by the simplicity of their design, the exact adaptation of their parts, and the uniform consistence of the whole, from the political establishments of other countries, which are commonly the irregular and motley production of time and accident. Without a careful examination of the whole system, it is impossible to seize the spirit of particular laws. But if the whole be attentively considered, we shall perceive that they contain nothing so original or so singular as is generally believed. From the innumerable coincidences that have been remarked between the heroic and the Spartan discipline, there seems sufficient ground to conclude that the one was borrowed from the other; and if we accurately contemplate the genius of both, we may discern that they tended, not (as has been often said) to stop and interrupt, but only to divert, the natural current of human propensities and passions. The desire of wealth and of power, of effeminate ease, of frivolous amusements, and of all the artificial advantages and enjoyments of society, are only so many ramifications of the love of action and of pleasure; passions which it would be impossible to eradicate without destroying the whole vigour

² The "patria potestas."

of the mind. Yet these propensities, which it is often the vain boast of philosophy to subdue, policy may direct to new and more exalted objects. For the sordid occupations of interest, may be substituted the manly pursuits of honour; the love of virtuous praise may control the desire of vicious indulgence; and the impressions of early institution, confirmed by example and habit, may render the great duties of life its principal employment and pleasure.

Such a condition of society seems the highest elevation and grandeur to which human nature can aspire. The Spartans attained, and long preserved, this state of exaltation; but several circumstances and events, which the wisdom of Lycurgus³ had foreseen, but which no human power could prevent, undermined the foundation of their greatness and felicity. Their military prowess gave them victory, slaves, and wealth; and though individuals could feel only the pride of virtue, and enjoy only the luxury of glory, the public imbibed the spirit of rapacity and the ambition of conquest. As in other countries the vices of individuals corrupt the community, in Laconia the vices of the public corrupted individuals. This unfortunate tendency was increased by the inequality of the cities originally subject to the Lacedæmonian laws. Sparta, the capital, contained nearly a fourth part of the inhabitants of the whole territory; the rest were divided among thirty, and afterwards eighteen, subordinate towns.⁴ The superior numbers of the Spartans enlarged their sphere of competition, and increased their ardour of emulation. They soon surpassed their neighbours, not only in valour and address, but in dignity and in power. All matters of importance were decided in the lesser assembly; the greater was seldom summoned; and the members of the former, instead of continuing the equals, became the masters, and at length the tyrants, of their Lacedæmonian brethren. The usurpation of power fomented their desire of wealth; several lots were accumulated by the same persons as early as the Persian war;⁵ and the necessity of defending their possessions, and their authority, against men who had arms in their hands and resentment in their hearts, rendered their government uncommonly rigid

and severe. The slaves, the freedmen,⁶ the tenants of the Laconic territory, and even such of the inhabitants of the capital as, on account of their poverty, cowardice, or any other disgraceful circumstance, were debarred from the dignities of the republic,⁷ testified the keenest animosity against the stern pride of the Spartan magistrates, and, to use the lively but indelicate expression of Xenophon, would have devoured them raw.⁸ The Spartans, however, still maintained their superiority by force or by fraud, by seasonable compliance, or by prompt and judicious severity. By dividing the strength they disarmed the fury of their enemies, and the flames of domestic discord were eclipsed by the splendour of foreign conquest, by which both the magistrates and the subjects were enriched and corrupted: yet, amidst civil discord and political degeneracy, they still preserved their religious and military institutions, as well as their invaluable plan of education; and their transactions, even in the latest ages of Greece, will furnish an ample and honourable commentary on the laws of Lycurgus.

Concerning this extraordinary man, only one farther⁹ circumstance is recorded with any appearance of authenticity; a circumstance highly descriptive both of his own character, and of that of the age in which he lived. Having beheld the harmony of the political machine, which he had so skilfully contrived, he summoned an assembly, and declared, that now he had but one new regulation to propose, upon which, however, it was first necessary to consult the oracle of Delphi; that, meanwhile, his countrymen, who had seen the success of his labours, would engage that no alterations should take place before his return. The kings, the senate, and the people, ratified the engagement by a solemn oath. Lycurgus undertook his journey; the oracle predicted the happiness which the Spartans should enjoy under his admirable laws; the response was transmitted to his country, where Lycurgus himself determined never more to return, convinced that the duration of the government which he had established would be better secured by the eternal sanctity of an oath, than by the temporary influence of his own personal presence.

³ Lycurgus had formed Sparta for defence, not for conquest. He expressly forbade them to pursue a flying enemy; he forbade them to engage frequently in war with the same people. Both injunctions were violated in the Messenian wars.

⁴ Strabo, l. viii.

⁵ Demaratus told Xerxes that there were but eight thousand Spartan lots, (Herodot.) and about a century afterwards their number was reduced to one thousand. Arist. Polit.

⁶ So I have translated the word *νιοδαμνιδες*, on the authority of Thucydides, l. v. *δυναται δὲ τὰ νιοδαμνιδες εὐθυερὸν ἢ δὴ σὺναι*. The resentment even of the freedmen proves the intolerable severity of the government.

⁷ They were called *υπομεινεις*, inferiors, in opposition to the *ομοιοι*, or peers.

⁸ Xenophon Hellen. l. iii.

⁹ Some contradictory traditions concerning his death are preserved in Plut. in Lycurg. et Justin. l. iii.

CHAPTER IV.

State of Greece after the Abolition of Royalty—Description of Laconia and Messenia—Causes of the War between those States—Invasion of Messenia—Distress of the Messenians—The horrid means by which they endeavour to remedy it—They obtain assistance from Argos and Arcadia—Their Capital taken by the Spartans—Issue of the first Messenian War—State of Greece—The Colony of Tarentum founded—The second Messenian War—Character and exploits of Aristomenes—The distress of the Spartans—They obtain assistance from Athens—The Poet Tyrtæus—Subjugation of Messenia—Future fortunes of its Citizens—Their Establishment in Sicily.

HAD the Greeks remained subject to kings, it is probable that they would have continued longer to exert their united valour against the surrounding barbarians. The successful adventures of the Argonauts, the glorious, though fatal expedition against Troy, would have animated the emulation and the hopes of succeeding candidates for fame; and the whole nation, being frequently employed in distant and general enterprises, would, through the habits of mutual intercourse, and the natural tendency of military subordination, have been gradually moulded into one powerful monarchy. This revolution would have given immediate tranquillity to Greece, but destroyed the prospect of its future grandeur. The honourable competitions of rival provinces must have ceased with their political independence; nor would the Greeks have enjoyed an opportunity of acquiring, by a long and severe apprenticeship in arms, that disciplined valour which eminently distinguished them above other nations of antiquity. In most countries it has been observed, that before the introduction of regular troops, the militia of the borders far excel those of the central provinces. Greece, even under its kings, was divided into so many independent states, that it might be regarded as consisting entirely of frontier. Under the republican form of government, it was still more subdivided; and motives of private ambition now co-operating with reasons of national animosity, wars became more frequent, and battles more bloody and more obstinate. It is little to be regretted that scarcely any materials remain for describing the perpetual hostilities between the Thebans and the Athenians; between the latter and the Peloponnesians; between the Phocians and Thessalians; and, in general, between each community and its neighbours. The long and spirited contest between the Lacedæmonians and Messenians, is the only war of that age which produced permanent effects. The relation of this obstinate struggle has happily come down to us, accompanied with such circumstances as paint the condition of the times, and answer the main ends of history.

The territories of Laconia and Messenia occupied the southern regions of the Peloponnesus. The shores of Laconia were washed by the eastern, or the Ægean; those of Messenia,¹ by the Western, or the Ionian, sea. The former country extended forty miles from east

to west, and sixty from north to south. The ground, though roughened by mountains, like the rest of the Peloponnesus, abounded in rich and fertile valleys, equally adapted to the purposes of cultivation and pasture. The whole country was anciently called Hecatonpolis,² from its hundred cities. They were reduced to the number of thirty,³ as early as the time of Lycurgus. The decay or destruction of Helos, Amyclæ, Pharis, and Geronthæ, and other less considerable towns, gradually increased the populousness of Sparta, the capital, situate near the centre of Laconia, and almost surrounded by the Eurotas. The other inland places of most note were Gerenea, Thurium, and Sellasia. The sea-ports were Prasias, Cyphanta, Zarax; Limera, famous for its vines; and Gythium, whose capacious harbour was, in all ages, more than sufficient to contain the naval strength of Sparta.⁴ In the time of Lycurgus, the freemen, of full age, amounted to thirty-nine thousand.⁵ Those of full age are generally reckoned the fourth part of the whole; so that the free inhabitants of Laconia may be computed at one hundred and fifty-six thousand; and the slaves, as will appear hereafter, probably exceeded four times that number.

Messenia was less extensive, but more fertile, than Laconia; and the former country, in ancient times, was proportionably more populous. Both kingdoms were principally supported by agriculture and pasturage, their subjects never having attained any high degree of improvement in arts, manufactures, or commerce. Messenia was, however, adorned by the seaports of Corone, Pylus, Methone, and Cyparyssus. The most considerable inland towns were Andania, the ancient capital; the strong fortress of Eira; the frontier town of Ampheia; and the celebrated Ithome, near to the ruins of which was erected, by Epaminondas, the comparatively modern city of Messene.⁶

As the countries of Laconia and Messenia were both governed by kings of the family of Hercules, and both inhabited by subjects of the same Doric race, it might have been imagined that such powerful connections would have disposed them to continue in a state of mutual friendship; or, if the ties of blood could not excite neighbouring states to a reciprocation of good offices, that they would at least have

² Strabo, l. viii. p. 362. mentions this only as a hearsay; but it has been always repeated.

³ Strabo says, "about thirty," and calls them *πολιχνεῖς*, oppidula, little towns.

⁴ Strabo, l. viii. p. 363, etc. et Pausan. in Lacon.

⁵ Plut. in Lycurg.

⁶ Pausan. in Messen. et Strabo, l. viii. p. 360, etc.

¹ Isocrat. in Archidam. calls the country Messene; Pausanias, Messenia.

engaged them to maintain an inoffensive tranquillity. The different branches of the family of Hercules were induced by interest, as well as persuaded by affection, mutually to support each other. When the prerogative was invaded in any particular kingdom, it was natural for the neighbouring princes to defend the cause of royalty;⁷ and we find that, on several occasions, they had engaged to assist each other in repressing the factious turbulence of the nobles, and the seditious spirit of the people. But when the influence of the family of Hercules declined with the abolition of monarchy in most countries of Greece, the capital of each little principality, which always enjoyed a pre-eminence in the national assemblies, began to usurp an unlimited authority over the neighbouring cities, and to control, by its municipal jurisdiction, the general resolves of the community. Sparta had, in this manner, extended her power over the smaller towns of Laconia. The walls of Helos, whose inhabitants had pertinaciously resisted this usurpation, were levelled with the ground, the citizens reduced to the most miserable slavery, and a law enacted by the Spartan council, which forbade, under severe penalties, the emancipation of the Helots, or the selling of them into foreign countries, where they might entertain the flattering hopes of regaining their lost liberty. The same tyrannical spirit which governed the measures of the Spartans, had taken possession of their neighbours the Messenians, and had urged the inhabitants of the capital to invade, conquer, and enslave several of the smaller cities.

While such ambitious principles prevailed with both nations, it was scarcely to be imagined that the more powerful should not exert its utmost strength to obtain dominion, and the weaker its utmost courage and activity to preserve independence. Besides this general cause of animosity, the rich fields of Messenia offered a tempting prize to the avarice of the Spartans; a circumstance continually alleged by the Messenians, as the principal motive which had induced their enemies to commence an unjust and unprovoked war. The Spartans, however, by no means admitted this reproach. It was natural, indeed, that such differences should arise between the subjects of rival states, as might furnish either party with a plausible pretence for taking arms. These differences it will be proper briefly to relate, after premising, that, although the Greek historians mention three Messenian wars, the third had little resemblance, either in its object, or in its effects, to the first and second. These were the generous struggles of a warlike people for preserving their hereditary freedom and renown, while the third, though dignified with the same appellation, was only an unsuccessful revolt of slaves from their masters.

On the confines of Messenia and Lacedæmon stood an ancient temple of Diana, which, being erected at the common expense, was open to the prayers and sacrifices of the two nations. Hither, according to annual custom, repaired a select band of Spartan virgins to solemnize the

chaste rites of their favourite divinity. A company of Messenian youths arrived at the same time to perform their customary devotion, and to implore the protection of the warlike goddess. Inflamed by the beauty of the Spartan ladies, the Messenians equally disregarded the sanctity of the place and the modest character of Diana, whose worship they came to celebrate. The licentious youths, after vainly attempting, by the most ardent prayers and vows, to move the stern inflexibility of Spartan virtue, had recourse to brutal violence in order to consummate their fatal designs; fatal to themselves, to their country, and to the unhappy victims of their fury, who, unwilling to survive so intolerable a disgrace, perished miserably by their own hands.⁸

To this atrocious injury, on the part of the Messenians, succeeded another, of a more private nature, on that of the Lacedæmonians.

A. C. Polychares was a Messenian of noble birth, of great wealth, conspicuous for the virtues of public and private life, and renowned for his victories in the Olympic games. The property of Polychares, like that of the most opulent of his countrymen, chiefly consisted in numerous herds of cattle; part of which he entrusted to a Lacedæmonian, of the name of Euephnus, who undertook, for a stipulated reward, to feed them on the rich meadows which he possessed on the Lacedæmonian coast. The avarice of Euephnus was not restrained by the sense of duty, the principles of honour, or the sacred ties of hospitality. Having sold the cattle to foreigners, who often came to purchase that article in Laconia, he travelled to the Messenian capital, and visiting his friend Polychares, lamented the loss of his property by the incursion of pirates.

The frequency of such events would, probably, have concealed the fraud; but a slave, whom Euephnus sold along with the cattle, having escaped the vigilance of his new masters, arrived in time to undeceive the generous credulity of Polychares. The perfidious Lacedæmonian, seeing his contrivance thus unexpectedly disconcerted, endeavoured to deprecate the just resentment of his friend, by the most humiliating confession of his guilt, and by insisting on the temptation of gain, the frailty of nature,⁹ the sincerity of his repentance, and his earnest desire of making immediate restitution. Unfortunately, indeed, he had not any considerable sum of money in his possession; but if Polychares would allow his son to accompany him to Lacedæmon, he would put into the hands of the youth the full price which he had received for his father's property. On this occasion it is easier to pity the misfortune, than excuse the weakness, of the Messenian. The youth had no sooner set foot on the Lacedæmonian territory, than the traitor Euephnus stabbed him to the heart.

⁸ Pausan. in Messen. p. 922. The Messenians denied this whole transaction, and substituted a more improbable story in its stead. Pausan. *ibid.*

⁹ Εν γὰρ τῇ ἀνθρώπινῃ φύσει, καὶ πολλῶν, ἐφ' οἷς βιάζονται ἀδίκαι γίνονται, τὰ κέρδη μεγίστην ἀνάγκην ἔχει.

PAUSAN.

Et l'intérêt enfin père de tous les crimes.

HENRIADE.

⁷ Isocrat. in Archidam

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The afflicted father, assembling his friends and followers, travelled to Sparta, and implored the just vengeance of the laws against the accumulated guilt of perfidy and murder. In vain he repeatedly addressed himself to the kings, to the ephori, to the senate, and to the assembly. The money, the eloquence, the intrigues of Euephnus, and, above all, his character of Spartan, prevailed over the impotent solicitations of a Messenian stranger. Polychares, provoked by the cruel disregard of the Lacedæmonians to his just demands, determined to return home; but having lost his understanding through rage and despair, he assaulted and slew several Spartan citizens whom he met on the road; and after thus quenching his resentment against the guilty in the blood of the innocent, he was conducted by the assistance of his friends to his native country.

He had not long returned to Andania, when ambassadors arrived from the Spartan senate, demanding the person of such an atrocious and open offender. The Messenians assembled to deliberate on this request; and Androcles and Antiochus, who were jointly invested with the regal power, having differed, as usually happened, in their opinions, each prince was supported by the strength of a numerous faction. The debate was decided by an expedient often adopted in such tumultuary assemblies. Both parties had recourse to arms, and the sedition being fatal to Androcles, the opinion of Antiochus prevailed, who declared against delivering Polychares into the power of his enraged enemies. But Antiochus, though he denied the unreasonable demand of the Spartan ambassadors, dismissed them with a proposal, which left them no room to complain of injustice. He offered, in the name of the Messenian assembly, to refer all the differences between the two nations to the respected council of the Amphictyons. This equitable proposal, which ill suited the ambitious designs of Sparta, was not honoured with an answer from that republic, who, desirous to acquire the rich fields of Messenia, prepared for taking arms; and, having completed her preparations, bound her citizens by oath, never to desist from hostility till they had effected their purpose.¹

A. C. Without an open declaration of war
743. (for ambition had extinguished every sentiment of piety) they invaded the Messenian frontier, and attacked the small town of Ampheia, which, from its advantageous situation on a rock, seemed equally proper for infesting the enemy, and securing their own retreat.² The time chosen for the assault was the dead of night, when the unsuspecting inhabitants reposed in full confidence of their accustomed security. There was neither sentinel at the gates, nor garrison within the place. The alarm was immediately followed by execution. Many Ampheians were assassinated in their beds; several fled to the altars of the gods, the sanctity of which proved a feeble

protection against the Spartan cruelty; and a miserable remnant escaped to diffuse the melancholy tidings of their unexpected calamity.

On this important emergency Euphaes, who had succeeded to the throne of his father Antiochus, summoned a general assembly of his countrymen to the plain of Stenyclara; where, after hearing the opinion of others concerning the critical situation of their affairs, he declared his own sentiments, which were full of honour and magnanimity: "That the final event of the war was not to be conjectured by its unfortunate beginning; the Messenians, though less inured to arms than their warlike opponents, would acquire both skill and courage in pursuing the measures of a just defence; and the gods, protectors of innocence, would make the struggles of virtuous liberty prevail over the rude assaults of violence and ambition." The discourse of Euphaes was received with shouts of applause; and the Messenians, by advice of their king, abandoned the open country, and settled in such of their towns as were best fortified by art or nature, leaving the remainder to the invasion of an enemy, with whose bravery and numbers their own weakness was yet unable to contend. But while they kept within their walls, they continued to exercise themselves in arms, and to acquire such vigour and discipline, as might enable them to oppose the Spartans in the field. Four years elapsed from the taking of Ampheia before they ventured to embrace this dangerous measure. During all that time, the Spartans made annual incursions into their country, destroying their harvests, and carrying into captivity such straggling parties as they happened to surprise. They took care, however, not to demolish the houses, to cut down the wood, or otherwise to disfigure or desolate a country, which they already regarded as their own.

A. C. The Messenians on the other hand, as
740. their courage continued to increase, were not contented with defending their own walls, but detached in small parties, the boldest of their warriors to ravage the sea-coast of Laconia. Encouraged by the success of these predatory expeditions, Euphaes determined to take the field with the flower of the Messenian nation. The army of freemen was attended by an innumerable crowd of slaves, carrying wood and other materials necessary for encampment. Thus prepared, they put themselves in motion, and, before they reached the frontier, were seen by the Spartan garrison of Ampheia, who immediately sounded the alarm of an approaching enemy. The Spartans flew to arms with more than their wonted alacrity, delighted with the opportunity, for which they had so long wished in vain, of deciding, at one blow, the event of a tedious war. The hostile armies approached with a celerity proportioned to the fury of their resentment, and arrived, with high expectations, at the intermediate plain which overspread the confines of the two kingdoms. But there the martial ardour of the troops received a check, which had not been foreseen by their commanders. The rivulet, intersecting the plain, was swelled by the rains into a torrent. This circumstance prevented a general

¹ Strabo expresses this oath strongly, but oddly, 'Ὁμοσπον-
τες μὴ πρὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον ἀποστῆναι, πρὶν ἢ Μισσηνὴν ἀνέλθω
ἢ πάντας ἀποθάνωσιν.' "Having sworn not to return home
before that they either took Messene, or that they all died."

² Ὁρμητήριον ἐπιτηδεύει.—PAUSAN.

engagement. The cavalry alone (amounting on either side to about five hundred horse) passed near the head of the ravine, and contended in an indecisive skirmish; while the fury of the infantry evaporated in empty boasts and unavailing insults. Night insensibly came on, during which the Messenians fortified their camp with so much skill, that the enemy, rather than venture to storm it, preferred to return home, after an expedition, which, considering their superiority in numbers, appeared no less inglorious than ineffectual.

The pusillanimous behaviour of the Spartan army deserved not the approbation of the senate. The severe fathers of the republic upbraided the degeneracy of the youth, who no longer paid regard to the sanctity of the oath which they had taken, never to lay down their arms until they had completely subdued the Messenians. The spirit of the senate was soon diffused through the community; and it was determined, in the general assembly of the nation, to prepare for carrying on a more fierce war than the enemy had yet experienced. At the approach of autumn, the season always preferred for the predatory expeditions of those early times, all the Spartans of military age, as well as the inhabitants of the subordinate towns of Laconia, known by the general name of Lacedæmonians, were ready to take the field. After leaving a sufficient body of troops for the internal safety of the country, the number that might be spared abroad, probably amounted to about twenty thousand men. This powerful army was still farther increased by the confluence of strangers, particularly the Assinians and Dryopians, who fled from the cruel tyranny of Argos, a republic no less blameable than Sparta, for oppressive severity towards her weaker neighbours. Besides this reinforcement, the Spartans hired a considerable body of archers from Crete, to oppose the horse and light infantry of the Messenians. The management of the expedition was entrusted to the Spartan kings Theopompus and Polydorus; the former of whom commanded the right, and the latter the left wing, while the central division was committed to the discretion and valour of Euryleon, who, though born in Sparta, was descended of the royal race of Theban Cadmus.

Ancient writers have neglected to mention the scene of this second engagement, which A. C. Pausanias has, with more diffusiveness than accuracy, described in his historical journey through Messenia; but it is reasonable to conjecture, from this omission, that both the first and second battles happened near the same place, on the extensive plain which connects the frontiers of the two kingdoms.

The Messenians were inferior, both in numbers and in discipline, but ardent in the cause of every thing most dear to them. Euphaes headed their left wing, which opposed the division of Theopompus; Pytharatus led the right; and Cleonnis commanded the centre. Before the signal was given for charge, the commanders addressed their respective troops. Theopompus, with Laconic brevity, "reminded the Spartans of their oath, and of the glory

which their ancestors had acquired by subduing the territories of their neighbours." Euphaes, at greater length, animated his soldiers to victory, by describing the fatal consequences of a defeat. "Their lands and fortunes were not the only objects of contention: they had already experienced the Spartan cruelty in the unhappy fate of Ampheia, where all the men of a military age had been put to the sword; the women, as well as the children, with their aged parents, subjected to an ignominious servitude; their temples burnt or plundered; the city levelled with the ground; and the country desolated. The calamities, hitherto confined to that little district, would be diffused over the whole of their beautiful territory, unless the active bravery of Messenia should now, by a noble effort of patriotism, overcome the numbers and discipline of Sparta." Encouraged by the ardour of their prince, the Messenians rather ran than marched to the battle. As they approached the enemy, they threatened them with their eyes and gestures, reproaching them with an insatiable avidity for wealth and power, an unnatural disregard to the ties of blood, an impious contempt for their common gods, and particularly for the revered name of Hercules, the acknowledged founder and patron of both kingdoms. From words of reproach they made an easy transition to deeds of violence. Many quitted their ranks, and assailed the embattled phalanx of the Spartans. The wounded spent the last exertions³ of their strength in signal acts of vengeance, or employed their last breath in conjuring their companions to imitate the example of their bravery; and to maintain, by an honourable death, the safety and renown of their country. To the generous ardour of the Messenians, Sparta opposed the assured intrepidity of disciplined valour. Her citizens, inured to the use of arms, closed their ranks, and remained firm in their respective posts. Where the enemy in any part gave way, they followed them with an undisturbed progress; and endeavoured, by the continuance of regular exertion, to overcome the desultory efforts of rage, fury, and despair.⁴

Such were the principal differences in the sentiments and conduct of two armies, both of which were alike animated by the love of glory and the desire of vengeance; passions which they carried to such a length, that there was no example, on either side, of a soldier who deigned to seek for quarter, or who attempted to sooth, by the promise of a large ransom, the unrelenting cruelty of the victors. Emulation and avarice conspired in despoiling the bodies of the slain. Amidst this barbarous employment, which custom only rendered honourable, many met with an untimely fate; for while they stripped the dead with the rashness of blind avidity, they often exposed their own persons to the darts and swords of their ene-

³ Agreeably to the melancholy firmness of the advice afterwards given by Tyrtæus to the Spartans,
Καὶ τὶς ἀποβύησεν ὅστις ἀκούσῃτο.

TYRTÆUS, edit. Glas. p. 4. ver. 5.

⁴ The mode of fighting in that age is forcibly described by Tyrtæus, p. 7. edit. Glasg. Ἀλλὰ τὶς ἐν δὶαβῶς μόνον ποιεῖ ἀμφοτέρωθεν, to the end of the poem.

mies; and sometimes the dying, by a fortunate wound, soothed the agonies of the present moment, and retaliated their past sufferings on their unguarded despoilers.

The kings, who had hitherto been satisfied with leading their troops to action, and sharing the common danger, longed, as the battle began to warm, to signalize their valour in single combat. With this design Theopompus, listening only to his courage, first marched towards Euphaes, who, seeing him approach, cried out to his companions, "Does not Theopompus well imitate the bloody-minded Polynices, who, at the head of an army of strangers, levied war against his native country, and, with his own hand, slew a brother, by whom, at the same instant, he himself was slain? In like manner does Theopompus, with unnatural hatred, persecute his kinsmen of the race of Hercules; but I trust he shall meet the punishment due to his impiety." At sight of this interesting spectacle, the troops were inspired with new ardour, and the battle raged with redoubled fury. The chosen bands, who respectively watched the safety of the contending princes, became insensible to personal danger, and only solicitous to preserve the sacred persons of their kings. The strength of Sparta, at length, began to yield to the activity of her rivals. The troops of Theopompus were broken and thrown into disorder; and the reluctant prince was himself compelled to retire. At the same time the right wing of the Messenians, having lost their leader Pytharatus, yielded to the exertions of Polydorus and his Spartans: but neither this general, nor king Euphaes, thought proper to pursue the flying enemy. It seemed more expedient to strengthen, with their victorious troops, the central divisions of their respective armies, which still continued to fight with obstinate valour, and doubtful success. Night at length put an end to the engagement, which had proved extremely humiliating to both parties; for next morning neither offered to renew the battle, neither ventured to erect a trophy of victory, while both craved a suspension of arms, for the purpose of interring the dead; a demand generally construed as an acknowledgment of defeat.

Although the immediate effects of the battle were alike destructive to the Spartans and to the Messenians, its remote consequences were peculiarly ruinous to the latter. They were less rich and less numerous than their opponents; their army could not be recruited with the same facility; many of their slaves were bribed into the enemy's service; and a pestilential distemper, concurring with other misfortunes, reduced them to the last extremity of distress. The Spartans, mean while, carried on their annual incursions with more than usual cruelty, involving the husbandman, with his labours, in undistinguished ruin, and destroying by fire and sword the wretched inhabitants of the unfortified cities. The miserable ravages to which these cities were continually exposed, obliged the Messenians to abandon them, and to seek refuge among the almost inaccessible mountains of Ithome; a place which, though situate near the frontiers of Laconia,

afforded them the securest retreat amidst their present calamities, being strongly fortified by nature, and surrounded by a wall, which bid defiance to the battering engines known in that early age.

The Messenians, thus defended against external assaults, were still exposed to the danger of perishing by famine. The apprehension of this new calamity gave additional poignancy to the feelings of their unhappy situation, and increased the horrors of the pestilence which raged more fiercely than ever among men cooped up within a narrow fortress. Under the pressure of present, and the dread of future evil, their minds were favourably disposed for admitting the terrors of superstition. A messenger was sent to Delphi to inquire by what sacrifice they might appease the resentment of the angry gods. On his return to Ithome, he declared the stern answer of the god, which demanded the innocent blood of a virgin of the royal race. The Messenians prepared, in full assembly, to obey the horrid mandate. The lots were cast, and the daughter of Lyciscus was declared worthy of atoning, by her blood, for the sins of the prince and people: but the father, who was only a distant branch of the royal family, allowed his paternal affection to prevail over the dictates of both his patriotism and his piety. By his advice, Ephebolus, a diviner, opposed the sacrifice, asserting that the pretended princess was not what she appeared, but a supposititious child, whom the artifice of the wife of Lyciscus had adopted to conceal her barrenness. While the remonstrances of the diviner engaged the attention of the assembly, Lyciscus privately withdrew his daughter; and, escaping unobserved through the gates of Ithome, sought protection, against the cruelty of fortune and of his friends, among the unrelenting enemies of his country.

He had already made considerable progress in his journey towards Sparta, when the discovery of his departure threw the Messenians into great consternation; nor is it easy to determine what might have been the effect of their superstitious terrors, had not Aristodemus, another branch of the Herculean stock, and still less distinguished by birth than merit, voluntarily offered to devote his own child for the public safety. But this sacrifice was likewise opposed by a youth, who, passionately in love with the intended victim, cried out, that the young lady had been betrothed to him, and that it belonged to her destined husband, not to her inhuman father, to dispose of her life and fortune. When his noisy clamours were little regarded by the assembly, he had the effrontery to assert, that the daughter of Aristodemus could not answer the condition required by the oracle; that, even before the nuptial rites had been consummated, she had pitied the violence of his passion, and that now she carried in her womb the fruit of their unhappy loves. Aristodemus, hearing this declaration, was seized with rage and indignation at the unmerited disgrace thrown on his family. "It then appeared," says an ancient author,¹ "with what ease des-

¹ Pausanias, p. 232. This might satisfy the superstition

tiny tarnishes the feeble virtues of men, as the slime of a river does the shining ornaments which cover its humid bed." The angry father plunged his dagger into the breast of his unfortunate daughter, and, with horrid barbarity, opening her womb in the presence of the amazed assembly, demanded justice on the infamous impostor who had traduced her virtue. The Messenians were still farther irritated against the youth, in consequence of the opinion of Ephebolus, who declared that another victim must be sought to appease the anger of the gods, because Aristodemus had sacrificed his daughter, not in obedience to the oracle, but to gratify the impetuous passion of his own ungovernable soul. The rage of the assembly would have speedily sent the lover to attend the shade of his mistress; but fortunately he was beloved and pitied by king Euphaes, whose authority controlled, on this occasion, the audacious insolence of a priest, and checked the wild fury of the populace. The king asserted that Apollo had no reason to complain of their disobedience: the god demanded the blood of a virgin, a virgin had been slain; but neither did the Pythia determine, nor belonged it to them to inquire, by whose hands, or from what motive, the victim should be put to death.

The oracle, thus favourably interpreted by the wisdom of the prince, not only allayed the frantic rage, but restored the fainting hopes, of the people. They determined to defend their capital to the last extremity; and this generous resolution, which they maintained inviolate during the course of several years, was justified by obstinate exertions of valour.

The spirited and persevering efforts of the Messenians, as well as the proud tyranny of Sparta, tended to procure, to the weaker state, several useful alliances among the neighbouring republics. Of all the communities inhabiting the Peloponnesus, the Corinthians alone, as a maritime and commercial people, entertained little jealousy of the Spartans; while the Argives and Arcadians, from proximity of situation, as well as interference of interest and ambition, held the disciples of Lycurgus in peculiar detestation. By the assistance of these powerful allies, the Messenians gained considerable advantages in two general engagements; in the former of which their king Euphaes, betrayed by the ardour of success into an unequal combat, was overpowered by numbers, and slain in the action. The valour of Aristodemus was called by the voice of the people to fill the vacant throne; and his conduct in war justified the high opinion entertained of him by his countrymen. For five years he baffled the aspiring hopes of the Spartans; defeated them in several desultory rencounters; and, in a pitched battle, fought near the walls of Ithome, overcame the principal strength of their republic, assisted by that of the Corinthians.

This victory, though obtained by stratagem rather than by superiority of courage or discipline, threw the Spartan senate into the great-

est perplexity, and deprived them of the expectation of putting a speedy, or even a fortunate, end to the war. In their distress they had recourse to the same oracle, which had relieved the afflictions of the Messenians. As the policy of the god seldom sent away, in ill humour, the votaries of his shrine, the destruction of Ithome was announced with prophetic obscurity. The Spartans, with revived hopes, again took the field; and their new ardour was successful in several skirmishes with the Messenians, who, harassed by an open, were still more fatally oppressed by a secret, foe. The people were again seized with superstitious terrors. Dreams, visions, and other prodigies confirmed the melancholy prediction of Apollo. The impatient temper of Aristodemus made him withdraw, by a voluntary death, from the evils which threatened his country. The other leaders of greatest renown had perished in the field. Ithome, deprived of its principal support, and

A. C. 724. invested more closely than before, was compelled, after a siege of five months,

to submit to the slow but irresistible impressions of famine. Such of its inhabitants as were entitled to the benefit of hospitality in Sicyon, Argos, or Arcadia, travelled with all possible expedition into those countries. The sacred families, who were attached to the ministry of Ceres, sought a secure refuge among the venerable priests of Eleusis, in Attica. The greater part of the people dispersed themselves through the interior towns and villages, endeavouring, in the obscurity of their ancient habitations, to elude the industrious search of an unrelenting enemy.²

The Lacedæmonians, having thus obtained possession of the Messenian capital, discovered signal gratitude to their gods, fidelity to their allies, and cruelty to their enemies. Ithome was demolished to the foundation. Of its spoil, three tripods were consecrated to Amyclean Apollo. The first was adorned with the image of Venus, the second with that of Diana, and the third with the figures of Ceres and Proserpine. To the Assinians, who had assisted them with peculiar alacrity in the war, the Spartans gave that beautiful portion of the Messenian coast, which assumed, and long retained, the name of its new inhabitants. They rewarded the good intentions of the Messenian Androcles, who, at the commencement of the war, had discovered his partiality for Sparta, by bestowing on his descendants the fertile district of Hyamia. The rest of the Messenian nation were treated with all the rigour of Spartan policy. They were obliged to take an oath of allegiance to their proud victors, to present them every year with half the produce of their soil, and, under pain of the severest punishment, to appear in mourning habits, at the funerals of the Spartan kings and magistrates.³

After the close of the first Messenian war, Greece appears, for several years, to have enjoyed an unusual degree of tranquillity. Peace promoted population; and the inhabitants of Peloponnesus continued to diffuse their nu-

of antiquity, but will appear, in modern times, a poor excuse for such a shocking barbarity

² Pausan. Messen. et Strabo, l. viii.

³ Pausan. *ibid.*

merous colonies over the islands of Sicily and Corcyra, as well as over the southern division of Italy, afterwards known by the name of Magna Græcia.¹ In this delicious country two considerable establishments were formed, about the same time, the one at Rhegium, and the other at Tarentum. Rhegium, situate on the southern extremity of the continent, soon acquired the ascendant over the neighbouring cities; and Tarentum, having become the most powerful community on the eastern coast, had the honour of giving name to the spacious bay, which penetrates so deeply into Italy, that it almost unites the Tuscan and the Ionian seas.

The particular causes which occasioned, or the various consequences which attended, these several migrations, are not related in ancient history; the Lacedæmonian establishment at Tarentum was alone marked by such circumstances as have merited, on account of their singularity, to be handed down to succeeding ages.

During the second expedition² of the Spartans against Messenia, the army, consisting of the greater part of the citizens who had attained the military age, bound themselves, by oath, not to return home until they had subdued their enemies. This engagement detained them several years in the field, during which Sparta, inhabited only by women, children, and helpless old men, produced no succeeding generation to support the future glories of the republic. Sensible of this inconvenience, which, in a warlike and ambitious state, surrounded by warlike and ambitious rivals, might have been productive of the most dangerous consequences, the senate recalled such young men as, having left their country before they had attained the military age, were not under any obligation to keep the field; and enjoined them to associate promiscuously with the married women, that the city might thus be preserved from decay and desolation. The children born of these useful, though irregular connections, were distinguished by the name of Partheniæ; probably denoting the condition of their mothers.³ They had no certain father; nor were they entitled, though citizens of Sparta, to any private inheritance. These circumstances kept them a distinct body, the members of which were attached by the strictest friendship to each other, and hostile to the rest of the community.

This dangerous disposition was still further increased by the imprudent behaviour of the Spartans, who, on their return from the conquest of Messenia, treated the Partheniæ with the most supercilious contempt. The young

men could endure poverty and misfortune, but could not brook disgrace. Their unhappy situation, and the impatience with which they submitted to it, naturally connected them with the Helots, those miserable slaves whose just indignation ever prompted them to revolt from the cruel tyranny of their masters. A conspiracy was formed; the day, place, and signal were determined, upon which the Partheniæ and Helots, armed with concealed daggers, and with the most hostile fury, should retaliate, in the public assembly, their past sufferings and insults on the unsuspecting superiority of the proud lords of Sparta. The time approached, and the design was ripe for execution, when the president of the assembly ordered the crier to proclaim, That none present should throw up his cap (for that had been the signal appointed by the conspirators;) and thus clearly intimated that the plot had been discovered, and that the Spartans were prepared to meet and to overcome the dangerous treachery of their dependents. We are not informed of the punishment inflicted on the Helots, or whether, as the conspiracy had been laid open by one of their number, the merit of an individual was allowed to atone for the guilt of the society. The Partheniæ, however, were treated with a remarkable degree of lenity, suggested, probably, by the fears, rather than by the humanity of Sparta.⁴ They were not only allowed to escape unpunished from their native country, but furnished with every thing necessary for undertaking a successful expedition against the neighbouring coasts; and thus enabled to establish themselves under their leader Phalantus, in the delightful recesses of the Tarentine gulf.⁵

The Spartans, when delivered from the danger of this formidable conspiracy, enjoyed, above thirty years, domestic as well as public peace, until again disturbed by the revolt of the Messenians. The dishonourable conditions imposed on that people, the toilsome labours to which most of them were necessarily condemned, in order to produce the expected tribute; the natural fertility of the soil, augmented by industry, and augmenting in its turn the populousness of the country; all these causes conspired to sharpen their resentment, to embitter their hostility, and to determine them, at every hazard, to expose their fortune to the decision of the sword. The negligence of Sparta was favourable to the progress of rebellion. While she degraded the Messenians by the most humiliating marks of servitude, she allowed them, however, to rebuild their cities, to assemble in the public places, and to communicate to each other their mutual grievances and complaints. To reward the services of Androcles, the Messenian king, she had bestowed on his family the rich province of Hyamia; but the descendants of that prince preferring the duties of patriotism to the dictates of gratitude, countenanced and encouraged the warlike dispositions of his countrymen. The young men of Andania longed to take up arms. They were headed by Aris-

¹ This name, as will be proved hereafter, denoted the Greek settlements both in Italy and Sicily. The colonies there became, in progress of time, perhaps more considerable than the mother country. Their proceedings will be fully related in the following work; but not until their transactions enter into the general system of Grecian politics.

² They had taken the same oath in the first expedition: but it appears from Pausanias, that they did not observe it. The senators upbraided the youth with cowardice and contempt of their oath, δειλίαν καὶ τοῦ ὁρκου ὑπερψίαν. PAUSAN. p. 228.

³ Παρθένιας. Filius natus ex ea, quæ quum duceretur, virgo non erat. ARISTOT. Polit. l. v. c. 7.

⁴ Ephor. apud Strab. l. vi.

⁵ Pausan. Phoc.

A. C. 685. *tomenes*, a youth descended from the ancient line of Messenian kings, adorned with the most extraordinary qualities of mind and body, and whose exploits, if instead of being sung by Rhianus, and related by Pausanias, they had been described by Xenophon, or celebrated by Homer, would place him in the first rank of Grecian heroes.

In entering upon this memorable war the Messenians consulted the dictates of prudence, at the same time that they indulged the motives of animosity and ambition. Before discovering their intention to take up arms, they despatched messengers to the Arcadians and Argives, intimating their inclination to throw off the yoke of Sparta, provided they could depend on the hearty assistance of their ancient allies. The Argives and Arcadians were naturally enemies to their warlike and ambitious neighbours; and, at this particular juncture, the enmity of the former towards Sparta was, by recent injuries, kindled into resentment. Both nations confirmed, by the most flattering promises, the resolution of the Messenians, who, with uncommon unanimity and concert, sought deliverance from the oppressive severity of their tyrants.

The first engagement was fought at Deræ, a village of Messenia. The soldiers on both sides behaved with equal bravery; the victory was doubtful; but Aristomenes, the Messenian, acquired unrivalled glory and renown. On the field of battle he was saluted king by the admiring gratitude of his countrymen. He declined, however, the dangerous honours of royalty, declaring himself satisfied with the appellation of general, which, in that age, implied a superiority in martial exercises, as well as in the knowledge of war, and in the experience of command. The Messenian excelled in all these, and possessed, besides, a degree of military enthusiasm, which as it was employed to retrieve the desperate affairs of his country, deserves to be for ever remembered and admired. Sensible how much depended on the auspicious beginning of the war, he immediately marched to Sparta; entered the city, which was neither walled nor lighted, during night; and suspended in the temple of Minerva a buckler, inscribed with his name, as a monument of his success against the enemy, and an offering to procure the good-will of that warlike goddess.

The hardiness of this exploit was rivalled by the singular intrepidity of his companions Panormus and Gonippus. While the Lacedæmonians celebrated, in their camp, the festival of their heroes Castor and Pollux, the two youths of Andania, mounted on fiery steeds, with lances in their hands, and a purple mantle flowing over their white vestments, presented themselves in the midst of the joyous assembly. The superstitious crowd, dissolved in mirth and wine, imagined that their heavenly protectors had appeared in a human form, in order to grace the festival established in their honour.⁶ As they approached, un-

armed, to pay their obeisance to the divine brothers of Helen, the young Messenians couched their spears, attacked the multitude with irresistible fury, slew them with their weapons, or trod them down with their horses, and before the assembly recovered from its surprise and consternation, set out, in triumph, on their return to Andania.

These exploits, and others of a similar kind, which are not particularly recorded, were sufficient to alarm the fears of the Spartans, and to make them seek the advice of Apollo. The oracle, when consulted by what means they might change the success of the war, ordered them to demand a general from Athens; a

A. C. 623. response highly mortifying to the high Spartan spirit, as their own kings, descended from Hercules, were the constitutional commanders of their armies. In

compliance, however, with the mandate of the god, the haughtiness of Sparta was obliged to make a request which the jealousy of Athens durst not venture to refuse. The Athenians, when informed of the oracle, immediately despatched to Sparta, Tyrtæus, a man who, like every Athenian citizen, had, indeed, borne arms, but who had never been distinguished by any rank in the army. He was chiefly known to his fellow-citizens as a poet; a character in which he has been justly admired by succeeding ages.⁷ Among the Spartans, however, he was regarded as the sacred messenger of the divinity; and his verses were supposed to convey the instructions and sentiments inspired by his heavenly protector.

The heroic valour of Aristomenes long continued to prevail against the force of the oracle, as well as against all the other enemies of Messenia. He defeated the Spartans in three successive engagements, the circumstances of which are so similar, that they have frequently been confounded with each other. They were all fought in the plain of Stenyclara, and the most remarkable at a place called the Boar's Monument, from a tradition that Hercules had anciently sacrificed there an animal of that species. The Messenians were reinforced by the assistance of their allies of Elis and Sicyon, as well as of Argos and Arcadia. The Spartans were followed by the Corinthians, their ancient confederates, and by the citizens of Leprea, who chose to seek the protection of Sparta, rather than submit to the government of Elis. The combined army was commanded by Anaxander the Spartan king, whose influence, however, was rivalled by the authority of Hecatæus the diviner, and of Tyrtæus the poet. The Messenians had not a poet worthy of being opposed to Tyrtæus; but the predictions of their diviner Theocles were able, on some occasions, to promote or to restrain the ardour of Aristomenes himself.

unquestionable evidence. Striking instances of it will occur in later periods of the Greek history.

⁷ *Insignis Homerus,*

Tyrtæusque marces animos in martia bella,

Versibus exauit.

HOR.

Three poems of Tyrtæus, containing the praise of valour, are preserved in Stobæus; a fourth on the same subject, in the only oration now remaining of Lycurgus, the Athenian orator, the friend and rival of Demosthenes. A few detached couplets may also be read in Strabo and Pausanias.

⁶ Pausanias, p. 266. However surprising this credulity may appear in the present age, it is attested by the most

The success of the engagement was chiefly owing to the spirited exertion of the Messenian general. At the head of a small band of chosen companions, he charged the principal division of the Spartan army, commanded by the king in person. The resistance was obstinate, and lasted for several hours. When the Spartans began to give way, Aristomenes ordered a new body of troops, to complete his success, to rout and pursue the enemy. He, with his little but determined band, attacked a second division of the Lacedæmonians, which still continued firm in its post. Having compelled these also to retreat, he, with amazing rapidity, turned the valour of his troops against a third, and then against a fourth brigade,¹ both of which giving ground, the whole army was put to flight, and pursued with great slaughter. The merit of these achievements was, on the return of Aristomenes, celebrated with great pomp at Andania. The men received their favourite hero with joyous acclamations; and the women, strewing his way with flowers, sung in his praise a stanza that has reached modern times, expressing, with elegant simplicity, the glorious victory obtained over the Lacedæmonians.

The tribute of just applause paid to the virtues of Aristomenes, inspired him with a generous ambition to deserve the sincerest gratitude of his countrymen. With unremitting activity he continued, with his little band of faithful adherents, to overrun the hostile territory, to destroy the defenceless villages, and to carry the inhabitants into servitude. The towns of Pharæ, Carya, and Egila, successively experienced the fatal effects of his ravages. In the first, he found a considerable booty, in money and commodities; in the second, he found a booty still more precious, the daughters of the principal inhabitants dancing in the chorus of Diana, whom he honourably protected against the licentious violence of his followers, and restored, uninjured, for the ransom offered by their parents. After attacking Egila, Aristomenes met with an unexpected check from the enthusiasm of the Spartan matrons, who were offering sacrifice to Ceres in a neighbouring temple, long held in peculiar veneration. As soon as they perceived the approach of the enemy, the women, who, according to the institutions of Lycurgus, had been trained to all the manly exercises of the other sex, issued forth from the temple, and assailing the Messenians with knives, hatchets, burning torches, and the other instruments of sacrifice, threw them into disorder, wounded several of the soldiers, and seized the person of their commander. Next day, however, Aristomenes was delivered from captivity, through the good offices of Archidamea, priestess of Ceres, whose susceptible heart had long admired and loved the merit and renown of the brave Messenian.

The amazing success of the Messenians,

¹ Pausanias acknowledges that the exploits of Aristomenes, in this engagement, almost exceed belief. Pausan. Messen. There is a remarkable coincidence in the character and exploits, as well as in the situation, of Aristomenes, and those of the celebrated Scottish patriot Wallace. Vid. Buchan. Hist. Scot. l. viii. passim.

which, in the course of three years, had been interrupted only by this inconsiderable accident, disposed the Spartan kings to abandon the war, and to allow their enemies to enjoy the honour and advantages which they had so bravely earned. This resolution was approved by the senate and assembly. The allies of Sparta readily adopted the same opinion. Tyrtæus alone opposed the disgraceful measure, with all the force of his authority. The sacred character of the bard, with the divine influence of his poetry, prevailed; and the Spartans again entered Messenia with an army, as numerous and powerful as any they had before collected. But at sight of the Messenian troops, headed by Aristomenes, they were thrown into new consternation. The dreaded prowess of their heroic antagonist, which they had so often and so fatally experienced, continually presented itself to their minds; and the inspired arts of Tyrtæus were again necessary to resist the increasing panic. A second time he revived their drooping courage, while he expatiated on the glory of ancient warriors; the magnanimity of despising fortune; the praise and honours of valour; the joys and rewards of victory.² These sentiments, dictated by the true spirit of heroism, fired their minds with martial ardour. Disregarding the sweets of life, they longed for an honourable death. One consideration only (such was the superstition of ancient times) damped the generous warmth that animated their souls. In an engagement, which there was every reason to believe would be fought with the most obstinate valour on both sides, what crowds of warriors must fall, whose bodies, heaped together in horrid confusion, could not be recognised by their friends, or obtain, with due solemnity, the sacred rights of funeral! This melancholy thought, which chilled the boldest heart with religious horror, might have formed an insurmountable obstacle to their success, had not their terrors been removed by the prudent missionary of Apollo. By the advice of Tyrtæus, each soldier tied a token, inscribed with his name and designation, round his right arm, by means of which his body, however disfigured,³ might be known to his friends and kindred. Thus fortified against the only illusion that could alarm the minds of men who preferred death to a defeat, they rushed forward to attack their dreaded, and hitherto victorious, foes.

The Messenian general had drawn up his forces at a place called the Great Ditch, from which this engagement has been called the battle of the Trenches.⁴ The national strength was reinforced by a considerable body of Arcadian troops, commanded by their king Aristocrates, to whose treachery, as much as to their own valour, the Spartans were indebted for the victory.

The Spartans, though possessed of little private wealth, had a considerable public treasure, with which they early began to bribe those whom they despaired to conquer. With this, perhaps, on many former occasions, they had

² Tyrtæus, p. 2 and 3. edit. Glaug.

³ Confusa corporum lineamenta. Justin.

⁴ Polybius, l. iv. Strabo, l. viii.

tempted the avarice of Aristocrates, who, from want of opportunity rather than of inclination to betray, had hitherto maintained his fidelity inviolate. But when he perceived the unusual ardour which animated the enemy; and reflected, that if, without his concurrence, victory should declare itself on their side, he might for ever be deprived of an occasion to earn the wages of his intended iniquity, he determined to abandon his ancient allies, and to ensure success to the Lacedæmonians. In sight of the two armies he explained and exaggerated to his troops the advantageous position of the Spartans; the difficulty of a retreat, in case they themselves were obliged to give ground; and the inauspicious omens which threatened destruction to Messene. In order to avoid the ruin ready to overtake the allies, he commanded his men to be prepared to follow him on the first signal for the engagement. When the charge was sounded, and the Messenians were preparing to resist the first onset of the enemy, Aristocrates led off his Arcadians; and, to make his defection more apparent, crossed the whole Messenian army. The Messenians, confounded with a treachery so bold and manifest, almost forgot that they were contending against the Spartans. Many forsook their ranks, and ran after the Arcadians, sometimes conjuring them to return to their duty, and sometimes reproaching them with their perfidious ingratitude. Their entreaties and insults were alike vain; their army was surrounded almost on every side; the little band of Aristomenes alone, with pertinacious valour, resisting the efforts, and breaking through the embattled squadrons of the enemy. Their example encouraged others of their countrymen to effect an escape by equal bravery; but, in attempting this dangerous measure, the greater part of the soldiers perished, as well as the generals Androcles, Phintas, and Phanas, persons descended from the ancient stock of Messenian nobility, and who, next to Aristomenes, formed the principal ornament and defence of their declining country.

Among the republics of ancient Greece, the fate of a nation often depended on the event of a battle. The contention was not between mercenary troops, who regarded war as a trade, which they carried on merely from interest, without emulation or resentment. The citizens of free communities fought for their liberties and fortunes, their wives and children, and for every object held dear or valuable among men. In such a struggle they exerted the utmost efforts of their animosity as well as of their strength; nor did the conflict cease, till the one party had reduced the other to extremity. It was not extraordinary, therefore, that after the bloody battle of the Trenches, the Messenians should be unable to keep the field. Aristomenes, however, determined, while he preserved his life, to maintain his independence. With this view he collected the miserable remains of his unfortunate troops; assembled the scattered inhabitants of the open country; abandoned the cities and villages on the plain, to the mercy of the victors; and seized with his little army, the strong fortress

of Eira, situate among the mountains which rise along the southern shore of Messenia, defended on the north by the river Neda, and open only on the south towards the harbours of Pylus and Methone, which offered it a plentiful supply of corn, fish, and other necessary provisions.

A. C. 682—671. In this situation the gallant Messenian resisted, for eleven years, the efforts of the Spartans, who endeavoured, with unremitting industry, to become masters of the fortress. Nor was he satisfied with defending the place; on various occasions he made vigorous and successful sallies against the besiegers. With a body of three hundred Messenians, of tried valour and fidelity, he, at different times, over-ran the Spartan territories, and plundered such cities as were either weakly garrisoned or negligently defended. In order to put a stop to incursions equally dishonourable and destructive, the Spartans ordered their frontier to be laid waste, and thus rendered incapable of affording subsistence to the enemy. But they themselves were the first to feel the inconveniency of this measure. As the lands towards that frontier were the most fertile in the province, and the crops in other parts had failed through the inclemency of the season, the Spartans were threatened with all the calamities of famine; to which the proprietors of the wasted grounds, deprived of their harvests by a rigorous injunction of the state, were prepared to add the horrors of a sedition. Tyrtæus displayed, on this occasion, the wonderful power of his art, by appeasing the angry tumult, and teaching the Spartans patiently to bear, in the service of their country, the loss of fortune, as well as of life.

While the enemy were disturbed by these commotions, Aristomenes set out from Eira, with his favourite band, and, marching all night, arrived by day-break at Amyclæ, a Lacedæmonian city, situate on the banks of the Eurotas, at the distance of a few miles from the capital. Having entered the place without resistance, he carried off a considerable booty in slaves and merchandise, and returned to his mountains, before the Spartans, though apprised of his incursion, could arrive to the assistance of their neighbours.

A continued series of such exploits, carried on with equal success, inspired into the Messenians a degree of confidence, which had almost proved fatal to their cause. Neglecting that celerity, and those precautions, to which they owed their past advantages, they began to continue so long in the field, that the Spartans found an opportunity to intercept their return. The little band of Aristomenes behaved with its usual gallantry, and long defended itself against far superior numbers, headed by the two kings of Sparta. The commander, after receiving many wounds, was taken prisoner; and, with fifty of his bravest companions, carried in chains to the Lacedæmonian capital. The resentment of that republic against those who had inflicted on her such dreadful calamities, was not to be gratified by an ordinary punishment. After much deliberation, the pri-

soners were thrown, alive, into the Ceadæ; a profound cavern, which was commonly employed as a receptacle for the most atrocious criminals. All the companions of Aristomenes were killed by the fall; he alone was preserved by an accident, which though natural enough in itself, has been disfigured by many fabulous circumstances.¹ The Spartans, who loved valour even in an enemy, permitted him, at his earnest desire, to be buried with his shield; a weapon of defence held in peculiar veneration by the Grecian soldiers. As he descended into the deep cavity, the edge or boss of his ample buckler, striking against the sides of the pit, broke the force of the fall, and saved his life. Two days he continued in this miserable dungeon, amidst the stench and horror of dead bodies, his face covered with his cloak, waiting the slow approaches of certain death. The third day (at day-break) he heard a noise, and looking up, perceived a fox devouring the mangled remains of his companions. He allowed the animal to approach him, and catching hold of it with one hand, while he defended himself against its bite with the other, he determined to follow wherever it should conduct him. The fox drew towards a chink in the rock, by which he had entered the cavity, and through which he intended to get out. Aristomenes then gave liberty to his guide, whom he followed with much difficulty, scrambling through the passage which had been opened for his deliverance. He immediately took the road of Eira, and was received with pleasing astonishment among his transported companions.

The news of his wonderful escape was soon conveyed to Sparta by some Messenian deserters, whose information on such a subject was not more credited, than if they had brought intelligence of one risen from the dead. But, in the space of a few days, the exploits of Aristomenes convinced the incredulity of the Spartans. He was informed by his scouts, that the Corinthians had sent a powerful reinforcement to the besiegers; that these troops were still on their march, observing no order or discipline in the day, and encamping during night without guards or sentinels. A general less active and less enterprising, would not have neglected so favourable an occasion of annoying the enemy. But Aristomenes alone was capable of effecting this purpose by the means which were now employed. That no appearance of danger might alarm the negligence of the Corinthians, he set out unattended,² waited their approach in concealment, attacked the camp in the dead of night, marked his route with blood, and returning loaded with spoils to Eira, offered to Messenian Jove the *Hecatombonia*; a sacrifice of a hundred victims, which he alone was entitled to perform, who with his own hand had killed a hundred of his enemies. This was the

third time the Messenian hero had celebrated the same tremendous rite.

Eleven years had the vigorous and persevering efforts of a single man prolonged the destiny of Eira. Aristomenes might have still withstood the impetuous ardour of the Spartans, but he could not withstand the unerring oracles of Apollo, which predicted the fall of the devoted city. The purpose of the gods, however, was accomplished, not by open force, but by the secret treachery of a Lacedæmonian adulterer. This Lacedæmonian was the slave of Emperamus, a Spartan, who in the field yielded the post of honour only to the kings. The perfidious slave had escaped to the enemy with his master's property, and had formed an intrigue with a Messenian woman whom he visited as often as her husband was called in his turn to guard the citadel. Amidst the miserable joys of their infamous commerce the lovers were one night disturbed by the husband, who loudly claimed admittance, which however he did not obtain till his wife had concealed the adulterer. When the wife with the most insidious flattery, inquiring by what excess of good fortune she was blessed with her husband's unexpected return, the simple Messenian related, that the inclemency of the weather had driven the soldiers from their posts, the wind and thunder and rain being so violent that it was scarcely possible for them to continue any longer uncovered on the high grounds; nor could their desertion be attended with any bad consequences either to themselves or to their country, as Aristomenes was prevented by a recent wound from walking the rounds as usual; and as it could not be expected that the Spartans should venture an attack against the citadel during the obscurity and horror of a tempest. The Lacedæmonian slave overheard this recital, and thus obtained a piece of intelligence, which he well knew might not only atone for his past crimes, but entitle him to gratitude from his ancient master. He cautiously escaped from his concealment, and sought with the utmost celerity the Spartan camp. Neither of the kings being then present, the command belonged to Emperamus, who readily pardoned the fortunate treachery of a servant that had afforded him the means of obtaining the highest object of his ambition. Notwithstanding the slipperiness of the steep ascent, the Spartans, by the direction of the slave, mounted the unguarded citadel, and obtained possession of all the principal posts before the Messenians became sensible of their danger.

As soon as it was known that the enemy had entered into the city, Aristomenes, accompanied by the warlike prophet Theocles, together with their respective sons Gorgus and Manticles, endeavoured to animate the despair of their fellow citizens, and to make them defend to the last extremity, the little spot of ground to which they could yet apply the endearing name of country. Such however were the terrors and confusion of the night (the darkness, thunder, and tempest, being rendered still more dreadful by the presence of an armed enemy,) that it was impossible to form the

¹ An eagle, it is said, flew to his relief, which arose from his having a spread eagle on his shield. Pausanias says, he saw the shield, which was preserved in the subterraneous chapel of Trophonius, at Lebæda.

² The exploits of Aristomenes often oblige us to remember the expression in Pausanias, p. 244: *Ἀριστομένην δὲ εἶναι φασὶν ἀποδείξασθαι πλεον τοῦ ἡ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι σικεῖς ἢν.* "That he did more than seemed possible for any one man."

Olymp. xxvii. 2. A. C. 671. Messenians into such an order of battle as might enable them to act with concert or effect. When the morning appeared they saw the danger more distinctly than before, and the impossibility of any other assistance than what may be derived from despair. They determined, at every hazard, to attack and penetrate the Spartan battalions. Even the women armed themselves with tiles, with stones, with every weapon that presented itself to their fury. They lamented that the violence of the wind prevented them from mounting to the roofs of the houses, which they had purposed to throw down on the enemy; and declared that they would rather be buried under the ruins of their country, than dragged in captivity to Sparta. Such generous resolutions ought to have retarded the fate of Messene; but it was impossible to fight against superior numbers, aided by the elements and by the manifest partiality of the gods; for the thunder happening on the right of the Spartans, afforded them an auspicious omen of future victory, and presented to the Messenians the sad prospect of impending calamities.

These circumstances, so favourable to the Spartans, were improved by the prudence of Hecatus the diviner, who advised that the soldiers who composed the last ranks, as they could not be brought up to the attack, should be remanded to the camp; and after refreshing themselves with sleep and nourishment, recalled to the assistance of their countrymen. Thus, without depriving themselves of present strength, the Spartans provided for a future supply of fresh troops; while the Messenians, engaged in continual action with the assailants, were obliged at the same time to combat cold, sleep, fatigue, and hunger. For three days and nights they withstood the combined force of these finally irresistible enemies; and when at length they began to give way, the diviner Theocles threw himself into the midst of the Spartans, crying out, "That they were not always to be victorious, nor the Messenians always to be their slaves. Such was the will of the gods! who commanded him to perish in the wreck of a country, which, in a future age, was destined to rise from its ruins."

It might have been expected that the patriotism of Aristomenes would have chosen the same honourable occasion of expiring with the freedom of his republic. But the general preferred life for the sake of defending the small remnant of a community, which, he flattered himself, would be immortal, not only from the prediction of Theocles, but from another circumstance equally important. When the downfall of Eira was foretold by the oracle of Apollo, the prudent chief had removed to a place of security some sacred pledges believed to contain the fate of Messene. These mysterious securities consisted of thin plates of lead, rolled up in the form of a volume, on which was engraved an account of the history and worship of the goddesses Ceres and Proserpine. Having concealed in mount Ithome this invaluable monument, which had been delivered down in veneration from the remotest antiquity, Aristomenes

determined never to despair of the fortune, or to forsake the interests of his country. Although he perceived, therefore, that it was now become necessary to relinquish Eira, he did not, on this account, abandon the safety of its remaining citizens. In order to preserve them, the only expedient that could be employed, with any hopes of success, was the sounding a retreat, and the collecting into one body such of his soldiers as were not already too far engaged with the Spartans. Having accomplished this measure, he placed the women and children in the centre of the battalion, and committed the command of the rear to Gorgus and Manticles. He himself conducted the van, and marching towards the enemy with his spear equally poised, and with well-regulated valour, showed, by his mien and countenance, that he was resolved to defend to the last extremity the little remnant of the Messenian state. The Spartans, as directed by Hecatus the diviner, opened their ranks, and allowed them to pass unhurt, judiciously avoiding to irritate their despair. The Messenians abandoned their city, and in mournful silence marched towards Arcadia.

As the wars of the Grecian republics were more bloody and destructive than those of modern times, so were their alliances more generous and sincere. When the Arcadians were informed of the taking of Eira, they travelled in great numbers towards the frontiers of their kingdom, carrying with them victuals, clothing, and all things necessary to the relief of the unfortunate fugitives; whom having met at mount Lycæa, they invited into their cities, offered to divide with them their lands, and to give them their daughters in marriage.³

The generous sympathy of the Arcadians animated Aristomenes to an exploit, the boldness of which little corresponded with the depression incident to his present fortune. He had only five hundred soldiers whose activity and strength were still equal to their valour; and these he commanded, in the presence of his allies, to march straightway to Sparta. Three hundred Arcadians desired to share the glory of this spirited enterprise; and it was hoped, that as the greater part of the Lacedæmonians were employed in plundering Eira, this small but valiant body of men might make a deep impression on a city deprived of its usual defence. The arrangements for this purpose were taken with the Arcadian king Aristocrates, whose behaviour at the battle of the Trenches had occasioned the defeat of the Messenians, and whose artifice had since persuaded them, that his shameful behaviour on that day was the effect of panic terror, not of perfidious intention. A second time the treacherous Arcadian betrayed the cause of his country and its allies. Having retarded the

Olymp. xxvii. 2. A. C. 671. execution of Aristomenes's project, on pretence that the appearance of the entrails was unfavourable, he despatched a confidential slave to Sparta, who discovered the imminent danger

threatening that republic to Anaxander the Lacedæmonian king.* The slave was intercepted on his return, carrying a letter from that prince, in which he acknowledged the faithful services of his ancient benefactor. Upon the discovery of this letter, which totally disconcerted the intended enterprize against Sparta, the Arcadians, frantic with disappointment and rage, stoned to death the perfidious traitor who disgraced the name of king. The Messenians joined not in the execution of this substantial act of justice. Watching the countenance of Aristomenes, whose authority was equally powerful in the council and in the field, they observed, that instead of being agitated by resentment, it was softened by grief. The hero was affected with the deepest melancholy, on reflecting that the only design was now rendered abortive, by which he could soon hope to avenge the wrongs of his country. Both nations testified the most signal detestation of the character of Aristocrates. The Arcadians extinguished his name, and extirpated his whole race. The Messenians erected a column near the temple of Lycæan Apollo (so named from mount Lycæa, on the confines of Arcadia,) with an inscription, setting forth his crime and punishment; asserting the impossibility of concealing treacherous baseness from the investigation of Time, and the penetrating mind of Jove; and praying the god to defend and bless the land of Arcadia.¹

Thus ended the second Messenian war, in the autumn of the year six hundred and seventy-one before Christ. The fugitive Messenians experienced various fortunes. The aged and infirm were treated by the Arcadians, among whom they continued to reside, with all the cordial attention of ancient hospitality. The young and enterprising took leave of their benefactors, and under the conduct of Aristomenes repaired to Cyllene, a harbour belonging to the Eleans. Agreeably to the information which they had received, they found in that place their countrymen of Pylus and Methone, with whom they consulted about the means of acquiring new establishments. It was determined, by the advice of their Elean friends, not to undertake any expedition for this purpose until the return of spring, when they should again convene in full assembly, finally to conclude this important deliberation. Having met at the time appointed, they agreed unanimously to commit their future fortunes to the wisdom and paternal care of Aristomenes, who declared his opinion for establishing a distant colony, but declined the honour of conducting it in person, and named for this office the brave Messenian youths Gorgus and Manticles. The former of these inheriting his father's hatred against Sparta, advised his countrymen to take possession of the island of Zacynthus, which, from its situation in the Ionian Sea, lay conveniently for harassing the maritime parts of Laconia. Manticles proposed a different opinion, observing that the island of Sardinia,

though less advantageously situated for the purposes of revenge, was far better adapted to supply the necessary comforts of life; and that the Messenians, if once settled in that large and beautiful island, would soon forget the calamities which Sparta had inflicted on them. It is uncertain whether motives of vengeance or utility would have prevailed with the Messenians; for before any resolution was taken on this important subject, a messenger arrived from Rhegium, then governed by Anaxilas, a prince descended from the royal House of Messenia, who invited his wandering countrymen to a safe and honourable retreat in his dominions. When, agreeably to this invitation, they arrived at Rhegium, Anaxilas informed them, that his subjects were continually harassed by the piratical depredations of the Zancleans, an Eolian colony,² who possessed a delightful territory on the opposite coast. With the assistance of the Messenians it would be easy (he observed) to destroy that nest of pirates; a measure by which the city of Rhegium would be delivered from very troublesome neighbours, and the Messenians enabled to establish themselves in the most delicious situation of the whole Sicilian coast. The proposal was received with alacrity; the armament sailed for Sicily; the Zancleans were besieged by sea and land. When they perceived that part of their wall was destroyed, and that they could derive no advantage from continuing in arms, they took refuge in the temples of their gods. Even from these respected asylums the resentment of Anaxilas was ready to tear them; but he was restrained by the humanity of the Messenians, who had learned from their own calamities to pity the unfortunate. The Zancleans, thus delivered from the sword and from servitude, the ordinary consequences of unsuccessful war, swore eternal gratitude to their generous protectors. The Messenians returned this friendly sentiment with an increase of bounty; they allowed the Zancleans either to leave the place, or to remain in the honourable condition of citizens; the two nations gradually coalesced into one community; and Zancle, in memory of the conquest, changed its name to Messene,³ a name which may still be recognized after the revolution of twenty-five centuries.

It has been already observed, that Aristomenes declined the honour of conducting the colony. His subsequent fortune is differently related by ancient writers.⁴ Pausanias, to whom we are indebted for the fullest account of the Messenian hero, informs us, that he sailed

² Thucyd. l. vi.

³ Such is the account of Pausanias, or rather of the ancient authors whom he follows. But it must not be dissembled, that Herodotus, lib. vi. c. 23. Thucydides, p. 114. and Diodorus, lib. xi. place Anaxilas, king of Rhegium, much later than the second Messenian war. It deserves to be considered, that Pausanias, writing expressly on the subject, is entitled to more credit than authors who only speak of it incidentally. But when we reflect that these authors are Herodotus and Thucydides, there seems no way of solving the difficulty, but by supposing two princes of the name of Anaxilas, to the latter of whom his countrymen, by a species of flattery not uncommon in Greece, ascribed the transactions of the first.

⁴ Confer. Pausan. Messen. et Plin. l. xi. cap. 70. Val. Maxim. lib. i. cap. 8.

¹ The inscription is preserved by Polybius, l. iv. and by Pausanias, Messen.

to the isle of Rhodes with Demagetes, the king of the city and territory of Ialysus in that island, who being advised by the oracle of Apollo to marry the daughter of the most illustrious character in Greece, had without hesitation preferred the daughter of Aristomenes. From Rhodes he sailed to Ionia, and thence travelled to Sardis, with an intention of being presented to Ardys king of the Lydians, probably to propose some enterprize to the ambition of that prince, which might finally be productive of benefit to Messene. But upon his

arrival at Sardis he was seized with a distemper which put an end to his life. Other generals have defended their country with better success, but none with greater glory; other characters are more fully delineated in ancient history, but none more deserving of immortal fame; since whatever is known of Aristomenes tends to prove, that according to the ideas of his age and country, he united, in singular perfection, the merits of the citizen and of the soldier, the powers of the understanding and the virtues of the heart.

CHAPTER V.

State of the Peloponnesus after the Conquest of Messenia—Of the Northern Republics of Greece—Of the Grecian Colonies—Revolutions in Government—Military Transactions—The first Sacred War—Destruction of the Crisean Republic—Restoration of the Pythian Games—Description of the Gymnastic and Equestrian Exercises—History of Grecian Music.

THE conquest of Messenia rendered Sparta the most considerable power in Greece. The Peloponnesus, formerly comprehending seven, now contained only six independent states. The subjects of Sparta alone occupied two-fifths of the whole peninsula. The remainder was unequally divided among the Corinthians, Achæans, Eleans, Arcadians, and Argives. In a narrow extent of territory, these small communities exhibited a wonderful variety of character and manners. The central district of Arcadia, consisting of one continued cluster of mountains, was inhabited by a hardy race of herdsmen, proud of their ancestry, and confident in their own courage and the strength of their country. Their Eolian extraction, their jealousy, and their pride, made them disdain connection with the Dorians, by whose possessions they were on all sides surrounded. Careless of the arts of peace, they were engaged in unceasing hostilities with their neighbours, by whom they were despised as barbarians, and whom they contemned as upstarts; since, amidst all the revolutions of Peloponnesus, the Arcadians alone had ever maintained their original establishments.⁵

The industrious and wealthy Corinthians presented a very different spectacle. Inhabiting the mountainous isthmus, which, towering between two seas, connects the Peloponnesus with the north of Greece, the Corinthians long formed the principal centre of inland communication and foreign commerce.⁶ Towards the southern extremity of the isthmus, and at the foot of their impregnable fortress Acro-Corinthus, they had built a fair and spacious city, extending its branches, on either side, to the Saronic and Corinthian gulfs, whose opposite waves vainly assailed their narrow but lofty

territory.⁷ Their harbours and their commerce gave them colonies and a naval power. They are said to have improved the very inconvenient ships, or rather long-boats, used in early times, into the more capacious form of triremes⁸

⁷ Strabo, l. viii. v. 379.

⁸ The triremes, quadriremes, quinqueremes of the ancients, were so denominated from the number of the ranks, or tiers, of oars on each side the vessel; which number constituted what we may call the rate of the ancient ships of war. It was long a desideratum in the science of antiquities to determine the manner of arranging these ranks of oars, as well as to ascertain the position of the rowers. The bulk of commentators and antiquaries placed the sedilia, or seats, in rows, immediately above each other, upon the sides of the vessel, which they supposed perpendicular to the surface of the water. But the least knowledge of naval architecture destroys that supposition. The rowers, thus placed, must have obstructed each other; they must have occupied too large a space, and rowed with too unfavourable an angle on the ship's side; above all, the length and weight of the oars required for the upper tiers, must have rendered the working of them totally impracticable, especially as we know from ancient writers, that there was but one man to each oar. These inconveniences were pointed out by many; but the ingenuity of lieutenant-general Melville explained how to remedy them. He conjectured that the waste parts of the ancient gallees, at the distance of a few feet above the water's edge, rose obliquely, with an angle of 45°, or near it; that upon the inner sides of this waste part, the seats of the rowers, each about two feet in length, were fixed, horizontally, in rows, with no more space between each seat, and those on all sides of it, than should be found necessary for the free movements of men when rowing together. The quincunx, or chequer order, would afford this advantage in the highest degree possible; and, in consequence of the combination of two obliquities, the inconveniences above-mentioned totally disappear. In 1773 the general caused the fifth part of the waist of a quinqueremis to be erected in the back yard of his house in Great Pulteney street. This model contained, with sufficient ease, in a very small space, thirty rowers, in five tiers of six men in each, lengthways, making one-fifth part of the rowers on each side of a quinqueremis, according to Polybius, who assigns three hundred for the whole complement, besides one hundred and twenty fighting men. This construction, the advantages of which appeared evident to those who examined it, serves to explain many difficult passages of the Greek and Roman writers concerning naval matters. The general's discovery is confirmed by ancient monuments. On several pieces of sculpture, particularly at Rome, he found the figures of war gallees, or parts of them, with the oars represented as coming down from oar holes disposed chequerwise. In the Capo di Monte Palace at

⁵ Pausan. Arcad. Strabo, l. viii. p. 388.

⁶ Pausan. Corinth. c. iv.

gallies.¹ Their sea-fight against their rebellious colony, Corcyra, is the first naval engagement recorded in history.² It was fought

A. C. six hundred and fifty years before
779— Christ, at which time the Corinthians
till 585. (as the ideas of wealth and luxury are
relative) were already regarded by

their neighbours as a wealthy and luxurious people. The influence of wealth to produce servitude prevailed over that of commerce, which is favourable to liberty. Their government, after the abolition of monarchy, was usurped by a numerous branch of the royal family, styled Bacchiadæ.³ This oligarchy was destroyed by Cypselus, a mild and gentle ruler,⁴ whose family governed Corinth till the year five hundred and eighty-five before Christ.

The contrast between Arcadia and Corinth was not more striking than that between Argolis and Achaia. The citizens of Argos, having expelled their kings, were seized with an ambition to reduce and domineer over the inferior towns in the province. The insolence of the capital provoked the indignation of the country. Mycenæ, Træzene, Epidaurus, and other places of less note, were often conquered, but never thoroughly subdued. Interest taught them to unite; and union enabled them to set at defiance the power of Argos, by which they were branded as rebellious, and which they reproached as tyrannical.⁵ The fortunate district of Achaia, having successfully resisted the oppression of Ogygus, an unworthy descendant of Agamemnon, established, at a very early period, a democratical form of policy.⁶ Twelve cities, each of which retained its municipal jurisdiction, united on a foot of perfect equality and freedom. This equitable confederacy prepared the way for the Achæan laws, so celebrated in latter times, when the cause of Greece, shamefully abandoned by more powerful guardians, was defended by the feeble communities of Achaia.⁷

We have already had occasion to explain the important institutions of Iphitus and Lycurgus. The very opposite systems adopted by these great legislators, respectively suited the weakness of Elis and the strength of Sparta, and occasioned a remarkable contrast between the peaceful tranquillity of the former republics and the warlike ambition of the latter, the lines of whose national character grew more bold and decisive after the Messenian conquest. The piteous remnant of the Messenians, who had defended their freedom with the most per-

severing bravery, was reduced to a cruel and ignominious servitude. Confounded with the miserable mass of Helots, those wretched victims of Spartan cruelty, they were condemned to laborious drudgery, exposed to daily insult, and compelled (still more intolerable!) to tend their own flocks, and cultivate their own fields, for the benefit of unrelenting tyrants.⁹ The haughty temper of the Spartans became continually more presumptuous. They totally disdained such arts and employments as they usually saw practised by the industry of slaves. War, and hunting as the image of war, were the only occupations which it suited their dignity to pursue; and this constant exercise in arms, directed by the military code of Lycurgus, rendered them superior in the field of battle, not only to the neighbouring states of Peloponnesus, but to the bravest and most renowned republics beyond the Corinthian isthmus.

While the Grecian peninsula was agitated by the stubborn conflict between the Spartans and Messenians, the northern states had been disturbed by petty wars, and torn by domestic discord.¹⁰ The Greek settlements in Thrace, in Africa, and Magna Græcia, were yet too feeble to attract the regard of history. But, during the period now under review, the Asiatic colonies, as shall be explained in a subsequent chapter, far surpassed their European brethren in splendour and prosperity.

Having abolished the regal office, the Athenians, whose political revolutions were followed with remarkable uniformity by neighbouring states, submitted the chief administration of their affairs to a magistrate entitled Archon, or ruler. The authority of the Archon long continued hereditary: it became afterwards decennial: at length nine annual Archons were appointed by the powerful class of nobility, consisting not only of the descendants of such foreign princes as had taken refuge in Athens, but of those Athenian families which time and accident had raised to opulence and distinction. The great body of the people gained nothing by these revolutions. The equestrian order, so called from their fighting on horseback, which before the improvement of tactics, rendered them superior in every rencounter with the disorderly rabble, enjoyed all authority, religious, civil, and military.¹¹ The Athenian populace were reduced to a condition of miserable servitude; nor did they recover their ancient and hereditary freedom until the admired institutions of Theseus were restored and improved by Solon, towards the beginning of the sixth century before Christ.

The domestic dissensions which prevailed in every state beyond the isthmus were only interrupted by foreign hostilities. Interference of interest occasioned innumerable contests between

Olymp. the Phocians and Thebans, the Dorians
xlvi. and Thessalians, the Locrians and Ætolians. Their various inroads, battles,
A. C. and sieges, which were begun with passion, carried on without prudence, and
600.

Naples, the reverse of a large médaglione of Gordianus has the figure of a triremis, with three tiers, each of fourteen or fifteen oars, issuing chequerwise from the oblique side. The collection at Portici contains ancient paintings of several gallies, one or two of which, by presenting the stern part, show both the obliquity of the sides, and the rows of oars reaching to the water.—The substance of this note is already published in Governor Pownall's Antiquities. The governor, however, speaks of a gallery for the rowers, which I did not observe in the general's model; nor do I apprehend that such a gallery could be necessary, as the purpose for which it is supposed to have been intended, is completely answered by the waist part of the vessel.

¹ Thucyd. l. i. c. xiii.

² Ibid.

³ Pausan. Corinth.

⁴ Aristot. Polit. l. v. c. xii.

⁵ Pausan. l. vi. c. xxi. Diodor. Sicul. l. xi. p. 275.

⁶ Pausan. Achaic. Strabo, l. viii. p. 363, et seq.

⁷ Polyb. l. ii.

⁸ Pausan. Eliac, et Strabo. l. viii.

⁹ Pausanias Messeniæc.

¹⁰ Thucyd. l. i.

¹¹ Aristot. Politic. l. iv. c. xiii.

concluded without producing any permanent effect, have been consigned by ancient historians to a just oblivion. But the first sacred war is recommended to our attention, both on account of the cause from which it arose, and the consequences with which it was attended. This memorable enterprize was occasioned by an injury committed against the oracle of Delphi; it was undertaken by order of the Amphictyons; it ended in the total destruction of the cities accused of sacrilegious outrage; and its successful conclusion was celebrated by the Pythian games and festival, which, of all Grecian institutions, had the most direct as well as most powerful tendency to refine rudeness and soften barbarity.

The territory of the Criseans, lying to the south of Delphi, comprehended, in an extent of about twenty-four miles in length and fifteen in breadth, three large and flourishing cities; Crissa, the capital, which gave name to the province; Cirrha, advantageously situated for commerce on the western side of a creek of the Corinthian gulf; and Antecirrha, on the eastern side of the same creek, celebrated for the production of hellebore, as well as for the skill with which the natives prepared that medicinal plant, the virtues of which were so much extolled and exaggerated by credulous antiquity.¹²

The Criseans possessed all the means of happiness, but knew not how to enjoy them. Their territory, though small, was fertile; and as its value was enhanced by the comparative sterility of the greatest part of Phocis,¹³ it acquired and deserved the epithet of *happy*. Their harbour was frequented by the vessels, not only of Greece, but of Italy and Sicily; they carried on an extensive foreign commerce, considering the limited communication between distant countries in that early age; and the neighbourhood of Delphi, at which it was impossible to arrive without passing through their dominions, brought them considerable accessions of wealth,¹⁴ as well as of dignity and respect. But these advantages, instead of satisfying, increased the natural avidity of the Criseans. They began to exact vexatious and exorbitant duties from the merchants who came to expose their wares in the sacred city, which, on account of the great concourse of profligate pilgrims from every quarter, soon became the seat, not of devotion only, but of dissipation, vanity, and licentious pleasure. It was in vain for the merchants to exclaim against these unexampled impositions; the taxes were continually increased; the evil admitted not the expectation of either remedy or relief; and the strangers, accustomed to it by long habit, began to submit without murmur; and perhaps endured the hardship with the greater patience, when they perceived that they drew back the tax in the increased price of their commodities. Encouraged by this acquiescence in their tyranny, the Criseans levied a severe impost on the pilgrims, whether Greeks or Barbarians, who visited the temple of Apollo; a measure directly inconsistent with a decree

of the Amphictyons, which declared that all men should have free access to the oracle,¹⁵ as well as extremely hurtful to the interest of the Delphians, who soon felt a gradual diminution of their profits arising from the holy shrine. It was natural for those who sustained a loss, either of gain or of authority, to remonstrate against the extortions of the Criseans; but their remonstrances, instead of producing any happy alteration of behaviour, only exasperated men grown insolent through prosperity. In the time of profound peace, the Criseans, provoked by useful admonitions, which they proudly called threats, entered with an armed force the territories of their neighbours; destroyed every thing that opposed them, with fire and sword; laid the defenceless cities under heavy contributions, and carried many of the inhabitants into servitude.¹⁶ Delphi itself, however much it was revered in Greece, and respected even by the most distant nations, appeared to the sacrilegious invaders an object better fitted to gratify the desire of plunder, than to excite the emotions of piety. Neighbourhood had rendered them familiar with the woods, the temples, and the grottoes of the presiding divinity; with the manners and character of many of his ministers they were probably too well acquainted to hold them in much reverence; and having deserved their resentment by what they had already done, they resolved to render it impotent by what they should next accomplish.

The design of plundering Delphi was no sooner formed than executed. The imaginations of men were not prepared for such an event; nor had any measures been taken to prevent such an unexpected and abominable profanation. The enemy meeting with no resistance, became masters of the temple, and seized the rich votive offerings accumulated by the pious generosity of ages. Thence they passed into the sacred wood, and rendered furious through pride or guilt, attacked, plundered, and murdered the promiscuous crowd, who were employed in the usual exercise of their devotions. The young were violated with a licentious rage which bid defiance to decency and nature. Even a deputation of the Amphictyons, clothed in the venerable garb and bearing the respected ensigns of their office, were repelled with blows and insults, while they vainly attempted to stop the fatal progress of these frantic and impious outrages, committed against every thing held sacred among men.¹⁷

The Amphictyonic council, to whom it belonged to judge and to punish the atrocious enormities of the Criseans, experienced, in an uncommon degree, those inconveniences to which all numerous assemblies are in some measure liable. Their proceedings were retarded by formality, warped by prejudice, and disturbed by dissension. Notwithstanding the aggravated crimes of the Criseans, it was not without encountering many difficulties and much opposition, that Solon, one of the Athenian representatives, roused his associates to

¹² Strabo and Pliny.
¹⁴ Pausan. in Phocis.

¹³ Strabo, p. 323, et seq.

¹⁵ Strabo, l. ix. p. 418.
¹⁷ Pausan. in Phocis.

¹⁶ Æschin. in Ctesiphont.

the resolution of avenging the offended majesty of religion, the violated laws of nature, and their own personal injuries. When at length they agreed to this useful and pious design, the measures pursued on the present occasion, as well as in all the future wars undertaken by their authority, were equally slow and indecisive. The forces which they at first brought into the field were by no means equal to the enterprize for which they were designed. After various reinforcements, they attempted ineffectually, during nine summers and winters, to reduce the towns of Crissa and Cirrha, which finally submitted, in the tenth year of the war, rather to the art than to the power of the besiegers.

The events of the preceding years strongly paint the ignorance, the superstition, and the rude manners of the times. The Crisseans had no sooner plundered, than they abandoned the temple of Apollo. Thither, by the advice of Solon, the Amphictyons sent messengers, to consult the oracle concerning the proper means as well as the just measure of their vengeance. They were commanded instantly to levy war on the Crisseans; to persecute them to the last extremity; to demolish their towns, to desolate their country, and after consecrating it to Apollo, Diana, Latona, and Minerva, to prevent it from ever thenceforth being cultivated for the service of man.¹ In obedience to this peremptory injunction of the god, the Amphictyons returned to their several republics, in order to collect troops, and to animate the exertions of their countrymen in the common cause.² The Greeks, however, were too deeply engaged in domestic dissensions, to make effectual efforts for the glory of Apollo. Few adventurers repaired to the holy standard; and the war, neither supported by vigour of execution, nor directed by wisdom of deliberation, languished for several years under different generals. At length Eurylochus, a Thessalian prince, of great valour and activity, was entrusted with the command of the Amphictyonic army.³ The new general waited till the time of harvest, to ravage the open country, to destroy the villages by fire and sword, and to desolate the happy Crissean plain.

On several occasions he defeated the army of the Crisseans, who made frequent and vigorous sallies in order to defend their possessions. But when he attempted to make an impression on the fortified strength of Crissa, its thick walls, its lofty towers, and above all, the activity and courage of its citizens, presented obstacles which it was impossible to surmount. The art of besieging towns still continued in a state of great imperfection. The battering-rams, and other engines employed in this operation of war, were of too rude a construction to make such a breach in the walls as might not easily be repaired. It was in vain that Eurylochus attempted by blockade to reduce the place. The enemy were furnished with all necessaries in great abundance, from the well-frequented port of Cirrha. Years thus passed

away, and nothing decisive was effected. The besiegers, fatigued with labour, and uneasy at disappointment, had often abandoned their camp, and cantoned themselves on the borders of the Crissean territory, where they expected more salutary supplies of provisions.

When they again returned to their duty, they were afflicted, in the ninth year of the war, with a pestilential or epidemic disorder, occasioned either by the want of wholesome food, the great numbers of men cooped up during the warm season within a narrow space, or by some unknown malignity of the atmosphere. A great part of the army fell a prey to the increasing contagion. Anxious for the public safety the Amphictyons had recourse to the wisdom of Apollo, who, instead of recommending to them the aid of an able physician, exhorted them to bring from the isle of Cos the *fawn with gold*. Ambassadors were immediately despatched to that island, in order to unravel the meaning of the god, thus wrapped up in its customary veil of mystic obscurity. They had no sooner explained their commission in the Coan assembly, than an eminent citizen, named Nebros, rising up, declared the sense of the oracle. "I am the fawn," said he, "pointed out by Apollo," (for Nebros in Greek signifies a fawn,) "and my son Chrysos" (which is the Greek word for gold) "has carried off the prize of strength, courage, and beauty, from all his competitors." The person who thus spoke is justly celebrated, on account of his ancestor Esculapius, of his descendant Hippocrates,³ and of his own unrivalled proficiency in the healing art. The knowledge of physic was become the hereditary honour, and almost the appropriated possession, of his family, by which it had been cultivated for many ages, and to which it is supposed, in a great measure, to owe its present improvement and perfection. Nebros obeyed with alacrity the injunction of Apollo, the peculiar patron of the science in which he excelled. At his own expense he equipped a vessel of fifty oars, loaded with valuable medicines as well as with warlike stores, and accompanied by his son Chrysos, set sail with the Amphictyonic ambassadors, in order to cure the confederates, and to conquer the Crisseans.

His advice, his prudence, and his assiduity, restored the decaying health of the army. Their numbers, however, were already so much diminished, that it seemed impossible by open force to put a successful end to the war. On this occasion the artful Coan employed a stratagem, which would have appeared entirely inconsistent with the laws of arms which had long been established in Greece, if it had not seemed to be the dictate of a divine admonition. The horse of Eurylochus was observed for several days to roll on the sand, and to strike his foot with great violence against a particular spot of ground. In digging under this ground,

¹ Æschin. *ibid.*

² Plut. in Solon. Strabo, l. ix. Platenus, l. vi. c. xv.

³ We owe, almost entirely, the history recorded in the text, to an oration of Thessalus, son of Hippocrates, addressed to the Athenians. It is published among the letters of his father. Vid. Hippocrat. Opera, ex edit. Fæsius, v. ii. p. 1291. There are some learned dissertations on the subject in the 5th and 7th volumes of the Memoirs of the Academy of Belles Lettres.

a wooden pipe was discovered, which supplied Crissa with water. The extraordinary means by which this discovery was made, convinced the ignorant credulity of the Greeks, that some important advantage might be derived from it; and upon mature deliberation it was concluded, that Apollo had thus suggested a contrivance for destroying his own and their enemies. Complying therefore with the heavenly intimation, Nebros poisoned the conduit of water; and the effect of this detestable artifice was soon discernible in the languid efforts and diminished resistance of the besieged. The besiegers, on the other hand, encouraged by the evident partiality of the gods, carried on their operations with redoubled vigour. A reward was proposed for the man who should first mount the walls, an honour obtained by the youthful ardour of Chryseos. The city was thus taken by assault; the fortifications were demolished, the houses burnt, and the inhabitants treated with a severity proportioned to the atrocious enormity of their own crimes, and the exasperated resentment of the victors.

The command of Apollo, however, was not completely executed by the destruction of the Crissean capital. Part of that impious community still subsisted in the maritime town of Cirrha, the reduction of which must have presented great difficulties to the Amphictyons, since it was necessary for them a third time to have recourse to the oracle. The answer delivered on this occasion was involved in two-fold obscurity. The words of the god, at all times dark and doubtful, now seemed absolutely unintelligible, since he made the taking of Cirrha, an event which there was every reason to expect, depend on a circumstance that appeared at first sight impossible. "You shall not overturn," said he, "the lofty towers of Cirrha, until the foaming billows of blue-eyed Amphitrité beat against the resounding shores of the Holy Land." How could the sea be conveyed for several leagues over rocks and mountains, so that its waves might dash against the craggy precipices which surround the sacred groves of Delphi? This was an enigma which the oldest and most experienced members of the Amphictyonic council acknowledged themselves unable to explain. The condition on which success was promised them seemed incapable of being fulfilled; the inhabitants of Cirrha flattered themselves with hopes of unalterable security; and the wisest of the Amphictyons gave their opinion, that there was good reason to abandon an enterprise which seemed disagreeable to Apollo, by whose advice the war had been originally undertaken.

While these sentiments universally prevailed in both armies, Solon, the Athenian, alone ventured to propose an advice more advantageous for the confederates, as well as more honourable for the holy shrine. His superior wisdom taught him the impiety of supposing that the god should require an impossibility, as the condition of happily terminating a war, the first measures of which he had himself suggested and approved. It exceeded, indeed, human power to extend the sea to the boundary of the Holy Land; but by removing this boundary,

it was possible to make the Holy Land communicate with the sea. This might easily be accomplished, since it sufficed for that purpose to consecrate the intermediate space with the same ceremonies which had been formerly employed in dedicating the Delphian territory.⁴

The opinion of Solon, proposed with much solemn gravity, was honoured with the unanimous approbation of his associates. Every one now wondered that he himself should not have thought of an expedient which seemed so natural and so obvious. The preparations were immediately made for carrying it into execution; and the property of the Cirrhean plain was surrendered to the god with the most pompous formality; the Amphictyons, either not considering that they bestowed on Apollo, what, as it was not their own, they had not a right to give away; or, if this idea occurred, easily persuaded themselves that the piety of the application would atone for the defect of the title.

When the senators had performed the consecration, the soldiers assailed the walls of Cirrha with the increasing activity of re-animated hope. That place, as well as the dependent town of Anticirrha, situate on the opposite side of the creek, soon submitted to their arms. The impious and devoted citizens were either put to the sword, or dragged into captivity. The Crissean community, formerly so rich and so flourishing, was for ever extirpated.⁵ Their lands were laid waste, their cities demolished, the proud monuments of their victories levelled with the ground; and the port of Cirrha, which was allowed to remain as a convenient harbour for Delphi, subsisted as the only vestige of their ancient grandeur. The territory, as it had been condemned by the divine will to perpetual sterility, long continued uncultivated; for the Delphians were not obliged to labour the ground in order to acquire the necessaries, the accommodations, and even the highest luxuries of life. The superstition of the age, furnished an abundant resource to supply their wants; the granaries of Apollo filled spontaneously; and, to use the figurative style of an ancient author, the land, unploughed and unsown by the industry of man, flourished in the richest luxuriance under the culture of the god.⁶

The successful event of a war begun, carried on, and concluded under the respectable sanction of the Amphictyonic council, was celebrated with all the pomp and festivity congenial to the Grecian character. According to an ancient and sacred institution, the several republics were accustomed, by public shows, to commemorate their respective victories. When different communities had employed their joint efforts in the same glorious enterprise, the grateful triumph was exhibited with a proportional increase of magnificence; but the fortunate exploits of gods and heroes, which had extensively benefited the whole Grecian name,

⁴ Pinitarch. in Solon. Pausan. in Phoc.

⁵ Eschin. in Ctesiphont.

⁶ Εἰσὶν τὰ πρὸς τὴν γῆν τοῦ ἁγίου

LUCIAN. Phalar. II.

were distinguished by such peculiar and transcendent honours as eclipsed the splendour of all other solemnities. While each republic paid the tribute of provincial festivals to the memory of its particular benefactors, the whole nation were concerned in acknowledging the bountiful goodness of Jupiter, the protecting aid of Neptune, the unerring wisdom of Apollo, and the unrivalled labours of Hercules. Hence the Olympian, Isthmian, Pythian, and Nemean games, which, though alike founded on the same principle of pious gratitude, were from their first establishment, distinguished by different ceremonies, and respectively consecrated to separate divinities.

The Amphictyons were principally indebted to the prudent admonitions of Apollo for the fortunate issue of a war undertaken by his authority; it therefore became them, while they rejoiced in the happy success of their arms, to offer respectful thanks to the god. These objects might easily be conjoined in the pleasing texture of ancient superstition, since the celebration of the Pythian games, which had been interrupted by a long train of wars and calamities, would form an entertainment not less agreeable to the supposed dictates of piety, than adapted to the natural demands of pleasure.

The festival re-established on this memorable occasion in honour of Apollo, is mentioned by ancient historians, on account of two remarkable circumstances by which it was distinguished. Instead of the scanty rewards usually distributed among the gymnastic combatants at other public solemnities, the Amphictyons bestowed on the victors the most precious spoils of the cities Crissa and Cirrha. The exhibitions of poetry and music had hitherto been united in all the Grecian festivals, and the laurel crown had been adjudged to the poet-musician, who enlivened the composition of his genius by the sound of his lyre. The Amphictyons for the first time separated the kindred arts; proposed prizes of instrumental music unaccompanied with poetry, and thus afforded an opportunity to the candidates for fame to display their superior merit in their respective professions.

These are the only particulars concerning the re-establishment of the Pythian games which seemed worthy the observation of Grecian authors, whose works were addressed to men who knew by experience and observation the nature and tendency of their domestic institutions. But a more copious explanation is required to satisfy the curiosity of the modern reader. The sacred games of Greece cannot be illustrated by a comparison with any thing similar in the present age; they were intimately connected with the whole system of ancient polity, whether civil or religious; they were attended with very extraordinary effects, both of a natural and moral kind; and on all these accounts they merit particular attention in a work which professes to unite the history of arts to that of arms, and to contemplate the varying picture of human manners, as well as the transient revolutions of war and empire.

In their most perfect form the sacred games

consisted in the exhibitions of the Stadium and Hippodrome, accompanied by the more refined entertainments of music and poetry. The Olympic Stadium took its name from the measure of length most commonly employed by the Greeks, consisting of the eighth part of a Grecian mile, or six hundred and thirty English feet. The Stadium, still remaining at Athens, has been accurately measured by our travellers, and is a hundred and twenty-five geometrical paces in length, and twenty-seven in breadth: it forms a long and lofty terrace on the banks of the Illyssus, and its sides were anciently built of white marble. That of Olympia was probably of the same dimensions, but far less magnificent, being entirely composed of earth. The one extremity contained an elevated throne, appropriated for the judges of the games, and a marble altar, on which the priestess of Ceres, and other privileged virgins, sat to behold a solemnity from which the rest of their sex were rigorously excluded. At the other extremity was the tomb of Endymion, the favourite of chaste Diana. The Stadium was divided by pillars into two courses. The five gymnastic exercises, so much celebrated by all the writers of antiquity, and so accurately described by Homer, Pindar, Sophocles, and Pausanias, began with the foot race, which is supposed to have been the most ancient, and which always retained the prerogative of distinguishing the Olympiads by the name of the victorious racer. The exercise at first consisted in running naked from one end of the Stadium to the other. The course was afterwards doubled, and at length the competitors were required to pass the goal three, six, and even twelve times, before they could be entitled to the prize. Motives of utility introduced the race of men loaded with heavy armour, which rendered this exercise a contest of strength as well as of swiftness. 2. The second trial of agility consisted in leaping; the competitors endeavouring to surpass each other in the length, without regard to the height of their leap. They carried in their hands weights of lead, through the perforations of which their fingers passed as through the handle of a shield, and by these they poised, and impelled forwards, their bodies. The perfection attained in this exercise must have far exceeded the experience of modern times, if we can believe that Phaulus of Crotona¹ leaped fifty-two feet. 3. The wrestling of the ancients required equal strength and agility. It was chiefly remarkable on account of the oil and sand with which they rubbed their bodies, in order to supple their joints, to prevent excessive perspiration, and to elude the grasp of their antagonists. The wrestlers were matched by lot, and the prize was adjudged to him who had thrice thrown his adversary on the ground. 4. The two following exercises tried chiefly the strength of the arms. The first consisted in throwing a huge mass of polished iron, brass, or stone, of a circular form, resembling a shield, but without handle or thong. It was called the disk, and thrown under the hand as the quoit is in England.

¹ Pausanias, p. 624.

The object of the competitors was to surpass each other in the length of the cast. Akin to this was the art of darting the javelin, which, as that weapon was directed at a mark, required steadiness of eye as well as dexterity of hand. 5. The last of the gymnastic exercises both in order and in esteem, was that of boxing. It was sometimes performed by the naked fist, and sometimes with the formidable *cæstus*, composed of raw hides lined with metal. Before the victory could be decided, it was necessary, from the nature of that exercise, that one of the combatants should acknowledge his defeat; a condition which seemed so inconsistent with the obstinacy of Grecian valour, that few ventured to contend in this dangerous amusement. The laws of Sparta absolutely prohibited her citizens from ever engaging in it, because a Spartan was taught to disdain saving his life by yielding to an opponent. Another reason, no less remarkable, tended still more to degrade the exercise of boxing. Besides strength and agility, the success of the boxer depended on a certain ponderous fleshiness of arm, which unfitted him to engage in any other contest. The regimen required for keeping up his corpulency, so necessary for the defence of his bones against the weight of blows, was altogether incompatible with the life of a soldier; a life of hardship and inequality, and continually exposed to the want of rest, of provisions, and of sleep.

These were the five gymnastic exercises in which the Grecian youth were trained with so much care, and to which they applied with so much emulation. But besides these simple sports, there were two others formed of their various combination; the *Panecratium*, which consisted of wrestling and boxing; and the *Pentathlon*, in which all the five were united; and to excel in such complicated exercises required an education and way of living not necessary to be observed by those who contended in the simple feats of strength and agility, and which was scarcely compatible with the study of any other than the athletic profession.

The Hippodrome, or ground allotted for the horse races, was twice as long as the Stadium,² and sufficiently spacious to allow forty chariots to drive abreast.³ The chariot race was instituted at Olympia about a hundred years after the regular celebration of the games, and that of riding horses twenty years later. These warlike sports followed the same progress with the military art, of which they were the image, and in which the use of chariots long preceded that of cavalry. The cars of the Greeks, as evidently appears from their medals, were low, open behind, furnished with only two wheels, and unprovided with any seat for the driver, who stood, with much difficulty in the body of his vehicle, while he commanded four horses, which were not paired but formed on one line. Notwithstanding this inconvenient posture they performed six and sometimes twelve rounds of the Hippodrome, amounting to six Grecian miles of eight hundred paces each, of which an English mile contains one thousand five

hundred and fifty. The Grecian heroes excelled, during the heroic ages, in this dangerous exercise; but in later times the owners of the horses were allowed to employ a charioteer, which enlarged the sphere of candidates for the Olympic prize, by admitting many foreign princes, as well as the wealthy ladies of Macedonia and Laconia, who could not appear in person at this important solemnity. Though riding-horses were not so early employed as chariots, either at the games, or in war, yet we cannot believe, with a fanciful writer,⁴ that this circumstance should have been occasioned by the timidity of the Greeks to mount on horseback; for we learn from Homer, that, even in the most ancient times, they were acquainted with all the feats of dexterity performed by our most accomplished jockies.⁵ But before the Persian war, the poverty of the Greeks prevented them from importing foreign horses, and their domestic breed was naturally of an inferior kind to those of Asia and Africa. The Spartans first employed them in battle during their wars with the Messenians. In the Persian expedition, Xerxes tried the mettle of the Persian, against the Thessalian horses, and the former carried off the palm in every contest. For a considerable time after the shameful retreat of that haughty monarch, the Athenians, who then formed the most powerful community of Greece, had a squadron of only three hundred horsemen: and it was not till that ambitious republic had begun to extend her dominion over the inferior states, that she seriously applied to the improvement of her cavalry.

While the Greeks thus acquired the accomplishments of the body, and displayed at Olympia their skill in horsemanship, and their vigour in the gymnastic exercises, the more refined entertainments of the fancy were not neglected; and the agreeable productions of music and poetry added lustre and elegance to every Grecian solemnity. It is well observed by the only ancient writer to whom we are indebted for a historical account of Grecian music, that the arts of peace, as they are more agreeable and more useful than those of war, demand, in a superior degree, the regard of the historian. If this had been the general opinion of authors, the study of their works would be equally entertaining and instructive. The writer of history would explain the various discoveries which happily tend to improve and to embellish social life; by introducing scenes of gayety and pleasure, he would diversify the eternal theme of human misery; and while he expatiated on the crimes and calamities of men, he would not neglect to point out the means best adapted to prevent the perpetration of the one, and to sooth the suffering of the other. But the Greek historians have not attempted to afford us this important information; they enlarge copiously on such topics as are adapted to the use of their countrymen; and they preserve the most mortifying silence concerning those subjects which deservedly excite the curiosity of later ages. Of all the arts cultivated by the ingenuity of their contemporaries, music

² Herodotus.³ Pausan. l. vi. p. 382, et 390.⁴ The Chevalier Folard.⁵ Iliad, xv. ver. 678.

was the most connected with religion, government, and manners; and the effects ascribed to Grecian music are numbered among the most singular as well as the most authentic of all recorded events;¹ yet as to the nature, the origin, the progress, the perfection, in one word, the history of this art, we can know little more than what we learn from the musical treatise of Plutarch, to which we have above alluded, which is extremely short and imperfect, obscure throughout, and in many parts unintelligible.²

Without much historical information, however, we may venture to explain the introduction of musical entertainments at the four public solemnities. These grand spectacles were destined to exhibit an embellished representation of the ordinary transactions of real life, and while the gymnastic and equestrian exercises represented the image of war, the most serious occupation of the Greeks, music recalled the memory of religion and love, their most agreeable amusements. Besides this, as music in those early times was closely connected with poetry,³ and as the use of prose composition was not known in Greece till the time of Pherecydes of Syros, and Cadmus of Miletus, who flourished only five hundred and forty-four years before Christ,⁴ the name of music naturally comprehended all the learning of the age; and to obtain the prize in the musical contests, was equivalent to the glory of being declared superior to the rest of mankind in mental abilities and endowments.

These abilities and endowments were anciently regarded in proportion to their utility. Before the practice of writing was introduced, the history of past events could be preserved only by tradition; and tradition was rendered more sure and permanent, by being committed to the safe protection of harmonious numbers.⁵ The customary offices of religion were celebrated in poetical composition, and the various hymns appropriated to the worship of particular divinities, were retained by the faithful memory of their respective votaries. The tuneful tribe, who were thus employed to extol the bounty of the gods, to exalt the glory of heroes, and to record and perpetuate the accumulated wisdom of antiquity, condescended also to regulate the duties, and to improve the pleasures, of private life. The same bards who taught the men to be brave, exhorted the women to be chaste.⁶ Poetry, together with the

sister arts of music and dancing, are elegantly called by Homer the chief ornaments of the feast. The poet musician quelled seditions in states,⁷ and maintained the domestic quiet of families; while he published laws of the most extensive influence over the whole community, he disdained not to animate the humble but necessary labours of the mechanic: every profession in society, even the meanest and most vulgar, was encouraged and adorned by its particular song;⁸ and the most ordinary transactions of common life, however trivial and low, and uninteresting in themselves, were heightened and ennobled by the combined charm of music and poetry.

The degree of perfection in which these arts are found in any country, depends on the language and character of the people by whom they are cultivated. Of this there is abundant proof in the history of ancient, as well as in that of modern nations. The melancholy, stern,⁹ atrocious, and unrelenting temper of the Egyptians (the supposed instructors of Greece) disqualified that nation either for improving or for relishing the beauties of harmony. The harsh dissonance of the eastern languages, their deficiency in vowels, and the inflexible thickness of their sounds, rendered them but little susceptible of musical composition. The music of the Egyptians and Orientals therefore depended rather on the quantity than the quality of sound; and the principal object of their art was rather to rouse the attention by noise, than to charm the soul by melody.

The language and manners of the Greeks were of a different and a far superior kind, to those of the neighbouring nations. Hence may be deduced the origin and peculiar excellence of their music, which, though injudiciously¹⁰ ascribed to the invention of Thracians, Mysians, and other barbarous strangers, must have been the natural production of Grecian genius, since the three most ancient modes of music were the Dorian, Ionian, and Eolian, corresponding with the three great divisions of the Hellenic race, and the three principal distinctions of the Hellenic tongue.¹¹

The perfection of language, as well as of music, depends on the melody of its sounds; their measure or rhythm; their variety; and their suitableness to the subject which they are

7 See what is said above of Tyrrhus, p. 56.

8 See Athenæus passim, and the discourses on the Greek songs, in the third volume of the excellent selection of the Memoirs of the Academy.

9 The nature of the government furnishes another reason for the imperfection of Egyptian music. Homer characterises Egypt by the epithet *πικρος*, bitter, to denote the rigid severity of the laws. Among that grave and formal people, the hours of amusement, as well as of business, were prescribed by law. There was a particular time of the day, not only for attending the courts of justice, but for walking, bathing, and even for performing the duties of matrimony. Diodor. Siculus. Poetry, music, sculpture, and all other arts, were regulated by express statute; and if we may believe Plato, continued invariable for many thousand years. Plato de Legibus. The austerity and restraints of despotism are inconsistent with that flowing freedom of genius necessary to the perfection of poetry.

10 While detraction referred the discovery of music to strangers, vanity referred it to the gods; and both accounts serve to prove the great antiquity of the art, Plat. de Music.

11 We owe the knowledge of this important circumstance to Heraclides of Pontus, the contemporary and scholar of Plato. His words are cited by Athenæus, l. xiv.

1 The continual complaints of Plato and Aristotle prove that the music of their age had greatly degenerated from its ancient dignity. It afterwards continued, like all the other arts, gradually to decline; yet, in the second century before Christ, the grave, judicious, and well-informed Polybius ascribes the most extraordinary effects to the Grecian music. Polybius, l. iv. c. xx. et seq.

2 Mr. Burette, a French physician, has translated this treatise in the tenth volume of the Memoirs of the Academy, &c. He finds fewer difficulties in it, than present themselves to men far better acquainted with the theory and practice of this elegant art. See Burney on Music, vol. i. p. 36.

3 The same word signified a song and a poem, a musician and a poet; *οδαι*, *οδματα*; *οδαι*, *οδικοι*, *οιδοι*. Hesych.

4 Strabo, l. i.

5 *Ὡς δὲ εἰπὼν ὁ σοφὸς λόγος κατασκευασμένος μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιητικῶν ἔστι· περὶ τῆς γὰρ ἡ ποιητικῆς κατασκευῆς περὶ τῆς τοῦ ποιοῦ.* STRABO, l. i.

6 Of this we have an example in Homer's Demodocus.

meant to describe or to express. The circumstances of the Greeks in the earliest periods of their society,¹² rendered them peculiarly attentive to all these objects. They lived continually in crowds; all matters of consequence were decided by the voice of the assembly; and, next to the force of his arm, every warrior felt himself indebted to the persuasive accents of his tongue. The perpetual necessity of employing the power of eloquence during the infancy of their political state, made them retain the original tones and cadences by which men, as yet unpractised in the use of arbitrary signs, had made known their affections and their wants. These tones and cadences, imitating the language of action (the first and most natural language of solitary savages,) possessed a degree of energy and of warmth which can never be attained by the mere artifice of articulate sounds.¹³ By uniting them to these sounds, the Greeks gave all the force of a natural, to an arbitrary sign. Music and action were incorporated in the substance of their speech; and the descriptive power of words was extended to all those objects which can be characterized by sound and motion, or which the various modifications of these qualities can suggest to the mind of man.

A language thus founded on the broad basis of nature, contained within itself the fruitful seeds of the imitative arts, and the rich materials of all that is *beautiful* and *grand* in literary composition.¹⁴ It is a subject of equal curiosity and importance, to examine how these materials were wrought up, and how these seeds were unfolded. In attempting, with much diffidence, to give some account of this delicate and refined operation, we shall observe the division above mentioned, and consider the melody, measure, variety, and expression of the Grecian poetry and music; arts once deemed so intimately connected, that their disjunction at the Pythian games, of which we have already taken notice, was emphatically compared by ancient writers to the separation of the soul and body.

The pleasure arising from the agreeable succession of sounds depends either on the combination of letters, or on that of musical tones.¹⁵ The attention which the Greeks paid to the former, is evident from the whole structure of their language. Wherever propriety permits,¹⁶ they always employ full, open, and *magnificent*¹⁷ sounds; innumerable rules of flexion and derivation are founded merely on the pleasure of the ear; and the great principle of the fine

arts, to move and affect, without fatiguing the senses, cannot be better illustrated than by the inimitable composition¹⁸ of elements which characterizes the general texture of the Grecian tongue. Whether the ancient poets and orators discovered this composition by investigation, or only preferred it from taste, is a question that may be easily answered, if we reflect, that such a discovery by investigation supposes an acquaintance with the most abstruse principles of philosophy, principles altogether unknown in that early age, during which the composition of elemental sounds attained its highest beauty and perfection. We may therefore without temerity conclude, that sentiment first directed to the practice of those rules which reason afterwards approved; and that this progress equally obtained in the articulation of voice, and the intonation of sound.

The *latter*, the agreeable composition of which is properly styled melody, was improved to such an extraordinary degree about the time of Homer, as rendered the productions of Olympus, and other ancient poet-musicians, the admiration of all succeeding ages. Unfortunately for the history of the arts, we have not any such analysis of the music of Olympus, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus has left us of the poetry of Homer. We are informed, however, that the ancient melody was not only divided, like the modern, by tones and semi-tones, but also distinguished by the diesis, or quarter-tone; an interval of which modern musicians rarely make use. The genus of music, regulated by this interval, a genus to which the most powerful effects are ascribed by ancient writers, was known by the name of the enharmonic; the genus, proceeding by semitones, was called the chromatic; and the diatonic, which denotes a progression by tones and semitones, expressed a musical scale nearly resembling that of the modern nations of Europe.¹⁹

These observations will give the reader an idea of the intervals in the different *genera*, which is all that we can learn on this subject from the learned collection of Meibomius. In none of the musical treatises in that collection do we find any specimen of ancient melody; nor are we enabled, by any circumstance mentioned in them, to ascertain the qualities which formed its principal merit. The invention of the enharmonic genus is ascribed by Plutarch to Olympus, who, happening to skip certain intervals in the diatonic scale, observed the beauty of the effect, and the peculiar force and character which the regular omission of the same intervals bestowed on the melody. Upon this observation, he is said to have founded a new genus of music remarkable for simplicity, gravity, and grandeur. These qualities might, doubtless, be produced by the happy discovery,

¹² See above, chap. ii.

¹³ See an excellent discourse of the Abbé Arnaud, on the Greek accents, in the third volume of the *Choix de Mémoires*.

¹⁴ These words very inadequately express the *ἡδύς* and the *καλός* of Dionysius, de Struct. Orat. The ingenious and philosophical critic ranges under two heads, the qualities of style fitted to please the ear and the imagination. These are the *sweet*, and the *fair*. Under the first are contained smoothness, beauty, grace, persuasion, &c. Under the second, dignity, weight, magnificence, and force. The two kinds of style have a similar relation to each other, which the pleasures of the taste, expressed by the word *ἡδύς*, have to those of the eye, expressed by *καλός*.

¹⁵ Dionysius comprehends both under the word *μελός*, melody.

¹⁶ The *το σείσω*, Dionysius observes, may sometimes require harsh, close, and disagreeable sounds.

¹⁷ The *μεγαλοπρεπής* of Dionysius.

¹⁸ As all languages are relative to the organs of speech, they may all be analyzed into about twenty-four letters, or elemental sounds, the combination of which forms the wonderful variety of language; a variety resulting from the respective characters and circumstances of different nations.

¹⁹ It is sufficient to explain the things signified by the enharmonic and diatonic. When, or why, these names were bestowed on the two kinds of music which they respectively denote, is disputed by philologists; and I have not met with any thing on the subject that seemed worthy of being transcribed.

seconded by the lofty genius of Olympus; and to them, perhaps, we may refer the enthusiasm and sublimity by which his compositions were distinguished. The employing of the greater intervals supported the dignity and character, while the use of the diesis chiefly contributed to the refinement and delicacy, of Grecian music. The bold separation of notes expressed the firmer feelings, and described the stronger emotions of the soul; while the more insensible distinctions of sound painted the innumerable shades and faint fluctuations of passion; as when the voice gradually ascended through the smallest perceptible divisions, it would admirably express the progress of a respectful but ardent affection, unable to hide, yet afraid to reveal its force, and striving by repeated efforts to overcome its natural timidity.

But by whatever conjectures we may explain the powers of ancient enharmonic, it appears from the universal consent of Greek writers, that the melody of music and of language differed only in degree, not in kind. The variations of *accent*, for *that* is the proper word to express the melody of language, seldom exceeded, in common discourse, the difference of three notes and a half; which makes Dionysius observe, that it never exceeds the compass of one interval, the diapente, or fifth. He pretends not, however, that in rhetorical declamation, the flexions of the voice were so narrowly circumscribed; and it is probable that in poetry, their range was always more extensive than in the most animated prose. When the poet therefore composed his verse, he was obliged to pay an equal attention to accent and to quantity: the acuteness and gravity of sounds, as well as the length and shortness of syllables, contributed to the effect of his art; and each particular word having not only its determined duration, but its appropriated tones, obtained that place in the verse which was felt to be most agreeable to the ear, and best adapted to the subject. The poet therefore naturally performed the office of the musician, and clothed his own thoughts and sentiments with that combination of sounds, which rendered them most beautiful and expressive.

As accent regulated the melody, quantity regulated the rhythm of ancient music. The most melodious succession of tones, however flattering to the ear, must soon become tiresome and disagreeable, when continued without interruption or pause, and undistinguished by such proportions of duration, as are readily seized and measured by the senses. This truth the Greeks illustrated by a comparison. The most brilliant composition of colours is nothing better, they observed, than a gaudy show, dazzling the sight for a moment, but passing afterwards disregarded and unobserved. But to this showy colouring let the painter add the solid beauties of design, and he will convert an empty amusement of the eye, into an elegant entertainment to the fancy. What design is to colouring, measure is to melody. It is measure that animates the song, and which, combined with the inimitable charms of Grecian verse, produced those extraordinary effects, which the ignorance and credulity of early ages weakly

deemed miraculous. On measure principally depended the different *modes* of music, by which the most opposite passions were alternately excited in the mind; and courage, pride, timidity, love, anger, resentment, successively diffused through a numerous assembly, at the will of a skilful composer. The difference of modes, indeed, arose also, in some measure, from the difference of key; and the same succession of sounds, pronounced with various degrees of acuteness or gravity, may doubtless produce effects more or less powerful; but dissimilar effects it never can produce; so that the grandeur of the Doric, the polished elegance of the Ionic, the soothing sweetness of the Eolic mode,¹ must have resulted from the rhythm or measure, which governing the movement of the verse, thereby determined its expression.

Besides these three modes, formerly mentioned as the original invention of Greece, the natives of that country gradually adopted several others that had been discovered by the neighbouring nations; particularly the Phrygian, consecrated to religious ceremonies, and the Lydian, appropriated to the expression of complaint or sorrow. The variety, indeed, at length became greater than can be easily conceived by such as are unacquainted with the mechanism of ancient languages. Every species of verse (and of verse there were above a hundred different kinds) occasioned a change of musical measure, and introduced what, in musical language, may be called a different time. These measures were only to be employed agreeably to the rules of propriety and decorum, which had been discovered in those great principles of nature, to which all rules of art must ultimately be referred. A slow succession of lengthened tones expressed moderation and firmness; a rapid inequality of verse betrayed disorderly and ignoble passions; the mind was transported by sudden transitions, and roused by impetuous reiterations of sound; a gradual ascent of notes accorded with all those affections which warm and expand the heart; and the contrary movement naturally coincided with such sentiments as depress the spirits, and extinguish the generous ardour of the soul. Having fixed, with the most accurate precision, the wide variety of *modes* and *genera*, the Greeks seldom confounded them with the same piece, and never applied them to any subject which they had not been originally destined to express. The natural perceptions of taste were gradually strengthened by habit; the principles of music were clearly ascertained, and universally understood; and possessing the warmth and energy of the language of nature, they acquired the perspicuity and extent of the language of convention. This is justly deemed the height of musical perfection,² and to this height the Greeks had attained, in the beginning of the sixth century before Christ.

¹ Lucian. Harmon. sub initio, et Heraclid. apud Athenæum, l. xiv.

² The question, whether the Greeks knew music in parts, has been carefully examined by Mr. Burette (Memoires de l'Academie des Inscriptions;) by Rousseau (Dictionnaire de Musique;) and by Dr. Burney (History of Music, vol. i. p. 146, et seq.) These writers who are so well entitled to

CHAPTER VI.

The Grecian Bards—Heroic Poetry—Change of Manners—Iambic or Satire—Elegy—Tyrtæus, Callinus Minnervus—Life of Archilochus—Terpander—Lyric Poetry—The Nine Lyric Poets—Sappho, Alcæus, Anacreon, Myrtis, Corinna, Pindar—Effects of the Sacred Games—Strength—Courage—Contempt of Prejudices—Taste—Moral Principle—Intellectual Powers—Genius.

POETRY has described the wonderful effects of Grecian music; and the inimitable excellence of ancient poets can alone render the description credible. Yet the early perfection of these elegant arts, asserted by the gravest writers of antiquity, seems extremely inconsistent with the received doctrines concerning the progress of civil society. Both in the ancient and modern world, the great system of practical knowledge, subservient to the useful purposes of human life, appears to have been slowly raised, and gradually extended, by successive trials, and reiterated efforts. Among savages, scarcely any distinction of professions takes place; the activity of each individual supplies his own wants. During the intermediate stages of society, men are still condemned to a wide variety of occupations; and their attention being distracted by a multiplicity of pursuits, it is impossible that, in any one art, they should reach proficiency, or even aspire to excellence. But, contrary to this observation, the Grecian music and poetry are represented as most perfect in their united state; the immortal fathers of verse excelled alike, it is said, in all the various kinds of poetical composition;³ and their inimitable productions were so far from advancing, by a gradual progress, to perfection, that the most ancient are, by universal consent, entitled to a just preference.⁴

The history of these admired authors is, unfortunately, as uncertain, as their merit was illustrious. The Greeks possessing much traditionary and little recorded information concerning the antiquities of their country, the great inventors of arts, and generous benefactors of society, have been deprived of their merited fame and well-earned honours. Their names indeed, like firm rocks resisting the assaults of the ocean, bid defiance to the depre-

decide on this subject, pronounce the Greeks to have been unacquainted with counterpoint. But that their ignorance in this respect did not detract from the perfection, or diminish the effects of their music, may be credited on the unsuspicious testimony of an ingenious Italian. "Il contra punto, essendo composto di varie parti, l'una acuta, l'altra grave, questa di andamento presto, quella di tardo, que hanno a trovarsi insieme, et ferir l'orecchie ad un tempo, come potrebbe egli muovere nell'animo nostro, una tal determinata passione, la quale, di sua natura, richiede un determinato moto, et un determinato tuono?" Algorotti, Saggio sopra l'Opera in Musica.

³ We are told by Aristotle, in the 4th chapter of his Poetics, that Homer wrote an iambic poem, entitled Margites, bearing the same relation to comedy and satire, that the Iliad bears to tragedy and panegyric. Notwithstanding the express testimony of the great critic, two very elegant scholars have said, that the hexameter was the only kind of verse known in the time of Homer; the Abbé Arnaut, in his excellent discourse on the Greek accents, and Mr. Burdette, in his Commentary on Plut. de Music.

⁴ Græcorum antiquissima quæque scripta vel optima. Horat. Epist. l. ii. Ep. 1.

dations of time; but of Linus, Orpheus, Musæus, and Melampus, little else than the names remain; and to determine the time in which they flourished, was a matter of as much difficulty two thousand years ago,⁵ as it remains in the present age.

Since even the chronology of the ancient bards is so extremely uncertain,⁶ it cannot be expected that we should be able to give a circumstantial account of their life and writings. Instead of considering minutely, therefore, the private history of individuals, a task which suits neither the design of the present work, nor the incredulity of the present age, we shall endeavour to explain the general nature and tendency of their profession, as well as the circumstances which conspired to raise it to that rank and dignity which it long held in society. During the heroic ages, the Grecian poets had one uniform character; and if we may depend on the positive assertions of antiquity, the same individual was alike successful in the various branches of his divine art.⁷ The earliest poets, therefore, may be represented in one picture, and delineated by the same strokes, until their profession came to be separated into different departments. We shall then distinguish the heroic, iambic, lyric, elegiac, and other kinds of poetical composition; offer some account of the improvers of each particular species; and

⁵ Herodotus, who reads his history at the Olympic games 444 years B. C. expresses himself as follows: "Homer and Hesiod lived about four hundred years ago; not more; and these are the poets who composed a Theogony for the Greeks: who assigned to the gods their respective appellations and epithets; distinguished their several forms; and defined the arts in which they excelled, and the honours to which they were entitled. As to the poets who are supposed to have preceded them, I am of opinion that they flourished in a later age." According to Herodotus, therefore, the age of Homer is fifty years later than it is placed by the marbles of Paros. But on this subject we have surer evidence than any monuments of marble, or even the testimony of Herodotus can afford. The circumstantial minuteness, and infinite variety, which characterise the Iliad and Odyssey, prove their inimitable author to have lived near the times which he describes. He conversed in his youth with those who had seen the heroes of the Trojan war; and, in the vigour of his age, beheld the grandchildren of Æneas, Ulysses, Achilles, and Agamemnon.

Νυν δὲ δὴ Λίνος γένος τεύχεσσι ἀνέστη.
Καὶ παῖδες παῖδων τοῖ καὶ μετόπισθε γένοντο. Iliad. xx. ver. 306.

The learned reader may consult the note on the passage in Clark's Homer, where Dionysius of Halicarnassus is quoted, to prove that the poet says nothing inconsistent with Æneas' voyage into Italy. It is to be observed, that the force of the criticism evaporates in Mr. Pope's translation.

⁶ The preceding note proves the ignorance of Herodotus, and his contemporaries, concerning the history of their ancient bards; since of these venerable fathers of the Grecian religion and policy, two are mentioned by Homer himself; Linus, in the description of the shield of Achilles, Il. xviii.; Melampus, in the 11th book of the Odyssey, ver. 15.

⁷ There are not any two kinds of poetry more different than those ascribed to Homer by Aristotle, Poetic. chap. iv.

examine such fragments of their works as deserve attention, not merely on account of their own intrinsic merit, but as genuine and authentic, and indeed the only genuine and authentic transcripts of the manners of that early age in which they were composed.

In ancient Greece, the favourites of fortune were often the favourites of the muses. There remain not, indeed, the works of any Grecian king; but we are told by Homer, that Achilles sung to his lyre the glory of heroes; Amphion, to whose musical powers such wonderful effects are ascribed, reigned in Thebes; the poet Melampus obtained royal authority in Argos; and Chiron, the wise Centaur,² though descended of the most illustrious ancestors, and entitled to the first rank among the Thessalian princes, preferred to the enjoyment of power, the cultivation of poetry, and retired, with his favourite muses, to a solitary cavern at the foot of mount Pelion, which was soon rendered, by the fame of his abilities, the most celebrated school of antiquity.³

The musical arts were not only deemed worthy the ambition of princes, but thought capable of elevating ordinary men to the first ranks in society. By excelling in such accomplishments, Anthes of Boeotia, Olen of Lycia, Olympus of Phrygia,⁴ obtained the highest pre-eminence. Nor was it during their life-time only that they enjoyed the happy fruits of their elegant labours. They were regarded as peculiarly deserving of a double immortality; living for ever in the memory of men, and being admitted, according to the belief of antiquity, to the most distinguished honours in the celestial regions.⁵

It has been already observed, that the texture of the Grecian tongue was singularly well adapted to the improvement of poetry; and this favourable circumstance was admirably seconded by the political condition of the Greeks in the early periods of their society. Religion then formed the sole principle of government; and the belief of religion was chiefly supported by the Theogonies,⁶ while its ceremonies were principally adorned by the hymns of the bards. These two kinds of poetry, doubtless the most ancient and the most venerable, formed the main pillars of the political edifice; and the essential parts of this edifice consisting in the praise of the gods, its brightest ornaments were composed of the glory of heroes. The hymns maintained the power of religion, the song animated to valour; and

both powerfully affected that peculiar sensibility of temper, and that romantic turn of fancy, the prevailing characteristics of Greece during the heroic ages.

Neither the Rüners of the north, nor the Troubadours of Provence, nor the Bards of Germany, nor even the Druids of Gaul and Britain, possessed more distinguished authority than the Aoidoi, or Rhapsodists, of the Greeks. The first requisite of their profession was, to know many soothing tales;⁷ and it was the daily object of their art, to delight gods and men.⁸ The piety of the priest, and the inspiration of the prophet, were intimately connected with the enthusiasm of poetry; and poets, who had celebrated the glory of the past, were naturally employed to rear the hopes of the future generation.⁹ It is probable, however, that the ancient bards had frequent avocations from their literary labours. The curiosity, natural to men of genius, would frequently tempt them to visit distant countries. The admiration paid to their abilities could only be upheld by novelty. Both inclination and interest, therefore, would prompt them to sail to foreign lands, to examine their civil and religious institutions, and to converse with their priests and poets, from whom they might derive such information as would enable them, on their return home, to surprise, entertain, and instruct their fellow-citizens.

Of all nations, the Greeks enjoyed most advantages for travelling; and of all Grecian professions, that of the bard. The general diffusion of their national language and colonies, as well as the sacred character with which they were invested, entitled this venerable class of men to expect a secure retreat among the most inhospitable barbarians. Whatever country they visited, the elegant entertainment derived from their art procured them a welcome reception at religious festivals, and all public solemnities. Amidst the most dreadful calamities which afflict mankind, the bards alone were exempted from the common danger. They could behold, in safety, the tumult of the battle; they could witness, undisturbed, the horror of a city taken by storm; calm and serene themselves, they might contemplate the furious conflicts, and wild agitations, of the passions. It belonged to them only, and to the sacred character of the herald, to observe and examine, without personal danger, the natural expressions of fear, rage, or despair, in the countenances and gestures of the vanquished, as well as the insolent triumph of success, the fury of resentment, the avidity of gain, and the thirst of blood, in the wild aspect and mad demeanour of the victors. Having considered at full leisure the most striking peculiarities of those agitated and distressful scenes, the poet might retire to his cavern, or grotto, and there delineate, in secure tranquillity, such a warm and expressive picture of the manners and mis-

1 Movet Amphion lapides canendo. Hor.

2 Most of the heroes of the Trojan war were his disciples. Xenoph. de Venat. sub initio.

3 Xenoph. de Venat. sub initio.

4 Mr. Burette has collected the most interesting particulars concerning these bards, in his Commentary on Plut. de Music.

5 Musæum ante omnes. Virg. Æn. vi. It is not easy to discover the reason why Virgil, in his Elysium, has placed Musæus before all the rest. This venerable bard, by some called the son, by others the disciple of Orpheus, is universally allowed to have been a native of Attica. The admirer of Grecian eloquence (Orabant causas mælus) intended, perhaps, to compliment the country of Musæus.

6 A Theogony is a poem explaining, not merely, as the name denotes, the generation, but also the history of the gods. Most of the ancient poets mentioned in the text wrote Theogonies. Diod. l. iii. Plut. de Music.

7 Πολλὰ δὲ ληστῆρας.

HOMER.

8 Θείοισι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέδουσιν.

HOMER.

9 In early ages, the education of youth was entrusted only to the first ranks in society. This profession was practised in Greece by Homer, as we learn from his life, falsely ascribed to Herodotus, yet certainly very ancient. In Gaul it belonged to the Druids. Vid. Cæsar de Bello Gallico, l. vi.

fortunes of men, as should astonish his contemporaries, and excite the sympathetic terror and pity of the most distant posterity.

If the Grecian bards were fortunate in observing such events of their own age as were most susceptible of the ornaments of poetical imitation, they were still more fortunate in living at a period which afforded a wonderful variety of such events. Amidst the unsettled turbulence of rising states, the foundation and destruction of cities, the perpetual wars and negotiations of neighbouring communities, they were daily presented with subjects worthy the grandeur of the heroic muse. The establishment of colonies, the origin of new superstitions, as well as the imaginary legends which supported the old, furnished copious materials for many a wondrous song. These materials, being eagerly embraced by the choice, were embellished by the fancy of the early bards; who, continually rehearsing them to their contemporaries, had an opportunity of remarking, in their approbation or dislike, the circumstances necessary to be added, taken away, or altered, in order to give their productions the happiest effect, and the highest degree of strength and beauty. As writing was little practised for the purpose of communicating knowledge, succeeding poets learned to repeat the verses of their predecessors; and, having treasured them in their memory, they adopted them as their own. Frequent repetition, attended with such careful observations as were natural to men whose character depended on the success of their art, led to new alterations and amendments;¹⁰ and their performances, thus improving by degrees, acquired that just measure of perfection, to which nothing could with propriety be added, and from which nothing could with propriety be taken away. In this manner, perhaps, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* received the last polish; the harmonious animation of poetry was admired as the language of the gods; and poets, originally the ministers of heaven, the instructors of youth, and the rewarders of merit, were finally regarded as the great authors of religion, the principal benefactors of mankind, and, as shall be explained hereafter, the wise legislators of nations.

As the singular manners and events of the heroic ages naturally produced the lofty strains of the epic muse, so the state of society in Greece, during the immediately succeeding periods, highly favoured the introduction of other kinds of poetry. The abolition of the royal governments gave free scope to the activity and turbulence of democracy; and the rivalships and enmities of neighbouring states, rankling in the minds of their citizens, prepared the imaginations of men for taking a malignant pleasure in works of invective and reproach. The innumerable causes of alienation, hatred, and disgust, which operated also within the bosom of each little republic, opened an inexhaustible source of satire. The competitions for civil offices, for military command, and for

other places of trust, profit, or honour, all of which were conferred by the free suffrages of the people, occasioned irreconcilable variance between the ambitious members of the same community, and subjected the characters of men to mutual scrutiny and remark. The sentiments of the Greeks, not being perverted by the habits of slavery, nor restrained by the terrors of a despot, they boldly expressed what they freely thought; they might openly declare a just contempt; and, while they extolled in the lofty ode and swelling panegyric the heroes and patriots whom they admired, they lashed the cowards and traitors whom they despised, with all the severity of satire.

The ode and satire may be successfully cultivated by imitators in the worst of times; but they could scarcely have been invented and perfected under any other than a popular government. The plaintive elegy, on the other hand, which describes the torments of unsuccessful love, or which paints the affliction of a miserable parent, an affectionate son, a disconsolate wife, or a faithful friend, for the loss of the several objects most dear to their hearts, seems to be the spontaneous production of every soil, and hardly to receive any change of impression from the fluctuating forms of society. The particular purposes, however, to which the Greeks principally applied this species of poetry, appear to have been suggested by their peculiar circumstances at the time of its origin. During the violence and disorder occasioned by the political revolutions, the frequent migrations, and the almost uninterrupted hostilities which succeeded and increased the calamities of the Trojan war, it was natural for those who reasoned concerning the affairs of men, to form, according to the original bent of their minds, two opposite theories for the best improvement of human life. Men of a firm texture of soul would prepare for the misery which awaited them, by strengthening their natural hardiness, and fortifying their natural intrepidity. The contempt of pain, and danger, and death, would be the great principle of their lives, and the perpetual subject of their song; and while they described the inevitable disgrace of weakness and cowardice, they would extol, with the most lively sensibility, the glory of valour, the triumphs of success, and the joys of victory. Such themes might delight the martial muse of Tyrtæus and Callinus, but could offer no charms to the effeminate softness of Mimnermus, or the licentious debauchery of Archilochus. To persons of their character, the calamities of the times, instead of appearing an argument for virtue, would prove an incitement to pleasure. The precarious condition of their lives and fortunes, while it depreciated all other objects, would increase the value of present enjoyment. In the agreeable amusements of the fleeting hour, they would seek refuge against the melancholy prospect of futurity. The pleasures of the table, the delights of love, the charm of the elegant arts and of conversation, would be perpetually studied in their lives, and perpetually recommended in their poetry.

The precious remains of their writings, and

¹⁰ Εὐκρινόμενοι τὰς ποιεῖσιν ἐν τῷ αὐτοσχιδισμῷ.
Aristot. Poet. c. iv.

Olymp. still more the authentic circumstances
 xv. 3. related concerning the characters of
 A. C. the ancient poets, sufficiently confirm
 718. the truth of these observations. Next
 to Homer, Archilochus is the earliest
 Greek writer, whose life is recorded so minutely as may serve to throw any considerable light on the history of his country. We are told by Herodotus,¹ that he flourished in the time of Gyges, king of Lydia, who mounted the throne seven hundred and eighteen years before Christ. He was a native of the isle of Paros, one of the Cyclades, which had already become wealthy and populous. His father, Telesicles, must have been a person of distinction, since he was employed to head a deputation of his countrymen to the oracle of Apollo. The object of the Parians was to obtain a favourable answer from the god concerning an enterprise, which they had long meditated, of settling a colony in the valuable island of Thasos, opposite to the coast of Thrace. The oracle approved the design, and in order to reward the respectful behaviour, and to repay the rich presents delivered to the holy shrine by Telesicles, who had unfortunately disgraced the dignity of his rank by an unequal marriage with a beautiful slave named Enipo, declared that the fame of Archilochus, the glorious fruit of this dishonourable connection, should descend to the latest ages of the world.

The prophecy would naturally contribute to its own accomplishment; especially as Archilochus descended from a family, in which the love of poetry was a hereditary passion. Tellis, his grandfather, accompanied the priestess of Ceres, in order to establish the Eleusinian mysteries in the isle of Thasos, an employment, which, like the sacred commission of Telesicles at the city of Apollo, could not have been exercised by any other than a favourite of the Muses. Enjoying the example of such ancestors, and encouraged by the admonition of the god, it was to be expected that the young poet should second the gifts of nature by the efforts of industry; and that his juvenile productions should soon have been distinguished above those of his contemporaries, by dignity of sentiment, force of expression, and beauty of imagery.

In that martial age, no superiority of genius, rank, or fortune could exempt its possessor from the duty of serving his country in the exercise of arms.² The Parian colony in Thasos, having ineffectually endeavoured by its own strength to establish a settlement in Thrace, was obliged, in order to accomplish this design, to have recourse to the assistance of the parent isle. Archilochus served in this expedition, which, though finally successful, was chequered with a great variety of fortune. During an engagement with the barbarous Thracians, in which his countrymen were defeated and put to flight, he saved his life by throwing away

his shield; an action so extremely inconsistent with the military prejudices of the age, that all his eloquence and ingenuity were incapable of extenuating its infamy.

On his return home, he renewed his addresses to a Parian damsel named Neobulé. Her father Lycambes, who had at first granted, afterwards refused his consent, whether disgusted by the unwarlike and therefore contemptible character of Archilochus, or tempted by the alluring offers of a richer rival. If we believe the poet, it was avarice alone that corrupted the sordid mind of Lycambes; and both he and his daughter, regardless of their plighted faith and repeated oaths, sacrificed their sentiments and character to the mean gratification of this ignoble passion.

This assertion he maintained by his poetical invectives, full of indignation and resentment against the whole family of the supposed traitors. His verses were rehearsed at the public games, where the force and vivacity of the satire were universally admired. Calumny, however, seems to have joined her poisoned darts to the more fair and equitable weapons employed by the anger of disappointed love. Neobulé and her sisters were accused of every vice most inconsistent with the modest dignity of the female character. Yet such an accusation is extremely improbable, considering the reserved circumspection of Neobulé herself, during the ardent solicitations of Archilochus a behaviour which naturally increased the fire of his passion, and sharpened the edge of his satire.

His reproach and calumny, however ill-grounded and unreasonable, gained an easy credit among the rivals and enemies of Lycambes; and the bitter taunts and invectives, which the malice of the poet had invented, the scornful contempt of the Parians too faithfully retained. An old poem was no sooner in danger of being forgotten, than it was succeeded by new verses, couched in the liveliest turns of ingenious satire. The perpetual strokes of malevolence, darted against the family of Lycambes by the persevering cruelty of the poet, rendered their characters suspicious to the public, and their lives painful to themselves. They determined to withdraw from a scene which seemed a constant variation of misery, and died in despair by their own hands.

The poems which produced this melancholy effect, and of which some scattered remains have reached the present times, were written in iambic³ verse of six and four feet. When the lines were of the same length throughout, the piece was entitled an iambic; but when short and long verses alternately succeeded each other, it was called, from this circumstance, an epodo,⁴ a name which Horace has

¹ Lib. i. cap. 12.

² This was not the case in the heroic ages; the *harmistæ*, though called *Hoplites*, as being of the first rank in society, were exempted from the fatigues of war. Hom. *Odys.* passim.

³ The term iambic is synonymous in Greek with the words reproachful, satirical. Arist. *Poet.*

⁴ This word, concerning the meaning of which there have been innumerable disputes, simply denotes the succession of verses or stanzas of different length or structure. In the first sense it is explained in the text; in the second it will be explained in speaking of the ode, of which the epodo regularly formed the third stanza, as we learn from Hephæstion, Terentianus Maurus, Marius Victorinus, and other ancient grammarians and philologists.

given to those performances in which he imitated the poetry and spirit of Archilochus, not copying, with servility, his sentiments and expression.⁵

Though iambic was the favourite⁶ pursuit of Archilochus, his genius was not entirely confined to that species of writing. Endowed with an extreme sensibility of heart, he was inclined to gratitude and friendship, as well as to enmity and resentment. Animated by the former sentiments, he lamented the death of a kinsman and friend, who had unfortunately perished by shipwreck. The piece consisted of alternate hexameter and pentameter verses, and abounded in elegiac strains, which were admired by the greatest critics of antiquity. The sublime Longinus, in particular, extols the affecting description of the shipwreck; and Plutarch⁷ has preserved the conclusion of the piece, in which the poet having asserted the hurtfulness of sorrow to the living, and its inutility to the dead, determines thenceforth to abstain from unavailing lamentations, and to seek relief for his affliction in wine, love, and other sensual pleasures.

These sentiments of Archilochus seem to prove, that whatever may have been the poetical merit of his elegy, the tender passions were less fitted than the irascible, to make a durable impression on his heart. He soon forsook the elegiac muse; and his natural disposition, as well as the fame which he had already acquired by his satires, led him to pursue that species of writing with unabating ardour. The perpetual rivalships and competitions among the principal Parian citizens, who aspired at the first offices of government, frequently degenerating into hatred, malice, and revenge, they observed, with infinite delight, the aspersions, however foul and false, that were cast on their opponents. The malignity of the public thus nourished and exasperated the venom of the poet; but there was a degree of virulence beyond which it could not proceed. After making the circle of the whole society, and equally offending friends and foes by his excessive and indiscriminate reproach, Archilochus came to be regarded as a public enemy. The licentious impunity of his manners, which bid defiance to every law of decency and of nature, heightened the detestation of his character, and he was compelled to fly in disgrace from his native island, to which his genius would have been an ornament, had his behaviour been more modest and inoffensive.⁸

Banished from the isle of Paros, the poet sought protection in the Thasian colony, to the establishment of which the services of his father had so eminently contributed; but, unfortunately for his repose, the fame of his satires had gone before him, and the disgrace of having lost his shield in the Thracian expedition was a stain not easily wiped off. His reception among the Thasians, therefore, an-

swered neither his own expectations, nor the liberal spirit of ancient hospitality. He soon quitted a place in which his company was so little acceptable, yet not before he had lampooned the principal citizens of Thasos, and endeavoured, by a singular and absurd excess of resentment, to satirise the narrowness and sterility of the island itself.

The wandering poet was not more fortunate in several other districts of Greece in which he took refuge. The warlike Spartans would scarcely admit into their city, a writer who had said that it was better for a soldier to lose his shield than his life, because he might purchase new armour, but could not acquire a new existence. Archilochus, thus abandoned, persecuted, and contemned, made one spirited effort for recovering his ancient character, and regaining the public esteem. The time approached for celebrating the Olympic festival. The irregularity of his manners, the general detestation of his behaviour, and, above all, his vindication of cowardice, would, according to general rules, have excluded him from assisting at that solemnity: but having removed the prejudices which the citizens of Elis had naturally conceived against him, by displaying his wonderful talents for music and poetry, he took care to insinuate that he was possessed of an ode in praise of Hercules, which, if rehearsed before the public assembly, would equally entertain the fancy, and improve the piety of the spectators. The interest of religion being materially concerned in this proposal, the judges of the games thought proper to comply with it. Archilochus appeared on the appointed day among the Olympic bards. After his competitors had given specimens of their art in such musical compositions as the audience were accustomed to hear, he began the song in honour of Hercules, accompanied with the sound of his lyre, and written with such new variations of verse, as necessarily occasioned new modulations of melody. It is probable that, on this occasion, he first practised the invention ascribed to him by Plutarch,⁹ of passing, with a rapidity, from one rhythm, or measure, to another of a different kind. The novelty, the beauty, and the grandeur of his composition ravished the senses, and elevated the souls of his hearers. The demerit of the performer was obliterated in the perfection of his song. The unanimous applause of the assembly declared his superiority to every rival, and he was immediately rewarded by the prize, and adorned with the crown, of victory.¹⁰

Having acquired such distinguished renown in the public theatre of assembled states, Archilochus returned, with exultation, to his native country, the glory of which had been proclaimed at Olympia, in consequence of the successful merit of a banished citizen. This proclamation being deemed the highest honour which an individual could procure for his com-

⁵ ————— Parios ego primus iambos
Ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus
Archilochi, non res, et agentia verba Lycamben.
Epist. lib. i. 19.
Archilochum proprio rabies armavit iambo.
De audiend. Poet.
Critias apud Ælian. Hist. l. ix. c. xlii.

⁹ De Music.

¹⁰ We learn from Pindar and his scholiast, Ode Olymp. ix. that this celebrated poem of Archilochus long continued to be sung at the Olympic games, in order to grace the coronation of those victors who either could not afford, or who did not incline, to purchase an ode in their particular honour.

munity, the hatred and resentment formerly entertained against the poet was converted into gratitude and admiration. The renewed respect of his country occasioned many ebullitions of poetical vanity, which evaporated in some verses that have reached the present times.¹ When death put an end to his labours, it could not extinguish his fame. His obsequies were distinguished by every sad circumstance of funeral pomp; and his memory was celebrated by a festival, established by the gratitude of his countrymen, and adopted by the general admiration of the Greeks, during which the verses of Archilochus were sung alternately with the poems of Homer:² and thus, by a fatality frequently attending men of genius, he spent a life of misery, and acquired honour after death. Reproach, ignominy, contempt, poverty, and persecution were the ordinary companions of his person; admiration, glory, respect, splendour, and magnificence, were the melancholy attendants of his shade.

Archilochus was the principal improver, not only of the iambic, but of the graver kind of lyric poetry; and Terpander, who flourished in the same age, was, as far as we can trace the history of the arts, the chief promoter of the gay and festive kinds of lyric composition. This agreeable poet was a native of Lesbos. He obtained the musical prize in the Carnean festival at Sparta; and in the beginning of the seventh century before Christ, gained four successive prizes at Delphi, as appeared by a correct register of the conquerors in the Pythian games, preserved in the time of Plutarch.³ These advantages procured him the respect of his contemporaries; but he was honoured by posterity chiefly for his improvement of the lyre, and for the new varieties of measure which he introduced into the Grecian poetry.⁴

The example of Archilochus and Terpander was followed by the nine Lyric poets, who, in the course of two centuries, flourished almost in regular succession, and maintained the poetic fame of their country. Of the two most ancient, Alcman and Stesichorus, we have only a few imperfect remains: of Sappho there are two complete odes; her followers Alcæus, Simonides, Ibycus, and Bacchilides are known by a few mutilated fragments, and by the remarks of ancient critics; but we still possess many inimitable odes of Pindar, and many pleasant songs of Anacreon.

As to the Grecian lyrists in general, it is worthy of observation, that except Alcman of Sardis, who on account of his merit was naturalised at Sparta, Pindar of Thebes in Bœotia, and Stesichorus of Aimera in Sicily, all the rest were born on the Asiatic coast, or in the islands of the Ægean sea. These enchanting climates were the best adapted to inspire the raptures

peculiar to the ode, as well as to excite that voluptuous gayety characteristic of the Grecian song.⁶ Amidst the romantic scenes of Ionia, was felt with uncommon sensibility the force of that pleasing painful passion, which, uniting grief, joy, and enthusiasm, contains the fruitful seeds of whatever is most perfect in music and poetry.⁷ Here the celebrated Sappho breathed the amorous flames by which she was consumed; while her countryman and lover Alcæus declared the warmth of his attachment, excited less perhaps by the beauty of her person, than by the bewitching charms of her voice. But neither Alcæus, who flourished in the beginning of the sixth, nor Anacreon, who flourished in the beginning of the fifth century before Christ, allowed the natural vivacity of their tempers to be overcome by the severities of a passion which they considered chiefly as an instrument of pleasure. When unfortunate in love, they had recourse to wine; and their lively invitations to this enjoyment composed the favourite *sirs* of antiquity.⁸ Of Alcæus it is usual to judge by the scattered remains of his works preserved in Plutarch⁹ and Athenæus,¹⁰ and by the high commendations bestowed on him by Horace and Quintilian. The Latin poet, however, seems on many occasions to have so exactly imitated, or rather translated the Greek, that the copy will perhaps best enable us to form a complete idea of the original.¹¹

Alcæus, though he chiefly indulged in the gay and sportive strains of poetry, was yet qualified to undertake more lofty¹² themes; but the whole soul of Anacreon was of that effeminate texture which fitted him only to sing of love and pleasure.¹³ Venus, Bacchus, Cupid, and the Graces were the peculiar divinities whom he adored; and the presents which he offered at their shrine were the most acceptable that any mortal could bestow. He not only observed the external rites and ceremonies which they commanded, but proved that his heart and mind had imbibed the genuine spirit of their worship. Throughout the whole of his works now remaining,¹⁴ there reign the most inimitable simplicity, purity, and sweetness of diction: his verses flow with a smooth volubility; his images, sentiments, and reason-

⁶ Hippocrat. de locis, vol. ii. p. 346. Edit. Lugd. Bat.

⁷ Agreeably to the principles established by Theophrastus in Plutarch's Symposium.

⁸ Give us a song of Alcæus or Anacreon, was a common saying in the age of Socrates. Athenæus, l. x. c. viii.

⁹ Sympos. c. vi.

¹⁰ Lib. x.

¹¹ Μηδὲν ἄλλο φουρτὸς πρὸς τὸν δεινὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ Αἰλίου.—A.L.C.

Nullam, Vare, sacra vite, prius severis arborem.

Other translations, equally literal, may be discovered by carefully examining the fragments in Athenæus l. x.

¹² In lusus et amores descendit, majoribus tamen aptior QUIN. l. x. c. i.

¹³ Ἄ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ δὲ χορὸς

ἔστιν ὁ μόνον ἔστιν—

ANAC. Od. i.

¹⁴ The works of Anacreon are said, by Petrus Alcyonius de exilio, to have been burned by the Greek priests of Constantinople, from which some learned men, destitute of taste, have absurdly concluded, that the works ascribed to the old poet are spurious. It cannot, surely, be said of those poems, "Etsi excitant animos nostrorum hominum ad flagrantiorum religionis cultum, non tamen verborum Atticorum proprietatem et linguæ Græcæ elegantiam docent;" which is the character that Petrus Alcyonius gives of the compositions substituted by the priests in their place.

¹ Athenæus, l. xiv. Pausanias, l. x. Stobæus, serm. 123.

² Anthol. p. 212. Aristot. Rhetor. l. ii.

³ De Music.

⁴ Enclid. Harmon. Strabo, l. xiii.

⁵ Πινδαρος φησὶν ἐν τῶν σχολίων μίλων Τερπανδρὸς ἐφεστῆς εἶναι. Plut. de Music. "Pindar says, that Terpander invented the Scholia," which, according to Pollux and Hesychius, properly denote the drinking songs of the Greeks; but, in a more general sense, signify every kind of lyric poetry not aspiring to the dignity of the ode.

ings (if what in him seems intuitive conviction can be called reasonings) are copied from the warmest impressions of nature. Yet in these poems, otherwise so beautiful and so perfect, there may be discovered an extreme licentiousness of manners, and a singular voluptuousness of fancy, extending beyond the senses, and tainting the soul itself.

The dissolute gayety of Anacreon, the delicate sensibility, of Sappho, and the tearful complaints of Simonides,¹⁵ were all expressed in that easy equable flow of uninterrupted harmony, which, in the opinion of the most learned of their countrymen,¹⁶ possesses more grace than strength, and more beauty than grandeur. The majestic muse of Stesichorus soared to a loftier pitch. Disdaining the subjects to which the other lyrists descended, he sung of war and heroes, and supported, by his harp, the whole weight and dignity of epic poetry.¹⁷ Such, at least, are the sentiments of a celebrated critic, who had read his works, of which we are at present entitled to judge only by their resemblance to those of Pindar, who possessed a similar turn of genius, and treated the same lofty themes.

The honours bestowed on Pindar by his contemporaries, as well as the admiration in which his name was uniformly held by the most improved nations of antiquity, render both his person and his works objects of a very natural curiosity. He was born five hundred and twenty years before Christ, and his long life almost completed the full revolution of a century. His age, therefore, extended beyond the period of history now under our review; yet the works of his predecessors having perished by the ravages of time and barbarism, it is necessary to examine, in this place, the nature and character of the writings of Pindar, as the only materials remaining that can enable us to form a general notion of the performances recited by the lyric poets at the principal Grecian solemnities. Pindar, from his earliest years, was carefully trained by his father (himself a musician) to the studies of music and poetry. His genius, naturally wild and luxuriant, was corrected by the lessons of his fair countrywomen, Myrtis and Corinna,¹⁸ whose poetical productions had acquired unrivalled fame, not only in Thebes, but among all the neighbouring cities.¹⁹ His first efforts for equalling their renown were displayed at the musical contests celebrated in his native country; where, after conquering Myrtis, he was five times overcome by Corinna, who, could we believe the voice of scandal, owed her repeated victories more to the charms of her beauty than to the superiority of her genius.²⁰ But in the four public assemblies of Greece, where females were not admitted to contend, Pindar carried off the prize from every competitor. The glory, in particular, which his poetry both acquired and bestowed at Olympia, made the greatest

generals and statesmen of the age court the friendship of his muse. To the temples of the gods, and especially to the celebrated temple of Delphi, his hymns and pæans drew an extraordinary concourse of Greeks and strangers. The priests, prophets, and other ministers of Apollo, sensible of the benefits which they derived from his musical fame, repaid the merit of his services by erecting his statue in the most conspicuous part of the temple, and declared by their organ the Pythia, that Pindar should be honoured with one half of the first-fruit offerings annually presented by the devout retainers of the Delphian shrine.²¹ Pindar was thus, during his lifetime, associated to the honours of the gods; and after his death, his memory was adorned by every mark of respect that public admiration can bestow. The beauty of the monument, erected to him by his fellow-citizens in the Hippodrome of Thebes, was admired after the revolution of six centuries.²² At the Theoxenian festival, a portion of the sacred victim was appropriated, even as late as the time of Plutarch, to the descendants of the poet. The inveterate hostility of the Spartans, when they destroyed the capital of their ancient and cruellest enemies, spared the house of Pindar, which was equally respected in a future age by the warlike and impetuous son of Philip, and the giddy triumph of his Macedonian captains.²³

Pindar, we are told, acquired unrivalled fame by his hymns to Jupiter, his pæans to Apollo, and his dithyrambics to Bacchus. But as all these works have perished, as well as his love verses, his elegies, and his Parthenia,²⁴ we are unfortunately obliged to confine our observations to the odes, which were rehearsed at the sacred games, in praise of the conquerors in the gymnastic and equestrian contests. These conquerors being persons of the first distinction in Greece, the poet takes occasion to celebrate the splendour of their past lives, the dignity of their character, the fame of their ancestors, and the glory of their several republics. The tutelary deities, to whom they owed their felicity, are not forgotten; and hence, by an easy transition, the poet passes to the worship of the god in whose honour the games were established; to the adoration of the heroes who had appointed them; and to innumerable other episodes, which are often more interesting and more beautiful than the original subject.

Such, most commonly, are the materials of the ode; and its form usually consisted of three stanzas, of which the two first were of an equal length, and either of them longer than the third. This arrangement was introduced as most suitable to the occasion of the poem, as well as to the scene on which it was rehearsed. The occasion was the solemn sacrifice, accompanied by a public entertainment, given to the spectators by the friends of the successful candidate for Olympic fame. Grateful acknowledgments to the gods formed a principal part of the ceremony, which could not, without impiety, be omitted by the victor, who had

¹⁵ *Mœstius lachrymis Simonideis.* Catull.

¹⁶ *Dionysius Halicarn.*

¹⁷ *Epici carminis onera lyrâ sustinentem.* Quint.

¹⁸ *Pausanias, l. ix. c. xxii.*

¹⁹ *Lucian. Aelian. Var. Hist.*

²⁰ *Pausanias, l. ix. c. xxii.*

²¹ *Pausan. Phocic.*

²² *Pausan. Bœotic.*

²³ *Polyb. Histor.*

²⁴ *Sung, as the word denotes, by a chorus of virgins.*

obtained so honourable a prize through the assistance of his protecting divinity. On the altar of this divinity the sacrifice was performed; and in his temple was sung the panegyric poem, containing the united praises of the beneficent god, and of his favoured votary. The chorus waited, as usual, to begin the song, till preparations were made for the feast. They repeated the first stanza, properly called *strophé*, while they gracefully danced, towards the right, round the well-replenished altar; returning, in an opposite direction, to the place from which they set out, they recited the second stanza, therefore called *antistrophé*; then standing motionless before the altar, and, as it were, in the immediate presence of the divinity, with whose statue it was adorned, they sung the concluding stanza, with a richer exuberance, and more complicated variations, of melody.¹ The ode, therefore, was distinguished from other pieces of poetry, not by being set to music,² (for this was common to them all,) but by being sung by a chorus, who accompanied the various inflections of the voice with suitable attitudes and movements of the body.

The lyric poetry of the Greeks thus united the pleasures of the ear, of the eye, and of the understanding. In the various nature of the entertainment consisted its essential merit and perfection; and he only could be entitled the prince of lyric poets, whose verses happily conspired with the general tendency of this complicated exhibition. By the universal consent of antiquity, this poet is Pindar, whom, ever since the eulogium of Horace, critics have extolled for the brilliancy of his imagination, the figurative boldness of his diction, and the fire, animation, and enthusiasm of his genius. The panegyrics bestowed on him, have generally more of the wildness of the ode, than of the coolness of criticism; so that the peculiar nature of his excellences may still deserve to be explained. It will be allowed by every one who reads his works with attention, that, great as his ideas are, Pindar is less distinguished by the sublimity of his thoughts and sentiments, than by the grandeur of his language and expression; and that his *inimitable*³ excellence consists in the energy, propriety, and magnificence of his style, so singularly fitted to associate with the lengthened tones of music, and the figured movements of the dance. The uniform cadence, the smooth volubility, and the light unimportance of ordinary composition, are extremely ill adapted to this association, which, bringing every single word into notice, and subjecting it to observation and remark, must expose its natural meanness, insignificance, and poverty. But as much as the language of ordinary writers would lose, that of Pindar would gain, by such an examination. His words and phrases are chosen with an habitual care, and possess a certain weight and dignity, which, the more they are contemplated,

must be the more admired. It is this magnificence of diction, those compound epithets, and those glowing expressions (which the coldness of criticism has sometimes condemned as extravagant) that form the transcendent merit of the Pindaric style, and distinguish it even more than the general flow of the versification, which is commonly so natural, free, and unrestrained, that it bears less resemblance to poetry, than to a beautiful and harmonious prose. It is not meant, however, that this great poet paid more attention to the choice, than to the arrangement, of words. The majesty of the *composition* equalled, and, in the opinion of a great critic, even surpassed the value of the materials. Dionysius, the critic to whom I allude, has explained by what admirable refinements of art, Pindar gave to his words a certain firmness and solidity of consistence, separated them at wide intervals, placed them on a broad base, and raised them to a lofty eminence, from which they darted those irradiations of splendour, that astonished the most distant beholders.

But the most exalted fame cannot extend with equal facility to distance of time and distance of place. The poems of Pindar are now deprived of their accompaniments of music and dancing, by which they were formerly ennobled and adorned. They are now read in the retirement of the closet, without personal interest and without patriotic emotion. They were anciently sung to large assemblies of men, who believed the religion which they described, knew the characters whom they celebrated, and felt the influence of that piety and patriotism which they were admirably calculated to uphold. Such passages as may appear most exceptionable in the cool moments of solitary study, would obtain the highest applause amidst the joyous animation of social triumph, when men are naturally disposed to admire every happy boldness of expression, and to behold, with unusual rapture, those lofty and dangerous flights which elevate the daring muse of Pindar.

In examining the effect of the games, as institutions for bodily exercise and mental improvement, it is necessary to reflect, not only on the universality of their establishment, but on the frequency of their repetition. Besides the public solemnities already described, innumerable provincial festivals were celebrated in each particular republic. The Athenians employed near a third part of the year in such amusements; and if we may be allowed to conjecture, that those communities which instituted most festivals, would most excel in the arts and exercises displayed in them, we may conclude, from the national designations of the Olympic victors preserved in ancient authors, that the number of the Athenian festivals was rivalled by that of several other states.

For these warlike and elegant amusements, the youth were carefully trained by the discipline of the gymnasia, in which they learned whatever can give strength and agility to the limbs, ease and grace to the motions, force and beauty to the genius. Bodily strength and agility were accompanied by health and vigour

¹ Marius Victorinus de Gram. and the Scholia on Hesiod.

² This error runs through the whole of the otherwise very sensible discourse of Mr. Charbanon on lyric poetry, in the *Memoirs de l'Académie*.

³ *Pindarum quisquis studet emulari, &c*

of constitution. Their athletic hardiness bore, without inconvenience, the vicissitudes of cold and heat. Even in the scorching warmth⁴ of July (for that was the season of the Olympic games,) they received, bareheaded, the direct rays of the sun. And the firm organization, acquired by perpetual exercise, counteracted that fatal propensity to vicious indulgence, too natural to their voluptuous climate, and produced those inimitable models of strength and beauty, which are so deservedly admired in the precious remains of Grecian statuary.

These corporeal advantages were followed by a train of excellences to which they are nearly allied. There is a courage depending on nerves and blood, which was improved to the highest pitch among the Greeks. They delight, says Lucian,⁵ to behold the combats of bold and generous animals; and their own contentions are still more animated. In the memorable war with Persia, they showed the superiority of their national courage; and it is worthy of observation, that the most signal exploits were performed in the field of battle by those who had been previously adorned with the Olympic crown. It was a general boast, that one Grecian could conquer ten Persians;⁶ and the suggestions of reason tend to confirm the evidence of history. In the battles of the Greeks and Persians, victory was not obtained by the mechanical exertions of distant hostility. The contest was decided by the point of the sword and spear. The use of these weapons requires activity of the limbs, steadiness of the eye, and dexterity of the hand. It improves the courage as well as the vigour of the soldier; and both qualities were admirably promoted by the habitual exercises of the gymnasia, which inspired not only the spirit to undertake, but the ability to execute, the most dangerous and difficult enterprises.

The gymnastic arts encouraged other excellences still more important than bodily accomplishments and courage. Chiefly by *their* influence, the love of pleasure and the love of action, the two most powerful principles in the human breast, were directed to purposes not only innocent but useful. The desire of an Olympic crown restrained alike those weaknesses which form the disgrace, and those vices which form the guilt and misery of undisciplined minds; and an object of earthly and perishable ambition led to the same external purity and temperance, that is recommended by the precepts, and enforced by the sanctions, of a divine and immutable religion. The oil, the crown, the robes, and the palms, compose not the *only* resemblance between the Christian and the Olympic victors. These visible images have been borrowed indeed by the sacred writers, to assist our imperfect conception of divine truths;⁷ but they have been borrowed from an institution which resembles Christianity, not in the honours and rewards which it proposed, but in the efforts and duties which it required. The ambition of honest fame taught men to

control the appetites of the body by the affections of the soul;⁸ the springs of emulation repressed the allurements of sensuality; one dangerous passion combated another still more dangerous; and a train of useful prejudices supported the cause, and maintained the ascendant of virtue.

Many of the peculiarities which distinguish the Greeks from the mass of ancient and modern nations, seem to have derived their origin from the same useful institutions; particularly the custom of going unarmed, and their perpetual contempt for the capricious notions concerning the point of honour. These unpolished republicans were accustomed, in the private gymnasia, as well as at the public entertainments, to inflict and to suffer the most provoking indignities. A barbarous Scythian, who witnessed a spectacle that seemed to him as shocking and intolerable as it would appear to a punctilious modern gentleman, declared to his Athenian conductor, that if any person should offer the same insults to him, which the Athenian youths were continually offering to each other, he would soon convince the assembly, that his sword was not an empty ornament of his person, but a useful guardian of his honour.⁹ Such were the sentiments of the Scythian; and history proves, that such are the sentiments of all uncultivated minds. An untutored barbarian sets no bounds to his resentment. The smallest injury renders his anger implacable; his indignation against the offender is proportioned, not to the nature of *his* offence, but to his own pride, which is boundless. The slightest fault requires the severest atonement; and not only a blow, but a word, or a look, may inflict a stain on the delicacy of his supposed honour, which can only be washed out by the blood of the aggressor. The excesses of this sanguinary temper, before they were corrected by the refinements of Grecian philosophy, were repressed by the habitual practice of the gymnastic exercises. In the schools appropriated to the advancement of these manly arts, the Greeks learned the valuable lesson of repelling injuries by others of a similar kind, of proportioning the punishment to the offence, and of thus preventing a slight occasion of animosity from degenerating into a solid ground of revenge. If any citizen of those warlike republics had worn armour in time of peace, he must have been regarded either as a madman or as an assassin; for to the chastised principles of Grecian discipline, it would have appeared altogether absurd that the sword or dagger should be thought necessary to retaliate the reproaches of the tongue, or even the more daring insults of the arm.

The entertainments of the public festivals thus tended to eradicate the wild excesses of resentment, and to improve the mild and gentle virtues; but considered in another view, the same entertainments were calculated to promote ardour, emulation, friendship, patriotism, and all the animated principles and contentions

⁴ Lucian, Solon.

⁵ In Solon.

⁶ Herodot. l. viii.

⁷ 1 Corinth. 9th chapter, four last verses.

⁸ Qui studet optatam cursu contingere metam
Multa tulit feritque puer sudavit et alit
Abstulit venere et vino.

⁹ Lucian Anacharsis.

of active life. The rewards bestowed on the conquerors were the most flattering which in that age could be proposed. Odes were sung in their praise; statues were erected to them on the scene of victory; the names of their parents and country were jointly celebrated with their own; they were entitled to the first seats at all public entertainments; maintained at the expense of their respective communities; and in their native cities, rewarded not only with monuments and inscriptions, but sometimes with altars and temples. Of these honours and rewards, the appropriated symbols were the olive, the pine, the parsley, and the laurel crowns; which were respectively distributed at the several solemnities of Olympia, the Isthmus, Nemea, and Delphi. Observing the small value of these badges of distinction, without adverting to the solid benefits which they conferred, the Persian Tigranes would have dissuaded his master from going to war with a people, who, insensible to interest, fought only for glory.¹ But had Tigranes been more completely informed concerning the institutions of Greece, he would have understood, that both interest and glory operated most powerfully upon the candidates for Olympic fame, and not only their personal interests, but those of their friends, their parents, and their country, who, being associated to their honours, were regarded by them with that love and affection which men naturally feel for the objects of their protection and bounty.

In explaining the influence of the Grecian solemnities, we must not forget the musical and poetical exhibitions, which, from being employed to reward the victors in the gymnastic exercises, came to be themselves thought worthy of reward. The martial lessons of Tyrtaeus and Callinus admirably conspired with the effects which have already been described, encouraging the firm and manly virtues both by the enthusiasm with which their precepts were conveyed, and by the lively impressions which they gave of those objects for which it is important to contend. The courage depending on blood and nerves is uncertain and transitory in its existence; and even while it exists, may be indifferently employed to purposes beneficial or destructive. It belonged to the martial bards to determine its doubtful nature, to fix and illustrate its genuine motives, and to direct it to the proper objects of its pursuit.

The musical entertainments thus strengthened, refined, and exalted the manly principles inspired by all the customs and institutions of that warlike age. But as bravery is a hardy plant that grows in every soil, the most beneficial consequence of the arts consisted in infusing a proper mixture of softness and sensibility into the Grecian character. This is well

known to be their effect in every country where they are allowed to flourish.² The Greeks, in a peculiar manner, required their assistance; nor could it have been possible for that people, without the happy influence of the arts, to control the barbarity naturally occasioned by their constant employment in war, the savage cruelty introduced by the practice of domestic servitude, and that unrelenting ferocity of character which seems essentially inherent in the nature of democratical government. Amidst these sources of degeneracy and corruption, the time and application necessary to attain proficiency in the pursuits of genius, habituated the Greeks to gentle amusements and innocent pleasures. The honours and rewards bestowed on the successful candidates for literary fame, engaged them to seek happiness and glory in the peaceful shade of retirement, as well as on the contentious theatre of active life; and the observations and discoveries occasionally suggested by the free communication of sentiment, strengthened and confirmed those happy prejudices which combat on the side of virtue, and enforce the practice of such rules of behaviour as are most useful and agreeable in society.

If the musical and literary entertainments acquired such a happy influence over the moral dispositions of the heart, they produced a still more considerable effect on the intellectual faculties of the mind. It is almost impossible, in the present age, to conceive the full extent of their efficacy in improving the memory, animating the imagination, and correcting the judgment. As to the memory, indeed, there is a period in the progress of society preceding the introduction of writing, when the energies of this faculty have been exerted among many nations with a wonderful degree of force. Even among the barbarous Celtic inhabitants of our own island, the Druids could repeat an incredible number of verses, containing the knowledge of their history, laws, and religion; and a period of twenty years was required to complete the poetical studies of a candidate for the priesthood.³

But if the Greeks were equalled by other nations in the exercise of the memory, they have always been unrivalled in the delicacy of their taste, and the inimitable charms of their fancy. These excellences, whether originally produced by natural or moral causes, or more probably by a combination of both, were, doubtless, extended and improved by emulation and habitual exercise. To this exercise the public solemnities afforded a proper field; and, in the contests of music and poetry, were displayed the opening blossoms of Grecian genius, blossoms which afterwards ripened into those fruits of philosophy and eloquence, that will form the admiration and delight of the last ages of the world.

¹ The word is *αρετης* in the original; but here means the reward of virtue. Vid. Herodot. l. viii. c. 26.

² *Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes,
Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.*

³ Caesar, de bello Gallico, l. vi.

CHAPTER VII.

State of the Grecian Colonies—The Ionians flourish in Arts and Arms—Their Wars with the Lydians—The Asiatic Greeks subdued by Cræsus—Splendour of the Lydian Court—Foundation of the Persian Monarchy—Causes of its rapid Grandeur—Which alarms Cræsus—His Alliance with the Lacedæmonians—He invades the Persian Dominions—Measures of his Allies—Cræsus defeated by Cyrus—End of the Lydian Monarchy.

ABOVE two thousand years have elapsed since it was observed, to the honour of Europe, that a handful of Greeks, having established themselves in Asia and Africa, continually maintained and extended their possessions in those quarters of the world.⁴ Wherever the spirit of enterprise diffused their settlements, they perceived, it is said, on the slightest comparison, the superiority of their own religion, language, institutions, and manners; and the dignity of their character and sentiments eminently distinguished them from the general mass of nations whose territories they invaded, and whom they justly denominated Barbarians.⁵ Yet these honourable advantages, instead of conciliating good-will, tended only to exasperate hostility. The northern Greeks were perpetually harassed by the fierce inroads of the Thracians: the southern were endangered by the united strength of Egypt and Lybia. The colonies in Magna Græcia, having easily resisted the rude, though warlike natives of that country, were called to contend with the more formidable power of Carthage. But the consequences of all these wars, which shall be described in due time, extended not beyond the countries in which they first arose. The memorable conflict between the Greek colonies in the east, and the great nations of Asia, forms a subject more vast and more interesting. Not confined to the extremities, it reached and shook the centre of Greece. It recoiled with more destructive violence on Persia; its duration comprehends the most illustrious period in the history of both countries; and its extent embraces all the great nations of antiquity, together with the scattered communities of Grecian extraction in every part of the world.

In the third century after their establishment in the east, and above seven hundred years before the Christian era, the Greeks of Asia, and particularly the Ionians, far surpassed their European ancestors in splendour and prosperity.⁶ While ancient Greece was harassed by intestine dissensions, and its northern frontier exposed to the hostility of neighbouring Barbarians, the eastern colonies enjoyed profound peace, and flourished in the vicinity of Phrygia and Lydia, the best cultivated and most wealthy provinces of Lower Asia,⁷ and perhaps of the ancient world. History and poetry alike extol the golden treasures of the Phrygian and Lydian kings.⁸ Their subjects

wrought mines of gold, melted the ore, moulded figures in bronze, dyed wool, cultivated music, enjoyed the amusements of leisure, and indulged the demands of luxury,⁹ when the neighbouring countries of Cappadocia and Armenia remained equally ignorant of laws and arts, and when the Medes and Persians, destined successively to obtain the empire of Asia, lived in scattered villages, subsisted by hunting, pasturage, or robbery, and were clothed with the skins of wild beasts.¹⁰

Yet the Lydians and Phrygians, satisfied with their domestic advantages, seem never to have directed their attention towards foreign commerce.¹¹ When the voluptuousness or ostentation of their kings and nobility made them covet the conveniences and luxuries of distant countries, they were contented to owe these new gratifications, first to the Phœnician merchants, and afterwards to the Greek settlements established on their coasts. Through the supine neglect of their neighbours respecting maritime affairs, the Asiatic Greeks acquired without contest, and enjoyed, without molestation, besides several valuable islands, the whole western coast of the continent, extending, in a waving line, above six hundred miles in length, beautifully diversified by hill and dale, intersected by rivers, broken by bays and promontories, and adorned by the noblest prospects and finest climate in the world. The face of that delightful country will be more particularly described, when it becomes the unhappy scene of military operations. It is sufficient at present to observe, that its Ionian inhabitants, possessing the mouths of great rivers, having convenient and capacious harbours before them, and behind, the wealthy and populous nations of Asia, whose commerce they enjoyed and engrossed, attained such early and rapid proficiency in the arts of navigation and traffic, as raised the cities of Miletus,¹² Colophon,¹³ and Phocæa,¹⁴ to an extraordinary pitch of opulence and grandeur. Their population increasing with their prosperity, they diffused new colonies every where around them.

⁹ Herodot. l. i. c. xciv. Plin. l. vi. c. lvi.

¹⁰ Herod. l. i. c. lxxi.

¹¹ The Lydians and Phrygians are mentioned, in Castor's Epochæ, among the seventeen nations, who, according to that careless and ignorant compiler, successively became masters of the Mediterranean sea; but the extravagant dreams of this fabulous writer are at variance with the whole tenor of ancient history. It is extraordinary that those who ever looked into Herodotus should pay any regard to the unwarranted assertions of Castor; yet this fabulist has been generally followed by modern chronologers and compilers. See BLAIR'S Tables, &c.

¹² Athenæus, l. xii. p. 523. Comparing their ancient and actual state, the Greek proverb said, Πάλαι ποτε Μιλήσιοι ἀλκίμοι Μιλήσιοι; Once, but long ago, the Milesians were powerful.

¹³ Athen. l. xiv. p. 643.

¹⁴ Strabo, p. 582 et p. 647. Herodot. l. iv. c. clii.

⁴ Hippocrat. vol. i. p. 350. Edit. Lugdun. 1763.

⁵ Isocrat. Panegy. passim.

⁶ Herodot. passim. Plin. l. v. et Senec. ad Helv.

⁷ Strabo, l. xii. et l. xiii.

⁸ Idem, p. 628 et 621. Edit. Paris.

Having obtained footing in Egypt,¹ in the eighth century before Christ, they acquired, and thenceforth preserved, the exclusive commerce of that ancient and powerful kingdom. Their territories, though in their greatest breadth compressed between the sea and the dominions of Lydia to the extent of scarce forty miles, became not only flourishing in peace, but formidable in war,² and bore something of a similar relation to the powerful kingdoms of Egypt, Lydia, and Assyria, which had hitherto swayed the politics of the ancient world, that the small but industrious republics of Italy had to the rest of Europe in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; or, to describe their condition still more exactly, that the Netherlands, three hundred years ago, had to the extensive countries of France, England, and Germany.

Such multiplied advantages could not languish in the hands of men, who, as we shall soon learn from their history, had genius to conceive, and courage to execute, the most arduous designs. With the utmost industry and perseverance they improved and ennobled the useful or elegant arts, which they found already practised among the Phrygians and Lydians. They incorporated the music of those nations with their own. Their poetry, as above described, far excelled whatever Pagan antiquity could boast most precious.³ They rivalled the skill of their neighbours in moulding clay, and casting brass. They appear to have been the first people who made statues of marble. The Doric and Ionic orders of architecture perpetuate, in their names, the honour of their inventors. Painting was first reduced to rule, and practised with success among the Greeks; and we may be assured that, during the seventh century before Christ, the Ionians surpassed all their neighbours, and even the Phœnicians, in the arts of design, since the magnificent presents which the far-famed oracle of Delphi received from the ostentation or piety of the Lydian kings, were chiefly the productions of Ionian artists.⁴ In the following century Ionia gave birth to philosophy; and we shall have occasion to explain hereafter by what means both science and taste were diffused from that country over Greece, Italy, and Sicily. But our present subject recalls us from the history of arts to that of arms.

The first formidable enemies with whom the Asiatic Greeks had to contend, were the barbarous Cimmerians,⁵ who, being driven from the banks of the Euxine, by a Scythian horde still fiercer than themselves, overflowed, with irresistible violence, the finest provinces of Asia Minor. But the invasion of the Cimmerians is described as a predatory incursion,⁶ not as a regular plan of enterprise directed to the purposes of conquest and settlement. The

hurricane soon spent its force; the Greeks recovered from the terror inspired by these desultory ravagers, and, within a few years after their departure, the Ionian and Eolian colonies, who seem to have carried their ancient enmity into their new acquisitions, totally forgot their recent and common danger, and engaged in cruel domestic wars.

These unnatural dissensions were quieted by the growing power of the Lydians, which extending itself on all sides, finally reduced the greatest part of Lesser Asia, a country once affording the materials of many rich and flourishing kingdoms, but now reduced to beggary and barbarism under the oppressive yoke of Turkish tyranny. The territory of Lydia, which extended its name with its authority from the river Halys to the Ægean, and from the southern shore of the Euxine to the northern coast of the Mediterranean, was anciently confined to that delightful district situate at the back of Ionia, watered on the north by the river Pactolus, famous for the golden particles⁷ intermixed with its sand, and on the south by Cayster, whose banks, frequented by swans, have afforded one of the most beautiful comparisons in the Iliad.⁸ The kingdom of Lydia was anciently subject to a race of princes,⁹ styled Atyatidæ, from the heroic Atya, the great founder of their house. To the family of Atya succeeded that of Hercules, which had obtained the government before the war of Troy, and continued to reign five hundred and five years, till their honours expired in the unhappy Candaules. The story of Candaules, of his beautiful wife, and of his fortunate servant, has been adorned by the father of history with the inimitable charms of his Ionic fancy. The vain, credulous prince, injudiciously displaying the beauty, offended the modesty, of his injured spouse. Gyges,¹⁰ the most favoured of her husband's attendants, to whom his weak master had prostituted the sight of her naked charms, was involuntarily employed as the instrument of her resentment. As a reward for taking away the life of v. 3. Candaules, he was honoured with A. C. 718. the hand of the queen, and from the rank of captain of the guards, advanced to the throne of Lydia.

This revolution, which happened seven hundred and eighteen years before Christ, was felt by the neighbouring nations, who soon discovered in the enterprising character of Gyges, the difference between adventurers who acquire, and princes who inherit, a crown. The Ionian cities of Asia offered a tempting prize to the valour of Gyges, and the valuable mines¹¹ discovered between the cities Atarneus and

¹ Herodot. l. ii. c. xxxii.

² Idem, ibid. et Aristot. de Civitat. l. iv. c. iv.

³ See chap. vi.

⁴ Herodot. l. i.

⁵ Strabo, p. 292, says, that the Cimmerians were called Cimbri by the Romans. He speaks frequently of them, particularly p. 108. 193. 292. 494. Their impetuous and destructive incursions are well expressed by the elegiac poet Callinus, cited in Strabo, p. 648.

Νυν δ' ἐπὶ Κιμμερίων στρατός ἐρχεται οὐβιμοίρων.

⁶ Οὐ καταστρόφη ἐγένετο τῶν πόλεων ἀλλὰ ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς ἀρπαγῆς. HERODOT.

⁷ They were washed down from Mount Tmolus, the gold of which was exhausted in the time of Strabo. Vid. Strab. l. xiii.

⁸ Καστορέου ἀμφὶ πύργῳ, &c. Iliad, ii. ver. 460. and Pope, ver. 540.

⁹ Herodotus, l. i. throughout, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, l. i. c. 27. et seq. furnish the principal materials for the history of Lydia.

¹⁰ Herodotus was unacquainted with the wonderful story of Gyges's ring, which had the power of rendering him invisible; by means of which he was enabled to kill his master, and usurp his throne. Plato, l. ii. de Repub.

¹¹ Strabo, l. xiii. p. 625

Pergamos, as well as the gold obtained from the river Pactolus,¹⁰ enabled him to hire such a number of troops as seemed necessary to accomplish his ambitious designs. The citizens of Miletus and Smyrna were harassed by a long war; but of all the Ionic settlements, Colophon alone submitted to his arms.

Ardys his successor, following the military example of Gyges, stormed the city of Priéné, and invaded the territories of the Milesians. He transmitted his enmity, against that people, to his son Sadyattes, from whom it descended to his more warlike grandson. Alyattes, grandson of Ardys, annually invaded the country of Miletus, cut down the trees, burnt the standing corn, ravaged and desolated the whole territory. The houses he allowed to remain entire, that the Milesians, governed by that powerful attachment which binds men to their ancient habitations, might return thither after his departure, and again apply to the sowing and cultivation of the ground, the fruits of which he was determined next harvest to destroy. In this manner he continued, during eleven years, to harass, but was unable to conquer, the Milesians. The inhabitants of the country retired at his approach, and shut themselves up in their capital, the walls of which bid defiance to his assaults; nor was it possible to reduce by blockade a city that had long been, and still continued mistress of the sea. But Alyattes persisted in distressing those whom it seemed impossible to subdue; and he was carrying on his twelfth autumnal incursion with fire and sword, when an unforeseen accident occasioned a speedy termination of the war.

The beautiful territory of Miletus was, according to annual custom, thrown into a blaze, and the flames of the standing corn, impelled by the violence of the wind, communicated with the temple of Assesian Minerva. That sacred edifice was burnt to the ground. Alyattes, who was attended on his march by pipes, harps, and flutes, adapted to the voice both of men and of women, did not immediately consider, amidst the noise of festivity, and the parade of military triumph, the fatal consequences of this enormous impiety. But sickening soon after at Sardis, he had leisure, during the quiet and solitude of his distemper, to reflect on the horror of his crime; and prying into futurity with that anxious solicitude which usually attends guilt, he despatched messengers to the temple of Delphi, to consult the Grecian god concerning the means of mitigating the distress of his present state of mind. Apollo refused giving an answer to his petition, until he had rebuilt the temple of Minerva. The Lydian prepared to comply with this condition, and immediately sent ambassadors to Miletus, to propose a suspension of

arms, until the great work should be completed. That city was then governed by Thrasybulus, who, by one of those revolutions not unfrequent in the Grecian republics, had attained the rank of tyrant,¹¹ as it was then called, in a state usually governed as a democratical community. Similarity of views and dispositions had introduced a friendly connection between Thrasybulus and the celebrated Periander of Corinth, who was no sooner acquainted with the advice of Apollo, than he sent immediate intimation of it to the Milesian prince, counselling him at the same time to avail himself of the present conjuncture to promote the interest of his country. In compliance with this advice, Thrasybulus employed an expedient equally singular and successful. When the Lydian ambassadors arrived at Miletus, they expected to behold a city in distress, not only destitute of the accommodations and luxuries, but ill provided with the chief necessities of life. But their surprise was extreme, to observe vast magazines of corn open to public view, to perceive an extraordinary abundance of all the other fruits of the ground; and to behold the inhabitants revelling in fulness and festivity, as if their country had never suffered the cruel ravages of an invader. This appearance of ease and plenty was exhibited by the contrivance of Thrasybulus, by whose command the corn and other provisions had been carried from private magazines into the street, that the Lydians, returning to Sardis, the usual residence of their prince, might acquaint him with the prosperous condition of a people, whom it had been the great object of his reign to afflict and to annoy. Alyattes was much affected by the intelligence, and at length consented to a peace with the Milesians on honourable terms. To compensate for his past injuries and impiety, he promised to dedicate to Minerva two new edifices, the magnificence of which should far eclipse the splendour of her ancient temple. The promise was performed, the new temples were consecrated, Alyattes recovered from his distemper, and peace subsisted for a short time between the two nations.

The long reign of Alyattes, which, if we may credit the doubtful evidence of ancient authors in matters of chronology, lasted fifty-two years after the treaty with Miletus, was not chequered with any great variety of fortune. He conquered, indeed, the city and small territory of Smyrna, a Grecian settlement then in its infancy, but which was destined afterwards to become, by its happy situation for commerce, the most wealthy and populous establishment in those parts, and to be styled, in the pompous language of inscription, the ornament of Ionia, the first and chief city of the Asiatic coast.¹² His arms were equally successful in repelling

¹⁰ Strabo, p. 680. The wealth of Gyges was proverbial in the time of Anacreon:

Ου μοι μέλει Γυγίαις
Του Σαρδίων ἀνακτός, &c.

¹¹ In the strict sense, τυραννός means him who has acquired sovereignty in a free republic. The word has no relation to the abuse of power, as in the modern acceptation. Thrasybulus of Miletus, Periander of Corinth, Pisistratus of Athens, Polycrates of Samos, Alexander of Phœnix, and Dionysius of Syracuse, were all called τυραννός, though their characters were as widely different as those of Titus and Domitian, the extremes of virtue and vice.

¹² Marm. Oxon.

the destructive invasions of the Scythian hordes, who ravaged the northern parts of his dominions, and in resisting the dangerous ambition of the Medes, the most powerful nation of Upper Asia. Satisfied with these advantages, Alyattes became unwilling to commit his future fortune to the vicissitudes of war. Fixed in this purpose, he spent his remaining days amidst the happiness of his wealth and grandeur, in contemplating the various stages of his prosperity, in listening to the flattery of his courtiers, in receiving the grateful homage of his subjects, and in enjoying that pomp and pleasure which usually surround an eastern throne.

Olymp. liv. 3. A. C. 562. This fortunate prince was succeeded five hundred and sixty-two years before Christ, by his son Cræsus, whose uninterrupted prosperity, in the first years of his reign, far eclipsed the glory of all his predecessors. But the splendour of Cræsus was that of a passing meteor, which dazzles for a moment, and disappears for ever. Of all the kings of Lydia, he was the greatest conqueror, but he was also the last king of that country,¹ as well as the last prince of his family. Under various unjust pretences he attacked the Grecian cities of Asia Minor, which being undisturbed by foreign war, had unfortunately engaged in domestic dissensions. While jealousy hindered the Greeks, ignorance prevented the barbarians, from forming a confederacy sufficient to resist the Lydian power. The Carians, Mysians, and Phrygians, fighting singly, were successively subdued; and the whole peninsula of Lesser Asia (excepting only the little territory of the Lycians and Cilicians,) extending eastward as far as the river Halys, and inhabited by three nations of Grecian, and eleven of barbarian extraction,² finally acknowledged the power of Cræsus, and tamely received his commands.

Having met with such extraordinary success by land, the Lydian prince determined to render his power equally conspicuous by sea. For this purpose he thought seriously of equipping a fleet, with which he proposed to invade and conquer the Grecian islands directly fronting his dominions. But this design, which, considering the slow progress in maritime power among the nations most diligent to attain it, would probably have failed of success, was prevented by the advice of a philosophical traveller, conveyed in such a lively turn of wit, as easily changed the resolution of the king. Bias of Priéné, in Ionia, some say Pittacus of Mitylene, in the isle of Lesbos, while he travelled, after the Grecian custom, from curiosity and a love of knowledge, was presented to Cræsus at the Lydian court; and being asked by that prince, what news from Greece? he answered with a republican freedom, that the islanders had collected powerful squadrons of cavalry, with an intention of invading Lydia. "May the gods grant," said Cræsus, "that the

Greeks, who are unacquainted with horsemanship, should attack the disciplined valour of the Lydian cavalry; there would soon be an end to the contest." "In the same manner," replied Bias, "as if the Lydians, who are totally unexperienced in naval affairs, should invade the Grecians by sea." Struck by the acuteness of this unexpected observation, Cræsus desisted from his intended expedition against the islands; and instead of employing new means for extending his conquests, determined peaceably to enjoy the laurels which he had won, and to display the grandeur which he had attained.

His court was the gayest and most splendid of any in that age; and the Asiatic Greeks, whatever dishonour they incurred, sustained not, perhaps, any real loss by their easy submission to a vain and weak man, but a magnificent and liberal prince,³ who was extremely partial to their country. They acknowledged the conqueror, indeed, by a very moderate tribute, but they enjoyed their ancient laws, and administered without control their domestic concerns and government.⁴ Cræsus spoke their language, encouraged their arts, admired their poets and *sophists*. Ionia, perhaps, was⁵ never more happy than under the eye of this indulgent master, whose protection nourished the tender shoot of philosophy, which had begun to spring up shortly before his reign. Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priéné, Cleobulus of Lindus and the other wise men, as they are emphatically styled, who lived in that age, not only gave advice and assistance to their countrymen in particular emergencies, but restrained their vices by wholesome laws, improved their manners by useful lessons of morality, and extended their knowledge by important and difficult discoveries. We shall have occasion hereafter to consider more fully the improvements made by those ancient sages, who are said to have maintained a correspondence with each other as well as with Chilon of Sparta, Periander of Corinth, and Solon of Athens, men who acquired such reputation by their practical wisdom, as rendered them the oracles of their respective countries. Most of these, as well as Æsop the fabulist, and the elegant Greek poets of the times, were bountifully received at the court of Cræsus. There is still on record a memorable conversation between that prince and Solon, which seemed to predict the subsequent events of his reign, and which had a late, but important influence on the character and fortune of the Lydian king.

Cræsus having entertained his Athenian guest, according to the ancient fashion, for several days, before he asked him any questions, ostentatiously showed him the magnificence of his palace, and particularly the riches of his treasury. After all had been displayed to the best advantage, the king complimented Solon

³ Such is the character which results from considering the conduct of Cræsus. The transactions of his reign will not warrant our adopting the admirable panegyric of him by Pindar (Pyth. i. :)

Οὐ φθίνει Κροίσου φιλοφρονεῖται, &c.

He was taught wisdom late, and only by adversity.

⁴ Herodot.

⁵ Thucyd.

¹ Lydia descended to the rank of a province, as will appear below.

² The Phrygians, Mysians, Mariandynians, Chalybians, Lydians, Paphlagonians, Thracians, Bithynians, Carians, and Pamphylians.

upon his curiosity and love of knowledge; and asked him, as a man who had seen many countries, and reflected with much judgment upon what he had seen, whom of all men he esteemed most happy? By the particular occasion, as well as the triumphant air with which the question was proposed, the king made it evident that he expected flattery rather than information. But Solon's character had not been enervated by the debilitating air of a court, and he replied with a manly freedom, "Tellus, the Athenian." Cræsus, who had scarcely learned to distinguish, even in imagination, between wealth and happiness, inquired with a tone of surprise, why this preference to Tellus? "Tellus," rejoined Solon, "was not conspicuous for his riches, or his grandeur, being only a simple citizen of Athens; but he was descended from parents who deserved the first honours of the republic. He was equally fortunate in his children, who obtained universal esteem by their probity, patriotism, and every useful quality of the mind or body; and as to himself, he died fighting gallantly in the service of his country, which his valour rendered victorious in a doubtful combat; on which account the Athenians buried him on the spot where he fell, and distinguished him by every honour which public gratitude can confer on illustrious merit."

Cræsus had little encouragement, after this answer, to ask Solon, in the second place, whom, next to Tellus, he deemed most happy? Such, however, is the illusion of vanity, that he still ventured to make this demand, and still, as we are informed by the most circumstantial of historians, entertained hopes of being favourably answered. But Solon replied with the same freedom as before, "The brothers Cleobis and Biton; two youths of Argos, whose strength and address were crowned with repeated victory at the Olympic games; who deserved the affection of their parents, the gratitude of their country, the admiration of Greece; and who, having ended their lives with peculiar felicity,⁶ were commemorated by the most signal monuments of immortal fame." "And is the happiness of a king, then," said Cræsus, "so little regarded, O Grecian stranger! that you prefer to it the mean condition of an Athenian or Argive citizen?" The reply of Solon sufficiently justified his reputation for wisdom. "The life of man," said he, "consists of seventy years, which make twenty-six thousand two hundred and fifty days; an immense number, yet in the longest life, the events of any one day will not be found exactly alike to those of another. The affairs of men are liable to perpetual vicissitudes; the Divinity who presides over our fate is envious of too much prosperity; and all human life, if not condemned to calamity, is at least liable to accident.⁷ Whoever has uninterruptedly enjoyed a prosperous tide of success may justly be called fortunate: but he cannot before his death be entitled to the epithet of happy."

The events which soon followed this conversation, prove how little satisfaction is derived

from the possession of a throne. Victorious in war, unrivalled in wealth, supreme in power, Cræsus felt and acknowledged his unhappiness. The warmest affections of his soul centred in his son Atys, a youth of the most promising hopes, who had often fought and conquered by his side. The strength of his attachment was accompanied with an excess of paternal care, and the anxiety of his waking hours disturbed the tranquillity of his rest. He dreamed that his beloved son was slain by a dart; and the solicitude with which he watched his safety, preventing the youth from his usual occupations and amusements, and thereby rendering him too eager to enjoy them, most probably exposed him to the much-dreaded misfortune. Reluctantly permitted to engage in a party of hunting, the juvenile ardour of Atys, increased by the impatience of long restraint, made him neglect the precautions necessary in that manly amusement. He was slain by a dart, aimed at a wild boar of monstrous size, which had long spread terror over the country of the Mysians. The weapon came from the hand of Adrastus, a Phrygian prince and fugitive, whom Cræsus had purified from the involuntary guilt of a brother's blood, and long distinguished by peculiar marks of bounty. To the grateful protection of the Phrygian, Cræsus recommended, at parting, the safety of his beloved son. A mournful procession of Lydians brought to Sardis the dead body of Atys. The ill-fated murderer followed behind. When they approached the royal presence, Adrastus stepped forward, and intreated Cræsus to put him to death; thinking life no longer to be endured after killing first his own brother, and then the son of his benefactor. But the Lydian king, notwithstanding the excess of his affliction, acknowledged the innocence of Adrastus, and the power of fate. "Stranger, your action is blameless, being committed without design. I know that my son was destined to a premature death." Adrastus, though pardoned by Cræsus, could not pardon himself. When the mourners were removed, he privately returned, and perished by his own hand on the tomb of Atys.

Two years Cræsus remained disconsolate for the loss of his son, and might have continued to indulge his unavailing affliction during the remainder of life, had not the growing greatness of Persia, which threatened the safety of his dominions, roused him from his dream of misery. That country was anciently confined to a small part of the immense region at present known by the Persian name. Its inhabitants had recently become formidable, and, in the course of a few years, under the elder Cyrus, they extended their name and conquests over Upper Asia, overturned the power of Cræsus, enslaved the Greeks of Asia Minor, and, for the first time, threatened Europe with the terrors of Asiatic despotism. This memorable revolution deserves not only to be examined in its consequences, but traced to its source, because the Grecian wars and transactions, during the space of above two centuries, with the Persian empire, form an important object of attention in the present history.

⁶ Τελότης του βίου πρώτη επιγινώσκτο. Herodot. l. i. c. 31.

⁷ Οὕτω οὐκ ἔστι τις ἀνθρώπος ἀσφαλής. The last word is improperly explained in all the translations that I have met with.

The first Assyrian monarchy extended its dominion in Upper Asia, from the northern deserts of Scythia, to the Southern or Indian Ocean. On the west it was separated by the river Halys from the dominions of Lydia. The river Indus formed its eastern boundary. The conquerors of the east have assumed, in all ages, the title of King of Kings; a title expressive of the nature, as well as of the greatness of their power. The various provinces which they conquered, though acknowledging their universal dependence on the emperor, were yet subject to their particular princes, who, while they paid their appointed tribute during peace, and furnished their contingent of troops in time of war, were permitted, in their ancient territories, to retain the power, and to display the pomp of royalty. This system of government is more favourable to the extension than to the permanence of empire. The different members of this unwieldy body were so feebly connected with each other, that to secure their united submission required almost as much genius as to achieve their conquest. When the spirit which animated the immense mass was withdrawn, the different parts fell asunder; revolutions were no less rapid than frequent; and, by one of those events familiar in the history of the east, the warlike sceptre of Ninus and Semiramis was wrested from the effeminate hands of Sardanapalus. In the year seven hundred and forty-six before Christ, the provincial governors of Babylonia and Media, disdaining to receive orders from this enervated shadow of their ancient lords, rejected his contemptible authority, and established two new dynasties, which, having governed Asia for two centuries, were again reunited by the fortunate valour of Cyrus.

This extraordinary man, who raised the Persian glory on the ruins of the Medes and Babylonians, was the son of Cambyse, the tributary prince of Persia: on the mother's side he derived a more honourable descent from Mandana, daughter of Astyages, the supreme lord of Media, and many kingdoms of the east. The powerful monarchy erected by Cyrus was distinguished by the name of his native province, as the preceding empires had been denominated after the provinces of their respective conquerors, although all of them, comprehending the same nations, were bounded by nearly the same limits, Cyrus alone having extended his empire to the Grecian sea.

The territory of Persia, to the name of which we allude, is situated on the southern frontiers of Media, and reaches to the Persian gulf. The mountainous nature of the country renders it improper for cavalry, but it formerly produced a bold and hardy race of men, who, uncorrupted by the effeminacy of the Asiatic plains, required only the directing genius of a commander to conduct them to war and victory. Such a commander they found in Cyrus, whose mind, bursting through the shackles imposed on virtues and abilities by the manners and climate of the east,¹ extended the name and conquests of Persia from the Tigris to the

Indus, and from the Caspian sea to the Ocean; a name which, after the revolution of so many ages and empires, is still retained by that spacious region of the earth.

As it is natural to account, by extraordinary causes, for extraordinary events, historians have ascribed institutions and customs to the Persians worthy of rendering them the masters of the world. The philosophical Xenophon, embellishing and disguising with wonderful art the most admired, and the most admirable, branches of Grecian discipline, has bestowed them with too lavish a generosity on the founders of a nation, who became the unrelenting enemies of his country. But, notwithstanding all the refinements of his ingenious and well-cultivated invention, it is not impossible to see through the laboured artifice of the disguise; and, as truth only is consistent, we may discern very material contradictions in the only remaining accounts of the ancient manners of the Persians.

Their early education consisted, if we may credit both Xenophon and Herodotus, in learning to manage the horse, to shoot with the bow, and to speak truth. Yet it is necessary to observe that the first of those arts, how well soever it might be understood in later times by the Persian nobility, must have been very little known to their ancestors in the time of Cyrus. The craggy mountains which they inhabited were unfavourable to the rearing of horses, and the poverty of their circumstances was ill adapted to maintain them. While all the other nations of Upper Asia, except the Scythians, fought on horseback, the Persian armies were composed chiefly of infantry: and when it is considered, that the Grecians under Alexander, the Romans under the republic, as well as the northern barbarians who overran and subdued the countries of the east and west, became masters of the world chiefly through the firm intrepidity of their infantry, there is reason to assign, as the main cause of the Persian conquests, not their acquaintance with horsemanship, but rather their ignorance of that art, which obliged them to employ the determined valour of foot soldiers against the desultory assaults of horsemen. The Persians were commonly armed with swords and lances, instead of bows and darts, the usual weapons of the people of Asia. This distinction was occasioned by their want of cavalry. While their neighbours, trusting to the mettle and swiftness of their steeds, employed the harmless efforts of distant hostility, the Persians fought hand to hand, each man buckling closely to his foe. If defeated, they had no means of escape; but it was not to be expected that, practising such a superior style of war, under the conduct of an accomplished general, they should ever meet with a defeat; and indeed Cyrus always proved victorious over the civilized nations of Asia; nor was the career of his triumph interrupted, till contending against the barbarous Scythians, who joined the Persian arms and discipline to their own irresistible fury, he lost at once his army and his life.²

¹ See his panegyric in Xenophon's *Cyropædia*, and in *Æschylus's Persæ*.

² In the history of Cyrus, the plain relation of Herodotus is to be preferred to the moral embellishments of Xenophon,

A. C. 559—529. But before experiencing this fatal reverse of fortune, he was destined, in the course of thirty years, to act a distinguished part on the theatre of the world, which long retained the marks, and will always preserve the memory, of his reign. Among the first conquests of Cyrus were the territories of Armenia and Chaldea, which had openly revolted against established authority. If we believe Xenophon, Cyrus was sent against these rebellious countries as the lieutenant of his grandfather Astyages, who from his palace in Ecbatan diffused his sovereign mandates over many provinces of Upper Asia. The relation of Herodotus makes it probable, that Cyrus had before this time assumed the government of Media, over which the cruelty, injustice, and superstitious fears of Astyages, rendered him unworthy to reign, even in the opinion of his most trusty subjects.

Olymp. lvi. 4. However that may be (for it affects not the design of the present narrative,) it was natural to expect **A. C. 549.** that the Persian success in Armenia, a province situate so near to the Lydian dominions, should alarm the fears of Cræsus, and determine that prince to resist the encroachments of a power which endangered the permanence of his own. In taking this resolution, which might probably be attended with the most important consequences, he was desirous to learn the will of heaven concerning the issue of the war. The principal oracles which he consulted were those of Branchis in Ionia, of Hammon in Libya, and of Delphi in Greece. Among these respected shrines, the oracle of Delphi maintained its ascendant, as the most faithful interpreter of fate. Cræsus was fully persuaded of its veracity; and desirous generously to compensate for the trouble which he had already given, and still meant to give the priests of Apollo, he sacrificed three thousand oxen to the god, and adorned his shrine with dedications, equally valuable for the workmanship and for the materials; precious vessels of silver, ewers of iron beautifully inlaid and enamelled; various ornaments of pure gold, particularly a golden lion, weighing ten talents, and a female figure, three cubits, or near five feet high. In return for these magnificent presents, the oracle, in ambiguous language, flattered Cræsus, with obtaining an easy victory over his enemies, and with enjoying a long life and a prosperous reign. The god at the same time enjoined him to contract an alliance with the most powerful of the Grecian states.

Olymp. lviii. 1. Elevated with these favourable predictions of Apollo, Cræsus prepared to yield a ready obedience to the only condition required on his part, for the accomplishment of his aspiring purpose. Not deeming himself sufficiently acquainted with the affairs of Greece, to know what particular republic was meant by the oracle, he made particular inquiry of those best informed concerning the state of Europe, and

discovered, that among all the members of the Grecian confederacy, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were justly entitled to the pre-eminence. In order to learn which of these communities deserved the epithet of most powerful, it was necessary to send ambassadors into Greece. The Lydians dispatched with this important commission soon discovered that the Athenians, after having been long harassed by internal dissensions, were actually governed by the tyrant Pisistratus. The Spartans, on the other hand, though anciently the worst regulated of all the Grecian communities, had enjoyed domestic peace and foreign prosperity, ever since they had adopted the wise institutions of Lycurgus. After that memorable period, they had repeatedly conquered the warlike Argives, triumphed over the hardy Arcadians, and, notwithstanding the heroic exploits of Aristomenes, subdued and enslaved their unfortunate rivals of Messene. To the Lydian ambassadors, therefore, the Spartan republic appeared to be pointed out by the oracle, as the community whose alliance they were enjoined to solicit. Having repaired accordingly to Sparta, they were introduced not only to the kings and senate, but, as the importance of the negotiation required, to the general assembly of the Lacedæmonians, to whom they, in few words, declared the object of their commission: "We are sent, O Lacedæmonians! by Cræsus, king of the Lydians and of many other nations, who being commanded by the oracle of Apollo to seek the friendship of the most powerful people of Greece, now summons you, who justly merit that epithet, to become his faithful allies, in obedience to the will of the god whose authority you acknowledge." The Lacedæmonians, pleased with the alliance of a warlike king, and still more with the fame of their valour, readily accepted the proposal. To the strict connection of an offensive and defensive league, they joined the more respected ties of sacred hospitality. A few years before this transaction, they had sent to purchase gold at Sardis, for making a statue of Apollo. Cræsus had on that occasion gratuitously supplied their want. Remembering this generosity, they gave the Lydian ambassadors, at their departure, as a present for their master, a vessel of brass, containing three hundred amphoras (above twelve hogsheads,) and beautifully carved on the outside with various forms of animals.

Cræsus, having thus happily accomplished the design recommended by the oracle, was eager to set out upon his intended expedition. He had formerly entered into alliance with Amasis king of Egypt, and Labynetus king of Babylon. He had now obtained the friendship of the most warlike nation of Europe. The newly-raised power of Cyrus and the Persians seemed incapable of resisting such a formidable confederacy.

Elevated with these flattering ideas of his own invincible greatness, Cræsus waited not to attack the Persian dominions until he had collected the strength of his allies. The sanguine impetuosity of his temper, unexperienced in adversity, unfortunately precipitated him into

except when the accounts of the latter are confirmed by the authority of scripture.

measures no less ruinous than daring. Attended only by the arms of Lydia, and a numerous band of mercenaries, whom his immense wealth enabled him at any time to call into his service, he marched towards the river Halys, and having crossed, with much difficulty, that deep and broad stream, entered the province of Cappadocia, which formed the western frontier of the Median dominions. That unfortunate country soon experienced all the calamities of invasion. The Pterian plain, the most beautiful and the most fertile district of Cappadocia was laid waste; the ports of the Euxine, as well as several inland cities, were plundered; and the inoffensive inhabitants were either put to the sword, or dragged into captivity. Encouraged by the unresisting softness of the natives of those parts, Cræsus was eager to push forwards; and if Cyrus did not previously meet him in the field, he had determined to proceed in triumph to the mountains of Persia. Against this dangerous resolution he was in vain exhorted by a Lydian, named Sandanis, who, when asked his opinion of the war, declared it with that freedom which the princes of the East have in every age permitted, amidst all the pride and caprices of despotic power, to men distinguished by the gifts of nature or education. "You are preparing, O king, to march against a people who lead a laborious and a miserable life; whose daily subsistence is often denied them, and is always scanty and precarious; who drink only water, and who are clothed with the skins of wild beasts. What can the Lydians gain by the conquest of Persia; they who enjoy all the advantages of which the Persians are destitute? For my part, I deem it a blessing of the gods, that they have not excited the warlike poverty of these miserable barbarians to invade and plunder the luxurious wealth of Lydia."¹ The moderation of this advice was rejected by the fatal presumption of Cræsus, who confounding the dictates of experienced wisdom with the mean suggestions of pusillanimity, dismissed the counsellor with contempt.

Mean while, the approach of Cyrus, who was not of a temper to permit his dominions to be ravaged with impunity, afforded the Lydian king an opportunity of bringing the war to a more speedy issue, than by his intended expedition into Persia. The army of Cyrus gradually augmented on his march, the tributary princes cheerfully contributing with their united strength towards the assistance of a master whose valour and generosity they admired, and who now took arms to protect the safety of his subjects, as well as to support the grandeur of his throne. Such was the rapidity of his movement, especially after being informed of the destructive ravages of the enemy in Cappadocia, that he arrived from the shores of the Caspian at those of the Euxine Sea, before the army of Cræsus had provided the necessaries for their journey. That prince, when apprised of the neighbourhood of the Persians, encamped on the Pterian plain; Cyrus likewise encamped at no great distance;

frequent skirmishes happened between the light troops; and at length a general engagement was fought with equal fury and perseverance, and only terminated by the darkness of night. The loss on both sides hindered a renewal of the battle. The numbers, as well as the courage of the Persians, much exceeded the expectation of Cræsus. As they discovered not any intention to harass his retreat, he determined to move back towards Sardis, to spend the winter in the amusements of his palace, and after summoning his numerous allies to his standard, to take the field early in the spring, with such an increase of force as seemed sufficient to overpower the Persians.²

But this design was defeated by the careful vigilance of Cyrus. That experienced leader allowed the enemy to retire without molestation; carefully informing himself of every step which they took, and of every measure which they seemed determined to pursue. Patiently watching the opportunity of a just revenge, he waited until Cræsus had re-entered his capital, and had disbanded the foreign mercenaries, who composed the most numerous division of his army. It then seemed the proper time for Cyrus to put his Persians in motion; and such was his celerity, that he brought the first news of his own arrival in the plain of Sardis.³ Cræsus, whose firmness might well have been shaken by the imminence of this unforeseen danger, was not wanting, on the present occasion, to the duties which he owed to his own fame, and the lustre of the Lydian throne. Though his mercenaries were disbanded, his own subjects, who served him from attachment, who had been long accustomed to victory, and who were animated with a high sense of national honour, burned with a desire of enjoying an opportunity to check the daring insolence of the invaders. Cræsus indulged and encouraged this generous ardour. The Lydians, in that age, fought on horseback, armed with long spears; the strength of the Persians consisted in infantry. They were so little accustomed to the use of horses, that camels were almost the only animals which they employed as beasts of burden. This circumstance suggested to a Mede, by name Harpagus, a stratagem, which, being communicated to Cyrus, was immediately adopted with approbation by that prince.⁴ Harpagus, having observed that horses had a strong aversion to the shape and smell of camels, advised the Persian army to be drawn up in the following order:—All the camels, which had been employed to carry baggage and provisions, were collected into one body, arranged in a long line, fronting the Lydian cavalry. The foot soldiers of the Persians were posted immediately behind the line, and placed at a due distance. The Median horse (for a few squadrons of these followed the standard of Cyrus) formed the rear of the army. As the troops on both sides approached to join battle, the Lydian cavalry, terrified at the unusual appearance of the camels, mounted with men

¹ Herodot. l. i. c. lxxi.

² Herodot. l. i. c. lxxvii.

³ Αυτος αγγελος Κροισω εληλυθιν. "He came his own messenger to Cræsus."

⁴ Herod. l. i. c. lxxx.

in arms, were thrown into disorder, and turning their heads, endeavoured to escape from the field. Cræsus, who perceived the confusion, was ready to despair of his fortune; but the Lydians, abandoning their horses, prepared with uncommon bravery to attack the enemy on foot. Their courage deserved a better fate; but unaccustomed as they were to this mode of fighting, they were received and repelled by the experienced valour of the Persian infantry, and obliged to take refuge within the fortified strength of Sardis, where they imagined themselves secure. The walls of that city bid defiance to the rude art of attack, as then practised by the most warlike nations. If the Persian army should invest it, the Lydians were provided with provisions for several years; and there was reason to expect, that in a few months, and even weeks, they would receive such assistance from Egypt, Babylonia, and Greece (to which countries they had already sent ambassadors,) as would oblige the Persians to raise the siege.⁵

The Lydian ministers dispatched into Greece met with great sympathy from the Spartans. That people were particularly observant of the faith of treaties; and while they punished their enemies with unexampled severity, they behaved with generous compassion towards those whom they had once accepted for allies. The benevolent principles of their nature were actually warmed and elevated by the triumph of a successful expedition against the most formidable of their domestic foes. They had maintained a long and bloody war with the Argives, for the small, but valuable district of Thyrea, lying on the frontiers of the rival states. The Spartans at length obtained possession of it; but the Argives advanced with an army more powerful than any that they had ever led into the field, in order to make good their ancient pretensions. The wars of the Greeks were not merely undertaken from the dictates of interest and ambition, but considered as trials of skill, and contests of honour. When a conference, therefore, was proposed, we know not by which of the parties, it was agreed, in order to prevent a greater effusion of blood, that three hundred combatants on the Spartan, and an equal number on the Argive side, should determine, by the success of their arms, the disputed title to Thyrea, as well as the warlike pre-eminence of their respective republics. Three hundred champions being selected for this purpose from either army, it seemed necessary that the remainder of both nations should retire; for the Argive and Spartan citizens, who felt with a republican sensibility for the interest of their communities, could not have remained tame spectators of the battle. The combatants fought with an obstinate valour, of which there are few examples in history. Each soldier behaved as if the success of the day had been committed to his single spear; and each was eager to sacrifice his own life to the preservation of his country's fame. These generous sentiments were fully proved by the issue of the battle. At the approach of night,

only three combatants survived, two Argives, and the Spartan Othryades. The Argives, either through neglect or pity, spared the life of their single opponent, and returned home with the melancholy tidings of their bloody victory. Othryades still kept the field, collecting the spoil, and carrying into his own camp the arms of the enemy, which he erected into the usual trophy of military success. Next day the two armies, consisting of a great proportion of the citizens capable of bearing arms, arrived at the scene of action. The surprise of the Argives is not to be expressed, when they saw the appearance of the field. Notwithstanding the Spartan trophy, they still insisted, that as *two* of their champions, and only *one* of the enemy's, had survived, they were justly entitled to the glory of the day; but, seemingly with more reason, the Spartans maintained that this honour belonged to Othryades. From verbal altercation, carried on with that warmth which the importance of the dispute naturally inspired, they made an easy transition to acts of violence.⁶ The conflict was long, fierce, and bloody; but the superior discipline of Sparta finally prevailed. The Argives lamented their defeat, as the greatest calamity that had ever befallen them. The inward feelings of their hearts were expressed by external demonstrations of sorrow. Like most of the Grecian nations, they had hitherto adorned their long hair, to increase the gracefulness of manly beauty, and to render their appearance more terrible to their enemies. But in remembrance of this disaster, they shaved their heads,⁷ deprived the Argive women of their golden ornaments, and bound themselves by a dreadful imprecation never more to assume their wonted appearance, until they had recovered possession of Thyrea. The Spartans, on the other hand, celebrated their victory with the liveliest expressions of national triumph. Othryades alone partook not the general joy. Ashamed of returning to Sparta a solitary monument of three hundred brave men, he, with a generous despair, sacrificed his own life to the manes of his warlike companions. Such were the circumstances of the Lacedæmonian republic, when the ambassadors of Cræsus came to demand their assistance. The prosperity of their own situation naturally heightened, by contrast, the melancholy condition of their unfortunate ally, besieged, as they learned, in his capital, by a victorious army. They immediately resolved to send him a speedy and effectual relief; and for this purpose assembled their troops, made ready their vessels, and prepared every thing necessary for the expedition.

⁶ Herodot. l. i. c. lxxxii.

⁷ At funerals, the Greeks cut off their hair, to be consumed in the funeral pile with the bodies of their friends. Thus at the interment of Patroclus, Achilles

Ἰτας ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ξανθὴν ἀπικαίρωτο χεῖτην,
τὴν δὲ Σπέρχισα ποταμὸν τρεφὶ τηλέθουσαν.

In the *Orestes* of Euripides, Helen is blamed for sparing her locks, and cutting off only the ends. "She is," says Electra, "ἡ παλαιὴ γυνή, the same coquette as ever." Lysias, speaking of a great national calamity, says metaphorically, "It becomes Greece to shave her head." Lysias, *Orat. Funeb.* The Argives, as a community, realised the metaphor.

⁵ Herodot. l. i. c. lxxx.

Olymp. lvi. 1. A. C. 548. The valour of the Spartans might perhaps have upheld the sinking empire of Lydia, but before their armament could set sail, Cræsus was no longer a sovereign. Notwithstanding the strength of Sardis, that city had been taken by storm, on the twentieth day of the siege; the walls having been scaled in a quarter, which, appearing altogether inaccessible, was too carelessly guarded. This was effected by the enterprise of Hyreades a Mede, who accidentally observed a sentinel descend part of the rock in order to recover his helmet. Hyreades was a native of the mountainous province of Mardia, and being accustomed to clamber over the dangerous precipices of his native country, resolved to try his activity in passing the rock upon which he had discovered the Lydian. The design was more easily accomplished than he had reason to expect; emulation and success encouraged the bravest of the Persians to follow his example; these were supported by greater numbers of their countrymen; the garrison of Sardis was surprised; the citadel stormed; and the rich capital of lower Asia subjected to the vengeful rapacity of an indignant victor.¹

The Persians were accustomed, like other nations of the ancient world, to exercise the rights of conquest, without respecting the laws of humanity. Though they fought, and conquered, and plundered, only for the benefit of their prince, whose slaves and property they themselves were, yet in the first emotions of military success they discovered all the eagerness of avarice, and all the fury of resentment; acting as if they had been called to punish, not the enemies of their king, but their own personal foes; and as if each man had been entitled to reap the full fruits of his rapacious cruelty.

The Lydian prince, delivered, as we are told, by an extraordinary accident from the blind rage of the soldiery,² seemed to be reserved for a harder fate. Dragged into the presence of his conqueror, he was loaded with irons; and the stern, unrelenting Cyrus, of whose humane temper of mind we have so beautiful, but so flattering a picture in the philosophical romance of Xenophon, ordered him, with the melancholy train of his Lydian attendants, to be committed to the flames. An immense pile of wood and other combustibles, was erected in the most spacious part of the city. The miserable victims bound hand and foot, were placed on the top of the pyre. Cyrus, surrounded by his generals, witnessed the dreadful spectacle, either from an abominable principle of superstition, if he had bound himself by a vow to sacrifice Cræsus as the first fruits of his Lydian victory, or from a motive of curiosity, equally cruel and impious, to try whether Cræsus, who had so magnificently adorned the temples and

enriched the ministers of the gods, would be helped in time of need by the miraculous interposition of his much honoured protectors.³

Meanwhile the unfortunate Lydian, oppressed and confounded by the intolerable weight of his present calamity, compared with the security and splendour of his former state, recollected his memorable conversation with the Athenian sage, and uttered with a deep groan the name of Solon. Cyrus asked by an interpreter, "Whose name he invoked?" "His," replied Cræsus, emboldened by the prospect of certain death, "whose words ought ever to speak to the heart of kings." This reply not being satisfactory, he was commanded to explain at full length the subject of his thoughts. Accordingly he related the important discourse which had passed between himself and the Athenian, of which it was the great moral, that no man could be called happy till his death.⁴

The words of a dying man are fitted to make a strong impression on the heart. Those of Cræsus deeply affected the mind of Cyrus. The Persian considered the speech of Solon as addressed to himself. He repented of his intended cruelty towards an unfortunate prince, who had formerly enjoyed all the pomp of prosperity; and dreading the concealed vengeance that might lurk in the bosom of fate, gave orders that the pyre should be extinguished. But the workmen who had been employed to prepare it, had performed their task with so much care, that the order could not speedily be obeyed. At that moment, Cræsus calling on Apollo, whose favourite shrine of Delphi had experienced his generous munificence, and whose perfidious oracle had made him so ungrateful a return, the god, it is said, sent a plentiful shower to extinguish the pyre. This event, which saved the life, and which sufficiently attested the piety of Cræsus, strongly recommended him to the credulity of his conqueror. It seemed impossible to pay too much respect to a man who was evidently the favourite of heaven. Cyrus gave orders that he should be seated by his side, and thenceforth treated as a king; a revolution of fortune equally sudden and unexpected. But the mind of Cræsus had undergone a still more important revolution; for, tutored in the useful school of adversity, he learned to think with patience, and to act with prudence; to govern his own passions by the dictates of reason, and to repay by wholesome advice the generous behaviour of his Persian master.⁵

The first advantage which he derived from the change in Cyrus's disposition towards him, was the permission of sending his fetters to the temple of Delphian Apollo, whose flattering oracles had encouraged him to wage war with the Persians. "Behold," were his messengers instructed to say, "the trophies of our promised success! behold the monuments of the unerring veracity of the god!" The Pythia heard their reproach with a smile of contemptuous indignation, and answered it with that solemn gravity, which she was so carefully taught to

¹ Herodot. l. i. c. lxxxiv.

² Herod. p. 38. Cræsus had a dumb son, who seeing a Persian rush against his father, whose misfortunes had rendered him careless of life, first spoke on this occasion: Ἀνδρα γὰρ καὶ κτεῖνα Κροίσου. The learned in physiology will decide, whether certain impediments of speech may sometimes be conquered by the impetuous violence of some strong passion.

³ Idem. l. i. c. lxxxvi.

⁵ Herodot. l. i. c. lxxxix.

⁴ See p. 85.

assume: "The gods themselves cannot avoid their own destiny, much less avert, however they may retard, the determined fates of men. Cræsus, has suffered, and justly suffered, for the crime of his ancestor Gyges, who, entrusted, as chief of the guards, with the person of Candaules, the last king of the race of Hercules, was seduced by an impious woman to murder his master, to defile his bed, and to usurp his royal dignity. For this complicated guilt of Gyges the misfortunes of Cræsus have atoned; but know, that, through the favour of

Apollo, these misfortunes have happened three years later than the fates ordained."⁶ The Pythia then proceeded to explain her answers concerning the event of the war against Cyrus, and proved, to the conviction of the Lydians, that her words, if properly understood, portended destruction, not of the Persians, but of the Lydian empire. Cræsus heard with resignation the report of his messengers, and acknowledged the justice of the Delphian oracle, which maintained and increased the lustre of its ancient fame.

CHAPTER VIII.

Cyrus threatens the Asiatic Colonies—Their Measures—The Spartans remonstrate against his Design—Conquests of Harpagus—Migrations of the vanquished Greeks—Cyrus takes Babylon—Cambyses subdues Egypt—Receives tribute from the African Greeks—Reign of Darius—Final settlement of the Persian Empire—Degeneracy of Manners—Revolt of Ionia—State of Greece—The Ionian Revolt abetted by the Athenians and Eretrians—Who burn Sardis—The Asiatic Greeks defeated by sea and land—Their condition under the Persian Government.

DURING the reign of Cræsus, and his four warlike predecessors, the Asiatic Greeks sometimes enjoyed their favourite form of republican government, sometimes submitted to domestic tyrants, alternately recovered and lost their national independence. The success of the ambitious Cyrus was not likely to improve the condition of the Ionians, who, during the dependence of his fortune, had repeatedly neglected opportunities to deserve his gratitude. Before invading Lower Asia, he earnestly entreated them to share the glory of his arms; but they preferred their allegiance to Cræsus, before the friendship of a less known, and perhaps severer, tyrant. When the fortune of war, or rather the superiority of his own genius, had given Cyrus possession of all the neighbouring provinces, the Ionians were forward to declare, by embassy, their acceptance of his proffered alliance; or, if that should now be refused, to request his protection on the same terms required by his Lydian predecessor. This submissive proposal only inflamed the ambition of the Persian; and his celebrated answer,⁷ on this occasion, clearly announced to the Greeks, that if they would escape the rigour of servitude, they must owe their safety to the strenuous exertions of a brave defence, not to the clemency of Cyrus.

When his hostile intentions were made known in Ionia, the inhabitants of that delightful country assembled in the Panionian grove, their ordinary rendezvous in general and important deliberations. This place, which, together with the adjoining promontory of My-

calé, was solemnly consecrated to Neptune, formed the centre of the Ionic coast. Towards the north extended the spacious bay of Ephesus, beyond which the beautiful peninsula of Clazomené stretched a hundred miles into the Ægean. On the south, the territory of Miletus occupied sixty-two miles of the winding shore. But the Milesians sent not their deputies to the present convention; for having been the confederates, not the subjects of Cræsus, they were admitted into the Persian alliance on terms of equality and independence. The Grecian interest in Asia, thus ungenerously abandoned by the principal member of the confederacy, was supported with usual spirit and unanimity by all the inferior communities. Representatives immediately appeared from Myus and Priéné, which were situate, like Miletus, on the coast of Caria; from Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teos, Clazomené, Erythræ, Phocæa, and Smyrna, which formed the maritime part of Lydia; and from the isles of Chios and Samos, which completed the whole number of the Ionic settlements.

Meanwhile the Eolians, alarmed by the same danger, convened in their ancient capital of Cymé. Their inferior towns were Larissa, Neontichus, Tenus, Cilla, Notion, Æginœssa, Pitané, Ægæa, Myrina, and Greneia. Their territory was more extensive and more fertile than that of their Ionian rivals, but their climate less temperate,⁸ their harbours less commodious, and their cities far less considerable in power and fame.

⁸ Herodotus's encomium on the climate of Ionia is remarkable: Οἱ δὲ Ἴωνες οὗτοι, τῶν καὶ τὸ Πανιώνιον ἔσται, τοῦ μὲν οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τῶν οὐρίων, ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ ἐτυχάνον ἰδρυσμένοι πόλεις, πάντων ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἡμῖς ἰδμένων: "These Ionians, to whom Panionium belongs, have built cities in the finest climate, and in the most beautiful situations, of all men whom we know." He then proceeds to observe, that the countries on all sides of Ionia were oppressed by cold and humidity on the one hand, or heat and drought on the other. Herod. l. i. c. cxlii.

⁶ Idem. l. i. c. xcii et seq.

⁷ After the oriental fashion, he answered them by an apologue. A piper seeing a great swarm of fishes in the sea, began to play, in order to allure them to land. But as they disregarded his music, he employed a net with better success. When caught, the fishes jumped about in the net. But he told them, "It is unnecessary now to dance, since I have ceased to play." Herodot. l. i. c. cxli.

It may seem extraordinary that the Dorians, especially those inhabiting the peninsula of Caria, who were likewise destined to feel the Persian power, should not have joined in measures necessary for the common defence. But this circumstance it is still possible to explain. Of the six Doric republics, who annually assembled at Triopium to celebrate the festival of Apollo,¹ four were encouraged, by their insular situation, to contemn the threats of Cyrus. Cnidus, as will appear hereafter, hoped to derive from art the same advantages which its confederates, Cos, Lindus, Jalissus, and Camirus, enjoyed by nature. And Halicarnassus, the sixth Dorian state, as we are informed with a laudable impartiality, by a native of that city, had been recently excluded from the Triopian festival. This disgrace was occasioned by the sordid avarice of Agasicles the Halicarnassian, who having conquered in the Triopian games, carried away the tripod, which was the prize of his victory; whereas, according to an established rule, he ought to have consecrated it in the temple of Apollo. His sacrilege deprived his country of the common benefits of the Dorian name.²

To enliven the dryness of geographical description, essential, however, to the perspicuity of the present narrative, we should in vain turn our thoughts to the actual condition of the Asiatic shore. Few vestiges remain of the Doric and Eolic cities; and even the Ionic, which far surpassed them in magnificence and splendour, can scarcely be recognized by the learned and curious traveller. Nothing now remains but the indelible impressions of nature; the works of men have perished with themselves. The physical advantages of Lower Asia continue nearly³ the same now, as two thousand years ago; but the moral condition of that country, compared to what it once was, is the silent obscurity of the grave, contrasted with the vivid lustre of active life.

The Asiatic Greeks, having examined the state of their affairs, were fully sensible of their own weakness, compared with the strength of the enemy. In forming their establishments in Asia, they had confined themselves to a long and narrow line on the coast, looking with a wishful eye towards the mother-country, from which, in every calamity, they expected assistance and protection. The result, therefore, of the present deliberation was to send an embassy into Greece, in order to explain the danger to which they were exposed, and to show the necessity of powerful and timely aid. It might have been expected that Attica, the native country of the Ionians, should have received the first visit of the ambassadors; but Athens was then governed by the tyrant Pisistratus, who, it was supposed, would be averse to take arms against a tyrant like himself. Sparta, though a republic of greater power and renown, was little connected, either by com-

merce or affinity, with the Greeks of Asia. The proposals of the Asiatic ambassadors, therefore, were very coolly received by the Spartan senate. On such occasions, however, it was customary to take the opinions also of the people. In the assembly convened for this purpose, Pythermus, a Phœcean, clothed with purple, as a mark of his consideration in his native country, spoke for himself and his colleagues. But the beauties of his Ionic dialect were unable to move the resolution of the Lacedæmonians, who, mindful of the ancient enmity between the Ionic and the Doric race, declined sending any forces into Asia, to resist the arms of Cyrus. Though their generosity furnished no public assistance, their caution privately dispatched several Spartan citizens to observe the operations of the war. When these men arrived in Ionia, they were easily persuaded to exceed the bounds of their commission. They appointed Lacrines, the most considerable of their number, to travel to the Lydian capital, in order to acquaint Cyrus, that if he committed hostilities against any of the Grecian cities, the Lacedæmonian republic would know how to punish his injustice. Cyrus, astonished at such an insolent message from a people altogether unknown to him, asked the Greeks present (for there was always a great number of Grecian fugitives in the armies of their neighbours,) who the Lacedæmonians were?⁴ and what number of men they could bring into the field? When informed of these particulars, he replied to the Spartan ambassador, "That he never should fear men who had a square in the midst of their city, in which they met together to practise mutual falsehood and deception;⁵ and that if he continued to enjoy the blessings of health, he hoped to afford the Spartans more domestic reasons of complaint, than his military preparations against the Greeks of Asia."

The interview with Lacrines happened among the last public transactions during Cyrus's residence at Sardis. Having reduced Cræsus into captivity, the only enemy in those parts who seemed worthy of his arms, he was eager to return towards the East, in order to complete his conquests in Upper Asia. The Grecians he knew to be a warlike people; but as their numbers were inconsiderable, their cities small, and ill fortified, he thought proper to attempt in person enterprises of greater renown, and to commit the Grecian war to the skill of his lieutenant, Harpagus.⁶

In the course of a few months, this general made himself master of all the countries of Lower Asia, possessed by either Greeks or Barbarians. Having the command of men and labour, he caused mounds of earth to be thrown up, adjacent to the Grecian walls. In

¹ Three in the isle of Rhodes, one in Cos.

² Herodot. l. i. c. cxliv.

³ The changes in the face of the country, produced chiefly by the receding of the sea, may be seen in the splendid work of Mons. Choiseul Gouffier, *Le Voyage pittoresque de la Grèce*, &c.

⁴ Herodotus leaves it uncertain whether this ignorance was not affected, the better to mark his contempt.

⁵ Cyrus alludes to the market-places, or public squares, common in all Grecian cities, with the use of which the Asiatics were totally unacquainted, "being destitute," as Herodotus says, "of all places of public resort."

⁶ His predecessor, Mazæus, died almost immediately after he had taken Priene and Magnesia, and sold the inhabitants for slaves. Herodot. l. i. c. lxi.

this service, immense numbers must have perished by the darts of the enemy; but the work was no sooner completed, than the Persians, running up the mounds, got possession of the walls, drove the Greeks from their battlements, overpowered them from their own fortifications, entered, and sacked their towns.⁷

Olymp. When we consider the fury with
lx. 2. which the wars of the ancients
A. C. 539. were carried on, and reflect, that the immediate consequences of a defeat were servitude or death, we have reason to believe that the Greeks would make a resolute and bloody defence. This indeed sufficiently appears, by the evidence of a few scattered facts preserved in history. The first place which Harpagus attacked was the celebrated capital of the Phocæans, the most northern city of Ionia. The inhabitants, as already mentioned, were famous for their long and successful navigations, in the course of which they had often visited the coasts of Spain, the Mexico and Peru of the ancient world. The money derived from that country had enabled them to build the best fortification that was to be seen in all those parts; yet they entertained not any hopes of resisting the Persian invaders. Such, however, was their love of liberty, and their dread of seeing in their streets the army of a conqueror, that they resolved on a measure which has been often proposed, but seldom executed. When Harpagus sent them his commands, they begged the favour of a day's pause for deliberation. In all probability they had already taken many necessary measures for effecting their escape; for during that short interval, their ships were prepared, their money and goods put on board, their wives and families embarked, and the whole community was floating on the waves, when the Persians arrived to take possession of desolated dwellings and empty walls. The advantageous situation of Phocæa, and the pains which had been taken to improve and to embellish it, make this resolution appear the more extraordinary; if any thing, at least, can add to the wonder, that a whole people should unanimously abandon their temples, their altars, and what in ancient times seemed not less sacred, the tombs of their ancestors; should totally divest themselves of every right to a country which they had been accustomed to call their own; and set sail with their wives and children, ignorant whither to direct their course, or in what friendly port they might expect protection or repose.⁸

The Phocæan fleet, consisting of more than two hundred sail, made for the isle of Chios, which, of all the Ionic settlements, seemed most secure against the Persian arms. Having arrived there, they endeavoured to purchase from the Chians the small Oenussian islands; but the Chians, jealous of their commerce, and knowing the adventurous spirit of the fugitives, denied their request. The Phocæans, thus cruelly rejected by men of the same race and language with themselves, set sail on a much longer voyage, for the isle of Cynus, or Corsica,

where, about twenty years before, they had formed a small establishment. As they coasted, in the night, along the solitary shore of their ancient city, a few ships, manned with enterprising crews, landed in the harbour, surprised the Persian garrison, and put every man to the sword. After applauding this memorable act of revenge, the whole fleet, transported with fury against the Persians, bound themselves by mutual oaths never to return to Phocæa, until a burning ball of iron, which they threw into the sea, should again emerge unextinguished.⁹ Yet such is the powerful attachment of men to their ancient habitations, that in a few hours, more than one half the fleet, unable to resist the alluring prospect of their native shore, disregarded their oaths, and sailed for the well-known harbour. The destruction of the Persian garrison removed the only obstacle in the way of immediate possession; and the blame of this massacre might be thrown on their countrymen who fled, while those who returned to Phocæa might prove their innocence, by speedily submitting to every burden imposed on them. Mean while, the best and bravest portion of the Phocæan republic arrived with safety at the island of Corsica; where, their subsequent adventures not being immediately connected with our present subject, will merit attention in another part of this history.¹⁰

The Phocæans were not the only people of Asiatic Greece who deserted their country, rather than abandon their liberty. The Teians who inhabited the southern shore of the Ionic peninsula, had not yet been softened into cowardice by the effeminate muse of Anacreon. They followed the generous example which the inhabitants of Phocæa had set; forsook a city in which they could no longer remain free, and sought refuge in
lx. 2. Abdera, an ancient colony of Clazomené, on the coast of Thrace, and near the mouth of the river Nessus.¹¹ The city of Clazomené, now mentioned, was built on the continent; but on the present occasion, the inhabitants, to avoid slavery, settled in eight small islands, at a little distance from the shore, on which they founded a new city, the model of that of Venice. The advantage which the Clazomenians enjoyed by nature, the Cnicians endeavoured to procure by art. They occupied the extremity of the Carian peninsula; and their city being joined to the continent by an isthmus of only half a mile broad, they attempted, by means of a ditch, to detach themselves entirely from the main land. If this could be effected, they might despise the power of their enemies, who not having as yet subdued the Phœnicians; possessed not any naval force sufficient to conquer the Grecian isles. But the approach of the Persians, and still more their own superstitious fears, interrupted this useful undertaking; and the city of Cnidas, as well as all others on the Asiatic coast, Miletus alone excepted, were reduced to unconditional submission under the Persian yoke.

⁷ Herodot. lib. i. cap. clxii, clxiii, et seq.
⁸ Herodot. l. i. c. clxiv.

⁹ Idem, l. i. c. clxv.

¹⁰ Herodot. l. i. c. clxv.

¹¹ Herodot. l. i. c. lxxviii. et c. clxxiii.

Olymp. lx. 2. A. C. 539. While the arms of Harpagus were thus successful on the western shore, those of Cyrus acquired still greater glory in the central parts of Asia.¹ With amazing rapidity his victorious troops over-ran the rich countries between the Mediterranean and the Tigris. Every thing gave way before their valour and their fortune. The city of Babylon alone, the ancient and proud capital of the Assyrian empire, opposed its lofty and impenetrable walls to the ambition of the conqueror. When all the countries round were reduced into obedience, it might seem absurd in the inhabitants of one place to think of resisting the Persian arms. But when we consider the singular resources of this place, we shall perceive, that a design which would have been obstinate folly in any other citizens, was no more than proper firmness in the Babylonians. Their capital, which was celebrated for its magnificence, wealth, and magnitude, when nothing deserving the name of capital existed elsewhere in the world, was situated in a spacious plain, surrounded on all sides by broad and rapid rivers. The outward wall was of a firm quadrangular form, three hundred feet high, seventy-five broad, extending sixty miles in circumference, and surrounded by a deep ditch, continually supplied with water. Behind this extraordinary bulwark, of whose existence the wall of China and the pyramids of Egypt can alone serve to convince modern incredulity, was another of almost equal dimensions; and besides both these general fortifications, each division of the city had its appropriated mounds and defences. It is unnecessary to describe the towers, temples, and gardens, which by their singular greatness evidently announced the seat of a mighty empire. These magnificent monuments tended, indeed, to adorn, but others, less splendid, served to defend Babylon.² These were magazines of corn and provisions, capable of maintaining the inhabitants for twenty years; and arsenals, which supplied with arms such a number of fighting men as seemed equal to the conquest or defence of a powerful monarchy. It was to be expected that Babylon would exert its utmost strength, being then governed by Labynetos, or Belthazar, whose despotism, injustice, and impiety, exceeded even the crimes of his father Nebuchadnezzar, and left him no room to expect forgiveness from the clemency of Cyrus.

Olymp. lx. 3. A. C. 538. During two years Cyrus blocked up the city, without attaining any nearer prospect of success than when he first approached its walls. The events of this memorable siege are not related by ancient writers. We only know, that the efforts of the Persians proved fruitless, until strength was directed by stratagem. The river Euphrates entered, by a deep channel, the northern walls of Babylon, and issuing forth from the opposite side, almost equally bisected

the city. Of this circumstance Cyrus availed himself to become master of the place. He employed his numerous army in digging a profound cavern adjacent to the lofty mound which confined the course of the river. This work being completed, he patiently waited an opportunity for cutting the mound, and thus turning the waters of the Euphrates into the prepared cavern; since, if this could be done without being perceived by the enemy, his troops, stationed at the two passages of the Euphrates, in and out of the city, might enter Babylon by the channel which the river had abandoned. This design was happily executed, when the Babylonians, who had long despised the impotent efforts of the besiegers, were employed in celebrating a festival with every circumstance of the most licentious security. The mound of the Euphrates being divided, the highest waters deserted their channel, the river became fordable, and the troops of Cyrus, who, had not the Babylonians been sunk in riot and debauchery, might have been confined within the walls, and overwhelmed by darts from the battlements, made their entrance unperceived into the place; cut to pieces the unarmed inhabitants; and having punished an impious king and his voluptuous courtiers, took possession of the greatest and richest city of the ancient world.³

Olymp. lxii. 4. A. C. 529. This memorable event rendered Cyrus sole master of those valuable countries around the Tigris and Euphrates, which, from time immemorial, had been the seat of despotism and luxury, wealth and wickedness. The active ambition of this great prince was adopted by the emulation of his immediate successors.

Olymp. lxiv. 1. A. C. 524. His son Cambyses received the submission of Tyre and Cyprus, and effected the important conquest of Egypt, in the consequences of which the Greek colonies in that country, and on the adjoining coast of Africa, were involved.

In the eighth century before the Christian era, the adventurous colonies in Ionia and Caria had, amidst other commercial, or rather piratical expeditions, undertaken a voyage to Egypt. Their brazen armour,⁴ their courage, and their activity, were beheld with amazement and terror by the Egyptians, then divided by faction, and torn by sedition. Psammetichus, one of the many pretenders to the throne, engaged the Greeks in his service. Through their valour and discipline he became master of Egypt. His rewards and promises prevailed on them to settle in that country. They upheld the throne of his successors, until Apries, the fourth in descent from Psammetichus, having undertaken an unfortunate expedition against the Greek colony of Cyrene, was dethroned by Amasis, the contemporary and ally of Croesus.⁵

Amasis rivalled the Lydian prince, in his partiality for the language and manners of the Greeks. He raised a Cyrenian woman to the honours of his bed. The Greeks who had served his predecessors, and who, in conse-

¹ Xenophon's *Cyropædia*, and Herodotus, contain the materials for the reign of Cyrus, as far as it is connected with the history of Greece. It is foreign to the subject of the present work, to examine the differences between these authors.

² Herodot. l. i. c. clxxix. et seq.

³ Herodot. l. i. c. clxxviii.—c. excii.

⁴ Herodot. l. ii. c. clii. et seq.

⁵ Herodot. *ibid.* et Diodor. Sicul. l. i. c. xlv.

quence of the Egyptian law, obliging the son to follow the profession of his father, now amounted to near thirty thousand, he removed to Memphis, his capital, and employed them as his body guard. He encouraged the correspondence of this colony with the mother country; invited new inhabitants from Greece into Egypt; promoted the commercial intercourse between the two nations; and assigned to the Greek merchants for their residence the town and district of Naucratis, on the Nile, where they enjoyed the free exercise of their religious processions and solemnities, and where the industry of the little island of Ægina in Europe, and the opulence of several Greek cities in Asia, erected temples after the fashion of their respective countries.⁶

Olymp. This able prince was succeeded by his son Psammenitus, soon after
lxiii. 4.

A. C. 525. Cambyzes mounted the throne of Persia. While Cambyzes made preparations for invading Egypt, Psammenitus imprudently excited the resentment of Phanes,⁷ a Halicarnassian by birth, and an officer of much authority in the Grecian guards. Phanes having dexterously effected his escape from Egypt, offered his services to Cambyzes, who by this time had collected the Grecian and Phœnician fleets. This armament, however, seemed unequal to the conquest of Egypt; and to conduct an army thither by land, was an undertaking of extreme difficulty. The main obstacle was overcome by the experience of Phanes. He advised Cambyzes to purchase the friendship of an Arabian chief, who agreed to transport on camels a sufficient quantity of water for the use of the Persians in their passage through the desert. With the punctuality peculiar to his nation, the Arabian fulfilled his engagement. The Persian army joined the fleet before Pelusium; that place, regarded as the key of Egypt, surrendered after a short siege; Psammenitus was defeated in a great battle; and the whole kingdom submitted to a haughty conqueror,⁸ whom prosperity rendered incapable of pity or remorse.

His cruel, outrageous, and almost frantic behaviour in Egypt, alarmed the neighbouring Africans, who sought to avert the tempest from themselves by speedy offers of submission and tribute. This prudent measure was adopted even by the Greek inhabitants of Cyrenaica, who had braved the united power of Egypt and Lybia. The African Greeks were a colony of Thera, the most southern island of the Ægean, and itself a colony of the Lacedæmonians.¹⁰ During the heroic ages, but it is uncertain at what precise era, the adventurous islanders settled in that part of the Synus Syrticus, which derived its name from the principal city, Cyrene, and which is now lost in the desert of Barca. Descended from Lacedæmon, the Cyrenians naturally preserved the regal form of government. Under Battus, the third prince of that name, their territory was well cultivated, and their cities populous and flourishing.

Six centuries before the Christian era, they received a considerable accession of inhabitants from the mother country. Emboldened by this reinforcement, they attacked the neighbouring Libyans,¹¹ and seized on their possessions. The injured craved assistance from Apries king of Egypt.¹² A confederacy was thus formed, in order to repress the incursions, and to chastise the audacity of the European invaders. But the valour and discipline of Greece, though they yet feared to encounter the power of Cambyzes, and the renown of Persia, always triumphed over the numbers and the ferocity of Africa:¹³ nor did Cyrene become tributary to Egypt, till Egypt itself had been subdued by a Grecian king, and the sceptre of the Pharaohs, and of Sesostrius had passed into the hands of the Ptolemies.¹⁴

Olymp. Cambyzes is said to have died
lxiv. 4.

A. C. 521. by an accidental wound from his own sword. Darius Hystaspes, the third in succession to the empire (for the short reign of the priest Smerdis, deserves only to be mentioned in the history of the palace,) possessed the political abilities, but reached not the magnanimity, of Cyrus. His ambition was unbounded, and his avarice still greater than his ambition. To discriminate the characters of the three first and most illustrious of their monarchs, the Persians, in the expressive language of the East, styled Cyrus the father, Cambyzes the master, or tyrant, and Darius the broker, of the empire. The last mentioned prince added the wealthy, but unwarlike, nations of India to his dominions. This important acquisition, which closed the long series of Persian conquests in Asia, was formed into the twentieth satrapy, or great division, of the empire. The other military enterprises of this prince (as we shall soon have occasion to relate) were less successful. But his reign is chiefly remarkable, as the supposed era at which the religious and civil polity of the Persians received that form which they afterwards invariably retained.

Yet it must be acknowledged, that the greatest learning and ingenuity have failed in the arduous task of ascertaining the age, and still more of explaining the doctrines, of Zoroaster. At whatever period he lived, he certainly did for the Persians, what Homer and Hesiod are said to have done for the Greeks.¹⁵ His theogony,¹⁶ as the Greeks would have called it, consisted in the extravagant doctrine of the two principles, in some moral precepts, and innumerable absurd ceremonies. The magi, or priests, who probably derived some share of their influence from practising those occult sciences afterwards distinguished by their name, were strongly protected by the authority of the prophet. "Though your good works," says the Sadder, "exceed the sands on the sea shore, or the stars of heaven, they will all be unprofitable, unless accepted by the priest; to whom you must pay tithes of all

⁶ Herodot. l. ii. c. ciii. et seq.

⁷ Herodot. l. iii. c. iv. &c.

⁸ Herodot. l. iii. c. iv.

¹⁰ Herodot. l. iv. c. clix. et seq.

⁹ Idem, *ibid.*

¹¹ Herodot. l. iv. c. clix.

¹² Herodot. *ibid.* Diodor. Sicul. l. i. c. xvi.

¹³ Herodot. *ibid.* et l. iii. c. clxi.

¹⁴ Strabo, l. ii. et l. xvii. p. 836. Pausan. l. i.

¹⁵ See p. 71.

¹⁶ Herodot. l. i. c. cxxxii.

you possess, of your goods, of your lands, and of your money. The priests are the teachers of religion, they know all things, and deliver all men." Next to the priests, the royal family, and particularly the reigning prince, was the peculiar care of Zoroaster. In their prayers and sacrifices, the Persians were not allowed to solicit individually for themselves the protection of heaven, but only for the great king, and for the nation at large. In celebrating their religious worship, they employed neither altars, nor images, nor temples; they even derided the folly of such practices in others, probably (says Herodotus) not believing, like the Greeks, the nature of the gods to resemble that of men. On the summits of the highest mountains they sacrificed to the divinity; and the whole circle of the heavens they called God. They sacrificed, besides, to the elements, particularly fire, which they considered as the purest symbol, and most powerful agent, of the divine nature. They borrowed, however, the worship of some other divinities from the Assyrians and Arabians; for of all ancient nations, the Persians, according to Herodotus, were the most disposed to adopt the customs of their neighbours. They soon preferred the dress, and as an essential part of dress, the arms of the Medes to their own. When they became acquainted with the Greeks, they learned the worst and most unnatural of their vices. There was scarcely any absurdity, or any wickedness, which they might not imbibe, from the licentious caprice, the universal corruption, and the excessive depravity of Babylon. The hardy and intrepid warriors, who had conquered Asia, were themselves subdued by the vices of that luxurious city. In the space of fifty-two years, which intervened between the taking of Babylon, and the disgraceful defeat at Marathon, the sentiments, as well as the manners of the Persians, underwent a total change; and, notwithstanding the boasted simplicity of their religious worship, we shall find them thenceforth oppressed by the double yoke of despotism and superstition, whose combined influence extinguished every generous feeling, and checked every manly impulse of the soul.¹

The tendency towards this internal decay was not perceived during the reign of Cyrus, whose extraordinary abilities enabled him to soften the rigours of despotism, without endangering his authority. He committed not the whole weight of government to the insolence of satraps, those proud substitutes of despotism, who were ever ready to betray their trust, and abuse their power. The inferior governors of towns and districts were appointed and removed by himself, to whom only they were accountable. By an institution, somewhat resembling the modern post, he provided for exact and ready information concerning the public occurrences in every part of his dominions. The vigilant shepherd of his people, he was always ready to hear their petitions, to redress their grievances, and to reward their merit. Nor did the love of ease or pleasure ever interfere with the discharge of his duty,

in which he placed the greatest glory and happiness of his reign.²

Olymp. His successors were universally distinguished by an exorbitant ambition, nourished by the immense resources of their empire, which under Darius amounted to fourteen thousand five hundred and sixty Eubœic talents, a sum equal to three millions six hundred and seventy-five thousand pounds sterling. Of this vast revenue, which, considering the value of money in ancient times, exceeded thirty millions at present, the Greek cities on the coast, together with the Carians, Lycians, and several other nations of Asia Minor, paid only the thirty-sixth part, a little more than a hundred thousand pounds. Besides this stated income, Darius might on every necessary occasion demand the money and services of his subjects. His predecessors were contented with voluntary contributions, and a militia. This prince established taxes, and a standing army. The number of his troops equalled the resources of his treasury; and both corresponded to the extent of his dominions, which comprehended the greatest and most populous nations of the earth. The barbarity of the northern Scythians, and the pertinacious spirit of the European Greeks, the only enemies whom it remained for him to conquer, seemed feeble barriers against the progress of universal monarchy. In the extensive regions of Asia, every head bowed to the tiara of the great king, who in an annual progress through the central parts of his empire, spent the winter in the warm plains of Babylon; enjoyed the happy temperature of spring in the city of Susa, which adorned the flowery banks of the Eulæus; and avoided the summer heats in his spacious palace at Ecbatan, fanned by the refreshing breezes of the Median mountains.³

Olymp. But Darius could not enjoy the splendour of his present greatness, lxvi. 4. while a single nation had merited A. C. 513. his resentment, without feeling the weight of his revenge. The wandering hordes of Scythia have been, in all ages, formidable to the civilized kingdoms of the East. Thrice before the reign of Darius, the inhabitants of that frozen region had overrun the finest provinces of Asia. Fighting against these barbarians, the founder of the Persian empire had lost his army and his life. It belonged to his warlike successor to punish the ferocity of that rude and uncultivated, but bold and high-minded people. With an army, it is said, of seven hundred thousand men, Darius traversed Asia Minor, crossed the Thracian Bosphorus, ravaged Thrace, and arrived on the banks of the Danube. Meanwhile a fleet of six hundred sail left the Asiatic coast, and passing the narrow seas which join the Ægean to the Euxine, coasted in a northern direction the shores of the latter, entered the mouth of the Danube, and sailed along that river until they joined the army. The Danube was passed by the usual expedient of a bridge of boats, which

¹ Xenoph. de Inst. Cyrii, l. iii. p. 238—243.

² Xenoph. *ibid.* p. 280.

³ Xenoph. *ibid.* et Herodot. l. iii. c. lxxix. et seq.

was built by the assistance of the fleet composed chiefly of Grecians, who were left to guard the work of their hands against the dangers of the elements, and the destructive rage of the barbarians.⁴

This formidable army, collected from so many distant provinces, boldly entered the vast uncultivated wilds of Scythia, in which they continued for five months, continually exposed to hunger and thirst, and the darts of the flying enemy. When they prepared to return from an expedition in which they had already lost the best part of their strength, their good fortune, rather than their prudence, saved them from immediate destruction. It had been agitated among the Greeks, whether they ought not to demolish the bridge; a measure strongly recommended to them by the Scythian tribes, who having ravaged all the adjacent country, expected to revenge the invasion of the Persians, by the confining them, without resource, in an inhospitable desert. Miltiades, an Athenian, descended from the heroic Ajax, eagerly embraced this proposal. He was king, or tyrant of the city of Cardia, situate near the neck of the Thracian Chersonesus. There his uncle, of the same name, planted a Grecian colony, which uniting with the barbarous natives, formed a small community, the government of which descended to the son of his brother Cimon, who increased the population of the rising state by new inhabitants from Athens. The generous son of Cimon, though, like all the princes of those parts, he held his authority under the protection of Darius, preferred the recovery of national independence to the preservation of personal dignity. The other chiefs of the Grecian cities listened with apparent pleasure to his arguments for destroying the bridge, and thus delivering themselves for ever from the yoke of Persia. Histæus, tyrant of Miletus, was alone averse to this bold resolution. He observed to the little tyrants of the Asiatic Greeks, "That their own interest was intimately connected with the safety of Darius and his Persians. Under the auspicious influence of that powerful people, they each of them enjoyed royalty in their respective commonwealths: but should the empire of the Persians fall (and what less could be expected from the destruction of Darius and his army,) the Greeks would immediately discover their partiality for republican government, banish their kings, and reassume liberty." The opinion of Histæus prevailed;

Olymp. the Persians repassed the Danube:
lxvi. 4. but Miltiades, dreading their resent-
A. C. 513. ment, had previously retired to
Athens, where, twenty-three years after the Scythian expedition, he enjoyed a more favourable opportunity of displaying his attachment to the cause of liberty, in the ever memorable battle of Marathon.⁵

If the public-spirited Athenians excited the hatred and revenge, the selfish tyrant of Miletus deserved the gratitude and the rewards of Darius. To continue the sovereign of his na-

tive city seemed a station below his merit; he was taken into the confidence of Darius, and accompanying him to Sardis, and afterwards to Susa, became the friend, counsellor, and favourite of the great king. While Histæus acted such a distinguished part at the Persian court, his nephew Aristagoras, to whom he had committed the government of Miletus, incurred the displeasure of Artaphernes,⁶ the brother of Darius, and the governor of Sardis. The representations of that minister, he well knew, would be sufficient to ruin him, both with his uncle and with Darius, by whom he might be deprived not only of his authority, but of his life. Governed by these considerations, Aristagoras meditated a revolt,⁷ when a messenger unexpectedly arrived from Histæus, exhorting him to that measure. The crafty Milesian, who disliked the restraint of a court, and the uncouth manner of the Persians, languished for an honourable pretence to return to his native country; and he saw not any means more proper for affording such an opportunity, than the tumults of the Greeks, which as lieutenant of Darius, he would probably be sent to quell.

Olymp. His message confirmed the resolu-
lxix. 3. tion of Aristagoras, who, as the
A. C. 502. first act of rebellion against the
Persians, formally renounced all power over his fellow-citizens.⁸ After giving this seemingly disinterested proof of his regard for the public, he erected the standard of freedom, which was soon surrounded by the flower of the Ionian youth; by whose assistance, traversing the whole coast, he abolished in every city the authority of kings, and proclaimed to all worthy to acquire it, the double blessing of civil liberty and national independence.⁹

The revolt thus happily effected, could not however be maintained without more powerful resources than the strength, the bravery, and the enthusiasm of the Asiatic Greeks. In order to resist the force of the Persian empire, which, it was easy to foresee, would soon be exerted in crushing their rebellion, it was necessary for the Ionians to obtain the protection and co-operation of their brethren in Europe. This important object was committed to the prudence and activity of Aristagoras, who having settled the affairs of the East, undertook, for the public service, an embassy into Greece.

Lacedæmon still continued, rather in name, however, than in reality, the most powerful state in that country. Though their government was, in strict language, of the republican kind, yet the Spartans sometimes bestowed an extraordinary authority on their kings. This degree of pre-eminence, more honourable than any that birth or fortune can bestow, the public esteem had conferred on Cleomenes. To him therefore Aristagoras, after arriving at Sparta, found it necessary to apply;¹⁰ and in order to effect the object of his commission, he

⁴ Herodot. l. iv. c. l. et seq.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Aristagoras had quarrelled with Megabates the kinsman of Artaphernes (since both were of the blood royal,) during a fruitless expedition, in which they seem to have enjoyed a joint command, against the island of Naxos, one of the Cyclades. Herodot. l. ii. c. xxviii. et seq.

⁷ Herodot. l. v. c. xxxvi. xxxvii.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid. c. xxxviii.

¹⁰ Herodot. l. v. c. xlix. et seq.

described to the Spartan king the immense wealth of the Persians, which they had neither virtue to enjoy, nor valour to defend. He painted in the warmest colours, the love of liberty which animated the Ionians, and their firm expectation that the Spartans would enable them to maintain that political independence, which their own laws taught them to consider as the most valuable of all human possessions. Their interest and their glory, he observed, were on this occasion most fortunately united: for how much greater glory might be acquired by conquering Asia, than by ravaging Greece? and how much easier would it be to defeat the Persian archers, than to subdue the Arcadians or Argives, who knew, as well as the Spartans themselves, the use of the spear and buckler? Their journey to Susa, the rich capital of the Persian dominions, would be not only safe but delightful. To prove this, he showed the Spartan a brazen tablet, on which, it is said, were engraved all the countries, seas, and rivers, of the ancient world. Pointing to the coast of Asia Minor, and the cities of the Ionians, with which Cleomenes was already acquainted, he showed him adjoining to these, the beautiful and rich country of Lydia. Next to the celebrated kingdom of Cræsus (he observed) extend the fertile fields of Phrygia, equally adapted to agriculture and pasturage. Beyond Phrygia lie the territories of the Cappadocians, whom the Greeks call Syrians. Farther towards the east dwell the wealthy Cilicians, who pay an annual tribute of five hundred talents to the king; next to them live the Armenians, abounding in cattle; and last of all the Matienians, bordering on the province of Cissa, and the flowery banks of the Choaspes,¹ containing the superb city of Susa, and the invaluable treasury of Darius. This immense space is filled by well-inhabited countries, intersected by excellent roads, and supplied at proper distances with convenient places of refreshment and accommodation, even for a great army. Cleomenes having patiently listened to the verbose description of the Milesian, answered him with Laconic brevity, "In three days I will decide concerning the propriety of your demand."² At the expiration of that time, Aristagoras failed not to repair to the place appointed, where he was soon met by the Spartan king, who asked him, In how many days they might march to Susa? Here the usual prudence of Aristagoras forsook him; for he ought not to have told the true distance, says Herodotus, if he had wished to engage the Spartans to accompany him. But he replied unguardedly, That travelling at the rate of about eighteen miles a day, they might reach Susa in three months. Upon this Cleomenes exclaimed with indignation, "Milesian stranger, you must be gone from Sparta before the setting of the sun; for you have made a very inauspicious and a very dangerous proposal, in advising the Spartans to undertake a journey of three months from the Grecian sea." With this severe reprimand he left Aristagoras, and

immediately returned home. The artful Milesian, however, was not to be disconcerted by a first refusal. According to the custom of ancient times, when men endeavoured to paint to the eye the feelings of the heart, he clothed himself in the garment of a suppliant, and sought protection in the house of Cleomenes. Having obtained the favour of a third audience, he attempted to effect by money what he could not accomplish by argument. But he found it as difficult to bribe, as it had been to persuade the Spartan; and although he tempted him with the offer of above five thousand pounds (an immense sum in Greece in those days,) it was impossible to render Cleomenes propitious to his design.³

Aristagoras, thus ungenerously dismissed from Sparta, had recourse to the Athenians, from whom he had reason to expect a more favourable reception. Athens was the mother country of the Ionians, who formed the greatest and most distinguished portion of the Asiatic Greeks. The Athenians, as a maritime state, had always maintained a closer connection than the Spartans with their distant colonies; and as they possessed, for that early age, a very considerable naval strength, they were not averse to a distant expedition. Besides

these reasons, which at all times must have had no small influence on their councils, the present situation of their republic was peculiarly favourable to the cause of Aristagoras. The free form of government, gradually introduced by the progressive spirit of liberty, had been defined by the laws of Solon, and confirmed by the unanimous approbation of the whole people. The public assembly, consisting of all citizens who had attained the age of manhood, was invested with the executive, as well as the legislative powers of government. The nine archons were rather the ministers, than, as their name denotes, the governors of the republic. The senate, consisting first of four, and afterwards of five hundred members, was constituted by lot, the most popular mode of appointment. The court of the Areopagus, originally entrusted with the criminal jurisdiction, assumed an extensive power in regulating the behaviour and manners of the citizens. It consisted only of such magistrates as had discharged with approbation the duties of their respective offices. The members were named for life; and as, from the nature of the institution, they were persons of a mature age, of an extensive experience, and who having already attained the aim, had seen the vanity of ambition, their characters admirably fitted them for restraining the impetuous passions of the multitude, and for stemming the torrent of popular frenzy. Such was the government⁴ enjoyed

³ Herodot. l. v. c. li.

⁴ I forbear treating fully of the Athenian government and laws, until the establishment of what was called the Athenian empire. During more than sixty years that republic maintained dominion over many hundred cities and colonies. The fate of all these, as well as the measures of independent and hostile states, depended on the proceedings of the Athenians. Then, and not till then, a thorough acquaintance with the internal constitution and state of Athens will become necessary for explaining the historical transactions which we shall have occasion to record.

¹ Otherwise called the Eulæus, as above, p. 96.

² Herodot. l. v. c. xlii. et seq.

by the Athenians, which they fondly regarded as the most perfect of all human institutions, and which was peculiarly endeared to them at present, by the recent discovery of freedom, after a long, though, in general, not a cruel tyranny.

Olymp.

l. 3.

A. C. 578.

The danger of tyranny is an evil necessarily attending every democratical republic, in which, as there is not a proper separation between the legislative and executive powers, the assembly must often intrust to one man those functions of government, which the collective body of the people are sometimes unable, and always ill qualified to exercise; and in which, therefore, the splendour of wealth may dazzle, the charms of eloquence may seduce, and the combined power of policy and prowess may intimidate and subdue the unsteady minds of the ignorant vulgar. The fame of his Olympic victories could not procure for Cylon⁵ the sovereignty of Athens; and it is probable that many other unsuccessful candidates had aspired at this high object of ambition, before the arts and eloquence of Pisistratus, who, though born an Athenian citizen, was descended of the blood of ancient kings, obtained possession of the dangerous prize, which proved fatal to his family.

What his enterprising ability had acquired, his firmness, his wisdom, and his moderation⁶ enabled him long to maintain. So completely was his authority established, that on his death the government descended, as a private inheritance, to his son. Resentment of a personal injury⁷ delivered the Athenians from the mild tyranny⁸ of Hipparchus; though his murderers, Hermodius and Aristogeiton, were afterwards celebrated by the Athenians, not as the avengers of a private quarrel, but as the restorers of public freedom.⁹ His brother Hippias succeeding to the throne, treated his countrymen with a degree of severity which they had not hitherto experienced: his person and his government became alike odious; he was

A. C. expelled, by the assistance of the 578—510. Lacedæmonians, and the general indignation of an injured people, after his family had, with various interruptions, governed Athens sixty-eight years.

The power of Athens was great in ancient times; but it became incomparably greater after the re-establishment of democracy.¹⁰ So

advantageous to the powers of the human mind

A. C.

510—504.

is the enjoyment of liberty, even in its least perfect form, that in a few years after the expulsion of Hippias, the Athenians acquired an ascendant in Greece, which was fatal to their enemies, painful to their rivals, and even dangerous to themselves. They chastised the insolence of the islanders of Eubœa and Ægina, who contended with them in naval power; and humbled the pride of Thebes, which rivalled them in military glory. Favoured, as they fondly believed, by the protection of their tutelary Minerva, and animated as they strongly felt, by the possession of an equal freedom, they adorned their capital with the richest spoils of their vanquished enemies. Their influence soon extended over the northern parts of Greece; and the fame of their power, still greater than their power itself, alarmed the fears and jealousy of the Peloponnesians. The Spartans, in particular, who had assisted them in restoring the democracy, now perceived the error of which they had been guilty, in promoting the greatness of an ambitious rival. In order to prevent¹¹ the dangerous consequences of their folly, they summoned to a congress all their allies in Peloponnesus, that their united wisdom might concert proper measures for resisting, ere it was too late, the encroachments of the Athenians, which threatened the liberties of all Greece. Their allies readily obeyed the welcome summons, and the deputies of the several states having assembled in the Spartan forum, eagerly listened to the speakers appointed to explain the intentions of that republic. The Lacedæmonian orators acknowledged the mistaken policy of their country, in expelling from Athens the family of Pisistratus, and delivering the government of that city into the hands of a most ungrateful populace, who had since treated them with much indignity. "But why (they proceeded)

σπουδαίον, ἡ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννεύουσιν· μὴν, οὐδ' αὖτε τῶν σφίσι περιεσπινόμενων ἰσχυροῦς, ἀπαλλὰχθῆναι δὲ τυραννῶν, μακρῶ πρῶτον ἐγένοντο. Herodot. l. v. c. lxxviii.

11 Besides this principal reason, the Spartans, and particularly their king Cleomenes, had private grounds for quarrel with the Athenians. The Alcmeonidæ, a powerful family, and rivals of the Pisistratidæ, had been banished Athens during the usurpation of the latter. Having repeatedly tried, without success, to return by force, they at length had recourse to stratagem. The temple of Delphi having been destroyed by fire, they contracted with the Amphictyons for rebuilding it; and instead of employing Porine stone, agreeably to their contract, they built the whole front of Parian marble. This generosity gained them the good-will of the Pythia, or rather of the directors of the oracle; and the Lacedæmonians were commanded by Apollo to deliver Athens from tyrants. This was effected by Cleomenes, who, upon discovering the fraud, was moved with great resentment against Clisthenes, the principal of the Alcmeonidæ, by whom he and his country had been so shamefully deceived. He therefore united with Isagoras, the rival of Clisthenes. The latter, together with his partisans, were again banished from Athens. But the Athenians perceiving it to be the intention of the prevailing faction to establish an oligarchy, flew to arms. Cleomenes and Isagoras took refuge in the citadel. On the third day they surrendered on capitulation. The Lacedæmonians were allowed to retire in safety. Isagoras was banished; many of his partisans executed; and the Alcmeonidæ, headed by Clisthenes, again returned in triumph. From this time democracy, in the strict sense of the word, continued, with short interruptions, to prevail in Athens. Herodot. l. v. c. lxx. et seq. Thucyd. l. vi. c. lvi.

⁵ Thucyd. l. i. c. cxxvi. Plut. in. Solon.

⁶ Plato in Hipparch. Herodot. Thucyd. i. 20. Aristot. Polit. l. v. c. xii.

⁷ In this circumstance Plato agrees with Thucydides, whose account of the transaction differs widely from that of most other ancient writers. Thucyd. l. vi.

⁸ Plato, p. 234. The orators Andocides and Isocrates agree with the philosopher. Meursius had made a careful collection of all the passages relating to the Pisistratidæ, in his Pisistratus.

⁹ Αἰεὶ σφῶν κλέος ἴσσιται κατ' αἰῶνα
Φίλτατε Ἀρμόδιε καὶ Ἀριστογείτων
Ὅτι τὸν τυραννὸν κτανίον
Ἰσχυροῦς τ' Ἀθῆνας ἐπείσθητον. ALCEUS.

"Your glory shall last for ever, most beloved Harmodius and Aristogeiton, because you slew the tyrant, and procured equal laws for Athens."

¹⁰ This observation, which is literally translated, has weight from such an old and honest historian as Herodotus. His words are still stronger in another passage: "Ἀλλοὶ δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὸ μόνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ ἡ ἰσχυροῦς ὡς οὐτὶ χρεμῶ"

should we relate private injuries? Have they not insulted all their neighbours? Does not their pride daily increase with their power? And is there not reason to dread, that their growing ambition may endanger, and at length destroy, the public safety? In order to prevent this evil, we have recalled Hippias from banishment. And let us, therefore, by our united efforts, reinstate the son of Pisistratus in that power and authority of which we most injudiciously deprived him."

The speech of the Lacedæmonians produced not the intended effect. The Peloponnesians, however jealous of the Athenian greatness, were still more jealous of the power of tyrants; and many of them, who had experienced the haughtiness of Sparta, were not dissatisfied with beholding a rival to that republic in the northern division of Greece. The other deputies expressed their dissent by silent disapprobation; but Sosicles, the Corinthian, declared his sentiments at great length, in a speech which alike marks the manly character of the age, and the youthful vigour of Grecian eloquence. "Then surely, Lacedæmonians, will the heavens sink below the earth, and the earth rise sublime in the air; men will inhabit the depths of the sea, and fishes will take possession of the land, when you, formerly the bulwarks of liberty, shall demolish the popular governments of Greece, and establish tyrannies in their room, than which nothing can be more unjust, or more pernicious." After this pompous exordium, the Corinthian proceeded to describe and exaggerate the calamities which his own countrymen had suffered from the usurpation of Cypselus, and his son Periander. Having related, at great length, the proud, cruel, and despotic actions of those princes, "Such," added he, "are the genuine fruits of absolute power; but I adjure you by the Grecian gods! attempt not to re-establish it in Athens. The Corinthians were seized with astonishment, when they heard that you had sent for Hippias; I myself was amazed at beholding him in this assembly; yet we never suspected that you purposed to restore him, in triumph, to his much injured city. If you still persist in this fatal resolution, know that the Corinthians disavow all part in a design equally unjust and impious."¹ The other deputies listened with pleasure to the boldness of Sosicles, who expressed the sentiments which they themselves felt, but which their respect for the Lacedæmonians obliged them to conceal. Hippias alone opposed the general voice of the assembly, attesting the same gods which his opponent had invoked, and prophesying, that at some future time the Corinthians would repent their present conduct, and regret their cruel injustice to the son of Pisistratus, when their own citizens, as well as the rest of Greece, should fatally experience the dangerous ambition of Athens. This remonstrance, which was so fully justified in the sequel, produced no immediate effect in the assembly; the Lacedæmonians finally yielded to the general request of their confederates, and

abstained from their intended innovation in the government of a Grecian city.

Olymp. The dethroned prince, finding his
lxi. 4. cause universally abandoned by the
A. C. 501. Greeks, sought the protection of
Artaphernes, the Persian governor
of Sardis. Having acquired the confidence of
this magistrate, he represented to him the insolence, ingratitude, and perfidy of his countrymen, and the severest reproaches with which he loaded their character, gained ready belief with the Persian. The Athenians, who were informed of these intrigues, sent ambassadors to Sardis, in order to counteract them: but the resolution of Artaphernes was already taken; and he told the ambassadors, that if they consulted their safety, and would avoid the resentment of Persia, they must reinstate Hippias in the throne of his father. His answer had been reported to the Athenians, and the assembly had finally resolved to oppose the power of the greatest empire upon earth, rather than admit within their walls the declared enemy of their liberties.²

Olymp. Precisely at this juncture Arista-
lxx. 1. goras arrived at Athens, explained
A. C. 500. the revolt of the Asiatic Greeks from
the government of Artaphernes, and
solicited the assistance of the Athenians, in
defending their own colonies against the oppressive violence of the common foe. Many arguments were not necessary to make the people of Athens adopt a measure which gratified their own passions. The eloquent Milesian, however, described the wealth and extent of Persia, the grandeur and populousness of its cities, and, above all, the slothful effeminacy and pusillanimous weakness of their inhabitants, who, unable to support the ponderous shield, or to poise the manly lance, invited, as an easy prey, the victorious arms of a more warlike invader. The speech of Aristagoras was well fitted to excite the ambition and avarice of Athens. The assembly immediately decreed that assistance should be sent to Ionia. Twenty ships were fitted out with all convenient speed, which, reinforced by five more belonging to Eretria, a town of Eubœa, rendezvoused in the harbour of Miletus.³

Olymp. Aristagoras spent not long time
lxx. 1. in his embassy to the other states of
A. C. 500. Greece, and soon met his Athenian
allies at the place appointed. It was
here determined, that while the commander in
chief regulated the civil affairs of the Ionians,
his brother Charopinus should conduct a military expedition against the wealthy capital of Lydia. The Athenians, desirous of testifying their resentment against the common enemy, and still more desirous of plunder, eagerly engaged in this undertaking. The united fleets left the harbour of Miletus, and sailed to Ephesus, where the troops were disembarked; and, in three days, accomplishing a journey of seventy miles, appeared before the walls of Sardis. The Persian governor little expected such a visit; his soldiers were not prepared to take the field; and the extensive walls of the

¹ Herodot. l. v. c. xxi.

² Ibid. c. xcvi

³ Ibid. c. xcvi.

city could not be defended, on all sides, against the besiegers. Artaphernes, therefore, contented himself with defending the citadel; while the Greeks, without opposition, entered Sardis, in order to plunder the accumulated wealth of that ancient capital. But an accident prevented them from reaping the fruits of their success. The resentment of a rapacious soldier, disappointed of his prey, set fire to the house of a Lydian, situate on the skirts of the town, which consisted, for the most part, of very combustible materials, the houses being all roofed, and many of them walled with cane; a mode of building doubly dangerous in that adust climate. The flames readily communicated from one house to another; and, in a short time, the whole circumference of the place was surrounded with a wall of fire. Sardis was built in the Grecian, not in the eastern fashion,⁴ having, on the banks of the Pactolus, which intersected the town, a spacious square, which commonly served for the market-place.⁵ Thither the Persians, driven from the extremities, betook themselves for refuge against the fury of the flames.

Arms formed part of the dress of Barbarians,⁶ and the Persians, who had assembled in the square without any intention of making defence, discovered their own strength to be more than sufficient to resist the enemy. Mean while the flames of Sardis brought the inhabitants from all parts of Lydia to their assistance. The Greeks were attacked, repelled, obliged to abandon their booty; and it was not without much difficulty that they effected their escape. Their retreat from Sardis was still more rapid than their march thither. It then appeared, that the taking and burning of the Lydian capital was no more than a stroke of military address, which succeeded, because unforeseen, and of which the Greeks had not sufficient strength to avail themselves. The enemy collecting their whole force, pursued them to Ephesus, and defeated them with great slaughter, notwithstanding the vigorous resistance of the Athenians. The Eubœan auxiliaries also behaved with uncommon spirit, headed by their countryman Eualcides, whose Olympic victories had been highly extolled in the verses of Simonides, and whose death on this occasion was long and deeply regretted.

Bad fortune is commonly attended with dissensions in a confederate army. The allies threw the blame on each other, and the Athenians returned home in disgust, determined no longer to endanger⁷ themselves for the sake of men who employed so little wisdom or valour in their own defence. The Ionians, though deserted by their allies, and defeated by the enemy at land, carried on the war vigorously by sea. Sailing northwards, they reduced Byzantium, and all the neighbouring cities on the Hellespont, or Propontis. Their fleet then directed its course to Caria, and having become master of the most considerable portion of that coast, defeated the Phœnicians off the isle of

Cyprus. The military success of the Persians engaged them, on the other hand, to prosecute the war by land; and their subsequent operations discovered such a degree of prudence and courage, as they seem never to have exerted on any future occasion. In order the more speedily to quash the hopes of the insurgents, they formed their numerous army into three divisions, allotting to each its particular department. After these separate brigades had reduced the smaller cities of the Eolians, Dorians, and Ionians, the three great branches of the Hellenic race, it was concerted, that they should re-assemble in one body, to attack Miletus, which was regarded as the centre of rebellion; and which, though properly an Ionic city, was considered, on account of its great strength and importance, rather as the metropolis of the whole country, than as the capital of a particular province. This plan, so judiciously concerted, was carried into execution by three sons-in-law of Darius, Hymees, Daurises, and Otanes; the first of whom reduced the Eolian cities; the second conquered the Dorians, as well as the other inhabitants of Caria,⁸ while Otanes, assisted by the counsels and bravery of Artaphernes, overran the Ionic coast, burning and destroying all before him. The miserable natives were put to the sword, or dragged into captivity; the more fortunate escaped these calamities, by flying to their ships, or taking refuge within the lofty walls of Miletus.⁹

The time now approached for attacking that place, which, as its harbour commanded the coast, it was necessary to invest by sea and land. We might, on this occasion, expect to find Aristagoras, the prime mover of the rebellion, displaying the fertile resources of his genius; but before Miletus was besieged, Aristagoras was no more. The perfidious Ionian, who had persuaded, not only his own countrymen, but all the Asiatic, and many of the European Greeks, that the public safety was the sole object of his concern, had never probably any other end in view but the success of his own selfish designs. When Cymé and Clazomené, two neighbouring towns of Ionia, had surrendered to the Persians, he thought it time to provide, by a speedy retreat, for his personal safety; and abandoning, in its greatest need, a country which he had involved in all the calamities of war, he fled, with his numerous partisans, to an obscure corner of Thrace, situated beyond the reach, both of the Persians, from whom he had revolted, and of the Grecians, whom he had betrayed. But while he endeavoured to secure his establishment there, he provoked, by his cruelty, the despair of the natives, and together with the companions of his perfidy, perished miserably by the hands of those fierce barbarians, who thus revenged what happened to be, for once, the common cause of Greece and Persia.¹⁰

⁴ We have already observed, that the Persians had not any Forum, or place of public resort.

⁵ Herodot. l. v. c. ci. et seq.

⁶ Thucyd. in proem.

⁷ Herodot. ibid.

⁸ After the conquest seemed complete, Daurises was surprised and slain by Heraclides, a general of the Carians. But this disaster had no effect on the general fortune of the war. Herod. l. v. c. cvi.

⁹ Herodot. l. v. c. cvi. cvii. et seq.

¹⁰ Herodot. l. v. c. cxxiv. cxxv. cxxvi.

About this time Histæus, the Milesian, the kinsman and friend of Aristagoras, arrived from Susa, commissioned by Darius to direct, by his experienced wisdom and perfect knowledge of the country, the valour and activity of the Persian generals. The birth, the education, the manners of this singular man, together with the strong partiality of every Greek in favour of his native land, might have afforded good reason to the Persian king to suspect his fidelity: he indeed suspected it; but the artful address, the warm professions, the subtle insinuation of Histæus, easily overcame every prejudice which his situation and character made it natural to conceive against him. He was sent to assist the army of Darius, his benefactor, in crushing the Grecian rebellion; but his real intention was to take upon himself the conduct of that rebellion, and to raise his own greatness on the ruins of the Persian power. As he passed to the coast of Asia Minor, his intrigues produced a conspiracy at Sardis, which, being discovered by the vigilance of Artaphernes, ended in the destruction of his accomplices. Histæus made a seasonable retreat to the Ionian shore,¹ where he hoped to be received with open arms by his ancient friends. But the Milesians, remembering his former tyranny, and the recent baseness of his nephew Aristagoras, shut their gates against him. He sought admission into Chios, but without better success. The Lesbians, with much difficulty, lent him eight vessels, which he employed against the enemy in the Euxine; but he was taken by the Persians, and crucified at Sardis, having performed nothing sufficient to change the fortune of a war, which had been undertaken by his advice, and fomented by his ambition.²

Meanwhile the Persian fleet and army surrounded the walls of Miletus. We are not informed of the exact number of their land forces, which, consisting of all the united garrisons in those parts, must have greatly exceeded any strength which the much exhausted Greeks could bring into the field. Their fleet, composed of Phœnicians, Cilicians, and Egyptians, amounted to six hundred sail; besides a considerable naval force belonging to the isle of Cyprus, which, having co-operated during one year with the Ionian insurgents, had recently submitted to Darius. In order to deliberate concerning the means of opposing this mighty armament, the Grecians assembled in the Panionian council, where it was unanimously resolved, that no attempt should be made to resist the Persians by land: the citizens of Miletus alone were exhorted to defend their walls to the last extremity, under the conduct of Pythagoras, a person of great rank and eminence in that republic. While every effort should be exerted for maintaining this strong hold of Ionia, it was determined that the Grecian fleet, the last and only hope of the nation, should assemble at the small island of Ladé, lying off the harbour of Miletus, and offer battle to that of the Persians.³ When all

their forces were collected at the appointed rendezvous, they amounted to three hundred and fifty-three ships, which, containing, each at a medium, a complement of above two hundred men, made the whole amount to a number sufficiently respectable, and which, had they all remained firm and unanimous in the common cause, might, perhaps, have still rendered them victorious. Such, at least, was the opinion of the Persian commanders, who, when informed of the strength of the Grecian fleet, despaired of conquering it by open force, and endeavoured to effect by policy, what they could not accomplish by valour. Calling together the Ionian tyrants, who, after being expelled their dominions by Aristagoras, had taken refuge with the Medes, and actually followed the standard of Darius, they represented to those banished princes, that now was the time to show their attachment to the service of the great king. For this purpose they were instructed, each of them, to persuade, by message or a personal interview, the subjects whom he had formerly commanded, to desert the Grecian confederacy; to acquaint them, that if they complied with this proposal, their houses and temples should be spared, while those of their more obstinate allies would be destroyed by the flames; that their republics should be treated with great lenity, and even received into favour, while their countrymen who resisted, would inevitably be reduced into servitude; their youth disgraced by castration; their virgins transported to Bactria, to satisfy the lust of barbarians; and their country, which contained every thing once dear to them, their temples, their statues, their oracles, and the tombs of their ancestors, bestowed on some more deserving and less rebellious people.

These insidious representations, however, produced not any immediate effect. Each community, believing that they alone were solicited to abandon the common cause, scorned, on account of their private advantage, to desert the general interest of the confederacy, and next day they called a council of war, to consider of the means proper, not for appeasing the wrath, but for resisting the arms, of the Persians.

In this council, where no distinction of persons prevailed, every individual had full liberty to propose his opinion. That of Dionysius, a Phocæan, met with the approbation of the assembly. "Our fortunes," said he, "O Ionians! stand on a needle's point. We must either vindicate our liberty, or suffer the ignominious punishment of fugitive slaves. If we refuse present labour and danger, we shall be exposed to eternal disgrace; but the toils of a few days will be compensated by a life of freedom, of glory, and of happiness. Submit, therefore, to my direction, and I will pledge my life, that, if the gods declare not against us, the enemy will either decline the engagement, or, engaging, be shamefully defeated." The Greeks, consenting to submit to the discipline of Dionysius, he, every day, arranged the fleet in three divisions: towards the east extended the right wing, consisting of eight ships of the Milesians, twelve belonging to

¹ Herodot. l. vi. c. ii. et seq.

² Ibid.

³ Herodot. l. vi. c. vi. et seq.

Priené, and three, which formed the whole strength of the small republic of Myus. The centre consisted of a hundred prime sailors, furnished by the Chians, seventy from Lesbos, and a few ships, sent by the little cities of Erythræa, Phocæa, and Teios. The Samians alone, with sixty sail, formed the left wing to the westward.

In ancient times the success of a naval engagement principally depended on the activity of the rowers, and the skill of the pilots, whose object it always was to dart, with great violence, the sharp beak or prow of their own ships, against the sides of the enemy. Sometimes at one stroke, more frequently by repeated assaults, while they themselves, with wonderful dexterity, eluded such a shock, they shattered or sunk the vessel of their opponents. By their continual exercise in navigation, the Greeks had acquired such proficiency in managing their gallees, that their movement depending, not on the external impulse of the wind, but on the active principle within, resembled the rapid motion of a fish in its native element. Constant practice, however, was necessary to maintain this superiority, and still more to preserve their bodies in a capacity for labour, which, on account of the softness of the climate and the heat of the season, were ready to melt away in sloth and debility. The prudent Phocæan, therefore, commanded them often to change their stations, habituating the sailors to the labour of the oar, and the restraints of discipline, which he assured them would, by habit, become easy and agreeable. For seven days they cheerfully obeyed his commands: but, at length, the warmth of the season rendered their exertions too great for their strength. Distempers broke out in the fleet. The Greeks, always averse to every shadow of absolute authority, complained at first in secret murmurs, and afterwards in licentious clamours, of the intolerable hardships to which they were exposed by the severity of an insolent Phocæan, who, though he brought only three ships to the common defence, had assumed an arbitrary direction in all their affairs. Governed by these sentiments, they refused any longer to obey his commands, landed on the shore of Lade, formed a camp in the island, and, sitting under the shade of their tents, disdained the useful labours to which they had hitherto submitted.

The Samians, who saw and dreaded the consequence of this general disorder, privately accepted the proposal which had been made them by the Persians. Their perfidy brought destruction on the common cause; for in the engagement, which followed soon after, they hoisted sail and deserted the line. The Lesbians followed their example. Among those, however, who obtained signal honour, by adhering to the cause of Greece, were eleven captains of Samian vessels, who detested the treachery of their companions, and despised the signs of their admirals; on which account

they were rewarded, at their return, by the community of Samos, with a pillar and inscription, transmitting their names, with immortal renown, to posterity. But of all the Greeks, the Chians acquired greatest glory on that memorable day: notwithstanding their inferior strength, they defended themselves to the last extremity, and rendered the victory late and dear to the Persians. The naval defeat was soon followed by the taking of Miletus, which surrendered in the sixth year from the commencement of the revolt. The Persians made good the threats which they had denounced

Olymp. against the obstinacy of their ene-
lxxi. 3. mics. Samos alone, at the price of
A. C. 494. its perfidy, obtained the safety of
its houses and temples. Those of
all the other communities were burnt to the ground. The women and children were dragged into captivity. Such of the Milesian citizens as escaped not by flight, were either put to the sword, or carried into the heart of Asia, and finally settled in the territory of Ampé, near the mouth of the Tygris. In other places, men of a timid or melancholy complexion continued to brood over the ruins of their ancient seats. The more enterprising sailed to Greece, to the coast of Italy and Sicily, and to the Greek colonies in Africa. Probably not a few betook themselves to piracy, among whom was Dionysius the Phocæan, who plundered the Tuscan and Carthaginian vessels, always sparing the Grecian. The Persian fleet wintered at Miletus, and next spring subdued the islands of Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos.⁴ Thus were the Asiatic Greeks conquered for the third time, once by the Lydians, and twice by the Persians.

But notwithstanding these repeated shocks, which subjected the inhabitants of Ionia to such dreadful calamities, that delightful country soon recovered its ancient populousness and splendour. The Persian government, having sufficiently punished the rebellion, began gradually to relent. The Ionians became an object of care and protection to Darius. Useful regulations were made for maintaining the public peace, as well as for securing the lives and properties of individuals. The face of the country began once more to smile; the cities, being built of slight materials, were easily repaired, while the exuberant fertility of the soil, the attractive beauties of the prospect, the charms of the climate, and the convenience of the harbours (an advantage of which the Persians knew not to avail themselves,) speedily collected the Greeks into their ancient habitations. Even those places which had been deserted or destroyed, emerged from the gloom of desolation, and assumed the cheerful appearance of industrious activity. And such was the attachment of the Greeks to their native land, and such their ambition to adorn it, that the labour of a few years repaired the destructive ravages of the Barbarians.

⁴ Herodot. l. vi. c. xxxi. et seq.

CHAPTER IX.

Resentment of Darius against Greece—Maritime Expedition of Mardonius—Invasion of Greece by Datis and Artaphernes—Battle of Marathon—Transactions in the interval between that Battle and Xerxes' Invasion—The Invasion of Xerxes—Battle of Thermopylæ.

IN attempting to give the reader a general, but tolerably complete, view of the ancient history of Greece, it was often necessary to have recourse to very obscure materials; to arrange and combine the mutilated fragments of poets and mythologists; and to trace, by the established principles of critical conjecture, and the certain, because uniform, current of human passions, those events and transactions which seem most curious and important. In this subsequent part of my work, the difficulty consists not in discovering, but in selecting, the materials; for the magnificent preparations, the splendid commencement, and the unexpected issue, of the Persian war, have been related with the utmost accuracy of description, and adorned by the brightest charms of eloquence. The Grecian poets, historians, and orators, dwell with complacency on a theme, not less important than extensive, and equally adapted to display their own abilities, and to flatter the pride of their country. The variety of their inimitable performances, generally known and studied in every country conversant with literature, renders the subject familiar to the reader, and difficult to the writer. Yet does the merit of those performances, however justly and universally admired, fall short of the extraordinary exploits which they describe; exploits which, though ancient, still preserve a fresh and unfading lustre, and will remain to the latest ages, precious monuments of that generous magnanimity, which cherishes the seeds of virtue, inspires the love of liberty, and animates the fire of patriotism.

Olymp. The memorable tragedy (to adopt
lxxii. 3. on this occasion an apt allusion of
A. C. 490. Plutarch,) which ended in the eternal disgrace of the Persian name, may be divided, with propriety, into three principal acts. The first contains the invasion of

Olymp. Greece by Darius's generals, Datis and Artaphernes, who were defeated in the battle of Marathon.
lxxv. 1.
A. C. 480.

The second consists in the expedition undertaken ten years afterwards by Xerxes, the son and successor of Darius, who fled precipitately from Greece, after the ruin of his fleet near the isle of Salamis.

Olymp. The third, and concluding
lxxv. 2. act, is the destruction of the Persian
A. C. 479. armies in the bloody fields of Mycalé and Plataea; events which happened on the same day, and nearly two years after Xerxes's triumphal entry into Greece.

The complete reduction of the insurgents on the Asiatic coast, prompted Darius to take vengeance on such Greeks as had encouraged and assisted the unsuccessful rebellion of his subjects. The proud monarch of the East, when informed that the citizens of Athens had co-operated with the Ionians in the taking and

burning of Sardis, discovered evident marks of the most furious resentment; shooting an arrow into the air, he prayed that heaven might assist him in punishing the audacious insolence of that republic; and every time he sat down to table, an attendant reminded him of the Athenians, lest the delights of eastern luxury should seduce him from his fell purpose of revenge.¹

Olymp. The execution of his design was
lxxi. 4. entrusted to Mardonius, a Persian
A. C. 493. nobleman of the first rank, whose personal, as well as hereditary advantages, had entitled him to the marriage of Artazostra daughter of Darius; and whose youth and inexperience were compensated, in the opinion of his master, by his superior genius for war, and innate love of glory. In the second spring after the cruel punishment of the Ionians, Mardonius approached the European coast with an armament sufficient to inspire terror into Greece. The rich island of Thasus, whose golden mines yielded a revenue of near three hundred talents, submitted to his fleet; while his land-forces added the barbarous province of Macedon to the Persian empire. But having steered southward from Thasus, the whole armament was overtaken, and almost destroyed, by a violent storm, while endeavouring to double the promontory of mount Athos, which is connected with the Macedonian shore by a low and narrow neck of land, but forms a long and lofty ridge in the sea. Three hundred vessels were dashed against the rocks; twenty thousand men perished in the waves. This disaster totally defeated the design of the expedition; and Mardonius having recovered the shattered remains of the fleet and army, returned to the court of Persia, where, by flattering the pride, he averted the resentment of Darius; while he represented, that the Persian forces, invincible by the power of man, had yielded to the fury of the elements; and while he described and exaggerated, to the astonishment and terror of his countrymen, the excessive cold, the violent tempests, the monstrous marine animals, which distinguish and render formidable those distant and unknown seas.²

Olymp. The address of Mardonius rescued him from punishment; but
lxxii. 3. his misfortunes removed him from
A. C. 490. the command of Lower Asia. Two generals were appointed in his room, of whom Datis, a Mede, was the more distinguished by his age and experience, while Artaphernes, a Persian, was the more conspicuous for his rank and nobility, being descended of the royal blood, and son to Artaphernes, governor of

¹ Herodot. l. v. c. cv. et seq.

² Herodot. l. vi. c. xliii. et seq.

Sardis, whose name has frequently occurred in the present history. That his lieutenants might appear with a degree of splendour suitable to the majesty of Persia, Darius assembled an army of five hundred thousand men,³ consisting of the flower of the provincial troops of his extensive empire. The preparation of an adequate number of transports and ships of war, occasioned but a short delay. The maritime provinces of the empire, Egypt, Phœnicia, and the coasts of the Euxine and Egean seas, were commanded to fit out, with all possible expedition, their whole naval strength; the old vessels were repaired, many new ones were built, and in the course of the same year in which the preparations commenced, a fleet of six hundred sail was ready to put to sea. This immense armament the Persian generals were ordered to employ, in extending their conquests on the side of Europe, in subduing the republics of Greece, and more particularly in chastising the insolence of the Eretrians and Athenians, the only nations which had conspired with the revolt of the Ionians, and assisted that rebellious people in the destruction of Sardis. With respect to the other nations which might be reduced by his arms, the orders of Darius were general, and the particular treatment of the vanquished was left to the discretion of his lieutenants; but concerning the Athenians and Eretrians, he gave the most positive commands, that their territories should be laid waste, their houses and temples burned or demolished, and their persons carried in captivity to the eastern extremities of his empire. Secure of effecting their purpose, his generals were furnished with a great number of chains for confining the Grecian prisoners; a haughty presumption (to use the language of antiquity) in the superiority of man over the power of fortune, which on this, as on other occasions, was punished by the just vengeance of heaven.

The Persian fleet enjoyed a prosperous voyage to the isle of Samos, from whence they were ready to proceed to the Athenian coast. The late disaster which befel the armament commanded by Mardonius, deterred them from pursuing a direct course along the shores of Thrace and Macedonia: they determined to steer in an oblique line through the Cyclades, a cluster of seventeen small islands, lying opposite to the territories of Argos and Attica. The approach of such an innumerable host, whose transports darkened the broad surface of the Egean, struck terror into the unwarlike inhabitants of those delightful islands. The Naxians took refuge in their inaccessible mountains; the natives of Delos, the favourite residence of Latona and her divine children, abandoned the awful majesty of their temple, which was overshadowed by the rough and lofty mount Cynthus. Paros,⁴ famous for its marble;

Andros,⁵ celebrated for its vines; Ceos, the birth-place of the plaintive Simonides; Syros, the native country of the ingenious and philosophic Pherecydes; Ios, the tomb of Homer;⁶ the industrious Amorgos;⁷ as well as all the other islands which surrounded the once sacred shores of Delos, either spontaneously offered the usual acknowledgment of earth and water, as a testimony of their friendship, or submitted, after a feeble resistance, to the Persian arms.⁹

The invaders next proceeded westward to the isle of Eubœa, where, after almost a continued engagement of six days, their strength and numbers, assisted by the perfidy of two traitors, finally prevailed over the valour and obstinacy of the Eretrians.¹⁰

Hitherto every thing was prosperous; and had the expedition ended with the events already related, it would have afforded just matter of triumph. But a more difficult task remained, in the execution of which the Persians (happily for Europe) experienced a fatal reverse of fortune. After the reduction of Eubœa, the Athenian coasts, separated from that island only by the narrow strait of Euripus, seemed to invite the generals of Darius to an easy conquest. They readily accepted the invitation, as the punishment of Athens was the main object which their master had in view when he fitted out his seemingly invincible armament. The measures which they adopted for accomplishing this design appear abundantly judicious; the greater part of the army was left to guard the islands which they had subdued; the useless multitude of attendants were transported to the coast of Asia; with a hundred thousand chosen infantry, and a due proportion of horse, the Persian generals set sail from Eubœa, and safely arrived on the *Marathonian shore*, a district of Attica about thirty miles from the capital, consisting chiefly of level ground, and therefore admitting the operations of cavalry, which formed the main strength of the Barbarian army, and with which the Greeks were very poorly provided. Here the Persians pitched their camp, by the advice of Hippias, the

of its component particles, somewhat resembling salt, is called by the Italians *Marmo salino*. These two kinds of marble were always the most valued by the Greeks; but the marble of Paros was preferred by artists, as yielding more easily to the graving tool, and, on account of the homogeneity of its parts, less apt to sparkle, and give false lights to the statue. The works of Parian marble, in the Farnesian palace at Rome, are mentioned by Winkelmann, *Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums*, l. i. c. 2.

⁵ The wines of Andros and Naxos were compared to nectar. See Athenæus, l. i.

⁶ Strabo, l. x. et Plin. l. iv. Pausanias (in Phœciæ) says, that Climenæ, the mother of Homer, was a native of the isle of Ios; and Aulus Gellius, l. iii. asserts, on the authority of Aristotle, that this island was the birth-place of Homer himself.

⁷ Amorgos was long famous for the robes made there, and distinguished by its name. Suid. ad voc. They were dyed red, with a species of lichen, which abounds in that island, and which was formerly used by the English and French in dying scarlet.

⁸ Herodot. l. vi. c. 94.

⁹ Ibid. c. 101. et seq.

¹⁰ The present deplorable state of these once fortunate islands may be seen in Tournefort, the most learned of travellers. Despotism, a double superstition, (the Grecian and Mahomedan,) pirates, banditti, and pestilence, have not yet depopulated the Cyclades, which respectively contain three, five, ten, and the largest, twenty thousand inhabitants.

³ Besides Herodotus, Plutarch, and Diodorus Siculus, this expedition is related by Lysias, Orat. Funeb. Isocrat. Panegy. Plato, Menex. Pausan. l. x. c. xx. Justin. l. ii. c. ix. Corn. Nepos, in Milt.

⁴ The marble of Paros was superior in whiteness, and the fineness of its grain, to the hard sparkling veins of mount Pentelicus in Attica; which, from the size and brilliancy

banished king of Athens,¹ whose perfect knowledge of the country, and intimate acquaintance with the affairs of Greece, rendered his opinion on all occasions respectable.

Mean while the Athenians had raised an army, and appointed ten generals, with equal power, chosen, as usual, from the ten tribes, into which the citizens were divided. Their obstinate and almost continual hostilities with the Phocians, the Thebans, and their other northern neighbours, prevented them from entertaining any hopes of assistance from that quarter: but, on the first appearance of the Persian fleet, they sent a messenger to Sparta, to acquaint the senate of that republic with the immediate danger which threatened them, and to explain how much it concerned the interest, as well as the honour of the Spartans, who had acquired just pre-eminence among the Grecian states, not to permit the destruction of the most ancient and the most splendid of the Grecian cities. The senate and assembly approved the justice of this demand, they collected their troops, and seemed ready to afford their rivals, whose danger now converted them into allies, a speedy and effectual relief. But it was only the ninth day of the month; and an ancient, unaccountable, and therefore the more respected, superstition prevented the Spartans from taking the field, before the full of the moon.² When that period should arrive, they promised to march, with the utmost expedition, to the plains of Marathon.

Mean while the Athenians had been reinforced by a thousand chosen warriors from Plataea, a small city of Boeotia, distant only nine miles from Thebes. The independant spirit of the Plataeans rendered them as desirous of preserving their freedom, as they were unable to defend it against the Theban power. But that invaluable possession, which their own weakness would have made it necessary for them to surrender, the protection of Athens enabled them to maintain, and, in return for this inestimable favour, they discovered towards their benefactors, on the present as well as on every future occasion, the sincerest proofs of gratitude and respect. The Athenian army, now ready to take the field, consisted of about ten thousand freemen, and of probably a still greater number of armed slaves. The generals might certainly have collected a larger body of troops; but they seem to have been averse to commit the safety of the state to the fortune of a single engagement; neither would it have been prudent to leave the walls of Athens, and the other fortresses of Attica, altogether naked and defenceless. It had been a matter of deliberation in the assembly, whether they ought not to stand a siege rather than venture a battle. The Athenian fortifications, indeed, had not attained that strength which they afterwards acquired, yet they might have long resisted the artless assaults of the Persians; or had the latter got possession of the walls, the long, narrow, and winding streets³ of Athens

would have enabled a small number of men to make an obstinate, and perhaps a successful defence, against a superior but less determined enemy. But all hopes from this mode of resistance were damped by the consideration, that an immense host of Persians might surround their city on every side, intercept their supplies, and instead of conquering them by assault, reduce them by famine. At the same time Miltiades, one of the ten generals, whose patriotism and love of liberty we have already had occasion to applaud, animated his countrymen with the desire of victory and glory. This experienced commander knew the Persians; he knew his fellow-citizens; and his discerning sagacity had formed a proper estimate of both.

The Athenians were few in number, but chosen men; their daily practice in the gymnastic had given them agility of limbs, dexterity of hand, and an unusual degree of vigour both of mind and body. Their constant exercise in war had inured them to hardship and fatigue, accustomed them to the useful restraints of discipline, and familiarized them to those skilful evolutions which commonly decide the fortune of the field. Their defensive as well as offensive armour was remarkably complete; and an acknowledged pre-eminence over their neighbours, had inspired them with a military enthusiasm, which on this occasion was doubly animated, in defence of their freedom and of their country. In their pertinacious struggles with each other, for whatever men hold most precious, the Greeks, and the Athenians in particular, had adopted a mode of military arrangement which cannot be too highly extolled. Drawn up in a close and firm phalanx, commonly sixteen deep, the impetuous vigour of the most robust youth held the first ranks; the last were closed by the steady courage of experienced veterans, whose resentment against cowardice seemed more terrible to their companions than the arms of an enemy. As the safety of the last ranks depended on the activity of the first, their united assaults were rendered alike furious and persevering, and hardly to be resisted by any superiority of numbers.⁴

⁴ The attention given by the Greeks to the relative disposition of the ranks, according to the respective qualities of the men who composed them, introduced certain rules in ancient tactics which would be unnecessary in the modern. To convert the rear into the front, a modern army has only to face about, because it is not very material in what order the ranks are placed. But we learn from the tactics of Arrian, that the Greeks had contrived three other ways of performing this evolution, in all of which the same front was uniformly presented to the enemy.—The first was called the *Macedonian*. In this evolution the file-leader faced to the right-about, without stirring from his place; the other men in the file passed behind him, and, after a certain number of paces, also faced about, and found themselves in their respective places.—The second was called the *Cretan*. In this the file-leader not only faced about, but paced over the depth of the phalanx. The rest followed him, and the whole found themselves in the same place as before, the ranks only reversed.—The third was called the *Lacedæmonian*, which was precisely the reverse of the first. In the Lacedæmonian evolution the first bringer-up, or last man in each file, whom the Greeks called *οὐραγός*, faced about, then halted. The file-leader faced about, and paced over twice the depth of the phalanx, the rest following him; the whole thus found themselves with the same front towards the enemy, the ranks only reversed. The difference between these three evolutions consisted in this, that the Macedonian,

¹ Thucyd. l. vi. c. lix. Herodot. ubi supra.

² Strabo, l. ix. p. 611; and Herodot. ibid.

³ Aristotle informs us, that this was the ancient mode of building in all the cities of Greece. Arist. Polit.

The Persians (for under the name of Persians are comprehended the various nations which followed the standard of Datis and Artaphernes) were not deficient in martial appearance, nor perhaps entirely destitute of valour, being selected with care from the flower of the Asiatic provinces. But, compared with the regularity of the Greek battalions, they may be regarded as a promiscuous crowd, armed in each division with the peculiar weapons of their respective countries, incapable of being harmonized by general movements, or united into any uniform system of military arrangement. Darts and arrows were their usual instruments of attack; and even the most completely armed trusted to some species of missile weapon. They carried in their left hands light targets of reed or osier, and their bodies were sometimes covered with thin plates of scaly metal; but they had not any defensive armour worthy of being compared with the firm corselets, the brazen greaves, the massy bucklers of their Athenian opponents. The bravest of the Barbarians fought on horseback; but in all ages the long Grecian spear has proved the surest defence against the attack of cavalry, insomuch that even the Romans, in fighting against the Numidian horsemen, preferred the strength of the phalanx to the activity of the legion. The inferiority of their armour and of their discipline, was not the only defect of the Persians; they wanted that ardour and emulation which, in the close and desperate engagements of ancient times, were necessary to animate the courage of a soldier. Their spirits were broken under the yoke of a double servitude, imposed by the blind superstition of the Magi, and the capricious tyranny of Darius; with them their native country was an empty name; and their minds, degraded by the mean vices of wealth and luxury, were insensible to the native charms, as well as to the immortal reward of manly virtue.

Miltiades allowed not, however, his contempt of the enemy, or his confidence in his own troops, to seduce him into a fatal security. Nothing on his part was neglected; and the only obstacle to success was fortunately removed by the disinterested moderation of his colleagues. The continual dread of tyrants had taught the jealous republicans of Greece to blend, on every occasion, their civil with their military institutions. Governed by this principle, the Athenians, as we already had occasion to observe, elected ten generals, who were invested, each in his turn, with the supreme command. This regulation was extremely unfavourable to that unity of design which ought to pervade all the successive operations of an army; an inconvenience which struck the discerning mind of Aristides, who on this occasion

displayed the first openings of his illustrious character. The day approaching when it belonged to him to assume the successive command, he generously yielded his authority to the approved valour and experience of Miltiades. The other generals followed this magnanimous example, sacrificing the dictates of private ambition to the interest and glory of their country; and the commander in chief thus enjoyed an opportunity of exerting, uncontrolled, the utmost vigour of his genius.

Lest he should be surrounded by a superior force, he chose for his camp the declivity of a hill, distant about a mile from the encampment of the enemy. The intermediate space he caused to be strewed in the night with the branches and trunks of trees, in order to interrupt the motion, and break the order of the Persian cavalry, which in consequence of this precaution seem to have been rendered incapable of acting in the engagement. In the morning his troops were drawn up in battle array, in a long and full line; the bravest of the Athenians on the right, on the left the warriors of Plataea, and in the middle the slaves,⁶ who had been admitted on this occasion to the honour of bearing arms. By weakening his centre, the least valuable part, he extended his front equal to that of the enemy: his rear was defended by the hill above mentioned, which, verging round to meet the sea, likewise covered his right; his left was flanked by a lake or marsh. Datis, although he perceived the skilful disposition of the Greeks, was yet too confident in the vast superiority of his numbers to decline the engagement, especially as he now enjoyed an opportunity of deciding the contest before the expected auxiliaries could arrive from Peloponnesus. When the Athenians saw the enemy in motion, they ran down the hill, with unusual ardour, to encounter them; a circumstance which proceeded, perhaps, from their eagerness to engage, but which must have been attended with the good consequence of shortening the time of their exposure to the slings and darts of the Barbarians.

The two armies closed; the battle was rather fierce than long. The Persian sword and Scythian hatchet penetrated, or cut down, the centre of the Athenians; but the two wings, which composed the main strength of the Grecian army, broke, routed, and put to flight the corresponding divisions of the enemy. Instead of pursuing the vanquished, they closed their extremities, and attacked the Barbarians who had penetrated their centre. The Grecian spear overcame all opposition: the bravest of the Persians perished in the field; the remainder were pursued with great slaughter; and such was their terror and surprise, that they sought for refuge, not in their camp, but in their ships. The banished tyrant of Athens fell in the engagement: two Athenian generals,

where the file-leader stood still, and the rest went behind him, had the appearance of a retreat; since the whole line receded by the depth of the phalanx from the enemy; in the Cretan, the men preserved the same ground which they had originally occupied; but the Lacedæmonian carried the whole line, by the depth of the phalanx, forward on the enemy. Among the first military changes introduced by Philip of Macedon, historians mention his having adopted the Lacedæmonian evolution, for changing the front, in preference to that formerly used by his own countrymen.

⁵ Plutarch. in Aristid. tom. ii. p. 488.

⁶ There is not any historian, indeed, who makes mention of this arrangement, although, by comparing the accounts of the havoc made in the centre, with the small number of Athenian citizens who were slain, it is evident that the slaves must have been the greatest sufferers in the action, and therefore posted, as is said in the text.

and about two hundred citizens, were found among the slain: the Persians left six thousand of their best troops on the scene of action. Probably, a still greater number were killed in the pursuit. The Greeks followed them to the shore; but the lightness of the Barbarian armour favoured their escape. Seven ships were taken; the rest sailed with a favourable gale, doubled the cape of Sunium; and, after a fruitless attempt to surprise the harbour of Athens, returned to the coast of Asia.¹

The loss and disgrace of the Persians on this memorable occasion, was compensated by only one consolation. They had been defeated in the engagement, compelled to abandon their camp, and driven ignominiously to their ships; but they carried with them to Asia the Eretrian prisoners, who, in obedience to the orders of Darius, were safely conducted to Susa. These unhappy men had every reason to dread being treated as victims of royal resentment; but when they were conducted in chains to the presence of the great king, their reception was very different from what their fears naturally led them to expect. Whether reflection suggested to Darius the pleasure which he might derive in peace, and the assistance which he might receive in war, from the arts and arms of the Eretrians, or that a ray of magnanimity for once enlightened the soul of a despot, he ordered the Greeks to be immediately released from captivity, and soon afterwards assigned them for their habitation the fertile district of Anderica, lying in the province of Cissia, in Susiana, at the distance of only forty miles from the capital. There the colony remained in the time of Herodotus, preserving their Grecian language and institutions; and after a revolution of six centuries, their descendants were visited by Apollonius Tyaneus,² the celebrated Pythagorean philosopher, and were still distinguished from the surrounding nations by the indubitable marks of European extraction.

When any disaster befell the Persian arms, the great, and once independent, powers of the empire were ever ready to revolt. The necessity of watching the first symptoms of those formidable rebellions gradually drew the troops of Darius from the coast of Lesser Asia; whose inhabitants, delivered from the oppression of foreign mercenaries, resumed their wonted spirit and activity; and except in paying, conjunctly with several neighbouring provinces, an annual contribution of about a hundred thousand pounds, the Asiatic Greeks were scarcely subjected to any proof of dependence. Disputes concerning the succession to the universal empire of the east, the revolt of Egypt, and the death of Darius, retarded for ten years the resolution formed by that prince, and adopted by his son and successor Xerxes, of restoring the lustre of the Persian arms, not only by taking vengeance on the pertinacious obstinacy of the Athenians, but by effecting the complete conquest of Europe.³ We shall have occasion fully to describe the immense preparations which were made for this purpose; but it is

necessary first to examine the transactions of the Greeks, during the important interval between the battle of Marathon and the expedition of Xerxes; and to explain the principal circumstances which enabled a country, neither wealthy nor populous, to resist the most formidable invasion recorded in history.

The joy excited among the Athenians by a victory, which not only delivered them from the dread of their enemies, but raised them to distinguished pre-eminence among their rivals and allies, is evident from a remarkable incident which happened immediately after the battle. As soon as fortune had visibly declared in their favour, a soldier was dispatched from the army to convey the welcome news to the capital. He ran with incredible velocity, and appeared, covered with dust and blood, in the presence of the senators. Excess of fatigue conspired with the transports of enthusiasm to exhaust the vigour of his frame. He had only time to exclaim, in two words, *Rejoice with the victors*,⁴ and immediately expired.

It is probable that the same spirit which animated this nameless patriot, was speedily diffused through the whole community; and the Athenian institutions were well calculated to keep alive the generous ardour which success had inspired. Part of the spoil was gratefully dedicated to the gods; the remainder was appropriated as the just reward of merit. The obsequies of the dead were celebrated with solemn pomp; and according to an ancient and sacred custom, their fame was commemorated by annual returns of festive magnificence.⁵ The honours bestowed on those who had fallen in the field, reflected additional lustre on their companions who survived the victory. In extensive kingdoms, the praise of successful valour is weakened by diffusion; and such too is the inequality between the dignity of the general and the meanness of the soldier, that the latter can seldom hope to attain, however well he may deserve, his just proportion of military fame.⁶ But the Grecian republics were small; a perpetual rivalry subsisted among them; and when any particular state eclipsed the glory of its neighbours, the superiority was sensibly felt by every member of the commonwealth.

That pre-eminence, which by the battle of Marathon, Athens acquired in Greece, Miltiades, by his peculiar merit in that battle, attained in Athens. His valour and conduct were celebrated by the artless praises of the vulgar, as well as by the more elaborate encomiums of the learned. Before the era of this celebrated engagement, tragedy, the unrivalled distinction of Athenian literature, had been invented and cultivated by the successful labours of Thespis, Phrynicus, and Æschylus. The last, who is justly regarded as the great improver of the Grecian drama, displayed in the battle of Marathon the same martial ardour which still breathes in his poetry. We may

⁴ Χαιρέτε νικησάντων.

⁵ Diodor. Sic. l. xi. Herodot. ubi supra.

⁶ Plutarch. in Cimon. p. 187. et Æschin. advers. Ctesiphont. p. 301. furnish us with examples of the jealousy of the Greeks, lest the fame due to their troops in general, should be engrossed by the commanders.

¹ Herodot. l. vi. c. cxi. et seq.

² Philostrat. in Vit. Apollon.

³ Herodot. l. vii. c. l. et. ii

reasonably imagine that he would employ the highest flights of his fancy in extolling the glory of exploits in which he had himself borne so distinguished a part; and particularly that he would exert all the powers of his lofty genius in celebrating the hero and patriot, whose enthusiasm had animated the battle, and whose superior talents had insured the victory. The name of the conqueror at Marathon re-echoed through the spacious theatres of Athens, which, though they had not yet acquired that solid and durable composition still discernible in the ruins of ancient grandeur, were already built in a form sufficiently capacious to contain the largest proportion of the citizens. The magnificent encomiums bestowed on Miltiades in the presence of his assembled countrymen, by whose consenting voice they were repeated and approved, fired with emulation the young candidates for fame, while they enabled the general to obtain that mark of public confidence and esteem which was the utmost ambition of all the Grecian leaders.

These leaders, while they remained within the territories of their respective states, were entrusted (as we already had occasion to observe) with only that moderate authority which suited the equal condition of freedom. But when they were appointed to the command of the fleet in foreign parts, they obtained almost unlimited power, and might acquire immense riches. To this exalted station Miltiades was advanced by the general suffrage of his country; and having sailed with a fleet of seventy gallees, the whole naval strength of the republic, he determined to expel the Persian garrisons from the isles of the *Ægean*; to reduce the smaller communities to the obedience of Athens, and to subject the more wealthy and powerful to heavy contributions.

The first operations of the Athenian armament were crowned with success: several islands were subdued, considerable sums of money were collected. But the fleet arriving before Paros, every thing proved adverse to the Athenians. Miltiades, who had received a personal injury from Tisagoras, a man of great authority in that island, yielded to the dictates of private resentment, and confounding the innocent with the guilty, demanded from the Parians the sum of a hundred talents (near twenty thousand pounds sterling.) If the money were not immediately paid, he threatened to lay waste their territory, to burn their city, and to teach them by cruel experience the stern rights of a conqueror. The exorbitancy of the demand rendered compliance with it impossible; the Parians prepared for their defence, guided however by the motives of a generous despair, rather than by any well-grounded hope of resisting the invaders. For twenty-six days they maintained possession of the capital of the island, which the Athenians, after ravaging all the adjacent country, besieged by sea and land. The time now approached when Paros must have surrendered to a superior force; but it was the good fortune of the islanders that an extensive grove, which happened to be set on fire in one of the Sporades, was believed by the besiegers to indicate the approach of a Per-

sian fleet. The same opinion gained ground among the Parians, who determined, by their utmost efforts, to preserve the place, until they should be relieved by the assistance of their protectors. Miltiades had received a dangerous wound during the siege; and the weakness of his body impairing the faculties of his mind, and rendering him too sensible to the impressions of fear, he gave orders to draw off his victorious troops, and returned with the whole fleet to Athens.

His conduct in the present expedition ill corresponded to his former fame; and he soon experienced the instability of popular favour. The Athenian citizens, and particularly the more eminent and illustrious, had universally their rivals and enemies. The competitions for civil offices, or military command, occasioned eternal animosities among those jealous republicans. Xantippus, a person of great distinction, and father of the celebrated Pericles, who in the succeeding age obtained the first rank in the Athenian government, eagerly seized an opportunity of depressing the character of a man which had so long overtopped that of every competitor. Miltiades was accused of being corrupted by a Persian bribe to raise the siege of Paros; the precipitancy with which he abandoned the place, so unlike to the general firmness of his manly behaviour, gave a probable colour to the accusation; and the continual terror which, ever since the usurpation of Pisistratus, the Athenians entertained of arbitrary power, disposed them to condemn, upon very slight evidence, a man whose abilities and renown seemed to endanger the safety of the commonwealth. The crime laid to his charge inferred death, a punishment which his accuser insisted ought to be immediately inflicted on him. But his judges were contented with fining him the sum of fifty talents, (near ten thousand pounds sterling,) which being unable to pay, he was thrown into prison, where he soon after died of his wounds.

But the glory of Miltiades survived him; and the Athenians, however unjust to his person, were not unmindful of his fame. At the distance of half a century, when the battle of Marathon was painted by order of the state, they directed the figure of Miltiades to be placed in the fore-ground, animating the troops to victory: a reward which, during the virtuous simplicity of the ancient commonwealth, conferred more real honour, than all that magnificent profusion of crowns and statues,⁷ which in the later times of the republic were rather extorted by general fear, than bestowed by public admiration.

The jealousies, resentments, dangers, and calamities, which often attend power and pre-eminence, have never yet proved sufficient to deter an ambitious mind from the pursuit of greatness. The rivals of Miltiades were animated by the glory of his elevation, not depressed by the example of his fall. His accuser Xantippus, though he had acted the principal part in removing this favourite of the people, was not deemed worthy to succeed him. Two

candidates appeared for the public confidence and esteem, who alternately outstripped each other in the race of ambition, and whose characters deserve attention even in general history, as they had a powerful influence on the fortune, not of Athens only, but of all Greece.

Aristides and Themistocles were nearly of the same age, and equally noble, being born in the first rank of citizens, though not of royal descent, like Solon and Pisistratus, Isagoras and Clisthenes, Xantippus and Miltiades, who had hitherto successively assumed the chief administration of the Athenian republic. Both had been named among the generals who commanded in the battle of Marathon. The disinterested behaviour of Aristides on this memorable occasion has been already mentioned. It afforded a promise of his future fame. But his dawning glories were still eclipsed by the meridian lustre of Miltiades. After the death of this great man, Aristides ought naturally to have succeeded to his influence, as he was eminently distinguished by valour and moderation, the two great virtues of a republican. Formed in such schools of moral and political knowledge as then flourished in Athens, he had learned to prefer glory to pleasure; the interests of his country to his own personal glory; and the dictates of justice and humanity, even to the interests of his country. His ambition was rather to deserve, than to acquire, the admiration of his fellow citizens; and while he enjoyed the inward satisfaction, he was little anxious about the external rewards of virtue. The character of Themistocles was of a more doubtful kind. The trophy, which Miltiades had raised at Marathon, disturbed his rest. He was inflamed with a desire to emulate the glory of this exploit; and while he enabled Athens to maintain a superiority in Greece, he was ambitious to acquire for himself a superiority in Athens. His talents were well adapted to accomplish both these purposes; eloquent, active, enterprising, he had strengthened his natural endowments by all the force of education and habit. Laws, government, revenue, and arms, every branch of political and military knowledge, were the great objects of his study. In the courts of justice he successfully displayed his abilities in defence of his private friends, or in accusing the enemies of the state. He was forward to give his opinion upon every matter of public deliberation; and his advice, founded in wisdom, and supported by eloquence, commonly prevailed in the assembly. Yet with all these great qualities, his mind was less smitten with the native charms of virtue, than captivated with her splendid ornaments. Glory was the idol which he adored. He could injure, without remorse, the general cause of the confederacy, in order to promote the grandeur of Athens;¹ and history still leaves it as doubtful, as did his own conduct, whether, had an opportunity offered, he would not have sacrificed the happiness of his country to his private interest and ambition.

The discernment of Aristides perceived the danger of allowing a man of such equivocal

merit to be entrusted with the sole government of the republic; and on this account, rather than from any motives of personal animosity, he opposed every measure that might contribute to his elevation. In this patriotic view, he frequently solicited the same honours which were ambitiously courted by Themistocles, especially when no other candidate appeared capable of balancing the credit of the latter. A rivalry thus began, and long continued between them;² and the whole people of Athens could alone decide the much contested pre-eminence. The interest of Themistocles so far prevailed over the authority of his opponent, that he procured his own nomination to the command of the fleet; with which he effected the conquest of the small islands in the Ægean, and thus completed the design undertaken by Miltiades. While he acquired fame and fortune abroad, Aristides increased his popularity at home. The opposition to his power, arising from the splendid eloquence and popular manners of his rival, was now fortunately removed, and he became the chief leader of the people. His opinion gave law to the courts of justice, or rather such was the effect of his equity and discernment, he alone became sovereign umpire in Athens. In all important differences he was chosen arbitrator, and the ordinary judges were deprived of the dignity and advantages formerly resulting from their office. This consequence of his authority, offending the pride of the Athenian magistrates, was sufficient to excite their resentment, which, of itself, might have effected the ruin of any individual.

But their views on this occasion were powerfully promoted by the triumphal return of Themistocles from his naval expedition. The admiral had acquired considerable riches; but wealth he despised, except as an instrument of ambition. The spoils of the conquered islanders were profusely lavished in shows, festivals, dances, and theatrical entertainments, exhibited for the public amusement. His generous manners and flowing affability were contrasted with the stern dignity of his rival; and the result of the comparison added great force to his insinuation, that, since his own necessary absence in the service of the republic, Aristides had acquired a degree of influence inconsistent with the constitution; and, by arrogating to himself a universal and unexampled jurisdiction in the state, had established a silent tyranny, without pomp or guards, over the minds of his fellow citizens. Aristides, trusting to the innocence and integrity of his own heart, disdained to employ any unworthy means, either for gaining the favour, or for averting the resentment, of the multitude. The contest, therefore, ended in his banishment for ten years, by a law entitled the Ostracism (from the name of the materials³ on which the votes were marked,) by which the majority of the Athenian assembly might expel any citizen, however inoffensive or meritorious had been

¹ Plutarch. in Themistocle et Aristide.

² Plutarch. *ibid.* Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxix.

³ Οστρακισμὸς, a shell.

his past conduct, who, by his present power and greatness, seemed capable of disturbing the equality of republican government. This singular institution, which had been established soon after the Athenians had delivered themselves from the tyranny of Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, was evidently intended to prevent any person in future from attaining the same unlawful authority. At Athens, even virtue was proscribed, when it seemed to endanger the public freedom; and only four years after the battle of Marathon, in which he had displayed equal valour and wisdom, Aristides, the justest and most respectable of the Greeks, became the victim of popular jealousy;⁴ an example of cruel rigour, which will for ever brand the spirit of democratical policy.

The banishment of Aristides exposed the Athenians still more than formerly to the danger which they hoped to avoid by this severe measure. The removal of such a formidable opponent enabled Themistocles to govern without control. Army, navy, and revenue, all were submitted to his inspection. It happened, indeed, most fortunately for the fame of this great man, as well as for the liberty of Athens, that his active ambition was called to the glorious task of subduing the enemies of his country. The smaller islands in the Ægean were already reduced to obedience, but the possession of them was uncertain while the fleet of Ægina covered the sea, and bid defiance to that of the Athenians. This small island, or rather this rock, inhabited time immemorial by merchants and pirates, and situate in the Saronic gulf, which divides the territories of Attica from the northern shores of Peloponnesus, was a formidable enemy to the republic; the jealousy of commerce and naval power embittered their mutual hostility; and as the inhabitants of Ægina, who were governed by a few leading men, had entered into an alliance with the Persians, there was every circumstance united which could provoke, to the utmost, the hatred and resentment of the Athenians.

A motive less powerful than the excess of republican antipathy, could not probably have prevailed on them to embrace the measure which they now adopted by the advice of Themistocles. There was a considerable revenue arising from the silver mines of Mount Laurium, which had been hitherto employed in relieving the private wants of the citizens, or dissipated in their public amusements. This annual income Themistocles persuaded them to destine to the useful purpose of building ships of war, by which they might seize or destroy the fleet of Ægina. The proposal was approved; a hundred galleys were equipped; the naval strength of Ægina was broken, and success animated the Athenians to aspire at obtaining the unrivalled empire of the sea. Corcyra formed the only remaining obstacle to their ambition. This island which, under the name of Phœacia, is celebrated by Homer for its amazing riches and fertility, had been still further improved by a colony of Corinthians. It extends a hundred miles along the western

shores of Epirus; and the natural abundance of its productions, the convenience of its harbours, and the adventurous spirit of its new inhabitants, gave them an undisputed advantage over their neighbours, in navigation and commerce. They became successively the rivals, the enemies, and the superiors of Corinth, their mother country; and their successful cruisers infested the coasts, and disturbed the communication of the islands and continent of Greece. It belonged to Athens, who had so lately punished the perfidy of Ægina, to chastise the insolence of the Corcyreans. The naval depredations of these islanders made them be regarded as common enemies; and Themistocles,⁵ when, by seizing part of their fleet, he broke the sinews of their power, not only gratified the ambition of his republic, but performed a signal service to the whole Grecian confederacy.

Victorious by sea and land against Greeks and Barbarians, Athens might now seem entitled to enjoy the fruits of a glorious security. It was generally believed in Greece, that the late disaster of the Persians would deter them from invading, a second time, the coasts of Europe. But Themistocles, who, in the words of a most accomplished historian,⁶ was no less sagacious in foreseeing the future, than skilful in managing the present, regarded the battle of Marathon, not as the end of the war, but as the prelude to new and more glorious combats. He continually exhorted his fellow citizens to keep themselves in readiness for action; above all, to increase, with unremitting assiduity, the strength of their fleet; and, in consequence of this judicious advice, the Athenians were enabled to oppose the immense armaments of Xerxes, of which the most formidable tidings soon arrived from every quarter, with two hundred galleys, of a superior size and construction to any hitherto known in Greece.⁷

This fleet proved the safety of Greece, and prevented a country, from which the knowledge of laws, learning, and civility, was destined to flow over Europe, from becoming a province of the Persian empire, and being confounded with the mass of barbarous nations. While the Athenians were led, by the circumstances which we have endeavoured to explain, to prepare this useful engine of defence, the other Grecian states afford, in their unimportant transactions, few materials for history.⁸ The Spartans had long preserved an unrivalled ascendant in Peloponnesus; and their pre-eminence was still farther confirmed by the unequal and unfortunate opposition of the Argives. Many bloody and desperate engagements had been fought between these warlike and high-spirited rivals: but, before the Persian invasion, the strength of Argos was much exhausted by repeated defeats, particularly by the destructive battle of Thyrea, in which she lost six thousand of her bravest citizens. The Spartans also carried on occasional hostilities

⁵ Plutarch in Themist. Thucyd. lib. i. Corn. Nepos. in Themist.

⁶ Thucydides, *ibid.*

⁷ Plato, l. iii. de Leg.

⁸ Herod. l. vii. Diodor. l. xi.

⁴ Plutarch et Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxix.

against the Corinthians and Achæans, the inhabitants of Elis and Arcadia; and these several republics frequently decided their pretensions in the field; but neither their contests with each other, nor their wars with Sparta, were attended with any considerable or permanent effects. Their perpetual hostilities with foreign states ought to have given internal quiet to the Spartans; yet the jealousy of power, or the opposition of character, occasioned incurable dissension between the two first magistrates of the republic, Cleomenes and Demaratus. By the intrigues of the former, his rival was unjustly deposed from the royal dignity. Leotychides, his kinsman and successor in the throne, insulted his misfortunes; and Demaratus, unable to endure contempt in a country where he had enjoyed a crown, sought for that protection which was denied him in Greece, from the power and resentment of Persia. Cleomenes soon afterwards died by his own hand, after vainly struggling against the stings of remorse, which persecuted his ungenerous treatment of a worthy colleague.¹ He was succeeded by the heroic Leonidas, whose death (as shall be related) at Thermopylæ, was still more illustrious and happy than that of Cleomenes was wretched and infamous. During the domestic disturbances of Sparta, the other states of Peloponnesus enjoyed a relaxation from the toils of war. The Arcadians and Argives tended their flocks, and cultivated their soil. Elis was contented with the superintendence of the Olympic games: the Corinthians increased and abused the wealth which they had already acquired by their fortunate situation between two seas, and by long continuing the centre of the internal commerce of Greece. Of the republics beyond the isthmus, the Phocians wished to enjoy, in tranquillity, the splendour and riches which their whole territory derived from the celebrated temple of Delphi. They were frequently disturbed, however, by invasions from Thessaly; the inhabitants of which, though numerous and warlike, yet being situated at the extremity of Greece, still continued, like the Etolians, barbarous and uncultivated.² The Thebans maintained and extended their usurpations over the smaller cities of Bœotia, and rejoiced that the ambition of the Athenians, directed to the command of the sea, and the conquest of distant islands, prevented that aspiring people from giving the same minute attention as usual to the affairs of the continent. The other republics were inconsiderable, and commonly followed the fortunes of their more powerful neighbours. The Asiatic colonies were reduced under the Persian yoke; the Greek establishments in Thrace and Macedon paid tribute to Xerxes; but the African Greeks bravely maintained their independence; and the flourishing settlements in Italy and Sicily were now acting a part which will be explained hereafter, and which rivalled, perhaps surpassed, the glory of Athens and Sparta in the Persian war.³

¹ Herodot. v. 73.

² Thucyd. i. i.

³ Diodor. l. xi. c. xvi. et xvii.

Olymp.
 lxxiv. 4.
 A. C. 481.

Meanwhile the reduction of revolted provinces had given employment and lustre to the Persian arms. Nine years after the battle of Marathon, and in the fourth year of his reign, Xerxes found himself uncontrolled master of the East, and in possession of such a fleet and army as flattered him with the hopes of universal empire. The three last years of Darius were spent in preparing for the Grecian expedition. Xerxes, who succeeded to his sceptre and to his revenge, dedicated four years more to the same hostile purpose. Amidst his various wars and pleasures, he took care that the artisans of Egypt and Phœnicia, as well as of all the maritime provinces of Lower Asia, should labour, with unremitting diligence, in fitting out an armament adequate to the extent of his ambition. Twelve hundred ships of war, and three thousand ships of burden, were at length ready to receive his commands. The former were of a larger size and firmer construction than any hitherto seen in the ancient world: they carried on board, at a medium, two hundred seamen, and thirty Persians who served as marines. The ships of burden contained, in general, eighty men, fewer being found incapable of rowing them. The whole amounted to four thousand two hundred ships, and about five hundred thousand men, who were ordered to rendezvous in the most secure roads and harbours of Ionia. We are not exactly informed of the number of the land forces, which were assembled at Susa. It is certain, however, that they were extremely numerous, and it is probable that they would continually increase on the march from Susa to Sardis, by the confluence of many tributary nations, to the imperial standard of Xerxes.

When the army had attained its perfect complement, we are told that it consisted of seventeen hundred thousand infantry, and four hundred thousand cavalry; which, joined to the fleet above mentioned, made the whole forces amount to near two millions of fighting men. An immense crowd of women and eunuchs followed the camp of an effeminate people. These instruments of pleasure and luxury, together with the slaves necessary in transporting the baggage and provisions, equalled, perhaps exceeded,⁴ the number of soldiers; so that, according to the universal testimony of ancient historians, the army of Xerxes appears the greatest that was ever collected.⁵

But many circumstances serve to prove that its strength by no means corresponded to its magnitude. The various nations which composed it, were not divided into regular bodies,

⁴ A military friend has favoured me with the actual return of an army serving under British officers in the East:
 Officers and troops, 6,727
 Servants and followers, 19,779

⁵ Herodot. l. vii. c. lxxxix. et seq. enters into a circumstantial detail of the Persian forces. His account is confirmed, with less difference than usual in such cases, by Lysias Orat. Funeb. Isocrat. Panegyri. Diodor. l. xi. p. 244. He repeatedly expresses his astonishment at the immensity of the Barbarian hosts. He appears fully sensible of the difficulties with which they had to struggle, in order to procure provisions. His account of the Grecian fleet and army is acknowledged to be faithful and exact in the highest degree; circumstances which all strongly confirm the credibility of his evidence.

properly disciplined and officered. Their muster-roll was taken in a manner that is remarkable for its simplicity. Ten thousand men were separated from the rest, formed into a compact body, and surrounded by a palisade. The whole army passed successively into this inclosure, and were thus numbered, like cattle, without the formality of placing them in ranks, or of calling their names.

Xerxes, having wintered at Sardis, sent ambassadors early in the spring to demand earth and water, as a mark of submission, from the

several Grecian republics. With regard to Athens and Sparta, he
Olymp. lxxv. l. thought it unnecessary to observe
A. C. 480. this ceremony, as they had treated,

with the most inhuman cruelty, and in direct contradiction to their own laws of war, the messengers intrusted with a similar commission by his father Darius. The slow march of his immense army, and, still more, its tedious transportation across the seas which separate Europe and Asia, ill suited the rapid violence of his revenge. Xerxes therefore ordered a bridge of boats to be raised on the Hellespont, which, in the narrowest part, is only seven stadia, or seven eighths of a mile in breadth. Here the bridge was formed with great labour; but whether owing to the awkwardness of its construction, or to the violence of a succeeding tempest, it was no sooner built than destroyed. The great king ordered the directors of the work to be beheaded; and, proud of his tyrannic power over feeble man, displayed an impatient rage against the elements. In all the madness of despotism, he commanded the Hellespont to be punished with three hundred stripes, and a pair of fetters to be dropped into the sea, adding these frantic and ridiculous expressions: "It is thus, thou salt and bitter water, that thy master punishes thy unprovoked injury, and he is determined to pass thy treacherous streams notwithstanding all the insolence of thy malice."⁶ After this absurd ceremony, a new bridge was made of a double range of vessels, fixed by strong anchors on both sides, and joined together by cables of hemp and reed, fastened to immense beams driven into the opposite shores. The decks of the vessels, which exceeded six hundred in number, were strewed with trunks of trees and earth, and their surface was still further smoothed by a covering of planks. The sides were then railed with wicker work, to prevent the fear and impatience of the horses; and upon this singular edifice the main strength of the army passed in seven days and nights, from the Asiatic city of Abydos to that of Sestus in Europe.⁷

But before this general transportation, a considerable part of the forces had been already sent to the coast of Macedonia, in order to dig across the isthmus which joins to that coast the high promontory of Athos. The disaster which befell the fleet commanded by Mardonius, in doubling the cape of this celebrated peninsula, was still present to the mind of Xerxes. The neck of land, only a mile and a half in breadth, was adorned by the Grecian city of Sana; and

the promontory being rich and fertile, was well inhabited by both Greeks and Barbarians. The cutting of this narrow isthmus, by a canal of sufficient width to allow two galleys to sail abreast, was a matter not beyond the power of a potentate who commanded the labour of so many myriads;⁸ but it is observed by Herodotus, to have been a work of more ostentation than utility, as the vessels might, according to the custom of the age, have been conveyed over land with greater expedition, and with less trouble and expense. The eastern workmen were in general so extremely unacquainted with operations of this kind, that they made the opening at the surface of the ground of the same breadth with that necessary at the bottom of the channel. In order to excite their diligence by national emulation, a particular portion of the ground was assigned to each distinction of people engaged in this undertaking. The Phœnicians alone, by giving a proper width at the top, avoided the inconvenience of submitting to a double labour. In performing this, and every other task, the soldiers of Xerxes were kept to their work by stripes and blows; a circumstance which gives us as mean an opinion of their spirit and activity, as all that has been already related, gives us of their skill and discipline.

The Persian forces were now safely conducted into Europe; and the chief obstacle to the easy navigation of their fleet along the coasts of Thrace, Macedon, and Thessaly, to the centre of the Grecian states, was removed by the dividing of mount Athos. Through the fertile plains of Lesser Asia the whole army had kept in a body; but the difficulty of supplies obliged them to separate into three divisions in their march through the less cultivated countries of Europe. Before this separation took place, the whole fleet and army were reviewed by Xerxes, near Doriscus, a city of Thrace, at the mouth of the river Hebrus. Such an immense collection of men assembled in arms, and attended with every circumstance of material magnificence, gave an opportunity for seeing, or at least for supposing, many affecting scenes. The ambition of the great king had torn him from his palace of Susa, but it could not tear him from the objects of his affection, and the ministers of his pleasure. He was followed by his women, and by his flatterers,⁹ and all the ef-

⁸ Herodot. l. vii. c. xxi. et seq. et Diodor. l. xi. c. ii. It is difficult to say, whether we ought most to condemn the swelling exaggeration with which Lysias, Isocrates, and other writers, speak of these operations of Xerxes, which they call, "navigating the land, and walking the sea," or the impudent incredulity of Juvenal:

— creditur olim
Velliscatus Athos, et quidquid Græcia mendax,
Audet in historia; constratum classibus iisdem
Suppositumque rotis solidum mare.—

Nothing is better fitted to perpetuate error than the smart sentence of a satirist. A line of the same Juvenal has branded Cicero as a bad poet, though that universal literary genius left admirable verses behind him, which have been transmitted to modern times. The digging of the canal of Athos is supported by the uniform testimony of all antiquity, and might be credited on the single evidence of Thucydides (l. iv. c. cix.) the most faithful, accurate, and impartial of all historians, ancient or modern; and who himself lived long in the neighbourhood of Athos, where he had an estate, and was director of the Athenian mines in Thrace; as will appear hereafter.

⁹ Plato de Legibus, l. iii. p. 536.

feminate pride of a court was blended with the pomp of war. While the great body of the army lay every night in the open air, Xerxes and his attendants were provided with magnificent tents. The splendour of his chariots, the mettle of his horses, which far excelled the swiftest racers of Thessaly, the unexampled number of his troops, and above all, the bravery of the immortal band, a body of ten thousand Persian cavalry, so named because their number was constantly maintained from the flower of the whole army, seemed sufficient, to the admiring crowd, to raise the glory of their sovereign above the condition of humanity; especially since, among so many thousands of men as passed in review, none could be compared to Xerxes in strength, in beauty, or in stature.¹

But amidst this splendour of external greatness, Xerxes felt himself unhappy. Having ascended an eminence to view his camp and fleet, his pride was humbled with the reflection, that no one of all the innumerable host could survive a hundred years. The haughty monarch of Asia was melted into tears. The conversation of his kinsman and counsellor, Artabanus, was ill calculated to console his melancholy. That respectable old man, whose wisdom had often moderated the youthful ardour of Xerxes, and who had been as assiduous to prevent, as Mardonius had been to promote, the Grecian war, took notice that the misery of human life was an object far more lamentable than its shortness. "In the narrow space allotted them, has not every one of these in our presence, and indeed the whole human race, often wished rather to die than to live? The tumult of passions disturbs the best of our days; diseases and weakness accompany old age; and death so vainly dreaded, is the sure and hospitable refuge of wretched mortals."

Xerxes was not of a disposition steadily to contemplate the dictates of experience and the maxims of philosophy. He endeavoured to divert those gloomy reflections which he could not remove, by amusing his fancy with horse-races, mock-battles, and other favourite entertainments. In the intervals of these diversions, he sometimes conversed with Demaratus, the banished king of Sparta, who, as we have already mentioned, had sought refuge in the Persian court, from the persecution of his countrymen. A memorable interview between them is described by Herodotus. The Persian, displaying ostentatiously the magnitude of his power, asked the royal fugitive, whether he suspected the Greeks would yet venture to take the field, in order to oppose the progress of his arms? Demaratus replied, that if he might speak without giving offence, he was of opinion that the Persians would meet with a very vigorous resistance. "Greece had been trained in the severe, but useful school of necessity; poverty was her nurse and her mother; she had acquired patience and valour by the early application of discipline; and she was habituated to the practice of virtue by the watchful attention of the law. All the Greeks

were warlike, but the Spartans were peculiarly brave. It was unnecessary to ask their number, for if they exceeded not a thousand men, they would defend their country and their freedom against the assembled myriads of Asia."²

Xerxes was rather amused than instructed by this discourse. His hopes of success seemed built on too solid principles to be shaken by the opinion of a prejudiced Greek. Every day messengers arrived with the submission of new nations. The inhabitants of the rocky country of Doris, many tribes of Thessaly, the mountaineers of Pindus, Ossa, Pelion, and Olympus, which like a lofty rampart surround that country, offered the usual present of earth and water, as the symbol of surrendering their territories to a power which it seemed vain to resist. These districts formed only the northern frontier of Greece. But what gave peculiar pleasure to Xerxes, the Thebans who inhabited the central parts, and all the cities of Bœotia, except Thespis and Plataea, privately sent ambassadors to testify their good-will to his cause, and to request the honour of his friendship.

Mean while those Grecians, who, unmoved by the terrors of invasion, obeyed the voice of liberty and their country, had sent deputies to the isthmus of Corinth, to deliberate about the common interest. They consisted of representatives from the several states of Peloponnesus, and from the most considerable republics beyond that peninsula. By common consent, they suspended their domestic animosities, recalled their fugitives, consulted their oracles, and despatched ambassadors, in the name of united Greece, to demand assistance from the islands of Crete, Cyprus, and Corcyra, as well as from the Grecian colonies on the coasts of Italy and Sicily. All their measures were carried on with great appearance of unanimity and concord. Even the Thebans, careful to conceal their treachery, had sent representatives to the common council. The general danger seemed to unite and harmonize the most discordant members; and although the perpetual dissensions between rival states frequently weakened the authority of the Amphyctyonic confederacy, it appeared on the present, as on many other occasions, that the Greeks acknowledged the obligation of a tacit alliance to defend each other against domestic tyrants and foreign barbarians.

Before they had an opportunity of learning the will of the gods, or of discovering the intentions of their distant allies, ambassadors arrived from those communities of Thessaly which still adhered to the interest of Greece, praying a speedy and effectual assistance to guard the narrow passes which lead into their country. There is a valley near the coast of the Egean, between the lofty mountains of Ossa and Olympus, which afforded the most convenient passage from Macedon into Thessaly. This singular spot, commonly called the valley of Tempé, is about five miles in length, and, where narrowest, scarcely a hundred paces in breadth; but is adorned by the hand of nature with every object that can gratify the senses or

¹ Herodot. l. vii. c. clxxiv.

² Herodot. l. vii. c. cii. et seq.

delight the fancy. The gently-flowing Peneus³ intersects the middle of the plain. Its waters are increased by perennial cascades from the green mountains, and thus rendered of sufficient depth for vessels of considerable burden. The rocks are every where planted with vines and olives, and the banks of the river, and even the river itself, are overshadowed with lofty forest trees, which defend those who sail upon it from the sun's meridian ardour. The innumerable grottos and harbours carelessly scattered over this delightful scene, and watered by fountains of peculiar freshness and salubrity, invite the weary traveller to repose; while the musical warbling of birds conspires with the fragrant odour of plants to soothe his senses, and to heighten the pleasure which the eye and fancy derive from viewing the charming variety of this enchanting landscape; from examining the happy intermixture of hill and dale, wood and water; and from contemplating the diversified beauty and majestic grandeur of Nature under her most blooming and beneficent aspects.

This delicious valley, which an ancient writer, by a bold figure of speech, calls "a festival for the eyes," and which the bounty of the gods had formed for happy scenes of love, innocence, and tranquillity, the destructive ambition of man was ready to convert into a field of bloodshed and horror. It was natural for the Thessalians to expect that the troops of Xerxes would pass by this inlet into their territories; and hither their ambassadors entreated the allied Greeks to send an army. The proposal seemed just and useful; ships were prepared at the Isthmus; and a body of ten thousand men were embarked under the command of Themistocles, with orders to sail through the narrow Euripus, to land in the harbours of Tempé, and to remain there in order to guard that important pass.

They had not continued in those parts many days, when a messenger arrived from Alexander, son of Amyntas, tributary prince of Macedonia, advising them to depart from that post, unless they meant to be trodden under foot by the Persian cavalry. It is not probable, however, that this menace could have changed their resolution. But they had already learned that there was another passage into Thessaly, through the territory of the Peræbians, near the city Gonnus in Upper Macedonia. Their army was insufficient to guard both; and the defending of one only, could not be of essential advantage to themselves, to the Thessalians, or to the common cause.

Mean time, the dangers which thickened over their respective republics, rendered it necessary to return southward. Their distant colonies, particularly those of Sicily, which were the most numerous and powerful, could not afford them any assistance, being themselves threat-

ened with a formidable invasion from the Carthaginians, the cause and consequences of which we shall have occasion fully to explain. The oracles were doubtful, or terrifying. To the Spartans they announced, as the only means of safety, the voluntary death of a king of the race of Hercules. The Athenians were commanded to seek refuge within their wooden walls. The responses given to the other states are not particularly recorded; but it appears in general, that all were dark, ambiguous, or frightful. The Grecian army returned therefore to their ships, repassed the Euripus, and arrived in safety at Corinth; while the Thessalians, thus abandoned by their allies, reluctantly submitted to the common enemy.

The terror inspired by the critical situation of affairs, rendered the presence of the leaders necessary in their respective communities. Themistocles found the Athenians divided about the meaning of the oracle, the greater part asserting, that by wooden walls was understood the inclosure of the citadel, which had been formerly surrounded by a palisade. Others gave the words a different construction, and each according to his fears or his interest; but Themistocles asserted that all of them had mistaken the advice of the god, who desired them to trust for safety to their fleet. This opinion, supported by all the force of his eloquence, and the weight of his authority, at length prevailed in the assembly, although Epicides, a demagogue of great influence among the lower ranks of people, opposed it with the utmost vehemence; and seizing this opportunity to traduce the character of Themistocles, insisted that he himself should be appointed general in his room. But the prudent Athenian knew the weakness of his adversary; his great passion was avarice; and a seasonable bribe immediately silenced his clamorous opposition. The Athenian galleys were fitted out with all convenient speed, and being joined with those of Eubœa, Ægina, Corinth, and the maritime allies of Peloponnesus, amounted to a fleet of three hundred sail. They proceeded to the narrow sea which divides the northern shore of Eubœa from the coast of Thessaly, rendezvoused at the promontory of Artemisium, and patiently expected the arrival of the Barbarians.

Besides the force necessary for manning this fleet, the confederates could raise an army of about sixty thousand freemen, besides a still greater proportion of armed slaves. As the passes leading from Thessaly to the territories of Phocis and Locris were still narrower and more difficult of access than those from Macedonia into Thessaly, it seems extraordinary that they did not immediately direct their whole military strength towards that quarter: but this neglect may be explained by their superstitious veneration for oracles, the necessity of celebrating their accustomed festivals, and the dangerous delays and inactivity inherent in the nature of a republican confederacy. As they were acquainted with only one pass, by which the Persians could arrive from Thessaly, they thought that a body of eight thousand pikemen might be equally capable with a larger

³ I know not why Ovid says,

Peneus ab imo

Effusus Pindo spumæis volvitur undis.

Metam. l. i. ver. 570.

Ælian (from whom the description in the text is taken) says, that the Peneus flows

Δίκην ἐλαίου, smooth as oil.

proportion of troops, to defend it against every invader. This narrow defile was called the Straits of Thermopylæ, in allusion to the warm springs in that neighbourhood, and was deemed the gate or entrance into Greece. It was bounded on the west by high and inaccessible precipices, which join the lofty ridge of mount Cæta; and on the east terminated by an impracticable morass, bordered by the sea. Near the plain of the Thessalian city Trachis, the passage was fifty feet broad; but at Alpené, there was not room for one chariot to pass another. Even these passes were defended by walls, formerly built by the Phocians to protect them against the incursions of their enemies in Thessaly, and strengthened, on this occasion, with as much care as time would allow. The troops sent to Thermopylæ, which was only fifteen miles distant from the station of the Grecian fleet at Artemisium, consisted chiefly of Peloponnesians, commanded by Leonidas the Spartan king, who was prepared, in obedience to the oracle, to devote his life for the safety of his country.

Before the Grecian confederates adopted these vigorous measures for their own defence, the Persian army had marched, in three divisions, from Thracian Doriscus. They were accompanied by the fleet, which coasting about two hundred miles along the shores of Thrace, Macedon, and Thessaly, at length reached Cape Sepias, which is twenty miles north of Artemisium. As they advanced southward, they laid under contribution Abdera,¹ Thasus, and Eion, the principal Grecian colonies in Thrace, as well as the cities of Torona, Olynthus, Potidea, and other places of smaller note on the coast of Macedonia. The whole fleet anchored, after performing the most tedious and dangerous part of the voyage, near the entrance of the rivers Axius and Lydius, which flow into the Thermaic gulf; and, after quitting these harbours, spent eleven days in sailing eighty miles, along a smooth unbroken coast, from the northern extremity of this gulf to the general rendezvous near Cape Sepias.

The fleet was commanded by Achæmènes and Areabignes, sons of Darius. Xerxes, in person, headed his army, which made a considerable halt during the march at the Macedonian towns of Therma and Pella, and encamped in the Thracian plains on each side of the above-mentioned rivers Axius and Lydius. From hence they proceeded in three bodies; the division nearest the shore was commanded by Mardonius and Masistes. Sergis, an experienced general, conducted the march through the higher parts of the country; and the great king, accompanied by Smerdones and Megabyzus, who occasionally relieved him from the trouble of command, chose the middle passage as the safest, the most convenient, and

the most entertaining; for hitherto the Persian expedition was rather a journey of pleasure, than an undertaking of fatigue or danger. Xerxes examined at leisure such objects of nature or art as appeared most interesting and curious. His fancy was amused, as he passed the various scenes of superstition, with the legendary tales carefully related by his conductors. He viewed, with pleasure, the wide plains of Thessaly, which bore indubitable marks of being once an extensive lake; and contemplated, with wonder, the lofty mountains which separated that country from the rest of Greece, and which evidently appear to be rent asunder, and to have received their present form, from the terrible operation of volcanos and earthquakes. After fully satisfying his curiosity, he joined, with the division more immediately under his command, the remainder of the army, assembled and encamped on the wide plains of Trachis, about forty miles in circumference, stretching along the shore of Thessaly, opposite to the station of the Persian fleet, and adjacent to the Straits of Thermopylæ.²

For more than twelve months, Xerxes had never seen the face of an enemy. He had traversed, without resistance, the wide regions of Asia, and the countries which in ancient times were deemed most warlike in Europe. All the territories beyond Trachis acknowledged his power; and the districts of Greece, which still presented a scene of action to his invincible arms, were less extensive than the meanest of his provinces. Yet it is probable that he heard, not without emotion, that an army of Greeks, headed by the Spartan king, had taken post at Thermopylæ, in order to dispute his passage. What he had been told by Demaratus concerning the character and principles of that heroic people, he might now, when the danger drew near, be the more inclined to believe, from the suggestions of his own memory and experience. In the warmth of generous indignation, the Spartans, as we have already observed, had put to death the Persian heralds, sent to demand their submission; but upon cool reflection, they were prompted, chiefly indeed by superstitious motives, to make atonement for a violation of the sacred law of nations. When proclamation was made in the assembly, "who would die for Sparta?" two citizens, of great rank and eminence, offered themselves as willing sacrifices for the good of the community. Sperthies and Bulis (for these were their names) set out for Susa on this singular errand. As they passed through Lesser Asia, they were entertained by Hydarnes, the governor of that province, who actually accompanied Xerxes, as commander of the immortal band, to which dignity he had been raised on account of his superior merit. Hydarnes, among other discourse with the Spartans, testified his surprise, that their republic should be so averse to the friendship of the king his master, who, he observed, as they might learn by his own example, well understood the value of brave men. That if they complied with the desires of Xerxes, he would appoint them governors over the other

¹ The places on the road prepared not only vast magazines of corn and other provisions for the troops, but sumptuous entertainments for Xerxes and his attendants. A saying of Megacreon of Abdera expressed the devouring rapacity of the invaders: "That the Abderites ought to thank the gods, that Xerxes feasted but once a day; it would ruin Abdera to furnish him with both a dinner and a supper."——

² Herodot. Diodor. Plutarch. *ibid.*

cities of Greece. The Spartans coolly replied, "That he talked of a matter of which he was not a competent judge. With the condition and rewards of servitude he was indeed sufficiently acquainted; but as to the enjoyments of liberty, he had never proved how sweet they were; for if he had once made that experiment he would advise them to defend their freedom not only with lances, but with hatchets."³

The same magnanimity distinguished their behaviour at Susa. The guards told them, that, when admitted into the presence of Xerxes, they must observe the usual ceremony of prostrating themselves on the ground. But the Spartans declared, "That no degree of violence could make them submit to such mean adulation: that they were not accustomed to adore a man, and came not thither for such an impious purpose." They approached Xerxes, therefore, in an erect posture, and told him with firmness, they were sent to submit to any punishment which he might think proper to inflict on them, as an atonement for the death of his heralds. Xerxes admiring their virtue, replied, "That he certainly should not repeat the error of the Greeks, nor, by sacrificing the individuals, deliver the state from the guilt of murder and impiety." The Spartans having received this answer, returned home, persuaded that they had done their duty in offering private satisfaction; which, though not accepted, ought sufficiently to atone for the public crime.⁴

The example of these distinguished patriots probably gave Xerxes a very favourable idea of the general character of their community. As he had not any particular quarrel with the Spartans, whose opposition, though it could not prevent, would certainly retard, his intended punishment of Athens, he sent messengers to desire them to lay down their arms; to which they replied, "Let him come, and take them." The messengers then offered them lands, on condition of their becoming allies to the great king: but they answered, "That it was the custom of their republic to conquer lands by valour, not to acquire them by treachery." Except making these smart replies, they took not the smallest notice of the Persians; but continued to employ themselves as before their arrival, contending in the gymnastic exercises, entertaining themselves with music and conversation, or adjusting their long hair to appear more terrible to their enemies. The messengers of Xerxes, equally astonished at what they saw and heard, returned to the Persian camp, and described the unexpected event of their commission, as well as the extraordinary behaviour of the Spartans; of which Xerxes desired an explanation from their countryman Demaratus.⁵ The latter declared in general, that their whole carriage and demeanour announced a determined resolution to fight to the last extremity; but he found it difficult to make the Persian conceive the motives of men, who sought, at the certain price of their own lives, to purchase immortal

renown for their country.—That a few individuals should be animated, on some extraordinary occasions, with this patriotic magnanimity, may easily be understood. Of this, history in all ages furnishes illustrious examples; but that a whole nation should be habitually impressed with the same generosity of character, cannot readily be believed, without reflecting on the institutions and manners of the Spartans. The laws of that celebrated people prohibiting, as it has been already observed,⁶ the introduction of wealth and luxury, and rigidly confining each individual to the rank in which he was born, had extinguished the great motives of private ambition, and left scarcely any other scope to the active principles of men, but the glory of promoting the interests of their republic. Their extraordinary military success, the natural fruit of their temperance and activity, had given them a permanent sense of their superiority in war, which it became their chief point of honour to maintain and to confirm; and as the law which commanded them to die, rather than break their ranks, or abandon their posts in battle, was, like all the ordinances of Lycurgus, conceived to be of divine authority, the influence of superstition happily conspired with the ardour of patriotism and the enthusiasm of valour, in preparing them to meet certain death in the service of the public.

Xerxes could not be made to enter into these motives, or to believe, as Herodotus observes with inimitable simplicity, "that the Grecians were come to Thermopylæ only as men desirous to die, and to destroy as many of their enemies, as they could, though nothing was more true." He therefore waited four days, continually expecting they would either retreat into their own country, or surrender their arms, agreeably to his message. But as they still continued to guard the passage, he ascribed this conduct to obstinacy or folly; and on the fifth day determined to chastise their insolent opposition.

The Medes and Cissians, who, next to the Sacæ and Persians, formed the bravest part of his army, were commanded to attack these obstinate Greeks, and to bring them alive into his presence. The Barbarians marched with confidence to the engagement, but were repulsed with great slaughter. The places of those who fell, were incessantly supplied with fresh troops, but they could not make the smallest impression on the firm battalions of the Greeks; and the great loss which they sustained in the attempt, proved to all, and particularly to the king, that he had indeed many men, but few soldiers. The Sacæ, armed with their hatchets, next marched to the attack, but without better success; and last of all, the chosen band of Persians, headed by Hydarnes, deigned to display their valour in what appeared to them a very unequal contest. But they soon changed their opinion when they came to close with the enemy; for, says Herodotus, their numbers were useless, as they fought in a narrow pass, and their short-pointed weapons

³ Herodot. l. vii. c. cxxxv.

⁴ Ibid. l. vii. c. cxxxiv. et seq.

⁵ Ibid. c. ccix. et seq.

⁶ See above, c. iii. p. 32.

were ill calculated to contend with the length of the Grecian spear. The Greeks had the advantage still more in the superiority of their discipline, than in the excellence of their armour. Tired with destroying, they retreated in close order, and when pursued unguardedly by the Barbarians, they faced about on a sudden, and killed an incredible number of the Persians, with scarcely any loss to themselves. Xerxes, who was seated on an eminence to behold the battle, frequently started in wild emotion from his throne; and fearing lest he should be deprived of the flower of his army, he ordered them to be drawn off from the attack. But as the Grecian numbers were so extremely inconsiderable, and as it seemed probable that the greatest part of them must have suffered much injury in these repeated assaults, he determined next day to renew the engagement. Next day he fought without better success than before; and after vainly endeavouring to force the pass, both in separate bodies, and with the collected vigour of their troops, the Persians were compelled to abandon the enterprise, and disgracefully to retire to their camp.

It was a spectacle which the world had never seen before, and which it was never again to behold, the persevering intrepidity of eight thousand men resisting the impetuous fury of an army composed of millions. The pertinacious valour of Leonidas, and of his little troop, opposed, and might have long retarded, the progress of the Barbarians. But it was the fate of Greece always to be conquered rather by the treachery of false friends, than by the force of open enemies. When Xerxes knew not what measures to pursue in order to effect his purpose, and felt the inconvenience of remaining long in the same quarters with such an immense number of men, a perfidious Greek, induced by the hopes of reward, offered to remove his difficulties.¹ The name of the traitor was Epialtes, and he was a native of the obscure district of Mœlis, which separates the frontiers of Thessaly and Phocis. His experience of the country made him acquainted with a passage through the mountains of Cœta, several miles to the west of that guarded by Leonidas. Over this unfrequented path he undertook to conduct a body of twenty thousand Persians, who might assault the enemy in rear, while the main body attacked them in front. By this means, whatever prodigies of valour the Greeks might perform, they must be finally compelled to surrender, as they would be inclosed on all sides among barren rocks and inhospitable deserts.

The plan so judiciously concerted, was carried into immediate execution. On the evening of the seventh day after Xerxes arrived at the Straits, twenty thousand chosen men left the Persian camp, commanded by Hydarnes, and conducted by Epialtes. All night they marched through the thick forests of oak which abound in those parts; and by day-break they had advanced near to the top of the hill. But how much were they surprised to see the first rays of the morning reflected by the glittering

surfaces of Grecian spears and helmets! Hydarnes was afraid that this guard, which seemed at no great distance, had been also composed of Lacedæmonians; but a nearer approach showed that they consisted of a thousand Phocians, whom the foresight of Leonidas had sent to defend this important but unknown pass, which chance or treachery might discover to the Persians. The thick shade of the trees long concealed the enemy from the Greeks; at length the rustling of the leaves, and the tumult occasioned by the motion of twenty thousand men, discovered the imminence of danger; the Phocians, with great intrepidity flew to their arms, and prepared, if they should not conquer, at least to die gallantly. The compact firmness of their ranks, which might have resisted the regular onset of the enemy, exposed them to suffer much from the immense shower of darts which the Persians poured upon them. To avoid this danger, they too rashly abandoned the pass which they had been sent to guard, and retired to the most elevated part of the mountain, not doubting that the enemy, whose strength so much exceeded their own, would follow them thither. But in this they were disappointed; for the Persians prudently omitting the pursuit of this inconsiderable party, whom to defeat they considered as a matter of little moment, immediately seized the passage, and marched down the mountain with the utmost expedition, in order to accomplish the design suggested by Epialtes.

Mean while obscure intimations from the gods had darkly announced some dreadful calamity impending on the Greeks at Thermopylæ. The appearance of the entrails, which were carefully inspected by the augur Magistias, threatened the Spartans with death; but when, or by what means, it did not clearly appear, until a Grecian deserter, a native of the city of Cymé, in Ionia, named Tyrastides, arrived with information of the intended march of the Persians across the mountain. Animated by the love of his country, this generous fugitive had no sooner discovered the treacherous design of Epialtes, than he determined, at the risk of his life, and still more at the risk of being subjected to the most excruciating tortures, to communicate his discovery to the Spartan king.² Zeal for the safety of Greece gave swiftness to his steps, and he appeared in the Grecian camp a few hours after the Persians, conducted by Epialtes, had left the plains of Trachis. Leonidas immediately called a council of war, to deliberate upon the measures necessary to be taken in consequence of this information, equally important and alarming. All the confederates of Peloponnesus, except the Spartans, declared their opinion, that it was necessary to abandon a post, which, after the double attack announced to them should take place, it would be impossible with any hopes of success to maintain. As their exertions could not be of any avail to the public cause, it was prudent to consult their private safety; and while time was yet allowed them, to retire to the isthmus of Corinth, where, joining the rest of the auxi-

¹ Herodot. l. vii. c. ccxii. et seq.

² Herodot. l. vii. c. ccxix. et seq.

liarise, they might be ready to defend the Grecian peninsula against the fury of the Barbarians. It belonged to Leonidas to explain the sentiments of the Spartans. The other inhabitants of Peloponnesus, he observed, might follow the dictates of expediency, and return to the isthmus, in order to defend their respective territories; but glory was the only voice which the Spartans had learned to obey. Placed in the first rank by the general consent of their country, they would rather die than abandon that post of honour; and they were determined, therefore, at the price of their lives, to purchase immortal renown, to confirm the pre-eminence of Sparta, and to give an example of patriotism, worthy of being admired, if it should not be imitated, by posterity.

The dread of unavoidable and immediate death deterred the other allies from concurring with this magnanimous resolution. The Thespians alone, amounting to seven hundred men, declared they would never forsake Leonidas. They were conducted by the aged wisdom of Demophilus, and the youthful valour of Dithyrambus. Their republic was united in the strictest alliance with Sparta, by which they had often been defended against the usurpation and tyranny of the Thebans. These circumstances added force to their natural generosity of sentiment, and determined them, on this occasion, to adhere with steadfast intrepidity to the measures of their Spartan allies. As the Thespians remained at Thermopylæ, from inclination, and from principles of distinguished bravery, the Thebans were detained by the particular desire of Leonidas, who was not unacquainted with the intended treachery of their republic. The four hundred men whom that perfidious community had sent to accompany his expedition, he regarded rather as hostages than auxiliaries; nor was he unwilling to employ their doubtful fidelity in a desperate service. He thought that they might be compelled by force, or stimulated by a sense of shame, to encounter the same dangers to which the Spartans and Thespians voluntarily submitted; and without discovering his suspicion of their treachery, he had a sufficient pretence for retaining them, while he dismissed his allies of Peloponnesus, because the Theban territories, lying on the north side of the isthmus of Corinth, would necessarily be exposed to hostility and devastation, whenever the Barbarians should pass the straits of Thermopylæ. Besides the Thespians³ and Thebans, the troops who remained with Leonidas, consisted of three hundred Spartans, all chosen men, and fathers of sons. This valiant band, with unanimous consent, solicited their general to dedicate to the glory of Greece, and their own, the important interval yet allowed

them, before they were surrounded by the Persians. The ardour of Leonidas happily conspired with the ready zeal of the soldiers. He therefore commanded them to prepare the last meal of their lives, and to sup like men who should to-morrow dine in Elysium. His own example confirmed the propriety of the command, for he took an abundant repast, in order to furnish strength and spirits for a long continuance of toil and danger.

It was now the dead of night, when the Spartans, headed by Leonidas, marched in a close battalion towards the Persian camp, with resentment heightened by despair.⁴ Their fury was terrible; and rendered still more destructive through the defect of Barbarian discipline; for the Persians having neither advanced guards, nor a watch-word, nor confidence in each other, were incapable of adopting such measures for defence as the sudden emergency required. Many fell by the Grecian spear, but much greater multitudes by the mistaken rage of their own troops, by whom, in the midst of this blind confusion, they could not be distinguished from enemies. The Greeks, wearied with slaughter, penetrated to the royal pavilion; but there the first alarm of noise had been readily perceived, amidst the profound silence and tranquillity which usually reigned in the tent of Xerxes; the great king had immediately escaped, with his favourite attendants, to the farther extremity of the encampment. Even there, all was tumult, and horror, and despair; the obscurity of night increasing the terror of the Persians, who no longer doubted that the detachment conducted by Epialtes had been betrayed by that perfidious Greek; and that the enemy, reinforced by new numbers, now co-operated with the traitor, and seized the opportunity of assailing their camp, after it had been deprived of the division of Hydarnes, its principal ornament and defence.

The approach of day discovered to the Persians a dreadful scene of carnage; but it also discovered to them that their fears had multiplied the number of the enemy, who now retreated in close order to the straits of Thermopylæ. Xerxes, stimulated by the fury of revenge, gave orders to pursue them; and his terrified troops were rather driven than led to the attack, by the officers who marched behind the several divisions, and compelled them to advance by menaces, stripes, and blows. The Grecians, animated by their late success, and persuaded that they could not possibly escape death on the arrival of those who approached by way of the mountain, bravely halted in the widest part of the pass, to receive the charge of the enemy. The shock was dreadful, and the battle was maintained on the side of the Greeks with persevering intrepidity and desperate valour. After their spears were blunted or broken, they attacked sword in hand, and

³ From the narrative of Herodotus, it would seem that the Thespians alone voluntarily remained with Leonidas and the Spartans. Yet the inscription which he cites makes the whole number who fought at Thermopylæ, amount to four thousand.

Μυρίσιν ποτε τῆς τριχόσιας ἰσχυόντο
ἐκ Ἰλαρποννήσου χιλιάδης πατοῦρας.

Isocrates likewise (p. 164.) says, that some Peloponnesians remained to fight.

⁴ Diodor. l. xi. p. 247. The nocturnal assault, omitted by Herodotus, is mentioned not only by Diodorus, but by Plutarch, Justin, and most other writers. The general panegyric of Plato (in Menex.) of Lysias (Orat. Funeb.) and of Isocrates (Panegyric) required not their descending into such particulars. Yet, notwithstanding these circumstances, I should have omitted this incident, if it had appeared inconsistent with the honest narrative of Herodotus.

their short, but massy and well-tempered weapons, made an incredible havoc. Their progress was marked by a line of blood, when a Barbarian dart pierced the heart of Leonidas. The contest was no longer for victory and glory, but for the sacred remains of their king. Four times they dispelled the thickest globes of Persians; but as their unexampled valour was carrying off the inestimable prize, the hostile battalions were seen descending the hill, under the conduct of Epialtes. It was now time to prepare for the last effort of generous despair. With close order and resolute minds, the Greeks, all collected in themselves, retired to the narrowest part of the strait, and took post behind the Phocian wall, on a rising ground, where a lion of stone was afterwards erected in honour of Leonidas. As they performed this movement, fortune, willing to afford every occasion to display their illustrious merit, obliged them to contend at once against open force and secret treachery. The Thebans, whom fear had hitherto restrained from defection, seized the present opportunity to revolt; and approaching the Persians with outstretched arms, declared that they had always been their friends; that *their* republic had sent earth and water, as an acknowledgment of their submission to Xerxes; and that it was with the utmost reluctance they had been compelled by necessity to resist the progress of his arms. As they approached to surrender themselves, many perished by the darts of the Barbarians; the remainder saved a perishing life, by submitting to eternal infamy. Meanwhile

the Lacedæmonians and Thebians were assaulted on all sides. The nearest of the enemy beat down the wall, and entered by the breaches. Their temerity was punished by instant death. In this last struggle every Grecian showed the most heroic courage; yet if we believe the unanimous report of some Thebians, and others who survived the engagement, the Spartan Dionece deserved the prize of valour. When it was observed to him, that the Persian arrows were so numerous, that they intercepted the light of the sun, he said it was a favourable circumstance, because the Greeks now fought in the shade. The brothers Alpheus and Maron are likewise particularized for their generous contempt of death, and for their distinguished valour and activity in the service of their country. What these, and other virtues, could accomplish, the Greeks, both as individuals, and in a body, had already performed; but it became impossible for them longer to resist the impetuosity and weight of the darts, and arrows, and other missile weapons, which were continually poured upon them; and they were finally not destroyed or conquered, but buried under a trophy of Persian arms. Two monuments were afterwards erected near the spot where they fell; the inscription of the first announced the valour of a handful of Greeks,¹ who had resisted three millions of Barbarians; the second was peculiar to the Spartans, and contained these memorable words: "Go, stranger, and declare to the Lacedæmonians, that we died here in obedience to their divine laws."²

CHAPTER X.

Sea Fight off Artemisium—Xerxes ravages Phocis—Enters Attica—Magnanimity of the Athenians—Sea Fight off Salamis—Xerxes leaves Greece—His miserable Retreat—Campaign of Mardonius—Battles of Platæa and Mycalé—Issue of the Persian Invasion.

DURING the military operations at Thermopylæ, the Grecian fleet was stationed in the harbour of Artemisium, the northern promontory of Eubœa. That of the Persians, too numerous for any harbour to contain, had anchored in the road that extends between the city of Castanœa and the promontory of Sepias, on the coast of Thessaly. Here this formidable armada suffered the calamities foretold by the wisdom of Artabanus. In a conversation with Xerxes, that prudent old man had warned him against two enemies, the sea and

the land, from whom his own rash inexperience seemed not to apprehend any danger. Yet both these enemies occasioned dreadful misfortunes to the Persians, whose numbers first exposed them to be destroyed at sea by a tempest, and afterwards to perish on land by a famine. The first line of their fleet was sheltered by the coast of Thessaly; but the other lines, to the number of seven, rode at anchor, at small intervals, with the prows of the vessels turned to the sea. When they adopted this arrangement, the waters were smooth, the sky clear, the weather calm and serene; but on the morning of the second day after their arrival on the coast, the sky began to lower, and the appearance of the heavens grew threatening and terrible. A dreadful storm of rain and thunder succeeded; and, what was more alarming, the billows began to rise to an amazing height, occasioned by a violent Helespontin, or northeast wind, which, when it once begins to

¹ Isocrates, p. 164. makes the Spartans who fought at Thermopylæ amount to one thousand. Diodorus, l. xi. p. 410. agrees with Herodotus, whose narrative is followed in the text. According to the most probable accounts, the Thebians were twice as numerous as the Spartans; although the latter have carried away all the glory of this singular exploit.

² Ὁ ξένος πρὸς τὸν Λακεδαιμονίαν ὅτι τῆς
Καίμης τοῖς κείνους ῥήμασι πισθόμενα.

Herodot. c. cxxviii.

blow in those seas with any considerable force, seldom ceases for several days. The nearest vessels were saved by hauling under the shore : of the more remote many were driven from their anchors ; some foundered at sea, others split on the promontory of Sepias, and several bulged on the shallows of Melibœa. Three days the tempest raged with unabating fury. Four hundred galleys were destroyed by its violence, besides such a number of storeships and transports, that the Persian commanders, suspecting this disaster might occasion the revolt of the Thessalians, fortified themselves with a rampart of considerable height, entirely composed of the shattered fragments of the wreck.³

This bulwark was sufficient to protect them against the irruptions of the Greeks ; but it could not defend them against the more dangerous fury of the waves. In a short time, therefore, they quitted their insecure station at Sepias, and with eight hundred ships of war, besides innumerable vessels of burden, sailed into the Pegasian bay, and anchored in the road of Apheté, which, at the distance of a few miles, lies directly opposite to the harbour of Artemisium.

The Grecians had posted sentinels on the heights of Eubœa to observe the consequences of the storm, and to watch the motions of the enemy. When informed of the dreadful disaster which had befallen them, they poured out a joyous libation, and sacrificed, with pious gratitude, to " Neptune the deliverer ;" but the near approach of such a superior force soon damped their transports of religious festivity. Neptune had favoured them in the storm, yet he might assist their enemies in the engagement. In the council of war, called to deliberate on this important subject, it was the general opinion of the commanders, that they ought immediately to retire southward. The Eubœans, whose coasts must have thus been abandoned to the fury of invaders, were peculiarly interested in opposing this pusillanimous resolution. The passage into the continent of Greece, they observed, was still guarded by the magnanimity of Leonidas, and the bravery of the Spartans. Following this generous example, the Grecian fleet, however inferior in strength, ought to resist the Persians, and to protect the estates and families of a rich and populous island.⁴ This remonstrance had not any effect on the determined purpose of Euribiades the Spartan, who, on account of the ancient pre-eminence of his republic, was entrusted with the command of the fleet ; an honour rather due to the personal merit of Themistocles, and the naval superiority of Athens.

To the Athenian commander the Eubœans secretly applied, and, by a present of thirty talents, engaged him to use his influence to retain the Grecian armament for the defence of their coasts. Themistocles was well pleased at being bribed into a measure which his good sense and discernment approved. By a proper

distribution of only eight talents, he brought over the other captains to his opinion, and thus effectually promoted the interest, and secured the good will, of the Eubœans, while he retained for himself an immense sum of money, which might be usefully employed, on many future occasions, in fixing, by largesses and expensive exhibitions, the fluctuating favour of his fellow citizens.

Meanwhile the Persians, having recovered from the terrors of the storm, prepared for the engagement. As they entertained not the smallest doubt of victory, they determined not to begin the attack, until they had sent two hundred of their best sailing vessels around the isle of Eubœa, to intercept the expected flight of the enemy through the narrow Euripus. In order to conceal this design, they ordered the detached ships to stand out to sea until they lost sight of the eastern coast of Eubœa, sailing behind the little island of Sciathus, and afterwards shaping their course by the promontories of Caphaneus and Gerestus. The stratagem, concerted with more than usual prudence, was, however, discovered to the Greeks by Scyllias, a native of Scioné, now serving in the Persian fleet, but who had long languished for an opportunity of deserting to his countrymen. While the attention of the Barbarians was employed in the preparations necessary for their new arrangement, Scyllias availed himself of his dexterity in diving, to swim, unperceived, to a boat which had been prepared at a sufficient distance, in which he fortunately escaped to Artemisium. He immediately gained admittance to the Grecian council, where the boldness of his enterprise gave persuasion to his words. In consequence of his seasonable and important information, the Greeks determined to continue till midnight in the harbour, and then weighing anchor, to sail in quest of the fleet which had been sent out to prevent their escape. But this stratagem, by which they would have met the art of the enemy with similar address, was not carried into execution. The advice boats, which had been immediately despatched to observe the progress of the Persians, returned before evening, without having seen any ships approaching in that direction.

This intelligence was welcome to the Greeks, who were unwilling, without evident necessity, to abandon their present situation. The enemy, who had lately suffered so severely in the storm, were now further weakened by a considerable diminution of their fleet. The strength of the adverse parties being thus reduced nearer to an equality, the weaker seized the opportunity to display their courage in fight, and their superior skill in naval action. About sunset they approached in a line, and offered battle to the Persians. The latter did not decline the engagement, as their ships were still sufficiently numerous to surround those of their opponents. At the first signal the Greeks formed into a circle, at the second they began the fight. Though crowded into a narrow compass, and having the enemy on every side, they soon took thirty of their ships, and sunk many more. Night came on, accompanied with an impetu-

³ Herodot. l. vii. c. clxxxviii. et seq. Diodor. Sicul. l. xi. c. xii.

⁴ Herodot. l. viii. c. ii. et seq.

ous storm of rain and thunder; the Greeks retired into the harbour of Artemisium; the enemy were driven to the coast of Thessaly. As the wind blew from the south, the dead bodies and wrecks dashed with violence against the sides of their ships, and disturbed the motion of their oars. The Barbarians were seized with consternation and despair; for scarcely had they time to breathe, after the former storm and shipwreck near Mount Pelion, when they were compelled to a dangerous sea-fight; after darkness put an end to the battle, they were again involved in the gloom and horrors of a nocturnal tempest. By good fortune, rather than by design, the greatest part of the fleet escaped immediate destruction, and gained the Pegasean bay. Their calamities were great and unexpected; but the ships ordered to sail round Eubœa met with a still more dreadful disaster. They were overtaken by the storm, after they had adventured further from the shore than was usual with the wary mariners of antiquity. Clouds soon intercepted the stars, by which alone they directed their course. They were driven they knew not whither by the force of the winds, or impelled by the impetuosity of currents. In addition to these misfortunes, they were terrified by the thunder, and overwhelmed by the deluge; and after continuing during the greatest part of the night, the sport of the elements, they all perished miserably amidst the shoals and rocks of an unknown coast.

The morning arose with different prospects and hopes to the Persians and Greeks. To the former it discovered the extent of their misfortunes; to the latter it brought a reinforcement of fifty-three Athenian ships. Encouraged by this favourable circumstance, they determined again to attack the enemy, at the same hour as on the preceding day, because their knowledge of the coast, and their skill in fighting their ships, rendered the dusk peculiarly propitious to their designs. At the appointed time, they sailed towards the road of Apheté, and having cut off the Cilician squadron from the rest, totally destroyed it, and returned at night to Artemisium.

The Persian commanders being deeply affected with their repeated disasters, but still more alarmed at the much dreaded resentment of their king, they determined to make one vigorous effort, for restoring the glory of their arms. By art and stratagem, and under favour of the night, the Greeks had hitherto gained many important advantages. It now belonged to the Persians to choose the time for action. On the third day at noon, they sailed forth in the form of a crescent, which was still sufficiently extensive to unfold the Grecian line. The Greeks, animated by former success, were averse to decline any offer of battle; yet it is probable that their admirals, and particularly Themistocles, would much rather have delayed it to a more favourable opportunity. Rage, resentment, and indignation, supplied the defect of the Barbarians in skill and courage. The battle was longer, and more doubtful, than on any

former occasion; many Grecian vessels were destroyed, five were taken by the Egyptians, who particularly signalized themselves on the side of the Barbarians, as the Athenians did on that of the Greeks. The persevering valour of the latter at length prevailed, the enemy retiring, and acknowledging their superiority, by leaving them in possession of the dead and the wreck. But the victory cost them dear; since their vessels, particularly those of the Athenians, were reduced to a very shattered condition; and their great inferiority in the number and size of their ships, made them feel more sensibly every diminution of strength.

This circumstance was sufficient to make them think of retiring (while they might yet retire in safety) to the shores of the Corinthian Isthmus. The inclination to this measure received additional force from considering, that the Persians, however unfortunate by sea, had still an immense army; whereas the principal hope of Greece centered in its fleet. While the commanders were occupied with these reflections, Abronycus, an Athenian, who had been entrusted with a galley of thirty oars, to cruise in the Malian bay, and to watch the event of the battle of Thermopylæ, arrived with an account of the glorious death of Leonidas. The engagements by sea and land had been fought on the same day. In both the Greeks defended a narrow pass, against a superior power; and in both the Persians had, with very different success, attempted, by surrounding, to conquer them. The intelligence brought by Abronycus confirmed their resolution of sailing southward; for it seemed of very little importance to defend the shores, after the enemy had obtained possession of the centre of the northern territories. Having passed the narrow Euripus, they coasted along the shore of Attica, and anchored in the strait of the Saronic Gulf, which separates the island of Salamis from the harbours of Athens.²

Before they left Artemisium, Themistocles, ever watchful to promote the interest of his country, endeavoured to alienate³ from the great king the affections of his bravest auxiliaries. Contrary to the advice of the prudent Artabanus, Xerxes had conducted the Asiatic Greeks to an unnatural expedition against their mother-country. His wise kinsman in vain persuaded him to send them back, because it appeared equally dishonourable and dangerous to depend on the service of men, which could only be employed in his favour at the expence of every principle of duty, and of every sentiment of virtue. By hope and fear, by threats and promises, and chiefly by honouring them with marks of distinguished preference, Xerxes had hitherto preserved their reluctant fidelity. In order at once to destroy a connection, which of its own accord seemed ready to dissolve. Themistocles engraved on the rocks, near the watering-place of Artemisium, the following words: "Men of Ionia, your conduct is most unjust in fighting against your ancestors, and in attempting to enslave Greece; resolve, therefore, while it is yet in your power, to repair the

¹ Herodot. l. viii. c. xiii. Diodor. l. xi. c. xiii.

² Herodot. l. viii. c. xxi.

³ Ibid. c. xxii.

injury.—If you cannot immediately desert from the Persian fleet, yet it will be easy for you to accomplish this design when we come to an engagement. You ought to remember, that yourselves gave occasion to the quarrel between us and the Barbarians; and further, that the same duties which children owe to their parents, colonies owe to their mother-country.”⁴

When news arrived that the Grecian fleet had abandoned Artemisium, Xerxes regarded this retreat of the enemy as equal to a victory. He therefore issued orders, that his naval force, after ravaging the coasts of Eubœa, should proceed to take possession of the harbours of Athens; while, at the head of his irresistible army, he intended to make a victorious procession, rather than a march, into the Attic territory. The road thither from Thermopylæ passed through the countries of Phocis and Bœotia, the latter of which had already acknowledged his authority. The Phocians adhered to the cause of Greece; and were still further confirmed in their allegiance, after the Thessalians, their inveterate enemies, had embraced the party of Xerxes. Such were the violent animosities which divided these hostile states, that, in the opinion of Herodotus, whichever side the Thessalians had taken, the Phocians would still have opposed them. He might perhaps have extended the observation to the other principal republics. The enthusiasm of Athens and Sparta in defending the cause of Greece, rendered the rival states of Thebes and Argos zealous in the service of Persia; and it is to be remembered, to the immortal glory of the friends of liberty and their country, that they had to struggle with domestic sedition, while they opposed and defeated a foreign invasion.

Having entered the territory of Phocis, the Persian army separated into two divisions, with a view to obtain more plentiful supplies of the necessaries of life, and to destroy more completely the possessions of their enemies. The most numerous division followed the course of the river Cephissus, which flows from the Thessalian mountains, to the lake Copais in Bœotia. The fertile banks of the Cephissus were adorned by Charadra, Neon, Elateæ, and other populous cities, all of which were burned or demolished by the fury of Xerxes, and the resentment of the Thessalians. Historians particularly regret the destruction of the sacred walls of Abé, a city held in peculiar respect on account of the temple of Apollo, famed for its unerring oracles, and enriched from the earliest times by the pious donations of superstition. The inhabitants had in general abandoned their towns, and taken refuge in the most inaccessible retreats of mount Parnassus. But the natives of Abé, vainly confiding for safety in the sanctity of the place, became a prey to an undistinguishing rage, which equally disregarded things sacred and profane. The men perished by the sword, the women by the brutal lust of the Barbarians.

After committing these dreadful ravages, the principal division of the army marched into Bœotia, by the way of Orchomenus. The *smaller* part (if either portion of such an immense host may be distinguished by that epithet) stretched to the right, along the western skirts of mount Parnassus, and traced a line of devastation from the banks of the Cephissus to the temple of Delphi. Such was the fame of the immense riches collected in this sacred edifice, that Xerxes is said to have been as well acquainted with their amount as with that of his own treasury; and, to believe the adulation of his followers, he alone was worthy to possess that invaluable depository. The Delphians having learned, by the unhappy fate of Abé, that their religious employment could not afford protection, either to their property or to their persons, consulted the oracle, “Whether they should hide their treasures under ground, or transport them to some neighbouring country?” The Pythia replied, “That the arms of Apollo were sufficient for the defence of his shrine.” The Delphians, therefore, confined their attention to the means necessary for their personal safety. The women and children were transported by sea to Achia; the men climbed to the craggy tops of mount Cirphis, or descended to the deep caverns of Parnassus. Only sixty persons, the immediate ministers of Apollo, kept possession of the sacred city. But, could we credit the testimony of ancient historians, it soon appeared that the gods had not abandoned Delphi: scarcely had the Persians reached the temple of Minerva the Provident, situated at a little distance from town, when the air thickened into an unusual darkness. A violent storm arose; the thunder and lightning were terrible. At length the tempest burst on mount Parnassus, and separated from its sides two immense rocks, which rolling down with increased violence, overwhelmed the nearest ranks of the Persians. The shattered fragments of the mountain, which long remained in the grove of Minerva, were regarded by the credulity of the Greeks as a standing proof of the miracle. But without supposing any supernatural intervention, we may believe, that an extraordinary event, happening on an extraordinary occasion, would produce great terror and consternation in the Barbarian army, since many of the nations which composed it acknowledged the divinity of Apollo, and must therefore have been sensible of their intended impiety, in despoiling his temple. The awful solemnity of the place conspired with the horrors of the tempest, and the guilty feelings of their own consciences. These united terrors were sufficient to disturb all the rational principles of their minds, and even to confound the clearest perceptions of their senses. They imagined, that they heard many sounds, which they did not hear; and that they saw many phantoms, which they did not see. A universal panic seized them; at first they remained motionless, in silent amazement; they afterwards fled with disordered steps and wild despair. The Delphians, who perceived their confusion, and who believed that the gods, by the most manifest signs, defended their favourite abode, rushed impetuously from their fast-

⁴ This sentiment is the dictate of nature, and occurs often in the Roman as well as the Greek writers. “Quæ liberi parentibus ea coloni antiquæ patriæ debent.” T. Livius.

nesses, and destroyed great numbers of the terrified and unresisting enemy.¹ The remainder took the road of Bœotia, in order to join the main body under Xerxes, which having already destroyed the hostile cities of Thespisæ and Plataea, was marching with full expectation to inflict complete vengeance on the Athenians.

The united army arrived in the Attic territory three months after their passage over the Hellespont. They laid waste the country, burned the cities, and levelled the temples with the ground. At length they took possession of the capital; but the inhabitants, by a retreat no less prudent than magnanimous, had withdrawn from the fury of their resentment.

It was impossible for the Athenians at once to oppose the Persian army, which marched from Bœotia, and to defend the western coasts of Greece against the ravages of a numerous fleet. The inhabitants of Peloponnesus, despairing of being able to resist the enemy in the open field, had begun to build a wall across the isthmus of Corinth, as their only security on the side of the land against the Barbaric invasion. In these circumstances, the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, embraced a resolution which eclipsed the glory of all their former exploits. They abandoned to the Persian rage their villages, their territory, their walls, their city itself, with the revered tombs of their ancestors; their wives and children, and aged parents, were transported to the isles of Salamis and Ægina, and to the generous city of Træzoné, on the Argolic coast, which, notwithstanding the defection of Argos, the capital of that province, steadfastly adhered to the maxims of patriotism, and the duties of friendship. The embarkation was made with such haste, that the inhabitants were obliged to leave behind them their household furniture, their statues and pictures, and in general the most valuable part of their property. But they were willing to relinquish all for the sake of their country, which they well knew consisted not in their houses, lands, and effects,² but in that equal constitution of government, which they had received from their ancestors, and which it was their duty to transmit unimpaired to posterity. This constitution it was impossible for them to defend, unless they determined, at the risk of their lives, and of every thing dear to them, to maintain the general independence of the Grecian confederacy; the interest of which became doubly precious, by being thus inseparably connected with their own.

The Athenians capable of bearing arms or of handling an oar, embarked on board the fleet stationed at Salamis. The ships equipped and manned by them alone, exceeded in number those of all their allies together, although the combined force was considerably augmented by the naval strength of Epirus and Arcanania,

which, formerly doubtful and irresolute, had been determined to the side of Greece by the fortunate issue of the engagements at Artemisium. The whole Grecian armament, thus increased, amounted to three hundred and eighty vessels. That of the Persians, which now took possession of the Athenian harbours, lying to the south of the strait occupied by the Greeks, had also received a powerful reinforcement. The Locrians, Bœotians, and in general every people who had submitted to their arms, readily supplying them with ships; and several of the Egean islands having at length prepared the quota which they had formerly been commanded to furnish. We are not exactly informed of the number or strength of the additional squadron; but it was supposed fully to compensate the loss occasioned by storms and sea-fights, and to restore the Persian fleet to its original complement of twelve hundred sail.³

Trusting to the immense superiority of his armament, Xerxes was still desirous to make trial of his fortune at sea, notwithstanding his former disasters on that element. But before he came to a final resolution, he summoned a council of war, in order to hear the opinion of his maritime subjects or allies. The tributary kings of Tyre and Sidon, the leaders of the Egyptians, Cyprians, and Cilicians, ever ready to flatter the passions of their sovereign, offered many frivolous reasons in favour of the alternative to which they perceived him inclined. But in the fleet of Xerxes there was a Grecian queen named Artemisia, widow of the prince of Halicarnassus, and who had assumed the government of that city and territory for the benefit of her infant son. Compelled by the order of Xerxes, or perhaps irritated against the Athenians for some reasons which history does not record, she not only fitted out five ships to attend the Persian expedition, but took upon herself the command of her little squadron, and on every occasion conducted it with equal skill and bravery. Such vigour of mind, united with so delicate a form, deserved to excite admiration in every part of the world; but the manly spirit of Artemisia becomes still more admirable, when we consider the severe restraints which have been in all ages imposed on the female sex, by the manners and climate of Asia. Her superior genius recommended her to the peculiar favour of Xerxes, who was obliged to esteem in a woman the virtues which he himself wanted spirit to practise. Trusting to his advantageous opinion of her courage and fidelity, Artemisia dissented from the general voice of the allies, and even opposed the inclination of the prince. "Her former exploits on the coast of Eubœa afforded sufficient proof that her present advice was not the child of timidity. She had been ever forward to expose her person and her fame in the service of the great king; but it was impossible to dissemble the manifest superiority of the Greeks in naval affairs. Yet, were the two armaments as much on a foot of equality in point of bravery and experience, as they were unequal in numbers, what motive could induce Xerxes to

¹ Herodot. l. viii. c. xxxvii. et seq. et Diodor. l. xi. p. 250.

² Οὐ λῆθαι, οὐδὲ ξυλῆθαι
Τεῖχη τεκτόνων καὶ πόλεις εἶσιν,
ἀλλ' οὗτοι ποτ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνὰ πέρας
αὐτοὺς σωζέειν εἰδότες,
ἐπὶ πᾶσι τεῖχη καὶ πόλεις.

ALCÆUS, apud Aristid.

³ Herodot. Diodor. ubi supra; et Plut. in Themistocle.

venture another engagement at sea? Was he not already in possession of Athens, the great object of the war? The Spartans, who had opposed his progress at Thermopylæ, had reaped the just fruits of their temerity: those assembled at the isthmus of Corinth might easily be involved in a similar fate. The Peloponnesus might then be laid waste by fire and sword, which would complete the destruction of Greece. Instead of proceeding immediately to that peninsula, should Xerxes choose to continue only a few weeks in the Attic territory, four hundred Grecian ships could not long be supplied with provisions from the barren rocks of Salamis. Necessity must compel them to surrender, or drive them to their respective cities, where they would become an easy prey to the Persian arms." These judicious observations were heard without approbation; the worst opinion prevailed, being the best adapted to flatter the vanity of Xerxes.

When the Grecian commanders observed that the enemy prepared to venture another engagement at sea, they likewise assembled to deliberate whether they should continue in the strait between Salamis and Attica, or proceed further up the gulf, towards the Corinthian isthmus. The latter proposal was generally approved by the confederates of Peloponnesus, who anxiously desired, in the present emergency, to approach as near as possible to their respective cities. Some hastened to their ships, and hoisted sail, in order to depart; and it seemed likely that their example would be soon followed by the whole fleet. On board the ship of Themistocles was Mnesiphilus, formerly mentioned as the instructor of his youth, and who now accompanied him as his counselor and friend. The experienced wisdom of Mnesiphilus readily discerned, that should the Greeks sail from Salamis, it would be impossible to prevent the general dispersion of their armament. He therefore exhorted Themistocles, to endeavour, by all means possible, to prevent this fatal measure; and particularly to persuade the Spartan admiral, Euribiades, to alter his present intention.

Themistocles readily embraced the opinion of his friend. Having waited on Euribiades, he obtained his consent to summon a second assembly of the confederates. After they were fully convened, the Athenian began to call their attention to the state of their affairs; but his discourse was insolently interrupted by Adimantus, the commander of the Corinthians, who had constantly discovered a particular solicitude for returning to the isthmus. Themistocles, no less prudent than brave, answered his reproaches with calmness, and then addressing himself to Euribiades, "The fate of Greece," said he, "depends on the decision of the present moment, and that decision on you; if you resolve to sail to the isthmus, we must abandon Salamis, Megara, and Ægina; we shall be compelled to fight in an open sea, where the enemy may fully avail themselves of their superior numbers; and as the Persian army will certainly attend the motions of their fleet, we shall draw their combined strength towards the Grecian peninsula, our last and only

retreat. But if you determine to retain the ships in their present station, the Persians will find it impossible, in a narrow channel, to attack us at once with their whole force: we shall preserve Megara and Salamis, and we shall effectually defend Peloponnesus; for the Barbarians being, as I firmly trust, defeated in a naval engagement, will not penetrate further than Attica, but return home with disgrace." He had scarcely ended his words, when Adimantus broke forth into new invectives, affecting surprise that Euribiades should listen to a man who, since the taking of Athens, had not any city to defend: that the Athenians ought *then* to have a voice in the council when they could say they had a home. Themistocles replied, "that the Athenians had indeed undervalued their private estates and possessions, in comparison of their political independence, and the general safety of Greece, and gloriously abandoned their *city* in defence of their *country*. But notwithstanding this sacrifice for the public good, they had still a home far more valuable than Corinth, two hundred ships of war well armed and manned, which no nation of Greece could resist. That should the confederates persist in their present dangerous resolution, the Athenians would in these ships embark their wives and families; desert a country, which had first forsaken itself; and repair to the coast of Italy, where it was foretold by ancient oracles, that Athens should, in some future time, form a great and flourishing settlement. That the Greeks would then remember and regret the advice of Themistocles, when, abandoned by the most considerable part of their allies, they became an easy prey to the Barbarian invader." The firmness of this discourse shook the resolution of the confederates; and it was determined by the majority to continue at Salamis.

Between this important resolve and the engagement, there intervened a moment of the most anxious solicitude. The minds of men, impressed with the awful idea of the events about to be transacted, were thrown off their ordinary bias; and as the operations of nature, and the agency of invisible beings, are always fondly connected in the imagination with the momentous concerns of human life, the Greeks felt, or believed they felt, extraordinary convulsions of the elements; they saw, or fancied they saw, hideous spectres in the air; and heard, or imagined they heard, the most terrible and threatening voices.⁴ But all these strange and supernatural appearances, which would otherwise have been doubtful or alarming, were proved, by a clear and explicit oracle, to foretel the destruction of the Barbarians.

Notwithstanding this favourable intimation of the divine will, which was carefully improved by the wisdom and eloquence of Themistocles, the Peloponnesians were ready to return to their first determination. A vessel arriving from the Isthmus, brought advice that the fortifications there were almost completed; if the fleet retired to the neighbouring shore, the sailors might, even after a defeat at sea, take refuge behind their walls; but if conquered

⁴ Lysias Fun. Orat. Herodot. *ibid.*

near the coasts of Salamis, they would be forever separated from their families and friends, and confined, without hope or resource, within the narrow limits of a barren island. In important alternatives, when the arguments on each side are almost equally persuasive, the party which we have embraced often appears the worst, merely because we have embraced it. Any new circumstance or consideration is always capable of changing the balance, and we hastily approve what we rejected after much deliberation. Lest this propensity should, as there was much reason to fear, again disconcert his measures, Themistocles determined to prevent the Greeks from the possibility of gratifying it. There commonly lived in his family a man named Sicinus, who at present accompanied him. He was originally a slave, and employed in the education of his children; but by the generosity of his patron, had acquired the rank of citizen, with considerable riches. The firmness and fidelity of this man rendered him a proper instrument for executing a stratagem, which concealed, under the mask of treachery, the enthusiasm of public virtue. Having received his instructions from Themistocles, he privately sailed to the Persian fleet, and obtaining admission into the presence of Xerxes, declared, "That he had been sent by the captain of the Athenians, who could no longer endure the insolence of his countrymen, to acquaint the great king, that the Greeks, seized with consternation at the near approach of danger, had determined to make their escape under cover of the night: that now was the time for the Persians to achieve the most glorious of all their exploits, and, by intercepting the flight of their enemies, accomplish their destruction at once."¹ The deceit was believed; the whole day, and the greatest part of the succeeding night, the Persians employed in securing the several passages between the islands and the adjacent coast; and that nothing might be neglected that could contribute to their success, they filled the little isle, or rather rock, of Psyttalea, lying between Salamis and the continent, with the flower of the Persian infantry, in order to intercept the miserable remnant of the Greeks, who, after the expected defeat, would fly thither for refuge.

The first intelligence of these operations was brought to the Grecian fleet by Aristides the Athenian, who seems not to have availed himself of the general act of indemnity to return from banishment, but who readily embraced every opportunity to serve his country. Having with difficulty escaped in a small vessel from the isle of Ægina, the generous patriot immediately communicated an account of what he had seen there to his rival and enemy, Themistocles, who, meeting his generosity with equal frankness, made him the confidant of his secret. Their interview was as memorable as the occasion; and, after a continued life of opposition and hatred, they now first agreed to suspend their private animosities, in order to promote the common interest of their country. As the Peloponnesian commanders were either

wavering and irresolute, or had determined to set sail, Aristides was desired to inform them of the arrangement which he had seen; the consideration of his country however rendered his evidence suspected, and it was imagined that he meant to sacrifice the general interest of the confederates to the safety of the Athenian families in Salamis. But the arrival of a vessel belonging to the isle of Tenos confirmed the veracity of his report, and the Peloponnesians resolved to fight, because it was impossible to fly.²

Before the dawn of the day the Grecian ships were drawn up in order of battle; and the Persians, who had been surprised at not finding them attempt to escape during night, were still more surprised when morning discovered their close and regular arrangement. The Greeks began with the light their sacred hymns and poems, which preceded their triumphant songs of war, accompanied by the animating sound of the trumpet. The shores of Attica re-echoed to the rocks of Salamis and Psyttalea. The Grecian acclamations filled the sky. Neither their appearance nor their words betokened flight or fear, but rather determined intrepidity, and invincible courage. Yet was their valour tempered with wisdom. Themistocles delayed the attack until the ordinary breeze should spring up, which was no less favourable to the experience of the Grecian mariners, than dangerous to the lofty unwieldiness of the Persian ships.³ The signal was then given for the Athenian line to bear down against that of the Phœnicians, which rode on the west, off the coast of Eleusis; while the Peloponnesians advanced against the enemy's left wing stationed on the east, near the harbour of the Piræus. The Persians, confiding in their number, and secure of victory, did not decline the fight. A Phœnician galley, of uncommon size and strength, was distinguished in the front of their line by every circumstance of naval pomp. In the eagerness to engage, she far outstripped her companions; but her career was checked midway between the two fleets by an Athenian galley which had sailed forth to meet her. The first shock shattered her sculptured prow, the second buried her in the waves. The Athenians, encouraged by this auspicious prelude, proceeded with their whole force, animating each other to the combat by a martial song: "Advance, ye sons of Athens, save your country, defend your wives and children, deliver the temples of your gods, regain the sacred tombs of your renowned forefathers; *this day*, the common cause of Greece demands your valour." The battle was bloody and destructive, and disputed on the side of the Persians with more obstinate resistance than on any former occasion; for, from the Attic coast, seated on a lofty throne on the top of mount Ægialos, Xerxes observed the scene of action, and attentively remarked, with a view to reward and punish, the various behaviour of his subjects. The presence of their prince operated on their hopes, and still more powerfully on their fears.

¹ Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxv.

² Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxix. et seq.

³ Ibid. l. viii. c. lxxix. et seq.

But neither the hope of acquiring the favour, nor the fear of incurring the displeasure of a despot, could furnish principles of action worthy of being compared with the patriotism and love of liberty which actuated the Greeks. To the dignity of their motives, as much as to the superiority of their skill, the latter owed their unexampled success in this memorable engagement. The foremost ships of the Phœnicians were dispersed or sunk. Amidst the terror and confusion occasioned by their repulse, they ran foul of those which had been drawn up in two lines behind them. The Athenians skillfully encircled them around, compressed them into a narrower space, and increased their disorder; they were at length entangled in each other, deprived of all power of action, and, to use the humble, but expressive figure of an eye-witness, "caught and destroyed like fish in a net."⁴ Such was the fate of the right wing; while the Ionians, who, on the left, opposed the fleets of Peloponnesus and Ægina, furnished them with an opportunity to complete the victory. Many of the Asiatic Greeks, mindful of the advice given by Themistocles, abandoned the interest of the great king, and openly declared for their countrymen; others declined the engagement; the remainder were sunk and put to flight. Among those which escaped was the ship of queen Artemisia, who in the battle of Salamis, displayed superior courage and conduct: she was closely pursued by an Athenian galley, commanded by Amenias, brother of the poet Æschylus. In this extremity she employed a successful, but very unwarrantable stratagem. The nearest Persian vessel was commanded by Damasithymus, a tributary prince of Calynda in Lycia, a man with whom Artemisia was at variance. With great dexterity she darted the beak of her galley against the Lycian vessel. Damasithymus was buried in the waves; and Amenias, deceived by this measure, equally artful and audacious, believed the vessel of Artemisia one of those which had deserted the Persian interest. The Phœnician and Ionian squadrons (for that of the Egyptians had been exceedingly weakened by the action on the coast of Eubœa) formed the main strength of the Persian armament; after these were defeated, the ships at a distance ventured not to advance, but hastily changing sail, measured back their course to the Athenian and other neighbouring harbours. The victors, disdaining to pursue them, dragged the most valuable part of the wreck to the coasts of Psyttalea and Salamis. The narrow seas were covered with floating carcasses of the dead, among whom were few Greeks; as even those who lost their ships in the engagement, saved their lives by swimming, an art which they universally learned as a necessary branch of education, and with which the Barbarians were totally unacquainted.⁵

Xerxes had scarcely time to consider and deplore the destruction and disgrace of his

fleet, when a new spectacle, not less mournful, offered itself to his sight. The flower of the Persian infantry had taken post, as we have already observed, on the rocky isle of Psyttalea, in order to receive the shattered remains of the Grecian armament, which, after its expected defeat, would naturally take refuge on that barren coast. But equally fallacious and fatal was their conjecture concerning the event of the battle. The Greeks, disembarking from their ships, attacked, in the enthusiasm of victory, those astonished troops, who, unable to resist, and finding it impossible to fly, were cut down to a man. As Xerxes beheld this dreadful havoc, he started in wild agitation from his silver throne, rent his royal robes, and, in the first moment of his returning tranquillity, commanded the main body of his forces, posted along the Athenian coast, to return to their respective camps.

From that moment he resolved to return with all possible expedition into Asia. Yet did his fears and his policy conceal, for a few days, the design, not only from the Grecian but from the Persian generals. Mardonius alone was too well acquainted with the genius of his master, to believe that his concern for the safety of his illustrious person would allow him to remain longer than necessary, in a country which had been the scene of so many calamities. The artful courtier availed himself of the important secret, to divert the storm of royal resentment which threatened the principal author of this inglorious undertaking. In his first interview with Xerxes, he exhorted him, "not to be too deeply affected by the defeat of his fleet: that he had come to fight against the Greeks, not with rafts of wood, but with soldiers and horses: that the valour of the Persians had opposed all resistance, and their invincible sovereign was now master of Athens, the main object of his ambition: that having accomplished the principal end of the enterprise, it was time for the great king to return from the fatigues of war to the cares of government, for with three hundred thousand chosen men he would undertake to prosecute his designs, and to complete his victory." Such is the language of adulation, too often held to princes. The other courtiers confirmed, by their approbation, the advice of Mardonius; and the Persian monarch, while he obeyed the dictates of his own pusillanimity, seemed to leave Greece in reluctant compliance with the anxious solicitude of his subjects.

The remains of the Persian fleet, frightened from the coast of Greece, returned to the harbours of Asia Minor, and afterwards assembled and rendezvoused, during the ensuing winter, in the port of Cymé. The transports were ordered to the Hellespont, on the banks of which Xerxes arrived with his troops in forty-five days, after intolerable hardships and fatigue. Famine and pestilence filled up the measure of their calamities; and, excepting the three hundred thousand chosen men committed to Mardonius, a detachment of whom guarded the royal person to the coast, scarcely a remnant was left of so many millions.⁶ The bridge

⁴ Æschylus Persæ.

⁵ Before this period it was a law at Athens and other states, τοὺς παῖδας διδασκασθαι πρῶτον νῆεν τε καὶ γερμματα; that boys first learn reading and swimming. Sam. Petit. de Leg. Att. p. 11.

⁶ Οὐδὲν μέγας ὡς ἴπποι, says Herodotus emphatically.

ostentatiously erected on the Hellespont would have presented, had it remained entire, a mortifying monument of past greatness. But this magnificent fabric had been destroyed by a tempest: and such is the obscurity with which Xerxes returned from Greece, compared with the blaze of grandeur in which he arrived there, that it is uncertain whether he crossed the channel in a Phœnician ship of war, or only in a fishing-boat.¹ Having returned to Sardis, he endeavoured to compensate for the disappointment of ambition by the gratification of sensuality, and buried himself in pleasures more infamous and degrading, and not less frightfully criminal, than all the disgrace which his pride had incurred, and all the calamities which his subjects had either inflicted or suffered.²

When the Greeks had leisure to examine the extent and completeness of their success, they determined in the first emotions of triumph and resentment, to pursue the shattered remains of the enemy. That no Barbarian might escape, they purposed immediately to sail northward, to destroy the Persian bridge over the Hellespont, and thus to intercept their return. This design was recommended, and chiefly supported by the Athenians, who having experienced the greatest share of the danger, felt most sensibly the joys of deliverance. But upon more mature deliberation, it occurred that the Persians were still sufficiently numerous to afford just grounds of terror. To their cowardice and inexperience, not to their want of strength, the Greeks owed all their advantages over them; but should the impossibility of retreat be added to their other calamities, they might derive courage from despair, and, by efforts hitherto unexerted, repair the consequences of their past errors and misfortunes. These considerations, first suggested, it is said, by Euribiades the Spartan, were adopted by Themistocles, who convinced his countrymen that the jealousy of the Grecian gods, unwilling that one man should be lord of Europe and Asia, rather than their own prowess, had given them the victory over Xerxes; a prince of such folly and madness, that he had treated with equal irreverence things human and divine, destroyed the sacred temples, overthrown the venerable altars and images, and impiously insulted the gods of the Hellespont with stripes and fetters. That it was the duty of the Athenians, after having gloriously repelled the common enemy, to provide for the subsistence of their wives and families, to sow their lands, rebuild their houses, and thus to repair, by the most industrious activity, the dreadful ravages committed in their territories.³

Themistocles had no sooner persuaded the Athenians to embrace his opinion, than he secretly despatched his confidant Sicinus to acquaint the great king with the danger which he had so nearly escaped, and to advise him to pursue his journey with all possible expedition. Xerxes readily believed a piece of information, which agreed with the suggestions of

his own timidity. The rapidity of his march conspired with other circumstances above mentioned, in proving fatal to the lives of his followers; and the crafty Athenian, who knowing the unstable affections of the multitude, wished to deserve the gratitude of a king, gained the double advantage of dispelling sooner than could otherwise have happened, that destructive cloud of Barbarians which hovered over his country, and of convincing their leader, that he was in part indebted for his safety to that very man whose counsels, rather than the arms of Greece, had occasioned his affliction and disgrace.

The victory at Salamis terminated the second act of the Persian expedition, which has, with much propriety, been compared to a tragedy. The Greeks soon understood that, notwithstanding the return of Xerxes, three hundred thousand men, commanded by Mardonius, were cantoned for the winter in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, with a design to take the field early in the spring, and again to try the fortune of war. This intelligence deterred the Athenians from bringing home their wives and children, as they originally intended, from Træzené, Salamis, and Ægina, because they had reason to dread that their country would experience new effects of Barbarian resentment. It appears, however, that a few citizens, more sanguine in their hopes than the rest, returned to their ancient habitations; while the greater part continued on board the fleet, or went to reside with their friends in the Peloponnesus.

According to modern ideas, it would be natural to expect, that under the apprehension of another formidable invasion, the Greeks should have employed the winter in raising contributions, levying and disciplining troops, and concerting proper measures for the public defence. But such preparations were in some degree unnecessary, because in the Grecian republics almost every citizen was a soldier; and the different states were at all times too weakly united, to agree in any uniform plan of operations. Besides, the customs and prejudices of that early age obliged them to observe many forms and ceremonies, which interfered with employments seemingly more useful, on such an important emergency. We find, accordingly, that instead of increasing or improving their military establishment, the Greeks spent the winter⁴ in dividing the spoil; assigning to the different commanders the prizes of conduct and valour; performing the last offices to the dead; celebrating their games and festivals; and displaying, both in the multitude of their prayers, and in the magnificence of their offerings, the warmest gratitude to their protecting divinities. The dedications to the gods were intrinsically valuable. The rewards bestowed on their generals were simple tokens of public esteem. The first consisted in vases, statues, and other ornaments of gold and silver; the second in a wreath of pine, laurel, or olive: a circumstance which made Tigranes the Persian, exclaim, "Heavens! against what men have we come to contend? insensible to interest, they fight only for glory!"

¹ Confer. Herod. Justin. Corn. Nepos.

² Herodot. et Diodor. *ibid.*

³ Herodot. l. viii. c. cviii. et seq.

⁴ Herodot. l. viii. c. cxi. et seq.

It is not surprising, that the institutions of Greece should have deceived an untutored Barbarian, when we consider that even the modern philosopher and historian have been too often dazzled by their splendour. Yet notwithstanding what Tigranes believed, and what, from the fond admiration of antiquity, many modern writers have asserted, the indiscriminate praise of disinterestedness by no means belonged to the Grecians. When the commanders of their several ships and squadrons assembled to regulate the distribution of naval and military rewards, each captain, with a selfishness equally indelicate and unjust, arrogated to himself the first prize of merit; though most of them acknowledged the desert of Themistocles as second to their own.⁵ This general assignment of the second, while all alike assumed the first place, was equivalent to a public declaration in favour of the Athenian: and the honours which were conferred on him, both in his own country and in Sparta, sufficiently confirmed the decision. The usual marks of the public esteem were not indeed attended with any immediate profit; but their consequences were extremely beneficial. Supported by the favourable opinion of his countrymen, a commander by sea or land frequently attained an authority, the exercise of which was equally adapted to flatter pride and to gratify avarice. The behaviour of Themistocles, after he had acquired sufficient merit with the public to justify his rapacity, affords one memorable example of this kind; and we shall meet with many more, in examining the subsequent events of the Grecian history. Instead of remaining at home, in order to concert a plan for repelling the danger which threatened his country, the Athenian commander sailed with a little squadron to the Cyclades, laid these unfortunate islands under a heavy contribution, and without the participation, or even knowledge of his colleagues in command, enriched himself and his favourites.⁶

On the approach of spring, Mardonius prepared to take the field. His army consisted of the Medes, Persians, Scythians, and Indians; and though reduced from the millions which followed Xerxes to about three hundred thousand men, it was thereby rather delivered from an useless encumbrance, than deprived of any real strength. Before marching from Thessaly, his superstition engaged him to consult the Grecian oracles, and moved probably by an erroneous explanation of their ambiguous responses, he determined to try the effect of negotiation, before he had recourse to arms. He might treat either with individuals, or with communities. By the former method, the Thebans assured him, that he might become master of Greece, without hazarding a battle. "You have only," said they, "to send money to the leading men in the several republics. In this manner you will divide each state into factions; engage them in a civil war; and, when exhausted by mutual hostilities, they will readily submit to your demands." Mardonius, instead of pursuing this judicious system, which

would probably have been successful, sent Alexander, king of Macedon, to treat with such Athenians as had returned to their city. This illustrious ambassador, who boasted an Argive extraction, was the tributary prince of a barbarous country; but of a country destined, in a future age, to attain empire and renown, by the arts of Philip and the arms of his immortal son. The first Alexander was peculiarly well qualified for executing the office with which Mardonius had entrusted him, because his family had long been connected with the republic of Athens, by the sacred ties of hospitality. But his commission was as unwelcome as his visit was acceptable. The Athenians, therefore, delayed calling an assembly to hear and answer his discourse, until the Spartans (who were apprised of the intention of Mardonius) should send ambassadors to assist at the deliberation. When all parties were convened, Alexander declared, "That he was sent on the part of Mardonius, who had received a message from the great king, intimating his will to forgive their past injuries, to reinstate them in their possessions, to rebuild their houses and temples, and to receive them into the number of his friends and confederates." Mardonius then spoke for himself: "What madness, O Athenians, can impel you to maintain war against a monarch whom you cannot expect ever to conquer, nor hope always to resist? You are acquainted with the number and prowess of the troops under my command, which, formidable as they are, make but a small part of the unbounded resources of Xerxes. Every year he can invade you with an increasing superiority of strength; submit, therefore, to a power which it is impossible to oppose; profit ere it be too late, of the disposition of the great king, and accept the offer of an alliance which folly alone, not fortitude and firmness, can engage you to decline." Alexander endeavoured to add weight to these considerations, by observing, "That his past conduct had uniformly proved the sincerity of his attachment to the Athenians; and that he was firmly convinced of the expediency, and even necessity of the measures now in agitation, otherwise he should not have undertaken to propose them. He therefore exhorted them to reflect on the advantages which would accrue to them from being alone, of all the Greeks, admitted into the alliance of Xerxes; to reflect also on the dreadful consequences which would attend their refusal, since their country, placed as a prize between the contending parties, would thereby be exposed to inevitable destruction."

As soon as Alexander had ended his discourse, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors represented to the assembly, "That they had been sent on the part of their republic, to thwart the measures of the Barbarians, with whom, in order to resent the quarrel of her Athenian allies, Sparta had engaged in a bloody and destructive war. Could the Athenians then, for whose sake alone the war which now extended over all Greece was originally undertaken, abandon their friends and confederates, whose

⁵ Herodot. l. viii. c. xxiii.

⁶ Herodot. *ibid.* c. lxxv.

⁷ Herodot. l. viii. c. cxi.

services they had every reason to approve? Could they associate with Barbarians, whose hostilities they had every reason to resent? Sparta affectionately sympathized with their sufferings, in the loss of their houses and their harvests; yet the confederates in general had endeavoured to prevent or repair the unhappy consequences of their loss: they had maintained their wives and families, supported and educated their helpless children, cherished and sustained the declining years of their parents. Their generosity was not yet exhausted; if the Athenians should be compelled again to abandon their country, they would again find the same hospitable reception in Peloponnesus; and their families, if it became necessary, would be maintained at the common expense, during the continuance of the war. Let them not, therefore, be deceived by the specious words of the tyrant Alexander, who, at the expense of truth, endeavoured to promote the interest of a tyrant like himself. The Athenians ought to remember, that neither justice, nor honour, nor fidelity, can be expected from tyrants and Barbarians."¹ Having thus spoken, the Lacedæmonians, as well as Alexander, withdrew; and the Athenians, after a short deliberation, answered both parties by the voice of Aristides, who, as archon, or chief magistrate, presided in the assembly: first, to the Macedonian they replied, "That as they were sufficiently acquainted with the strength of Xerxes, he might have spared them the insult of describing its vast superiority to their own. Yet, in defence of liberty, there was no power too great to oppose. Return then, and tell Mardonius, that the Athenians will never make peace with Xerxes, while the sun performs his annual course in the heavens; but that, trusting to the assistance of the gods and heroes, whose temples and images the tyrant has impiously destroyed, we will resist him to the last extremity. To conclude: come not a second time to Athens with such messages, the insolence of which may make us forget that you are our friend, and connected with us by the sacred ties of reciprocal hospitality." The answer given to the Lacedæmonian ambassadors was delivered in a still higher strain of patriotism: "That the Barbarians, or even the peasants of Laconia, should suppose us capable of coming to an accommodation with the Persians, does not surprise us; but it is indeed surprising, that you, citizens of Sparta, should entertain the same groundless fears; you, who have so often heard by report, and who, on so many occasions, have yourselves witnessed the disinterested magnanimity of our republic. Know then, that the richest possessions on earth, that all the treasures of the great king, are not sufficient to seduce our unalterable attachment to Greece. The laws of God and man equally forbid our ingratitude; or if all ties of *duty* were dissolved, our *resentment* against the Persians would restrain us. We must avenge our plundered altars, our prostrate images, our desolated temples. We must avenge the cause of our allies, and our own;

for all the Greeks have the same religion, language, lineage, and manners; and, while an Athenian survives, will never, with his consent, make peace with the Barbarians. We acknowledge with gratitude your proffered kindness to our families; but henceforth we hope to provide for them, without giving the confederates any trouble on their account. What we request of you is, that your army march with all possible expedition towards Bœotia, that our united resistance may stop the progress of the Barbarian, who, as soon as he is apprised of our determined hostility, will not fail to proceed southward, to invade Attica a second time."²

This conjecture was justified by the event. The Persians within a few weeks marched into Bœotia, but the Athenians looked in vain for the expected arrival of their Spartan auxiliaries. To have witnessed the proceedings just described in the Athenian assembly, we should have imagined that there was a generous contest of patriotism between the two republics; and that the happiness and glory of Greece, not the interest of their particular communities, was the great object of their ambition. But the Greeks had often much patriotism in their speeches, when there was little in their hearts; and the Spartans, who had lately employed such powerful arguments to engage Athens in defence of the common cause, totally abandoned their principles whenever it suited their convenience.³ Instead of issuing forth in order to support their allies in Bœotia, they remained within the isthmus, and endeavoured to fortify that inlet into their territory with such additional walls and bulwarks as might render it impenetrable. The work was now complete; and the Peloponnesians, secure, as they imagined, behind this solid rampart, equally disregarded the safety, and despised the resentment, of their northern allies.

The Athenians, a second time forsaken by their confederates, were obliged again to desert their country. They had scarcely sailed to their families in Salamis, when Attica was invaded by the Persians. While the fugitives continued in that island, they received another embassy from Mardonius, offering them the same terms which they had formerly rejected. They still persisted in rejecting them; in consequence of which, they beheld, without apparent uneasiness, from the shores of Salamis, their territories⁴ again laid waste; their cities, and villas, and temples, devoured by the flames; and every thing that had escaped the fury of the first invasion, destroyed or consumed by the second. After committing these ravages, which as he had already obtained complete possession of the country, deserve to be considered only as the effect of a childish resentment, Mardonius returned into Bœotia, that his troops might be supplied with provisions; and that, should the enemy offer them battle, they might engage in a country better adapted than Attica to the operations of cavalry.

¹ Herodot. l. viii. c. cxlii.

² Herodot. l. viii. c. cxl. et seq.

³ Lysias, Orat. Funeb.

⁴ Herodot. l. ix. c. i. et seq.

The Athenians, who had been sent from Salamis to remonstrate with the Spartan council against the delays or desertion of the Peloponnesians, were accompanied by the ambassadors of Plataea and Megara, who confirmed their arguments and complaints. With the indignation of disappointed confidence, they upbraided the indifference and lukewarmness of the Spartans in the common cause; sentiments which ill corresponded with their own generous ardour. They contrasted the base treachery of Sparta, formerly the honour, now the disgrace of Greece, with the patriotic magnanimity of Athens. The latter, they observed, compelled by necessity, or urged by resentment of the shameful dereliction on the part of her allies, would doubtless accept the terms offered by Mardonius, and then the Peloponnesians must become sensible, when it was too late, that the wall across the isthmus formed but a partial and feeble defence; and however it might secure them from inroads on the side of the land, would ill protect their coasts against the descents of the Persian, reinforced by the Athenian fleet.⁵

Whether the eloquence of the ambassadors, or the returning sense of public utility, overcame the pusillanimous resolutions formerly embraced by the Spartans, it is certain that they now first determined to take the field. Five thousand Spartan pike-men were accompanied by thirty-five thousand Helots. Their Peloponnesian allies sent their respective contingents; so that the heavy-armed men raised in the peninsula exceeded twenty thousand, commanded by Pausanias, the guardian and kinsman of Plistarchus, son of Leonidas. Having marched beyond the isthmus, they were joined by Aristides, at the head of eight thousand Athenians, and by a superior number of their allies of Megara, Thespiae, Plataea, Salamis, Euboea, and Ægina. The whole heavy-armed troops amounted to nearly forty thousand; the light-armed were the thirty-five thousand Helots, attendants on the Spartans, and about as many more, one to each soldier, attended the other divisions of the army.⁶

Mardonius having marched into Boeotia, encamped on the banks of the Æsopus. His army of three hundred thousand men, while they waited the enemy's approach, of which they were secretly informed by the Argives, were employed in building a square fortification, about five quarters of a mile in front; a work of little utility, since it could only defend a small portion of a camp which extended many miles, from the Theban town of Erythraea, to the territory of the Plataeans. The Greeks having arrived in those parts, took post at the foot of mount Citheron, directly opposite to the enemy.

The hostile armies remained eleven days in their encampments, during which several incidents happened, which tend to display the manners and character of those great bodies of men, who were soon to attempt the destruction of each

other. Of the Grecians inhabiting the countries north of Attica, the Phocians, as we have already had occasion to observe, were the least disposed to embrace the cause of Mardonius. Yet as all their neighbours had submitted to his arms, they reluctantly sent to his camp a thousand soldiers, well armed, and commanded by Harmocydes, a citizen of great influence and authority. They had not continued many days in the Persian army, when an order came from Mardonius (the reason was unknown,) for the Phocians to be detached from the rest, and encamped in a separate body on the plain. They had no sooner obeyed his command, than the whole Persian cavalry appeared in sight, and soon formed themselves in hostile array. It immediately occurred to the Phocians, and particularly to their prudent commander, that Mardonius, suspecting their fidelity, or yielding to the solicitations of their inveterate enemies the Thessalians, had determined their destruction. Harmocydes therefore, pointing to the cavalry, called to his companions, "You see those men, who come with an evident intention to destroy us: but let us die like Grecians, and exert ourselves with all the fury of a desperate defence, rather than tamely submit to a dishonourable fate." While he yet spoke, the Phocians seized their arms, arranged themselves in order of battle, and supporting each other in redoubled ranks, presented on every side a firm circle of protended lances. Their warlike appearance struck terror into the surrounding cloud of Barbarians, who advanced brandishing, and a few of the nearest throwing, their javelins: but farther they ventured not to proceed; the determined countenance of the Greeks sufficed to repel them; they retired in haste to the Persian camp. A herald was then sent by Mardonius, "desiring the Phocians to take courage, nor to dread farther hostilities; that they had shown themselves to be brave men, contrary to the account which he had received of them; and, if they displayed their valour in the Persian cause, they should find it impossible to conquer either Xerxes or himself in good offices."⁷

The above relation tends to prove, that none of the Greeks, not even those who joined the enemy, were deficient in courage. Another incident related by the same historian proves, that notwithstanding the extreme folly of their commanders, the Persians were not universally deficient in wisdom. While they were encamped on the Æsopus, a wealthy Theban, named Attaginus, invited Mardonius, with fifty of his most distinguished officers, to a magnificent entertainment. The feast was given at Thebes, and an equal number of Boeotians were called to it. Among these was Thersander, a native of Orchomenus, and a person of the highest distinction in that city. Two of the guests were placed on each couch; and, as Thersander himself related to Herodotus, his Persian companion, after supper, entering into conversation in the Greek tongue, testified, under the seal of secrecy, his gloomy apprehensions concerning the event of the present war.

⁵ Lysias, Orat. Funeb.

⁶ Herodot. l. ix. c. i. et seq. Diodor. Sicul. l. xi. et Plut. in Aristid.

⁷ Herodot. l. ix. c. i. et seq.

He did not even hesitate to declare his firm persuasion, that few Persians would survive an engagement. When asked by the Theban, Why he did not communicate his opinion to his general? he said, that men of plain sense and honesty had seldom much influence with the great. It appeared from the whole tenor of his discourse, that there were many people in the Persian army, who, like himself, lamented the mad ambition of Xerxes, and the fatal rashness of Mardonius; and who, while they respected their stations and dreaded their power, despised their characters, and condemned their conduct.¹ This observation it is proper to make for the honour of human nature. In absolute governments, it is said that men obey, like a flock of sheep, the voice of a despot; yet it may be said with equal truth, that amidst the obedience extorted by fear, they often see and regret the folly of their shepherd.

In this situation, it was scarcely to be expected that the hostile camps should remain without frequent skirmishes. These preludes to the general engagement ended favourably for the Grecians. Three thousand soldiers, furnished by the rocky district of Megara, were posted on the side most exposed to the enemy's cavalry, by whose incursions they had been so much harassed, that they determined to abandon that difficult station. Before executing their design, they sent a herald to the Grecian generals, intimating the resolution they had taken from necessity, and at the same time hinting the injustice of detaining them, from the time of the first encampment, in a post of peculiar danger, which though they had hitherto indeed maintained with singular constancy and fortitude, they now found themselves unable longer to defend. Pausanias addressed himself successively to the whole army, to know whether any division was willing to change posts with the Megarians. All were silent, or declined the proposal on frivolous pretences. The Athenians alone, actuated by that love of pre-eminence which they did not more ardently desire than they justly deserved, voluntarily offered their services on this trying occasion. They had not long occupied the important post, when the enemy's cavalry began to assault them. The assault they repelled with vigour, and Masistius the Persian general fell in the action. A terrible conflict ensued, according to ancient custom, around the body of the dead. The Athenians at length gained possession of it; though they began to give way before the general attack of the horse, yet upon being supported by a reinforcement from the main body, they again recovered their ground, and compelled the Persians to retire. When the first unwelcome messengers arrived in the camp with an account of their own defeat, and the death of the general, Mardonius and his attendants burst into tears; their lamentations were soon communicated to the troops, and diffused over the army, whose plaintive cries filled the whole land of Boeotia. The Persians tore their hair, disfigured their faces, and displayed every symptom of intol-

erable woe; for they had lost Masistius, who in comeliness and stature was the first of their generals, and in military courage and address only second to Mardonius.²

The Grecians having thus bravely delivered themselves from the incursions of the Persian cavalry, were now exposed to a still greater inconvenience, the scarcity of fresh water, which soon obliged them to decamp. Their late success afforded a favourable moment for executing this dangerous measure. They proceeded in arms along the foot of mount Citheron, prepared to repel the attack of the enemy, by converting the column of march into an order of battle. They arrived without opposition at the place appointed. This was a plain near the village of Hysia, in the territory of Platea, interspersed with many gentle eminences, adorned with a grove and temple sacred to the genius of the place, and enriched by the copious fountain Gargaphia; a necessary resource to the Greeks, as the enemy, by means of their cavalry and archers, commanded both sides of the *Æsopus*.

It might be expected, that men prepared to defend every thing most dear to them, should have preserved in the field perfect agreement and unanimity; especially as the Greeks, on some occasions at least, seemed sensible that mutual union was necessary for the general safety. When the allies on both sides the isthmus had assembled in Attica, they vowed with common consent to the gods, and bound themselves by the most tremendous oaths, to maintain with steadfast adherence an unshaken fidelity to Greece, to prefer liberty to life, to obey the command of their leaders, and to bury their companions slain in battle. Should fortune render them victorious (which to their present ardour seemed scarcely a matter of doubt,) they swore never to demolish any city whose inhabitants had concurred with the general voice on this important occasion, and never to rebuild the temples defaced by the Barbarians, but to leave them to the most distant posterity, as a monument of sacrilegious rage, and an incitement to honourable revenge. They swore also to institute an annual festival denominated the Common Liberty,³ and to consecrate public games and sacrifices to the goddess, the great author of their union, and the venerable object of their worship. But these public-spirited sentiments continued not long to actuate them. We have already had occasion to remark several symptoms of approaching animosity. Their dissensions soon broke out into an open rupture, and prevailed, even on the eve of a battle, not only between rival republics, but in the bosom of almost every community.

The first contest arose between the Athenians and Tegeans, about the command of the left wing. Both parties yielded the right, as the place of greatest honour to the Spartans. But the citizens of Tegea, in number three thousand, had been long deemed the best soldiers in Arcadia; and in all the conjunct ex-

¹ Herodot. l. ix. c. xv.

² Herodot. c. cxxiv.

³ Ibid. l. ix. c. viii. et seq.

peditions of the Peloponnesians, they had always obtained, unrivalled, the second honours of the field. These they professed themselves unwilling to relinquish, alleging the heroic exploits of their ancient kings; and asserting, "that the actions of the Athenians, performed either during their royal or democratical government, could not bear a comparison with their own: they appealed on this subject to the Lacedæmonians, in conjunction with whom they had often fought and conquered, and whose decision in their favour they rather claimed than requested." This bold pretension the Athenians easily repelled, by the lustre of their usual eloquence. "We know," said they, "that the Greeks are here assembled, not to dispute about precedence, but to fight the Barbarian. Yet, as the Tegeans have mentioned *their* ancestors, it becomes us to maintain the immortal renown of our own. Need we mention their ancient victories over the impious Thebans; their chastisement of the insolent Eurystheus; their generous protection of the unfortunate sons of Hercules? When Greece was invaded by the warlike Amazons, and afterwards by the fiercer savages of Scythia and Thrace, the Athenians resisted and overcame the common enemy. What people fought with more bravery than they in the war of Troy? But perhaps *we*, who now address you, have degenerated from the glory of our ancestors. Let the battle of Marathon efface the foul suspicion. There, unaided and alone, we defended the general safety, maintained the glory of Greece, and raised, by the prowess of our single republic, a trophy over forty nations. This exploit, had we no other to allege, entitles us to the rank claimed by the Tegeans, and to far higher honours. But the present is not a time for such contests; place us therefore, O Spartans! in whatever station you think fit; there, we will behave like brave men." Their words were scarcely ended, when the whole army of the Lacedæmonians cried out with one consent, "That the Athenians were far more worthy than the Tegeans, or any nation of Arcadia, to stand at the head of the left wing;" accordingly they assumed that important post.⁴

Mean time the Barbarian army approached. The Medes and Persians encamped on the plain, fronting the Spartans: the Grecian auxiliaries were placed in direct opposition to the Athenians. It is easy to perceive, even at this distance of time, the reason of such an arrangement. The Persians avoided to encounter the Athenian bravery, which they had already fatally experienced in the field of Marathon; and as the Thebans were the most powerful and the warmest of their foreign allies, as well as the inveterate enemies of Athens, it was thought proper to oppose them to that side on which the Athenians were posted. Ambiguous oracles, attended by unfavourable omens and prophecies, had hitherto deterred Mardonius from venturing a general engagement; and he was at length determined to this measure, not from any auspicious change in the admoni-

tions of heaven,⁵ but from the apparent timidity occasioned by the real dissensions of the Greeks.

The same reasons which made Mardonius desire to preserve, made Pausanias wish to alter, the relative disposition of their respective camps. Excepting in the glorious contest at Thermopylæ, in which they devoted themselves to death for the safety of their country, the Spartans had never contended with the Medes; but they had often fought and conquered the Bœotians. Pausanias therefore desired (for, though dignified with the title of general, he could not command) the Athenians to change places with his countrymen. This request was cheerfully complied with; but other circumstances sowed dissension in the Athenian camp.⁶ The quiet likewise of the Lacedæmonians was disturbed by the quarrels between Pausanias and Anompharetus, the Spartan next in command; and conspiring with these internal animosities, the Persian horse beat up their quarters, intercepted their convoys, and, by an unexpected incursion, destroyed their watering-place. It thus became necessary again to decamp. The obscurity of midnight was chosen as the most convenient time for effecting this purpose; and the destined place of retreat was a narrow slip of ground lying towards the source of the *Æsope*, and confined between that river and mount Citheron. This post was at least preferred by the majority; for the Greeks were by no means unanimous: so that when the march was ordered, many of the allies abandoned their leaders; others took refuge in the neighbouring temples, to elude the pursuit of the horse; while Anompharetus the Spartan declared, "That neither he, nor the division under his command, should ever fly from the enemy:" and in consequence of its dispersion in so many different directions, the Grecian army presented next morning the appearance, not of a regular march, but of a flight or rout.

Mardonius was apprised that the Greeks had changed their order of battle. He was now informed, that they had abandoned their camp. Not doubting that fear had precipitated their retreat, he ordered his soldiers to pursue the fugitives, and to complete the victory. The Lacedæmonians and Athenians were still within his reach; the former near the foot of the mountain, the latter in the middle of the plain. Having sent his Grecian auxiliaries, amounting to fifty thousand, against the Athenians, he advanced with the bravest of the Persian troops against that portion of the enemy which had shown an anxious solicitude to avoid his arms. Never did the contrast appear greater, than in the opposite appearance and behaviour of the hostile armies on this occasion. The Barbarians, ill armed, and totally ignorant of discipline,

⁵ The prophets consulted were Greeks, who perhaps secretly served the cause of their country. Mardonius resolved to engage the enemy, as we learn from Herodotus, without regarding their predictions. Alexander of Macedon came in the night to the Grecian camp, to give intimation of that resolution: yet Mardonius seems to have been immediately determined to attack, by the circumstances mentioned in the text.

⁶ Plutarch in Aristid.

⁴ Herodot. l. ix. c. xxvi. et seq. Plut. in Aristid.

advanced without order, and with a loud insulting noise. The Lacedæmonians, carefully covered with their shields, observed in silence the result of their sacrifices. While the heavenly admonitions were unfavourable, they patiently received the darts and javelins which the enemy threw upon them. But as soon as Pausanias, casting his eyes towards a neighbouring temple of Juno, and devoutly entreating the protection of the goddess, had obtained, in the changing aspect of the victims, a propitious answer to his prayer, they proceeded with intrepidity to close with their opponents.¹ The Persians, reinforced with the Sacæ, a Scythian tribe, sustained the attack with great bravery. Immense numbers were slain; but new numbers succeeded, crowding together in tumultuous disorder, and making a hideous outcry, as if they had intended to tear in pieces and to devour the enemy. Mardonius, mounted on a white steed of uncommon strength and swiftness, was distinguished in every part of the battle by the splendour of his appearance, but still more by deeds of signal valour. He was attended by a thousand horsemen, consisting of the flower of the Persian nobility, all alike ambitious to imitate the example, and to emulate the fame, of their leader. Had their skill been equal to their courage, or had they previously bestowed as much pains in disciplining their troops, as in improving their own agility and address, either the Greeks must have been conquered, or the battle must have remained doubtful. But the Barbarians acted without union or concert; and as they fought singly, were successively defeated. It is the nature, and the greatest disadvantage of cavalry, not to increase in force in proportion to the reduplication of their ranks. The Grecian phalanx, on the other hand, received an accession of strength from every addition to its depth; the ranks behind supported those before; no power was mispent or unexerted; and the effect might be continually augmented, till it became irresistible. Availing themselves of this circumstance, the Lacedæmonians thickened their ranks, extended their spears, sustained the shock, and penetrated the depth, of the brave Persian squadron. Mardonius fell by the fortunate arm of the Spartan Alcimnestus.² The death of the general was immediately followed by the defeat of the Persians, and the defeat of the Persians by the flight of the Barbarian army. Artabazus, the Parthian chief, had from the beginning condemned the rash measures of Mardonius. He commanded forty thousand men, who were prepared on every occasion to follow the example of their leader. As soon as he perceived the confusion of the Persians, he made the signal for his troops to quit the field. He conducted them through the territory of the Phocians, and arriving by hasty marches at the Hellespont, before the news of the defeat

and death of Mardonius, returned in safety to the Asiatic coast, with the forces entrusted to his care.³

The remainder of the discomfited Barbarians sought refuge in their camp, which, as we have already mentioned, had been strengthened by a considerable fortification. The Spartans pursued them with great ardour, but were unable to force their encampment. The Tegeans and other troops seconded the attack, but no impression could be made on the wall, till the arrival of the Athenians. These generous defenders of the cause of liberty had repulsed the Grecian auxiliaries, who impiously assisted the enemies of their country. The behaviour of the greater part of the traitors furnished the occasion of an easy victory; for, unable to meet the just reproaches and indignant looks of their countrymen, they soon betook themselves to flight, which, in the present case, seemed more honourable than resistance. The Thebans alone opposed with great perseverance the Athenian valour; they did not desist from hostility, till several hundreds were slain; and when compelled to quit the field, they fled towards Bœotia, and shut themselves up within the strong walls of their city. Instead of pursuing these fugitives, though their domestic and inveterate foes, the Athenians, with a laudable moderation and prudence, probably inspired by Aristides, then one of their generals, directed their march towards the Lacedæmonian forces, which had already engaged and put to flight the main strength of the enemy. The Athenians, however, came in time to complete the glory of that memorable day. They attacked with redoubled vigour the fortification, which had been in vain assailed by their allies; and having effected a breach in the wall, entered the Persian camp. They were followed by the brave soldiers of Tegea, and afterwards by the Spartans. The Barbarians were seized with consternation at seeing so many myriads confined within a narrow space. The means of their expected safety became the principal cause of their destruction. Fear hindered them to fight; the wall hindered them to fly; the great number of the enemy made it dangerous for the victors to give quarter; resentment of past injuries prompted them to revenge; of near two hundred thousand Barbarians, not two thousand escaped the fury of the Grecian spear.⁴

The event of this bloody engagement not only delivered the Greeks from the danger of servitude, but gave them possession of greater wealth than they could ever have expected to possess. In his precipitate retreat from Greece, Xerxes left behind him all his riches and magnificence. His most valuable effects were bestowed on Mardonius, the flatterer of his inclinations, and the unfortunate minister of his revenge. The rest was divided among his inferior favourites; and independent of the bounty of the prince, the tents of the Persian nobles furnished a wide profusion of elegance and splendour. Couches magnificently embroidered; tables of gold and silver; bowls and goblets

¹ Herodot. l. ix. c. lxii. et seq.

² Composed of two Greek words, which may be translated "of immortal memory:" an instance, among many, that the Greeks frequently gave names characteristic of persons; a custom which likewise prevailed much among the Jews. See Michaelis's Translation and Annotations on Genesis, p. 37. et passim.

³ Herodot. l. ix. c. lrv.

⁴ Ibid. l. ix. cap. c.

of gold; stalls and mangers of brass, curiously wrought and ornamented; chains, bracelets, scimitars, some of solid gold, others adorned with precious stones; and, to crown all, many chests of Persian money, which began at that time, and continued long afterwards, to be current in Greece. Among the common mass of spoil, Herodotus reckons a great many Persian women, besides innumerable horses and camels. The whole being collected into one place, the tenth was consecrated to the gods. A tenth of the remainder was bestowed on the general. Peculiar presents were offered to the temples of Olympian Jove, Isthmian Neptune, and Delphian Apollo, the favourite divinities of the whole Grecian name; nor did the Athenians forget to show particular gratitude to their adored Minerva. Prizes were afterwards distributed among the bravest of the surviving warriors; for though the victory had been obtained with little blood, yet several hundreds had fallen, especially of the most generous and daring; among whom, were ninety-one Spartans, fifty-two Athenians and sixteen men of Tegea. Callicratides, a Spartan, the bravest and most beautiful of the Greeks, was slain by an arrow, before Pausanias, who had not yet finished the sacrifice, had given the signal of engagement. As he fell, he said to those around him, that he was contented to die for Greece, but regretted dying ingloriously, having performed nothing worthy of himself or the common cause. But in the battle itself none of the warriors behaved with such distinguished bravery as Aristodemus, who alone of three hundred Spartans survived the action at Thermopylae. This circumstance had rendered him contemptible in the eyes of his countrymen. He was continually upbraided with the base desertion of his companions. The most heroic deeds could not restore him to the good opinion of the public; and it was asserted by the Spartans, that even on the present occasion, as he had determined to seek a voluntary death in order to efface the stain of his former infamy, he was not entitled to any of those honours which are deservedly bestowed on the genuine efforts of spontaneous valour.⁵

The Greeks buried their dead with every circumstance of funeral pomp, erected in the field of battle conspicuous trophies of their renown, and appropriated about twenty thousand pounds for dedicating temples and statues to the tutelary deities of Plataea, the illustrious scene of victory. A few days were spent in these transactions; after which it was determined, by universal consent, to march into Boeotia, in order to chastise the perfidy of the Thebans. On the eleventh day after the battle they arrived in the neighbourhood of Thebes, ravaged the territory, and made approaches to the walls. The citizens, who were not all equally guilty or equally obnoxious, escaped general destruction by surrendering the leaders of the faction which abetted the interest of the Medes. The traitors were carried to Corinth, condemned without trial, and sacrificed to the manes of their countrymen who

had fallen at Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea, in defence of political liberty and national independence.⁶

The battle of Plataea was fought the twenty-second of September; and on the same day another battle, not less glorious or less decisive, was fought between the same nations at the promontory of Mycalé in Ionia, opposite to the isle of Samos. The shattered remnant of the Persian fleet, which had escaped destruction on the fatal twentieth of October of the preceding year, took refuge in the friendly ports of Asia Minor. The victorious armament had suffered too much in repeated shocks with a superior force, to engage at that late season in the pursuit of an enemy, whose strength, amounting to above four hundred vessels, was still nearly the double of their own. The little squadron of Themistocles, averse to inactivity, found occupation, as we already had occasion to notice, in laying the islands of the Aegean under contribution. The great body of the fleet rendezvoused in the harbours of Aegina. There the Grecians continued during the winter, and before the season for action approached, the command was bestowed on Xantippus the Athenian, and on Leotychides the Spartan king. To these commanders, whose abilities and influence in their respective republics we formerly had an opportunity to mention, there arrived early in the spring a secret deputation from several cities of Ionia, intreating that the valour of the European Greeks, which had been so successfully employed in their own defence, might be still further exerted in delivering from bondage their brethren in Asia. In consequence of this invitation the fleet sailed eastward, and had scarcely reached the coast of Delos, when a second embassy came from the Samians, proposing the same measures as the first, and further adding, that the Persian fleet, now lying in the harbour of Samos, might be attacked and defeated without danger or difficulty. The Grecians seized with eagerness the favourable opportunity of terminating the war; but before they arrived at Samos, the enemy suspecting their motions, and unwilling to hazard another engagement at sea, had retired to the Ionic coast, and according to the custom of that age, not only drawn their ships on shore, but surrounded them with a ditch and palisade, and even a stone wall of considerable strength. The vessels thus secured, the sailors amounting to forty thousand, commanded by Artayndes, formed a camp along the shore. They were reinforced by the Persian army under Tigranes, computed at sixty thousand. It appears not whether this powerful body of men made any attempt to disturb the landing of the Greeks, who at the highest computation could not amount to a fourth part of their number. It seems most probable that they disdained this measure, and though they acknowledged their inferiority at sea, determined to hazard at land a general engagement, in which the isles and Hellespont, as well as the flourishing cities of the Asiatic coast should form the important prize of victory.

⁵ Herodot. i. ix. c. lxx.

⁶ Herodot. i. ix. c. lxxv.

The Greeks did not decline the battle. Xantippus is said to have made use of a similar contrivance with that employed by Themistocles at Artemisium, for depriving the enemy of their Grecian auxiliaries.¹ A more probable stratagem is ascribed to Leotychides, who, in order to encourage his troops, is said to have industriously spread a report that their countrymen had obtained a signal victory at Plataea. This report, by whatever means² it was raised and circulated, had doubtless a considerable effect in deciding the fortune of the day. Other circumstances, not less powerful, were, the general revolt of the Asiatic Greeks, and the silent contest of honour between the Spartans and Athenians. Among the Barbarian troops the Persians behaved with uncommon bravery; and on the side of the Grecians, the battle of Mycalé was more bloody than any other fought in the course of the war. It deserves attention, that, in all these memorable actions, the Greeks had no resource but in victory. But the Barbarians had provided probable means of safety, even in case of a defeat. On the present occasion they had endeavoured not only to secure a retreat within a strongly fortified camp, but to acquire an undisturbed passage through the

narrow defiles of Mycalé. Yet all these precautions were ineffectual against the valour and fortune of the Greeks. The Milesians, posted by the enemy to guard the passes of the mountain, prevented, instead of promoting, their escape. The Spartans pursued them with great slaughter in that direction; while the Athenians, assisted by the allies of Corinth, Sicyon, and Træzené, advanced with undaunted bravery to attack their camp. The Asiatic Greeks, who at all times acknowledged the warlike pre-eminence of their European brethren, emulated, in the present engagement alone, in which they fought for every thing dear to them, the admired valour of their ancestors. Above forty thousand Persians perished in the field; many fell in the pursuit, or in defending their entrenchments; the remainder fled in disorder, nor thought themselves secure till they had reached the walls of Sardis. Their ships, their camp, the freedom of Ionia, and the undisturbed possession of the Asiatic coast, formed the inestimable prize of the victors; and thus the expedition of Xerxes, undertaken with a view to enslave Europe, restored liberty to the fairest portion of Asia.³

CHAPTER XI.

Military Glory of Greece—Enemies to whom that Country was exposed—Foundation and Growth of Carthage—The flourishing Condition of Magna Græcia—Excites the Jealousy of the Carthaginians—Who enter into a League with Xerxes—The object of this Alliance—Causes of the singular Prosperity of Magna Græcia—History of Pythagoras, and of his Philosophy—The Carthaginians invade Sicily—Their Disasters—Glory of Gelon—His Treaty with the Carthaginians—Causes of the Decay of Magna Græcia.

THE beginning of the fifth century before Christ forms the most glorious era in the history of Greece. While the republics of Athens and Sparta humbled the pride of Asia, the flourishing settlements on the Hellespont and the Hadriatic overawed the fierce Barbarians of Europe;⁴ and the southern colony of Cyrené restrained, within their native limits, the savage ferocity of the Libyans.⁵ The north, south, and east thus acknowledging the ascendant of the Grecian valour and genius, Rome still contended in the west, with the obstinacy of the Volsci,⁶ for the rude villages of Latium: yet on this side, from which the stream of conquest was destined, in a future age, to flow over the world, the Greeks

had already most danger to apprehend, and most laurels to acquire; not, however, from Rome, but from the implacable enemy of the Roman name.

The foundation and growth of Carthage, which have been so successfully adorned by poetical fiction, are very imperfectly explained in history. It is known, that at least eight hundred and ninety years⁸ before the Christian era, a Phœnician colony settled on that fertile projecture of the African coast, which boldly advances into the Mediterranean, to meet, as it were, and to defy the shores of Sicily and Italy, planted in the following century by Greeks,

¹ The story is improbable, because the Asiatic Greeks had already declared their intention to revolt. It was not the interest of Xantippus, therefore, to make the Persians suspect their fidelity, since treacherous friends are always more dangerous than open enemies.

² Herodotus, (l. ix. c. c.) and Diodorus (l. xi. c. xxxv.) differ in their accounts.

³ Herodot. l. ix. c. xc.—c. cxiv. Diodorus Siculus, l. xi. xxxiv.—c. xxxviii.

⁴ Herodot. l. vi. Thucyd. l. i.

⁵ Strabo, l. xvii.

⁶ Diodor. l. xi.

⁷ With what energy does Virgil express the eternal enmity between Rome and Carthage?

Littora littoribus contraria, fluctibus undas,
Imprecor, arma armis; pugnent ipsique nepotes.
Æneid. l. iv.

⁸ B. C. 891. Petav. de Doctr. Temporum. Yet, as there is a gap in the Carthaginian history of several centuries, every man of taste will be desirous of extending the duration of this dark and unknown period, to have the pleasure of believing that Æneas and Dido were contemporaries: an opinion more probable than that of Sir Isaac Newton, who would bring down the time of Æneas and the era of the Trojan war to the age of Dido and the foundation of Carthage.

with whom the republic of Carthage, long before the age of her great Hannibal, waged many cruel and bloody wars. For three centuries after their establishment, the Carthaginians seem to have silently but successfully availed themselves of the natural fertility of their soil, the conveniency of their harbours, the skill and dexterity of their artisans, the adventurous spirit of their mariners; above all, of the profound wisdom of their government, which had been established on such admirable principles, that, from the foundation of their city till the age of the philosopher Aristotle,⁹ no tyrant had oppressed the freedom, no sedition had disturbed the tranquillity of Carthage.¹⁰

From this peaceful and happy obscurity, the Carthaginians first emerged into notice in consequence of their opposition to the naval enterprises of the Asiatic Greeks, who, about the middle of the sixth century before Christ, flying the oppressive domination of Persia, threw themselves on the western shores and islands of the Mediterranean. As a maritime and enterprising nation the Greeks were naturally the rivals of the Carthaginians; and the Phœceans, who had left the coast of Ionia to avoid the cruel tyranny of the satrap Harpagus, had landed at, or perhaps founded, Aleria in the isle of Corsica, before they finally settled at Velia¹¹ in Italy, and Marseilles in Gaul.¹² The Carthaginians, who had already formed establishments in Corsica, regarded the whole island as a dependency of their republic, and set themselves to oppose with vigour the Grecian invaders. From a similar motive the Tuscans embraced the same design; and the most ancient naval engagement, distinctly recorded in history, was fought in the Sardinian sea, between the Phœceans with sixty sail on the one side, against the Tuscans and Carthaginians with double that number on the other.¹³ The Greeks had the whole glory of the battle; they destroyed forty of the enemy's ships, and compelled the rest to fly. But the smallness of their numbers, greatly diminished by their desperate efforts in defence of the honour of their nation against a superior force, obliged them to abandon the project of settling in Corsica.

Though the issue of this memorable sea-fight tends to dispel the cloud of fiction concerning the remote voyages and ancient naval power of the Carthaginians, yet it cannot be doubted, that in the beginning of the following century, and before the invasion of Xerxes, they were the most powerful commercial nation in the world. The proud centre of their empire was surrounded by a cluster of colonies and tributary cities, which extended

above a thousand miles¹⁴ along the coast of Africa. They were masters of Sardinia and the northern coast of Sicily.¹⁵ They had established colonies not only in Corsica, but in Malta and the Balerian isles. They often visited the Casseterides. They probably first discovered the Canaries, whose equable and happy temperature entitled them to the epithet of Fortunate. They had appropriated the gold mines of Spain, the Peru and Mexico of the ancient world;¹⁶ and all these advantages being directed by the prudent enterprise of the magistrates, consisting chiefly of merchants,¹⁷ and improved by the patient industry of the people, who knew that by gaining wealth they must attain respect, rendered Carthage the centre of general commerce. From Egypt they imported linen and the papyrus; the coasts of the Red Sea furnished them with spices, perfumes, gold, pearls, and precious stones.¹⁸ The rich carpets of Persia adorned the palaces of the Carthaginian magistrates. From Spain they drew the precious metals necessary to facilitate their commerce; and from Britain and other provinces of the north, they derived iron, lead, tin, and copper, equally necessary to second all the efforts of their industry. The Carthaginian exports consisted partly in the produce of their fertile soil, but chiefly in the ingenious labours of their artificers; grains, fruits, honey, leather, and flax of a superior kind;¹⁹ naval stores, particularly ropes made of a species of broom called spartum; household furniture, toys, and the materials of the highly valued *Punicean* colour. Their mechanic arts had attained a degree of perfection which was acknowledged and admired by their enemies;²⁰ but the liberal arts, and particularly poetry and eloquence,²¹

14 From the western boundary of Cyrenaica to the Straits of Gibraltar, Shaw reckons 1420 geographical miles; but this was the extent of the Carthaginian dominion in the greatest splendour of the republic. Shaw's Travels, p. 150.

15 Polyb. l. iii. c. xxii.

16 Auctor. apud Hendreich Respub. Carthag. l. i.

17 In this respect the government of Carthage was very different from that of Crete, and particularly of Sparta, with both which Aristotle compares it. Isocrates (ad Nicoclem) says, that in civil affairs the Carthaginian government was aristocratical; in military, royal: this probably was the case in the earliest times. The chief magistrates were called Suffetes, which, in the Hebrew language, signifies judges (Bochart, Canaan,) and might therefore be naturally translated by the word βασιλεις, in Greek. But it appears from Aristotle, that these judges or kings, who were two in number, were nothing more than annual magistrates, who convoked the senate, and presided in that assembly. When the senate and suffetes were of one mind, the people had no vote in the management of public affairs; but when their opinions were different, it belonged to the people to decide. Aristotle regards this as an imperfection in their constitution; and time justified his opinion. In a commercial republic, where the people gradually become more rich and more licentious, such a regulation naturally tended to throw too much power into their hands. During the century which elapsed from Aristotle to Hannibal, the people of Carthage became more powerful than the senate; at Rome the senate were more powerful than the people: and to these circumstances chiefly, the most judicious author of antiquity ascribes the very different fortune of the two nations in the ever memorable wars waged between them. Polyb. l. vi.

18 Pliny, l. xxxviii. c. vii. tells us, that carbuncles were so common in Carthage, that they were generally known by the name of Carthaginian.

19 Xenophon, de Venatione.

20 Cato de Re Rustica, et Valerius Maximus, l. vii.

21 The great Hannibal was a lover of Greek learning, and composed several books in that language. Cornelius Ne-

9 Aristot. de Repub. l. ii. c. xi.

10 If Dido laid the foundation of so much prosperity and happiness, she might boast, with becoming dignity, of having secured immortal fame:

Vixi, et quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi,
Urbem præclaram statui, mea mœnia vidi:
Et nunc magna mei sub terris ibit imago.

VIRGIL, ibid.

11 Diodor. l. v. and Cluverius Sicil. Ant. p. 507.

12 Thucyd. l. i.

13 Thucyd. l. i. et Herodot. l. vi.

seem never to have flourished or taken root in their republic: a circumstance more fatal to the renown of Carthage than all the destructive ravages of the Romans, whose immortal hate would have found it more difficult to abolish the elegant inventions of genius, than to extinguish the most splendid monuments of wealth and grandeur.

Few individuals are able to enjoy, without abusing, the gifts of fortune; and no nation ever possessed power, without aspiring at conquest. But the commercial ambition of the Carthaginians was distinguished by an exclusive and jealous spirit, which sought to stifle the activity and improvements of every people that might ever become their rival. In the end of the sixth century before Christ, and twenty-eight years before the invasion of Xerxes, they concluded a treaty with Rome, recently delivered from the tyranny of its kings, which marks the utmost solicitude to prevent the new republic from ever entering into correspondence, or ever gaining acquaintance¹ with the dependencies of Carthage. The Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, which, within the course of sixty years, had (for reasons that will immediately be explained) received such accessions of strength and splendour, as entitled those countries to the appellation of *Magna Græcia*,² more justly alarmed the jealousy, and provoked the envious resentment of the Carthaginian magistrates. The Greeks were already masters of the eastern isles and shores of the Mediterranean. They were not only a warlike, but an ingenious and commercial nation. The naval force of the Phœceans alone had defied and disgraced the united fleets of the Tuscans and Carthaginians. The latter therefore beheld, with the utmost satisfaction, the continual sparks of hostility that broke out between the Greeks and Persians. They learned, with admiration and delight, the mighty preparations of Xerxes; but were still more delighted when the great king, who had been accustomed to receive the presents and the adulation of the tributary princes of Asia, condescended to demand an equal alliance with their republic; probably granted them subsidies to raise troops in Spain, Gaul, and the northern parts of Italy; and only required them to join their efforts with his own, to punish, and if possible, to extirpate the natural enemies of both. The crafty Africans greedily accepted propositions, seemingly so favourable to their interest; and, after three years preparations, had collected an armament of two thousand ships

of war, and three thousand transports to convey an army of three hundred thousand men into *Magna Græcia*.³ It was determined between the confederates, that while Xerxes poured his millions into the centre of Greece, and rooted out the original stock of the devoted nation, the Carthaginians should cut off its flourishing branches in Italy and Sicily. The terms of the agreement were carefully observed; the combined attack was made at the time appointed; and Europe is interested in knowing to what particular causes must be ascribed the failure of expeditions, which, if successful, would probably have inverted her destiny, and deprived her of the boasted superiority which she thenceforth maintained over the other quarters of the world.

Whoever has observed the desolate barbarity of Calabria, or reflected on the narrow extent and present weakness of Sicily, cannot hear, without a mixture of surprise and incredulity, that five centuries before Christ, those countries contained above twenty warlike communities, several of whom could send into the field a hundred thousand fighting men. The hasty glance of impatient ignorance will confidently reject, on this subject, the evidence of antiquity, as contrary to probability and experience; the contemplative visionary will admit the fact, and deduce from it many gloomy reflections on the old age and decay of the world; but the more practical philosopher will attempt to discover the causes of the ancient and actual state of *Magna Græcia*, in the history and institutions of that country during the respective periods of time which are the objects of his research.

The establishment of Eubœan Cumæ, the mother of Parthenopé, or Naples, and the foundation of a few other Grecian cities in Italy and Sicily, remounts, as already mentioned, to the heroic ages; but by far the greater number of Greek colonies in those parts were planted during the eighth century before the Christian era,⁴ and chiefly, 1. by the Eubœans, whose principal city, Chalcis, usually furnishing the conductor of the colony, gave the epithet of Chalcidian to the new settlements; 2. by the Achæans of Peloponnesus, who were of the Eolian tongue and lineage; and, 3. by the Dorian states of that peninsula, especially Corinth; to which city may be applied the observation of ancient republicans concerning the fathers of Cato and Brutus, that as children often derived lustre from the merit of their parents, so Corinth acquired renown from the splendour and prosperity of its children. Besides their powerful colonies in Corcyra, Leucas, Anactorium, Ambracia, whose transactions form such an important part of the history of ancient Greece, the Corinthians founded Syracuse, which A. C. 729. soon became, and long continued, the capital of Sicily. Seventy years after their establishment there, the inhabitants of Syracuse built Acras, and afterwards, at an equal distance of time, Camerina. Many other cities

pos in Hannibal.—Silenus, another Carthaginian, wrote history in Greek. Cicer. de Divinat.—Sallust speaks of *Punic books* in his history of the Jugurthine war; and we know that Mago's Treatise of Rural Economy, in twenty-eight books, was translated by order of the Roman senate, although the elder Cato had previously handled that important subject. I mention not the spurious voyage of Hanno, since better proofs of the Carthaginian literature may be found in the second and eighteenth books of Pliny. But two observations naturally present themselves, which justify what is said in the text; first, that the Carthaginians wrote rather on the useful than ornamental arts; and secondly, that their greatest writers preferred the Greek to the Punic language.

¹ Polyb. l. iii. c. xxii.

² Strabo, l. viii. p. 389.

³ Herodot. l. vii. et Diodor. l. xi.

⁴ Between the 10th and 30th Olympiads, and the years 737 and 777 B. C.

of less note owed their birth to the same metropolis; so that in the sixth century before Christ, the Syracusans had extended their settlements over all the southern coast of the island.⁵ We had already an opportunity to mention on what occasion the Lacedæmonians

Olymp. founded the city of Tarentum in vii. 2. Italy; thirty-nine years afterwards, A. C. 707. Rhegium was built by the Messenians and Chalcidians, the former of whom (as we have related above) had already settled at Messene, on the opposite shore of Sicily. The citizens of Tarentum founded Heraclea, situated on the Tarentine gulf, and perhaps gave an accession of inhabitants to Locri, which, though originally planted by the Eolians, seems early to have used the Doric dialect. The Rhodians, who were also of the Doric race, built the city of Gela in Sicily, forty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse;⁶ and Gela planted the flourishing colony of Agrigentum, which xlix. 3. soon surpassed the splendour of its A. C. 582. metropolis, and became the second city in the island.

By means of these powerful establishments, the Dorians acquired, and always maintained an ascendant in Sicily; but the Achæan colonies, who were of the Eolian blood and language,⁷ commanded the Italian shore. Crotona, the most considerable city of the Achæans, and of all Italy in ancient times, was built seven hundred and ten years before Christ.⁸ Sybaris, its rival, was founded about the same time, and by the same nation. The former sent colonies to Tirina, Caulonia, and Padosia; the latter built Laus, Metapontum, and Posidonia, or Paestum,⁹ whose admired ruins attest the ancient wealth and grandeur of the Greek cities of Italy.

In this deduction, had we followed the order of time, we ought to have mentioned, first of all, the Ionian colonies, who came from the isle of Eubœa. The inhabitants of that island built Naxos in Sicily, a year before the foundation of Syracuse;¹⁰ but neither that, nor their settlements at Catana, Egesta, Leontium, ever attained considerable populousness or splendour. And it deserves to be particularly remarked, that, for reasons which will appear in the sequel of this work, the Ionians, who settled chiefly near the eastern shore of Sicily, never rivalled the power and fame of their Dorian and Eolian neighbours, but fell short of those nations in Magna Græcia, as much as they surpassed them in the shores and islands of Asia.

Instead of fatiguing the memory of our readers with the names of less considerable states or cities, which had little influence on the general affairs of the whole country,¹¹ it is of more im-

portance to examine the circumstances to which the inhabitants of Magna Græcia owed their flourishing situation at the period of time of

Olymp. which we write, when (it may be lxx. 1. boldly affirmed) these colonies A. C. 500. equalled, and exceeded, the wealth and power of the mother country.

We shall not insist on the well-known physical and moral causes which usually contribute to the rapid growth of newly-established colonies. It is evident, that amidst the equality of fortune, and simplicity of manners, which commonly prevail in such communities, men who have a wide country before them must naturally multiply far beyond the proportion of nations corrupted and weakened by the vices of wealth, luxury, and above all, of vanity, which perhaps is the greatest enemy to the increase of the human species. It is sufficient barely to mention the natural fertility of Magna Græcia, and particularly of Sicily, which in many places produced a hundred fold.¹² The Greeks who sailed thither from Peloponnesus, carried with them the knowledge and practice of agriculture, which had early attained a high degree of perfection in their peninsula; and the exuberant soil of Sicily, improved by cultivation, soon exhibited a picture of that rich abundance, which, in later times, made that beautiful island be entitled the granary of Rome.¹³

The peculiar situation of the Achæans and Dorians, from whom, chiefly, the colonies in Magna Græcia derived their origin, had a considerable influence in accelerating the population and grandeur of these new establishments. The Achæans, whose republic became so famous in later times, and that in consequence of circumstances which it is necessary at present to describe, originally inhabited a long, but narrow strip of ground, not more fertile than extensive, along the Corinthian gulf, whose rocky shores were destitute of good harbours.¹⁴ But the impartial and generous spirit of the Achæan laws early compensated the natural defects of their territory. They were the first, and long the only republic of Greece, who admitted strangers into their community on equal terms with the ancient citizens.¹⁵ In their truly free country, no powerful capital, like Thebes in Bœotia, or Athens in Attica, domineered over the inferior towns and villages. Twelve cities, which had common laws and institutions, and afterwards common weights and measures,¹⁶ sent deputies to Helicé, which is distinguished by Homer¹⁷ as the most considerable town of Achaia. That place being destroyed by an earthquake¹⁸ three hundred and seventy three

⁵ Scymnus, v. 293. Thucyd. l. vi. et Herodot. l. vi.

⁶ Thucyd. l. vi.

⁷ Strabo, l. viii. p. 513. assures us of the latter circumstance, which is of more importance than the uncertain genealogy of the ancient Grecian tribes.

⁸ Dionys. Halicarn. l. ii.

⁹ Scymnus, v. 245.

¹⁰ Thucyd.

¹¹ The Magna Græcia, which I always use in the sense of Strabo, cited above, to denote the Greek settlements in Sicily as well as Italy, being the most accessible part of the Grecian dominions, has been more fully described by the

moderns than any other. The immense collection of the Thesaurus Siculus, and particularly vols. i. iv. vii. viii. and xiii. afford useful materials, as well as Cluverii Sicil. Antiqua, and Fazellus de Rebus Siculis, and the excellent work of Gio. Balt. Caruso, Memorie istoriche di quanto è accaduto in Sicilia dal tempo de suoi primi abitanti fino ai Normanni.

¹² Strabo, l. viii.

¹³ Diodorus l. xvi.

¹⁴ Plutarch, in Arato, p. 1031.

¹⁵ Polybius, l. ii. p. 178.

¹⁶ Polybius, ibid. mentions this circumstance, to show how desirous they were to have every thing common and equal among them.

¹⁷ Il. ii. in the catalogue.

¹⁸ Strabo, l. viii. p. 589. says, the earthquake happened two years before the battle of Leucra, which was fought 371 years before Christ.

years before Christ, *Ægæ* became the seat of the general congress, which regulated public affairs, and appointed annual magistrates and generals to execute their resolutions, who were accountable to the congress, or council, as the members of the council themselves were to the cities by which they had been named and constituted.¹ This excellent system of government, which checked the ambition, while it maintained the independence of *Achaia*,² defended that fortunate country against the convulsions which shook and overwhelmed the most powerful republics of Greece. It was

A. C. 281. then that the Achæans, who during many ages had enjoyed their equitable laws in silence, emerged from obscurity; and communicating their government on equal terms to the neighbouring cities of Peloponnesus, preserved the feeble spark of liberty, every where extinguished around them, for one hundred and thirty-six years, till they finally yielded to the power and policy of Rome.³ This short period of war and tumult has been minutely described in history, while the many happy centuries that preceded it are but occasionally glanced at by ancient writers: and were it not for the defeats and calamities which the Achæans suffered in later times, we should, perhaps, be ignorant that their ancestors anciently possessed an equitable and generous policy, which being transported with them into *Magna Græcia*, could not fail to promote the happiness and prosperity of that delightful country.⁴

The condition of the Dorians at the time when they planted colonies in Italy and Sicily, is not less worthy of remark. The Dorian states of Peloponnesus were then universally subject to the gentle government of limited but hereditary princes, or to magistrates chosen from the descendants of their ancient royal families,⁵ and who, thus adorned by birth, were sometimes still more ennobled by wisdom and virtue.⁶ It is the nature of colonies to preserve with affectionate respect the institutions of the mother country, which often improve by transplantation, and thrive and flourish in foreign lands, when they have withered and perished in the soil which originally produced and propagated them. Time and accident, and the various causes which have been explained in the course of this history, tended to change the ancient constitution, and to diminish the strength of the Grecian states on both sides the

Corinthian Isthmus. While fierce and frequent wars exhausted their population, the exclusive spirit of republican jealousy, which sternly refused strangers any participation in their government, or any protection from their laws, naturally repressed their vigour and stunted their growth. The colonies in *Magna Græcia*, enjoying a wide territory before them, had not the same interference of interest, and found sufficient employment in subduing the original inhabitants of that country; without commencing hostilities against each other. Nor were they more ambitious to subdue the barbarous natives, than solicitous to incorporate them into their own communities. The kings, or nobility, of *Magna Græcia*, secure of their own pre-eminence, felt⁷ nothing of the republican jealousies which prevailed in the mother country. They received with pleasure new citizens, or rather subjects, from whatever quarter they might come. The Barbarians adopted the language and manners of the nation to whom they were associated; their children received a Grecian education; and the states of Italy and Sicily thus increasing by degrees, could soon boast, the former of Crotona, Tarentum, Sybaris, Rhegium; the latter of Syracuse, Agrigentum, Messene, Himera, and several other cities, which rivalled or surpassed the wealth of Athens or Corinth, and the populousness of Thebes, Argos, or Sparta.

The wars, conquests, or oppressions, but above all, the civil dissensions, which in the sixth century before Christ disturbed and deformed the coast of Ionia, and the other Grecian colonies in the islands and continent of Asia, brought frequent accessions of inhabitants to the shores of *Magna Græcia*. In that age the Asiatic Greeks had attained greater proficiency, both in the useful and in the agreeable arts, than any other portion of the Grecian name; but they had also sunk deeper in voluptuousness and luxury. Their poetry, which still remains, alike attests the refinement of their taste, and the corruption of their morals. The effeminate vices, for which the Ionians were thenceforth in all ages infamous,⁸ seem to have taken deep root in that century; and it is probable, that along with their poetry, music, and painting, they communicated also their dissolute and artificial appetites to the Greeks of Italy and Sicily.

But whether this be admitted, or whether we suppose that, according to the ordinary course of events, the inhabitants of *Magna Græcia* having attained opulence by industry, dissipated it in idleness and licentiousness, it is acknowledged by all writers on this part of history, that the Greek cities of Italy, and particularly Sybaris and Crotona, had degenerated from their ancient maxims, and fallen a prey to the most dangerous errors and vices, when Pythagoras came to their relief, about five hundred and fifty years before the Christian era.

¹ Polybius, l. ii. p. 178.

² Schook. *Achaia*, apud Gronov. *Thes.* t. v.

³ Polyb. Excerpt. Legat. et Titus Livius, l. xxxviii. et xxxix.

⁴ Xenophon, in his Greek history, speaks of the excellence of the Achæan laws, in treating a passage of history which will be related in the sequel. Polybius was evidently engaged to enter deeper into this subject, by the reason assigned in the text.

⁵ These were properly the only nobility in Greece; they were called *εὐπατρίδαι*, and long held sway in all the Grecian states. S. Petitus has collected the most important passages concerning them in his commentary on the ancient Athenian law, "Τους, Εὐπατρίδας γίνωσκειν τὰ θία, καὶ περιχρὴν ἀρχοντας, καὶ νόμων διδασκαλοὺς εἶναι, καὶ ἑσίων καὶ ἱερῶν ἐξηγητὰς." That the Eupatridæ, or nobility, administer the rites of religion, fill the offices of magistracy, interpret the laws, and explain all sacred and divine matters."

⁶ Thucyd. l. i.

⁷ The same policy was practised by Macedon; and, as we shall have occasion to relate, was the primary cause of the Macedonian greatness.

⁸ *Motus doceri gaudet Ionicos
Matura virgo, et fingitur artibus
Jam nunc, et incestos amores
De tenero meditatur ungue.*

HORACE

The philosophy of Pythagoras forms an important object in the history of the human mind: and if we admit the concurring testimony of ancient authors,⁹ the philosophy, or rather the legislation, of this extraordinary man, reformed and improved the manners and policy of Magna Græcia, and contributed in an eminent degree, not only to the quiet and happiness, but to the industry, power, and splendour, of that celebrated country. Lest this influence should appear too great, and even incredible, in a stranger, who is known to have studiously declined all public offices and authority, the occasion requires that we should explain the means by which such extraordinary effects were produced.

Pythagoras was born at Samos,¹⁰ when Samos was the richest and most flourishing of all the Grecian isles. His father, Mnesarchus, being a person of distinction in his country,¹¹ the promising youth was carefully instructed in the learning known or valued in that early age. Music, poetry, and the gymnastic exercises, formed the principal part of his education; but the young philosopher, if we may anticipate that name, was not indifferent¹² to the discoveries of Thales, the first Grecian who nearly calculated an eclipse of the sun; and he early set himself to rival the Milesian sage in his favourite studies. It is recorded, that he learned eloquence from Pherecydes of Syros,¹³ who resided a considerable time in the isle of Samos, and who is famous in the literary history of Greece, as the first author in prose.¹⁴ Pittacus of Lesbos, Bias of Prené, and the other sophists, or wise men (as they were emphatically styled by their contemporaries) who then flourished in Asiatic Greece, and whose abilities and virtue had raised them, in troubled times, to the head of the several communities of which they were respectively members, excited the kindred ambition of Pythagoras, who appears to have been early animated with the desire of acquiring just renown, by promoting public happiness. In his eighteenth year he visited the continent of Greece, and gained the prize of wrestling at the Olympic games,¹⁵ where his vigour, address, and beauty, were beheld with admiration by the multitude; while the opening virtues of his mind were still more admired by men of sense and discernment. In conformity with the practice of an age when the feeble rays of knowledge were scattered over a wide surface, and much pains were requisite to collect them, he

withdrew himself from the applauses of his countrymen, and for a longer time than was usual with the Grecian travellers. This circumstance gave occasion to many fables concerning the extent and variety of his voyages.¹⁶ But it is certain that he resided several years in the ancient kingdom of Egypt,¹⁷ which had

16 The travels of the Greek philosopher were spoken of in vague terms, and magnified even by great writers. *Ultimas terras lustrasse Pythagoram, Democritum, Platonem accepimus.* Cicero de Finibus, l. iv. c. xix. We may well believe then, that such men as Hermippus (apud Joseph. advers. Apionem,) Apollonius, Jamblichus, &c. would carry their exaggerations to the highest degree of incredibility on this fertile subject. The chief source of these fables, and of the supposed learning of the Magi, Chaldeans, Indians, &c. may be found in the credulous or lying writers who accompanied Alexander in his eastern expedition. At their return to Greece, they magnified the learning, as well as the power and wealth, of the nations conquered by their patron; they were solicitous to persuade their countrymen, that their ancestors had learned their philosophy from people whose names they had never before heard; and their own vanity was flattered by having visited, and familiarly known those fancied instructors of mankind. Clearchus, Onesicritus, and Callisthenes, were the most celebrated of these writers, of whom Diogenes Laertius, or rather a far superior man whom he cites, says, *Λανθάνουσι δὲ αὐτοὺς τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων κατὰ δόγματα βέλτεροις προσπατούντες.* "They are mistaken, when they refer the Grecian discoveries to the Barbarians." It was natural for the eastern nations, when they had adopted the language and learning of the Greeks, to avail themselves of Grecian authorities, to prove how much that celebrated nation owed to people whom they proudly denominated Barbarians. Hence the fables of Berosus the Chaldean, of Manetho the Egyptian, of Sanchoniathon the Phœnician. We except from this class of fabulists the Jew, Josephus, the antiquity of whose nation rests on evidence which it would be irreverent to name in such company. Had Pythagoras or Thales been acquainted with the Jewish religion, they would have learned far nobler notions of the Deity, than those which it appears they entertained. Anaxagoras, surnamed οὐρανός, the preceptor of the great Pericles, was the first Grecian philosopher who saw, by the light of reason, the natural and moral attributes of God, so sublimely described in the Psalms of David. Yet it never was said, that Anaxagoras had seen the Psalms, the Books of Moses, or any part of the sacred writings; and it may be remarked, that Josephus himself, in his first book (cont. Ap.) however zealous to prove, that the Greeks derived their knowledge from the East, can cite no author in favour of this opinion, who lived before the age of Alexander.

17 There is a famous passage in Isocrates's panegyric of Busiris, which might seem to contradict what is said in the preceding note, if we did not reflect, that the rules of panegyric require not always a strict adherence to historical truth. In speaking of the ancient wisdom and piety of the Egyptians, and particularly of the sacerdotal order, he says, that he himself is not the first who perceived and acknowledged their merit; that many philosophers had done this before him, and particularly Pythagoras the Samian. *Ὁς ἀφικόμενος εἰς Αἴγυπτον, καὶ μαθητὴς ἔκινων γενόμενος, τὴν τε ἀλλήν φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτος εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκομίσει, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς θύσιας τε καὶ τῆς ἀγιστείας τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐπιφανεστέρων τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐσπούδασεν. ἡγούμενος, εἰ καὶ μὴδὲν αὐτῷ διὰ ταῦτα πλεῖον γίγνοιτε τὰ ἐκ τῶν θείων, ἀλλὰ παρὰ γὰρ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ τούτων μάλιστα ἐν εὐδοκίᾳ σκίον. ὅπερ αὐτῷ καὶ συνέβη. Τοσούτον γὰρ εὐδοξίᾳ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπάντας ὑπερβᾶν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς νεώτερους ἀπάντας ἐπιθυμοῖν αὐτοῦ μαθητὰς εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἡδὲ οὐρανὸν τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς αὐτῶν ἔκινω συγγιγνομένους ἢ τῶν οἰκίων ἐπιμιλουμένων.* "Who coming to Egypt, and being instructed by the priests of that country, first introduced other kinds of learning into Greece, and particularly a more accurate knowledge of religious rites and ceremonies," (I have generalized the expression *θύσιας καὶ ἀγιστείας ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς*;) "of which he was a careful observer, thinking that although he were entitled to no peculiar favour on that account from the gods, he would thereby, at least, procure esteem among men, which also happened to him; for he so far eclipsed the glory of all other philosophers, that all the young desired to become his disciples, and the old were better pleased to see their sons in the company of Pythagoras, than engaged in the most lucrative or honourable pursuits." If what is said in my account of the life and writings of Isocrates be considered with attention, this passage will only serve to confirm the observations in the text.

9 Particularly Aristoxenus, the learned disciple of Aristotle (apud Stobæum, Serm. xli.) various ancient authors cited by Jamblichus and Porphyry, as well as by Diogenes Laertius, l. viii.; to which add Justin, l. xx. and Cicero, *Tusc. Quest. de Amicitia, et de Oratore.* "Pythagoras exornavit eam Græciam quæ Magna dicta est, et privatim et publice, præstantissimis et institutis et artibus." Cicero de Amicitia.

10 Isocrates in Busiri. Titus Livius, l. i. c. xviii. Lucian. Lexiphanes. To these authorities we may add, that Pythagoras is represented on several Samian coins. Fabric. Bibl. Græca, t. i. p. 455.

11 Mnesarchus was sent from Samos to consult the oracle of Delphi, probably on some public occasion. Jam. in Vit. Pythag.

12 Apollon. apud Jamblichum.

13 Diogenes apud Porph.

14 Plin. N. H. l. vii. c. lvi.

15 Jambl. Porph. &c.

been long familiarly known to the Grecian mariners, and where the son of Mnesarchus might probably enjoy the protection of many hereditary friends. In that country he probably made some additions to his knowledge in arithmetic and geometry; he certainly learned many traditions concerning the gods, and the human soul: but what particularly deserved his attention was, the secret symbolic writing of the priests, and the singular institutions and policy of the sacerdotal order, by which that body of men had long been enabled to govern prince and people.¹ At his return

from Egypt and the East, Pythagoras found his native country governed, or rather insulted, by the

A. C. 560. artful and long fortunate Polycrates; a tyrant whose power seemed so firmly established, that there remained no hopes to subvert it, and under whose jealous eye the son of Mnesarchus could neither display his talents, nor enjoy personal security: he therefore returned to European Greece, and again assisted at the Olympic games; where being saluted by the then honoured name of Sophist, he modestly declined that distinction for the humbler title of Philosopher; and when asked what he precisely meant by this new appellation, he is said to have replied, "That, in the same manner as at the Olympic assembly, some men came to contend for crowns and honours, others to sell their merchandize, and a third class merely to see and examine every thing which passed in that celebrated convention; so, on the greater theatre of the world, while many struggled for the glory of a name, and many for the advantages of fortune, a few, and but a few, neither covetous of money, nor ambitious of fame, were contented with beholding the wonders of so magnificent a spectacle."² This definition has been often cited, because it well agrees with the contemplative notions generally entertained of the Pythagorean school; but it will appear in the sequel, that the philosophy of Pythagoras was of a more practical kind.

From Olympia and the republic of Elis, he travelled to the neighbouring territory of Sparta,³ and spent a considerable time in that capital, diligently studying the laws and institutions of Lycurgus, and observing the manners and genius of the best governed, most virtuous, and most prosperous of all the Grecian states. Here he beheld a constitution of government (the wisdom of which had been long approved by experience) founded on a system of education; and combining, in his clear capacious mind, the Spartan laws and discipline with a mixture of the Egyptian craft and policy, he framed that sublime plan of legislation, which was to be far more extensive than the laws of Lycurgus; and which, at first fixing its root in a small sect at Crotona, was destined, in twenty or thirty years, to diffuse its flourishing branches over Italy and Sicily.

¹ Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, *passim*; and Strabo, l. x. p. 482.

² Cicero (*Tusc. Quæst.* v. 3.) has translated a passage to this purpose from Heraclides Ponticus, the scholar of Plato; and the original passage of Heraclitus is still preserved in Jamblichus.

³ Porphyry. *Jambl. et Justin.* l. xx.

Pythagoras arrived at the capital of Italian Greece in his fortieth year, in the full vigour of mind and body.⁴ His fame, doubtless, preceded him; since, whoever had honourably distinguished himself in the general convention at Olympia, was speedily known and celebrated in the remotest provinces of Greece. His personal acquaintances among the Italian Greeks, whose esteem, or rather respect, he had acquired in that august assembly, would naturally be loud in his praises; and the manners of the age, in which men lived together in crowds, and enjoyed their pastimes, or transacted their serious business with undisguised freedom, in temples and gymnasia, contributed to the rapid increase of his friends and admirers. Upon his arrival at Crotona, he appeared in the public places displaying his dexterity in those exercises and accomplishments, which were the fashionable objects of pursuit, and the principal sources of honour. His skill in music and medicine, sciences which were far better understood in his native country than in Magna Græcia, procured him particular regard; nor can we hesitate to believe, that his mathematical and natural knowledge would be highly admired by the Greeks of Italy, who, having recently received the first tincture of arts and sciences from the Asiatics, cultivated them with that ardour which novelty inspires; and who seem hitherto to have gamed in point of knowledge and civility, in proportion as they had lost in purity of life and manners, by an acquaintance with their Eastern brethren.

Neither the voluptuousness nor the refinement of the inhabitants of Magna Græcia, were incompatible with the hopes and fears of the most puerile superstition; and Pythagoras, who had seen and examined the rites and ceremonies employed by remote nations, celebrated for their antiquity and their wisdom, to avert the displeasure, or to gain the good-will of their invisible protectors, called forth the whole force of this powerful, yet dangerous instrument of policy, to excite respect for his person, and reverence for his instructions. He carefully frequented, at an early hour, the temples of the gods; his regular purifications and sacrifices announced superior sanctity of character; his food was of the purest kind, that no corporeal stain might interrupt his fancied communication with his celestial friends; and he was clothed in the linen of Egypt, which was the dress⁵ of the sacerdotal order in that native land of superstition, as well as of the Athenian magistrates and nobles, in the early and pious times of their republic.⁶ The respect excited by such artifices (if we may degrade by that name the means used to deceive men into their duty and happiness) was enhanced by the high renown, the long travels, the venerable aspect, the harmonious voice, the animated and affecting eloquence, of the Samian philosopher. His hearers sometimes amounted to two thousand of the principal citizens of Crotona; and the magistrates of that republic erected, soon after his arrival among them, an elegant and spacious edifice, which was appropriated to the

⁴ Aristoxen. *apud Jambl.*

⁶ Thucyd. l. i.

⁵ Diodorus.

virtuous lessons of this admired stranger, who pleased their taste, and gratified their fancy, while he condemned their manners, and reproached their vices. Equally rapid and astonishing, and not more astonishing than advantageous, if we may credit the general voice of antiquity, was the reformation produced at Crotona in persons of every age, and of either sex, by this singular man. The women laid aside their ornaments, and resumed their modesty; the youth preferred their duty to their pleasures; the old improved their understanding, and almost neglected to improve their fortunes.

Yet this revolution of manners was not surely so instantaneous, as the concurring exaggerations of wonder and credulity were naturally inclined to represent it. The same writers, who would thus magnify the fame of Pythagoras, acknowledge, that soon after coming to Crotona, he chose a select number of his most assiduous disciples, and those chiefly persons of weight in the republic, whose temper, character, and views, best suited his own. These were formed into an association, or separate order of men, into which none were admitted who possessed not qualities and endowments worthy of that honour. In order to confirm this association, as well as to obtain the purposes for which it had been instituted, Pythagoras employed the cypher, or symbolic writing, and other secrets, which he had learned from the wisdom, or rather cunning, of the Egyptian priests: his scholars were taught certain signs or words, by which they might know each other; they could correspond, when separated by place, in an unknown character; and strangers of all countries, Greeks and Barbarians, were promiscuously admitted into the society, after undergoing a due probation as to their dispositions and understanding. In a few years, three hundred men, all Pythagoreans, held the sovereignty of Crotona; the influence of the new sect extended with rapidity over Locri, Rhegium, Catana, and other cities of Italy and Sicily; the disciples of Pythagoras were diffused over ancient Greece, and the isles of the

Ægean sea; and it seemed as if the sage of Samos, whose nobler ambition declined and disdained any particular office of power and dignity, had conceived the sublime idea of forming a school, or rather an association of men, who might govern the world, while they were themselves governed by wisdom and virtue.

Pythagoras was deeply persuaded, that the happiness of nations depends chiefly on the government under which they live; and the experience of his own times, and of his own island in particular, might teach him the dangerous tendency of democratic turbulence on the one hand, and jealous tyranny on the other.⁷ He preferred, therefore, to all govern-

⁷ A striking example of this appeared at that time in Sicily, if we credit Jamblicus, who places the reign of Phalaris, at Agrigentum, in the age of Pythagoras. The doubtful, or rather incredible, history of this tyrant, may be comprised in few words. His reign, of about sixteen years, was distinguished by intolerable atrocities. He burned his enemies in a brazen bull; and, as last or cruelty happened

ments, a moderate aristocracy; which seems, without exception, to have been the well-founded opinion of the greatest men of antiquity, since, under the administration of a senate, the republics of Greece, of Rome, and of Carthage, attained their highest prosperity and splendour. Yet he was extremely averse to arbitrary power, whatever shape it might assume: and the main aim of his institution was, to prevent oppression in the magistrates and licentiousness in the people. The dead letter of the law could never, he thought, effect that salutary purpose, until men were so trained by education and discipline, as to regard the great duties of life as its most agreeable amusement, and to consider the esteem of their fellow-citizens, and their own, as the chief source of their enjoyment. Magistrates, thus formed, would command a willing obedience, and the inhabitants of Magna Græcia must soon attain the most perfect state of which political society is susceptible.

To explain at large the system of Pythagoras, would be to write a treatise of sublime, yet practical morality, since his conclusions are strictly founded on the nature of man. Besides the propensities common to us with inferior natures, and besides the selfish and artificial passions of avarice and ambition, he found in the human breast the seeds of nobler faculties, fitted to yield an incomparably more durable, more perfect, and more certain gratification. The chief happiness of the mind

to direct, sometimes abused, and sometimes eat, boys. Phalaris, together with his mother and friends, (could such a monster have friends?) were burned, by the long-injured Agrigentines, in his own bull. This is the abominable tyrant, whose spurious letters furnished an opportunity to Dr. Bentley to display his profound erudition (see his Dissert. upon Phalaris.) But that very learned man seems not to suspect, that the history of Phalaris is as spurious as his epistles. It was a common artifice among Greek poets and orators (see p. 100. speech of Sosicles the Corinthian,) to exaggerate the vices of bad princes. Of this we shall find many examples in the following parts of this work. This practice began early; for Pindar says,

Τὸν δὲ ταυρῷ χαλκῷ καυτὴν ἡλίκον νοῦν
ἔχεν Φάλαριν κατιχὲν πάντα φάτις.
PYTH. l. Epod. xxi. 11.

Aristotle mentions, *Τὸ περὶ Φαλῆριν λεγόμενον*, the hearsay about Phalaris, which Aspasius explains, *Ὁ δὲ Φάλαρις λεγεται φαγεῖν τὸν αὐτοῦ παῖδα*. Phalaris is said to have eat his own son. In the same chapter (c. v. l. vi. Ethic. Nicom.) speaking of brutal passions, Aristotle instances Phalaris sometimes devouring boys, sometimes using them as instruments of an absurd venereal pleasure: *Πρὸς ἀφροδισίων αὐτοῦ ἡδονήν*. The philosopher does not say, that he believes these monstrous fictions, any more than Cicero, *"Ille nobilis taurus, quem crudelissimus omnium tyrannorum Phalaris habuisse dicitur;"* l. iv. in Verrem, c. xxxiii. Timæus, the historian of Sicily, who was more likely than any other writer to be well informed concerning the transactions in his own island, represents the story of Phalaris's bull as a mere fable. Polyb. Excerpt. ver. 3. p. 47. Polybius, indeed, attempts to refute Timæus, but I think, as to the main point, with little success. Nor is it surprising that this judicious writer should be carried along by the torrent. The republicans of Greece and Rome delighted in blackening the characters of tyrants; *Τετραγώντες δὲ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν τετραγώνων, καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα τῶν τετραγώνων*; "exaggerating, after the manner of tragedians, the fierceness of their manners, and the impiety of their actions." For this reason, the absurd fictions concerning Dionysius of Syracuse, Alexander of Phææ, &c. are related by many respectable writers. For this reason Hieronymus was described in the blackest colours, vide Excerpt. ex Polyb. l. vii. p. 10. And for this reason the enormous cruelties of Phalaris, which no nation, and far less the Sicilians in that age, could have tolerated, receive countenance from some of the highest authorities of antiquity.

must be sought in itself, in the enjoyment of intellectual and moral pleasure. Our thoughts are ever, and intimately present with us; and although the bustle of external objects, and the tumult of passion, may sometimes divert their current, they can never dry up their source. The reflections on our own conduct will be continually occurring to our fancy, whatever pains we may take to exclude them; nor can voluptuous enjoyment, or ambitious activity, ever so totally occupy the mind of a Persian satrap, or a Grecian demagogue, but that their principal happiness or misery, in the whole course of life, must chiefly depend upon the nature of their reflections on the past, and upon their hopes and fears about futurity. To strengthen this great groundwork of morality, Pythagoras employed the whole force of education and habit. Rules were laid down, to which the members of his respected order bound themselves to conform, and from which none could swerve, without being excluded from a society of which they proved themselves unworthy. The different periods of life had each its appropriated employment. The youth were carefully instructed in the gymnastic exercises, in literature,¹ and in science, and especially in the laws and constitution of their country. Their time was so diversified by successive study, exercise, and repose, that no leisure remained for the premature growth of dangerous passions; and it was an important maxim of the Pythagorean school, that many things were best learned late,² especially love; from which, if possible, the youth should be restrained till their twentieth year, and after that period should rarely, and with many precautions, indulge a passion, always hurtful to the weak, and which, when injudiciously indulged, enfeebled the most vigorous. He required in those who had attained the age of manhood, that they should no longer live for themselves, but for the business of the community of which they were members. They were to employ the greatest part of the day in the duties of public spirit and patriotism; in the laborious or dangerous offices committed to their charge; and to derive their chief reward from reading, in the eyes of their admiring countrymen, the history of their generous exploits; and from beholding the happy effects of their probity, beneficence, and fortitude.

The Pythagoreans were strictly enjoined, as their earliest and latest work, to review the actions of the past, and, if time permitted, of many preceding, days. In the morning they

¹ So I have translated *Εν γράμμασι καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς μαθήμασι*, of Aristoxenus apud Stobæum, Serm. xli. The learned reader will perceive, that I comprehend under the name of youth, the two different periods of life, or *παῖς* and *νεανίσκος*, boy, and young man. I have done this, because it was not the intention of Aristoxenus to say, that the young men were not still to be employed in literature and science, or that the boys were to be kept ignorant of the laws and constitution. The rules of the Pythagorean school, and the laws of Lycurgus, often explain each other. See p. 41, et seqq. It may be worthy of remark, that Jean Jacques Rousseau has borrowed what is rational and practical in his system of education, from these two great sources.

² Aristoxen. apud Stobæum, Serm. lxi. This is the great principle of Rousseau in his *Emile*. The passage of Aristoxenus concerning love, is almost literally translated in that ingenious but fanciful work.

repaired alone to the temples, to solitary mountains and forests; and after there conversing with themselves, joined in the conversation of their friends, with whom they assembled, in small companies, to an early and frugal meal, discussed different subjects of philosophy or politics, regulated their conduct for the ensuing day, and by the mutual strength and encouragement acquired in this select society, prepared for the tumultuous bustle of the world, and the contentions of active life. The evening was spent as the morning, with this difference, that they then indulged in the moderate use of flesh and wine, from which they rigidly abstained during the day; and the whole concluded with that self-examination, which was the capital precept of the Pythagorean school.

To enter more fully into the principles of this association, would be repeating what has been formerly observed concerning the laws of Lycurgus. It is sufficient barely to mention, that, like the legislator of Sparta, Pythagoras enjoined the highest respect for age; that, like him, he raised the weaker sex from that state of inferiority in which they were ungenerously kept in all other countries of Greece; that he inured his disciples to temperance and sobriety by the same means employed by Lycurgus; and that both these great men regarded health and vigour of body as the first principle of mental soundness and energy; that the probationary silence of the Pythagoreans, which credulity has so much exaggerated, was nothing more than that prudent, recollected behaviour, required by Lycurgus, who prized higher the caution of silence than the readiness of speech;³ and that the intimacy of the Spartan and Pythagorean friendships, and almost the community of goods, naturally flowed from the general spirit and genius of their respective systems;⁴ so that the rules of the Pythagorean order were little more than a transcript of the Spartan laws, as these laws themselves were only a refinement on the generous and manly institutions of the heroic ages.⁵

In the history of a man who entertained such just notions of human life, as did the founder of the Pythagorean school, we may at once reject, as fabulous, the tales related by the vain, lying Greeks, who lived in and after the age of Alexander, when their nation seems to have lost their love of truth along with their liberty, as well as the ridiculous wonders of the later Platonists, those contemplative visionaries, who, during the first centuries of the Christian era, degraded ancient philosophers, by describing *their* active and useful lives, as if they had resembled their own speculative tranquillity. Yet, after all, should the least extraordinary account of the Pythagorean order still seem incredible, it need only be observed, that modern history, and even our own observation, may have made us acquainted with orders of another kind, of which the rules are more difficult to be observed than those of the Pythagoreans: and it is equally unreasonable and ungenerous to suppose, that what our

³ Plut. in Lycurg.

⁵ Diodor. l. xii. p. 77, &c.

⁴ See p. 43.

own experience teaches us may be done by the illiberal spirit of superstition, could not, in a happier age, be effected by the love of glory, of virtue, and of mankind.

The concurring testimony of historians assures us, that the school of Pythagoras had flourished above forty years, to the unspeakable benefit of Magna Græcia, when a war arose between Crotona and Sybaris, the latter of which had ever contemptuously rejected the Pythagorean institutions. The city of Sybaris was founded (as above mentioned) by the Achæans, on the confluence of the river Sybaris, from which the city derives its name, and the winding stream of Crathis, which descends from the Lucanian mountains. The fertility of the soil, the happy temperature of the climate, the resources of fishing, navigation, manufactures, and commerce, conspired, with the salutary effect of the Achæan laws, wonderfully to increase, in the course of two centuries, the strength and populousness of Sybaris, which was surrounded by walls nine miles in extent, commanded twenty-five subordinate cities, and, could we credit the evidence of writers often prone to exaggeration, brought three hundred thousand men into the field.⁶ Riches and luxury proved fatal to the Sybarites, whose effeminacy passed into a proverb,⁷ which has been transmitted to modern times. In a decisive battle, they were defeated by the citizens of Crotona, under the command of Milo, a favourite disciple of Pythagoras, who had already obtained universal renown by his Olympic victories.⁸

But the destruction of Sybaris was almost alike fatal to Crotona. The inferior ranks of men in that city, intoxicated with prosperity, and instigated by the artful and ambitious Cylon, whose turbulent manners had excluded him from the order of Pythagoras, into which he had repeatedly attempted to enter, became clamorous for an equal partition of the conquered territory of Sybaris; which being denied, as inconsistent with the nature of aristocratical government, they secretly conspired against their magistrates, attacked them by surprise in the senate-house, put many to death, and drove the rest from their country. Pythagoras himself died soon afterwards, in extreme old age, at Metapontum in Lucania.⁹ His disciples were scattered over Magna Græcia, and particularly Sicily, which at the time of the Carthaginian invasion, was governed by men who had imbibed the sublime spirit of their illustrious master.

Gelon, who, eleven years before that event, had mounted the throne of Syracuse, was entitled, by the unanimous suffrage of his subjects, to the glorious, though often prostituted, appellation, of Father of his Country.¹⁰ The mildness of his government restored the felicity of the heroic ages, whose equitable institutions

had much affinity (as above observed) with the political system of Pythagoras. This virtuous prince had cemented an alliance with Theron, king of Agrigentum, by accepting his daughter in marriage; and the confederacy of the two principal states of Sicily seemed to have diffused security and happiness over the whole island, when the immense armament of Carthage was beheld off the northern coast. Though not absolutely destitute of naval strength, the Sicilians had nothing by which they could oppose a fleet of two thousand galleys. The enemy landed without opposition in the spacious harbour, or rather bay, of Panormus, whose name may be still recognised in the modern capital Palermo, where the Carthaginians had planted one of their most ancient colonies. Their forces were commanded by Hamilcar, who was deemed a brave and experienced leader. The first care of this general was, to fortify two camps; the one destined for his fleet, which, according to the practice of that age, was drawn on shore; the other intended as a safe retreat for his army, which immediately prepared to form the siege of Himera. Theron used proper measures to defend the second city in his dominions, until his kinsman, the intrepid Gelon, should arrive to his assistance, at the head of an army of fifty thousand foot and five thousand horse. While this numerous army advanced, by rapid marches, towards Himera, they encountered a foraging party of the enemy, and took ten thousand prisoners. But what appeared a still more important booty to the discernment of Gelon, they seized a messenger from Selinus, a city in the neighbourhood of Agrigentum, which had entered into a treacherous correspondence with the Carthaginians. The prisoner conveyed a letter to Hamilcar, acquainting him, that the Selinuntines would not fail to send the cavalry demanded from them at the appointed time, which was likewise particularly specified. Upon this discovery, Gelon founded a stratagem, not more daring than successful. He commanded a chosen body of troops to advance in the night towards the Carthaginian camp, and by day-break to present themselves to Hamilcar, as his Selinuntine auxiliaries; and when admitted, by this artifice, within the rampart, to assassinate the general, and set fire to the fleet.¹¹

It happened on the fatal day, that Hamilcar offered a solemn sacrifice to the bloody divinity of Carthage, who delighted in human victims. While he performed this abominable rite, the soldiers surrounded him unarmed, in the gloomy silence of their detested superstition, with which their minds were totally penetrated. The Sicilian cavalry being admitted without suspicion, thus found no difficulty to execute their audacious design. Hamilcar, while he sacrificed an innocent and noble youth to the abhorred genius of Superstition, was himself despatched with a dagger; and next moment the Carthaginian ships were in a blaze. A chain of Sicilian sentinels, posted on the neighbouring eminences, intimated to Gelon the

⁶ Strabo, l. vi. p. 263. Diodor. *ibid.*

⁷ Athenæus, l. xii. p. 518.

⁸ Strabo, *ibid.* Pausanias, l. v. p. 369.

⁹ Aristoxenus.

¹⁰ *Ælian.* Var. Hist. l. xiii. c. xxxvii. Plut. in Timol.

¹¹ Diodor. l. ix. sect. 25, et seqq. Polyæn. l. i. c. xxvii.

happy success of his stratagem; of which, in order fully to avail himself, that gallant commander immediately conducted the main body of his troops to the Carthaginian army, while it was yet agitated by surprise and terror at the sudden conflagration. The furious onset of the Sicilians made a dreadful havoc among the astonished Barbarians, who, recovering, however, their faculties, began to defend themselves with vigour; when the melancholy tidings, that their ships were all burnt, and their general slain, drove them to despair and flight. Gelon commanded his troops not to give quarter to an enemy, who, though defeated, still seemed formidable by their numbers. It is reported, that a hundred and fifty thousand perished in the battle and the pursuit. The remainder seized an eminence, where they could not long maintain themselves, for want of water and provisions. In the language of an ancient historian, all Africa seemed to be taken captive in Sicily. Gelon distributed the prisoners among the Sicilian cities, in proportion to the contingents of troops which they had respectively raised for this memorable service. The greater part falling to the share of Syracuse and Agrigentum, were employed in beautifying and enlarging those capitals,¹ whose magnificent monuments, still conspicuous in their ruins, are supposed with great probability, to be the effect of Carthaginian labour.

The melancholy tidings affected Carthage with consternation and despair. The inhabitants of that city, ever shamefully depressed by bad fortune, in proportion as they were immoderately elated by the deceitful gifts of prosperity, dreaded every moment to behold the victorious enemy in their harbour. To ward off this calamity, their ambassadors were sent to crave a suspension of hostilities on any terms the victorious Greeks might think proper to impose. Gelon received them with such moderation as marked the superiority of his character, and told them, that he would desist from every purpose of revenge, on condition that the Carthaginians paid two thousand talents of silver, to be distributed among the cities of Sicily, which had incurred trouble and expense by the war; that they thenceforth abstained from the abominable practice of insulting the gods by human victims; that they erected two temples, one in Carthage, another in Syracuse, to preserve the memory of the war, and the articles of the peace.²

This honourable treaty was a prelude to that still more famous, lxxxii. concluded thirty years afterwards A. C. 449. between the Athenians and the Persians. It marked a nation superior to its enemies not only in valour but humanity, and conferred more true glory than could be acquired by the most splendid series of victories.

It might be expected, however, and seems much to have been desired, that a people so advantageously distinguished as were the Greeks during that age in arts and arms; a people A. C. 504. who had repelled, defeated, and disgraced the most populous and powerful nations, and who were alike prompted, by ambition and revenge, to the attainment of distant conquest, should have united their efforts against the enemies who still made war on them, and, advancing in a rapid career of victory, have diffused, along with their dominion, their manners, knowledge, and civility, over the eastern world. But various events and causes, which we shall have occasion afterwards to explain, tended to detach the colonies of Magna Græcia from the affairs of the mother country, as well as to disunite the two most powerful republics of that country by intestine discord.

While the fortune of Athens raised her to such power as threatened the liberty of Sicily and Greece, the kings of Syracuse and Agrigentum contented themselves with the humbler glory of embellishing their capitals with barbaric spoils, and producing those wonders of art, which, in the time of Cicero and Verres, were esteemed among the most precious monuments of antiquity.³ The golden medals of Gelon, still preserved and of the highest beauty,⁴ justify the glowing expressions of the Roman orator.

In Italy, the citizens of Crotona had too soon cause to lament their insurrection against their magistrates, and their forsaking the discipline of Pythagoras. They who had hitherto defeated superior numbers, who had furnished so many victors in the Olympic contest, and whose country was distinguished by the epithet of healthy, on a supposition that the vigorous bodies of its inhabitants proceeded from an effect of the climate, were now totally routed and put to flight at the river Sagra, with an army of a hundred and thirty thousand men, by the Locrians and Rhegians, whose forces were far less numerous. The other Greek cities of Italy, which are said to have imitated the fatal example of Crotona, were harassed by wars against each other, or against their barbarous neighbours. In consequence of these misfortunes, the Pythagoreans again recovered their credit; and about sixty years after the death of the great founder of their order, Zaleucus and Charondas, the first in Locri, the second in Thurium, endeavoured to revive the Pythagorean institutions, which, perhaps, were too perfect for the condition of the times. In less than forty years, a new persecution entirely drove the Pythagoreans from Italy, and completed, according to Polybius, the confusion and misery of that once happy country.⁵

¹ Cicero, Orat. iv. in Verrem.

² Diodor. Sicul. lib. 13.

³ Cicero in Verrem, passim.

⁴ Mem. de Trevoux, l'ann. 1787, p. 1440.

⁵ Polybius, i. 203.

CHAPTER XII.

Glory of Athens—Military Success of the Confederates—Athens Rebuilt and Fortified—Extent of its Walls and Harbours—The Confederates take Byzantium—Conspiracy of Pausanias—Banishment of Themistocles—Virtue of Aristides—Cimon assumes the Command—His illustrious Merit and Success—Revolt of Egypt—War in Cyprus—Peace with Persia—Domestic Transactions of Greece—The Athenian Greatness—Envy of Sparta, Thebes, and Argos—Earthquake in Sparta—Revolt of the Helots—War between the Elians and Pisans—The Temple and Statue of Olympian Jupiter—Dissensions in Argolis—Revolt in Boeotia—Truce of Thirty Years—Character of Pericles—Subjection of the Athenian Allies and Colonies—Spirit of the Athenian Government.

FROM the battles of Mycalé and Platea, to the memorable war of Peloponnesus, elapsed half a century, the most illustrious in the Grecian annals. A single republic, one of sixteen states, whose united possessions hardly equalled the extent of Scotland, and whose particular territory is scarcely visible in a map of the world, carried on an offensive war against the Persian empire, and, though surrounded by jealous allies or open enemies, prosecuted this extraordinary enterprise with unexampled success; at length, granting such conditions of peace as the pride of victory may dictate, and the weight of accumulated disasters condescended to solicit or accept. In that narrow space of time the same republic erected, on the feeble basis of her scanty population and diminutive territory, a mighty mass of empire; established and confirmed her authority over the extent of a thousand miles of the Asiatic coast, from Cyprus to the Thracian Bosphorus; took possession of forty intermediate islands,⁶ together with the important straits which join the Euxine and the Ægean; conquered and colonized the winding shores of Macedon and Thrace; commanded the coast of the Euxine from Pontus to the Chersonesus Taurica, or Crim Tartary; and, overawing the barbarous natives by the experienced terrors of her fleet,⁷ protected against their injustice and violence, but at the same time converted, to the purposes of her own ambition and interest, the numerous but scattered colonies which Miletus, and other Greek cities of Asia, had at various times established in those remote regions.⁸ Our wonder will be justly increased, if we consider that Athens obtained those immortal trophies, not over ignorant savages or effeminate slaves, but over men who had the same language and laws, the same blood and lineage, the same arts and arms, in short, every thing common with the victors but their audacity and fortune.

But it is the peculiar glory of the Athenians that, during this rapid series of military and naval triumphs, they cultivated, with a generous enthusiasm, the arts which adorn peace as well as war, and improved these decorations of polished life into such perfection as few na-

tions have been able to imitate, and none have found it possible to surpass. During the administration of a single man, more works of elegance and splendour, more magnificent temples, theatres, and porticoes were erected within the walls of Athens, than could be raised during many centuries in Rome, though mistress of the world, by the wealth and labour of tributary provinces.⁹ In the same period of time sculpture attained a sublimity, from which that noble art could never afterwards but descend and degenerate; and a republic hitherto inferior in works of invention and genius to several of her neighbours, and even of her own colonies, produced, in the single lifetime of Pericles, those inestimable models of poetry, eloquence, and philosophy,¹⁰ which, in every succeeding age, the enlightened portion of mankind hath invariably regarded as the best standards, not merely of composition and style, but of taste and reason. The name of Greek seemed thenceforth to be sunk in that of Athenian; Athenian writers are our surest and almost only guides in relating the subsequent transactions of the whole nation;¹¹ and from them we learn what is yet the most extraordinary circumstance respecting the Athenian empire, that it had been built on such stable foundations, and reared with such art and skill, as might have long defied the hostile jealousy of Greece and Persia, confederate in arms and resentment, if various causes, which human prudence could neither foresee nor prevent, had not shaken its firmness, and precipitated its downfall.¹²

Such is the subject which I have undertaken to treat in this and the two following chapters; a subject worthy to animate the diligence, and call forth the vigour of a historian: but, if he truly deserves that respected name, he will remember that it is less his duty to amuse the fancy by general description, than to explain, with precision and perspicuity, the various transactions of this interesting and splendid theme; to give the reader a full and distinct view of the complicated matter which it involves; and to remove every adventitious circumstance that might distract or dazzle the

⁶ Several of these islands had been formerly conquered by Athenian commanders, particularly Miltiades, as we have related above; but having rebelled against the severe government of Athens, they were finally subdued by Pericles.

⁷ Plut. in Pericle.

⁸ Strabo, Geograph. passim.

⁹ Plutarch. in Pericle.

¹⁰ Pericles may be considered as the contemporary of Socrates, Sophocles, Euripides, Thucydides, &c. since, although he died before them of the plague, these and other great men flourished during his administration.

¹¹ I mean Thucydides and Xenophon, together with the Athenian orators, philosophers, and poets.

¹² Thucyd. l. vii. et viii. passim.

attention, as astronomers, in viewing the sun, are careful to ward off its surrounding splendour.

The military success of the Athenians¹ (which naturally forms the first branch of the subject, because it not only supplied the materials of future improvements, but awakened that energy requisite to cultivate and complete them) includes three separate actions which were carried on at the same time, and conspired to the same end, yet cannot be related in one perpetual narrative, without occasioning some confusion of ideas, alike destructive of the pleasure and of the use of history. While we endeavour to keep each series of events unbroken and distinct, we must be careful to point out its influence on the simultaneous or succeeding transactions of the times, that our relation may be at once satisfactory and faithful. In such a delineation the trophies of the Persian war justly claim the first and most conspicuous place; the hostile animosity of rival states, which continually envied and opposed, but, for reasons that will be fully explained, could neither prevent nor retard the growing superiority of Athens, shall occupy the middle of the picture; and we shall throw into the back ground the successive usurpations of that fortunate republic over her allies, colonies, and neighbours.

The common fears which, notwithstanding innumerable sources of animosity, had formed, and hitherto upheld a partial confederacy of the Greeks, were removed by the decisive victories of Plataea and Mycalé. After Olymp. these memorable events, it was the lxxv. 2. first care of the Athenians to bring A. C. 479. home their wives, children, and most valuable effects from the isles of Ægina and Salamis. In the latter island they celebrated their good fortune by a national solemnity. The sublime Sophocles joined in the chorus of boys which danced, in exultation, around the Barbarian spoils;² the valour of his predecessor, Æschylus, had contributed to the victories by which they were obtained; and his rival, the tender Euripides, was born in the isle Salamis,³ on that important day which proved alike glorious to Greece, and fatal to Persia. But an attention to domestic concerns prevented not the Athenians from pushing the war with vigour, though deserted by the Spartans and other Peloponnesians, who sailed home before winter. The Asiatic colonies, animated by the recent recovery of freedom, seconded the Athenian ardour; and the confederates, having successfully infested the territories of the great king, besieged and took the rich city of Sestos in the Chersonesus of Thrace, the only place of strength which adhered to the Persian interest in that fertile peninsula.⁴

During the two following years the war

¹ The chief materials for this portion of history consist in the first and second books of Thucydides; the eleventh and twelfth of Diodorus Siculus; Plutarch's lives of Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, Pericles; Pausanias's Description of Greece, and Pliny's Natural History: scattered facts are supplied by other ancient writers, whose works will be carefully cited.

² Athenæus, l. i.

³ Vita Euripid.

⁴ Herodot. l. ix. c. cvi. Diodor. l. xi. c. xxxvii.

languished abroad, while the symptoms of jealousy and discord, which had already appeared in the separation of the Athenian and Spartan fleets, broke out with more virulence

at home. The Athenians began the Olymp. laborious task of rebuilding their lxxv. 3, 4. ruined city, which the Persian A. C. 478, spoils might contribute to enrich et 477. with uncommon magnificence, and

which the acquaintance gained in the course of the war, the graceful forms of Ionic and Doric architecture, might enable them to adorn with more beauty and elegance than had yet been displayed in Europe. But the weighty advice of Themistocles prevailed on them to suspend this noble undertaking, and engaged them, instead of decorating their capital with temples, theatres, and gymnasia, to fortify it by walls of such strength and solidity as might thenceforth bid defiance to every enemy, whether foreign or domestic. In an age when the art of attack was so rude and imperfect, that the smallest fortress formed an object of importance, such a design could not fail of exciting jealousy in the neighbouring republics. The measure was scarcely determined when an embassy arrived from Sparta, remonstrating against a design peculiarly dangerous and alarming to those who owed their safety to the weakness of their cities. "If the Greeks," it was said, "had possessed any town of impregnable strength, they must have found it impossible to expel the Barbarians from their country. The Athenians therefore, who had hitherto so generously maintained the cause of the confederacy, ought not only to desist from raising walls and fortifications, but even to prevent a similar design in any republic beyond the isthmus; the Peloponnesus was alone sufficient to afford, in time of danger, a secure refuge to the whole Grecian name."

Themistocles easily unveiled the suspicion and hatred concealed under this specious mask of public utility, and encouraged his countrymen to elude the Spartan artifice by similar address. The senate of the five hundred, who gave audience to foreign ambassadors, declared that Athens would adopt no measure inconsistent with the public interest, and promised speedily to send an embassy, in their turn, which would remove all groundless apprehensions entertained on that subject. The Lacedæmonians having returned with this temporising answer, Themistocles was immediately despatched to Sparta, and expected, as he had previously concerted matters with his countrymen,⁵ to be followed, at a proper time, by Aristides, the most respected character of his age; and by Lisicles, an able orator in the senate and assembly. Mean while the Athenian walls arose with unexampled celerity. Not only slaves, artificers by profession, and the poorer classes of citizens, but magistrates of the first rank, the venerable fathers of the republic, wrought with their own hands, and with unceasing industry. The feeble efforts of women and children contributed to the useful labour. The most superstitious of men

⁵ Idem ibid. et in Them. Lys. Orat. Fun. et cont. Alcib.

neglected their accustomed solemnities, and no longer acknowledged the distinction of days or seasons: nor did even the silent tranquillity of night abate the ardour of their diligence. The ruins of their city happily supplied them with a rich variety of material; no edifice was spared, public or private, sacred or profane; the rude sculpture of ancient temples, even the mutilated tombs of their ancestors, were confounded in the common mass; and, at the distance of near a century, the singular appearance of the wall, composed of stones rough and unpolished, of various colours and unequal size, attested the rapid exertions by which the work had been constructed.⁶

Themistocles had hitherto, under various pretences, avoided declaring his commission before the Spartan senate. When urged to this measure by some of the magistrates, who began to suspect his silence, he still alleged the absence of his colleagues as a sufficient reason for delay. But a company of travellers, who had recently visited Athens, gave intelligence of the extraordinary works carrying on in that city. This information, and the resentment of the Spartans which it occasioned, must have disconcerted a man who possessed less cool boldness than the commander at Salamis and Artemisium. But Themistocles, with the address congenial to his character, asserted, that it was unworthy the gravity of Sparta to regard the vague rumours of obscure men; and that before lightly suspecting the approved fidelity of their allies, she ought to bestow some pains in discovering the truth. This declaration was enforced, it is said, by seasonable bribes to the most popular of the Ephori; and the Spartans, deluded or corrupted, agreed to despatch a second embassy to Athens, consisting of some of their most respectable citizens. These men had no sooner arrived at their destination, than they were taken into custody, as pledges for the safe return of Themistocles and his colleagues, who by this time had brought him the welcome news, that the walls were completed. The Athenian ambassadors were now prepared to throw off the mask. They appeared in the Lacedæmonian assembly; and Themistocles, speaking for the rest, declared, that his countrymen needed not to learn from their confederates, what measures were honourable to themselves, and beneficial to the common cause; that, by his advice, they had firmly defended their city against the assaults of open enemies and jealous friends; and that if Sparta entertained any resentment of this measure, which was evidently not less conducive to the public interest, than, perhaps, displeasing to private ambition, her anger would be equally unjust and impotent, since her own citizens must remain as hostages at Athens, till his colleagues and himself should be restored in safety to their country.⁷ Whatever secret indignation this speech might excite, the Spartans thought proper to suppress their animosity. They allowed the ambassadors to return home; but the conduct of Themistocles laid the foundation

of that unrelenting hatred with which he was persecuted by Sparta, whose intrigues engaged all Greece, not excepting Athens herself, in the destruction of this illustrious citizen. Yet his eminent services, before they were interrupted by the storm of persecution, gave an opportunity to his unworthy country to display more fully her signal ingratitude.⁸

The ancient Athenian harbour of Phalericum was small, narrow, and inconvenient. To supply its defects, Themistocles, even before the Persian invasion, had recommended the Piræus, a place five miles distant from the citadel, furnished with three natural basins, which, if properly fortified, might form a far more commodious and secure station for the Athenian navy. The foundations were laid, and the walls began to rise, when the cruel ravages of the Barbarians interrupted the undertaking. Having in the preceding year fortified the city, Themistocles thought the present a proper time to finish the new harbour.⁹ His address, his eloquence, and his bribes, were seasonably applied to divert the resentment of Sparta, who, though thenceforth less jealous of the naval than military power of her rival, threatened, on this occasion, to enter Attica with an armed force. But the artful Athenian had the skill to persuade the Spartans and their allies, that the procuring a strong and capacious harbour was a matter essentially requisite to the common interest of the Grecian confederacy. The work, mean time, was carried on at Athens with much spirit and activity, and, in less than a twelvemonth, brought to such a prosperous conclusion, as could scarcely be credited, but on the testimony of a contemporary historian of the most approved diligence and fidelity.¹⁰ The new walls were sufficiently broad to admit two carriages abreast; the stones composing them were of an immense size, strongly united by bars of iron, which were fastened by melted lead. The Piræus soon grew into a town, containing many thousand inhabitants. It was joined to the city by walls begun by Cimon, but finished by Pericles, twenty years after the harbour itself had been erected. The new buildings of Cimon and Pericles are often mentioned in history under the name of the Long Walls. They extended forty stadia on either side; and when added to the circumference of the ancient city (about sixty stadia) give us for the whole circuit of the Athenian fortifications an extent of nearly eighteen English miles.¹¹

The altercations and animosities excited by such undertakings among the confederates at home, prevented not their united arms from assaulting the dominions of the great king. Thirty Athenian, and fifty Peloponnesian ships, had been employed to expel the Persian garrisons from the sea-ports which they still occupied in the Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Ægean isles. The European fleet, being sea-

⁶ Thucyd. l. i. c. lxxxix. et. seq.

⁷ Plut. &c. ibid.

⁸ Diodor. l. xi. p. 437.

⁹ Thucyd. l. i. c. xciii. Plut. in Themist. Diodor. xi. 436.

¹⁰ Thucyd. ubi supra.

¹¹ Pausanias, p. 20, et seq. Strabo, p. 391, et seq. Plut. in Cimon.

sonably joined by various squadrons from the Greek cities of Asia, scoured the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, and delivered from oppression the long enslaved island of Cyprus. Their next operation must have been at a considerable distance of time, since they had to return near two hundred leagues westward,

Olymp. and then to proceed almost as far
lxxvi. 1. towards the north, and the Bos-
A. C. 476. phorus of Thrace. At the entrance
of this celebrated canal, which joins the Euxine and Propontia, the city of Byzantium, destined in future ages to become the seat of empire, and long to remain the chief emporium of Europe and of Asia, had been first founded by a feeble colony of Megareans, which had gradually become populous, flourishing, and independent, but which was actually commanded and insulted by armed Barbarians. It is not probable that Xerxes, or his ministers, perceived the peculiar security of Byzantium, situate between the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, two straits, which it might occasionally shut to a hostile navy, or open to the fleets of commerce. But had they been sensible of this advantage, the misfortunes hitherto attending all their maritime enterprises must have rendered it impossible to encourage their seamen to resist a victorious enemy. They discovered, however, more than their usual vigour, in defending, by land, a place which they regarded as the centre of very valuable possessions. The adjacent coast of Thrace forms a striking contrast with the inland parts of that country. Instead of bleak heaths, and snowy mountains, which deform the inhospitable regions of Hæmus and Rhodopé, the maritime provinces produce in abundance, vines, olives, the most useful grains, and the most delicious fruits. The climate vies with the delightful softness of the Asiatic plains; and the soil had been long cultivated by Greek colonies, who had widely extended themselves on both sides of Byzantium. The Barbarians strengthened the garrison of the place, which was well supplied with provisions, and commanded by Persians of the first distinction, among whom were several kinsmen of the great king. The siege was obstinate, but the events of it are not described in history. It is only known, that the walls were stormed, and that an immense booty, together with many Persian princes and nobles, fell into the hands of the victors.¹

Here the glory of Pausanias, who still commanded the forces of the confederacy; a man whose fame would rival the most illustrious names of antiquity, had he fallen in the siege of Byzantium. The rich spoils of Platæa, of which the tenth was allotted to him, as general, raised him above the equality required by the republican institutions of his country. His recent conquest still farther augmented his wealth and his ambition; a continual flow of prosperity, which is dangerous to the best regulated minds, proved fatal to the aspiring temper of Pausanias. As he conceived himself too

great to remain a subject, he was willing to become a sovereign, through the assistance of Xerxes, the inveterate enemy of his country. To this prince he made application, by means of Gongylus the Eretrian, a fit instrument for any kind of villany. To such an associate Pausanias had entrusted the noble Persians taken in Byzantium. This man escaped with his prisoners across the Bosphorus, and conveyed a letter to the great king, in which the Spartan general, having mentioned, as indubitable proof of his sincerity, the restoring his captive kinsmen, proposed to enter into strict amity with Xerxes, to take his daughter in marriage, to second his efforts in conquering Greece, and to hold that country as a dependent province of the Persian empire. The Persian is said to have highly relished these proposals, the subjugation of Greece being the great object of his reign. It is certain that he speedily sent Artabazus, a nobleman of confidence, to confer and co-operate with the traitor.

But Pausanias himself acted with the precipitancy and inconsistency of a man, who had either been deluded into treason by bad advice, or totally intoxicated by the dangerous vapours of ambition that floated in his distempered brain. Instead of dissembling his designs until they were ripe for execution, he assumed at once the tone of a master and the manners of a tyrant. He became difficult of access to his colleagues in command; disdained their advice in concerting measures which they were ordered to execute; he was surrounded by guards, chosen from the conquered Barbarians; and he punished the slightest offence in the allied troops with a rigour hitherto unknown to the Grecian discipline. He still managed, indeed, the fierce spirits of the Spartans, but without any degree of prudence, since the distinctions which he demanded for them, tended only to irritate and inflame their confederates, who were not allowed to forage, to draw water, to cut down straw for their beds, until the countrymen of Pausanias had been previously furnished with all these articles.

Olymp. This intolerable insolence dis-
lxxvi. 1. gusted and provoked the army in
A. C. 476. general, but especially the Ionians,
who lamented that they had been no sooner delivered from the shackles of Persian despotism, than they were bent under the severer and more odious yoke of Sparta. By common consent, they repaired to the Athenian Aristides, and his colleague Cimon, the son of Miltiades, a youth of the fairest hopes, who had signalized his patriotism and valour in all the glorious scenes of the war. Their designs being approved by the Athenian admirals, Uliades and Antagoras, who respectively commanded the fleets of Samos and Chios, the bravest of all the maritime allies, seized the first opportunity to insult the galley of Pausanias; and when reproached and threatened by the Spartan, they desired him to thank Fortune, who had favoured him at Platæa, the memory of which victory alone saved him from the immediate punishment of his arrogance

¹ Plut. in Aristid. Thucyd. l. i. 95, et seq. Diodor. l. xl. 44—46.

and cruelty. These words speedily re-echoed through the whole fleet, and served, as soon as they were heard, for the signal of general revolt. The different squadrons of Asia, and the Hellespont sailed from their stations, joined the ships of Uliades and Antagoras, loudly declared against the insolent ambition of Pausanias, abjured the proud tyranny of Sparta, and for ever ranged themselves under the victorious colours of Athens, whose generous magnanimity seemed best fitted to command the willing obedience of freemen.²

Olymp. ^{lxxvi. 2.}
A. C. 475. This revolution had immediate and important effects, which we shall proceed to explain, when we have punished and dismissed the unworthy Pausanias. Apprised of his malversation and treachery, the Spartan senate recalled him, to stand trial for his life. But his immense wealth enabling him to corrupt the integrity of his judges, he escaped without farther punishment than degradation from his office, and paying a heavy fine. In his stead, the Spartans substituted, not one admiral, but several captains, with divided authority, thereby to remove the odium and resentment which the insolence of unlimited command had excited among their confederates. Pausanias, though divested of his public character, having accompanied these officers to the Hellespont, in a vessel fitted out at his private expense, began to display more arrogance than ever. He disdained not only the manners and behaviour, but the dress and appearance of a Greek; carried on, almost openly, his treacherous correspondence with Artabazus; increased the number of his Barbarian guards and attendants; trampled with contempt on the most revered institutions of his country; and assumed that provoking pomp of power, and that offensive ostentation of vice, which disgraced the profligate lives of the Persian satraps.³

When the Spartan magistrates received a full account of his pride and folly, they were apprehensive lest he might refuse to return home on an ordinary summons, and therefore employed the form of the scytalé, a form reserved for the most solemn occasions. The scytalé (for opinion can give importance to any thing) was only a narrow scroll of parchment, which had been rolled on a piece of wood, and then stamped with the decree of the republic. Every Spartan, invested with authority at home or abroad, possessed a tally exactly corresponding to the rod on which the parchment had been first rolled. By applying his tally, the words of the scytalé necessarily arranged themselves in their original form, and attested the authentic command of the magistrate. As tutor to the infant king of Sparta, Pausanias had been furnished with an instrument of this kind; and such is the effect of legal formality, that a man who would probably have despised the injunction of a simple letter, returned without delay to a country which he had betrayed, when recalled by this frivolous, but respected ceremony.

The external professions, and hypocritical pedantry, of Spartan virtue, were most shamefully detected and exposed in the whole affair of Pausanias. Though convicted of the most odious tyranny, extortion, and profligacy, he was still allowed to enjoy the benefit of personal freedom; to correspond by frequent messages with his accomplice Artabazus; and, at length, to tamper with the Helots and Messenians, those oppressed slaves, who were ever ready to rebel against the unrelenting tyranny of their masters. But as it exceeded even the opulence and effrontery of Pausanias, to corrupt and influence the whole republic, those who had either escaped the general contagion of venality, or who were offended at not sharing his bribes, accused him, a third time, of treason to Greece, in consequence of an event which enabled them in the fullest manner to make good the charge. An unhappy youth, who lived with Pausanias as the infamous minister of his pleasure, was destined by that monster to become the victim of his ambition. He was charged with a letter from his master to Artabazus, in which, after explaining the actual state of his affairs, Pausanias hinted to him, as had been his usual practice, to destroy the bearer. The suspicious youth, who had observed that none of those sent on such errands ever returned to their country, broke open the letter, and read his own fate. Fired with resentment, he instantly carried the writing to the enemies of Pausanias, who prudently advised the messenger to take refuge in the temple of Neptune, expecting that his master would soon follow him. Mean while they practised a concealment in the wall of the temple, and having acquainted the Ephori, and other chief magistrates, with their contrivance for convicting the traitor by his own words, they obtained a deputation to accompany them, to remain concealed with them in the temple, and to overhear the mutual reproaches of Pausanias and his messenger. Yet the superstition of the Spartans permitted them not to seize the criminal in that sacred edifice. He was allowed to retire in safety; and when the senate had at length determined to lay hold of him, he was privately admonished of his danger by some members of that venal assembly. Upon this intelligence, he took refuge in the temple of Minerva, from which it being unlawful to drag him, that asylum was surrounded by guards, all necessities were denied the prisoner, and he thus perished by hunger.⁴

Olymp. ^{lxxvi. 2.}
A. C. 475. The late punishment of this detestable traitor could not repair the ruinous effects of his misconduct and villany. Not only the Ionians, who had first begun the revolt, but the foreign confederates in general, loudly rejected the pretensions of Dorcus and other captains whom the Spartans appointed to command them. A few communities of Peloponnesus still followed the Lacedæmonian standard; but the islanders and Asiatics unanimously applied to Aristides, to whose ap-

² Nepos in Pausan. Plutarch. in Aristid.

³ Thucyd. i. 95 et 128.

⁴ Thucyd. i. i. c. cxxviii. et seq. Diodor. l. xi. c. xliv. et Nepos in Pausan

proved wisdom and virtue they not only entrusted the operations of the combined armament, but voluntarily submitted their more particular concerns; and experience soon justified their prudent choice. Pay was not yet introduced into the Grecian service, because the character of *soldier* was not separated from that of *citizen*. It had been usual, however, to raise annually a certain proportion of supplies among the several confederates, in order to purchase arms, to equip and victual the galleys, and to provide such engines of war as proved requisite in storming the fortified towns belonging to the common enemy.¹ By unanimous suffrage, Aristides was appointed to new-model and apply this necessary tax, which had been imposed and exacted by the Spartans without sufficient attention to the respective faculties of the contributaries. The honest Athenian executed this delicate office with no less judgment than equity. The whole annual imposition amounted to four hundred and sixty talents, about ninety thousand pounds sterling; which was proportioned with such nice accuracy, that no state found the smallest reason to complain of partiality or injustice. The common treasure was kept in the central and sacred island of Delos; and, though entrusted to the personal discretion of the Athenian commander, was soon conceived to lie at the disposition of his republic.²

While the merit of Aristides thus procured his countrymen the management of the national treasury of Greece, Themistocles was equally successful in improving the internal resources of the state. By yielding more protection to strangers than they enjoyed in neighbouring cities, he augmented not only the populousness, but the wealth of Athens, as that description of men paid an annual contribution in return for their security.³ This, together with other branches of the revenue, he employed in building annually about sixty galleys, the addition of which to the Athenian navy abundantly compensated such losses as were sustained by the accidents of the sea in foreign parts. Notwithstanding the envy and malice of worthless demagogues, who infested the Athenian assembly and courts of justice, Themistocles was fast advancing to the attainment of the same authority at home, which Aristides enjoyed abroad, when complaints arrived from Sparta, that he had conspired with Pausanias to betray the public liberty. The known resentment of the Spartans against this extraordinary man, sufficiently explains the reason why they, who were so dilatory in their proceedings against Pausanias himself, should be so eager to bring to punishment his supposed accomplice. But it was not easy to conceive, how the Athenians could admit such an accusation against a citizen, whose singular valour and conduct had gained the decisive victory at Salamis; whose counsels and address had fortified their city with impregnable strength; whose foresight and activity had

procured them a fleet which no nation in the world could resist; and whose abilities and patriotism had not only saved his country from the most formidable invasion recorded in history, and which was principally directed against Athens, but amidst the terrors of this invasion, the treachery of false friends, and the violence of open enemies, had so eminently contributed to raise his republic to the first rank in the Grecian confederacy. Yet such, on the one hand, was the effect of that envy which, in republics, always accompanies excellence; and such, on the other, the influence of Spartan bribery and intrigues, that Themistocles was banished by the ostracism, a punishment inflicted on men whose aspiring ambition seemed dangerous to freedom, which required not the proof of any particular delinquency, and which had effect only during a term of years.⁴

Olymp. It is probable, that the illustrious
lxxvi. 4. exile would have been recalled before the expiration of the appointed
A. C. 473. time; but the persecution of Sparta allowed not his countrymen leisure to repent of their severity. Having punished Pausanias, they acquainted the Athenians, "That from the papers of that notorious traitor, complete evidence appeared of the guilt of Themistocles; that it was not sufficient, therefore, to have expelled him for a few years from Athens, by an indulgent decree, which the assembly might revoke at pleasure; that crimes against the general confederacy of Greece ought to be judged by the Amphictyonic council, and punished by death, or perpetual banishment." The Athenians shamefully complied with this demand. It appeared, indeed, that Themistocles had corresponded with Pausanias, and been privy to his designs; but he persisted in affirming that he never had approved them. The rivalry and enmity subsisting between Sparta and Argos, had induced him to choose the latter as the place of his retreat. There he received the news of his condemnation; after which, not thinking himself secure in any city of Peloponnesus, he sailed to Corcyra. But his enemies still continuing to pursue him, he fled to the opposite coast of Epirus, and sought refuge among the barbarous Molossians. Soon afterwards he escaped into Persia, where his wonderful versatility of genius, in acquiring the language and manners of that country, recommended him to the new king Artaxerxes, who had lately succeeded the unfortunate invader of Greece. The suspicion
Olymp. of treason throws a dark shade on
lxxvii. 1. the eminent lustre of his abilities;
A. C. 472. nor does the disinterestedness of his private character tend to remove the imputation. Though he carried with him to Persia his most valuable effects, yet the estimate of the property which he left behind in Athens, amounted to a hundred talents (above twenty thousand pounds sterling,) an immense sum, when estimated by the value of money in that age. The whole was confiscated to the exchequer; and the eagerness of the populace to seize this rich booty, serves to explain the ala-

¹ Plat. in Aristid. p. 532, et seq.

² Ibid. p. 534. Thucyd. l. i. c. xcvi. Diodor. p. 440.

³ Lyrius adv. Philon.

⁴ Diodor. p. 445, et seq. Plat. ibid.

crity with which all parties agreed to his destruction. A report prevailed in Greece, that Themistocles could never forgive the ingratitude of the Athenians, which he had determined to revenge at the head of a powerful army, raised by Artaxerxes. But perceiving the unexampled success of Cimon on the Asiatic coast, he despaired of being able to accomplish his design; and, in a melancholy hour, ended his life by poison, at the age of sixty-five, in Magnesia, a town of Lydia, which had been bestowed on him by the liberality of the Persian monarch.⁵

Olymp. It is worthy of observation, that
lxxvii. 2. the three great commanders who
A. C. 471. had resisted and disgraced the arms
of Xerxes, quitted the scene almost at the same time. While Pausanias and Themistocles suffered the punishment of their real or pretended crimes, Aristides died of old age, universally regretted by the affectionate admiration of his country. He, who had long managed the common treasury of Greece, left not a sufficient sum to defray the expense of his funeral. His son Lysimachus received a present of three hundred pounds from the public, to enable him to pursue and finish his education. His daughters were maintained, and portioned at the expense of the treasury. This honourable poverty well corresponded with the manly elevation of his character, whose pure and unsullied splendour, in the opinion of a good judge of merit,⁶ far eclipses the doubtful fame of his daring, but unfortunate rival.

By the death of Aristides, the conduct of the Persian war devolved on his colleague Cimon, who united the integrity of that great man to the valour of Miltiades and the decisive boldness of Themistocles. But as he felt an ambition for eminence which disdains bare imitation, he not only reflected the most distinguished excellences of his predecessors, but improved and adorned them by an elegant liberality of manners, an indulgent humanity, and candid condescension; virtues which long secured him the affections of his fellow citizens, while his military talents and authority, always directed by moderation and justice, maintained an absolute ascendant over the allies of the republic. His first operations were employed against the

Olymp. coast of Thrace which the taking
lxxvii. 2. of Byzantium seemed to render an
A. C. 471. easy conquest. The only places in that country fitted to make an obstinate resistance, were the towns of Eion and Amphipolis, both situate on the river Strymon; the former near its junction with the Strymonic gulf, the latter more remote from the shore, but entirely surrounded by an arm of the gulf, and the principal branches of that copious river. Amphipolis, however, was taken, and planted by a numerous colony of Athenians. But Eion still opposed a vigorous resistance; Boges, the Persian governor, having determined rather to perish than surrender. After

long baffling the efforts of the besiegers, by such persevering courage and activity as none of his countrymen had displayed in the course of the war, this fierce Barbarian was at length not tamed, but exasperated by hunger. His companions and attendants, equally desperate with their leader, followed his intrepid example; and mounting the ramparts with one accord, threw into the middle stream of the Strymon their gold, silver, and other precious effects. After thus attesting their implacable hatred to the assailants, they calmly descended, lighted a funeral pile, butchered their wives and children, and again mounting the walls, precipitated themselves with fury into the thickest of the flames.⁷

With this signal act of despair ended the Persian dominion over the coast of Europe, which finally submitted to the victorious arms of Cimon; a general, Olymp. lxxvii. 3. who knew alike how to conquer, A. C. 470. and how to use the victory. The Athenians were eager to prolong the authority of a man, who seemed ambitious to acquire wealth by valour, only that by wealth he might purchase the public esteem; and whose affable condescension, and generous liberality, continually increased his fame and his influence both at home and abroad. The reinforcements with which he was speedily furnished by the republic, enabled him to pursue the enemy into Asia, without allowing them time to breathe, or recover strength, after their repeated defeats. The intermediate islands ambitiously courted his protection and friendship; and their feeble aid, together with the more powerful assistance of the Ionian coast, speedily increased his fleet to the number of three hundred sail.

With this formidable armament he stretched towards the coast of Caria, where his approach served for the signal of liberty to the numerous Greek cities in that valuable province. Seconded by the ardour of the natives, he successively besieged and reduced the walled towns and fortresses, several of which were filled with powerful garrisons; and, in the course of a few months, totally expelled the Persians from all their strong holds in Caria. The victorious armament then proceeded eastward to Lycia, and received the submission of that extensive coast. The citizens of Phaselis alone, defended by strong walls, and a numerous garrison, refused to admit the Grecian fleet, or to betray their Persian master. Their resistance was the more formidable, because their ancient connection with the Chians, who actually served under the colours of Cimon, enabled them to enter into a treacherous correspondence with the enemy. After other means of intercourse had been cut off, the Chians still shot arrows over the walls, and thus conveyed intelligence into the place of all the measures adopted by the assailants. Wherever the attack was made, the townsmen and garrison were prepared to resist: the besiegers were long baffled in their attempts; but the perseverance of Cimon finally overcame

⁵ Plut. et Nepos in Themist. Diodor. l. xi. c. liv—lix. Thucyd. i. 135, et seq.

⁶ Plato apud Plutarch. in Aristid.

⁷ Plut. in Cimon. Diodor. l. xi.

the obstinacy of his enemies. Their vigorous resistance was not distinguished by any memorable punishment; the mediation of the Chians, who were justly esteemed among the best sailors in the Athenian fleet, easily prevailing on the lenity of Cimon to grant them a capitulation, on condition that they immediately paid ten talents, and augmented the Grecian armament by their whole naval strength.¹

The distracted state of Persia, the intrigues of the court, the discord of the palace, and the civil wars which raised to the throne of Xerxes his third son Artaxerxes, distinguished by the epithet of Longimanus, prevented that vast but unwieldy empire from making any vigorous effort to resist the European invasion. But after Artaxerxes had at length crushed the unfortunate ambition of his competitors, and acquired firm possession of the reins of government, which he continued to hold for half a century,² he naturally concerted proper measures to defend his remaining dominions in Asia

Minor. Having re-established the Persian authority in the isle of —425.

Cyprus, he considered that Pamphylia, being the next province to Lycia, would probably receive a speedy visit from the victorious Greeks. That he might meet them there with becoming vigour, he assembled a powerful army on the fertile banks of the Eurymedon. A fleet likewise of four hundred sail, was collected, chiefly from Cilicia, and Phœnicia, and was commanded to rendezvous near the mouth of that river.

The Greeks, conducted by the activity of Cimon, delayed not to undertake the enterprise

which the prudence of Artaxerxes had foreseen. Their fleet, amounting to two hundred and fifty galleys,

A. C. 470. fell in with the Persian squadrons off the coast of Cyprus. The Barbarians,

vainly confident in their superior numbers, did not decline the engagement, which was obstinate, fierce, and bloody. Many of their ships were sunk; a hundred were taken; the rest fled in disorder towards the shore of Cyprus; but, being speedily pursued by a powerful detachment of the Grecian fleet, were abandoned by the terror of their crews, to the victors; and thus the mighty preparations, which the great king had raised with such flattering hopes, strengthened in one day, with about three hundred sail, the hostile navy of Greece.³

The vigorous mind of Cimon, instead of being intoxicated with this flow of prosperity, was less elevated with good fortune, than solicitous to improve it. The captured vessels contained above twenty thousand Persians. The soldiers encamped on the Eurymedon were still ignorant of the battle. These circumstances instantly suggested to the quick discernment of Cimon a stratagem for surprising the Persian camp, which was executed on the

evening of the same glorious day with unexampled success. The prisoners were stripped of their eastern attire; the bravest of the Greeks condescended to assume the tiara and scimeter, and thus disguised, embarked in the Persian ships, and sailed up the river Eurymedon with a favourable gale. The unsuspecting Barbarians received them with open arms into their camp, as their long-expected companions. But the Greeks had no sooner been admitted within the gates, than on a given signal, at once drawing their swords, they attacked, with the concert of disciplined valour, the defenceless security of their now astonished and trembling adversaries. Before the Persians recovered from their surprise, Cimon had advanced to the tent of their general. Consternation and despair seized this numerous but unwarlike host. The few who were least overcome by the impressions of fear and amazement, betook themselves to flight; a panic terror suspended the powers of the rest; they remained, and fell, unarmed and unresisting, by the hands of an unknown enemy.

The rich spoil of the Barbarian camp rewarded the enterprise and celerity of the Greeks, who, loaded with wealth and glory, returned home during winter, and piously dedicated to Apollo a tenth of the plunder acquired by these ever memorable achievements. A considerable portion of the remainder was employed (as mentioned above) in strengthening the fortifications of Athens. Agreeably to the Grecian custom, the general was entitled to a valuable share. Cimon received it as a testimony of the public esteem, and expended it for the public use; embellishing his beloved native city with shady walks, gardens, porticoes, schools of exercise, and other works of general pleasure and utility.⁴

After these decisive victories, the Greeks headed by the Athenians, carried on the war during twenty-one years, rather for plunder than glory. The manifest superiority which they enjoyed on all

lxxvii. 4. the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, might have rendered their maritime allies sufficiently secure. But the

people of Athens, whose councils began about this time to be governed by the magnanimous ambition and profound policy of Pericles, had the address to persuade their confederates that naval preparations and enterprises were still as necessary as ever. At length, however, most of those scattered islands and sea-ports, which followed the colours of Athens, grew weary of perpetual hostilities, of which they shared the toil and danger, while their ambitious leaders alone reaped the advantage and the glory, and became continually more anxious to enjoy the benefits of public peace, and the undisturbed comforts of domestic tranquillity. The Athenians availed themselves of this disposition, to engage such states as appeared most backward in raising their contingents for the common armament, to compound for personal service on shipboard, by an annual supply of money, which might enable Athens continually to keep in readiness a fleet of observation, to

¹ Plut. et Diodor. *ibid.*

² Compare Thucyd. l. i. c. cxxxvii. and Usher Chronol. See also Petav. de Doctrin. Temp. l. x. c. xxv. who endeavours to reconcile the chronological differences between Thucydides and Plutarch in Themist.

³ Thucyd. Plut. Diod. *ibid.*

⁴ Idem. *ibid.* et Nepos in Cimon. et Thucyd. l. i.

watch and check the motions of the common enemy. This, at first voluntary, contribution soon amounted to about a hundred thousand pounds. It was gradually augmented; and, at length, raised by Pericles to three times the original sum;⁵ an immense income, considering that the proportional value of money to labour was then ten times higher than at present; and considering also the very limited revenues of the greatest monarchs of antiquity; since, from all the various provinces of the Persian empire, scarcely four millions sterling entered the royal treasury.⁶

In their easier expeditions, the Greeks had an opportunity of visiting the large and beautiful island of Cyprus, which, though delivered by their valour from some Persian garrisons, either

still continued, or again became, subject to that empire. The striking advantages of a delightful territory, four hundred miles in circumference, producing in great abundance wine, oil, with the most delicious fruits, and deemed invaluable in ancient times on account of its rich mines of brass, naturally tempted the ambition of an enterprising nation. The conquest of Cyprus was still farther recommended to the Athenians, as the sea-coast had been peopled by a Grecian colony under the heroic Teucer, who built there a city called Salamis from the name of his native country,⁸ which, from the earliest antiquity, had been regarded as a dependence of Attica. The Grecian inhabitants of Cyprus had hitherto attained neither power nor splendour; their settlements had been successively reduced by the Phœnicians and the great king; and they actually languished in a condition of the greatest debility.⁹ Honour prompted the Athenians to relieve their distressed brethren; interest incited them to acquire possession of a valuable island. With two hundred ships of war they prepared to undertake this important enterprise, when an object still more dazzling gave a new direction to their arms.

Amidst the troubles which attended the establishment of Artaxerxes on the Persian throne, the Egyptians sought an opportunity to withdraw themselves from the yoke of a nation whose tyranny they had long felt and lamented. A leader only was wanting to head the rebellion. This also was at length discovered in Inarus, a bold Libyan chief, to whose standard the malcontents assembling from all quarters, gradually grew into an army, which attacked and defeated the Persian mercenaries, expelled the garrisons, banished or put to death the governors and officers of the revenue, and traversing the kingdom without control or resistance, every where proclaimed the Egyptians a free and independent nation. Nor was this the capricious revolt of short-sighted Barba-

rians. Inarus maintained his conquest with valour and policy; and in order to strengthen his interest by foreign alliance, despatched an embassy to Athens, craving the assistance of that victorious republic against its most odious and inveterate enemy.¹⁰

The negotiation was successful; the Athenians burned with desire to share the spoils of Persia, and commanded the ships, destined for Cyprus, to sail to Egypt. They had scarcely arrived in that kingdom, when a Persian army of three hundred thousand men, commanded by Achæmenes, encamped on the banks of the Nile. A battle speedily ensued, in which the insurgents obtained a complete victory, chiefly through the valour and discipline of their Grecian auxiliaries. The vanquished sought refuge within the walls of Memphis; that capital was invested; and after becoming master of two divisions of the city, the Athenians pushed with vigour the siege of the third, called, from the colour of its fortifications, the White Wall. Artaxerxes, mean while, neglected no possible effort, for breaking, or eluding, a tempest, that threatened to dismember his dominions. While Persian nobles of distinction conveyed immense sums of gold and silver into Greece, to rouse, by seasonable bribes, the hostility of rival states against the audacity of Athens, a new army was collected, still more numerous than the former, and entrusted to Megabazus, the bravest general in the East. Such, at least, he was deemed by his countrymen; yet we cannot perceive any very illustrious merit in forcing the Greeks to raise the siege of Memphis, the soldiers being already worn out with the fatigues of hard service, and probably enfeebled by diseases in a far distant climate, extremely different from their own.

Megabazus, however, had the glory of first turning against the Greeks that current of success which had run for many years so strongly in their favour. They and the revolted Egyptians were now besieged, in their turn, in a small island of the Nile called Prosopis, along the coast of which the Athenians had anchored their ships. By diverting the course of the river, Megabazus left them on dry land. This operation so much confounded the Egyptians, that they immediately laid down their arms: but their wonted magnanimity did not forsake the Greeks: with their own hands they set fire to their fleet, and exhorting each other to suffer nothing unworthy of their former fame, determined, with one accord, to resist the assailants, and although they could not expect victory, to purchase an honourable tomb. Megabazus, intimidated by their countenance and resolution, and unwilling to expose his men to the efforts of a dangerous despair, granted them a capitulation, and, what seems more extraordinary in a Persian commander, allowed them to retire in safety. They endeavoured to penetrate through Libya to the Grecian colonies in Cyrenaica, from which they hoped to be transported by sea to their native country. But the

⁵ Thucyd. *ibid.* et Plut. in Pericl.

⁶ Herodot. iii. 95. In modern times the precious metals have so much increased in quantity and diminished in value, that in 1660 the revenue of Hindoostan amounted to thirty two millions sterling.

⁷ Strabo, p. 648.

⁸ Isocrat. in Evagor.

⁹ Isocrat. *ibid.*

¹⁰ Thucyd. l. i. et Diodor. l. xi. p. 979.

greater part perished through fatigue or disease in the inhospitable deserts of Africa, and only a miserable remnant of men, whose bravery deserved a better fate, revisited the shores of Greece. To complete the disaster, a reinforcement of sixty ships, which the Athenians had sent to Egypt, was attacked, surrounded, and totally destroyed by the Phœnicians, near the same scene which had already proved so fatal, but so honourable, to their countrymen.¹

Olymp. lxxxii. 3. A. C. 450. These repeated misfortunes, together with the growing troubles in Greece, which we shall speedily have occasion to describe, prevented the Athenians, during seven years, from reviving their design against Cyprus. A fleet of two hundred sail was at length entrusted to Cimon, who enjoyed a prosperous voyage to the Cyprian coast. The towns of Malos and Citium opposed a feeble resistance, and the singular humanity with which Cimon treated his prisoners, would have facilitated more important conquests: but the Phœnician and Cilician fleets had again put to sea, and Cimon wisely determined to attack them as they approached the island, rather than wait their arrival, his countrymen being superior to their enemies, still more in naval than in military prowess. In the battle which soon followed, he took above a hundred galleys; the number of those sunk or destroyed is unknown; the remainder fled to the coast of Cilicia, in hopes of protection from the army of Megabazus, encamped in that province; but that slow unwieldy body was unable to afford them any seasonable or effectual relief. The Greeks, having pursued them on shore, totally destroyed *them*, as well as the Persian detachments who came to their succour, and returned loaded with spoil to Cyprus. The Athenian general then prepared to form the siege of Salamis, which, though defended by a numerous Persian garrison, and well provided with all the necessities of defence, must have soon yielded to his skill and valour, had not sickness, in consequence of a wound received before the walls of Citium, prevented him from exerting his usual activity.

Olymp. lxxxii. 4. A. C. 449. Mean while Artaxerxes, who perceived that the acquisition of Salamis would naturally draw after it the conquest of the whole island, and who had been continually disappointed in expecting to prepare fleets and armies capable to contend with the Athenians, eagerly solicited peace from that people, almost on their own terms. His ambassadors were favourably heard in the Athenian assembly by those who were more solicitous about confirming their usurpations over their allies and colonies, than ambitious of extending their Asiatic conquests. Cimon, who invariably maintained the contrary system, was now no more. A peace, therefore, was concluded on the following conditions:² That all the Greek colonies in Lower Asia should be declared independent of the Persian empire; that the armies of the great king should not approach within three days' journey of the

western coast; and that no Persian vessel should appear between the Cyanean rocks and the Chelidonian isles, that is, in the wide extent of the Ægean and Mediterranean seas, between the northern extremity of the Thracian Bosphorus and the southern promontory of Lycia. On such terms the Athenians and their allies stipulated to withdraw their armament from Cyprus, and to abstain thenceforward from molesting the territories of the king of Persia.³ Such was the conclusion of this memorable war, which, since the burning of Sardis, the first decisive act of hostility, had been carried on, with little intermission, during fifty-one years. The same magnanimous republic, which first ventured to oppose the pretensions of Persia, dictated to that haughty empire the most humiliating conditions of peace; an important and illustrious era in Grecian history, which was often celebrated with pompous panegyric during the declining ages of Athenian glory.

Although, for reasons which will be explained hereafter, peace was alike necessary to both parties, yet the reader, who feels a warm interest in the cause of civilization and humanity, cannot but regret that, after disgracing the arms of Persia, and breaking the power of Carthage, the Greeks had not combined in one powerful exertion, and extended their victories and their improvements over the ancient world. But the internal defects in her political constitution, which stunted the growth of Greece, and prevented her manhood and maturity from corresponding to the blooming vigour of her youth, rendered impossible this most desirable union, which, could it have taken place, would probably have left little room for the transient conquests of Alexander, or the more permanent glory of the Roman arms. Instead of these imagined trophies, the subsequent history of Greece presents us with the melancholy picture of intestine discord.

During a hundred and eleven years, which elapsed between the glorious peace with Persia, in which the Athenians, at the head of their allies, seemed for ever to have repressed the ambition of that aspiring power, and the fatal defeat at Cheronæa, in which the same people, with their unfortunate auxiliaries, submitted to the valour and activity of Philip, Greece, with short variations of domestic quiet and foreign hostility, carried on bloody wars, and obtained destructive victories, in which her own citizens, not the enemies of the confederacy, were the unhappy objects of her inglorious triumph. Yet the transactions of this distracted and miserable period, however immaterial in the history of empire, are peculiarly interesting in the still more instructive history of human nature. A confederacy of soldiers and freemen, extending their dominion over ignorant savages, or effeminate slaves, must continually exhibit the unequal combat of power, courage, and conduct on the one side, against weakness, ignorance, and timidity on the other. But amidst the domestic dissensions of Greece, the advantages of the contending parties were nicely

¹ Isocrat. de Pace et Panegyr. et Thucyd. et Diodor. *ibid.*
² Thucyd. Plutarch. Diodor. Isocrat. &c.

³ Isocrat. Panegyr.

balanced and accurately adjusted. Force was resisted by force, valour opposed by valour, and art encountered or eluded by similar address. The active powers of man, excited by emulation, inflamed by opposition, nourished by interest, and at once strengthened and elevated by a sense of personal honour and the hope of immortal fame, operated in every direction with awakened energy, and were displayed in the boldest exertions of the voice and arm. In every field where glory might be won, men recognised the proper objects of their ambition, and aspired to the highest honours of their kind; and although the prizes were often small, and the victory always indecisive, yet the pertinacious efforts of the combatants (great beyond example, and almost beyond belief) furnish the most interesting spectacle that history can present to the rational wonder of posterity.

The powerful cities of Sparta, Thebes, and Argos, which had long rivalled Athens and each other, could not behold, without much dissatisfaction and anxiety, the rapid growth of a republic which already eclipsed their splendour, and might some time endanger their safety. The Spartans had particular causes of disgust. The immortal victories of Cimon made them deeply regret that they, who had shared the first and severest toils of the war, had too hastily withdrawn from a field of action that afforded so many laurels. They were provoked at being denied the command of the maritime allies, and not less offended at being overreached by Themistocles. All these reasons had determined them, above twenty years before the peace with Persia, to make war on the Athenians, expecting to be seconded in this design by the fears of the weak, and the jealousy of the more powerful, states, on both sides the Corinthian isthmus. But their animosity, before it broke out into action, was diverted by a calamity equally sudden and unforeseen. In the year four hundred and sixty-nine before Christ,

Olymp. lxxvii. 4. A. C. 469. Sparta was overwhelmed by an earthquake.⁴ Taygetus and the neighbouring mountains were shaken to the foundation, and twenty thousand Lacedæmonian citizens or subjects perished in this dreadful disaster. But, amidst the ruins of Sparta, one description of men beheld the public misfortunes not only without horror, but with a secret satisfaction.

The oppressed Spartan slaves, known by the appellation of Helots and Messenians, assembled in crowds from the villages in which they were cantoned, and took measures for delivering themselves during the cruelty of the elements, from the not less inexorable cruelty of their unfeeling tyrants. The prudent dispositions of king Archidamus, who, foreseeing the revolt, had summoned the citizens to arms, prevented them from getting immediate possession of the capital; but they rendered themselves masters of the ancient and strong fortress Ithomé, from which they continued many years to infest the Lacedæmonian territories.

The Spartans in vain exerted their utmost endeavours to expel this dangerous intestine enemy; and in the third year of the war (for this revolt is dignified in history by the name of the Third Messenian War,) they had recourse to the Athenians, who, of all the Greeks, were deemed the most skilful in sieges. The Athenians, either not sufficiently acquainted with the secret hostility of Sparta, or willing to dissemble their knowledge of it, as they were then totally bent on other projects and enterprises, sent them the required assistance. The besiegers, however, met with so little success, that the Spartans dismissed their Athenian auxiliaries, on pretence indeed that their help was no longer necessary; but, in reality, from a suspicion that they favoured the interest of the rebels; and, as they retained the troops of all the other allies, the Athenians were justly provoked by this instance of distrust.⁵ Meanwhile the inhabitants of Pisa, who, for a reason that will be immediately explained, were highly incensed against Sparta, gave vigorous assistance to the besieged.

Olymp. lxxx. 2. A. C. 459. The place thus held out ten years: many sallies were made, several battles were fought with the fury that might be expected from the cruelty of tyrants chastising the insolence of slaves. Both parties must have been reduced to extremity, since the Helots and Messenians, though obliged to surrender the place, obtained from the weakness, a condition which they would have vainly solicited from the mercy of Sparta, "that they should be allowed, with their wives, children, and effects, to depart, unmolested, from the Peloponnesus." The Athenians, deeply resenting the affront of suspected fidelity, determined to mortify the Spartans by kindly receiving those needy fugitives, whom they finally established in Naupactus, a sea-port on the Crisean gulf, which their arms had justly wrested from the Locri Ozolæ; a cruel and barbarous people, whose savage manners and rapacity disgraced their Grecian extraction. The Helots and Messenians repaid, by signal gratitude, the humane protection of Athens. During the long course of the Peloponnesian war, while their neighbours on every side espoused the opposite interest, the inhabitants of Naupactus alone invariably exerted themselves, with zeal and vigour, in defence of the declining power of their magnanimous confederate and ancient benefactor.

The cause above alluded to, which had incensed the Pisans against Sparta, dated beyond a century.⁶ That people had long contended with Elis, the capital of their province, for the right of superintending the Olympic games. The Spartans enabled the Elians to prevail in the contest, who continued, without opposition, to direct that august solemnity, until the earthquake and subsequent calamities of Sparta emboldened the insolent and wealthy Pisans to renew their pretensions.⁷ Their attempts, however, to maintain this bold claim, especially

⁵ Thucyd. l. i. cap. ci.

⁶ Pausanias, l. vi. c. xxii.

⁷ Strabo, l. viii. p. 545.

⁴ Thucyd. lib. i. cap. c. et seq. Diodor. lib. xi. cap. lxiil.

after the removal of the Helots and Messenians, appear to have been alike feeble and unfortunate. Pisa was taken, plundered, and so thoroughly demolished, that not a vestige, and scarce the name, remained.

Olymp. With the valuable booty acquired in this warfare, the Elians executed a memorable undertaking; A. C. 456.

having, in the course of ten years,¹ enlarged and adorned the temple of Olympian Jupiter, and erected the celebrated statue of that divinity; a work which no subsequent age could ever rival, and whose sublimity is said to have increased and fortified the popular superstition.² This famous temple was of the Doric order, encircled with a colonnade, and built of the stone of the country resembling Parian marble. From the area, or ground, to the decoration over the gate, it reached sixty-eight feet in height; it was ninety-five feet broad, and two hundred and thirty long: thus falling short of the greatest modern temples in magnitude, as much as it excelled them in beauty and the richness of material. It was covered with Pentelican marble, cut in the form of brick tiles. At each extremity of the roof stood a gilded vase; in the middle a golden victory; below which was a shield embossed with Medusa's head, likewise of gold. Pelops and CEnomaus were represented, on the pediment, ready to begin the chariot-race before very illustrious spectators, since Jupiter himself was of the number. The vault was adorned with the battle of the Centaurs and Lapithæ. The labours of Hercules distinguished the principal entrance.³

After passing the brass gates, you discovered Iphitus crowned by his spouse Echecheiria; from thence you proceeded, through a noble portico, to the majestic creation of Phidias the Athenian, which formed the principal ornament of the temple, and of Greece. The god was sitting on a throne, and being sixty feet high, touched the roof with his head; and threatened, if he moved himself, to shake in pieces that noble edifice, which, lofty and spacious as it was, still appeared unworthy to contain him. This vast colossus was composed of gold, taken in the sack of Pisa, and of ivory, then almost as precious as gold, which was brought from the East by Athenian merchantmen. The god had an enamelled crown of olive on his head, an image of victory in his right hand, a burnished sceptre in his left. His robes and sandals were variegated with golden flowers and animals. The throne was made of ivory and ebony, inlaid with precious stones. The feet which supported it, as well as the fillets which joined them, were adorned with innumerable figures; among which you perceived the Theban children torn by sphynxes, together with Apollo and Diana shooting the beautiful and once flourishing family of Niobé. Upon the most conspicuous part of the throne which met the eye in entering, you beheld eight statues, representing the gymnastic exercises; and the beautiful figure, whose head was encircled with

a wreath, resembled young Pantarces, the favourite scholar of Phidias, who, in the contest of the boys, had recently gained the Olympic prize. Besides the four feet, mentioned above, the throne was supported by four pillars, placed between them, and painted by Panænus, the brother of Phidias. There that admirable artist had delineated the Hesperides guarding the golden apples; Atlas painfully sustaining the heavens, with Hercules ready to assist him; Salaminé with naval ornaments in her hand; and Achilles supporting the beautiful expiring Penthesilea.

It would be tedious to describe the remaining ornaments of this celebrated statue, and still more of the sacred edifice itself: yet the temple of Olympia was much inferior in size to that of Ceres and Proserpine, at Eleusis, in Attica. The latter was built by Ictinus, the contemporary and rival of Phidias; and sufficiently capacious (could we believe the exaggerations of travellers) to contain thirty thousand persons.⁴ This edifice was also of the Doric order; that of Diana at Ephesus, and of Apollo at Miletus, were both of the Ionic; and the celebrated temple of Jupiter at Athens, begun by Pisistratus, and enlarged by Pericles, was finished in the Corinthian style, by Antiochus Epiphanes, king of Syria. These four temples were the richest and most beautiful in the world, and long regarded as models of the three Grecian orders of architecture.⁵

Olymp. While the earthquake and the servile war confined within a domestic sphere the activity of Sparta, A. C. 468. Argos, the second republic of the Peloponnesus, and long the most considerable principality in that peninsula, underwent such revolutions and misfortunes, as left her neither inclination nor power to oppose the Athenian greatness. Ever rivals and enemies of Sparta, the Argives had jealously declined the danger and glory of the Persian war, to the success of which their adversaries had so eminently contributed. This ungenerous dereliction passed not unpunished. As deserters of the common cause, the Argives incurred the hatred and contempt of their public-spirited neighbours. Mycenæ, once the proud residence of royal Agamemnon, Epidaurus, and Træzené, which formed respectively the greatest strength and ornament of the Argive territory, threw off the yoke of a capital, whose folly or baseness rendered her unworthy to govern them. Sicyon, Nauplia, Helisæa, and other towns of less note, which were scattered at small distances over the face of that delightful province, obeyed the summons to liberty, and assumed independence. The rebels (for as such they were treated by the indignant magistrates of Argos) strengthened themselves by foreign alliance, and continued thenceforth to disdain the authority of their ancient metropolis and sovereign. At the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, they formed a respectable portion of the Lacedæmonian confederacy; while Argos alone, of all the cities in the Peloponnesus, openly espoused the cause of the Athenians.

¹ Between the years 456 and 446, A. C.

² Aliquid receptæ religioni adjecisse fertur.—PLIN.

³ Pausan. in Eliac. p. 303, et seq.

⁴ Strabo, l. ix. p. 395.

⁵ Vitruvius, l. vii

The ancient city of Mycenæ, which had first sounded the trumpet of sedition, was the only victim of Argive resentment. The Argives seized a favourable opportunity, while the allies and adherents of Mycenæ were occupied with their domestic concerns, to lead their whole forces against the place; and having taken it by storm, they decimated the inhabitants, and demolished not only the walls, but the town⁶ itself, which was never afterwards rebuilt.

The desultory transactions of so many states and cities as composed the name and nation of Greece, must appear a continual maze of perplexity and confusion, unless we carefully follow the threads which should direct us in this intricate, yet not inextricable, labyrinth. But if we seriously apply ourselves to investigate the hidden cause of events, and to trace revolutions to their source, we shall be surprised by the agreeable discovery, that the history of this celebrated people is not entirely that mass of disorder which it appears on a superficial survey. The same causes which repressed the activity, and humbled the pride of Argos, operated alike fatally on Thebes, the second republic beyond the isthmus, and the only one that ever aspired to rival the power of Athens. The Thebans, for similar, or more odious reasons, than those which had restrained the Argives, had also withheld their assistance in the Persian war; and by this mean selfishness or treachery had justly provoked the indignation of the subordinate cities of Bœotia. Not only Thespis and Plataea, which had ever borne with impatience the Theban yoke, but the seaports of Aulis, Anthemon, and Larymna; Aschra, the beloved habitation of old Hesiod; Coronea, overshadowed by mount Helicon, a favourite seat of the Muses; Labadea, famous for its oracle of Trophonius; Delium and Alalkomené, respectively sacred to Apollo and Minerva, together with Leuctra and Chæronæa, the destined scenes of immortal victories; all these cities successively rejected the jurisdiction and sovereignty of Thebes, which, during the invasion of Xerxes, had so shamefully betrayed the common interest and glory of the nation.⁷

During several years, the Thebans patiently yielded to a storm, which they found it impossible to resist. But when the Spartans began to breathe after the recovery of Ithomé, and had made a successful expedition against the Phocians, in defence of Olymp. lxxx. 2. their kinsmen in Doris, the Thebans warmly solicited them to take part in their domestic quarrels, and to enable them to regain their ascendant in Bœotia; with assurance that they would employ the first moments of returning vigour to oppose the growing pretensions of the Athenians. This proposal was accepted, not only by the resentment, but by the policy, of the Spartan senate, who perceived, that it equally concerned their interest, that the neighbouring city of Argos should lose her jurisdiction over Argolis; and that Thebes, the neighbour and rival of Athens, should recover her authority in Bœotia.

They were applying themselves with vigour and success to effect this salutary purpose, when the active vigilance of Athens despatched an army, fifteen thousand strong, to maintain the independence of Bœotia. The valour and conduct of Myronides, the Athenian general,

A. C. 458—456. obtained a decisive victory near the walls of Tanagra, one of the few places in the province which had preserved its fidelity to the capital. This memorable battle, which no ancient writer has thought proper to describe, although it is compared to the glorious trophies of Marathon and Plataea,⁸ confirmed the liberty of Bœotia; nor could the Thebans, notwithstanding their partial success against several of the revolted cities, recover their authority in that province, until, about fourscore years afterwards, they emerged into sudden splendour under the conduct of their heroic Epaminondas.

The ambitious policy of Pericles, which will be fully explained in the sequel, was eager to profit by every favourable turn of fortune. He took care to place Athenian garrisons in several Bœotian fortresses; he made the neighbouring A. C. 455. republics of Corinth and Megara feel and acknowledge the superiority of Athens; and after sending Tolmidas, a commander endued rather with an impetuous than well regulated courage, to ravage A. C. 454. the coast of the Peloponnesus, he sailed thither next year in person, and made the Lacedæmonians and their allies deeply regret, that they had too soon discovered their animosity against a republic, alike capable to protect its friends and take vengeance on its enemies. The measures of this daring leader were actually uncontrolled by any opposition, since his eloquence had prevailed over the innocence and merit of Cimon, and procured the banishment of that illustrious commander. But Cimon was recalled in two years; and his return was signalized by a suspension of arms in Greece, which that real patriot had been as zealous to promote, as he was A. C. 447. ambitious to pursue his Asiatic triumphs. This treaty, however, was soon broke; but an ill-concerted and unfortunate enterprise against Thebes (disapproved by Pericles himself,) in which the rash Tolmidas lost his army and his life, made the Athenians again listen to terms of accommodation. They A. C. 445. agreed to withdraw their garrisons from Bœotia; to disavow all pretensions against Corinth and Megara, pretensions which had no other effect than to exasperate those little republics against their usurping neighbour; and, on complying with these conditions, the Athenians recovered their citizens made captive in Bœotia, through the misconduct of Tolmidas.⁹

This was the famous truce of thirty years, concluded in the fourteenth year Olymp. lxxxiii. 4. preceding the Peloponnesian war. The former treaty had been limited A. C. 445. to a much shorter period; for it is worthy of observation, that even in their agree-

⁶ Diodor. l. xi. p. 276.

⁷ Diodor. l. xi. p. 283. et seq. et Thucyd. l. i. p. 273.

⁸ Diodor. l. xi. p. 284.

⁹ Diodor. l. xii. p. 293. Thucyd. l. i. p. 71, et seq.

ments of peace, the Greeks discovered that perpetual propensity to war, which was the unhappy effect of their political institutions.¹

The terms of this accommodation, seemingly little favourable to the interest of Athens, were dictated, however, rather by the ambition than the equity of that republic; a conclusion that evidently results from examining the third series of events, which (as observed

Between the years 470 and 440, A. C. above) completes the history of this memorable period. Amidst the foreign expeditions of Cimon, and the domestic dissensions of Greece,

the Athenian arms and policy had been gradually, during thirty years, establishing the sovereignty of the republic over her distant colonies and confederates. This bold undertaking was finally accomplished by Pericles, whose character contributed more than that of any one man, to the glory and greatness, as well as to the calamities and ruin of his country.

His father Xanthippus, who gained the illustrious victory at Mycalé, rejoiced in a son endowed with the happiest natural talents, and an innate love of glory. His youth was entrusted to the learned and virtuous Damon, who concealed, under the uninvincible title of master of rhetoric, the art of animating his pupil with an ambition to deserve the first rank in the republic, as well as of adorning him with the accomplishments most necessary to attain it. From Aristagoras of Clazomené, denominated the philosopher of mind, on account of his continual solicitude to confirm the most important and most pleasing of all doctrines, that a benevolent intelligence presides over the operations of nature, and the events of human life, Pericles early learned to control the tempest of youthful passions, which so often blast the promising hopes of manhood; to preserve an unshaken constancy in all the vicissitudes of fortune, since all are the varied dispensations of the same wise providence; and to trample, with generous contempt, on the groveling superstition of the vulgar. Thus qualified by nature and education, he soon displayed, in the Athenian assembly, an eloquence, nourished by the copious spring of philosophy, and ennobled by the manly elevation of his character. His speeches consisted not in the unpremeditated effusions of a temporary enthusiasm; he was the first of his countrymen who, before pronouncing his discourses, committed them to writing:² they were studied and composed with the most laborious and patient care; and being polished by repeated touches of correcting art, they rose in admiration, in proportion as they were more closely examined by the piercing eye of criticism; and acquired the epithet of Olympian, to express that permanent and steady lustre which they reflected.³

But the superior talents of Pericles, which in a well regulated government, would have increased his influence, had well nigh occasioned his ruin in a turbulent and suspicious democracy. The memory of the oldest citizens faithfully recollected, and the envy or fears of

the younger readily believed, that the figure, the countenance, and the voice, of the young orator, strongly resembled those of the ambitious and artful Pisistratus, whose specious virtues had subverted the liberty of his country. The alarmed jealousy of freedom, which often destroyed, in an hour, the authority established slowly, and with much labour, during many meritorious years, might be tempted to punish the imagined tyranny of Pericles; who, to escape the disgrace of the ostracism, shunned the dangerous admiration of the assembly.

The active vigour of his mind, thus withdrawn from politics, was totally directed to war; and his abilities, alike fitted to excel in every honourable pursuit, and gradually opening with every occasion to display them, carried off the palm of military renown from the most illustrious captains of the age. Cimon alone surpassed him in the object of his victories gained over Barbarians; but Pericles equalled Cimon in valour and conduct. A rivalry in warlike fame was followed by a competition for civil honours. Cimon, who had been introduced on the theatre of public life by the virtuous Aristides, regarded, like that great man, a moderate aristocracy, as the government most conducive to public happiness. The contrary opinion was warmly maintained by Pericles, who found an ostentatious admiration of democracy the best expedient for removing the prejudice excited against him, by his resemblance to Pisistratus, of aspiring, or at least of being capable to aspire, at royal power. On every occasion he defended the privileges of the people against the pretensions of the rich and noble; he embraced not only the interests, but adopted the capricious passions, of the multitude; cherishing their presumption, flattering their vanity, indulging their rapacity, gratifying their taste for pleasure without expense, and fomenting their natural antipathy to the Spartans, who, as the patrons of rigid aristocracy, were peculiarly obnoxious to their resentment.

The condition of the times powerfully conspired with the views and measures of Pericles, since the glory and wealth acquired in the Persian war, procured not only allies and power to the state, but industry and independence to the populace. The son of Xanthippus impelled this natural current, which ran so strongly in favour of both, when he maintained, that the citizens of Athens were entitled to enjoy equal advantages at home, to challenge a just pre-eminence in Greece, and to assume a legal dominion over their distant colonies and confederates.

These unfortunate communities had unwarily forged their own chains, when they consented to raise an annual subsidy to maintain the guardian navy of Athens. They perceived not, that this temporary

A. C. 470—440. benevolence would be soon converted into a perpetual tribute, since, in proportion as they became unaccustomed to war, they laid themselves at the mercy of that republic, to which they had tamely entrusted the care of their defence. When the rigorous exactions of Athens speedily warned

¹ Thucyd. l. i. p. 74.

² Suidas.

³ Plut. in Pericl.

them of their error, the wide intervals at which they were separated from each other, rendered it impossible for them to afford mutual assistance, and to act with united vigour. Naxos, Thasos, Ægina, Eubœa, Samos, and other islands or cities of less importance, boldly struggled to repel usurpation; but fighting singly, were successively subdued; while new, and more grievous, burdens were cruelly imposed on them. The least patient again murmured, petitioned, rebelled, and taking arms to resist oppression, were treated with the severity due to unprovoked sedition. The punishment inflicted on them was uniformly rigorous. They were compelled to deliver up the authors of the revolt, to surrender their shipping; to demolish their walls, or receive an Athenian garrison, to pay the expenses of the war, and give hostages for their future obedience.⁴ It is not the business of general history to describe more minutely the events of this social war, which was carried on chiefly by Pericles, and finished in the course of thirty years, with every success the most presumptuous ambition of Athens could either expect or desire. Samos, the capital of the island of that name, made the most vigorous resistance; but at length surrendered to Pericles, after a siege of nine months, in the ninth year before the war of the Peloponnesus.⁵

Historians, partial or credulous, have handed down some atrocious cruelties committed after the taking of Samos, which may be confidently rejected as fictions, injurious to the fame of Pericles, who, though he approved and animated the aspiring genius of his country, and vainly flattered himself that he could justify, by reasons of state, its most ambitious usurpations,

uniformly showed himself incapable of any deliberate wickedness. It may be observed, however, that as the moderate peace with Sparta had been concluded chiefly with a view to allow the Athenians to apply their undivided attention to the affairs of their tributaries, the severities exercised over these unfortunate states were, in consequence of that event, rather increased than mitigated. Athenian magistrates and garrisons were sent to govern and command them. They were burthened with new impositions, and dishonoured by new badges of servitude. The lands, which the labour of their ancestors had cultivated, were seized and appropriated by strangers, who claimed the distinction of Athenian colonies; and all these once independent and flourishing republics were thenceforth compelled to submit their mutual contests, their domestic differences, and even their private litigations to the cognizance and decision of Athenian assemblies and tribunals.⁶ By drawing thus closely the reins of government, Pericles, in the course of ten years, brought into the treasury of Athens the sum of near two millions sterling.⁷ His vigilance seasonably displayed the terrors of the Athenian navy before the most distant enemies or allies of the republic; by alternate pliancy and firmness, by successive promises, bribes, and threats, he repressed the jealous hostility of neighbouring powers; and while his ambition and magnificence fortified and adorned the capital with external strength and splendour, they also laid the foundations of those internal disorders, which rendered his long administration glorious for his contemporaries, fatal to the succeeding generation, and ever memorable with posterity.

CHAPTER XIII.

Transition to the Internal State of Athens—Laws of Draco—Solon—Pisistratus—Clisthenes—Aristides—Pericles—Final Settlement of the Athenian Government—View of the Athenian Empire—The combined Effect of External Prosperity and Democratic Government on Manners—Arts—Luxury—History of Grecian Literature and Philosophy—Singular Contrast and Balance of Virtues and Vices—The sublime Philosophy of Anaxagoras and Socrates—The unprincipled Captiousness of the Sophists—The Moral Tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides—The licentious Buffoonery of Aristophanes—The imitative Arts employed to the noblest Purposes—And abused to the most Infamous—Magnificence of public Festivals—Simplicity in private Life—Modest Reserve of Athenian Women—Voluptuousness, Impudence, and Artifices of the School of Aspasia.

THE taking of Samos closed the long series of Athenian conquests. During the nine subsequent years, that once fortunate people enjoyed and abused the blessings of peace and prosperity. Their ostentatious display of power increased the envy and terror of Greeks and Barbarians, and excited the obstinate and bloody war of twenty-seven years, during

which the force of the whole Grecian nation was exerted to demolish or uphold the stately edifice of empire that had been reared by the ambitious patriotism of Pericles. Assisted by feeble or reluctant allies, Athens long struggled against the combined strength of Peloponnesus, Bœotia, Macedon, Sicily, and Persia; and our curiosity must deservedly be attracted towards the internal resources and moral condition of a people, who, with few natural advantages, could make such memorable and pertinacious efforts, and who, amidst the din of arms, still

⁴ Thucyd. et Diodor. loc. citat.

⁵ Thucyd. l. i. p. 75.

⁶ Isocrat. de Pace; et Xenoph. de Repub. Athen.

⁷ Thucyd. Diodor. Isocrat. Plut. &c.

cultivating and improving their favourite arts, produced those immortal monuments of taste and genius, which, surviving the destruction of their walls, navy, and harbours, have ever attested the glory of Athens, and the impotent vengeance of her enemies. In an inquiry of this kind, the science of government and laws, which gives security to all other sciences, merits the first place in our attention; nor, at this distance of time, will the enlightened reader contemplate with indifference the laws of Athens, which having been incorporated¹ into the Roman jurisprudence about the middle of the fifth century before Christ, served, after an interval of above sixteen hundred years, to abolish the barbarous practices of the Gothic nations, and to introduce justice, security, and refinement, among the modern inhabitants of Europe.²

The admirable institutions of the heroic ages were built on religion; which, as we have fully explained above, ascertained and enforced the rights and obligations of public and private life. But the abused authority of priests and oracles, and the natural depravity of man, ever solicitous to obtain the partial favour of his heavenly protectors on easier terms than the faithful discharge of his duty, gradually severed, by fraud or violence, the natural and most salutary union between religion and morality; in consequence of which separation, the

former degenerated into an illiberal superstition, and the latter relaxed into licentiousness, or stiffened into pedantry. The striking comparison, or rather contrast, between the genius and character, the virtues and vices, of the Greeks, as variously described by Homer and by Solon, and which is so much to the advantage of the earlier period, must, in the progress of this discourse, naturally present itself to the reflection of the attentive reader, and will set in the clearest point of view the unhappy revolution of manners, which time and accident had produced in the wide interval between the poet and the legislator.

The very imperfect legislation of Draco,³ who flourished thirty years before Solon,⁴ proved that the Athenians felt the want of a science, which they knew not how to acquire or cultivate. A. C. 624. The austere gravity of that magistrate seems to have imposed on the easy credulity of the multitude; for his ignorance or severity were alike unworthy of the important office with which he was entrusted. He gave laws, which, according to the lively expression of an orator, seemed to be written,⁵ not with ink, but with blood; since death or banishment were his ordinary penalties for the most trivial offences, as well as for the most dangerous crimes: and he justified this rigour, by absurdly observing, that the smallest disorders deserved death, and no severer punishment could be inflicted on the greatest. The laws of Draco, therefore, tended only to increase the evils which they were designed to remedy;⁶ and no people ever presented a scene of greater confusion and misery, than did the unhappy Athenians, when the abilities and virtues of Solon were seasonably called to their relief.

In relating the general revolutions of Greece, we had occasion to describe the important services, and illustrious merit, of this extraordinary man, whose disinterestedness, patriotism, and humanity, equalled his military conduct and success. His royal extraction (for he sprang from the race of the Codridæ,) his experienced abilities, above all, his approved wisdom and equity, pointed him out for the noblest and most sublime employment of humanity, that of regulating the laws and government of a free people. Such, at least, the Athenians may be considered, when their unanimous suffrage rendered Solon the absolute umpire of their whole constitution and policy; although, prior to this period, they suffered the combined evils of anarchy and oppression.⁷ The magistrates plundered the treasury and the temples; and often betrayed, for bribes, the interests of their country. The rich tyrannised over the poor, the poor continually alarmed the safety of the rich. The rapacity of credi-

1 The Romans sent deputies to Athens, to obtain a copy of Solon's laws, four hundred and fifty-four years before Christ. The benefits derived from these salutary institutions were gratefully acknowledged by the liberal candour of a people, who knew how to appreciate the merit of enemies and subjects. Hear the language of Pliney (l. viii. ep. 24.) to Maximus, who in the reign of Trajan was appointed governor of the province of Achaia, or Greece: "Remember that you go to a country, where letters, politeness, and agriculture itself (if we believe common report,) were invented. . . . Revere the gods and heroes, the ancient virtue and glory of the nation. Respect even its fables and its vanity; remembering that from Greece we derived our laws. The right of conquest, indeed, hath enabled us to impose our laws on the Greeks; but that people had first given us their laws, at our solicitation, and when they had nothing to fear from the power of our arms. It would be inhuman and barbarous to deprive them of the small remnant of liberty which they still possess."

2 Justinian's Pandects, it is well known, were discovered at Amalfi, in Italy, A. D. 1130. In less than half a century afterwards, the civil law was studied and understood in all the great provinces of Europe; and this study (as Mr. Hume observes, Reign of Richard the Third) tended to sharpen the wits of men, to give solidity to their judgment, to improve their taste, and to abolish the barbarous jurisprudence which universally prevailed among the Gothic nations. To this law we owe the abolition of the mode of proof by the ordeal, the combat, the duel, and other methods equally ridiculous and absurd. Pecuniary commutations ceased to be admitted for crimes; private revenge was no longer authorised by the magistrate; and the community was made to feel its interest in maintaining the rights, and avenging the wrongs, of all its members. See more in the admirable discourse annexed to the Reign of Richard the Third. I shall add but one observation, in Mr. Hume's own words: "The sensible utility of the Roman law, both to public and private interest, recommended the study of it, at a time when the more exalted and speculative sciences carried no charms with them; and thus the last branch of ancient literature which remained uncorrupted, was happily the first transmitted to the modern world: for it is remarkable, that in the decline of Roman learning, when the philosophers were universally infected with superstition and sophistry, and the poets and historians with barbarism, the lawyers, who, in other countries, are seldom models of science or politeness, were yet able, by the constant study and close imitation of their predecessors, to maintain the same good sense in their decisions and reasonings, and the same purity in their language and expression." Hume's Hist. 2d vol. 8vo. p. 300.

3 Suidas in voce Draco. Pollux, l. viii. c. vi.

4 Meursius, Solon.

5 The orator Demades, of whom more hereafter. The observation has been always repeated in speaking of Draco, though his laws were certainly written neither with blood nor ink. Even those of Solon were only engraved on tables kept in the citadel.

6 Aristot. de Civl. ii. et Plut. in Solon.

7 Fragm. Solonis apud Demosth. p. 234. edit. Wet.

tors knew no bounds. They compelled the insolvent debtors to cultivate their lands, like cattle; to perform the service of beasts of burden; and to transfer to them their sons and daughters, whom they exported as slaves to foreign countries. Solon, with a laudable vanity, boasts of having recovered and restored to their native rights many of those unhappy men, whose sentiments had been debased, and language corrupted, by the infamy of Barbarian servitude.⁸ The wretched populace, deriving courage from despair, had determined no longer to submit to such multiplied rigours; and before the wisdom of the lawgiver interposed, they had taken the resolution to elect and follow some warlike leader, to attack and butcher their oppressors, to establish an equal partition of lands, and to institute a new form of government.⁹ But the numerous clients and retainers, who, in a country little acquainted with arts and manufactures, depended on the wealthy proprietors of lands and mines of Attica, must have rendered this undertaking alike dangerous to both parties; so that both became willing rather to submit their differences to law, than to decide them by the sword.

The impartiality of Solon merited the unlimited confidence of his country. He maintained the ancient division of property, but abolished debts. He established the rate of interest at 12 per cent., at which it afterwards remained; but forbade, that the insolvent debtor should become the slave of his creditor, or be compelled to sell his children into servitude. After these preliminary regulations, which seemed immediately necessary to the public peace, Solon proceeded, with an impartial and steady hand, to new-model the government;¹⁰ on this generous, but equitable principle, that the few ought not, as hitherto, to command, and the many to obey; but that the collective body of the people, legally convened in a national assembly, were entitled to decide, by a plurality of voices, the alternatives of peace and war; to contract or dissolve alliances with foreign states; to enjoy all the branches of legislative or sovereign power;¹¹ and to elect,

⁸ Idem, *ibid.*

⁹ Plut. in Solon.

¹⁰ The most correct information concerning the ancient republic of Athens, and the laws of Solon, is contained in Aristot. *Fragm. de Civit. Athen.* and in various parts of his second, fourth, and sixth books of *Politics*. 2. In Isocrat. *Areopagit. Panathen. and Panegyri.* And 3. In Plut. in *Vit. Solon.* Xenophon's *Treatise* concerning the Athenian republic relates to later times, when many corruptions had crept in, as will be afterwards explained. It is remarkable, that Polybius, l. vi. has confounded the moderate institutions of Solon with the democratical licentiousness and tyranny introduced by Pericles and his successors in the administration. The palpable errors of so judicious an author prove how little accurate knowledge the Greeks possessed on the subject of their own history; and how impossible it is for a modern writer, who blindly follows such guides, not to fall into innumerable errors and contradictions. The treatise of Aristotle (*de Civitate*) above mentioned, deserves particular attention from those who write or study the history of republics. In it we see the germ, and often more than the germ, of the political works of Machiavel, which Montesquieu has so often copied, without once acknowledging his obligation.

¹¹ The election contained a mixture of chance, since those who were named by the people cast lots to decide on whom the office should be conferred. The same practice prevails in choosing the senators of the republic of Berne. But Solon enacted, that the fortunate candidate should un-

approve, and judge the magistrates or ministers entrusted, for a limited time, with the executive authority.

In the actual state of most countries of Europe, such a form of government, as only takes place in some small cantons of Switzerland, would be attended with the inconvenience of withdrawing the citizens too much from their private affairs. But in ancient Greece, and particularly in Attica, the slaves were four times more numerous than the freemen;¹² and of the latter we may compute that little more than one-half were entitled to any share in the sovereignty. Strangers, and all those who could not ascertain their Athenian descent, both in the male and female line, were totally excluded from the assembly and courts of justice. The regulations of Solon marked the utmost attention to preserve the pure blood of Athens unmixed and uncorrupted; nor could any foreigner, whatever merit he might claim with the public, be admitted to the rank of citizen, unless he abandoned for ever his native country, professed the knowledge of some highly useful or ingenious art, and, in both cases, had been chosen by ballot, in a full assembly of six thousand Athenians. These circumstances (especially as the Athenian people were usually convened only four times in thirty-five days) prevented their assemblies from being either so inconvenient and burdensome, or so numerous and tumultuary, as might at first sight be supposed. Yet their numbers, and still more their impetuosity and ignorance, must have proved inconsistent with good government, if Solon had not secured the vessel of the republic from the waves of popular frenzy, by the two firm anchors of the senate and the Areopagus; tribunals originally of great dignity and of very extensive power, into which men of a certain description only could be received as members.

Solon divided the Athenians into four classes, according to the produce of their estates. The first class consisted of those whose lands annually yielded five hundred measures of liquid, as well as dry commodities; and the minimum of whose yearly income may be calculated at sixty pounds sterling; which is equivalent, if we estimate the relative value of money by the price of labour, and of the things most necessary to life, to about six hundred pounds sterling in the present age.¹³ The second class consisted of those whose estates produced three hundred measures; the third, of those whose estates produced two hundred; the fourth, and by far the most numerous class of Athenians, either possessed no landed property, or at least enjoyed not a revenue in land equal to twenty-four pounds sterling, or, agreeably to the above proportion, two hundred and forty pounds of our present currency.

All ranks of citizens were alike admitted to

dergo what is called a probation; his character and merits were thus exposed to a second examination; and it seemed scarcely possible, after this severe scrutiny, that any man should attain power, who was altogether unworthy of public confidence.

¹² See my *Introductory Discourse* to the *Orations* of Lysias and Isocrates, p. 5, et seq.

¹³ See *Introduction* to Lysias, &c. p. 14.

vote in the public assembly, and to judge in the courts of justice, whether civil or criminal, which were properly so many committees of the assembly.¹ But the three first classes were exclusively entitled to sit in the senate, to decide in the Areopagus, or to hold any other office of magistracy. To these dignities they were elected by the free suffrages of the people, to whom they were accountable for their administration, and by whom they might be punished for malversation or negligence, although they derived no emolument from the diligent discharge of their duty.

The senate of four hundred, which, eighty-six years after its institution, was augmented to five hundred by Clisthenes, enjoyed the important prerogatives of convoking the popular assembly; of previously examining all matters before they came to be decided by the people, which gave them a negative before debate in all public resolutions; and of making laws which had force during a year, without requiring the consent of the populace. Besides this general superintendence and authority, the senate was exclusively invested with many particular branches of the executive power. The president of that council had the custody of the public archives and treasury. The senate alone built ships; equipped fleets and armies; seized and confined state-criminals; examined and punished several offences, which were not expressly forbidden by any positive law. The weight of such a council, which assembled every day, except festivals, infused a large mixture of aristocracy into the Athenian constitution. This, as we shall immediately explain, was still farther increased by the authority of the Areopagus, a court so named from the place where it was held; a hill sacred to Mars, adjoining to the citadel.

The principal magistrates in Athens were the nine archons, the first of whom gave his name to the year, and presided in the civil courts of justice, where a committee of the people, chosen promiscuously from all classes by lot,² sat as judges and jury; but where it belonged to the archon and his assessors, men appointed by suffrage, and acquainted with forms, to take what in Scotland is called precognition, to prescribe the form of action, to give the ballot,³ and to receive and declare the verdict and sentence of the court. The archon next in dignity, who had the appellation of king, presided

in causes respecting religion and things sacred, which formed the object of an important and dangerous branch of Athenian jurisprudence. The Archon third in dignity, with his assessors the generals,⁴ presided in military matters; and the six remaining, who were known by the general appellation of thesmothetæ, heard criminal pleas of various kinds, or rather directed the proceedings of the six courts where criminal causes were examined and determined. These nine archons, or presidents of the several courts of justice, like all other Athenian magistrates, were, at the expiration of their annual office, accountable to the people; and when their conduct, after a severe scrutiny, appeared to merit public approbation and gratitude, they were received, and remained for life, members of the Areopagus, a senate invested with a general inspection over the laws and religion, as well as over the lives and manners of the citizens; and which, in dangerous emergencies, was even entitled to assume a sort of dictatorial power.⁵

Such is the great outline of the constitution established by Solon, according to which every Athenian citizen enjoyed the inestimable privilege of being judged by his peers, and tried by laws to which he himself had consented. Although the legislative and judicial powers were thus lodged with the people, men of property and ability were alone entrusted with the administration of government; and as power in some measure followed property, the same expedient which served to maintain a due distinction of ranks in society, tended also to promote the industry and frugality of the multitude, that they might thereby become entitled to share those honours and offices, to which persons of a certain estate only could aspire.

The laws of Solon were of the most extensive nature, comprehending not only rules of right, but maxims of morality, regulations of commerce, and precepts of agriculture. To describe his institutions respecting such matters as are properly the objects of law, would be explaining those great but familiar principles, concerning marriage, succession, testaments, the rights of persons and of things, which, through the medium of the civil law, have been conveyed into the jurisprudence of all the civilized nations of Europe. His laws concerning education and manners prove that drunkenness and unnatural love were the predominant vices of that early age. It was a particular duty of the archons, to prevent or punish offences committed in consequence of intoxication; and the regulations concerning schools,⁶ which were not to be opened till sunrise, which were ordered to be shut before night, and into which none but such relations of the master, as were particularly specified by law, could on any pretence be admitted, marked the utmost solicitude to root out an evil which already infected and disgraced the manners of Greece.

1 In my Introductory Discourses to the Orations of Lysias, &c. I had occasion to explain the nature of the Athenian tribunals. Since the publication of that work, the same subject, and particularly the form of civil process, has been accurately explained by Sir William Jones, in his Dissertations annexed to the translation of Isæus. Mr. Pettinall's learned work upon the use and practice of *juries* among the ancients, lately fell into my hands. Wherein my ideas and his differ, will easily appear from the text, and needs not be pointed out.

2 The essential difference between the Roman and Athenian government, consisted in the different placing of the judicial power; which at Rome remained 300 years in the hands of the senate. The seditions of the Gracchi, and most of the civil dissensions which happened before the time of Augustus, had for their object or pretence, the altering of this order of things, and bringing the Roman constitution nearer the Athenian.

3 Οἱ τίσυντες τοῦ ἀγῶνα καὶ τὴν ψήφον δίδοντες, are the words of Lysias. The same writer mentions the *παρεδρεῖς*, *συνδίκη*, assessors *syndics*.

4 Lysias, in the second oration against Alcibiades (a military cause,) not only mentions the *στρατηγοί*, or generals, but addresses them separately from the *ἀνδρες δικάσται*, or judges.

5 Isocrat. Oratio Areopagit.

6 Æschin. in Timarchum.

The education recommended by Solon nearly resembled that above described, which generally prevailed in Greece.⁷ The children of Athenian citizens, when taken from the hands of the women, were delivered to two masters, of whom the one formed the body, and the other the mind. Swimming, and the easier exercises, prepared them for the harder toils of the gymnastic. Reading, and learning by heart the lessons and examples of the poets, made way for the severer studies of eloquence and philosophy. In process of time, music, geometry, and drawing, seem to have entered into the plan of a liberal education.⁸ At the age of twenty, the youth of all ranks took an oath in the temple of Agraules (an appellation of Minerva,) to obey and to maintain the laws of their country; to use their best endeavours to promote its prosperity; to follow the standard of whatever commanders might be appointed to conduct them; to sail to every part of the world, when summoned by the public service; to fight to death for their native land; and to regard wheat, barley, vines, and olives, as the only boundaries of Attica;⁹ a preposterous arrogance in that little republic, which already betrayed an ambition to conquer and appropriate all the cultivated parts of the world. When the Athenian youth were not, in consequence of this oath, engaged in military service, they were obliged by law to follow such employments as suited their respective fortunes. Agriculture, commerce, and the mechanic arts, fell to the share of the poor; the rich still continued their application to gymnastic and philosophy, carefully studied the laws of the republic, examined the ancient and actual condition of their own and neighbouring states; and, at the age of thirty, appeared as candidates in the assembly for such offices of trust and honour as their regular manners, inoffensive and dutiful behaviour in all the relations of private life, temperance, economy, public spirit, and abilities,¹⁰ might obtain from the voluntary suffrage of the people.

A. C. 578. The usurpation of Pisistratus, though it destroyed for a time the political liberty of Athens, gave stability to most of the laws and forms introduced by Solon. That extraordinary *tyrant*, for so the Greeks styled him, was not more distinguished by the loftiness of his genius than the humanity of his disposition; and had not the violence of contending factions, and the fury of his enemies, inflamed his natural love of power, the name of Pisistratus would stand the foremost in the list of Grecian patriots and heroes. His valour and conduct were signalized in the conquest of Nisæa, Salamis, Naxos, Delos, and Sigeum; and if he displayed boldness and address in acquiring sovereignty, he displayed still more moderation and virtue in administering it. He assumed, indeed, the royal dignities of priest and general, and took care that the chief offices of magistracy should be filled by his par-

tisans. But he maintained the regular course of law and justice, not only by his authority, but by his example; having appeared in person to answer an accusation in the Areopagus. He not only enforced the laws of Solon against idleness, but endeavoured to give them more efficacy by introducing new arts and manufactories into Attica. He was the first who brought into that country the complete collection of Homer's poems, which he commanded to be sung at the Panathenæan festival; nor can we suppose that he should have been zealous to diffuse the liberal and manly sentiments of that divine poet, if his government had not resembled the moderation and equity of the heroic ages, rather than the despotism of tyrants.

His son Hipparchus imitated and surpassed the mild virtues of his father; and amidst the turbulence of the late democracy, it was acknowledged with a sigh by the Athenians, that their ancestors were indeed happy under Solon and Pisistratus, but that the reign of the tyrant Hipparchus brought back on earth the golden days of Saturn. The father had required a tenth part of the produce of Attica, to support his guards, and the other appendages of royalty: his more generous son remitted one half of this imposition. While he alleviated the burdens, yet encouraged the industry of his subjects, by building the temple of Olympian Jupiter, he was solicitous to dispel their ignorance and barbarity by erecting pillars in every part of the city, engraved with elegiac verses, containing lessons of wisdom and precepts of morality. He collected the first library in Athens; and his liberal rewards, and still more his agreeable manners and winning affability, attracted to that city the most distinguished poets of the age.

The murder of Hipparchus exasperated the temper of his brother and successor Hippias; but notwithstanding the calamities which the latter inflicted and suffered, it must be allowed that the government of Pisistratus and his family, which, with various interruptions, lasted sixty-eight years,¹¹ increased the strength, and promoted the refinement of Athens.¹²

Olymp. Yet in nothing was that usurpation more advantageous than in the
lxvii. 3. animating sense of liberty which
A. C. 509. the memory of past servitude, under Hippias, excited and kept alive in Athens, after the popular government had been restored by Clisthenes and Alcibiades. We have already had occasion to relate the foreign victories of the republic, which immediately followed that event; but at the same time the constitution of government underwent a considerable change. By admitting to the rank of citizens a promiscuous crowd of strangers, fugitives, Athenians of half blood, and perhaps slaves, the tribes were augmented from four to ten; and the senators from four to five thousand. The ostracism was likewise established; a law by which any citizen whose influence or abili-

⁷ See Chapters V. and VI.

⁸ Arist. Polit. l. vii. c. iii.

⁹ See introduction to *Lysias*, &c. p. 4.

¹⁰ *Lysias*, *passim*.

¹¹ Between 578 and 510, B. C.

¹² See the treatise of Meursius, entitled *Pisistratus*, one of the few satisfactory performances in the immense collection of Gronovius.

ties seemed dangerous to liberty, might be banished ten years, without the proof or allegation of any positive crime.

Olymp. continued thirty years until the glorious victories of Salamis, Platea, and Mycæ, encouraged the lowest but most numerous class of citizens, by whose valour those memorable exploits had been achieved, to make further invasions on the prerogatives of their superiors. The sudden wealth, which the rich spoils of the Barbarians had diffused among all ranks of men, increased the *census* of individuals, and destroyed the balance of the constitution. Aristides, who perceived it to be impossible to resist the natural progress of democracy, seasonably yielded to men who had arms in their hands, and firmness in their hearts; and proposed, with apparent satisfaction, but much secret reluctance,¹ a law by which the Athenian magistrates should be thenceforth promiscuously elected from the four classes of citizens. This innovation paved the way for the still greater changes begun twenty years afterwards, and gradually completed by Pericles; a revolution of which the consequences were not immediately felt, but which continually became more sensible, and finally terminated in the ruin of Athens and of Greece.

The general reasons which prevailed on the equity and discernment of Pericles to espouse, with undue warmth, the cause of the populace, have in the preceding chapter been sufficiently explained. Yet whatever partial motives of

Olymp. interest and ambition² might warp the views of this illustrious statesman, it must be acknowledged, that the foreign transactions and success of the republic, and particularly the new situation in which the Athenians found themselves placed with regard to their distant allies and colonies, might naturally suggest and occasion very important alterations in the Athenian constitution. The ancient and sacred law, which obliged every citizen, without fee or reward, to take arms in defence of his country, could not easily be extended to the obligation of protecting, without a proper recompense, the interest of foreign communities. The scanty population of Attica sufficed not to answer the demands of so many distant expeditions. It became necessary to hire troops wherever they might be found; and, as this necessity introduced pay into the Athenian armies, a similar, though not equally cogent, reason established fees and salaries for all the different orders of judges and magistrates. The same principle of duty and public spirit, which obliged every freeman to

fight without pay, likewise obliged him gratuitously to judge, consult, and deliberate, for the benefit of his country. But when the contested interests of foreign, though dependent communities, were agitated and adjusted in the tribunals of Athens, it seemed reasonable for those who spent their time in an employment, to which no natural obligation called them, to demand a proper reward for their useful services. At first, therefore, a small sum, but which gradually increased with the power of the people, was regularly distributed among the citizens, for every deliberation which they held, and for every cause which they determined.

The desire of reaping this profit made the populace anxious to draw all causes and deliberations before their own tribunals and assemblies. This design was successfully accomplished by Ephialtes,³ an artful and daring demagogue, whom Pericles employed as a proper instrument to effect such invidious measures as were most obnoxious to the rich and noble. While his patron extended the renown of Athens by his foreign victories, and gradually reduced into subjection the colonies and allies of the republic, the obsequious Ephialtes zealously promoted his domestic measures; and by undermining the authority of the senate and of the Areopagus,⁴ the firmest bulwarks of the aristocracy, obtained a signal victory over the laws of Solon. The assassination of Ephialtes proved only the weakness of his enemies; and we shall find, in the subsequent history of Athens, that most matters of deliberation came, thenceforth, in the first instance, before the popular assembly; that the wise institutions of Solon were reduced to an empty form; and that the magnanimity of Pericles, the extravagance of his immediate successors, the patriotism of Thrasybulus and Conon, the integrity of Phocion, the artifices of Æschines, and the eloquence of Demosthenes, successively swayed, at will, a wild and capricious democracy.

Olymp. The revolution which immediately followed, in the manners, character, and conduct of the Athenians, A. C. 440. was the natural consequence of the change of government, combined with other circumstances inseparably connected with their domestic and external prosperity. In the course of a few years, the success of Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles, had tripled the revenues, and increased, in a far greater proportion, the domi-

³ Plut. in Pericle.

⁴ Authors have not described in what particular respects, or by what particular means, Ephialtes effected his purpose: yet we may collect, from obscure hints on this subject, that he not only brought before the inferior tribunals causes hitherto confined to the Areopagus, but took from that court its general inspection and superintendence over the religion and laws; which offices he bestowed on the popular court of the *ἐλλήνισα* and the *νομοφύλαξις*, who were appointed, and dismissed, at the will of the people. He likewise rendered the *probation* for becoming an *Areopagite* less severe than formerly. Persons crept into this order, whose characters disgraced it. The Areopagites became equally accessible to presents and to beauty; and their decisions fell into contempt. See the discourse of Isocrates upon reforming the government of Athens, and Athenæus, l. ix. That Ephialtes, or Pericles himself, likewise weakened the authority of the senate (although it is not remarked by any ancient author,) appears from all the subsequent history of Athens.

¹ Εὐνοῦ ἀκροῦσι δὲ βύμας, cited on this occasion by Plutarch, well expresses the forced generosity of Aristides to the populace.

² Plutarch (in Pericle) mentions a particular reason which engaged Pericles to counteract the aristocracy, and to abridge the power of the Areopagus. Although he had been often named for the office of archon, the lot had never fallen on him; so that he could not be received as a member of that respected court. If this observation be well founded, it shows how little real weight the annual magistracies had at Athens; since Pericles, though he never attained the dignity of archon, governed the republic many years with unrivalled authority.

nions of the republic. The Athenian galleys commanded the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean; their merchantmen had engrossed the traffic of the adjacent countries; the magazines of Athens abounded with wood, metal, ebony, ivory, and all the materials, of the useful as well as of the agreeable arts; they imported the luxuries of Italy, Sicily, Cyprus, Lydia, Pontus, and Peloponnesus; experience had improved their skill in working the silver mines of mount Larium; they had lately opened the valuable marble veins in mount Pentelicus; the honey of Hymettus was more esteemed, in proportion as it became better known to their neighbours; the culture of their olives (oil being long their staple commodity, and the only production of Attica, which Solon allowed them to export) must have improved with the general improvement of the country in arts and agriculture, especially under the active administration of Pericles, who liberally let loose the public treasure to encourage every species of industry.⁵

But if that minister promoted the love of action, he found it necessary at least to comply with, if not to excite, the extreme passion for pleasure, which then began to distinguish his countrymen. The people of Athens, successful in every enterprise against their foreign as well as domestic enemies, seemed entitled to reap the fruits of their dangers and victories. For the space of at least twelve years preceding the war of Peloponnesus, their city afforded a perpetual scene of triumph and festivity. Dramatic entertainments, to which they were passionately addicted, were no longer performed in slight unadorned edifices, but in stone or marble theatres, erected at great expense, and embellished with the most precious productions of nature and of art. The treasury was opened, not only to supply the decorations of this favourite amusement, but to enable the poorer citizens to enjoy it, without incurring any private expense; and thus, at the cost of the state, or rather of its tributary allies and colonies, to feast and delight their ears and fancy with the combined charms of music and poetry. The pleasure of the eye was peculiarly consulted and gratified in the architecture of the theatres and other ornamental buildings; for as Themistocles had strengthened, Pericles adorned his native city; and unless we had the concurring testimony of antiquity, as well as the immortal remains of the Parthenon, or temple of Minerva, which still excite the admiration of travellers, it would be difficult to believe that in the space of a few years, there could have been created those inestimable wonders of art, those innumerable temples, theatres, statues, altars, baths, gymnasia, and porticoes, which, in the language of ancient panegyric, rendered Athens the eye and light of Greece.⁶

Pericles was blamed for thus decking one favourite city, like a vain, voluptuous harlot, at the expense of plundered provinces;⁷ but it would have been fortunate for the Athenians if

their extorted wealth had not been employed in more perishing, as well as more criminal luxury. The pomp of religious solemnities, which were twice as numerous and as costly in Athens as in any other city of Greece; the extravagance of entertainments and banquets which on such occasions always followed the sacrifices; the increase of private luxury, which naturally accompanied this public profusion, exhausted the resources, without augmenting the glory, of the republic. Instead of the bread, herbs, and simple fare recommended by the laws of Solon, the Athenians, soon after the eightieth Olympiad, availed themselves of their extensive commerce to import the delicacies of distant countries, which were prepared with all the refinements of cookery.⁸ The wines of Cyprus were cooled with snow in summer; in winter⁹ the most delightful flowers adorned the tables and persons of the wealthy Athenians. Nor was it sufficient to be crowned with roses, unless they were likewise anointed with the most precious perfumes.¹⁰ Parasites, dancers, and buffoons, were a usual appendage of every entertainment.¹¹ Among the weaker sex, the passion for delicate birds, distinguished by their voice or plumage, was carried to such excess as merited the name of madness.¹² The bodies of such youths as were peculiarly addicted to hunting and horses, which began to be a prevailing taste,¹³ were corrupted by the commerce of harlots, who had reduced their profession into system;¹⁴ while their minds were still more polluted by the licentious philosophy of the sophists. It is unnecessary to crowd the picture, since it may be observed, in one word, that the vices and extravagances, which are supposed to characterize the declining ages of Greece and Rome, took root in Athens during the administration of Pericles, the most splendid and most prosperous in the Grecian annals.

This paradox, for such it must appear, may be explained by considering the singular combination of circumstances, which, in the time of that statesman gave every poison its antidote, and rendered the partial evils, already described, only the thorn that ever accompanies the rose. The Grecian history of those times affords a more striking contrast than ever appeared in any other age or country, of wisdom and folly, of magnanimity and meanness, of liberty and tyranny, of simplicity and refinement, of austerity and voluptuousness. The sublime philosophy of Anaxagoras and Socrates was accompanied, as with a shadow, by the dark, unprincipled captiousness of the sophists; the pathetic and moral strains of Sophocles and Euripides were parodied by the licentious buffoonery of Aristophanes; painting and sculpture, which, under geniuses of the first order like Phidias, served as handmaids to religion and virtue, degenerated under inferior artists into mean hirelings of vice and disorder; the modesty of Athenian matrons was set off as by a foil,

⁵ Isocrat. Areop. de Pace, et Panegyri. Xenoph. et Aristot. de Repub. Athen.

⁶ Isocrat. et Aristid. in Pangyr.

⁷ Plutarch in Pericle.

⁸ Aristoph. Nubes, ver. 50. et Lysistrat. passim.

⁹ Athen. l. xi. 3. et Xenoph. Memorabilia, l. ii.

¹⁰ Xenoph. ibid.

¹¹ Athenæus, l. i. et Xenoph. Symp.

¹² Ορνιθομανία, Athen. l. xi. 3.

¹³ Aristoph. Nubes, passim.

¹⁴ Alexis apud Athenæum, l. xiii.

when compared with the dissoluteness of the school of Aspasia; and the simple frugality of manners, which commonly prevailed in private families, even of the first distinction, was contrasted with the extravagant dissipation of public entertainments and festivals. To examine the parallel links of this complicated chain will illustrate the character of a people whose subsequent transactions form one principal object of Grecian history.

Philosophy, which in Greece alone deserves the peculiar attention of the historian, arose about the beginning of the sixth century before Christ, and in a hundred and fifty years attained the highest degree of perfection, and sunk into the lowest degeneracy and corruption, to which the use or abuse of the human intellect could raise or plunge it. Lesser Asia, to which Europe and America owe the inestimable benefits of their religion and letters, produced and nourished the tender plant of philosophy; and the flourishing Greek colonies on that delightful coast, communicated to their mother country this precious offspring of their soil. Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, Cleobulus of Lindus in the isle of Rhodes, and the other wise men, as they were emphatically styled, who lived in that age, not only gave advice and assistance to their countrymen in particular emergencies, but restrained their vices by wholesome laws, improved their manners by useful lessons of morality, and extended their knowledge by important and difficult discoveries.¹ But the first attempt towards moral philosophy, as independent on, and unconnected with religion, seems to have been the fables of Æsop, which, to men in an early period of society, must have appeared a very serious and important species of composition. The sphere of history was narrow; the examples of the gods, amidst the continual corruptions of superstition, had become too flagitious for imitation; and men, whose rustic simplicity of life afforded them continual opportunities to observe the instinctive sagacity of certain animals, might derive many useful lessons from those humble instructors. In the early ages of Greece and Rome, and of all other nations whose history is recorded, fables were told, and in some degree believed, in the assembly and senate-house, on the most important occasions; for in the infancy of society men are children; and the delusion, which the belief of a fable supposes, is not more gross and improbable than many of those errors into which (as we have already proved²) their lively fancy had often hurried them. The same romantic cast of imagination which had animated woods and winds, mountains and rivers, which had changed heroes into gods, and gods into frail men, might endow animals with reason, and even speech.

The next step towards moral science was of a more refined and abstract kind, consisting of the sentences of the gnomonic poets,³ and in those detached precepts or proverbs which, in

all countries, have preceded any systematic account of morality. Each of the seven sages, as they were called, had his favourite maxims,⁴ which he engraved in temples and other places of public resort; but at this distance of time it is impossible, amidst the differences of authors, to discover what belongs to each; nor is the search important, since all their maxims or proverbs, whatever efforts of generalization they might cost their inventors, now appear extremely simple and familiar.

These respectable fathers of Grecian philosophy, who silently diffused light through the gloom of a barbarous age, are said to have maintained a correspondence⁵ with each other, as well as with Solon of Athens, Chilon of Sparta, and Periander of Corinth; men who in imitation of their eastern brethren, chiefly cultivated such practical knowledge as qualified them to be the legislators, magistrates, and generals of their respective countries.

Thales the Milesian, alone, quitted the ordinary pursuits of civil and military renown; and although he composed verses, promulgated moral sentences, and, on some particular emergencies, gave seasonable advice to his countrymen, yet he established his fame on a basis more broad and permanent than the fluctuating interests of perishing communities. Many of the elementary propositions of geometry, afterwards collected by Euclid, were first discovered⁶ by Thales, who directed the acuteness of his mind with equal success to astronomy. He divided the heavens into five zones; discovered the equinoxes and solstices; remarked the Ursa Minor; observed, and nearly predicted, eclipses. The division of the year into three hundred and sixty-five days was already known to the Egyptians; but although Thales might borrow this, and perhaps other discoveries, from that ancient people, among whom he sometime resided, it appears, even from those authors who are ever prone to exaggerate the wisdom of Egypt, that he owed much less to that country, than to the native sagacity and penetration of his clear comprehensive mind.⁷

Thales founded the Ionic school, in which he was succeeded by Anaxamander and Anaximenes, who were followed by Anaxagoras, the instructor of Pericles and Archelaus, who is called by ancient writers the master of Socrates. About fifty years after Thales, the same speculations which he had introduced were pursued by Xenophanes of Colophon, Leucippus and Parmenides of Elea, and Heraclitus of Ephesus. These ingenious men discovered many useful truths; yet all of them, not excepting Thales himself, likewise busied themselves with subjects that will for ever excite and elude human curiosity. Their doctrines were equally liable to objection, whichever of the elements they assumed as the first principle of nature; they universally agreed in asserting the fallacy of the senses, and the unworthiness of the vulgar superstition; but their various opinions concerning the origin and destruction of worlds,

¹ Plutarch. *Sympos. et de Placit. Philosoph.* Plac'o in Protagor. Diogen. Laert. *passim*.

² See above, Chapter II.

³ See the sentences of Theognis, which are evidently a collection, not the work of one man.

⁴ Aristot. *Rhet.* ii. 21. Stobæus, *Serm.* p. 44, &c.

⁵ Plut. *Symp.*

⁶ Proclus in Euclid.

⁷ Hieronym. *apud* Laert. l. i. c. xxvii. Plin. l. xxviii. c. xvii.

the magnitudes and distances of heavenly bodies, the essence of matter and spirit,⁸ deserve only to be considered as the dreams of inquisitive men, whose ambition of knowledge carried them beyond the sphere of experience, and the clear deductions of reason. The system of Leucippus, the most famous of them all, was improved by Democritus of Abdera,⁹ and afterwards adopted by Epicurus, whose philosophy is sufficiently explained in the extraordinary work of Lucretius, the boldest monument which the world is ever likely to behold, of learning, genius, and impiety.

But it is particularly worthy of observation, that at the same time Democritus assailed the celestial mansions, and unveiled, with a daring hand, the feeble majesty of Grecian superstition, Anaxagoras of Clazomené revealed a new and infinitely more august spectacle, by first announcing to the heathen world, a self-existent, all-perfect mind, as the great cause and author of the material world. Thales and Pythagoras, with such of their disciples as faithfully adhered to their tenets, had indeed admitted spirit as a constituent principle of the universe; but they had so intimately blended mind and matter, that these dissimilar substances seemed to make an indissoluble compound, as the soul and body constitute but one man. According to Anaxagoras, on the other hand, the creating and sovereign intelligence was to be carefully distinguished from the soul of the world, which he seems to have regarded merely as a poetical expression for the laws which the Deity had impressed on his works. The great Ruler of the universe did not animate, but impel matter; he could not be included within its limited and perishing terms; his nature was pure and spiritual, and totally incapable of pollution by any corporeal admixture.¹⁰

The discovery and diffusion of this luminous and sublime principle, which was naturally followed by an investigation of the moral attributes of the Deity, and the deducing from thence the great duties of morality, might have produced a general and happy revolution in Greece, under the zealous and persevering labours of Socrates and his followers, if the tendency of this divine philosophy had not been counteracted, not only by the gross prejudices of the vulgar, but by the more dangerous refinements of incredulous Sophists.

The same spirit of inquiry, which leads to the discovery of truth, will ever promote the propagation of error; and unfortunately for Greece, in the middle of the fifth century before Christ, errors were propagated, so congenial to the condition of the times, that they could not fail to take deep root, and flourish in a soil which was peculiarly well prepared to receive them. The glorious victories over the Carthaginians and Persians had increased the wealth and security, called forth the invention and industry, but, at the same time, multiplied the wants, and inflamed the passions, of the

Greeks. The more powerful cities, and particularly Athens and Syracuse, had attained a pitch of prosperity which exceeded their most sanguine hopes; elated by the bloom of health and the pride of riches, they continually sighed for new and unknown enjoyments, while both individuals and communities were ever ready to listen to such instructors as justified their vices, and taught them to abuse the gifts of fortune.

In this situation of affairs appeared the Sophists,¹¹ whose name, still familiar in the languages of Europe, pretty faithfully expresses their character. Hippias of Elis, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontium, with many inferior names, preserved in the writings of Xenophon, Plato, and Isocrates, started up about the same time, and exhibited a new phenomenon in Greece. The Olympic, and other public assemblies, furnished them with an opportunity to display their specious accomplishments to the admiring spectators. They frequented the great cities, particularly Athens, and acquired the friendship of the rich, and the applause of the multitude. They professed the knowledge of every science, and of every art, which they taught publicly, for a stipulated price; and, as they really possessed the art of persuasion, their disciples continually increased among the rich and the voluptuous, the idle and the vain.

Their language was glowing and harmonious, their manners elegant, their life splendid. When it served their interest, and pleased the taste of their hearers, they could paint virtue in the warmest and most alluring colours; but the capricious will of their scholars, whose passions they were ever careful to gratify, served as the only standard of their principles; and engaged them, for the most part, to deck out the barren doctrines of Leucippus and Democritus with the meretricious arts of the rhetorician. Their morality supplied the springs with which Epicurus watered his gardens; and their captious logic furnished the arguments by which Pyrrho attempted to justify his scepticism.¹² It would be easy to trace up to the Sophists that quibbling metaphysic, which being embodied in the Greek language, thenceforth adhered too closely to the philosophical writings of that people, and which totally disfigures many otherwise valuable compositions of antiquity. But our present business is only to remark the destructive effects immediately resulting from their tenets, which, while they undermined, without openly opposing, the ancient and popular superstition, boldly set at defiance all those useful maxims of conduct, and all those salutary discoveries of reason, which, amidst the insolence of the Greek democracies, fomented by prosperity, appeared essentially requisite to restrain the intemperance, injustice, and violence, of individuals and communities.

In several republics of Greece, the Sophists enjoyed a free career to display their talents,

⁸ See Diogen. Laert. l. i. Aristot. Metaph. passim. et Plut. de Placit. Philosoph.

⁹ Laert. l. ix. Aristot. Physic. l. viii.

¹⁰ Aristot. Metaphys. l. i. c. iii. Plato in Cratylus, et Plut. in Pericle.

¹¹ Vid. Philostrat. de Vit. Sophist.

¹² See the note on the Sophists, in my Translation of Isocrates's Panegyric of Athens, p. 1. et seq.

practice their artifices, and to promote their fame and fortune. But in Athens their frauds were detected, and their characters unmasked by Socrates,¹ whose philosophy forms an important era in the history of the human mind. The son of Sophroniscus was born at Athens, forty years before the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. The smallness of his patrimony, amounting only to three hundred pounds, and his original profession of a statuary,² have encouraged an opinion of the obscurity of his birth, among writers who did not reflect on the narrowness of Athenian fortunes, and who forgot to consider, that as hereditary distinctions were little known or regarded in the Grecian republics, a solid and permanent lustre was naturally derived from the practice of ingenious arts, which could not be cultivated, as in ancient Rome, and sometimes in modern Europe, by servile or mercenary hands, but only by the first class of freemen and citizens. Whatever reputation or advantage Socrates might have acquired by the exercise of a profession, which was peculiarly encouraged by the taste of the times, and the magnificent spirit of Pericles, he readily sacrificed to the natural bent of his mind, which concealed, under an external form worthy to represent the voluptuous Silenus,³ the fruitful seeds of every amiable and manly sentiment, and determined him, by an irresistible impulse, to the study of wisdom and virtue.

In his early youth he heard the physics of Archelaus, and learned the geometry of Theodorus;⁴ and from these, and other teachers, acquired such an acquaintance with the fashionable theories concerning the formation of the universe, the original principles of things, the hidden powers of matter, as enabled him to regard with just contempt, and occasionally to deride with inimitable humour, the vanity of those useless and shadowy speculations. He acknowledged with the pious Anaxagoras, the superintending mind, whose providence regulated the operations of nature, as well as the affairs of human life. He denied not the existence of those inferior intelligences, which formed the only objects of popular adoration; he allowed the divine origin of dreams and omens; he was exemplary in all the religious duties of his country; and were we to judge the Athenian sage by the standard of ordinary men, we should be inclined to believe that he had not entirely escaped the contagion of superstition; since he professed to be accompanied by a demon, or invisible conductor, who often restrained his passions, and influenced his behaviour.⁵ If this assertion was not an effect of that refined irony familiar to Socrates, we must allow his temper to have been tinged with credulity: yet, whoever seriously reflects on a life of seventy years, spent in the service of mankind, uniformly blameless, and terminated by a voluntary death, in obedience to the

unjust laws of his country; whoever considers attentively the habitual temperance, the unshaken probity, the active usefulness, the diffusive benevolence, the constant equanimity and cheerfulness of this singular man, will admit a degree of enthusiasm, rather as the ornament, than defect, of such an extraordinary character. Men of learning and genius, who, examining the matter still more deeply, have observed the important revolution produced by the life and death of Socrates, on the principles and sentiments of his contemporaries, and of posterity, are disposed to believe that such an extraordinary phenomenon could not have appeared in the moral world, without the particular interposition of heaven. The cheerful serenity of his last moments,⁶ and still more, the undeviating tenor of his active virtue, justified the hardest maxims of Lycurgus and Pythagoras; while the main aim of his speculations was to establish the sublime morality of those sages, on the clearest deductions of reason and experience.

From the perfections of the supreme intelligence he deduced his just government of the universe, which implied the immortality of the human soul. But the great object of his research was to discover the general laws by which, even in this life, the superintending providence had variously dispensed to men good and evil, happiness and misery. These laws he regarded as the promulgated will of the God, with which, when clearly ascertained, it became our duty invariably to comply; since nothing but the most short-sighted folly could risk incurring the divine displeasure, in order to avoid pain or poverty, sickness or death; far less to acquire perishing gratifications, which leave a sting behind them. Reasoning on such principles, and taking experience only for his guide, he deduced, with admirable perspicuity, the interests and duties of nations and individuals, in all the complicated relations of society. The actions of men furnished the materials, their instruction formed the object, their happiness was the end of his discourse. Wherever his lessons might be most generally useful, there he was always to be found; frequenting, at an early hour, the Academy, Lyceum, and other public Gymnasias; punctually attending the forum at mid-day, the hour of full assembly; and in the evening joining, without the affectation of austerity, in the convivial entertainments of his friends, or accompanying them in the delightful walks which adorned the banks of the Illyssus. As a husband, a father, a citizen, and a soldier, the steady practice of his duty continually illustrated his doctrines. The conversation and example of this truly practical philosopher (and this is his highest panegyric) persuaded many of his fellow citizens sincerely to embrace a virtuous course of life; and even those who, like Critias and Alcibiades, allowed the current of their passions to prevail over the conviction of their sober hours, were still charmed with the wonderful extent, as well as the singular accuracy, of his various knowledge; with the acuteness and penetration of

¹ To avoid prolixity in the account of Socrates and his philosophy, I cite not particular passages, but give the general result of my reading in Plato and Xenophon.

² Laert. l. ii. art. Socrat.

³ Plato et Xenoph. in Symp.

⁴ Plato in Theætet. et in Menon.

⁵ Plut. de Genio Socratis.

⁶ This subject will be treated hereafter.

his arguments; the beauty, vivacity, and persuasiveness of his style; which, whether he assumed the tone of reason or of ridicule, surpassed whatever had been deemed most eloquent.⁷

Yet, how great soever might be the personal influence of Socrates, the triumph of his philosophy became more illustrious and complete, after his principles were embraced by those who cultivated the imitative arts, and directed the public amusements, which in all countries, but particularly in Greece, have ever produced immediate and powerful effects on the national opinions and character. In Greece alone, the theatre was regarded as an object of the first importance and magnitude; it formed an essential, and by far the most splendid, part of religious worship; the expense of supporting it exceeded that of the army and navy together; and this celebrated entertainment, which united the tragedy and opera of the moderns, was carried to perfection by a favourite disciple of Socrates, whose works were so universally admired in Greece, that (as we shall have occasion to relate in the Sicilian war) the Syracusans released from captivity those Athenians, and those only, who had learned to repeat the verses of Euripides. This admired poet rendered the Grecian tragedy complete, by perfecting the chorus,⁸ the principle distinction between the ancient and the modern drama, and which, when properly conducted, rendered the former more regular, yet more varied; more magnificent, and at the same time more affecting; above all, more interesting and more instructive.

From the prevailing manners of the times, when the principal citizens lived together in crowds, and daily frequented the public halls, the gymnasia, the forums, and temples, it was natural to expect that the action of a Grecian tragedy should consist in some great public event, which interested the whole body of the people. The scene was usually the portico of a temple, the gate of a palace, the wide expanse of a forum, or market-place. In such places many spectators must be supposed present, who would naturally take part in an action which concerned the public interest and happiness.⁹ On this principle was introduced

the ancient chorus, consisting of such persons as most properly suited the occasion, and who, though not immediately or principally concerned in the catastrophe, had such general and indirect interest, as kept them continually on the scene, and made them approve or condemn, promote or oppose, the sentiments and measures of the actors. The chorus, never quitting the stage, necessarily introduced the unity of place; and as their songs and dances between the acts expressed the feelings excited by the representation, they connected the preceding act with that which immediately followed it, and rendered the whole spectacle uninterrupted and continuous. The music of the chorus was more rich and various, and the poetry more elevated and glowing, than what could be admitted into the acts; or ordinary dialogue, which was confined to the iambic measure; circumstances which, together with the numbers, the dresses, the dances, and gestures, of these fancied spectators, equally increased the magnificence and variety of the entertainment. They likewise rendered it more affecting; since nothing is more proper to interest us in any scene, than the beholding a great number of persons deeply engaged by it, and expressing their feelings by natural tones and movements. But the principal advantage of the chorus was to furnish the poet with an opportunity (without loading the dialogue, and rendering it too sententious) of enforcing, by all the power of fancy and of numbers, that moral instruction, which was occasionally attempted by Æschylus and Sophocles, but which forms the continual end and aim of Euripides, who had a soul to feel, and a genius to express, whatever is most lovely and most excellent in sentiment and character. It is unnecessary to mention the affecting delicacy of Admetus and his attendants towards his guest Hercules; the lively emotions of gratitude in that hero; the friendship of Pylades and Orestes; the amiable picture of conjugal affection in the character of Alcestis; since the whole remains of that inestimable writer prove his unceasing labours to warm his countrymen with all the virtues and charities that adorn private life, as well as to keep alive an ardent love of the republic, and a generous passion for its glory and liberty; while, in several passages, he describes and refutes the philosophy of Epicurus¹⁰ (which, as we have already observed, was chiefly borrowed from the licentious maxims of the Sophists) with such fulness and accuracy as entitled him to the appellation of the Philosophic Tragedian.

⁷ Xenoph. Memor. l. iv. c. xv. Laert. l. ii. c. xix. et seq. et Cicero de Orat. iii. 16.

⁸ In this part of the drama, the Philosophy of Euripides excels the loftiness of Æschylus, and the richness of Sophocles. It is sufficient to compare the works of the three rivals, to perceive that the chorus in Euripides most faithfully answers the description of Horace:

Ille bonis faveatque, et consilietur amicis
Et regat iratos, et amet peccare timentes.
Ille dapas laudet menas brevis; ille salubrem
Justitiam, legesque, et apertis otia portis;
Ille tegat commissas; deosque precetur et orat,
Ut redeat miseriis, abeat fortuna superbis.

⁹ In the *Œdipus Tyrannus*, the chorus is composed of priests, senators, Theban youths, &c. Creon says to *Œdipus*,

Εἰ τῶνδε χρεῖς πλεονάζοντων κλυεῖν
Σταῖμος εἰπείν, οἷς καὶ στυχεῖν ἔστω.

The answer is

Εἰ πάντας αὐδῶ τῶνδε γὰρ πλεον φέρω
Πυθός η καὶ τῆς ἰμης ψυχῆς πέρι

Creon. Shall I speak in presence of this numerous assembly? or shall we retire?

Œdipus. Speak before all present; for the public distress afflicts me more than my own danger.

¹⁰ See particularly *Alcest.* ver. 782, &c. and ver. 900, &c.

Euripides flourished near a hundred years before Epicurus and Zeno, the respective founders of the Epicurean and Stoical philosophy. Yet we find the tenets of both sects in the tragedian; which may be easily explained, by considering that those opposite kinds of philosophy arose from different aspects of nature, which must often present themselves to an observing eye; and as the doctrines of the Sophists laid the foundation for the moral system of Epicurus, so the moderate doubt of Socrates, and the old academy, was corrupted into different degrees of scepticism, according to the fancy of their successors; and his rational preference of virtue to all other objects, degenerated into a pretended contempt for these objects, as things totally indifferent, the insensibility and pedantry of the Stoics.

That Euripides, though ten years older than Socrates, owed the characteristic excellences of his works to the conversation and friendship of that unrivalled moralist, is universally acknowledged by antiquity;¹ though the character and intentions both of the poet and the philosopher were grossly misrepresented by some of their contemporaries. Before the commencement, and during the continuance of the Peloponnesian war, there flourished at Athens a class of men who were the declared enemies, not only of Socrates and his disciples, but of all order and decency. The reader will easily perceive, that I allude to Aristophanes, and the other writers of the old licentious comedy; an entertainment which was never carried to the same vicious excess in any other age or country. Yet this hideous spectre was the sister of Tragedy, whose angelic sweetness and dignity were long accompanied by this odious and disgusting form; but to understand the natural connection between objects seemingly so different, it is necessary to remount to their source.

Tragedy, the song of the goat,² and Comedy, the song of the village, sufficiently indicate, by the meanness of their ancient names, the humility of their first original. They arose amidst the sacrifices and joyous festivity of the vintage, in a country which seldom adopted the amusements, any more than the arts and institutions, of others, but which was destined to communicate her own to all the civilized portion of mankind. During the entertainments of a season peculiarly dedicated to recreation and pleasure, the susceptible minds of the Greeks naturally yielded to two propensities congenial to men in such circumstances, a disposition to exercise their sensibility, and a desire to amuse their fancy. Availing himself of the former, the sublime genius of Æschylus³ improved the song of the goat into a regular dramatic poem, agreeing with the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in those unalterable rules of design

¹ Εἰς αὐτὴν συμπόσειν Εὐριπίδην. Diogen. Laert. in Vit. Socrat. The comic poets, who envied and hated Euripides, as the darling of the public, pretended that Socrates had even composed all the finest passages in his tragedies. Soon after the representation of the *the Troes*, Mnesilochus parodied it in a farce, which he called Φρυγίαις, Phrygians, probably to have an opportunity of playing on the word φρυγαννόν, fuel.

Φρυγίαις ἔστι καὶ νῦν δρᾶμα τοῦτ' Εὐριπίδου
ὃ καὶ Σωκράτης τὰ φρυγαννὰ υποτίθησι.

"The Phrygians is a new play of Euripides, to whom Socrates furnishes the fuel." But the pun cannot be translated. The same Mnesilochus calls Euripides a sort of hammerman to Socrates,

Εὐριπίδης Σωκράτεγορμφίης.

² A goat, as the particular enemy of the vine, was very properly sacrificed to Bacchus, whose praises composed the song. In the *Antigoné* of Sophocles, v. 1127,

Πολυννύμι Καδμείας
Νυμφὰς ἀγαλάμα, καὶ Δίος
Βαρυβέρματα γίνες, &c.

we have a specimen of what formed the first business of tragedy.

³ Æschylus is said by Aristotle (*de Arte Poetica*) to have introduced interlocutors, dialogue, &c. which is acknowledging him the father of tragedy. We know little of Theophrastus, but from Horace:

Ignotum tragicæ genus invenisse camœnæ
Dicitur, et plaustris vexisse poemata Theophrastus.

The plaustrum, however, has a more direct reference to comedy; since λαλεῖν ὡς ἐξ αμαξίας, to speak as from a cart, was a common Greek expression for reviling with gross indecent insolence.

and execution which are essential to the perfection of every literary performance, yet differing from those immortal archetypes of art, in a circumstance naturally suggested by the occasion for which tragedies were composed. It had been usual with the Athenians, when they celebrated in the spring and autumn the great festivals of Bacchus, to personate the exploits and fables handed down by immemorial tradition concerning that bountiful divinity; this imitation was considered as a mark of gratitude due to the beneficence of the god, to whose honours they associated the kindred worship of Pan, Silenus, and their attendant fawns and satyrs. When Æschylus represented, therefore, instead of simply reciting, the real history, or agreeable fictions, of antiquity, he only adopted a mode of imitation already practised in the religious ceremonies of his country; a mode of imitation more powerful than the epic, since, instead of barely describing the deeds of gods and heroes, it shows those distinguished personages on the scene, makes them speak and act for themselves, and thus approaching nearer to reality, is still more forcible and affecting.

As tragedy was introduced in imitation of the more serious spectacles of the Dionysian festival, so comedy, which soon followed it, was owing to the more light and ludicrous parts of that solemnity.⁴ Tragedy is the imitation of an important and serious action, adapted to affect the sensibility of the spectators, and to gratify their natural propensity to fear, to weep, and to wonder. Comedy is the imitation of a light and ludicrous action, adapted to amuse the fancy, and to gratify the natural disposition of men to laughter and merriment. Terror and pity have in all ages been regarded as the main springs of tragedy, because the laws of sensibility, founded solely in nature, are always the same. Comedy has been infinitely varied by the innumerable modes of wit, humour, and ridicule, which prevail in different ages and countries, and which agree scarcely in any one particular, unless it may be reckoned an agreement, that men have seldom indulged them, except at the expense of their good-nature, and often of their virtue. The Grecian comedy was uncommonly licentious; the profligate characters of Aristophanes and his contemporaries, Mnesilochus, Callias, Eupolis, and Cratinus, contributed, doubtless, to this deformity; yet these poets could not easily have rendered their new entertainment agreeable to the taste⁵ and prejudices of the public, without

⁴ Horace is authentic, and the most agreeable authority.

Agricolæ prioci, fortes, parvoque beati
Condita post frumenta, levantes tempore festo
Corpus, et ipsum animum spe finis dura ferentem,
Cum sociis operum, pueris, et conjuge fidâ,
Tellurem porco, Silvanum lacte piabant,
Floribus et vino Genium, memorem brevis ævi.
Fescennina per hunc invecata licentia morem
Versibus alternis opprobria rustica fudit, &c. &c.

and still more directly, *Ars Poetic.* v. 290, &c.

⁵ Horace has expressed, with his usual felicity, the situation of the spectators, and the fatal necessity of humouring it:

——Asper

Incolumi gravitate jocum tentavit; eo quod
Illecebris erat et grata novitate morandus
Spectator, functusque sacris, et potus et exlex.

incorporating in them the substance of the *phallic* songs,⁶ which constituted an ancient and essential part of the amusements of the vintage. The fond admirers of antiquity have defended the abominable strains of these licentious poets, by pretending, that their intention was to reform vice, not to recommend it; an apology which, if admitted, might tend to exculpate the writers, but could never justify their performances, since it is known by experience, that low descriptions prove a poison rather than a remedy; and instead of correcting manners, tend only to corrupt them.

Besides the general licentiousness of the ancient comedy, its more particular characteristics resulted from the peculiar circumstances of the Athenians, during the time of its introduction and continuance. The people of all ranks at Athens were then too deeply engaged in the military and political transactions of their country, to enjoy any amusement which did not either directly flatter their passions, or bear an immediate relation to the great and important interests of the republic. It was during the confusion and calamities of the Peloponnesian war, that all the comic pieces which remain were originally represented; a period too disorderly and tumultuous to relish comedies, such as are now written, or such as were composed in Greece by Menander, in an age of greater moderation and tranquillity. The elegant and ingenious, the moral and instructive strains of Moliere or Menander, may amuse the idleness of wealth, and the security of peace. But amidst the fermentation of war and danger, amidst civil dissensions and foreign invasions, the minds of men are too little at ease to enjoy such refined and delicate beauties, which then appear lifeless and insipid. In such turbulent circumstances, the reluctant attention must be excited by real, instead of imaginary characters; by a true, instead of a fictitious event; by direct and particular advice concerning the actual state of their affairs, instead of vague or abstract lessons of wisdom and virtue. Coarse buffoonery may often force them to laugh; delicate ridicule will seldom engage them to smile; they may be affected by the sharpness of personal invective, but will remain impenetrable to the shafts of general satire.

By combining the different parts of this description, we may form a tolerably exact notion of the writings of Aristophanes, which commonly conceal, under a thin allegorical veil, the recent history of some public transaction, or the principal features of some distinguished character, represented in such a ludicrous light, as reflects on those concerned, unexpected, and often unmerited, but not therefore the less striking, flashes of insolent ridicule. Such was the nature, and such the materials of the ancient comedy, which, in its form, agreed entirely with tragedy, having borrowed from this entertainment (which was already in possession of the theatre) the distribution of the whole, as well as the arrangement of the several parts;

the music, the chorus, the dresses, decorations, and machinery; all of which were so modified and burlesqued as suited the purposes of the comic writer, and often rendered his pieces little else than parodies of the more fashionable tragedies of the times.

This singular species of drama, which, in its less perfect state, had long strolled the villages of Attica, was simply tolerated at Athens, until the profusion of Pericles, and his complaisance for the populace, first supplied from the exchequer the necessary expenses for the representation of comedies, and proposed prizes for the comic, as well as for the tragic, poets and actors. But, by this injudicious encouragement, he unwarily cherished a serpent in his bosom. Aristophanes and his licentious contemporaries having previously ridiculed virtue and genius, in the persons of Socrates and Euripides, boldly proceeded to avail themselves of the natural malignity of the vulgar, and their envy against whatever is elevated and illustrious, to traduce and calumniate Pericles himself; and though his successors in the administration justly merited (as we shall have occasion to relate) the severest lashes of their invective, yet, had their characters been more pure, they would have been equally exposed to the unprovoked satire of those insolent buffoons, who gratified the gross appetites of the vulgar, by an undistinguished mass of ridicule, involving vice and virtue, things profane and sacred, men and gods.

Dramatic entertainments formed an essential part of the festivals consecrated to the bountiful author of the vine. Minerva, who had given not only the olive, but what was deemed far more valuable, her peculiar protection to the city of Athens, was rewarded with innumerable solemnities. Jupiter enjoyed his appropriated honours; but more commonly, as is attested by Athenian medals, the worship of the father of the gods was associated with that of his wife and warlike daughter. We shall have occasion to speak more particularly of the festival and mysteries of Ceres, who taught the Athenians the important knowledge of agriculture, which they were supposed to have diffused over the ancient world. It would be endless to mention the institutions in honour of the crowd of inferior or less propitious divinities, which rendered the festivals at Athens twice more numerous than in any other Grecian city. Nor did their frequency abate any thing of the expensive splendour which accompanied them. The shops and courts of justice were shut; the mechanic quitted his tools, the husbandman ceased from his labours, the mourner intermitted his sorrow. The whole city was dissolved in feasting and jollity; the intervals of which were filled up by pompous shows and processions, by concerts of music, by exhibitions of painting; and at several festivals, particularly the Panathenæan, by hearing and judging the noblest productions of eloquence and poetry.⁷ We shall have occasion to mention some particular ceremonies of a more melancholy cast; but the general character of the Grecian religion was

⁶ Φαλλός. Priapus ξυλον επιμηκεις ιχυν εν τω ακρω σφυτινον ειδοιον. Suidas. This was carried in procession, accompanied with the φαλλικα σαρματα.

⁷ Isocrat. Panegy. et Panathen.

as cheerful and attractive, as the superstition of the Egyptians, from whom they are ignorantly supposed to have borrowed it, was gloomy and forbidding. Even the Egyptian hymns consisted in dismal complaints and lamentations;¹ the Grecian solemnities concluded with songs of joy and exultation. The feasts which followed the sacrifices were enriched by all the delicacies and luxuries of the ancient world; and, to use the words of Aristotle, many persons thought it their duty, at those religious entertainments, to get drunk in honour of the gods.²

It seems extraordinary, that the revenues of Athens, notwithstanding their improvement by Pericles, should have sufficed for this multitude of expenses. But we must consider, that the general simplicity of manners in private life, formed a striking contrast with the extravagance of public festivals and amusements. The houses and tables of the most wealthy Athenians were little distinguished above those of their poorest neighbours. Pericles himself, though never suspected of avarice, lived with the exactest economy; and the superabundance of private wealth, which would have created envy and danger to the owner, if he had employed it for his particular convenience and pleasure, procured him public gratitude and esteem, when expended for the satisfaction of the multitude.

For reasons which will immediately appear, we have not hitherto found it necessary to describe the manners and influence of the Grecian women; but the character and condition of the fair sex will throw light on the preceding observations in this chapter, and present the most striking contrast of any to be met with in history. If we knew not the consideration in which women were anciently held in Greece, and the advantages which they enjoyed at Sparta, after the laws of Lycurgus had revived the institutions of the heroic ages,³ we should be apt to suspect that the ungenerous treatment of the feebler sex, which afterwards so universally prevailed, had been derived from the Egyptian and Asiatic colonies, which early settled in that part of Europe. Excluded from social intercourse, which nature had fitted them to adorn, the Grecian women were rigorously confined to the most retired apartments of the family, and employed in the meanest offices of domestic economy. It was thought indecent for them to venture abroad, unless to attend a procession, to accompany a funeral,⁴ or to assist at certain other religious solemnities. Even on these occasions, their behaviour was attentively watched, and often malignantly interpreted. The most innocent freedom was construed into a breach of decorum; and their reputation, once sullied by the slightest imprudence, could never afterwards be retrieved. If such unreasonable severities had proceeded from that absurd jealousy which sometimes accompanies a violent love, and of which a certain degree is nearly connected with the delicacy of

passion between the sexes, the condition of the Grecian women, though little less miserable, would have been far less contemptible. But the Greeks were utter strangers to that refinement of sentiment,⁵ which, in the ages of chivalry, and which still, in some southern countries of Europe, renders women the objects of a suspicious but respectful passion, and leads men to gratify their vanity at the expense of their freedom. Married or unmarried, the Grecian females were kept in equal restraint; no pains were taken to render them, at any one period of their lives, agreeable members of society; and their education was either entirely neglected, or confined at least to such humble objects, as, instead of elevating and enlarging the mind, tended only to narrow and to debase it. Though neither qualified for holding an honourable rank in society, nor permitted to enjoy the company of their nearest friends and relations, they were thought capable of superintending or performing the drudgery of domestic labour, of acting as stewards for their husbands, and thus relieving them from a multiplicity of little cares, which seemed unworthy of their attention, and unsuitable to their dignity. The whole burden of such mercenary cares being imposed on the women, their first instructions and treatment were adapted to that lowly-rank, beyond which they could never afterwards aspire.⁶ Nothing was allowed to divert their minds from those servile occupations in which it was intended that their whole lives should be spent; no liberal idea was presented to their imagination, that might raise them above the ignoble arts in which they were ever destined to labour; the smallest familiarity with strangers was deemed a dangerous offence; and any intimacy or connection beyond the walls of their own family, a heinous crime; since it might engage them to embezzle the household furniture and effects committed to their care and custody. Even the laws of Athens confirmed this miserable degradation of women, holding the security of the husband's property a matter of greater importance than defending the wife's person from outrage, and protecting her character from infamy.⁷ By such illiberal institutions were the most amiable part of the human species insulted, among a people in other respects the most improved of all antiquity. They were totally debarred from those refined arts and entertainments, to which their agreeable qualities might have added a new charm. Instead of directing the taste, and enlivening the pleasures of society, their value was estimated, like that of the ignoblest objects, merely by profit or utility. Their chief virtue was reserve, and their point of honour, economy.

The extreme depression of women levelled the natural inequalities of their temper and disposition; the prude, the coquette, with the various intermediate shades of female character, disappeared; and all the modest and vir-

1 Apuleius de Genio Socratis.

2 Arist. Ethic. ad Nichom. l. viii. c. iii.

3 Aristot. Politic. l. ii. p. 105.

4 Lysias, p. 420.

5 Idem, p. 435.

6 Xenoph. Memorab. l. v. passim, particularly Socrates's Discourse with Ischomachus.

7 See the laws quoted by Lysias, explained in my Introductory Discourse to that orator, p. 100.

tuous part of the sex (if virtue and modesty can ever be the effects of restraint) were reduced to humble imitation and insipid uniformity. But, in the time of Pericles, there appeared and flourished at Athens a bolder class of females, who divested themselves of the natural modesty, disdained the artificial virtues, and avenged the violated privileges of their sex. Asia, the mother of voluptuousness, produced this dangerous brood, whose meretricious arts and occupations met with no check or restraint from the laxity of Ionian morals, and were even promoted and encouraged by the corruptions of Pagan superstition. In most of the Greek colonies of Asia, temples were erected to the earthly Venus; where courtezans were not merely tolerated, but honoured, as priestesses of that condescending divinity.⁹ The wealthy and commercial city of Corinth first imported this innovation from the East; and such is the extravagance of the human mind, that after the repulse of Xerxes, the magistrates of that republic ascribed the safety of their country to the powerful intercession of the votaries of Venus, whose portraits they caused to be painted at the public expense, as the Athenians had done those of the warriors who gained the battle of Marathon.¹⁰ The fame of all those accomplished, but mercenary beauties, though highly celebrated by the poets and historians of the times, was eclipsed by the splendour of Aspasia of Miletus, who settled at Athens under the administration of Pericles, and is said to have embarked in the fleet with which that fortunate commander subdued the powerful and wealthy island of Samos. The personal character of Aspasia gave temporary lustre to a profession, which, though exalted by the casual caprices of superstition, must naturally have fallen into contempt; since later writers among the Greeks¹¹ acknowledge, that though she carried on a very dishonourable commerce in female virtue, yet her wit and eloquence, still more than her beauty, gained her extraordinary consideration among all ranks in the republic. The susceptible minds of the Athenians were delighted with what their absurd institutions rendered a novelty, the beholding the native graces of the sex, embellished by education. Aspasia is said

to have acquired a powerful ascendant over Pericles himself; she certainly acquired his protection and friendship; which is less extraordinary than that her conversation and company should have pleased the discernment of the sage Socrates. She is accused (as we shall afterwards have an opportunity to mention) of having excited, from motives of personal resentment, the war of Peloponnesus; yet, calamitous as that long and obstinate conflict proved to Greece, and particularly to Athens, it may be suspected that Aspasia occasioned still more incurable evils to both. Her example, and still more her instructions, formed a school at Athens, by which her dangerous profession was reduced into system. The companions of Aspasia served as models for painting and statuary, and themes for poetry and panegyric. Nor were they mere objects, but the authors of many literary works, in which they established rules for the behaviour of their lovers, particularly at table; and explained the art of gaining the heart, and captivating the affections;¹² which would have been an imprudence, had they not considered, that the mysteries of their calling alone lose little by being disclosed, since men may often perceive the snare, without having courage to avoid it. The dress, behaviour, and artifices of this class of women, became continually more seductive and dangerous; and Athens thenceforth remained the chief school of vice and pleasure, as well as of literature and philosophy.

It has been already hinted, that the fine arts, and particularly painting, were prostituted to the honour of harlots, and the purposes of voluptuousness. Licentious pictures are mentioned by ancient writers as a general source of corruption, and considered as the first ambush that beset the safety of youth and innocence.¹³ Yet this unhappy effect of the arts was only the vapour that accompanies the sun; since painting, architecture, and above all, statuary, attained their meridian splendour in the age of Pericles; and shed peculiar glory on this period of Athenian history, not only by the powers of genius which they displayed, but by the noble purposes to which they were directed. But the arts of design form so important a subject, that they merit to be examined apart, in the following chapter.

⁹ Athenæus, l. xiii. et Plutarch, p. 637.

¹⁰ Simonides apud Athen. l. xiii.

¹¹ Plutarch. in Pericle.

¹² Athenæus, ibid.

¹³ Euripid. in Hippolyt.

CHAPTER XIV.

History of the Arts of Design—Superiority of the Greeks in those Arts—Causes of that Superiority—Among the Asiatic Greeks—Who communicated their Inventions to Europe—Bathycles the Magnesian—Dipenus and Scyllis—Imitated in Greece, Italy, and Sicily—The Athenians surpass their Masters—Sublime Style of Art—Works of Phidias, Polygnatus, &c.—Characteristic Excellence of Grecian Art—Different Impressions made by Painters and Poets—Depended on the Nature of their respective Arts.

THAT the history of arts has been less cultivated than that of arms and politics, is a general and just complaint, to which writers will seldom be inclined to pay regard, because they will always find it an easier task to relate wars and negotiations, debates and battles, than to describe the gradual and almost imperceptible progress of genius and taste, in works of elegance and beauty.

The origin of the imitative¹ arts (so congenial is imitation to man) reaches beyond the limits of profane history; and to dispute who were their inventors, is only to examine what nation is the most ancient. In this respect, the Egyptians and Phœnicians merit, doubtless, the pre-eminence. From the earliest ages of Hea-then antiquity, both these nations seem to have cultivated the arts of design. In the remotest periods of their history, the Egyptians engraved on precious stones, and strove to render their public transactions immortal, by recording them in hieroglyphics, on the hardest bazaltes; nor can we sufficiently admire the perfection to which the patience of that laborious people had carried the mechanical part of sculpture, before the Persian conquest, and the reign of Cambyses. But beauty, the essence and the end of art, was never studied by the natives of either Phœnicia or Egypt, who faithfully copied their national features, without attempting to improve them; until the traces of Grecian conquest and colonization appeared in the medals of the Ptolemies, particularly those with the head of Jupiter Ammon.

Allowance, doubtless, must be made for the prejudices of national vanity, when Euripides, Aristotle, and Epicurus, endeavour to persuade us, that the clear skies and happy temperature of Greece engendered a peculiar aptitude for arts, letters, and philosophy. The testimony, however, of modern travellers confirms the evidence of antiquity, that the shores and islands of the Archipelago produce more elegant and liberal forms, and features more animated and expressive, with fewer individual imperfections, and more of general nature, than can be found in any other divisions of the world.² Yet whatever the Greeks owed to their skies and climate, they were probably not less indebted to their active laborious education and way of life, and to the manly spirit of their religious, civil, and military institutions.

1 Concerning the arts of the Greeks, the most copious materials are furnished by Pausanias throughout; and by the 34th and 35th books of Pliny. The best modern guides are Winckelman and Lessing in German, and Caylus in French. Many important errors of Winckelman, are detected by the learned professor Heine, in his *Antiquarische Abhandlungen*.

2 Belon. *Observat.* l. ii. 34.

Long before the invasion of Xerxes, the Grecian sculpture was distinguished by an air of majesty peculiar to itself;³ and the awful images of the gods, as yet rudely finished, displayed a grandeur and sublimity of expression, that delighted and astonished the best judges, in the most refined ages of art.⁴

This singularity might be expected from the description already given of the religion and manners of Greece, and from the inimitable excellence of its poets. The divinities of Greece being imagined of the human form, though incomparably more noble and perfect, artists would naturally begin, at a very early period,⁵ to exalt and generalize their conceptions. The bold enthusiasm of poetry served to elevate and support their flight, and the native country of Homer was the first scene of their success, the happy climate of Ionia rendering frequent and natural, in that delightful region, those beautiful and lovely forms which are elsewhere merely ideal, while other circumstances concurred to accelerate the progress of invention and genius in that highly-favoured country.

In the eighth century before the Christian era, the Asiatic colonies, as we already had occasion to explain, far surpassed their mother country in splendour and prosperity. For this pre-eminence, they were indebted to the superior fertility of their soil, the number and convenience of their harbours, the advantages of their situation and climate, the vicinity of the most wealthy and refined nations in Asia; above all, to their persevering diligence and ingenuity, by which they not only improved and ennobled the arts derived from the Lydians and Phrygians, but invented others long peculiar to themselves, particularly painting, sculpture in marble, together with the Doric and Ionic orders of architecture.

In the seventh century before Christ, the magnificent presents which the far-famed oracle of Apollo received from the superstition or vanity of the Lydian kings, were the productions, not of Egyptian or Phœnician, but of Ionian artists; and, during both that and the following century, the Ionians diffused the elegant inventions of their country through the dominions of their ancestors in Europe. Alarmed

3 Pausan. *Corinth.* l. ii. 34.

4 Plato et Aristot. *passim*.

5 We omit the fabulous accounts of Dedalus the Athenian, who is said to have flourished in the time of Hercules and Theseus, and forty years before the Trojan war. It has been already proved that, during the heroic ages, the Greeks paid no adoration to statues. Athenian writers, who lived a thousand years after that period, might easily confound the supposed works of the ancient Dedalus with those of Dedalus of Sicily, especially since the error was extremely flattering to their national vanity.

by the inroads of the Cimmerians, and disturbed by the continual hostility of Lydia, many Eastern artists sought refuge in the commercial cities of Ægina, Sicyon, and Corinth, where the peaceful spirit of the inhabitants, comparatively wealthy and luxurious, afforded the Ionian artists both encouragement and security.

The Asiatic fugitives, however, did not confine themselves to these secondary republics. Bathycles, a native of Ionian Magnesia, a place early celebrated for painting,⁶ fixed his abode in Sparta, the most considerable community in Greece. By order of the magistrates of that illustrious republic, he made the throne of Amyclæan Apollo, the statue of Diana Leucophryné, the figures of the Graces and Horæ, and all the other gifts and ornaments inclosed within the consecrated ground surrounding the temple of Amyclæ. The statue of Apollo, thirty cubits high, seemed to be the work of an ignorant sculptor, and probably was the production of a far earlier age than that of Bathycles. But whoever considers the colossean bulk of the principal figure, the base of which was formed into an altar, containing the tomb of Hyacinth, must admire the proportional magnitude of his throne, both sides of which were adorned with sculpture.⁷ Among these ornaments, many subjects of history or fable are mentioned by Pausanias, which bear no known relation to Apollo or Hyacinth, to Bathycles or the Spartans; but the top of the throne contained a chorus of Magnesians, supposed to represent the artists who assisted in the execution of this stupendous work. The altar represented a celestial group, Minerva, Venus, Diana, and several other divinities, conveying Hyacinth to the skies. Its sides were adorned with the combat of Tyndareus and Eurytus; the exploits of Castor and Pollux; and the extraordinary scene between Menelaus and the Egyptian Proteus, as described in the *Odyssey*.⁸ Nor was this the only subject copied from the divine bard. It was easy to distinguish his favourite Demodocus singing among a chorus of Phæacians; a circumstance confirming our observations in a former part of this work, that the poems of Homer were generally known in Sparta long before they had been collected by the Athenian tyrant Pisistratus.

Almost six centuries before the Christian era, the Cretans, Dipenus and Scillis, adorned many Grecian cities in Europe as well as in Asia; and about fifty years afterward, the Chians, Bupalus and Anthernus, diffused over Greece those precious works in Parian marble, which were highly admired in the age of Augustus.⁹

⁶ Plin. l. xxxv. I call it Ionian Magnesia, to distinguish it from other places of the same name. Vid. Plin. edit. Berolin. tom. i. p. 167. et tom. iii. p. 136. 139. et 255.

⁷ Winkelman, who scarcely mentions the throne of Amyclæan Apollo, though undoubtedly the greatest ancient monument in Greece, confounds Bathycles the Magnesian, with a later artist of the same name, who made the celebrated cup which the seven sages modestly sent one to the other, as most worthy of such a present, and which was finally consecrated to Delphian Apollo. Diogenes Laertius, speaking on this subject, says, Βαθυκλίας τινος Ἀρκάδος; and that he was an Arcadian appears also from Plut. in *Bolon.* et *Causabon*, ad *Athenæum*, l. xi. 4.

⁸ Pausan. *Lacon.* p. 196, et seq.

⁹ Vid. Plin. l. xxxvi. § 4.

About the same time, Polydorus of Samos, who seems to have been much employed by Cræsus, the last king of Lydia, made the famous ring for the Samian tyrant Polycrates, which is extolled by Pliny¹⁰ as a master-piece of art.

The productions of those Eastern artists were imitated with successful emulation by their disciples in ancient Greece, and likewise by the Grecian colonies in Italy and Sicily; as sufficiently appears from the medals of those last-mentioned countries. These more durable monuments, however, can afford but an imperfect idea of the innumerable statues which were formed of turf or gravel stone,¹¹ and of various kinds of wood. The most esteemed were made of ivory, which, like the teeth of other animals, calcines under ground; an unfortunate circumstance for the arts, since, before the invasion of Xerxes, Greece could boast a hundred ivory statues of the gods, all of a colossean magnitude, and many of them covered with gold.¹² The white marbles of Paros, together with those of Cyprus and Ægina, furnished the chief materials for sculpture, before the Athenians opened the hard sparkling veins of mount Pontelicus. Ebony, cypress, and other materials, were gradually brought into use, in consequence of the more general diffusion of the art, which was destined not only to represent gods and heroes, but to commemorate the useful merit of illustrious citizens.¹³ At the four sacred festivals common to the Grecian name, the victors in the gymnastic exercises, as well as in the musical and poetical entertainments, were frequently distinguished by the honour of a statue. The scenes of those admired solemnities thus became the principal repositories of sculpture; and the cities of Delphi and Olympia, in particular, long surpassed the rest of Greece in the number and value of their statues, as well as in the splendour and magnificence of all their other ornaments.¹⁴

But the time approached when those cities themselves were to be eclipsed by the lustre of Athens, which, in the course of forty years, became the seat not only of opulence, power, and politics, but of literature, philosophy, and the fine arts, and thenceforth continued to be regarded as the sovereign of Greece, rather than as the capital of the narrow and unfruitful territory of Attica. During that memorable period, the Athenians, whose circumstances had hitherto proved little favourable to the progress of taste and elegance, acquired unrivalled power and renown. Having disgraced the arms, they plundered the wealth of Persia. Their valour gave them possession of those maritime provinces of Lower Asia, which were justly regarded as the cradle of the arts. Their magnanimity and firmness commanded respect abroad, and ensured pre-eminence in Greece; while, by a rare felicity, their republic, amidst this uninterrupted flow of external prosperity, produced men capable to improve the gifts of valour or fortune to the solid and permanent glory of their country.

It is difficult to determine whether the dis-

¹⁰ L. xxxvii. § 4.

¹¹ Plut. in *Vit. Andoc.*

¹² Pausanias.

¹³ Lucian. *Imagin.*

¹⁴ Pausanias *Phocic.* and *Eliac.*

cerning encouragement of Pericles was more useful in animating the industry of Phidias, or the genius of Phidias in seconding the views of his illustrious protector. Their congenial minds seemed as happily formed for each other, as both were admirably adapted to the flourishing circumstances of their country. In the language of Plutarch,¹ this great *minister*, whose virtues gradually rendered him the *master* of the republic, found Athens well furnished with marble, brass, ivory, gold, ebony, and cypress, together with all the other materials fitted to adorn a city, which, having raised to the glory of empire, he wished likewise to render the model of elegance. According to the popular principles which he professed, he deemed it the duty of a statesman to provide not merely for the army, the navy, the judges, and others immediately employed in the public service; the great body of the people he regarded as the constant and most important object of his ministerial care. The immense revenues of the state, which had hitherto been chiefly squandered in shows and festivals, in gaudy ostentation and perishing luxury, he directed to objects more solid and durable, which, while they embellished the city, might exercise the industry and display the talents of the citizens. Guided by such motives, he boldly opened the treasury, and expended about four thousand talents; a sum which then might command as much labour as six or seven millions sterling in the present age. By this liberal encouragement, he animated every art, excited every hand, enlivened every exertion, and called forth into the public service the whole dexterity, skill, and genius of his countrymen; while the motives of gain or glory which he proposed, allured from all quarters the most ingenious strangers, who readily transported their talents to Athens, as to the best market, and most conspicuous theatre.

But it was the peculiar felicity of Pericles, to find Athens provided not only in all the materials of art, but in artists capable of employing them to the best advantage. In the inaccurate, but often expressive, language of Pliny, sculpture and painting then first arose, under the plastic hands of Phidias and his brother Panænus. Both arts, however, are known to have flourished at an earlier period; but in the age of Pericles, they assumed more elevation and majesty. The inventive genius of man tried a new and nobler flight. The superiority of Phidias and his contemporaries obscured, and almost obliterated, the memory of their predecessors, and produced that sublime style of art, which, having flourished about a hundred and fifty years, decayed with the glory of Greece, and disappeared soon after the reign of Alexander.

It appears from the gems and medals, and the few remains in marble, preceding the age of Pericles, that the mechanical part of engraving and sculpture had already attained a high degree of perfection. In many of those works, the minutest ornaments are finished with care, the muscles are boldly pronounced, the outline

is faithful; but the design has more hardness than energy, the attitudes are too constrained to be graceful, and the strength of the expression distorts, and for the most part destroys, beauty. The sculptors Phidias, Polycletus, Scopas, Alcamenes, and Myron, together with the contemporary painters, Panænus, Zeuxis, and Parrhasius, softened the asperities of their predecessors,² rendered their contours more natural and flowing, and by employing greater address to conceal the mechanism of their art, displayed superior skill to the judgment, and afforded higher delight to the fancy, in proportion as less care and labour appeared visible to the eye. In the works of those admired artists, the expression was skilfully diffused through every part, without disturbing the harmony of the whole. Pain and sorrow were rather concentrated in the soul than displayed on the countenance; and even the more turbulent passions of indignation, anger, and resentment, were so tempered and ennobled, that the indications of them became consistent with the sublimest grace and beauty. But the triumph of art consisted in representing and recommending the social affections; for, setting aside the unwarranted assertions of Pliny, in his pretended epochs of painting, it appears from much higher authority, that as early as the age of Socrates, painters had discerned and attained that admired excellence of style, which has been called in modern times the manner of Raphael; and had learned to express, by the outward air, attitude, and features, whatever (in the words of Xenophon³) is most engaging, affectionate, sweet, attractive, and amiable, in the inward sentiments and character. Of these Grecian paintings, indeed, which were chiefly on wood, and other perishing materials, no vestige remains; but the statuary of that celebrated age, while it displays its own excellence, is sufficient to redeem from oblivion (as far at least as invention, expression, and ideal beauty, are concerned) the obliterated charms of the sister art.

In statuary, the superior merit of Phidias was acknowledged by Olymp. lxxxiii. 4. the unanimous admiration of independent and rival communities. A. C. 445. Intrusted by Pericles with the superintendence of the public works, his own hands added to them their last and most valuable ornaments. Before he was called to this honourable employment, his statues had adorned the most celebrated temples of Greece. His Olympian Jupiter we had already occasion to describe. In the awful temple of Delphi, strangers admired his bronze statues of Apollo and Diana. He likewise made for the Delphians a group of twelve Grecian heroes, surrounding a figure of brass, that represented the Trojan horse. His admired statue of the goddess Nemesis, or Vengeance, was formed from a block of marble, which the vain confidence of the Persians transported to Marathon for a trophy of victory, but which their disgraceful and precipitate

1 Plut. in Pericle.

2 Plut. in Pericle et Quintilian, l. xii. c. x. p. 578.

3 See the conversation of Socrates with the painter Parrhasius, in Memorab. l. iii.

flight left for a monument of their cowardice on the Marathonian shore. The grateful piety of Greece adored his Venus Urania, and Parthenopean Apollo. His three Minervas were respectively made for the Pallanians, Platsans, and Lemnians, and all three presented by those tributary states to their Athenian protectors and sovereigns. These inimitable works silenced the voice of envy. The most distinguished artists of Greece, sculptors, painters, and architects, were ambitious to receive the directions, and to second the labours, of A. C. 455—430. Phidias, which were uninterruptedly employed, during fifteen years, in the embellishment of his native city.

During that short period he completed the Odeum, or theatre of music; the Parthenon, or temple of Minerva; the Propylæa or vestibule, and porticoes belonging to the citadel, together with the sculptured and picturesque ornaments of these and other immortal works; which, when new (as Plutarch finely observes,) expressed the mellowed beauties of time and maturity, and when old, still preserved the fresh charms and alluring graces of novelty. The Parthenon, which still remains, attests the justice of this panegyric. It is two hundred and seventeen feet nine inches long, composed of beautiful white marble, and acknowledged by modern travellers⁴ to be the noblest piece of antiquity existing in the world. It appears at first sight extraordinary, that the expense of two thousand talents should have been bestowed on the Propylæa.⁵ But we must consider, that this extensive name comprehended the temple of Minerva, the treasury, and other public edifices.

The Pœcile, or diversified portico, which was painted by Pansenus, the brother of Phidias, assisted by Polygnotus and Micon, must have been a work of great time and expense. Its front and ceilings were of marble, like those of all the other porticoes leading to the citadel, which still remained in the time of Pausanias, and were regarded, both on account of the workmanship and materials, as superior to any thing extant. In the Pœcile, those great painters, whose merit Pliny⁶ forgets in his inaccurate epochs of art, had represented the most illustrious events of Grecian history; the victory of Theseus over the Amazons, the sacking of Troy, and particularly the recent exploits against the Persians. In the battle of Marathon, the Athenian and Platæan heroes were drawn from the life, or more probably from the innumerable statues which preserved the faithful lineaments of those illustrious patriots. The whole extent of the Acropolis, above six miles in circumference, was so diversified by works of painting and statuary, that it became one continued scene of elegance and beauty.

But all these ornaments were surpassed by one production of Phidias, which probably was the last of that great master: his admired statue of Minerva, the erecting of which served to consecrate the Parthenon, was composed of

gold and ivory, twenty-six cubits high, being of inferior dimensions to his Minerva Poliades of bronze, the spear and crest of which was seen from the promontory of Sunium,⁷ at twenty-five miles distance. Parrhasius had painted the ornaments of the latter,⁸ Phidias himself adorned every part of the former; and, the compliment which, in this favourite work, he took an opportunity of paying to the merit of Pericles, occasioned (as we shall have occasion to explain⁹) his own banishment, a disgrace which he seems not to have long survived. Cicero, Plutarch, Pliny, and Pausanias, had seen and admired this invaluable monument of piety, as well as genius, since the Minerva of Phidias increased the devotion of Athens towards her protecting divinity. It belongs only to those who have seen and studied, to describe such master-pieces of art; and as they exist no more, it will better suit the design of this history, to confine ourselves to such works as we ourselves have seen, and which are generally acknowledged to bear the impression of the Socratic age, when philosophy gave law to painting and sculpture, as well as to poetry and eloquence.

Were it allowed to make the melancholy supposition, that all the monuments of Grecian literature had perished in the general wreck of their nation and liberty, and that posterity could collect nothing farther concerning that celebrated people, but what appeared from the Apollo Belvidere, the groupes of the Laocoon and Niobé, and other statues, gems, or medals, now scattered over Italy and Europe, what opinion would mankind form of the genius and character of the Greeks? would it correspond with the impressions made by their poets, orators, and historians? which impression would be most favourable? and what would be the precise difference between them? The solution of these questions will throw much light on the present subject.

The first observation that occurs on the most superficial, and that is strongly confirmed by a more attentive survey of the ancient marbles, is, that their authors perfectly understood proportion, anatomy, the art of clothing, without concealing the naked figure, and whatever contributes to the justness and truth of design. The exact knowledge of form is as necessary to the painter or statuary, whose business it is to represent bodies, as that of language to the poet or historian, who undertakes to describe actions. In this particular, it would be unnecessary to institute a comparison between Grecian writers and artists, since they are both allowed as perfect in their respective kinds as the condition of humanity renders possible.

But when we advance a step farther, and consider the expression of passions, sentiments, and character, we find an extraordinary difference, or rather contrariety. Homer, Sophocles, and Demosthenes, are not only the most original, but the most animated and glowing, of all writers. Every sentence is energetic; all the parts are in motion; the passions are described

⁴ Sir George Wheeler's Travels, &c.

⁵ Plutarch. in Pericle, et Demosth. p. 71.

⁶ He places the first epoch of great painters in the 20th Olymp. A. C. 430.

⁷ Pausanias Attic.

⁸ Idem, *ibid.*

⁹ Plutarch. in Pericle. et Thucyd. l. ii.

in their utmost fury, and expressed by the boldest words and gestures. To keep to the tragic poet, whose art approaches the nearest to painting and sculpture, the heroes, and even the gods of Sophocles, frequently display the impetuosity of the most ungoverned natures; and, what is still more extraordinary, sometimes betray a momentary weakness, extremely inconsistent with their general character. The rocks of Lemnos resound with the cries of Philoctetes; Œdipus, yielding to despair, plucks out his eyes; even Hercules, the model of fortitude, sinks under the impressions of pain or sorrow.

Nothing can be more opposite to the conduct of Grecian artists. *They* likewise have represented Philoctetes; but, instead of effeminate tears and lamentations, have given him the patient concentrated woe of a suffering hero. The furious Ajax of Timomachus was painted, not in the moment when he destroyed the harmless sheep instead of the hostile Greeks, but after he had committed this mad deed, and when his rage having subsided, he remained, like the sea after a storm, surrounded with the scattered fragments of mangled carcasses, and reflecting with the silent anguish of despair on his useless and frantic brutality. The revenge of Medea against her husband was not represented, as in Euripides, butchering her innocent children, but while she was still wavering and irresolute, agitated between resentment and pity. Even Clytemnestra, whose unnatural, intrepid cruelty, poets and historians had so indignantly described and arraigned, was not deemed a proper subject for the pencil, when imbruing her hands in the blood of Agamemnon. And although this may be referred to a rule of Aristotle, "that the characters of women should not be represented as too daring or decisive;" yet we shall find on examination that it results from principles of nature, whose authority is still more universal and indispensable. The consideration of the Apollo, Niobé, and Laocoon, whose copies have been infinitely multiplied, and are familiarly known, will set this matter in the clearest point of view.

The Apollo Belvidere is universally felt and acknowledged to be the sublimest figure that either skill can execute, or imagination conceive. That favourite divinity, whom ancient poets seem peculiarly fond of describing in the warmest colours,¹ is represented in the attitude of darting the fatal arrow against the serpent Pytho, or the giant Tityus. Animated by the noblest conception of heavenly powers, the artist has far outstepped the perfections of humanity, and (if we may speak without irreverence) made the corrupt put on incorruption, and the mortal immortality. His stature is above the human, his attitude majestic; the Elysian spring of youth softens the manly graces of his person, and the bold structure of his limbs. Disdain sits on his lips, and indignation swells his nostrils; but an unalterable serenity invests his front, and the sublime elevation of his aspect aspires at deeds of renown still surpassing the present object of his victory.

The irascible passions are not represented

with more dignity in the Apollo, than are those of fear, terror, and consternation, in the Niobé. This group contained Niobé and her husband Amphion, with seven sons, and as many daughters. Their melancholy story, which is too well known² to be related here, required the deepest expression; and the genius of the artist has chosen the only moment when this expression could be rendered consistent with the highest beauty; a beauty not flattering the senses by images of pleasure, but transporting the fancy into regions of purity and virtue. The excess and suddenness of their disaster, occasioned a degree of amazement and horror, which, suspending the faculties, involved them in that silence and insensibility, which neither breaks out in lamentable shrieks, nor distorts the countenance, but which leaves full play to the artist's skill to represent motion without disorder, or, in other words, to render expression graceful.

The Laocoon may be regarded as the triumph of Grecian sculpture; since bodily pain, the grossest and most ungovernable of all our passions, and that pain united with anguish and torture of mind, are yet expressed with such propriety and dignity, as afford lessons of fortitude superior to any taught in schools of philosophy. The horrible shriek which Virgil's Laocoon³ emits, is a proper circumstance for poetry, which speaks to the fancy by images and ideas borrowed from all the senses, and has a thousand ways of ennobling its object; but the expression of this shriek would have totally degraded the statue. It is softened, therefore, into a patient sigh, with eyes turned to heaven in search of relief. The intolerable agony of suffering nature is represented in the lower part, and particularly in the extremities, of the body; but the manly breast struggles against calamity. The contention is still more plainly perceived in his furrowed forehead; and his languishing paternal eye demands assistance, less for himself, than for his miserable children, who look up to him for help.

If subjects of this nature are expressed without appearing hideous, shocking, or disgusting, we may well suppose that more temperate passions are represented with the greatest moderation and dignity. The remark is justified by examining the remains or imitations of Grecian art; and were we to deduce from these alone the character of the nation, it would seem at first sight, that the contemporaries of Pericles must have been a very superior people in point of fortitude, self-command, and every branch of practical philosophy, to the Athenians who are described by poets and historians.

But when we consider the matter more deeply, we shall find that it is the business of history to describe men as they are; of poetry and painting, to represent them as may afford most pleasure and instruction to the reader or spectator. The aim of these imitative arts is the same, but they differ widely in the mode, the object, and extent of their imitation. The

¹ Horace, b. iii. ode 4. ver. 60.

² Ovid Metamorph. l. vi. ver. 146, et seq.

³ Æneid, l. ii. ver. 222.

poet who describes actions in time, may carry the reader through all the gradations of passion, and display his genius most powerfully in its most furious excess. But the painter or statuary, who represents bodies in space, is confined to one moment, and must choose that which leaves the freest play to the imagination. This can seldom be the highest pitch of pas-

sion, which leaves nothing beyond it; and in contemplating which, the sympathy of the spectator, after his first surprise subsides, can only descend into indifference. Every violent situation, moreover, is felt not to be lasting; and all extreme perturbation is inconsistent with beauty, without which no visible object can long attract or please.⁴

CHAPTER XV.

Causes of the Peloponnesian War—Rupture between Corinth and its Colony Corcyra—Sea Fights—Insolence and Cruelty of the Corcyreans—They provoke the Resentment of the Peloponnesians—Obtain the protection of Athens—Are defeated by the Corinthians—Who dread the Resentment of Athens—Their Scheme for rendering it impotent—Description of the Macedonian Coast—It revolts from Athens—Siege of Potidæa—General Confederacy against Athens—Peloponnesian Embassy—Its demands firmly answered by Pericles—His speech to the Athenians—The Thebans surprise Plataea—Preparations for War on both Sides—Invasion of Attica—Operations of the Athenian Fleet—Plague in Athens—Calamitous Situation of that Republic—Magnanimity of Pericles—Firmness of his last advice—His Death and Character.

BY the lustre of the elegant arts, the magnificence of Pericles had displayed and ennobled the military glory of his country; and the pre-eminence of Athens seemed immovably established on the solid foundation of internal strength, adorned by external splendour. But this abundant measure of prosperity satisfied neither the active ambition of the republic, nor the enterprising genius of its minister. The Greeks beheld and admired, but had not yet formally acknowledged, the full extent of Athenian greatness. In order to extort this reluctant confession, than which nothing could more firmly secure to him the affectionate gratitude of his fellow-citizens, Pericles despatched ambassadors to the republics and colonies in Europe and in Asia, requiring the presence of their deputies in Athens, to concert measures for rebuilding their ruined temples, and for performing the solemn vows and sacrifices promised, with devout thankfulness, to the immortal gods, who had wonderfully protected the Grecian arms, during their long and dangerous conflict with the Persian empire. This proposal, which tended to render Athens the common centre of deliberation and of union, was readily accepted in such foreign parts as had already submitted to the authority of that republic. But in neighbouring states, the ambassadors of Pericles were received coldly, and treated disrespectfully; in most assemblies of the Peloponnesus they were heard with secret disgust, and the pride of the Spartan senate openly derided the insolence of their demands. When at their return home, they explained the behaviour of the Spartans, Pericles exclaimed, in his bold style of elo-

quence, that he "beheld war advancing with wide and rapid steps from the Peloponnesus."⁵

Such was the preparation of materials which the smallest spark might throw into combustion. But before we relate the events which immediately occasioned the memorable war of twenty-seven years, it is impossible (if the calamities of our own times have taught us to compassionate the miserable) not to drop a tear over the continual disasters which so long and so cruelly afflicted the most valuable and enlightened portion of mankind, and whose immortal genius was destined to enlighten the remotest ages of the world. When rude, illiterate peasants are summoned to mutual hostility, and, unaffected by personal motives of interest or honour, expend their strength and blood to gratify the sordid ambition of their respective tyrants, we may lament the general stupidity and wretchedness of human nature; but we cannot heartily sympathize with men who have so little sensibility, nor very deeply and feelingly regret, that those should suffer pain, who seem both unwilling and incapable to relish pleasure. Their heavy unmeaning aspect, their barbarous language, and more barbarous manners, together with their total indifference to the objects and pursuits which form the dignity and glory of man; these circumstances, interrupting the ordinary course of our sentiments, divert or repel the natural current of sympathy. Their victories or defeats are contemplated without emotion, coldly related, and read without interest or concern. But the war of Peloponnesus presents a different spectacle. The adverse parties took arms, not to support the unjust pretensions of a tyrant, whom they had reason to hate or to despise, but to vindicate their civil rights, and to maintain their political independence. The

⁴ This subject is admirably treated in Lessing's *Laocoon*, in which he traces the bounds of painting and poetry: a work which, it is much to be regretted, that great genius did not finish.

⁵ *Plut. in Pericle.*

meanest Grecian soldier knew the duties of the citizen, the magistrate, and the general.¹ His life had been equally divided between the most agreeable amusements of leisure, and the most honourable employments of activity. Trained to those exercises and accomplishments which give strength and agility to the limbs, beauty to the shape, and grace to the motions, the dignity of his external appearance announced the liberal greatness of his mind: and his language, the most harmonious and expressive ever spoken by man, comprehended all that variety of conception, and all those shades of sentiment, that characterize the most exalted perfection of human manners.

Ennobled by such actors, the scene itself was highly important, involving not only the states of Greece, but the greatest of the neighbouring kingdoms; and, together with the extent of a foreign war, exhibiting the intenseness of domestic sedition. As it exceeded the ordinary duration of human power or resentment, it was accompanied with unusual circumstances of terror, which, to the pious credulity of an unfortunate age, naturally announced the wrath of heaven, justly provoked by human cruelty. Whilst pestilence and famine multiplied the actual sufferings, eclipses and earthquakes increased the consternation and horror of that lamentable period.² Several warlike communities were expelled from their hereditary possessions; others were not only driven from Greece, but utterly extirpated from the earth; some fell a prey to party-rage, others to the vengeance of foreign enemies; some were slowly exhausted by the contagion of a malignant atmosphere, others overwhelmed at once by sudden violence; while the combined weight of calamity assailed the power of Athens, and precipitated the downfall of that republic from the pride of prosperous dominion to the dejection of dependence and misery.³

Olymp. The general, but latent hostility of the Greeks, of which we have lxxxv. 2. already explained the cause, was A. C. 439. first called into action by a rupture between the ancient republic of Corinth, and its flourishing colony Corcyra. The haughty disdain of Corcyra, elated with the pride of wealth and naval greatness, had long denied and scorned those marks of de-

ference and respect which the uniform practice of Greece exacted from colonies towards their mother country. At the Olympic and other solemn festivals, they yielded not the place of honour to the Corinthians; they appointed not a Corinthian high-priest to preside over their religion; and when they established new settlements on distant coasts, they requested not, as usual with the Greeks, the auspicious guidance of a Corinthian conductor.⁴

While the ancient metropolis, incensed by those instances of contempt, longed for an opportunity to punish them, the citizens of Epidamnus, the most considerable sea-port on the coast of the Adriatic, craved assistance at Corinth against the barbarous incursions of the Taulantii, an Illyrian tribe, who, having united with a powerful band of Epidamnian exiles, greatly infested that territory, and threatened to storm the city. As Epidamnus was a colony of Corcyra, its distressed inhabitants had first sought protection there; but although their petition was preferred with respectful deference, and urged with the most affecting demonstration of abasement and calamity, by ambassadors who long remained under the melancholy garb of supplicants in the temple of Corcyrean Juno, the proud insensibility of these intractable islanders showed not the smallest inclination to relieve them; partly restrained, it is probable, by the secret practices of the Epidamnian exiles, consisting of some of the principal and richest families of that maritime republic. The Corinthians readily embraced the cause of a people abandoned by their natural protectors, and their own inveterate enemies; and immediately supplied Epidamnus with a considerable body of troops, less with a view to defend its walls against the assaults of the Taulantii, than in order irrecoverably to detach and alienate its inhabitants from the interest of Corcyra.

Olymp. The indignation of the Corcyreans was inflamed into fury, when lxxxvi. 2. they understood that those whom A. C. 435. they had long affected to consider as aliens and as rivals, had interfered in the affairs of their colony. They instantly launched a fleet of forty sail, proceeded in hostile array to the harbour of Epidamnus, summoned the inhabitants to re-admit their exiles, and to expel the foreign troops. With such unconditional and arbitrary demands, the weakest and most pusillanimous garrison could scarcely be supposed to comply. The Epidamnians rejected them with scorn; in consequence of which their city was invested and attacked with vigour, by land and sea. The Corinthians were now doubly solicitous, both to defend the place, and to protect the troops already thrown into it, consisting partly of their Leucadian and Ambracian allies, but chiefly of Corinthian citizens. A proclamation, first published at Corinth, was industriously disseminated through Greece, inviting all who were unhappy at home, or who courted glory abroad, to undertake an expedition to Epidamnus, with assu-

¹ Such is the testimony uniformly given of them in the panegyric of Athens by Isocrates, and confirmed by the more impartial authority of Xenophon, in the expedition of Cyrus. Their exploits in that wonderful enterprise justify the highest praise; and yet the national character had rather degenerated than improved, in the long interval between the periods alluded to.

² Thucyd. l. i. p. 16. et seq.

³ For the Peloponnesian war we have not, indeed, a full stream of history, but a regular series of annals in Thucydides and Xenophon; authors of whom each might say,

Quæque inæ miserrima vidi,

Et quorum pars magna fui:—

Many material circumstances may likewise be learned from the Greek orators, the writings of Plato and Aristotle, the comedies of Aristophanes, the twelfth and two following books of Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch's Lives of Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades, Lysander, and Agesilaus. It is remarkable, that the heavy compiler, as well as the lively biographer, have both followed the long lost works of Ephorus and Theopompus, in preference to those of Thucydides and Xenophon; a circumstance which strongly marks their want of judgment, but which renders their information more interesting to posterity.

⁴ Schol. in Thucyd. ad locum. He mentions the other circumstances which I have introduced into the text, and which will afterwards be confirmed by more classic authority.

ance of enjoying the immunities and honours of a republic whose safety they had ventured to defend. Many exiles and military adventurers, at all times profusely scattered over Greece, obeyed the welcome summons. Public assistance, likewise, was obtained, not only from Thebes and Megara, but from several states of the Peloponnesus. In this manner the Corinthians were speedily enabled to fit out an armament of seventy-five sail; which, directing its course toward Epidamnus, anchored in the Ambracian gulf, near the friendly harbour of Actium, where, in a future age, Augustus and Antony decided the empire of the Roman world. Near this celebrated scene of action, the impetuous Corcyreans hastened to meet the enemy. Forty ships were employed in the siege of Epidamnus. Twice that number sailed towards the Ambracian gulf. The hostile armaments fought with equal animosity; but the Corcyreans far surpassed in bravery and skill. Fifteen Corinthian vessels were destroyed; the rest escaped in disorder, and the decisive battle was soon followed by the surrender of Epidamnus. By a clemency little expected from the victors, the ancient inhabitants of the place were allowed their lives and liberties; but the Corinthians were made prisoners of war, and their allies condemned to death.

The Corcyreans thanked their gods, and erected a conspicuous trophy of victory on the promontory of Leucimné, whose lofty ridges

A. C. overlooked the distant scene of the engagement. During the two following years they reigned undisturbed masters of the neighbouring seas; and though a principle of fear, or perhaps a faint remnant of respect towards their ancient metropolis, prevented them from invading the territory of Corinth, they determined to make the confederates of that republic feel the full weight of their vengeance. For this purpose they ravaged the coast of Appollonia; plundered the city Ambracia; almost desolated the peninsula, now the island of Leucas; and, emboldened by success, ventured to land in the Peloponnesus, and set fire to the harbour of Cyllene, because in the late sea-fight the Elians, to whom that place belonged, had supplied Corinth with a few galleys.⁵

The southern states of Greece, highly provoked by this outrage to the peaceable Elians, whose religious character had long commanded general respect, were still farther incensed by the active resentment of the Corinthians, who, exasperated at the disgrace of being vanquished by one of their own colonies, had, ever since their defeat, bent their whole attention, and employed the greatest part even of their private fortunes, to hire mercenaries, to gain allies, and especially to equip a new fleet, that they might be enabled to chastise the impious audacity (as they called it) of their rebellious children.⁶

The magistrates of Corcyra saw and dreaded the tempest that threatened to burst on them, and which the unassisted strength of their island was totally unable to resist. They had not

taken part in the late wars; they had not acceded to the last treaty of peace; they could not summon the aid of a single confederate. In this difficulty they sent ambassadors to Athens, well knowing the secret animosity between that republic and the enemies by whom their own safety was endangered. The Corinthians likewise sent ambassadors to defeat their purpose. Both were allowed a hearing in the Athenian assembly; but first the Corcyreans, who in a studied oration, acknowledged, "that having no previous claim of merit to urge, they expected not success in their negotiation, unless an alliance between Athens and Corcyra should appear alike advantageous to those who proposed, and to those who accepted it. Of this the Athenians would immediately become sensible, if they reflected that the people of Peloponnesus being equally hostile to both (the open enemies of Corcyra, the secret and more dangerous enemies of Athens,) their country must derive a vast accession of strength by receiving, without trouble or expense, a rich and warlike island, which, unassisted and alone, had defeated a numerous confederacy; and whose naval force, augmenting the fleet of Athens, would for ever render that republic sovereign of the seas. If the Corinthians complained of the injustice of receiving their colony, let them remember, that colonies are preserved by moderation, and alienated by oppression; that men settle in foreign parts to better their situation, not to submit their liberties; to continue the equals, not to become the slaves of their less adventurous fellow-citizens. If they pretended, that the demand of Corcyra was inconsistent with the last general treaty of peace, let the words of that treaty confound them, which expressly declare every Grecian city, not previously bound to follow the standard of Athens or of Sparta, at full liberty to accede to the alliance of either of those powers.⁷ But it became the dignity of Athens to expect honour and safety, not from the punctilious observance of a slippery convention, but from the manly and prompt vigour of her councils. It suited the renowned wisdom of a republic, which had ever anticipated her enemies, to prevent the fleet of Corcyra from falling a prey to that confederacy, with whose inveterate envy she herself must be soon called to contend; and to merit the useful gratitude of an island possessing other valuable advantages, and most conveniently situated for intercepting the Sicilian and Italian supplies, which, in the approaching and inevitable war, would otherwise so powerfully assist their Doric ancestors of Peloponnesus."

The Corinthians indirectly answered this discourse by inveighing, with great bitterness, against the unexampled insolence and unnatural cruelty of Corcyra: "That infamous island had hitherto declined connection with every Grecian state, that she might carry on her piratical depredations unobserved, and alone enjoy the spoil of the unwary mariners who approached her inhospitable shores. Rendered at once wealthy and wicked by this inhuman

⁵ Thucyd. l. i. p. 22. et seq.

⁶ Idem, ibid.

⁷ Εἰρηται γὰρ ἐν αὐταῖς, τὸν ἑλληνικὸν πόλεμον ἡγεῖται μηδὲν ἐκκαταλείπει, ἵνα μὴ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀντιπάλαισι ἐπὶ τῇ πόλει. The σκοπεῖται justifies the paraphrase in the text.

practice, the Corcyreans had divested themselves of all piety and gratitude towards their mother country, and imbrued their parricidal hands in their parent's blood. Their audacity having provoked a late vengeance, which they were unable to repel, they unseasonably sought protection from Athens, desiring those who were not accomplices of their injustice to participate their danger, and deluding them through the vain terror of contingent evil, into certain and immediate calamity; for such must every war be regarded, its event being always destructive, often fatal. The Corcyreans vainly chicaned as to *words*; Athens, it was clear, must violate the *sense* and *spirit* of the last treaty of peace, if she assisted the enemies of any contracting power. These fierce islanders acknowledged themselves a colony of Corinth, but pretended that settlements abroad owe nothing to those who established them, to those whose fostering care reared their infancy, from whose blood they sprung, by whose arms they have been defended. We affirm, on the contrary, (and appeal to you, Athenians! who have planted so many colonies,) that the mother country is entitled to that authority which the Corcyreans have long spurned, to that respect which their insolence now refuses and disdains: that it belongs to us, their metropolis, to be their leaders in war, their magistrates in peace; nor can you, Athenians! oppose our just pretensions, and protect our rebellious colony, without setting an example most dangerous to yourselves."

These sensible observations made a deep impression on the moderate portion of the assembly; but the speech of the Corcyreans was more congenial to the ambitious views of the republic, and the daring spirit of Pericles. He wished, however, to avoid the dishonour of manifestly violating the peace, and therefore advised his countrymen to conclude with Corcyra, not a general or complete alliance, but only a treaty of defence, which, in case of invasion, obliged the two states reciprocally to assist each other.

Olymp. lxxxvii. 1. This agreement was no sooner ratified than ten Athenian ships reinforced the fleets of Corcyra, stationed on the eastern coast of the island; because the Corinthians, with their numerous allies, already rendezvoused on the opposite shore of Epirus. The hostile armaments met in line of battle, near the small islands Sibota, which seem anciently to have been separated from the continent by the impetuosity of the deep and narrow sea between Epirus and Corcyra. The bold islanders, with a hundred and ten sail, furiously attacked the superior fleet of the Corinthians, which was divided into three squadrons; the Megareans and Ambracians on the right, the Elians and other allies in the centre, their own ships on the left, which composed the principal strength of their line. The narrowness of the strait, and the immense number of ships (far greater than had ever assembled in former battles between the Greeks,) soon rendered it impossible, on either side, to display any superiority in sailing, or any address in manœuvre. The action was irregular

and tumultuous, and maintained with more firmness and vigour than naval skill. The numerous troops, both heavy and light-armed, who were placed on the decks, advanced, engaged, grappled, and fought with obstinate valour; while the ships, continuing motionless and inactive, made a sea-fight resemble a pitched battle. At length, twenty Corcyrean galleys, having broken the left wing of the enemy, and pursued them to the coast of Epirus, injudiciously landed there to burn or plunder the Corinthian camp.

This inessential service too much weakened the smaller fleet, and rendered the inequality decisive. The Corcyreans were defeated with great slaughter, their incensed adversaries disregarding plunder and prisoners, and only thirsting for blood and revenge. In the blindness of their rage they destroyed many of their fellow citizens, who had been captured by the enemy in the beginning of the engagement. Nor was their loss of ships inconsiderable; thirty were sunk, and the rest so much shattered, that when they endeavoured to pursue the feeble remains of the Corcyrean fleet, which had lost seventy galleys, they were effectually prevented from executing this design by the small Athenian squadron, which, according to its instructions from the republic, had taken no share in the battle, but, agreeably to the recent treaty between Athens and Corcyra, hindered the total destruction of their allies, first by hostile threats, at length by actual resistance.

The Corinthians having dragged up their wreck, and recovered the bodies of their slain, refitted on the coast of Epirus, and hastened to Corcyra; considerably off which they beheld the enemy reinforced, and drawn up in line of battle, in order to defend their coast. They advanced, however, with intrepidity, till, to their surprise and terror, they perceived an unknown fleet pressing towards them. This new appearance shook their resolution, and made them change their course. The Corcyreans, whose situation at first prevented them from seeing the advancing squadron, were astonished at the sudden retreat of the enemy; but when they discovered its cause, their uncertainty and fears, increased by their late afflicting calamity, made them prefer the safest measure. They also turned their prows; and, while the Corinthians retired to Epirus, pressed in an opposite direction to Corcyra. There, to their inexpressible joy, not unmixed with shame, they were joined by the unknown fleet, consisting of twenty Athenian galleys; a reinforcement which enabled them, next morning, to brave the late victorious armament off the coast of Sibota, a deserted harbour of Epirus, opposite to the small islands of the same name.

The Corinthians, unwilling to contend with the unbroken vigour of their new opponents, despatched a brigantine with the following remonstrance: "You act most unjustly, men of Athens! in breaking the peace, and commencing unprovoked hostilities. On what pretence do you hinder the Corinthians from taking vengeance on an insolent foe? If you are determined to persist in iniquity and cruelty, seize

us who address you, and treat us as enemies." The words were scarcely ended when the Corcyreans exclaimed, with a loud and unanimous voice, "Seize, and kill them." But the Athenians answered with moderation: "Men of Corinth, we neither break the peace, nor act unjustly. We come to defend our allies of Corcyra: sail unmolested by us to whatever friendly port you deem most convenient; but if you purpose making a descent on Corcyra, or on any of the dependencies of that island, we will exert our utmost power to frustrate your attempt."¹

This menace, which prevented immediate hostility, did not deter the Corinthians from surprising, as they sailed homeward, the town of Anactorium, on the Ambracian gulf, which, in the time of harmony between the colony and parent state, had been built at the joint expense of Corinth and Corcyra. From this sea-port they carried off two hundred and fifty Corcyrean citizens, and eight hundred slaves. The former, added to the captives saved during the fury of the sea-fight, by the clemency or the avarice of a few Corinthian captains, made the whole prisoners of war amount to twelve hundred and fifty; a capture which, as we shall have occasion to relate, produced most important and lamentable consequences on the future fortune of Corcyra.

The Corinthians, having chastised the insolence of their revolted colony, had reason to dread the vengeance of its powerful ally. Impressed with this terror, they laboured with great activity and with unusual secrecy and

address, to find for the Athenian arms an employment still more interesting than the Corcyrean war.

A. C. 432. The domestic strength of Athens defied assault; but a people who, on the basis of a diminutive territory and scanty population, had reared such an extensive fabric of empire, might easily be wounded in their foreign dependencies, which, for obvious causes, were ever prone to novelty and rebellion. The northern shores of the Ægean sea, afterwards comprehended under the name of Macedon, and forming the most valuable portion of that kingdom, reluctantly acknowledged the stern authority of a sovereign whom they obeyed and detested. This extensive coast, of which the subsequent history will deserve our attention, composed, next to the Ægean islands and colonies of Asia, the principal foreign dominions of the Athenian republic. The whole country (naturally divided by the Thermaic and Strymonic gulfs into the provinces of Pieria, Chalcis, and Pangæus) stretched in a direct line only a hundred and fifty miles; but the winding intricacies of the coast, indented by two great, and by two smaller bays, extended three times that length; and almost every convenient situation was occupied by a Grecian sea-port. But neither the extent of above four hundred miles, nor the extreme populousness of the maritime parts, formed the chief importance of this valuable possession. The middle division, called the region of Chalcis,

because originally peopled by a city of that name in Eubœa, was equally fertile and delightful. The inland country, continually diversified by lakes, rivers, and arms of the sea, afforded an extreme facility of water carriage; Amphipolis, Acanthus, Potidæa, and many other towns, furnished considerable marts of commerce for the republics of Greece, as well as for the neighbouring kingdoms of Thrace and Macedon; and the constant demands of the merchant excited the patient industry of the husbandman. This beautiful district had, on one side, the black mountains of Pangæus, and on the other, the green vales of Pieria. The former, extending ninety miles towards the east and the river Nessus, abounded neither in corn nor pasture, but produced variety of timber proper for building ships; and the southern branches of the mountain contained rich veins of gold and silver, which were successively wrought by the Thracians and the Athenians, but of which the full value was first discovered by Philip of Macedon, who annually extracted from them the value of two hundred thousand pounds sterling.² The last and smallest division, Pieria, extended fifty miles along the Thermaic gulf to the confines of Thessaly and Mount Pindus. The towns of Pydna and Methoné enriched the shore with the benefits of arts and commerce. Nature had been peculiarly kind to the inland country, whose shady hills, sequestered walks and fountains, lovely verdure, and tranquil solitude, rendered it, in the fanciful belief of antiquity, the favourite haunt of the Muses; who borrowed from this district their favourite appellation of Pierides. According to the same poetical creed, these goddesses might well envy the mortal inhabitants, who led a pastoral life, enjoyed happiness, and are scarcely mentioned in history.

Such was the nature and such the divisions of a territory, which the policy and resentment of Corinth encouraged to successful rebellion against the sovereignty of Athens. Several maritime communities of the Chalcidicé³ took refuge within the walls of Olynthus, a town which they had built and fortified, at the distance of five miles from the sea, in a fertile and secure situation, between the rivers Olynthus and Amnion, which flow into the lake Bolyce, the inmost recess of the Toronaic gulf. The neighbouring city of Potidæa, a colony of Corinth, and governed by annual magistrates sent from the mother country, yet like most establishments in the Chalcidicé, a tributary confederate⁴ of Athens, likewise strengthened its walls, and prepared to revolt. But the Athenians anticipated this design, by sending a fleet of thirty sail, which having entered the harbour of Potidæa, commanded the citizens to

² Diodorus, l. xvi. p. 514.

³ In using the name of Chalcidicé I have followed the analogy of the Greek language rather than complied with custom; yet that part of the Macedonian coast, usually called the region of Chalcis, gave name to the province of Chalcidicé in Syria, as Strabo mentions in his sixteenth book; wherein he explains how the principal divisions of Syria, as well as Mesopotamia, came to be distinguished, after the conquests of Alexander, by Grecian appellations, borrowed from the geography described in the text.

⁴ Συμμεχὺς ὑποταγῆς. Thucydides.

¹ Thucydides, p. 37.

demolish their fortifications, to give hostages as security for their good behaviour, and to dismiss the Corinthian magistrates. The Potidæans artfully requested that the execution of these severe commands might be suspended until they had time to send ambassadors to Athens, and to remove the unjust suspicions of their fidelity.

The weakness or avarice of Ancestratus, the Athenian admiral, listened to this deceitful request, and, leaving the coast of

Olymp. request, and, leaving the coast of
lxxxvii. 2. Potidæa, directed the operations of
A. C. 432. his squadron against places of less

importance, not sparing the dependencies of Macedon. Meanwhile the Potidæans sent a public but illusive embassy to Athens, while one more effectual was secretly despatched to Corinth, and other cities of the Peloponnesus, from which they were supplied with two thousand men, commanded by the Corinthian Aristeus, a brave and enterprising general. These troops were thrown into the place during the absence of the Athenian fleet; and the Potidæans, thus reinforced, set their enemies at defiance. Alarmed by this intelligence; the Athenians fitted out a new fleet of forty sail, with a large body of troops, under the command of Callias; who, arriving on the coast of Macedon, found the squadron of Ancestratus employed in the siege of Pydna. Callias judiciously exhorted him to desist from that enterprise, comparatively of little importance, that the united squadrons might attack Potidæa by sea, while an Athenian army of three thousand citizens, with a due proportion of allies, assaulted it by land. This measure was adopted; but the spirit of the garrison soon offered them battle, almost on equal terms, though with unequal success. Callias however was slain, and succeeded by Phormio; who conducting a fresh supply of troops, desolated the hostile territory of Chalcis and Pieria; took several towns by storm; and, having ravaged the adjoining district, besieged the city of Potidæa.

While those transactions were carrying on in the north, the centre of Greece was shaken by the murmurs and complaints of the Corinthians and their Peloponnesian confederates, who lost all patience when their citizens were blocked up by an Athenian army. Accompanied by the deputies of several republics beyond the isthmus, who had recently experienced the arrogance of their imperious neighbour, they had recourse to Sparta, whose actual power and ancient renown justly merited the first rank in the confederacy, but whose measures were rendered slow and cautious by the foresight and peaceful counsels of the prudent Archidamus. When introduced into the Spartan assembly, the representatives of all the states inveighed, with equal bitterness, against the injustice and cruelty of Athens, while each described and exaggerated the weight of its pecu-

liar grievances. The Megareans complained that, by a recent decree of that stern unfeeling republic, they had been excluded from the ports and markets of Attica;² an exclusion which, considering the narrowness and poverty of their own rocky district, was equivalent to depriving them of the first necessities of life. The inhabitants of Ægina explained and lamented that, in defiance of recent and solemn treaties, and disregarding the liberal spirit of Grecian policy, the Athenians had reduced their unfortunate island into the most deplorable condition of servitude.

When other states had described their particular sufferings, the Corinthians last arose, and their speaker thus addressed the Lacedæmonian assembly: "Had we come hither, men of Lacedæmon! to urge our private wrongs, it might be sufficient barely to relate the transactions of the preceding and present years. The revolt of Corcyra, the siege of Potidæa, are facts which speak for themselves; but the thoughts of this assembly should be directed to objects more important than particular injuries, however flagrant and enormous. The *general* oppressive system of Athenian policy,—it is this which demands your most serious concern; a system aiming at nothing less than the destruction of Grecian freedom, which is ready to perish through your supine neglect. That moderation and probity, men of Sparta! for which your domestic counsels are justly famous, render you the dupes of foreign artifice, and expose you to become the victims of foreign ambition; which, instead of opposing with prompt alacrity, you have nourished by unseasonable delay; and, in consequence of this fatal error, are now called to contend, not with the infant weakness, but with the matured vigour of your enemies, those enemies, who, ever unsatisfied with their present measure of prosperity, are continually intent on some new project of aggrandizement. How different from *your* slow procrastination is the ardent character of the Athenians! Fond of novelty, and fertile in resources, alike active and vigilant, the accomplishment of one design leads them to another more daring. Desire, hope, enterprise, success, follow in rapid succession. Already have they subdued half of Greece; their ambition grasps the whole. Rouse, then, from your lethargy, defend your allies, invade Attica, maintain the glory of Peloponnesus, that sacred deposit, with which being entrusted by your ancestors, you are bound to transmit unimpaired to posterity."

² The Megareans were accused of ploughing some consecrated lands: they were accused of harbouring the Athenian slaves, fugitives, and exiles; other causes of complaint might easily have been discovered or invented by their powerful neighbours, who were provoked that such a small community on their frontier should uniformly spurn their authority. But the malignity of the comic writers of the times ascribed the severe decree against Megara to an event equally disgraceful to the morals of their country, and injurious to the honour of Pericles. The following verses are translated from the *Acharnenses* of Aristophanes:

Juvenes profecti Megaram ebrii auferunt
Simetham ex scortatione nobilem:
Megarensis hinc populus dolore perictus
Furatur Aspasie duo scorta haud impiger:
Hinc initium belli prorupit
Universis Græcis ob tres meretriculas.

¹ Plutarch (in Pericle) ascribes the backwardness of the Spartans to engage in war to the advice of their principal magistrates, bribed by Pericles, who wished to gain time for his military preparations; a report as improbable as another calumny, that they were bribed by their allies to take arms against Athens (Aristoph. in Pace.) The cause of their irresolution, assigned in the text, is confirmed by the subsequent behaviour of Archidamus.

Several Athenians, then residing on other business at Sparta, desired to be heard in defence of their country. Equity could not deny the request of these voluntary advocates, who spoke in a style well becoming the loftiness of their republic.³ With the pride of superiority, rather than the indignation of innocence, they affected to despise the false aspersions of their adversaries; and, instead of answering directly the numerous accusations against their presumptuous abuse of power, described, with swelling encomiums, "the illustrious and memorable exploits of their countrymen; exploits which had justly raised them to a pre-eminence, acknowledged by their allies, uncontested by Sparta, and felt by Persia. When it became the dignity of Greece to chastise the repeated insults of that ambitious empire, the Spartans had declined the conduct of a distant war; Athens had assumed the abandoned helm, and, after demolishing the cruel dominion of Barbarians, had acquired a just and lawful sway over the coasts of Europe and of Asia. The new subjects of the republic were long treated rather as fellow-citizens, than as tributaries and slaves. But it was the nature of man to revolt against the *supposed* injustice of his equals, rather than against the *real* tyranny of his masters. This circumstance, so honourable to Athenian lenity, had occasioned several unprovoked rebellions, which the republic had been compelled to punish with an exemplary severity. The apprehension of future commotions had lately obliged her to hold, with a firmer hand, the reins of government, and to maintain with armed power, an authority justly earned, and strictly founded in nature, of which it is an unalterable law, that the strong should govern the weak. If the Spartans, in violation of the right of treaties, thought proper to oppose this immovable purpose, Athens well knew how to redress her wrongs, and would, doubtless, uphold her empire with the same valour and activity by which it had been established."

Having heard both parties, the assembly adjourned, without forming any resolution. But next day, it appeared to be the prevailing opinion, that the arrogance and usurpation of Athens had already violated the peace, and that it became the prudence as well as the dignity of Sparta, no longer to defer hostilities. This popular current was vainly opposed by the experienced wisdom of king Archidamus, who still counselled peace and moderation, though his courage had been conspicuously distinguished in every season of danger. He exhorted his countrymen "not to rush blindly on war, without examining the resources of the enemy and their own. The Athenians were powerful in ships, in money, in cavalry, and in arms; of all which the Lacedæmonians were destitute, or at least, but feebly provided. Whatever provocation, therefore they had received, they ought in prudence to dissemble their resentment, until they could effectually exert their vengeance. The present crisis required negotiation; if that failed, the silent preparation of a few years would enable them to take the field with well-founded

hopes of redressing the grievances of their confederates." Had this moderate language made any impression on such an assembly, it would have been speedily obliterated by the blunt boldness of Sthenelaides, one of the Ephori, who closed the debate. "Men of Sparta! Of the long speeches of the Athenians I understand not the drift. While they dwell with studied eloquence on their own praises, they deny not their having injured our allies. If they behaved *well* in the Persian war, and now *otherwise*, their degeneracy is only the more apparent. But then, and now, we are still the same; and if we would support our character, we must not overlook their injustice. They have ships, money, and horses; but we have good allies, whose interests we must not abandon. Why do we deliberate, while our enemies are in arms? Let us take the field with speed, and fight with all our might." The acclamations of the people followed, and war was resolved.

This resolution was taken in the Olymp. fourteenth year after the conclusion lxxxvii. 2. of the general peace; but near a A. C. 431. twelvemonth elapsed before the properest measures for invading Attica could be finally adjusted among the discordant members of so numerous a confederacy. It consisted of all the seven republics of the Peloponnesus, except Argos and Achaia, the first of which from ambition, and the second perhaps from moderation,⁴ preserved, in the beginning of the war, a suspicious neutrality. Of the nine northern republics, Acarnania alone declined joining the allies, its coast being particularly exposed to the ravages of the Corcyrean fleets. The cities of Naupactus and Platæa, for reasons that will soon appear, were totally devoted to their Athenian protectors; whose cause was likewise embraced by several petty princes of Thessaly. But all the other states beyond the isthmus longed to follow the standard of Sparta, and to humble the aspiring ambition of their too powerful neighbour.

The representatives of these various communities having, according to the received practice of Greece, assembled in the principal city of the confederacy, were strongly encouraged by the Corinthians, who, as their colony of Potidæa was still closely besieged, laboured to accelerate reprisals on Attica, by exhibiting the most advantageous prospect of the approaching war. They observed, "That the army of the confederacy, exceeding sixty thousand men, far outnumbered the enemy, whom they excelled still more in merit, than they surpassed in number. The one was composed of national troops, fighting for the independence of those countries in whose government they had a share; the other chiefly consisted in vile mercenaries, whose pay was their government and their country. If supplies of money were requisite, the allied states would doubtless be more liberal and forward to defend their interest and honour, than the reluctant tributaries of Athens to rivet their servitude and chains: and if still more

³ Thucyd. l. xliii. et seq.

⁴ The ambition of Argos is confirmed by the subsequent measures of that republic; the moderation of Achaia is suspected, from the nature of the Achaean laws which will afterwards be described

money should be wanted, the Delphic and Olympic treasures afforded an inexhaustible resource, which could not be better expended than in defending the sacred cause of justice and of Grecian freedom." In order to gain full time, however, for settling all matters among themselves, the confederates despatched to Athens various overtures of accommodation, which they well knew would be indignantly rejected. In each embassy they rose in their demands, successively requiring the Athenians to raise the siege of Potidæa; to repeal their prohibitory decree against Megara; to withdraw their garrison from Ægina; in fine, to declare the independence of their colonies.¹

These last demands were heard at Athens with a mixture of rage and terror. The capricious multitude, who had hitherto approved and admired the aspiring views of Pericles, now trembled on the brink of the precipice to which he had conducted them. They had hitherto pushed the siege of Potidæa with great vigour, but without any near prospect of success. They must now contend with a numerous confederacy, expose their boasted grandeur to the doubtful chance of war, and exchange the amusements and pleasures of the city for the toils and hardships of a camp. Of these discontented murmurs the rivals and enemies of Pericles greedily availed themselves, to traduce the character and administration of that illustrious statesman. It was insinuated, that, sacrificing to private passion the interest of his country, he had enacted the imperious decree, of which the allies so justly complained, to resent the personal injury of his beloved Aspasia, whose family had been insulted by some licentious youths of Megara.² Diopithes, Dracontides, and other demagogues, derided the folly of taking arms on such a frivolous pretence, and as preparatory to the impeachment of Pericles himself, the courts of justice were fatigued with prosecutions of his valuable friends.

The philosopher Anaxagoras, and Phidias the statuary, reflected more lustre than they could derive from the protection of any patron. The mixed character of Aspasia was of a more doubtful kind. To the natural and sprightly graces of Ionia, her native country, she added extraordinary accomplishments of mind and body; and having acquired in high perfection the talents and excellences of the other sex, was accused of being too indifferent to the honour of her own. Scarcely superior in modesty to Phryné, Thais, or Erigoné,³ her wit, her knowledge, and her eloquence, excited universal ad-

miration or envy,⁴ while the beauty of her fancy and of her person inspired more tender sentiments into the susceptible breast of Pericles. She was reproached, not with entertaining free votaries of pleasure in her family (which in that age was regarded as a very allowable commerce,) but of seducing the virtue of Athenian matrons; a crime severely punished by the laws of every Grecian republic. But we have reason to conclude her innocent, since the arguments and tears of her lover saved her from the fury of an enraged populace, at a crisis when his most strenuous exertions could not prevent the banishment of Anaxagoras and Phidias.

The former was accused of propagating doctrines inconsistent with the established religion; the latter of having indulged the very pardonable vanity (as it should seem) of representing himself, and his patron, on the shield of his admired statue of Minerva. There, with inimitable art, Phidias had engraved the renowned victory of the Athenians over the warlike daughters of the Thermodon;⁵ he had delineated himself in the figure of a bald old man raising a heavy stone (an allusion to his skill in architecture,) while the features of Pericles were distinguished in the countenance of an Athenian chief, bravely combating the queen of the Amazons, though his elevated arm hid part of the face, and in some measure concealed the resemblance.⁶ For this fictitious crime, Phidias was driven from a city which had been adorned by the unwearied labours of his long life, and debarred beholding those wonders of art which his sublime genius had created.

The accusation of the principal friends of Pericles paved the way for his own. He was reproached with embezzling the public treasure; but, on this occasion, plain facts confounded the artifices of his enemies. It was proved, that his private expenses were justly proportioned to the measure of his patrimony; many instances were brought of his generous contempt of wealth in the service of his country; and it appeared, after the strictest examination, that his fortune had not increased since he was intrusted with the exchequer. This honourable display of unshaken probity, which had ever formed the basis of the authority⁷ of Pericles, again reconciled to him the unsteady affections of his countrymen, and gave irresistible force to that famous and fatal speech, which unalterably decided the war of Peloponnesus.

"Often have I declared, Athenians! that we

¹ Besides complying with the demands mentioned in the text, the Athenians were required "to expel the descendants of those impious men who had profaned the temple of Minerva." This alluded to an event which happened the first year of the 45th Olympiad, or 598 years before Christ. Cylon, a powerful Athenian, having seized the citadel, and aspiring at royalty, was defeated in his purpose by Megacles, a maternal ancestor of Pericles, who having decoyed the associates of Cylon from the temple of Minerva, butchered them without mercy, and with too little respect for the privileges of that venerable sanctuary. The whole transaction is particularly related by Plutarch in his life of Solon. The renewal of such an antiquated complaint, at this juncture, pointed particularly at Pericles, and showed the opinion which the Spartans entertained of his unrivalled influence and authority.

² See above, p. 186

³ See above, p. 175.

⁴ Plato in Menex.

⁵ Lysias Orat. Funeb.

⁶ Plut. in Pericl. et Aristot. de Mund.

⁷ This testimony, which is given by the impartiality of Thucydides, destroys at once the numerous aspersions of the comic poets of the times, which have been copied by Plutarch, and from him transcribed by modern compilers. Pericles, it is said, raised the war of Peloponnesus, merely for his own convenience and safety; and was encouraged to this measure by the advice of his kinsman Alcibiades, then a boy; who, calling one day at his house, was refused admittance, "because Pericles was occupied in considering how he might best state his accounts." "Let him rather consider," said the sagacious stripling, "how to give no account at all." Pericles took the hint, and involved his country in a war, which allowed no time for examining the public expenditure. Such anecdotes may amuse those who can believe them.

must not obey the unjust commands of our enemies. I am still firmly of that mind, convinced as I am of the dangerous vicissitudes of war and fortune; and that human hopes, designs, and pursuits, are all fleeting and fallacious. Yet, in the present crisis, necessity and glory should alike fix us to this immovable resolution. The decree against Megara, which the first embassy required us to repeal, is not the cause of that hostile jealousy which has long secretly envied our greatness, and which has now more openly conspired our destruction. Yet that decree, of which some men have spoken so lightly, involved the honour of our councils and the stability of our empire. By pusillanimously repealing it, we should have emboldened that malignant enmity, which, notwithstanding our proper firmness in the first instance, has yet successively risen to higher and more arbitrary demands; demands which merit to be answered, not by embassies, but by arms.

"The flourishing resources, and actual strength, of the republic, afford us the most flattering prospect of military success. Impregnable fortified by land, our shores are defended by three hundred gallees; besides a body of cavalry, to the number of twelve hundred, together with two thousand archers, we can immediately take the field with thirteen thousand pikemen, without draining our foreign garrisons, or diminishing the complete number of sixteen thousand men who defend the walls and fortresses in Attica. The wealthy seaports of Thrace and Macedon; the flourishing colonies of Iona, Eolia, and Doria; in a word the whole extensive coast of the Asiatic peninsula, acknowledge by annual contributions, the sovereignty of our guardian navy, whose strength is increased by the ships of Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, while the smaller islands furnish us, according to their ability, with money and troops. Athens thus reigns queen of a thousand tributary republics, and notwithstanding the expenses incurred by the siege of Potidæa, and the architectural ornaments of the city, she possesses six thousand talents in her treasury.

"The situation of our enemies is totally the reverse. Animated by rage, and emboldened by numbers, they may be roused to a transient, desultory assault; but destitute of resources, and divided in interests, they are totally incapable of any steady, persevering exertion. With sixty thousand men they may enter Attica; and if our unseasonable courage gives them an opportunity, may win a battle; but unless our rash imprudence assists and enables them, they cannot possibly prosecute a successful war. Indeed, Athenians! I dread less the power of the enemy, than your own ungovernable spirit. Instead of being seduced from your security, by a vain desire to defend, against superior numbers, your plantations and villas in the open country, you ought to destroy these superfluous possessions with your own hands. To you who receive the conveniences of life from so many distant dependencies, the devastation of Attica is a matter of small moment; but how can

your enemies repair, how can they survive, the devastation of the Peloponnesus? How can they prevent, or remedy, this fatal, this intolerable calamity, while the squadrons of Athens command the surrounding seas? If these considerations be allowed their full weight; if reason, not passion, conducts the war, it seems scarcely in the power of fortune to rob you of victory. Yet let us answer the Peloponnesians with moderation, "that we will not forbid the Megareans our ports and markets, if the Spartans, and other states of Greece, abolish their exclusive and inhospitable laws: that we will restore independent governments to such cities as were free at the last treaty of peace, provided the Spartans engage to follow our example: that we are ready to submit all differences to the impartial decision of any equitable tribunal; and that, although these condescending overtures be rejected, we will not commence hostilities, but are prepared to repel them with our usual vigour." The assembly murmured applause; a decree was proposed and ratified; the ambassadors returned home with the reply dictated by Pericles; which, moderate as it seemed to the Athenian statesman, sounded like an immediate declaration of war to the Spartans and their allies.

Olymp. Six months after the battle of
lxxxvii. 2. Potidæa, the Thebans, who were
A. C. 431. the most powerful and the most
May 7th. daring of these allies, undertook a
military enterprise against the small
but magnanimous republic of Platæa. Though
situate in the heart of Boeotia, amidst numerous and warlike enemies, the Platæans still preserved an unshaken fidelity to Athens, whose toils and triumphs they had shared in the Persian war. Yet even this feeble community, surrounded on every side by hostile Boeotians, was not exempted from domestic discord. Naucrides, the perfidious and bloody leader of an aristocratical faction, engaged to betray the Platæan gates to a body of foreign troops, provided they enabled him to overturn the democracy, and to take vengeance on his political adversaries, whom he regarded as his personal foes. Eurymachus, a noble and wealthy Theban, with whom, in the name of his associates, this sanguinary agreement had been contracted, entered Platæa with three hundred of his countrymen, at the first watch of the night; but, regardless of their promise to Naucrides, who expected that they would break tumultuously into the houses, and butcher his enemies, the Thebans formed regularly in arms, and remained quietly in the market-place, having issued a proclamation to invite all the citizens indiscriminately to become allies to Thebes. The Platæans readily accepted a proposal, which delivered them from the terror of immediate death. But while they successively ratified the agreement, they observed, with mixed

8 Aristoph. Vesp. He says, that twenty thousand Athenians might live as in the Elysian fields, if each tributary city undertook to provide for twenty citizens. V. 705, &c.

9 In examining the speech ascribed to Pericles, on this occasion, by Thucydides, the attentive reader will perceive that it supposes the knowledge of several events omitted in the preceding narrative of that historian, but which are carefully related in the text. The English Speech is shorter than the Greek, but contains more information, collected from Plutarch, Diodorus, Aristophanes, and the 2nd book of Thucydides himself.

shame and joy, that darkness and surprise had greatly augmented the number of the conspirators. Encouraged by this discovery, they secretly despatched a messenger to Athens; and, while they expected the assistance of their distant protector, determined to leave nothing untried for their own deliverance.

The night was spent in an operation not less daring than extraordinary. As they could not assemble in the streets without alarming suspicion, they dug through the interior walls of their houses, and fortified the outward in the best manner the time would allow, with their ploughs, carts, and other instruments of husbandry. Before day-break the work was complete; when, with one consent, they rushed furiously against the enemy, the women and children animating with horrid shrieks and gestures the efforts of their rage. It was night, and a storm of rain and thunder augmented the gloomy terrors of the battle. The Thebans were unacquainted with the ground; above a hundred fell; near two hundred fled in trepidation to a lofty and spacious tower adjoining the walls, which they mistook for one of the gates of the city. In the first movements of resentment, the Plataeans prepared to burn them alive; but a moment's reflection deterred them from this dangerous cruelty. Meanwhile a considerable body of Thebans advanced towards Plataea, to co-operate with their countrymen. Their progress would have been hastened by a fugitive who met them, and related the miscarriage of the enterprise, had not the heavy rain so much swelled the Asopus, that an unusual time was spent in crossing that river. They had scarcely entered the Platæan territory, when a second messenger informed them, that their unfortunate companions were all killed or taken prisoners. Upon this intelligence they paused to consider, whether, instead of proceeding to the Platæan walls, where they could not perform any immediate service, they ought not, as an easier enterprise, to seize the citizens of that place, who were dispersed over their villages in the open country.

But while they deliberated on this measure, a Platæan herald arrived, complaining of the unjust and most unexpected infraction of the peace, by a daring and atrocious conspiracy; commanding the Thebans immediately to leave the territory of Plataea, if they hoped to deliver their fellow citizens from captivity; and denouncing, if they refused compliance, that their countrymen would inevitably be punished with a cruel death. This stratagem, not less audacious than artful, prevailed on the enemy to re-pass the Asopus, while the Plataeans lost not a moment to assemble within their walls the scattered inhabitants of their fields and villas; and braving the Theban resentment, the immediate effects of which they had rendered impotent, massacred the unhappy prisoners, to the number of a hundred and eighty, among whom was Eurymachus, the chief promoter of the expedition. After this signal act of vengeance, they strengthened the works of the place; transported their wives and children to the tributary islands of Athens; and that they might more securely sustain the expected siege, required

and received from that republic a plentiful supply of provisions, and a considerable reinforcement of troops.

A. C. 431. The sword was now drawn, and both parties seemed eager to exert their utmost strength. The Spartans summoned their confederates to the Isthmus; demanded money and ships from their Italian and Sicilian colonies; and solicited assistance from the Persian monarch Artaxerxes, and from Perdiccas king of Macedon; both of whom naturally regarded the Athenians as dangerous neighbours, and ambitious invaders of their coasts. The people of Athens also condescended to crave the aid of Barbarians, and actually contracted an alliance with Sitalces, the warlike chief of the Odrysians, who formed the most powerful tribe in upper Thrace. They required at the same time an immediate supply of cavalry from their Thessalian allies, while their fleet already cruised along the coast of Peloponnesus, to confirm the fidelity of the surrounding islands; an object deemed essential to the successful invasion of that territory. The unexperienced youth, extremely numerous in most republics of Greece, rejoiced at the prospect of war. The aged saw and dreaded the general commotion, darkly foretold, as they thought, by ancient oracles and prophecies, but clearly and recently announced, by an earthquake in the sacred, and hitherto immovable island of Delos. Such was the ardour of preparation, that only a few weeks after the surprise of Plataea, the Lacedæmonian confederates to the number of sixty thousand, assembled from the north and south, at the Corinthian Isthmus. The several communities were respectively commanded by leaders of their own appointment; but the general conduct of the war was intrusted to Archidamus, the Spartan king.

In a council of the chiefs, that prince warmly approved their alacrity in taking the field, and extolled the greatness and bravery of an army, the most numerous and best provided that had ever followed the standard of any Grecian general. Yet their preparations, however extraordinary, were not greater than their enterprise required. They had waged war with a people not less powerful, than active and daring; who had discernment to perceive, and ability to improve, every opportunity of advantage; and whose resentment would be as much inflamed, as their pride would be wounded, by the approach of invasion and hostility. It seemed probable, that the Athenians would not allow their lands to be wasted, without attempting to defend them. The confederates, therefore, must be always on their guard; their discipline must be strict, regular, and uniform; to elude the skill, and to oppose the strength of Athens, demanded their utmost vigilance and activity.

Archidamus, after leading his army into Attica, seems blamable in allowing their martial ardour to evaporate in the fruitless siege of Oenoe, the strongest Athenian town towards the southern frontier of Boeotia. This tedious and unsuccessful operation enabled the Athenians to complete, without interruption, the singular plan of defence so ably traced by the

bold genius of Pericles. They hastened the desolation of their own fields; demolished their delightful gardens and villas, which it had been their pride to adorn; and transported, either to Athens or the isles, their valuable effects, their cattle, furniture, and even the frames of their houses. The numerous inhabitants of the country towns, and villages, where the more opulent Athenians commonly spent the greater part of their time, flocked to the capital, which was well furnished with the means of subsistence, though not of accommodation, for such a promiscuous crowd of strangers, with their families, slaves, or servants. Many people of lower rank, destitute of private dwellings, were obliged to occupy the public halls, the groves and temples, the walls and battlements. Even persons of distinction were narrowly and meanly lodged; an inconvenience severely felt by men accustomed to live at large in the country, in rural ease and elegance. But resentment against the public enemy blunted the sense of personal hardship, and silenced the voice of private complaint.

Mean while, the confederate army, having raised the siege of CEnoé, advanced along the eastern frontier of Attica; and, within eighty days after the surprise of Plataea, invaded the Olymp. Thriasian plain, the richest ornament of the Athenian territory.

lxxxvii. 2. Having wasted that valuable district with fire and sword, they proceeded to Eleusis, and from thence to Acharnæ, the largest borough in the province, and only eight miles distant from the capital. There they continued an unusual length of time, gradually demolishing the houses and plantations, and daily exercising every act of rapacious cruelty, with a view either to draw the enemy to a battle, or to discover whether they were unalterably determined to keep within their walls; a resolution, which, if clearly ascertained, would enable the invaders to proceed with more boldness and effect, and to carry on their ravages with security, even to the gates of Athens.

The Athenians, hitherto intent on their naval preparations, had exerted an uncommon degree of patience and self-command. But their unruly passions could no longer be restrained, when they learned the proceedings in Acharnæ. The proprietors of that rich and extensive district boasted that they alone could send three thousand brave spearmen into the field, and lamented, that they should remain cooped up in dishonourable confinement, while their possessions fell a prey to a hostile invader. Their animated complaints inflamed the kindred ardour of the Athenian youth. It appeared unworthy of those, who had so often ravaged with impunity the territories of their neighbours, patiently to behold the desolation of their own. Interested priests announced approaching calamity; seditious orators clamoured against the timid councils of Pericles; the impetuous youth required their general to lead them to battle. Amidst this popular commotion, the accomplished general and statesman remained unmoved, bravely resisting the storm, or dexterously eluding its force. Though de-

termined not to risk an engagement with the confederates, he seasonably employed the Athenian and Thessalian cavalry to beat up their quarters, to intercept their convoys, to harass, surprise, or cut off their advanced parties. While these enterprises tended to divert or appease the tumult, a fleet of a hundred and fifty sail ravaged the defenceless coast of Peloponnesus. A squadron, less numerous, made a descent on Locris. The rebellious inhabitants of Ægina were driven from their possessions, and an Athenian colony was settled in that island. The wretched fugitives, whose country had long rivalled Athens itself in wealth, commerce, and naval power, received the maritime district of Thyrea¹ from the bounty of their Spartan protectors.

Intelligence of these proceedings, and still more the scarcity of provisions, engaged the confederates to return to their respective republics. Having advanced by the eastern, they retired along the western, frontier of Attica; every place in their line of march experiencing the fatal effects of their resentment or rapacity. Soon after their retreat, Pericles, towards the beginning of autumn, led out the Athenians to ravage the neighbouring and hostile province of Megara. The invading army was accidentally observed by the fleet, while it returned from the coast of Peloponnesus. The sailors hastened to share the danger and plunder. The whole Athenian force thus amounted to near twenty thousand men; a number far more than sufficient to deprive the industrious Megarians of the hope of a scanty harvest, earned with infinite toil and care, in their narrow unfruitful territory.

The winter was not distinguished by any important expedition on either side. The Corinthians, long inured to the sea in all seasons, carried on indecisive hostilities against the Athenian allies in Acarnania. During this inactive portion of the year, the Athenians, as well as their enemies, were employed in celebrating the memory of the dead, with much funeral pomp, and high encomiums on their valour;² in distributing the prizes of merit

¹ This district lay on the frontier of the Argive and Lacedæmonian territory, and was long an object of contention between those republics. See p. 89.

² This mournful solemnity, as practised by the Athenians, is described by Thucydides, l. ii. p. 120, et seq. The bones of the deceased were brought to a tabernacle previously erected for receiving them. On the day appointed for the funeral, they were conveyed from thence in cypress coffins, drawn on carriages, one for each tribe, to the public sepulchre in the Ceramicus, the most beautiful suburb of the city. The relations of the dead decked out the remains of their friends, as they judged most proper. (See Lysias against Agoratus.) One empty bier was drawn along in honour of those whose bodies had not been recovered. Persons of every age, and of either sex, citizens and strangers, attended this solemnity. When the bones were deposited in the earth, some citizen of dignity and merit, named by the state, mounted a lofty pulpit, and pronounced the panegyric of the deceased, of their ancestors, and the Athenian republic. On this occasion, Pericles himself had been appointed to that solemn office. He performed it with great dignity. His speech, containing almost as many ideas as words, is incapable of abridgment; nor does its nature admit the insertion of it entire in the present history, in which eloquence is merely considered as an instrument of government, and such speeches only introduced as influenced public resolutions and measures. It is, however, worthy of observation, that his magnificent display of the

among the surviving warriors; in confirming their respective alliances; and in fortifying such places on their frontier as seemed most exposed to military excursions, or naval descents.

The return of summer brought back into Attica the Peloponnesian invaders; but it likewise introduced a far more dreadful calamity.

A. C. 430. A destructive pestilence, engendered in Æthiopia, infected Egypt, and spread over great part of the dominions of the king of Persia. History does not explain by what means this fatal disorder was communicated to Greece. The year had been in other respects remarkably healthful. As the disease first appeared in the Piræus, the principal Athenian harbour, we may be allowed to conjecture, that it was imported from the east, either by the Athenian merchantmen, or by the ships of war, which annually sailed to that quarter, in order to levy money on the tributary cities. When its miserable symptoms broke out in the Piræus, the inhabitants suspected that the enemy had poisoned their wells. But it soon extended over the adjoining districts, and raged with peculiar violence in the populous streets which surrounded the citadel.

The malady appeared under various forms, in different constitutions; but its specific symptoms were invariably the same. It began with a burning heat in the head; the eyes were red and inflamed; the tongue and mouth had the colour of blood. The pain and inflammation descended to the breast with inexpressible anguish; the skin was covered with ulcers; the body of a livid red; the external heat not sensible to the touch, but the internal so violent, that the slightest covering could not be endured. An insatiable thirst was a universal symptom; and, when indulged, increased the disorder. When the bowels were attacked, the patient soon perished through debility. Some lived seven or nine days, and died of a fever, with apparent remains of strength. The life was saved, when the internal vigour diverted the course of the disease towards the extremities. Those who once recovered were never dangerously attacked a second time, from which they conceived a vain hope of proving thenceforth superior to every bodily infirmity. The disorder, which was always accompanied with an extreme dejection of spirits, often impaired the judgment, as well as the memory. All remedies, human and divine, were employed in vain to stop the progress of this fatal contagion. The miserable crowds expired in the temples, preferring unavailing prayers to the gods. A shocking spectacle was seen round the sacred fountains, where multitudes lay dead, or perishing in agonizing torture. At length all medical assistance was despised,¹ and all religious cere-

monies neglected. Continually suffering or apprehending the most dreadful calamities, the Athenians became equally regardless of laws human and divine. The fleeting moment only was theirs. About the future they felt no concern, nor did they believe it of concern to the gods, since all alike perished, guilty or innocent. Decency no longer imposing respect, the only pursuit was that of present pleasure. To beings of an hour, the dread of punishment formed no restraint; to victims of misery, conscience presented no terrors. Athens thus exhibited at once whatever is most afflicting in wretchedness, and most miserable in vice, uniting to the rage of disease the more destructive fury of unbridled passions.

While the city fell a prey to these accumulated evils, the country was laid waste by an implacable enemy. On the present Olymp. lxxxvii. 3. occasion, the confederates advanced beyond Athens; they destroyed A. C. 430. the works of the miners on Mount Laurium; and, having ravaged all that southern district, as well as the coast opposite to Eubœa and Naxos, they traced a line of devastation along the Marathonian shore, the glorious scene of an immortal victory, obtained by the valour of Athens, in defence of those very states by which her own territories were now so cruelly desolated.

If conscious wisdom and rectitude were not superior to every assault of fortune, the manly soul of Pericles must have sunk under the weight of such multiplied calamities. But his fortitude still supported him amidst the flood of public and domestic wo. With decent and magnanimous composure, he beheld the unhappy fate of his numerous and flourishing family, successively snatched away by the rapacious pestilence. At the funeral of the last of his sons, he dropped, indeed, a few reluctant tears of paternal tenderness. But, ashamed of this momentary weakness, he bent his undejected mind to the defence of the republic. Having collected a hundred Athenian, together with fifty Chian or Lesbian vessels, he sailed through the Saronic gulf, and ravaged the unprotected coasts of Elis, Argos, and Laconia. While this armament weighed anchor in the Piræus, there happened an eclipse of the sun,² which terrified the superstitious mariners, whose minds were already clouded by calamity. The pilot of the admiral's galley betrayed the most unmanly cowardice, when Pericles, throwing a cloak before his eyes, asked, whether the obscurity surprised him. The pilot answering him in the negative, "Neither," rejoined Pericles, "ought an eclipse of the sun, occasioned by the intervention of a revolving planet, which intercepts its light."

Having arrived on the Argolic coast, the

advantages, the security, and the glory of Athens, forms a striking contrast with the unexpected calamities which soon overwhelmed his unhappy country.

¹ The supposed decree of the Athenians in favour of Hippocrates, says, that his scholars showed the means both of preventing and curing the plague. *Ταῖς καὶ θεραπευτικαῖς μεθόδοις διαφεύγεσθαι τὸν λοιμὸν*; and again, *Ὅπως τὴν ἰατρικὴν δοῦναι μεθόδοις καὶ τοὺς καμνοντάς*. Hippocrates, p. 1200. This decree therefore, as well as the letters of Hippocrates, mentioning the plague of Athens, are unquestionably spurious. The malady is minutely described

by Thucydides, l. ii. c. xlvii. by Lucretius, l. vi. ver. 1136, et seq. Diodorus, l. xli. differs widely from them both, probably having copied from Ephorus and Theopompus. Hippocrates has several cases of the plague from Thasos, Abdera, &c. but not one from Athens. See Hippocrat. de Morbis Epidem.

² Plutarch. in Pericle. But as Thucydides mentions no such eclipse that summer, although extremely attentive in recording such phenomena, I would not warrant the chronology of Plutarch.

Athenians laid siege to the sacred city. Epidaurus, whose inhabitants gloried in the peculiar favour of Æsculapius. The plague again breaking out in the fleet, was naturally ascribed to the vengeance of that offended divinity. They raised the siege of Epidaurus; nor were their operations more successful against Trœzene, Hermioné, and other Peloponnesian cities. They took only the small fortress of Prasîæ, a sea-port of Laconia; after which they returned to the Piræus, afflicted with the pestilence, and without having performed any thing that corresponded to the greatness of the armament, or the public expectation.

The Athenian expedition into Thrace was still more unfortunate. Into that country Agnon conducted a body of four thousand men, to co-operate with Phormio in the siege of Potidæa. But in the space of forty days, he lost one thousand and fifty men in the plague; and the only consequence of his expedition was, to infect the northern army with that melancholy disorder.

These multiplied disasters reduced the Athenians to despair. Their sufferings exceeded example and belief, while they were deprived of the only expected consolation, the pleasure of revenge. The bulk of the people desired peace on any terms. Ambassadors were sent to Sparta, but not admitted to an audience. The orators clamoured, and traduced Pericles. The undiscerning populace ascribed their misfortunes to the unhappy effect of his councils; but his magnanimity did not yet forsake him, and, for the last time, he addressed the assembly: "Your anger, Athenians! occasions no surprise, because it comes not unexpected. Your complaints excite no resentment, because to complain is the right of the miserable. Yet as you mistake both the cause and the measure of your present calamity, I will venture to expose such dangerous, and, if not speedily corrected, such fatal errors. The justice and necessity of the war I have often had occasion to explain: it is just that you, who have protected and saved, should govern Greece; it is necessary, if you would assert your pre-eminence, that you should now resist the Peloponnesians. On maintaining this resolution, not your honour only, but your safety, depends. The sovereignty of Greece cannot, like an empty pageant of grandeur, be taken up with indifference, or without danger laid down. That well-earned dominion, which you have sometimes exercised tyrannically, must be upheld and defended, otherwise you must submit, without resource, to the resentment of your injured allies, and the animosity of your inveterate enemies. The hardships, to which you were exposed from the latter, I foresaw and foretold; the pestilence, that sudden and improbable disaster, it was impossible for human prudence to conjecture; yet great and unexpected as our calamities have been, and continue, they are still accidental and transitory, while the advantages of this necessary war are permanent, and its glory will be immortal. The greatness of that empire which we strive to uphold, extends beyond the territories of our most distant allies. Of

the two elements, destined for the use of men, the sea and the land, we absolutely command the one, nor is there any kingdom, or republic, or confederacy, that pretends to dispute our dominion. Let this consideration elevate our hopes; and personal afflictions will disappear at the view of public prosperity. Let us bear, with resignation, the strokes of providence; and we shall repel, with vigour, the assaults of your enemies. It is the hereditary and glorious distinction of our republic, never to yield to adversity. We have defied danger, expended treasure and blood; and, amidst obstinate and formidable wars, augmented the power, and extended the fame, of a city unrivalled in wealth, populousness, and splendour, and governed by laws and institutions worthy its magnificence and renown. If Athens must perish, (as what human grandeur is not subject to decay?) let her never fall, at least, through our pusillanimity; a fall that would cancel the merit of our former virtue, and destroy at once that edifice of glory which it has been the work of ages to rear. When our walls and harbours are no more; when the terror of our navy shall have ceased, and our external magnificence fallen to decay, the glory of Athens shall remain. This is the prize which I have hitherto exhorted, and still exhort you to defend, regardless of the clamours of sloth, the suspicions of cowardice, or the persecution of envy."

Such were the sentiments of Pericles, who, on this occasion, declared to his assembled countrymen, with the freedom of conscious merit, that he felt himself inferior to none in wisdom to discover, and abilities to explain and promote, the measures most honourable and useful; that he was a sincere and ardent lover of the republic, unbiassed by the dictates of selfishness, unseduced by the allurements of partiality, and superior to the temptations of avarice. The anger of the Athenians evaporated in imposing on him a small fine, and soon after they re-elected him general. The integrity and manly firmness of his mind restored the fainting courage of the republic. They rescued the dignity of Pericles from the rage of popular frenzy; but they could not defend his life against the infectious malignity of the pestilence. He died two years and six months after the commencement of the war. The character which he draws of himself is confirmed by the impartial voice of history, which adds a few circumstances fitted to confirm the texture of a virtuous and lasting fame. During the first invasion of the Peloponnesians, he declared that he would convey his extensive and valuable estate to the public, if it should be excepted from the general devastation, by the policy or the gratitude of Archidamus, his hereditary guest and friend.³ Yet this generous patriot lived with the most exemplary economy in his personal and domestic expense. His death-bed was surrounded by his numerous admirers, who dwelt with complacency on the illustrious exploits of his glorious life. While they recounted the wisdom of his government, and

enumerated the long series of his victories by sea and land, "You forget," said the dying statesman and sage, "you forget the only valuable part of my character: none of my fellow citizens were ever compelled, through any action of mine to assume a mourning robe."¹ He expired, teaching an invaluable lesson to human kind, that in the last important hour, when all other objects disappear, or lose their

value, the recollection of an innocent life is still present to the mind, and still affords consolation more valuable than Pericles could derive from his nine trophies erected over the enemies of his country, from his long and prosperous administration of forty years, the depth of his political wisdom, the perfection of his military and naval skill, and the immortal fame of his unrivalled eloquence.

CHAPTER XVI.

Subsequent Events of the War—Plataea taken—Revolt of Lesbos—Description and History of that Island—Nature of its political Connection with Athens—Address of Lesbos—Its Capital besieged by the Athenians—Measures of the Peloponnesians for relieving it—Mitylené surrenders—Deliberations in Athens concerning the Treatment of the Prisoners—Resettlement of the Affairs of Lesbos—The Corinthians foment Factions in Corcyra—Sedition in that Island—The contending Factions respectively supported by the Athenians and Peloponnesians—Progress, Termination, and Consequences of the Sedition.

THE dignity and vigour of the republic seemed to perish with Pericles, and several years elapsed scarcely distinguished by any event that tended to vary the uniformity, much less to decide the fortune of the war. While the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, the Athenian fleet annually ravaged the coast of Peloponnesus. In vain the inhabitants of that country, little accustomed to the sea, collected ships, and used their utmost endeavours to contend with the experienced skill of the Athenian mariners. They were always defeated, and often by an inferior force; one proof among many, that naval superiority is slowly acquired and slowly lost. Neither the Athenians nor the Peloponnesians derived any effectual assistance from their respective alliances with Sitalces and Perdiccas. The former, reinforced by many independent tribes of Thrace, who were allured to his standard by the hopes of plunder, poured down a hundred and fifty thousand men on the Macedonian coast. But a hasty agreement between the two kings dissipated that numerous and desultory band with the same rapidity with which it had been collected.²

One benefit, indeed, the Athenians received from Sitalces, if that can be reckoned a benefit, which enabled them to commit an action of atrocious cruelty: he put into their hands Aristæus, the Corinthian, a bold and determined enemy of their republic; and actually travelling through Thrace into Persia, to solicit money from Artaxerxes to support the war against them. Both Aristæus and his colleagues in the embassy suffered a painful and ignominious death.

The success of the adverse parties was equally balanced in the sieges of Potidæa and Plataea. The former, having surrendered on capitulation,

was occupied by new inhabitants. The expelled citizens retired to Olynthus and other places of the Chalcidicé, where they strengthened and exasperated the foes of Athens. Plataea also capitulated, after a long and spirited resistance during five years. Notwithstanding the warm and affecting remonstrances of the citizens who had acted such an illustrious part in the Persian war, when the Thebans behaved most disgracefully, the capitulation was shamefully violated by the Spartans, who sacrificed to the resentment of Thebes, the eternal enemy of Plataea, two hundred brave men, whose courage and fidelity merited a better fate. But the youth of Plataea still flourished in the bosom of Athens, and were destined, in a future age, to reassume the dignity of independent government, which always formed the highest ambition of their small but magnanimous community.

Among the transactions of this otherwise unimportant period, happened the revolt of Lesbos, and the sedition of Corcyra. Both events deeply affected the interest of Athens; and the former is distinguished by such circumstances as serve to explain the political condition of the times, while the latter exhibits a striking but gloomy picture of Grecian manners.

The island of Lesbos, extending above a hundred and fifty miles in circumference, is the largest, except Eubœa, in the Ægean sea. Originally planted by Eolians, Lesbos was the mother of many Eolic colonies. They were established on the opposite continent, and separated from their metropolis by a strait of seven miles, which expands itself into the gulf of Thebe, and is beautifully diversified by the Hecatonnesian and Arginussian isles, of old sacred to Apollo. The happy temperature of the climate of Lesbos conspired with the rich fertility of the soil to produce those delicious fruits, and those exquisite wines, which are still acknowledged by modern travellers to deserve

¹ Plat. in Pericl.

² Thucyd. p. 167—170.

the encomiums so liberally bestowed on them by ancient writers.³ The convenience of its harbours furnished another source of wealth and advantage to this delightful island, which, as early as the age of Homer, was reckoned populous and powerful, and, like the rest of Greece at that time, governed by the moderate jurisdiction of hereditary princes. The abuse of royal power occasioned the dissolution of monarchy in Lesbos, as well as in the neighbouring isles. The rival cities of Mitylené, and Methymna contended for republican pre-eminence. The former prevailed; and having reduced Methymna, as well as six cities of inferior note, began to extend its dominion beyond the narrow bounds of the island, and conquered a considerable part of Troas. Mean while the internal government of Mitylené was often disturbed by sedition, and sometimes usurped by tyrants. The wise Pittacus, contemporary and rival of Solon, endeavoured to remedy these evils by giving his countrymen a body of laws, comprised in six hundred verses, which adjusted their political rights, and regulated their behaviour and manners. The Lesbians afterwards underwent those general revolutions, to which both the islands and the continent of Asia Minor were exposed from the Lydian and Persian power. Delivered from the yoke of Persia by the successful valour of Athens and Sparta, the Lesbians, as well as all the Greek settlements around them, spurned the tyrannical authority of Sparta and Pausanias, and ranged themselves under the honourable colours of Athens, which they thenceforth continued to respect in peace, and to follow in war.

In the exercise of power the Athenians displayed principles totally different from those by which they had attained it. The confederacy between Athens and Lesbos was still supported, however, by mutual fear rather than by reciprocal affection. During peace, the Lesbians dreaded the navy of Athens; the Athenians feared to lose the assistance of Lesbos in war. Besides this, the Athenians were of the Ionic, the Lesbians of the Eolic, race; and the latter justly regretted that the allies of Athens should be successively reduced to the condition of subjects. They perceived the artful policy of that republic in allowing the Chians and Lesbians alone to retain the semblance of liberty. While the Chians and Lesbians, still free in appearance, assisted in subduing the other confederates of Athens, that ambitious republic was always furnished with a plausible justification of her general oppression and tyranny; since it was natural to imagine that men, left to the unrestrained liberty of choice, should, in matters indifferent to themselves, prefer the cause of justice to that of usurpation. But even the apparent freedom which the Lesbians enjoyed had become extremely precarious. They felt themselves under the disagreeable necessity to soothe, to bribe, and to flatter the Athenian demagogues, and in all their transactions with that imperious people, to testify the

most mortifying deference and submission. Notwithstanding their watchful attention never designedly to offend, they were continually endangered by the quarrelsome humour of a capricious multitude, and had reason to dread, lest, in consequence of some unexpected gust of passion, they should be compelled to demolish their walls, and to surrender their shipping, the punishment already inflicted on such of the neighbouring islands as had incurred the displeasure of Athens.

This uneasy situation naturally disposed the Lesbians, amidst the calamities of the second Peloponnesian invasion, heightened by the plague at Athens, to watch an opportunity to revolt. The following year was employed in assembling the scattered inhabitants of the island within the walls of Mitylené, in strengthening these walls, in fortifying their harbours, in augmenting their fleet, and in collecting troops and provisions from the fertile shores of the Euxine sea. But in the fourth year of the war, their design, yet unripe for execution, was made known to the Athenians by the inhabitants of Tenedos, the neighbours and enemies of Lesbos, as well as by the citizens of Methymna, the ancient rival of Mitylené, and by several malcontents in the Lesbian capital. Notwithstanding the concurrence of such powerful testimonies, the Athenian magistrates affected to disbelieve intelligence which their distressed circumstances rendered peculiarly alarming. The Lesbians, it was said, could never think of forsaking the alliance of a country, which had always treated them with such distinguished favour, how powerfully soever they might be urged to that measure by the Thebans, their Eolian brethren, and the Spartans, their ancient confederates. Ambassadors, however, were sent to Lesbos, desiring an explanation of rumours so dishonourable to the fidelity and gratitude of the island.

The ambassadors having confirmed the report, Athens equipped a fleet of forty sail, intending to attack the enemy by surprise, while they celebrated, with universal consent, the anniversary festival of Apollo, on the promontory of Malea. But this design was rendered abortive by the diligence of a Mitylenian traveller, who, passing from Athens to Eubœa, proceeded southward to Geraistos, and, embarking in a merchant vessel, reached Lesbos in less than three days from the time that he undertook this important service. His seasonable advice not only prevented the Mitylenians from leaving their city, but prepared them to appear, at the arrival of the enemy, in a tolerable posture of defence. This state of preparation enabled them to obtain from Cleippidas, the Athenian admiral, a suspension of hostilities, until they despatched an embassy to Athens, to remove, as they pretended, the groundless resentment of the people, and to give ample satisfaction to the magistrates.

On the part of the Lesbians, this transaction was nothing more than a contrivance to gain time. They expected no favour or forgiveness from the Athenian assembly; and while this

³ Mons. de Guys, Tournesfort, &c. agree with Horace (*passim*) and Strabo, l. xiii. p. 584—657. from which the following particulars in the text, concerning Lesbos, are extracted.

illusory negotiation was carrying on at Athens, other ambassadors went secretly to Sparta, requesting that the Lesbians might be admitted into the Peloponnesian confederacy, and thus entitled to the protection of that powerful league. The Spartans referred them to the general assembly, which was to be soon held at Olympia, to solemnize the most splendid of all the Grecian festivals. After the games were ended, and the Athenians, who little expected that such matters were in agitation, had returned home, the Lesbian ambassadors were favourably heard in a general convention of the Peloponnesian representatives or deputies, from whom they received assurance of immediate and effectual assistance.

This promise, however, was not punctually performed. The eyes of the Athenians were at length opened; and while the Peloponnesians prepared or deliberated, their more active enemies had already taken the field. Various skirmishes, in which the islanders showed little vigour in their own defence, engaged the neighbouring states of Lemnos and Imbros to send, on the first summons, considerable supplies of troops to their Athenian confederates; but as the combined forces were still insufficient completely to invest Mitylené, a powerful reinforcement was sent from Athens; and before the beginning of winter, the place was blocked up by land, while an Athenian fleet occupied the harbour.

The unfavourable season, and still more, that dilatoriness which so often obstructed the measures of the confederates, prevented timely aid from arriving at Mitylené. But in order to make a diversion in favour of their new allies, the Peloponnesians assembled a considerable armament at the isthmus, intending to convey their ships over land from Corinth to the sea of Athens, that they might thus infest the Athenian shores with their fleet, while the army carried on its usual ravages in the central parts of Attica. The activity of the Athenians defeated this design. Notwithstanding their numerous squadrons on the coasts of Peloponnesus, Thrace, and Lesbos, they immediately fitted out a hundred sail to defend their own shores. The Peloponnesian sailors, who had been hastily collected from the maritime towns, soon became disgusted with an expedition, attended with unforeseen difficulties; and, as autumn advanced, the militia from the inland country grew impatient to return to their fields and vineyards. During winter, the Mitylenians were still disappointed in their hope of relief. They were encouraged, however, to persevere in resistance, by the arrival of Salsæthus, a Spartan general of considerable merit, who having landed in an obscure harbour of the island, travelled by land towards Mitylené; and, during the obscurity of night, passed the Athenian wall of circumvallation, by favour of a breach made by a torrent. Salsæthus gave the besieged fresh assurances that a powerful fleet would be sent to their assistance early in the spring; and that, at the same time, the Athenians should be harassed by an invasion more terrible and destructive than any which they had yet experienced.

The latter part of the promise was indeed performed. The Peloponnesians invaded Attica. Whatever had been spared in former incursions, now fell a prey to their fury. But after the spring was considerably advanced, the long-expected fleet was looked for in vain. The same procrastination and difficulties still retarded the preparations of the confederates; and when at length forty sail were collected, the command was bestowed on the Spartan Alcidas, a man totally devoid of that spirit and judgment essential to the character of a naval commander. Instead of sailing directly to the relief of Mitylené, he wasted much precious time in pursuing the Athenian merchantmen, in harassing the unfortified islands, and in alarming the defenceless and unwarlike inhabitants of Ionia, who could scarcely recover from their astonishment, at seeing a Peloponnesian fleet in those seas. Many trading vessels, that sailed between the numerous islands and harbours on that extensive coast, fell into the hands of Alcidas; for when they descried his squadron, they attempted not to avoid it; many fearlessly approached it, as certainly Athenian. In consequence of this imprudence, Alcidas took a great number of prisoners, whom he butchered in cold blood at Myonesus.

This barbarity only disgraced himself, and injured the Spartan cause in Asia, many cities of which were previously ripe for revolt. Before he attempted to accomplish the main object of his expedition, the opportunity was for ever lost by the surrender of Mitylené. Despair of assistance, and scarcity of provisions, had obliged Salsæthus, who began himself by this time to suspect that the Peloponnesians had laid aside all thoughts of succouring the place, to arm the populace, in order to make a vigorous assault on the Athenian lines. But the lower ranks of men, who in Lesbos, as well as in all the Grecian isles, naturally favoured the cause of Athens, the avowed patron of democracy, no sooner received their armour, than they refused obeying their superiors, and threatened, that unless the corn were speedily brought to the market-place, and equally divided among all the citizens, they would instantly submit to the besiegers. The aristocratical party prudently yielded to the torrent of popular fury, which they had not strength to resist; and justly apprehensive, lest a more obstinate defence might totally exclude them from the benefit of capitulation, they surrendered to Paches, the Athenian commander, on condition that none of the prisoners should be enslaved or put to death, until their agents, who were immediately sent to implore the clemency of Athens, should return with the sentence of that republic.

The terms were accepted and ratified; but such were the furious resentments which prevailed in that age, such the dark suspicions, and such the total disregard to all laws of justice and humanity, that the Athenian army had

¹ He gave the populace, who were before light armed, heavy armour. Thucyd. p. 188. English cannot imitate his expression: *οπλαζει τον δημον προτερον ψιλον οντα.*

no sooner taken possession of the place, than the chief authors and abettors of the revolt, judging it imprudent to trust their safety to the faith of treaties, and the sanctity of oaths, flew for protection to their temples and altars. This unseasonable diffidence (for Paches appears to have united uncommon humanity with a daring spirit, and great military abilities) discovered conscious guilt, and enabled the Athenians to distinguish between their friends and enemies. The latter were protected by Paches, and prevailed on to withdraw from their sanctuaries. He afterwards sent them to the isle of Tenedos, until their fate, as well as that of their fellow citizens, should be finally determined by the Athenian republic.

Immediately after the arrival of the Mitylenian ambassadors, the people of Athens had assembled to deliberate on this important subject. Agitated by the giddy transports of triumph over the rebellious ingratitude and perfidy of a people, who, though distinguished by peculiar favours, had abandoned and betrayed their protectors in the season of danger, the Athenians doomed to death all the Mitylenian citizens, and condemned the women and children to perpetual servitude. In one day the bill was proposed, the decree passed, and the same evening a galley was despatched to Paches, conveying this cruel and bloody resolution. But the night left room for reflection; and the feelings of humanity were awakened by the stings of remorse. In the morning, having assembled, as usual, in the public square, men were surprised and pleased to find the sentiments of their neighbours exactly corresponding with their own. Their dejected countenances met each other; they lamented, with one accord, the rashness and ferocity of their passion, and bewailed the unhappy fate of Mitylené, the destined object of their misguided frenzy. The Mitylenian ambassadors availed themselves of this sudden change of sentiment; a new assembly was convened, and the question submitted to a second deliberation.

A turbulent impetuous eloquence had raised the audacious profligacy of Cleon, from the lowest rank of life, to a high degree of authority in the Athenian assembly. The multitude were deceived by his artifices, and pleased with his frontless impudence, which they called boldness, and manly openness of character. His manners they approved in proportion as they resembled their own; and the worst of his vices found advocates among the dupes of his pretended patriotism. This violent demagogue, whose arrogant² presumption so unworthily succeeded the enlightened magnanimity of Pericles, had, in the former assembly, proposed and carried the sanguinary decree against Mitylené. He still persevered in supporting that atrocious measure, and upbraided the weak and wavering counsels of his countrymen, liable to be shaken by every gust of passion, and totally

incapable of that stability essential in the management of great affairs, and particularly indispensable in the government of distant dependencies.

"Such a temper of mind (he had often ventured to declare, and would repeat the same disagreeable truth as often as their folly obliged him) was alike unworthy, and incapable, of command. That a democracy was unfit for sovereign rule, past experience convinced him, and the present instance now confirmed his opinion. The empire of Athens could not be maintained without an undivided attachment, an unalterable adherence, to the interest and honour of the republic. But the masters of Greece were the slaves of their own capricious passions; excited at will by the perfidious voice of venal speakers, bribed to betray them. Lulled to a fatal repose by the softness of melodious words, they forgot the dignity of the state, and restrained their personal resentment against multiplied and unprovoked injuries. What was still more dangerous, they invited, by an ill-judged lenity, the imitation and continuance of such crimes as must terminate in public disgrace and inevitable ruin. What else can be expected from pardoning the aggravated guilt of Mitylené? Encouraged by this weakness, must not the neighbouring cities and islands, whose resources form the principal vigour of the republic, greedily seize the first opportunity of shaking off the yoke, which they have long reluctantly borne; and follow the example of a revolt, which, without presenting them with the fear of danger, promised them the hope of deliverance?"

This sanguinary speech was answered by Deodatus, a man endowed with an amiable moderation of character, joined to a profound knowledge of government, and a deep insight into human nature. In the former assembly, this respectable orator had ventured, almost single and alone, to plead the cause of the Mitylenians, and to assert the rights of humanity. He observed, "that assemblies were liable to be misled by the fury of resentment, as well as by the weakness of compassion; and that errors of the former kind were often attended by consequences not less destructive, and always followed by a far more bitter repentance. Against vague slanders and calumny no man is secure; but a true patriot must learn to despise such unmanly reproaches. Undaunted by opposition, he will offer good counsel, to which there are no greater enemies than haste and anger. For my part, I stand up neither to defend the Mitylenians, nor to waste time in fruitless accusations. They have injured us most outrageously, yet I would not advise you to butcher them, unless *that* can be proved expedient; neither, were they objects of forgiveness, would I advise you to pardon them,³ unless that were conducive to the public interest, the only point on which our present deliberation turns. Guided by vulgar prejudices, Cleon has loudly asserted, that the destruction of the Mitylenians is necessary to

² The character of Cleon, sketched in miniature by Thucydides, pp. 193 and 266. is painted at full length by Aristophanes, in his comedy of the *ἵππαις*, "The Horseman." Yet we could not safely trust the description of the angry satirist, who bore a personal grudge to Cleon, unless the principal strokes were justified by the impartial narrative of Thucydides.

³ This is speaking like an orator. It will appear in the sequel, that Deodatus by no means considered the innocence or guilt of the Mitylenians as things indifferent.

deter neighbouring cities from rebellion. But distant subjects must be kept in obedience by the mildness of discretionary caution, not by the rigour of sanguinary examples. What people were ever so mad as to revolt, without expecting, either through their domestic strength, or the assistance of foreign powers, to make good their pretensions? Men who have known liberty, how sweet it is, ought not to be punished too severely for aspiring at that inestimable enjoyment. But their growing disaffection must be watched with care, and anticipated by diligence; they must be prevented from taking the first steps towards emancipation; and taught, if possible, to regard it as a thing altogether unattainable.

"Yet such is the nature of man, considered either individually or collectively, that a law of infallible prevention will never be enacted. Of all crimes that any reasonable creature can commit, Desire is the forerunner, and Hope the attendant. These invisible principles within, are too powerful for all external terrors; nor has the increasing severity of laws rendered crimes less frequent in latter times, than during the mildness of the heroic ages, when few punishments were capital. While human nature remains the same, weakness will be distrustful, necessity will be daring, poverty will excite injustice, power will urge to rapacity, misery will sink into meanness, and prosperity swell into presumption. There are other contingencies, which stir up the mutiny of passions, too stubborn for control. The authority of government can neither change the combination of events, nor interrupt the occasions of fortune. Impelled by such causes, the selfish desires of men will hurry them into wickedness and vice, whatever penalties await them. The imagination becomes familiar with one degree of punishment, as well as with another; and, in every degree, hope renders it alike ineffectual and impotent; since neither individuals nor communities would be guilty of injustice, if they believed that it must infallibly subject them to punishment, small or great. When individuals commit crimes, they always expect to elude the vengeance of law. When communities rebel, they expect to render their revolt not the occasion of triumph to their enemies, but the means of their own deliverance and security.

"The severe punishment of Mitylené cannot, therefore, produce the good consequences with which Cleon has flattered you. But this cruel measure will be attended with irreparable prejudice to your interest. It will estrange the affections of your allies; provoke the resentment of Greece; excite the indignation of mankind; and, instead of preventing rebellion, render it more frequent and more dangerous. When all hopes of success have vanished, your rebellious subjects will never be persuaded to return to their duty. They will seek death in the field rather than await it from the hand of the executioner. Though reduced to the last extremity, they will spurn submission, and gathering courage from despair, either repel your assaults, or fall a useless prey, weak and exhausted, incapable of indemnifying you for

the expense of the war, or of raising those subsidies and contributions, which rendered their subjugation a reasonable object either of interest or ambition.

"The revolt of Mitylené was the work of an aristocratical faction, fomented by the Lacedæmonians and Thebans. The great body of the people were no sooner provided with arms, than they discovered their affection for Athens. It would be most cruel and most ungrateful, to confound the innocent with the guilty, to involve friends and foes in undistinguished ruin. Yet this odious measure would show more weakness than cruelty, more folly than injustice. What advantage could the enemies of Athens more earnestly desire? What boon could the aristocratical factions, so profusely scattered over Greece, more anxiously request from Heaven? Furnished with your sanguinary decree against Mitylené, they might for ever alienate from the republic the affections of her subjects and confederates; for having once seduced them to revolt, they might unanswerably convince them, that safety could only be purchased by persevering in rebellion, and that to return to duty was to submit to death."

The moderation and good sense of Deodatus (such was the influence of Cleon) were approved only by a small majority of voices. Yet it remained uncertain, whether this late and reluctant repentance would avail the Mitylenians, who, before any advice of it arrived, might be condemned and executed in consequence of the former decree. A galley was instantly furnished with every thing that might promote expedition. The Mitylenian deputies promised invaluable rewards to the rowers. But the fate of a numerous and lately flourishing community, still depended on the uncertainty of winds and currents. The first advice-boat had sailed, as the messenger of bad news, with a slow and melancholy progress. The second advanced with the rapid movement of joy. Not an adverse blast opposed her course. The necessity of food and sleep never restrained a moment the labour of the oar; and her diligence was rewarded by reaching Lesbos in time to check the cruel hand of the executioner.

The bloody sentence had been just read, even the orders had been issued for its execution, when the critical arrival of the Athenian galley converted the lamentable outcries, or gloomy despair of a whole republic, into expressions of admiration and gratitude.

The punishment, however, of Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. Mitylené was still sufficiently severe, even according to the rigorous maxims of Grecian policy. The prisoners, who had been sent to Tenedos, were transported to Athens. They exceeded a thousand in number, and were indiscriminately condemned to death. Sæthius, the Spartan general, shared the same fate, after descending to many mean contrivances to save his life. The walls of Mitylené were demolished, its shipping was sent to Athens, and its territory divided into three thousand portions, of which three hundred were consecrated to the gods, and the rest distributed by lot among the people of Athens. The Lesbians were still allowed to

cultivate, as tenants, their own fields, paying for each share an annual rent of about six pounds nine shillings sterling.¹

The activity and judgment of Paches thus effected an important conquest to his country. Though the affairs of Lesbos might have required his undivided attention, he no sooner was apprised of the appearance of the Peloponnesian fleet, than he immediately put to sea, protected the allies of Athens, and chased the enemy from those shores. During the whole time of his command, he behaved with firmness tempered by humanity. But, at his return to Athens, he met with the usual reward of superior merit. He was accused of misconduct; and finding sentence ready to be pronounced against him, his indignation rose so high, that he slew himself in court.²

The Spartan admiral, Alcidas, met, on the other hand, with a reception (such is the blindness of popular prejudice!) far better than his behaviour deserved. The Peloponnesian fleet of forty sail, imprudently intrusted to his command, retired ingloriously, after a most expensive and fruitless expedition, to the protection of their friendly harbours. A northerly wind, however, drove them on the shores of Crete; from whence they dropped in successively to the port of Cyllené, which had recovered the disaster inflicted on it by the Corcyreans at the beginning of the war, and became the ordinary rendezvous of the Peloponnesian fleet. In this place, Alcidas found thirteen galleys, commanded by Brasidas, a Spartan of distinguished valour and abilities, purposely chosen to assist the admiral with his counsels. This small squadron had orders to join the principal armament; with which the confederates, as their design had miscarried at Lesbos, purposed to undertake an expedition to Corcyra, then agitated by the tumult of a most dangerous sedition.

Among the hostilities already related between the republics of Corinth and Corcyra, we described the enterprises by which the Corinthians took above twelve hundred Corcyrean prisoners. Many of these persons were descended from the first families in the island; a circumstance on which the policy of Corinth founded an extensive plan of artifice and ambition. The Corcyreans, instead of feeling the rigours of captivity, or experiencing the stern severity of republican resentment, were treated with the liberal and endearing kindness of Grecian hospitality. Having acquired their confidence by good offices, the Corinthians insinuated to them, in the unguarded hours of convivial merriment, the danger as well as the disgrace of their connection with Athens, the universal tyrant of her allies; and represented their shameful ingratitude in deserting Corinth, to which the colony of Corcyra owed not only its early happiness and prosperity, but its original establishment and existence. These arguments, seasonably repeated, and urged with much address, at length proved effectual. The Corcyreans recovered their freedom, and returned to

their native country; and while they pretended to be collecting the sum of eight hundred talents (about a hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling) to pay their ransom, they left nothing untried to detach Corcyra from the Athenian interest.

Their first expedient for accomplishing this purpose was, to traduce the popular leaders, who were the most steadfast partizans of that republic. Accusations, impeachments, all the artifices and chicanes of legal persecution, were directed and played off against them. The demagogues, who were not of a temper to brook such injuries, retorted on their antagonists with equal ingenuity, and far superior success. Peithias, the most distinguished advocate of the Athenian or democratical party, accused five ringleaders of the opposite faction of having destroyed the fence which inclosed the grove of Jupiter; a trespass estimated by the Corcyrean law at a severe pecuniary punishment.³ In vain the persons accused denied the charge; in vain, after conviction before the senate, they fled as supplicants to the altars. They could obtain no mitigation of the amercement. The demagogue was inflexible; and his influence with his colleagues in the senate, of which he happened that year to be a member, determined them to execute the law in its utmost rigour.

Exasperated by this severity, and not doubting that during the administration of the present senate, many similar prosecutions would be raised against them, the aristocratical party entered into a conspiracy for defending themselves and their country against the oppressive injustice of Athens and Athenian partizans. On this emergency they acted like men who knew the danger of delay. Having fortified their cause with a sufficient number of adherents, they armed themselves with concealed daggers, suddenly rushed into the senate-house, and assassinated Peithias, with sixty of his friends. This boldness struck their opponents with terror. Such persons as felt themselves most obnoxious to the conspirators, immediately fled to the harbour, embarked, and sailed to Athens.

The people of Corcyra, thus deprived of their leaders by an event equally unexpected and atrocious, were seized with such astonishment as suspended their power of action. Before they had sufficiently recovered themselves to take the proper measures for revenge, or even for defence, the arrival of a Corinthian vessel, and a Lacedæmonian embassy, encouraged their opponents to attempt their destruction. The attack was made at the hour of full assembly; the forum, or public square, presented a scene of horror; the streets of Corcyra streamed with blood. The unguarded citizens were incapable of making resistance against such sudden and unforeseen fury. They fled in trepidation from the forum, and the more spa-

¹ Thucyd. p. 173—206.

² Plutarch. in Nicia, et in Aristid.

³ The fine was, for every pale a stater (one pound and nine pence sterling.) Such causes were frequent in other parts of Greece, as we learn from the oration of Lysias in defence of a citizen accused of cutting down a consecrated olive. See the translation of Lysias and Isocrates, p. 377.

cious streets. Some took possession of the citadel; others of the Hillæan harbour; and in general occupied, before evening, the higher and more remote parts of the town. Their adversaries kept possession of the market-place, around which most of their houses stood, or assembled in the principal harbour, that points towards Epirus, from which they expected succour. The day following was spent in doubtful skirmishes, and in summoning from the country the assistance of the peasants, or rather slaves, by whom chiefly the lands of the island were cultivated. These naturally ranged themselves on the side of the people: the Corcyrean women zealously embraced the same party, and sustained the tumult with more than female courage. One inactive day intervened. The partizans of aristocracy were reinforced by eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent of Epirus. But in the succeeding engagement, the numbers and fury of the slaves, who seized the present opportunity to resent the barbarous cruelty of their respective masters, and the generous ardour of the women, rendered the friends of liberty completely victorious. The vanquished fled towards the forum and the greater harbour. Even these posts they soon despaired of being able to maintain; and, to escape immediate death, set fire to the surrounding houses, which being soon thrown into a blaze, presented an impervious obstacle to the rage of the assailants. The most beautiful part of Corcyra was thus destroyed in one night; the houses, shops, magazines, and much valuable merchandize, were totally consumed; and had an easterly wind aided the conflagration, the whole city must in a short time have been reduced to ashes. Amidst this scene of confusion and horror, the Corinthian galley, together with the auxiliaries from Epirus, retired in consternation from a place that seemed doomed to inevitable destruction.

Next day twelve Athenian galleys arrived from Naupactus, containing, besides their ordinary complement of men, five hundred heavy-armed Messenians. Nicostratus, who commanded this armament, had upon the first intelligence of the sedition, hastened with the utmost celerity to support the cause of Athens and democracy. He had the good fortune not only to anticipate the Peloponnesian squadron, which was so anxiously expected by the enemy, but to find his friends triumphant. They had obtained, however, a melancholy triumph over the splendour of their country, which, if its factions were not speedily reconciled, was threatened with total ruin. Nicostratus omitted nothing that seemed proper to heal the wounds of that afflicted commonwealth. By authority, entreaties, and commands, he persuaded the contending parties to accommodate matters between themselves, and to renew their alliance with Athens. Having happily terminated this business, he was intent on immediate departure; but the managers for the people proposed, that he should leave five of his ships with them, to deter the enemy from any fresh commotion, and take in exchange five of theirs, which should be instantly manned to attend him on his station. With this proposal he complied; and

the Corcyreans selected the mariners destined to sail with Nicostratus. Those named for this service were, to a man, partisans of the oligarchy and Lacedæmon: a circumstance which created in them just alarm, lest they should be transported to Athens, and notwithstanding the faith of treaties, condemned to death. They took refuge in the temple of Castor and Pollux: the assurances of Nicostratus could scarcely remove them from this sanctuary; and all his declarations and oaths were incapable to prevail on them to embark. The opposite party asserted, that this want of confidence betrayed not only the consciousness of past, but the fixed purpose of future, guilt; and would have immediately despatched them with their daggers, had not Nicostratus interposed. Terrified at these proceedings, the unhappy victims of popular malice and suspicion assembled, to the number of four hundred, and retired with one accord, as suppliants, to the temple of Juno. From this sanctuary they were persuaded to arise, and were transported to a neighbouring island, or rather rock, small, barren, and uninhabited. There they remained four days, supplied barely with the means of subsistence, and impatiently waiting their fate.

In this posture of affairs a numerous fleet was seen approaching from the south. This was the long-expected squadron of fifty-three ships commanded by Alcidas and Brasidas. With the unfortunate slowness inherent in all the measures of the confederacy, this armament arrived too late to support the ruined cause of their friends. The Peloponnesian commanders, however, might still expect to take a useless but agreeable vengeance on their enemies. To accomplish this design they prepared to attack the harbour of Corcyra, while all was hurry and confusion. The islanders had sixty vessels fit for sea, in which they embarked with the utmost expedition, and successively sailed forth as each happened to be ready. Their ardour and impatience disdained the judicious advice of Nicostratus, who alone, calm and unmoved amidst a scene of unexpected danger, exhorted them to keep the harbour until they were all prepared to advance in line of battle, generously offering, with his twelve Athenian galleys, to sustain the first assaults of the enemy.

The Peloponnesians, observing the hostile armament scattered and unsupported, divided their own fleet into two squadrons. The one, consisting of twenty galleys, attacked the Corcyreans; the other, amounting to thirty-three, endeavoured to surround the Athenians. But the address of the Athenian mariners frustrated this attempt. Their front was extended with equal order and celerity. They assaulted, at once, the opposite wings of the Peloponnesian fleet, intercepted their motion, and skilfully encircled them around, hoping to drive their ships against each other, and to throw them into universal disorder. Perceiving these manœuvres, the ships which followed the Corcyreans left off the pursuit, and steered to support the main squadron: and now, with their whole embodied strength, they prepared to pour on the Athenians. These prudently declined the shock of superior force: but the glory of their retreat was

equal to a victory. They seasonably shifted their helms, slowly and regularly gave way, and thus recovered the retreat of their Corcyrean allies, who, having already lost thirteen vessels, were totally unable to renew the engagement.

Having reached the harbour, the Corcyreans still feared lest the enemy, in pursuance of their victory, should make a descent on the coast, and even assault the city. But the manly counsels of Brasidas, who strongly recommended the latter measure, were defeated by the timidity and incapacity of Alcidas. The Corcyreans seized, therefore, the present opportunity to remove the suppliants from the uninhabited island to the temple of Juno, as less exposed there, to be discovered and taken up by the Peloponnesian fleet. Next day they entered into accommodation with these unhappy men, and even admitted several of them to embark in thirty vessels, which they hastily equipped, as the last defence of the island. The Peloponnesians, mean while, still prevented, by the dastardly counsels of Alcidas, from attacking the capital, wreaked their resentment on the adjacent territory. But before the dawn of the succeeding day, they were alarmed by lights on the northern shore of Leucadia, which, by their number and disposition, signified the approach of an Athenian fleet of sixty sail.

The situation of the invaders was now extremely dangerous. If they stretched out to sea, they might be obliged to encounter the unbroken vigour of the Athenians; if they cruised off the coast, they would be compelled to contend, not only with the power of Athens, but with the resentment of Corcyra. One measure alone promised the hope of safety: it was immediately adopted. Having crept along the shore to Leucadia, they carried their vessels across the isthmus,¹ afterwards buried in the sea, but which then joined the peninsula, now the island of Leucas, to the adjacent coast of Acarnania. From thence sailing through the narrow seas, which separate the neighbouring isles from the continent, they escaped without discovery, and safely arrived in the harbour of Cyllené.

The democratical party in Corcyra soon perceived the flight of the enemy, and decried the approach of the Athenian fleet, commanded by Eurymedon. These fortunate events, which ought in generous minds to have effaced the dark impressions of enmity and revenge, only enabled the Corcyreans to display the deep malignity of their character. They commanded the thirty galleys, recently manned, to pass in review, and in proportion as they discovered their enemies, punished them with immediate death. Fifty of the principal citizens, who still clung to the altars in the temple of Juno, they seduced from their asylum, and instantly butchered.

Politics and party formed the pretence for violence, while individuals gratified their private passions, and wreaked vengeance on their personal foes. The sedition became every hour more fierce: the confusion thickened; the whole city was filled with consternation and horror.

The altars and images of the gods were surrounded by votaries, whom even the terrors of a superstitious age could no longer protect. The miserable victims were dragged from the most revered temples, whose walls and pavement were now first stained with civil blood. Many withdrew themselves by a voluntary death from the fury of their enemies. In every house, and in every family, scenes were transacted too horrid for description. Parents, children, brothers, and pretended friends, seized the desired moment for gratifying their latent malignity, and perpetrating crimes without a name. The unfeeling Eurymedon (whose character, as will shortly appear, was a disgrace to human nature) showed neither ability nor inclination to stop the carnage. During the space of six days that his fleet continued in the Corcyrean harbour, the actors in this lamentable tragedy continually aggravated the enormity of their guilt, and improved in the refinement of their cruelty. A dreadful calm succeeded this violent agitation. Five hundred partisans of aristocracy escaped to the coast of Epirus; and the Athenian fleet retired.

The fugitives, instead of rejoicing in their safety, thought only of revenge. They sent agents to Lacedæmon and Corinth. By describing their sufferings to the astonished Epirots, they excited their compassion, and acquired their assistance. The severity of the prevailing party in Corcyra increased the number of outlaws; who, at length, finding themselves sufficiently powerful to attack and conquer the island, which, from the moment of their banishment, they had infested by naval descents, sailed with their whole strength for that purpose in boats provided by the Barbarians. In landing at Corcyra, the rowers drove with such violence against the shore, as broke many of their vessels in pieces; the rest they immediately burned, disdaining safety unless purchased by victory. This desperate measure deterred opposition: they advanced, seized, and fortified, mount Istoné; a strong post in the neighbourhood of the city, from which they ravaged the territory, and subjected their enemies to the multiplied evils of war and famine.

Olymp. An epidemical disorder increased the measure of their calamities: lxxviii. 4. The flames of civil discord, which A. C. 425. had never been thoroughly extinguished, again broke out within the walls. The misery of the Corcyreans was verging to despair, when an Athenian fleet of forty sail appeared off the coast. This armament was commanded by Eurymedon and Sophocles. It was principally destined against Sicily, as we shall have occasion to relate, but ordered in its voyage thither to touch at Corcyra, and regulate the affairs of that island. This unexpected assistance enabled the besieged to become the besiegers. The outworks and defences of Mount Istoné were successively taken, the parties who defended them gradually retiring to the more elevated branches, and, at length, to the very summit, of the mountain. They were on the point of being driven from thence, and of falling into the hands of enemies exasperated by innumerable injuries suffered and inflicted. Alarm-

¹ D'Arville considers the ancient Leucadia as an island; Ptolemy speaks of it as a peninsula.

ed by this reflection, they called out to the Athenians for quarter, and surrendered to Eurymedon and Sophocles, on condition that their fate should be decided by the people of Athens. They were sent prisoners to the small island of Ptychia, till it should be found convenient to transport them to Athens, and commanded not to make any attempt to stir from thence under pain of annulling the capitulation which had been granted them.

If the malignity of the Corcyrean populace had not exceeded the ordinary standard of human pravity, their resentment must have been softened by the sudden transition wrought by accident in their favour. But their first concern was to intercept the precarious clemency of Athens, and to assure the destruction of their adversaries. This atrocious design was executed by a stratagem equally detestable, uniting, by a singular combination, whatever is savage in ferocity, and base in perfidy. By means of proper agents despatched secretly to Ptychia, the leaders of the popular faction acquainted those of the prisoners, with whom, in peaceable times, they had respectively lived in some habits of intimacy, that the Athenians had determined to give them up indiscriminately to the fury of the populace. Pretending much regret that persons in whom they once had so tender a concern, should share the common calamity, they exhorted them, by all possible means, to contrive their escape, and offered to provide them with a bark for that purpose. The known cruelty of Eurymedon made the artifice succeed. The bark was already launched from the island; the terms of the capitulation were thus infringed; the deluded victims were apprehended in the very act of departure, seized, bound, and delivered into the hands of their inexorable enemies.

The Athenian commanders, Eurymedon and Sophocles, favoured the deceit, because, as they were themselves obliged to proceed towards Sicily, they envied the honour that would accrue to their successors in conducting the captives to Athens. To gratify this meanness of soul without example, they permitted barbarities beyond belief.

The unhappy prisoners were first confined in a dungeon. Dragged successively from thence, in parties of twenty at a time, they were compelled to pass in pairs, their hands tied behind their backs, between two ranks of their enemies, armed with whips, prongs, and every instrument of licentious and disgraceful torture. The wretches left in prison were long ignorant of the ignominious cruelty inflicted on their companions: but, as soon as they learned the abominable scenes transacted without, they refused to quit their confinement, guarded the entrance, and invited, with one consent, the Athenians to murder them. But the Athenians wanted either humanity or firmness to commit this kind cruelty. The Corcyrean populace ventured not to force a passage from despair. They mounted the prison walls, uncovered the roof, and overwhelmed those below with stones, darts, and arrows. These weapons were destructive to many, and furnished others with the means of destroying themselves, or each

other. They laid down their heads, opened their breasts, exposed their necks, mutually soliciting, in plaintive or frantic accents, the fatal stroke. The whole night (for the night intervened) was spent in this horrid scene; and the morning presented a spectacle too shocking for description. The obdurate hearts of the Corcyreans were incapable of pity or remorse; but their relenting eyes could not bear the sight; and they commanded the bodies of their fellow citizens, now breathless or expiring, to be thrown on carts, and conveyed without the walls.

Thus ended the sedition of Corcyra;¹ but its consequences were not soon to end. The contagion of that unhappy island engendered a political malady, which spread its baneful influence over Greece. The aristocratical, and still more, the popular governments of that country, had ever been liable to faction, which occasionally blazed into sedition. But this morbid tendency, congenial to the constitution of republics, thenceforth assumed a more dangerous appearance, and betrayed more alarming symptoms. In every republic, and almost in every city, the intriguing and ambitious found the ready protection of Athens, or of Sparta, according as their selfish and guilty designs were screened under the pretence of maintaining the prerogatives of the nobles, or asserting the privileges of the people. A virtuous and moderate aristocracy, an equal, impartial freedom, these were the colourings which served to justify violence and varnish guilt. Sheltered by the specious coverings of fair names, the prodigal assassin delivered himself from the importunity of his creditor. The father, with unnatural cruelty, punished the licentious extravagance of his son: the son avenged, by parricide, the stern severity of his father. The debates of the public assembly were decided by the sword. Not satisfied with victory, men thirsted for blood. This general disorder overwhelmed laws, human and divine. The ordinary course of events was reversed: sentiments lost their natural force, and words their usual meaning.² Dulness and stupidity triumphed over abilities and refinement; for while the crafty and ingenious were laying fine-spun snares for their enemies, men of blunter minds had immediate recourse to the sword and poniard. This successful audacity was termed manly enterprise; ferocity assumed the name of courage; faction and ambition passed for patriotism and magnanimity; perfidy was called prudence; cunning, wisdom; every vice was clothed in the garb of every virtue; while justice, moderation, and candour were branded as weakness, cowardice, meanness of soul, and indifference to the public interest. Such was the perversion of sentiment, and such the corruption of language, first engendered amidst the turbulence of Grecian factions, and too faithfully imitated, as far as the soft effeminacy of modern manners will permit, by the discontented and seditious of later times—Wretched and detestable delusions, by which wicked men deceive and ruin the public and themselves.

¹ Thucyd. p. 220—223.

² Ibid. p. 227, et seq.

CHAPTER XVII.

Physical Calamities conspire with the Evils of War—Athenian Expedition into Ætolia—Victories of Demosthenes—He fortifies Pybus—Blocks up the Spartans in Sphacteria—The Spartans solicit Peace—Artifices and Imprudence of Cleon—His unmerited Success—Ridiculed by Aristophanes—Athenian Conquests—Battle of Delium—Commutations in Thrace—Expedition of Brasidas—Truce for a Year—The War renewed—Battle of Amphipolis—Peace of Nicias—Dissatisfaction of the Spartan Allies.

IT would be agreeable to diversify the dark and melancholy scenes of the Peloponnesian war, by introducing occurrences and transactions of a different and more pleasing kind. But such, unfortunately, is the settled gloom of our present subject, that the episodes commonly reflect the same colour with the principal action. The miserable period now under our review, and already distinguished by revolt and sedition, was still farther deformed by a return of the pestilence, and by innumerable earthquakes. The disease carried off five thousand Athenian troops, and a great but uncertain number of other citizens. It raged, during a twelvemonth, with unabating violence; many remedies were employed, but all equally ineffectual. The poison at length spent its force, and the malady disappeared by a slow and insensible progress, similar to that observed in the Levant, and other parts of the world, which are still liable to be visited by this dreadful calamity.³ The earthquakes alarmed Attica and Bœotia, but proved most destructive in the neighbouring isles. The dreadful concussions of the land were accompanied, or perhaps produced, by a violent agitation of the sea. The reflux of the waves overwhelmed the flourishing city of Orobia, on the western coast of Eubœa. Similar disasters happened in the small islands of Atalanta and Perperathus. Nor did these alarming events terminate the afflictions of the Greeks; for Nature, as if she had delighted to produce at one period every thing most awful, poured forth a torrent of fire from Mount Etna, which demolished the industrious labours of the Cataneans. A dreadful eruption had happened fifty years before this period; and the present was the third, and most memorable, by which Sicily had been agitated and inflamed, since the coasts of that island were adorned by Grecian colonies.⁴

Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A. C. 427. If the Peloponnesian war had not been carried on with an animosity unknown to the mildness of modern times, the long sufferings of the contending parties would have disposed them eagerly to desire the blessings of tranquillity. But such virulent passions rankled in Athens and Sparta, that while calamities were equally balanced, and the capitals of both republics were secure, no combination of adverse circumstances seemed sufficient to determine either side to purchase peace by the smallest diminution of honour. Yet to this

necessity, Sparta in the following year was reduced by a train of events, equally sudden and singular. Demosthenes, a general of merit and enterprise, commanded the Athenian forces at Naupactus. This town, as related above, had been bestowed on the unfortunate Messenians; by whose assistance, together with that of the Athenian allies in Acarnania, Cephallenia, and Zacynthus, Demosthenes undertook to reduce the hostile provinces of Ætolia, Ambracia, and Leucadia. But the operations necessary for this purpose were obstructed by the jealousies and dissensions which prevailed among the confederates; each state insisting, that the whole force of the war should be immediately directed against its particular enemies.

The allied army, thus distracted by contrariety, and weakened by defection, performed nothing decisive against Leucadia or Ambracia. In Ætolia they were extremely unfortunate. The Messenians, who were continually harassed by the natives of that barbarous province, persuaded Demosthenes that it would be easy to overrun their country, before the inhabitants, who lived in scattered villages, widely separated from each other, could collect their force, or attempt resistance. In pursuance of this advice, Demosthenes entered Ætolia took and plundered the towns, and drove the inhabitants before him. During several days he marched unresisted; but having proceeded to Ægitiun, the principal, or rather only city in the province, he found that his design had by no means escaped the notice of the enemy. Ægitiun is situate among lofty mountains, and about ten miles distant from the Corinthian gulf. Among these intricate, and almost inaccessible heights the flower of the Ætolian nation were posted. Even the most distant tribes had come up, before the confederate army entered their borders.

Ægitiun was stormed; but the inhabitants escaped to their countrymen concealed among the mountains. While the Athenians and their allies pursued them, the Ætolians rushed, in separate bodies, from different eminences, and checked the pursuers with their darts and javelins. Having discharged their missile weapons, they retired, being light-armed, and incapable to resist the impression of pikemen. New detachments continually poured forth from the mountains, and in all directions annoyed the confederates. The latter lost no ground, as long as their archers had darts, and were able to use them. But when the greatest part of their light troops were wounded or slain, the heavy-armed men began to give way. They still, however, maintained their order; and the

³ Voyage de Tournesfort, vol. ii. Discourse on the Plague, in the Phil. Trans. vol. lxiv.

⁴ Thucyd. p. 230.

battle long continued, in alternate pursuits and retreats, the Ætolians always flying before the enemy as soon as they had discharged their javelins. But at length the confederates were exhausted by so many repeated charges, and totally defeated by opponents who durst not wait their approach.

Their conductors through this intricate country had all perished. They mistook their road to the sea. The enemy were light-armed, and in their own territories. The pursuit, therefore, was unusually destructive. Many fell into caverns, or tumbled headlong from precipices. A large party wandered into an impervious wood, which being set on fire by the enemy, consumed them in its flames. A miserable remnant returned to Naupactus, afflicted by the loss of their companions, and highly mortified at being defeated by Barbarians, alike ignorant of the rules of war, and of the laws of civil society, who spoke an unknown dialect, and fed on raw flesh.¹

This disaster deterred Demosthenes from returning to Athens, till fortune gave him an opportunity to retrieve the honour of his arms. The Ætolians and Ambraciots, the most formidable enemies of the republic on that western coast of Greece, solicited and obtained assistance from Lacedæmon and Corinth, vigorously attacked the towns of Naupactus and Amphilo-chian Argos, and threatened to reduce the whole province of Acarnania, in which the latter was situated. The vigilance and activity of Demosthenes not only saved these important cities, but obtained the most signal advantages over the assailants. With profound military skill he divided the strength of the enemy, and, by a well-conducted stratagem, totally defeated the Ambraciots among the heights of Idomené. A strong detachment of that brave nation had advanced the preceding day to Olpæ, a place fortified by the Acarnanians, and the seat of their courts of justice. Demosthenes obliged them to retreat with considerable loss, and intercepted their return homeward. Mean while the collected force of the Ambraciots marched to support their detachment, with whose misfortunes they were totally unacquainted. Apprised of this design, Demosthenes beset the passes, and seized the most advantageous posts on their route. With the remainder of his force he advanced to attack them in front. They had already proceeded to Idomené, and encamped on the lowest ridge of that mountain.²

Demosthenes placed his Messenians in the van, and commanded them, as they marched along, to discourse in their Doric dialect. This circumstance, as the morning was yet in its dawn, effectually prevented the advanced guards from suspecting them to be enemies. Demosthenes then rushed forward with the Messenians and Acarnanians. The Ambraciots were yet in their beds. The camp was no sooner assaulted, than the rout began. Many were slain on the spot; the rest fled amain; but the passes were beset, and the pursuers light-armed. Some ran to the sea, and beheld a new object of ter-

ror, in some Athenian ships then cruising on the coast. In this complication of calamities, they plunged into the water, and swam to the hostile squadron, choosing rather to be destroyed by the Athenians, than by the enemies from whom they had escaped.

On the following day, the victors, who remained at Idomené, stripping the dead, and erecting a trophy, were addressed by a herald sent on the part of the detachment who had so much suffered in its retreat from Olpæ. This herald knew nothing of the fresh disaster that had befallen his countrymen. Observing the arms of the Ambraciots, he was astonished at their number. The victors perceiving his surprise, asked him, before he explained his commission, "What he judged to be the amount of the slain?" "Not more than two hundred," replied the herald. The demander then said, "It should seem otherwise, for there are the arms of more than a thousand men." The herald rejoined, "They cannot then belong to our party." The other replied, "They must, if you fought yesterday at Idomené." "We fought no where yesterday; we suffered the day before, in our retreat from Olpæ." "But we fought yesterday against these Ambraciots, who were marching to your relief." When the herald heard this, he burst into a groan, and went abruptly off, without farther explaining his commission.³

These important successes enabled Demosthenes to return with honour to Athens. The term of his military command had expired; but his mind could not brook inactivity. He therefore solicited permission to accompany, as a volunteer, the armament which sailed to Corcyra, the success of which has already been related, with leave to employ the Messenians, whom he carried along with him, on the coast of Peloponnesus, should any opportunity occur there, for promoting the public service. While the fleet slowly coasted along the southern shores of that peninsula, the Messenians viewed, with mingled joy and sorrow, the long lost, but still beloved, seats of their ancestors. They regretted, in particular, the decay of ancient Pylus, the royal residence of their admired Nestor, whose youth had been adorned by valour, and his age renowned for wisdom. Their immortal resentment against Sparta was inflamed by beholding the ruins of Messenæ. A thousand ideas and sentiments, which time had obliterated, revived at the sight of their native shores.

When the tumult of their emotions subsided, they explained their feelings to Demosthenes, and to each other. He suggested, or at least warmly approved, the design of landing, and rebuilding Pylus, which had been abandoned by the Spartans, though it enjoyed a convenient harbour, and was strongly fortified by nature. Demosthenes proposed this measure to Eurymedon and Sophocles, who answered him with the insolence congenial to their character, "That there were many barren capes on the coast of Peloponnesus, which those might

¹ Thucyd. p. 837, et seq.

² Ibid. p. 844, et seq.

³ Thucyd. p. 844, et seq.

fortify who wished to entail a useless expense on their country." He next applied to the several captains of the fleet, and even to the inferior officers, but without better success, although he assured them that the place abounded in wood and stone, with which a wall sufficient for defence, might speedily be completed. He had desisted from farther entreaties, when a fortunate storm drove the whole fleet towards the Pylian harbour. This circumstance enabled him to renew his instances with greater force, alleging that the events of fortune confirmed the expediency of the undertaking. At length the sailors and soldiers, weary of idleness (for the weather prevented them from putting to sea,) began the work of their own accord, and carried it on with such vigour and activity, that in six days the place was strongly fortified on every side.⁴ The Athenian fleet then proceeded to Corcyra, Demosthenes retaining only five ships to guard this new acquisition.

The Spartans were no sooner apprised of this daring measure, than they withdrew their army from its annual incursion into Attica, and recalled their fleet from Corcyra. The citizens, residing at home, immediately flew to arms, and marched towards Pylus, which was only fifty miles distant from their capital. They found the new fortress so well prepared for defence, that nothing could be undertaken against it with any prospect of success, until their whole forces had assembled. This occasioned a short delay; after which Pylus was vigorously assaulted by sea and land. The walls were weakest towards the harbour; the entrance of which, however, was so narrow, that only two ships could sail into it abreast. Here the attack was most furious, and the resistance most obstinate.

Demosthenes encouraged his troops by his voice and arm. The gallant Brasidas, a man destined to act such an illustrious part in the following scenes of the war, called out to the Lacedæmonian pilots to drive against the beach; and exhorted them, by the destruction of their ships, to save the honour of their country. He farther recommended this boldness by his example, but, in performing it, received a wound which rendered him insensible. His body dropped into the sea, seemingly deprived of life, but was recovered by the affectionate zeal of his attendants. When his senses returned, he perceived the loss of his shield, a matter highly punishable by the Spartan laws, if the shield of Brasidas had not been lost with more glory than ever shield was defended.⁵

During three days, Demosthenes, with very unequal strength, resisted the enemy; when the approach of the Athenian fleet from Corcyra, which he had apprised of his danger, terminated the incredible labours of his exhausted garrison. A naval engagement ensued, in which the Lacedæmonians were defeated. But neither this defeat, nor the loss of five ships, nor the total dispersion of their fleet, nor the unexpected relief of Pylus, gave them so

much uneasiness, as an event principally occasioned by their own imprudence. The island of Sphacteria, scarce two miles in circumference, barren, woody, and uninhabited, lies before the harbour of Pylus. In this island the Spartans had posted four hundred and twenty heavy-armed men, with a much greater proportion of Helots, not reflecting that the Athenians, as soon as they had resumed the command of the neighbouring sea, must have these forces at their devotion. This circumstance occurred not to the Spartans till after their defeat; and then affected them the more deeply, because the troops blocked up in the island belonged to the first families of the republic.

Advice of this misfortune was immediately sent to the capital. The annual magistrates, attended by a deputation of the senate, hastened to examine matters on the spot. The evil appeared to be incapable of remedy; and of such importance was this body of Spartans to the community, that all present agreed in the necessity of soliciting a truce, until ambassadors were sent to Athens to treat of a general peace. The Athenians granted a suspension of hostilities, on condition that the Spartans, as a pledge of their sincerity, surrendered their whole fleet (consisting of about sixty vessels) into the harbour of Pylus. Even this mortifying proposal was accepted. Twenty days were consumed in the embassy; during which time the troops intercepted in Sphacteria were supplied with a stated proportion of meal, meat, and wine,⁶ that of the freemen amounting to double the quantity allowed to the slaves.

When the Spartan ambassadors were admitted to an audience at Athens, they artfully apologized for the intended length of their discourses. In all their transactions with the Greeks, they had hitherto affected the dignified brevity⁷ inspired by conscious pre-eminence: "Yet on the present occasion, they allowed that it was necessary to explain, at some length, the advantages which would result to all Greece, and particularly to Athens herself, if the latter accepted the treaty and alliance, the free gifts of unfeigned friendship, spontaneously offered by Sparta. They pretended not to conceal or extenuate the greatness of their misfortune; but the Athenians ought also to remember the vicissitudes of war. It was full time to embrace a hearty reconciliation, and to terminate the calamities of their common country. The war had as yet been carried on with more emulation than hatred; neither party had been reduced to extremity, nor had any incurable evil been yet inflicted or suffered. Terms of agreement, if accepted in the moment of victory, would redound to the glory of Athens; if rejected, would ascertain, who were the authors of the war, and to whom the public calamities ought thenceforth to be

⁴ Thucyd. p. 256, et seq.

⁵ Ibid. p. 758.

⁶ Thucydides does not ascertain the quantity of meat. He says, two chœnixes of meal, and two cotyls of wine; that is, two pints of meal, and one pint of wine, English measure, a very small allowance; but the Athenians were afraid lest the besieged might hoard their provisions, if allowed more for daily support; which, if the negotiation failed, would enable them to hold out the place longer than they could otherwise have done.

⁷ Imperatoria brevitās. TACITUS.

imputed; since it was well known, that if Athens and Sparta were unanimous, no power in Greece would venture to dispute their commands."¹

The meek spirit of this discourse only discovered to the Athenians the full extent of their good fortune, of which they determined completely to avail themselves. Instigated by the violence of Cleon, they answered the ambassadors with great haughtiness; demanding, as preliminaries to the treaty, that the Spartans in Sphacteria should be sent to Athens, and that several places of great importance, belonging to the Spartans or their allies, should be delivered into their hands. These lofty pretensions, which were by no means justified by military success, appeared totally inadmissible to the ambassadors, who returned in disgust to the Spartan camp.

Nothing, it was evident, could be expected from the moderation of Athens; but it was expected from her justice, that she would restore the fleet, which had been surrendered as a pledge of the treaty. Even this was, on various pretences, denied.² Both parties, therefore, prepared for hostilities; the Athenians to maintain their arrogance, the Spartans to avenge it.

The former employed the operation of famine, as the readiest and least dangerous mode of reducing the soldiers in Sphacteria. The Athenian fleet now greatly augmented, carefully guarded the island night and day. But notwithstanding their utmost vigilance, small vessels availed themselves of storms and darkness to throw provisions into the place; a service undertaken by slaves from the promise of liberty; and by freemen, from the prospect of great pecuniary rewards. The Athenians redoubled their diligence, and often intercepted these victuallers; but they found it more difficult to interrupt the expert divers, who, plunging deep under water, dragged after them bottles of leather, filled with honey and flour. The blockade was thus fruitlessly protracted several weeks. Demosthenes was averse to attack an island difficult of access, covered with wood, destitute of roads, and defended on the side of Pylus by a natural fortification, strengthened by art. Meanwhile the Athenians began to suffer inconveniences in their turn. Their garrison in Pylus was closely pressed by the enemy; there was but one source of fresh water, and that scanty, in the place; provisions grew scarce; the barrenness of the neighbouring coast afforded no supply; while they besieged the Spartans, they themselves experienced the hardships of a siege.

When their situation was reported at Athens, the assembly fell into commotion: many clamoured against Demosthenes; several accused Cleon. The artful demagogue, whose opposition had chiefly prevented an advantageous peace with Sparta, affected to disbelieve the intelligence, and advised sending men of approv-

ed confidence to Pylus, in order to detect the imposture. The populace called aloud, "that Cleon himself should undertake that commission." But the dissembler dreaded to become the dupe of his own artifice. He perceived, that if he went to Pylus, he must, at his return, either acknowledge the truth of the report, and thus be subjected to immediate shame, or fabricate false intelligence, and thus be exposed to future punishment. He therefore eluded his own proposal, by declaring, "that it ill became the dignity of Athens to stoop to a formal and tedious examination; and that, whatever were the state of the armament, if the commanders acted like men, they might take Sphacteria in a few days: that if he had the honour to be general, he would sail to the island with a small body of light infantry, and take it at the first onset."

These sarcastic observations were chiefly directed against Nicias, one of the generals actually present in the assembly; a man of a virtuous, but timid disposition; endowed with much prudence, and little enterprise; possessed of moderate abilities, and immoderate riches; a zealous partizan of aristocracy, and an avowed enemy to Cleon, whom he regarded as the worst enemy of his country.

A person of this character could not be much inclined to engage in the hazardous expedition to Sphacteria. When the Athenians, with the usual licentiousness that prevailed in their assemblies, called out to Cleon, "that if the enterprise appeared so easy, it would better suit the extent of his abilities;" Nicias rose up, and immediately offered to cede to him the command. Cleon at first accepted it, thinking Nicias's proposal merely a feint; but when the latter appeared in earnest, his adversary drew back, alleging, "that Nicias, not Cleon was general." The Athenians, with the malicious pleasantry natural to the multitude, pressed Cleon the closer, the more eagerly he receded. He was at length overcome by their importunity, but not forsaken by his impudence.³ Advancing to the middle of the assembly, he declared, "that he was not afraid of the Lacedæmonians; and engaged in twenty days to bring the Spartans as prisoners to Athens, or to die in the attempt."⁴ This heroic language excited laughter among the multitude; the wise rejoiced in thinking, that they must obtain one of two advantages, either the destruction of a turbulent demagogue (which they rather hoped,) or the capture of the Spartans in Sphacteria.

The latter event was hastened by Olymp. an accident. While some soldiers lxxxviii. 4. were preparing their victuals, the A. C. 425. wood was set on fire, and long burned unperceived, till a brisk gale arising, the conflagration raged with such violence, as threatened to consume the island. This unforeseen disaster disclosed the strength and position of the Spartans; and Demosthenes was actually

¹ Thucyd. p. 262. et seq.

² The Athenians objected, "an incursion towards their fortress, during the suspension of hostilities, *καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἐξ ὀλογῆς*," and other matters of little moment, says Thucydides, with his usual impartiality, p. 266.

³ Thucyd. p. 271.

⁴ *ἢ αὐτοὺς ἀποκτείνειν*, "or kill them on the spot." A little alteration in the text will give the meaning which I preferred as most agreeable to what follows; but the other translation better suits the boastful character of Cleon.

preparing to attack them, when Cleon, with his light-armed troops, arrived in the camp. The island was invaded during night; the advanced guards were taken or slain. At the dawn, the Athenians made a descent from seventy ships. The main body of the enemy retired to the strong post opposite to Pylus, harassed in their march by showers of arrows, stones, and darts, involved in the ashes of the burnt wood, which mounting widely into the air, on all sides intercepted their sight, and increased the gloom of battle. The Spartans, closely embodied, and presenting a dreadful front to the assailants, made good their retreat.

Having occupied the destined post, they boldly defended it wherever the enemy approached, for the nature of the ground hindered it from being surrounded. The Athenians used their utmost efforts to repel and overcome them; and during the greatest part of the day, both parties obstinately persevered in their purpose, under the painful pressures of battle, thirst, and a burning sun. At length the Messenians, whose ardour had been signally distinguished in every part of this enterprise, discovered an unknown path leading to the eminence which defended the Lacedæmonian rear. The Spartans were thus encompassed on all sides, and reduced to a similar situation to that of their illustrious countrymen who fell at Thermopylæ.

Nor did their commanders disgrace the country of Leonidas. Their general, Epitades, was slain. Hippagretes was dying of his wounds. Styphon, the third in command, still exhorted them to persevere. But Demosthenes and Cleon, desirous rather to carry them prisoners to Athens, than to put them to death, invited them, by the loud proclamation of a herald, to lay down their arms. The greater part dropped their shields, and waved their hands in token of compliance. A conference followed between Demosthenes and Cleon on one side, and Styphon on the other. Styphon desired leave to send over to the Lacedæmonians on the continent for advice. Several messages passed between them; in the last of which it was said, "the Lacedæmonians permit you to consult your own utility, provided you submit to nothing base:" in consequence of which determination, they surrendered their arms and their persons. They were conducted to Athens, within the time assigned by Cleon; having held out fifty-two days after the expiration of the truce, during which time they had been so sparing of the provisions conveyed to them by the extraordinary means above mentioned, that, when the place was taken, they had still something in reserve.⁵

The Athenians withdrew their fleet, leaving a strong garrison in Pylus, which was soon reinforced by an enterprising body of Messenians from Naupactus. The Messenians, though possessed of no more than one barren cape on their native and once happy coast, resumed their inveterate hatred against Sparta, whose territories they continually infested by incursions, or harassed by alarms. This species of war, destructive in itself, was rendered still more dangerous by the revolts of the Helots, attracted

by every motive of affection towards their ancient kinsmen, and animated by every principle of resentment against their tyrannical masters. Mean while the Athenian fleet renewed and multiplied their ravages on the coast of Peloponnesus. Reduced to extremity by such proceedings, the Spartans sent to Athens repeated overtures of accommodation. But the good fortune of the Athenians had only nourished their ambition. At the instigation of Cleon, they dismissed the Spartan ambassadors more insolently than ever.⁶ Such was their deference to the opinion of this arrogant demagogue; at the same time that, with the most inconsistent levity, they listened with pleasure to the plays of Aristophanes, which lashed the character and administration of Cleon with the boldest severity of satire, sharpened by the edge of the most poignant ridicule.

The taking of Pylus, the triumphant return of Cleon, a notorious coward transformed by caprice and accident into a brave and successful commander, were topics well suiting the comic vein of Aristophanes. The imperious demagogue had deserved the personal resentment of the poet, by denying the legitimacy of his birth,⁷ and thereby contesting his title to vote in the assembly. On former occasions, Aristophanes had stigmatised the incapacity and insolence of Cleon, together with his perfidious selfishness in embroiling the affairs of the republic. In the comedy⁸ first represented in the seventh year of the war, he attacks him in the moment of victory, when fortune had rendered him the idol of a licentious multitude, when no comedian was so daring as to play his character, and no painter so bold as to design his mask.⁹

Aristophanes, therefore, appeared for the first time on the stage, only disguising his own face, the better to represent the part of Cleon. In this ludicrous piece, which seems to have been celebrated even beyond its merit, the people of Athens are described under the allegory of a capricious old dotard, whose credulity, abused by a malicious slave lately admitted into his house,¹⁰ persecutes and torments his faithful old servants. Demosthenes bitterly complains, that, intending to gratify the palate of the old man, he had brought a delicate morsel from Pylus; but that it had been stolen by Cleon, and by him served up to their common master. After lamenting, with his companion Nicias, the hardships of their condition, they hold counsel together, and contrive various expedients for putting an end to their common calamities. The desponding Nicias proposes drinking bull's blood, after the example of Themistocles; Demosthenes, with more courage, advises a hearty draught of wine. Finding Cleon asleep, they seize the opportunity not only to purloin this liquor, but to rifle his pockets, in which they discover some ancient oracles, typically representing the succession of Athenian magistrates. Towards the end of the

⁵ Aristoph. Equit. 794.

⁷ Vit. anonym. Aristoph.

⁸ The *ἰππιδες*.

⁹ Ὑπερ τοῦ δεινῆς γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἠδελῶ

τὸν εὐνοποῖον εἰκασίαι. Equites, v. 931.

¹⁰ Νέονητον κακόν, "The new-bought mischief."

prophecy, it was said, that the dragon should overcome the devouring vulture. The rapacious avarice of Cleon corresponded to the type of the vulture; and the dragon darkly shadowed out Agoracritus, an eminent maker of puddings and sausages, the shape and contents of which alluded to the figure and food of that terrible serpent. Nicias and Demosthenes hail this favourite of fortune, as the destined master of the republic. Agoracritus alleges in vain, that he is totally unacquainted with political affairs, ignorant of every liberal art, and has hardly learned to read. They reply, by announcing to him the oracle, and by proving that his pretended imperfections better qualified him to conduct the government of Athens. This office required none of the talents, the want of which he lamented. He matched Cleon in impudence, and surpassed him in strength of lungs. His profession had taught him to squeeze, to amass, to bruise, to embroil, and to confound; and long experience had rendered him accomplished in all the frauds and chicanes of the market.¹ He might therefore boldly enter the lists with Cleon, being assured of assistance from the whole body of Athenian knights.² Agoracritus, thus encouraged, prepares for encountering his adversary. The contest, long doubtful, is maintained in a style of the lowest buffoonery, always ludicrous, often indecent. The old dotard, or rather the Athenians whom he represents, finally acknowledge their past errors; and regret being so long deceived by an upstart slave, through whose obstinacy in continuing the war, they had been cooped up within the walls of an unwholesome city, and hindered from enjoying their beautiful fields and happy rural amusements. Agoracritus seizes this favourable moment to produce two ancient treaties with the Lacedæmonians, personified by two beautiful women, whom he had found closely mewed up in the house of Cleon. Of these females the old Athenian becomes suddenly enamoured, and they retire together to the country.

Olymp. The people of Athens permitted, and even approved, the licentious lxxxix. 1. boldness of Aristophanes; but neither the strength of reason, nor the sharpness of satire, could resist the impetuosity of their ambition. The war was rendered popular by success; they prepared for carrying it on with redoubled vigour. The first operations of the ensuing summer gratified their utmost hopes. The principal division of the fleet, conducted by the prudence of Nicias, took the fertile and populous island of Cythera, stretching from the southern promontory of Laconia towards the Cretan sea, and long enriched by the commerce of Egypt and Libya. The Lacedæmonian garrison, as well as the Spartan magistrates in the island, surrendered prisoners of war. The more dangerous part of the inhabitants were removed to the Athenian isles; the remainder were subjected to an annual tribute of eight hundred pounds sterling;

an Athenian garrison took possession of the fortress.

Soon after this important conquest, the arms of Demosthenes and Hippocrates reduced the town of Nicæa, the principal sea-port of the Megareans; and the Athenian fleet ravaged with impunity several maritime cities on the eastern coast of Peloponnesus. Thyrea was condemned to a harder fate. This city, together with the surrounding district, had been granted, by the compassion of Sparta, to the miserable natives of Ægina, who (as above mentioned) had been driven from their once powerful island by the cruelty of Athens. This cruelty still continued to pursue them. Their newly-raised walls were taken by assault; their houses burned; and the inhabitants, without distinction, put to the sword.

Hitherto all the enterprises of the Athenians were crowned with success. Fortune first deserted them in Bœotia. During several months their generals, Demosthenes and Hippocrates, availing themselves of the political factions of that country, had been carrying on secret intrigues with Chæronæa, Siphæ, and Orchomenus, places abounding in declared partizans of democracy, and eternally hostile to the ambition of Thebes. The insurgents had agreed to take arms, in order to betray the western parts of Bœotia to Demosthenes, who sailed with forty galleys from Naupactus; while Hippocrates, at the head of seven thousand heavy-armed Athenians, and a much greater proportion of light-armed auxiliaries, invaded the eastern frontier of that province. It was expected, that, before the Thebans could bring a sufficient force into the field, the invaders and insurgents, advancing from opposite extremities of the country, might unite in the centre, and perhaps subdue Thebes itself, the most powerful, as well as most zealous, ally of Sparta.

This plan, though concerted with much ability, was found too complicated for execution. Demosthenes steered towards Siphæ, before his coadjutor was ready to take the field; some mistake, it is said, having happened about the time appointed for action; and the whole contrivance was betrayed by Nichomachus, a Phocian, to the Spartans, and by them communicated to the Bœotians. The cities which meditated revolt were thus secured, before Demosthenes appeared at Siphæ, and before Hippocrates had even marched from Attica.

Olymp. The latter at length entered the eastern frontier of Bœotia; and, as lxxxix. 1. the principal design had miscarried, A. C. 424. contented himself with taking and fortifying Delium, a place sacred to Apollo. Having garrisoned this post, he prepared for returning home. But while his army still lay in the neighbourhood of Delium, the Thebans, encouraged by Pagondas, a brave and skilful leader, marched with great rapidity from Tanagra, in order to intercept his retreat. Their forces amounted to eighteen thousand; the Athenians were little less numerous. An engagement ensued, which national emulation rendered bloody and obstinate. Before the battle, Pagondas had detached a small squadron

1 The same word in Greek denotes the market and the forum. Indeed the same place usually served for both.

2 The ἰππῖται, or Equites, the second rank of citizens at Athens, who detested Cleon, and from whom the play takes its name.

of horse, with orders to ride up after the commencement of the action. This stratagem was decisive. The Athenians, terrified at the sight of a reinforcement, which their fears magnified into a new army, were thrown into disorder, and put to flight. Approaching darkness saved them from total destruction. They escaped disgracefully into Attica, after leaving in the field of battle a thousand pikemen, with their commander Hippocrates.

The victorious army immediately formed the siege of Delium, which was taken by means of a machine first contrived for that purpose. Several parts of the fortification, which had been raised in great haste, consisted chiefly of wood. The besiegers therefore, joining together a number of large beams, formed a huge mast, perforated in the middle; to one of its extremities they appended a prodigious mass of pitch and sulphur; and to the other a bellows, which, when this unusual instrument of destruction was raised above the wooden rampart, immediately threw the whole into flames. The Athenian garrison, diminished by death or desertion to two hundred men, surrendered prisoners of war.³

The Athenians had scarcely time to lament their losses in Bœotia, when they received intelligence of a calamity in another quarter, equally unexpected, and still more alarming. This event is the more remarkable, because it naturally arose out of the preceding prosperity of Athens, and the past misfortunes of Sparta. The uninterrupted train of success which attended the arms of Nicias and Demosthenes in the eighth year of the war, alarmed the citizens of Olynthus and other places of the Chalcidicé, which having embraced the earliest opportunity of revolting from the Athenians, justly dreaded the vengeance of an incensed and victorious people. Every southerly wind threatened them with the approach of an Athenian fleet. Their apprehensions were not less painful on the side of Thessaly. The slightest movement in that country terrified them with the apprehensions of an Athenian army, which, victorious in the south, should advance to punish its northern enemies. But as none of these dreaded dangers were realized, the inhabitants of the Chalcidicé gradually resumed courage, put their towns in a posture of defence, and craved assistance from their Peloponnesian allies. At the same time Perdiccas, king of Macedon, who regarded the Athenians as his ancient and natural enemies, and the rapacious invaders of his coast, sent money into the south of Greece, for the purpose of hiring soldiers, whom he intended to employ in resisting the encroachments of that ambitious people, as well as in subduing the Elymeans, Lyncestæ, and other barbarous tribes, not yet incorporated in the Macedonian kingdom.

Such were the enemies, whose activity the good fortune of Athens had roused; while the calamities of Sparta prompted her to supply the reinforcement of troops, which both Perdiccas and the Chalcidians demanded. During the seventh and eighth years of the war, that re-

public fatally experienced the truth of Pericles's maxim, "that those who command the sea, may also become masters at land." The Athenian fleets domineered over the coast of Peloponnesus. It was impossible to foresee what places would be the next objects of their continual descents. The maritime parts were successively laid waste, and finally abandoned by the inhabitants, who found resistance ineffectual and useless. These misfortunes were increased by the frequent desertion of the Helots to the neighbouring garrisons in Pylus and Cythera, and by the dread of a general insurrection, among those numerous and unhappy victims of Spartan tyranny. To prevent this evil, the Spartans had recourse to such expedients as excite astonishment and horror. They commanded the Helots to choose two thousand of their bravest and most meritorious youths, who, by the general consent of their companions, deserved the crown of liberty; and when invested with this perfidious ornament, the unsuspecting freemen had paraded the streets, and sacrificed in the temples, exulting in their late emancipation, these new members of the community gradually disappeared from the sight of men, nor was it ever known by what means they had been destroyed. But the veil of mystery, which concealed that dark and bloody stratagem, prevented neither the resentment of the slaves, nor the just suspicion of their masters. The latter were eager to embrace any measure that might deliver their country from its dangerous domestic foes. With much satisfaction, therefore, they sent seven hundred Helots to the standard of Brasidas, whose merit had recommended him to Perdiccas and the Chalcidians, as the general best qualified to manage the Macedonian war. About a thousand soldiers were levied in the neighbouring cities of Peloponnesus. Several Spartans cheerfully accompanied a leader whom they admired. With this inconsiderable force Brasidas, towards the beginning of autumn, undertook an expedition highly important in its consequences, and conducted with consummate prudence and bravery.⁴

Olymp. Having traversed the friendly countries of Bœotia and Phocis, he lxxxix. 1. arrived at the foot of Mount Oëta, A. C. 424. and penetrated through the narrow defiles confined between that steep and woody range of hills, and the boisterous waves of the Malian gulf. The sight of Thermopylæ animated the enthusiasm of the Spartans, and encouraged them to force their way through the hostile plains of Thessaly; a country actually torn by domestic discord, but always friendly to the Athenians. The celerity of Brasidas anticipated the slow opposition of a divided enemy. Having reached the Macedonian town of Dium, he joined forces with Perdiccas, who proposed directing the first operations of the combined army against Arribæus, the king or leader of the barbarous Lyncestæ. But even this Barbarian knew the valour of the Spartans, and the equity of Brasidas. To the decision of the Grecian general he offered

³ Thucyd. p. 304—320.

⁴ Thucyd. p. 304.

to submit the differences between Perdiccas and himself, and engaged to abide by the award, however unfavourable to his interest. The Spartan listened to a proposal extremely reasonable in itself, though altogether inconsistent with the ambitious views of Perdiccas, who disdained to accept as a judge the man whom he paid as an auxiliary. Brasidas, on the other hand, declined in firm but decent terms, to employ his valour against those who implored his justice. The generals thus separated in mutual disgust; and Perdiccas thenceforth reduced his contribution of subsidy from a moiety to a third; but even that was extorted from his fears, not bestowed by his munificence.

Brasidas hastened to join the Chalcidians, by whom he was received with a degree of joy suitable to the impatience with which he had been expected. Amidst the general defection of their neighbours, the towns of Acanthus and Stagirus still maintained their allegiance to Athens. Brasidas appeared before the gates of Acanthus, while the peaceful inhabitants were preparing for the labours of the vintage. He sent a messenger, craving leave to enter the place, and to address the assembly. The Acanthians were divided in opinion; but the majority, fearing to expose their ripe fields and vineyards to the resentment of his army, agreed to admit the general alone and unattended, and impartially to weigh whatever he proposed for their deliberation. Brasidas, though a Spartan, was an able speaker. He observed to the Acanthians, convened in full assembly, "That, in compliance with the generous resolution of Sparta, he had undertaken, and finally accomplished, a long and dangerous journey, to deliver them from the tyranny of Athenian magistrates and garrisons, and to restore them, what the common oppressors of Greece had so long withheld, the independent government of their own equitable laws. This was the object, which, amidst all the calamities of war, the Spartans had ever kept in view; this was the purpose, which, before his departure from home, the principal magistrates had sworn unanimously to maintain. That freedom and independence, which formed the domestic happiness of Sparta, his countrymen were ambitious to communicate to all their allies. But if the Acanthians refused to share the general benefit, they must not complain of experiencing the unhappy effects of their obstinacy. The arms of Sparta would compel those whom her arguments had failed to persuade. Nor could this be blamed as injustice; first, because the resources with which the Acanthians furnished Athens, under the ignominious name of tribute, served to rivet the chains of Greece; and secondly, because the example of a people, so wealthy and flourishing, and long renowned for their penetration and sagacity, might influence the resolutions of neighbouring states, and deter them from concurring with the measures necessary to promote the public welfare and security."

This judicious discourse, enforced by the terror of the Spartan army, engaged the Acanthians to accept the friendship of Brasidas. Stagi-

rus, another city on the Strymonic gulf, readily followed the example, and opened its gates to the deliverer. During the ensuing winter, the measures of the Spartan general were conducted with equal ability and enterprise. His successful operations against the inland towns facilitated the surrender of such places, as, by their maritime or insular situation, were most exposed to the vengeance of Athens, and therefore most averse to revolt. His moderate use of victory ensured the goodwill of the vanquished. The various parts of a plan, thus artfully combined, mutually assisted each other; the success of one undertaking contributed to that of the next which followed it; and, at length, without any considerable miscarriage, he had rendered himself master of most places in the peninsulas of Acta, Sithonia, and Palléné.

The loss of Amphipolis was that which most deeply afflicted the Athenians: a rich and populous city, beautifully situate on a small but well cultivated island, surrounded by the river Strymon, the banks of which supplied excellent timber, and other materials of naval strength. By possessing this town, the Spartans now commanded both branches of the river, and might thus pass, without interruption, to the Athenian colonies, or subjects, on the coast of Thrace; seize, or plunder, the gold mines opposite to the isle of Thasos; and ravage the fertile fields of the Thracian Chersonesus. The conquest of a place so essential to the enemy, had exercised the courage, the eloquence, and the dexterity of Brasidas. He formed a conspiracy with the malecontents in the place, skilfully disposed his army before the walls, harangued the assembly of the people. A most seasonable promptitude distinguished all his measures; yet the Athenian Eucleus, who commanded the garrison, found time to send a vessel to Thasos, requesting immediate and effectual relief.

The Athenians had committed the government of that island, as well as the direction of the mines on the opposite continent, to the celebrated historian of a war, in which he was a meritorious, though unfortunate, actor. Without a moment's delay, Thucydides put to sea with seven galleys, and arrived in the mouth of the Strymon the same day on which his assistance had been demanded. But it was already too late to save Amphipolis.¹ The Spartan general, who had exact information of all the measures of the besieged, well knew the importance of anticipating the arrival of Thucydides, whose name was highly respected by the Greek colonies in Thrace, and whose influence was considerable among the native Barbarians. Brasidas, therefore, proposed such a capitulation to the Amphipolitans as it seemed imprudent to refuse. They were to be released from the tribute which they had hitherto paid the Athenians; to enjoy the utmost degree of political independence, not inconsistent with the alliance of Sparta; even the Athenian garrison, if they continued in the place, were to be entitled to all the rights of citizens; and

¹ Thucyd. p. 322.

such persons as chose to leave it, were granted a reasonable time to remove their families and their property. The last condition was embraced by the Athenians, and their more determined partizans. They retired to the neighbouring town of Eion, situate near the sea, on the northern branch of the Strymon; a place secured against every hostile assault by the skill and activity of Thucydides.

Towards the end of winter, the full extent of Brasidas's success was made known at Athens. The assembly was in commotion; and the populace were the more enraged at their losses, as it now appeared so easy to have prevented them, either by guarding the narrow defiles, which led to their Macedonian possessions, or by sending their fleet with a seasonable reinforcement to their feeble garrisons in those parts. Their own neglect had occasioned the public disgrace; but with the usual injustice and absurdity accompanying popular discontent, they exculpated themselves, and banished their generals. Thucydides was involved in this cruel sentence. An armament was sent to Macedon; and new commanders were named to oppose Brasidas.

But the designs of that commander, who had begun to build vessels on the Strymon, and aspired at nothing less than succeeding to the authority, without exercising the oppression, of Athens, over those extensive shores, were more successfully opposed by the envy of the Spartan magistrates. The pride of the nobility was wounded by the glory of an expedition, in which they had no share; and their selfishness, while it obstinately prevented the supplies necessary to complete the plan of Brasidas, was eager to reap the profit of his past success. The restoration of their kinsmen taken at Sphacteria formed the object of their fondest wish; and they expected that the Athenians might listen to a proposal for that purpose, in order to recover the places which they had lost, and to check the fortunate career of a prudent and enterprising general. The Athenians readily entered into these views; it was determined that matters of such importance should be discussed with leisure and impartiality; a truce was therefore agreed on for a year between the contending republics.

Olymp. This transaction was concluded
lxxxix. 2. in the ninth summer of the war.
A. C. 423. It was totally unexpected by Brasidas, who received the voluntary submission of Scioné and Menda, two places of considerable importance in the peninsula of Palléné; of the former, indeed, before he was acquainted with the suspension of hostilities; but of the latter, even after he was apprised of that treaty.

Olymp. While the active valour of Brasidas prevented the confirmation of
lxxxix. 3. peace, the conscious worthlessness
A. C. 422. of Cleon promoted the renewal, or rather the continuance, of war. The glory of Athens was the perpetual theme of his discourse. He exhorted his countrymen to punish the perfidy of Sparta, in abetting the insolent revolt of Menda and Scioné; and to employ his own skill and bravery, which had been so success-

fully exerted on the coast of Peloponnesus, to repair their declining fortune in Macedonia. The Athenians listened to the specious advice of this turbulent declaimer, who, in the ensuing spring, sailed to the Macedonian coast with a fleet of thirty galleys, twelve hundred citizens, heavy-armed, a squadron of three hundred horse, and a powerful body of light-armed auxiliaries. The surrender of Menda and Torona, whose inhabitants were treated with every excess of cruelty, encouraged him to attack Amphipolis. With this design, having collected his forces at Eion, he waited the arrival of some Macedonian troops, promised by Perdiccas, who having quarrelled with the Spartan general, deceitfully flattered the hopes of his antagonist.

The army of Cleon contained the flower of the Athenian youth, whose ardent valour disdained a precarious dependence on barbarian aid. They accused the cowardice of their leader, which was only equalled by his incapacity, and lamented their own hard fate in being subjected to the authority of a man so unworthy to command them. The impatient temper of an arrogant demagogue was ill fitted to endure these seditious complaints. He hastily led his troops before the place, without previously examining the strength of the walls, the situation of the ground, the number or disposition of the enemy. Brasidas, meanwhile, had taken proper measures to avail himself of the known imprudence of his adversary. A considerable body of men had been concealed in the woody mountain Cerdylum, which overhangs Amphipolis. The greater part of the army were drawn up, ready for action, at the several gates of the city. Cleon, who commanded there, had orders to rush forth at a given signal, while Brasidas in person, conducting a select band of intrepid followers, watched the first opportunity for attack. The plan, contrived with so much skill, was executed with equal dexterity and precision. Confounded with the rapidity of such an unexpected and complicated charge, the enemy fled amain, abandoning their shields, and exposing their naked backs to the swords and spears of the pursuers. The forces on either side amounted to about three thousand; six hundred Athenians fell victims to the folly of Cleon, who, though foremost in the flight, was arrested by the hand of a Myrcinian targeteer.

His death might appease the manes of his unfortunate countrymen; but nothing could alleviate the sorrow of the victors for the loss of their admired Brasidas, who received a mortal wound while he advanced to the attack. He was conveyed alive to Amphipolis, and enjoyed the consolation of his last victory, in which only seven men had perished on the Spartan side. The sad magnificence of his funeral was adorned by the splendour of military honours; but what was still more honourable to Brasidas, he was sincerely lamented by the grateful tears of numerous communities, who regarded his virtues and abilities as the surest pledges of their own happiness and security. The citizens of Amphipolis paid an extraordinary tribute to his memory. Having

demolished every monument of their ancient leaders and patriots, they erected the statue of Brasidas in the most conspicuous square of the city, appointed annual games to be celebrated at his tomb, and sacrificed to his revered shade, as to the great hero and original founder of their community.¹

Olymp. The battle of Amphipolis re-
lxxxix. 4. moved the principal obstacles to
A. C. 421. peace. There was not any Spar-
tan general qualified to accomplish
the designs of Brasidas. The Athenians, de-
jected by defeat, and humbled by disgrace,
wanted the bold imposing eloquence of Cleon,
to disguise their weakness, and varnish their
misfortunes. With the disheartened remains
of an enfeebled armament, they despaired of
recovering their Macedonian possessions; and
the greater part returned home, well disposed
for an accommodation with the enemy. These
dispositions were confirmed by the pacific tem-
per of Nicias, who had succeeded to the
influence of Cleon, and who fortunately dis-
covered in the moderation of Pleistoanax, king
of Sparta, a coadjutor extremely solicitous to
promote his views. During winter, several
friendly conferences were held between the
commissioners of the two republics; and to-
wards the commencement of the ensuing spring,
a treaty of peace, and soon afterwards a defen-
sive alliance, for fifty years, was ratified by the
kings and ephori of Sparta on the one side, and
by the archons and generals of Athens on the
other. In consequence of this negotiation,
which was intended to comprehend the respec-
tive allies of the contracting powers, all places
and prisoners, taken in the course of the war,

were to be mutually restored; the revolted ci-
ties in Macedon were specified by name; but
it was regulated that the Athenians should not
require from them any higher revenue than
that apportioned by the justice of Aristides.²

In all their transactions, the Greeks were
ever prodigal of promises, but backward in per-
formance; and, amidst the continual rotation of
authority, magistrates easily found excuses for
violating the conditions granted by their pre-
decessors. The known principles of republican
inconstancy, ever ready to vibrate between ex-
cessive animosity and immoderate friendship,
might likewise suggest a reason for converting
the treaty of peace into a contract of alliance.
But this measure, in the present case, was the
effect of necessity. Athens and Sparta might
make mutual restitution, because their respec-
tive interests required it. But no motive of
interest engaged the former power to restore
Nicsæa to the Megarians, or the towns of Solium
and Anactorium to Corinth. The Thebans,
shortly before the peace, had seized the Athe-
nian fortress of Panactum, situate on the fron-
tier of Bœotia. They were still masters of
Platsæa. Elated by their signal victory at De-
lium, they could not be supposed willing to
abandon their conquests, or even much inclined
to peace. It was still less to be expected that
the Macedonian cities should, for the conve-
niency of Sparta, submit to the severe yoke
of Athens, from which they had recently been
delivered; nor could it be hoped that even the
inferior states of Peloponnesus should tamely
lay down their arms, without obtaining any of
those advantages with which they had been
long flattered by their Spartan allies.

CHAPTER XVIII.

*Discontents fomented by the Corinthians—The Argive Alliance—To which Athens accedes—
Birth and Education of Alcibiades—His Friendship with Socrates—His Character—And
Views—Which are favoured by the State of Greece—He deceives the Spartan Ambassadors—
Renewal of the Peloponnesian War—Battle of Mantinea—Tumults in Argos—Massacre of the
Scioneans—Cruel Conquest of Melos.*

THE voluptuous, yet turbulent citizens of
Corinth, enjoyed the odious distinction of
renewing a war which their intrigues and ani-
mosities had first kindled. Under pretence of
having taken an oath never to abandon the
Macedonian cities, they declined being parties
in the general treaty of peace. The alliance be-
tween Athens and Sparta, in which it was sti-
pulated, that these contracting powers should be
entitled to make such alterations in the treaty
as circumstances might require, the Corinthians
affected, with some reason, to consider as a
conspiracy against the common liberties of
Greece.³ Fired with this idea, they hastened

to Argos, in order to animate that republic with
the same passions which rankled in their own
breasts. Having roused the ambition of the
magistrates, they artfully reminded the people
of the glory of Agamemnon, recalled to the
Argives their ancient and just pre-eminence in
the Peloponnesus, and conjured them to main-
tain the honour of that illustrious peninsula,
which had been so shamefully abandoned by
the pusillanimity, or betrayed by the selfish-
ness, of Sparta.

Olymp. The Argives wanted neither
lxxxix. 4. power nor inclination to assume
A. C. 421. that important office. During the
Peloponnesian war, they had ob-
served the principles of a prudent neutrality,
equally favourable to their populousness and
their wealth. Their protection was courted by

¹ Thucyd. p. 307.

² Thucyd. p. 354, et seq.

³ The clause was worded in such a manner as might nat-
urally excite alarm: Προσδίδωμι καὶ ἀφίλειν ὅτι ἐν ἈΜ-
ΦΟΙΝ τοῖς πόλεσιν ὄντα. Thucyd. l. v. p. 284.

Mantineæ, the most powerful city in Arcadia, which had recently conquered some villages in its neighbourhood, to which Sparta laid claim. The Elians, long hostile to Sparta, eagerly promoted the Argive alliance, which was farther strengthened by the speedy accession of the Macedonian allies, whose inhabitants were not more flattered by the kind zeal of Corinth, than provoked by the cruel indifference of Sparta. Thebes and Megara were equally offended with their Lacedæmonian allies, and equally inclined to war. But a rigid aristocracy prevailed in those states, whose ambitious magistrates, trembling for their personal authority, and that of their families, declined entering into confederacy with free democratical republics.⁴

Olymp. But this democratical association soon acquired an accession still more important, and received into its bosom the fountain of liberty itself; even the republic of Athens. This extraordinary event happened in the year following the negotiation between Athens and Sparta. It was effected by means extremely remote from the experience of modern times; means which it is incumbent on us to explain, lest the political transactions of Greece should appear too fluctuating and capricious to afford a proper subject for history.

Amidst the factious turbulence of senates and assemblies, no measure could be adopted by one party, without being condemned by another. Many Athenians disapproved of the peace of Nicias;⁵ but the general blaze of opposition was eclipsed by the splendour of one man, who, on this occasion, first displayed those singular but unhappy talents, which proved fatal to himself and to his country. Alcibiades had not yet reached his thirtieth year, the age required by the wisdom of Solon for being entitled to speak in the assembly. But every advantageous circumstance of birth and fortune, talents natural and acquired, accomplishments of mind and body, pleaded an exception in favour of this extraordinary character, which, producing at once flowers and fruit, united with the blooming vivacity of youth, the ripened wisdom of experience.⁶ His father, the rich and generous Clinias, derived his extraction from the heroic Ajax, and had distinguished his own valour and patriotism in the glorious scenes of the Persian war. In the female line, the son of Clinias was allied to the eloquence and magnanimity of Pericles, who, as his nearest surviving kinsman, was entrusted with the care of his minority. But the statesman, who governed with undivided sway the affairs of Athens and of Greece, could not bestow much attention on this important domestic task. The tender years of Alcibiades were committed to the illiberal discipline of mercenary preceptors; his youth and inexperience were beset by the destructive adulation of servile flatterers,—until the young Athenian, having begun to relish the poems of Homer, the admiration of which is

congenial to every great mind, learned from thence to despise the pedantry of the one, and to detest the meanness of the other.⁷

From Homer Alcibiades early imbibed that ambition for excellence which is the great lesson of the immortal bard. Having attained the verge of manhood, he readily distinguished, among the crowd of rhetoricians and sophists, the superior merit of Socrates, who, rejecting all factitious and abstruse studies, confined his speculations to matters of real importance and utility; who, having never travelled to Egypt and the East in search of mysterious knowledge, reasoned with an Attic perspicuity and freedom; and who, being unbiassed by the system of any master, and always master of himself, thought, spoke, and acted with equal independence and dignity. An amiable and most instructive writer, the disciple and friend of Socrates, has left an admirable panegyric of the uniform temperance, the unshaken probity, the diffusive benevolence invariably displayed in his virtuous life of seventy years.⁸ His distinguishing excellences are justly appreciated by Xenophon, a scholar worthy of his master;⁹ but the youthful levity of Alcibiades (for youth is seldom capable of estimating the highest of all merits, the undeviating tenor of an innocent and useful life) was chiefly delighted with the splendour of particular actions. The eloquence, rather than the innocence of Socrates, excited his admiration. He was charmed with that inimitable raillery, that clear comprehensive logic, which baffled the most acute disputants of the Athenian schools;¹⁰ that erect independence of mind, which disdained the insolence of power, the pride of wealth, and the vanity of popular fame, was well fitted to attract the congenial esteem of Alcibiades, who aspired beyond the beaten paths of vulgar greatness; nor could the gallant youth be less affected by the invincible intrepidity of Socrates, when, quitting the shade of speculation, and covered with the helm and cuirass, he grasped the massy spear, and justified by his strenuous exertion in the field of battle, the useful lessons of his philosophy.¹¹

Socrates in his turn (since it is easier for a wise man to correct the errors of reason than to conquer the delusions of sentiment) was deeply affected with the beauty of Alcibiades;¹² a beauty depending, not on the transient flower of youth, and the seductive delicacy of effeminate graces, but on the ineffable harmony of a form which realized the sublime conceptions of Homer and Phidias concerning their fabulous divinities, and which shone in the autumn of life with undiminished effulgence.¹³ The affection of Socrates, though infinitely removed from impurity, resembled rather the ardour of love

⁴ Thucyd. l. v. p. 371.

⁵ The Greeks sometimes distinguished treaties by the names of those who made them: the peace of Cimon; the peace of Nicias; and, as we shall see hereafter, the peace of Antalcidas.

⁶ Plut. et Nepos in Alcibiad.

⁷ Plut. in Alcibiad.

⁸ Xenoph. Memorabil. Socrat.

⁹ See particularly Xenoph. Apolog. Socrat.

¹⁰ Plato, passim.

¹¹ Xenoph. Memorab. Socrat. pp. 449. 804. 818.

¹² Vid. Xenoph. and Plato, passim. Socrates often acknowledges the danger of beauty, and its power over himself; but loses no opportunity to caution his disciples against the shameful passions, and abominable vices, which flow from this fair source. Vid. Memorab. Socrat. l. ii. passim et l. v. c. iii. Sympos. c. iv. p. 246.

¹³ Plut. in Alcibiad.

than the calm moderation of friendship. The sage, whose company was courted by his other disciples, himself courted the company of Alcibiades; and when the ungrateful youth sometimes escaped to his licentious companions, the philosopher pursued him with the eagerness of a father or master, anxious to recover a fugitive son or slave.¹ At the battle of Potidæa he saved the life of his pupil, and in order to gratify the love of military glory, which already animated his youthful bosom, the sage obtained for Alcibiades the prize of valour, which the universal consent of the Athenians thought due to himself. At the fatal engagement of Delium, Alcibiades, it is said, had an opportunity of returning the more substantial favour, by saving the precious life of Socrates;² and it may well be supposed that an interchange of such important favours would straiten the bands of their mutual friendship, during which the powers of reason and fancy were directed, with unabating diligence, to improve the understanding, and excite the virtue of Alcibiades.

But this favourite youth laboured under a defect, which could not be compensated by the highest birth, the most splendid fortune, the noblest endowments of mind and body, and even the inestimable friendship of Socrates. He wanted an honest³ heart. This we are warranted to affirm on the authority of contemporary writers, who acknowledge, that first admiration, and then interest, was the foundation of his attachment to the illustrious sage, by whose instruction he expected to become, not a good, but an able, man. Some inclination to virtue he might, in such company, perhaps feel, but more probably feign; and the nicest discernment might mistake the real character of a man, who could adopt, at pleasure, the most opposite manners; and who, as will appear from the subsequent events of his various life, could surpass the splendid magnificence of Athens, or the rigid frugality of Sparta; could conform, as interest required, to the laborious exercises of the Thebans, or to the voluptuous indolence of Ionia; assume the soft effeminacy of an Eastern prince, or rival the sturdy vices of the drunken Thracians.⁴

The first specimen of his political conduct discovered the extraordinary resources of his versatile mind. He opposed the peace of Nicias, as the work of a rival, whom he wished to disgrace. His ambition longed for war, and the Spartans deserved his resentment, having, in all their transactions with Athens, testified the utmost respect for Nicias, while they were at no pains to conceal their want of regard for himself, though his family had been long connected with their republic by an intercourse of hospitality, and he had endeavoured to strengthen that connection by his personal good offices to the Lacedæmonians taken in Sphacteria. To gratify at once his resentment, his ambition, and his jealousy, he determined to renew the war with Sparta; a design by no means difficult at the present juncture.

¹ Plut. in Alcibiad.

² Strabo, p. 330. et Plut. in Alcibiad.

³ Lysias cont. Alcibiad. et Xenoph. Memorab. Socrat. l. i. p. 715.

⁴ Nepos in Alcibiad.

Olymp. In compliance with the peace of
xc. 1. Nicias, the Spartans withdrew their
A. C. 420. troops from Amphipolis; but they
could restore neither that city, nor
the neighbouring places in Macedon, to the do-
minion of Athens. The Athenians, agreeably
to the treaty, allowed the captives taken in
Sphacteria to meet the longing embraces of
their kinsmen and friends; but good policy
forbade their surrendering Pylus, until the
enemy had performed some of the conditions
stipulated in return. Mutual unwillingness, or
inability, to comply with the articles of peace,
sowed the seeds of animosity, which found a
favourable soil in both republics. The au-
thority of those magistrates, who supported the
peace measures of Nicias and Pleistoanax, had
expired. The Spartan youth wished, by new
hostilities, to cancel the memory of a war, which
had been carried on without profit, and ter-
minated with dishonour. But the wiser part
perceived that better success could not be ex-
pected while the Athenians possessed Pylus.
In their eagerness to recover that fortress, they
renewed their alliance with the Thebans, from
whom they received Panactum, which they
hoped to exchange for Pylus; forgetting, in
this transaction, an important clause in their
treaty with Athens, "that neither of the con-
tracting powers should, without mutual com-
munication and consent, conclude any new
alliance." The Thebans rejoiced in the pros-
pect of embroiling the affairs of Athens and
Sparta; and the Corinthians, guided by the
same hostile views, readily concurred with the
Thebans, and openly re-entered into the Lace-
dæmonian confederacy.⁵

Olymp. Having concluded this negotia-
xc. 1. tion, the Spartans who yielded to
A. C. 420. none in the art of dissembling,
despatched ambassadors to Athens,
excusing what they termed an apparent in-
fringement of the treaty, and requesting that
state to accept Panactum (which had been
carefully dismantled) in exchange for Pylus.
The senate of Athens heard their proposal
without suspicion, especially as they declared
themselves invested with full powers to em-
brace every reasonable plan of present accom-
modation and permanent friendship. It now
remained for the ambassadors to propose their
demand in the popular assembly, which, they
had reason to hope, might be deceived still
more easily than the senate. But in this ex-
pectation they were disappointed by a con-
trivance of Alcibiades, no less singular than
audacious. Having invited the ambassadors
to an entertainment, during which he talked
of their republic with more than his wonted
respect, and testified the utmost solicitude for
the success of their negotiation, he observed to
them, that one circumstance gave him much
concern, their having mentioned full powers.
They must beware of repeating that error in
the assembly, because the natural rapacity of
the populace, apprized of that circumstance,
would not fail to insist on such conditions as
the honour of Sparta could not possibly comply

⁵ Thucyd. l. v. passim.

with. If they concealed the extent of their commission, the declaring of which could only serve to indicate timidity on the one side, and to provoke insolence on the other, he pledged himself to obtain the recovery of Pylus, and the gratification of their utmost hopes. On this occasion the Spartans injudiciously confided in a man, who had been irritated by the former neglect and ingratitude of their country. When they appeared next day in the assembly, Alcibiades demanded, with a loud voice, the object and extent of their commission. According to the concerted plan, they denied their having full powers. The artful Athenian, affecting a transport of indignation, arraigned the audacity and baseness of a people by whom his own unsuspecting temper had been egregiously abused. "But yesterday they declared their full powers in the senate; they denied to-day what yesterday they displayed with ostentation. Such (I now perceive it) is the usual duplicity of their republic. It is thus they have restored Amphipolis. It is thus, Athenians! they have restored the neighbouring towns in Macedon: it is thus they have, indeed, put you in possession of Panactum, but with demolished walls; and after concluding an alliance with Athens, ratified by solemn oath, most treacherously and daringly infringed it, by entering into a league with Thebes, your determined and inveterate enemy. Can you still, men of Athens! tamely submit to such indignities? Do you not expel such traitors (pointing to the ambassadors) from your presence, and from your city?" This extraordinary harangue totally disconcerted the Spartans. Had their confusion allowed them to extenuate their fault by declaring the truth, the least reflection must have suggested, that Alcibiades would represent their simple story as a new turn of ingenious artifice. They retired abruptly from the assembly;⁶ Nicias, and the other partizans of Sparta, shared their disgrace; and the Athenians were soon afterwards persuaded by Alcibiades to embrace the Argive alliance.⁷

It might be expected that the weight of such a powerful confederacy should have speedily crushed the debility of Sparta, already exhausted by the former war. But the military

Olymp. operations of Greece depended less
xc. 2. on the relative strength of contend-
A. C. 419. ing powers, than on the alternate
preponderance of domestic factions.

In the year following the treaty, the Athenians sent a small body of troops to assist their Peloponnesian allies in the reduction of Epidaurus, Tegea, and other hostile cities in Argolis and Arcadia. Yet in the ensuing year when the Spartans, dreading the loss of some cities, and the defection of others, made a vigorous effort to retrieve their authority in Peloponnesus, the Athenians alone discovered little inclination, and exerted no activity, to obstruct their measures for that purpose. Pleistoanax being a partizan of the peace of Nicias, the Spartans entrusted the command to Agis, his more war-

like colleague. All Lacedæmonians of the military age were summoned to the field. The dangerous expedient of arming the Helots was adopted on this important emergence. The Spartan allies showed unusual ardour in their cause. The Thebans sent ten thousand foot, and one thousand horsemen;⁸ the Corinthians two thousand heavy-armed men; the Megarians almost an equal number; the ancient cities of Palléné and Sicyon in Achaia gave a powerful and ready assistance; while the small, but generous republic of Phlius, whose territory, bordering on Argolis, was appointed for the rendezvous of the confederates, took the field with the whole body of citizens and slaves capable of bearing arms.⁹

Olymp. The Argives observed the ap-
xc. 3. proaching storm, and prepared to
A. C. 418. resist it. The Eleans and Man-
tinæans joined them; and although the Athenians were long expected in vain, the Argives did not lose courage, but boldly took the field to oppose the invaders. The skilful movements of king Agis intercepted their return to Argos; the high grounds above them were occupied by the Corinthians and Phliansians; their retreat towards Nemea was cut off by the Bœotians and Megarians. A battle seemed inevitable in the winding vale of Argos; but it is easier to admire, than explain, the subsequent conduct of either army. Whether the Argive commanders¹⁰ were disconcerted by the judicious position of the enemy, or that compassion touched their minds on perceiving such numerous bodies of men, chiefly natives of the same peninsula, sprung from the same blood, and speaking the same Doric tongue, prepared to imbrue their parricidal hands in kindred blood; or that, being secretly partizans of aristocracy,¹¹ they were unwilling to come to extremities with Sparta; it is certain, that instead of joining battle, they entered into conference, with the Lacedæmonian king. In consequence of this unexpected measure, a truce was concluded between the chiefs, without the concurrence or knowledge of the officers or troops in either army. The Argives, Thrasyllus and Alciphron, engaged that their countrymen should give complete satisfaction for the injuries of which they were accused; and king Agis, whose authority, by the Spartan laws, was absolute in the field, led off his obsequious army.

Whatever might be the cause of this measure, it occasioned (after the first pause of silent astonishment) universal discontent, followed by loud and licentious clamours. The Spartans complained, "That, after assembling such a body of men as had scarcely ever been collected in Peloponnesus, whose attachment to their

⁸ They had, however, but five hundred horses; *πνίγες πεντακιστόι καὶ ἀνιππτοὶ ἑκατ.* Perhaps the *ανιππτοὶ*, those not provided with horses, served as attendants on the horsemen. The mixing of light infantry with the cavalry was frequent in later times; but of this hereafter.

⁹ Thucyd. l. v. p. 384, et seq.

¹⁰ Or rather Thrasyllus, who was one of five generals, but who seems to have enjoyed some pre-eminence over his colleagues. Perhaps it was his turn to command.

¹¹ Alciphron, who, with Thrasyllus, was the principal agent in this affair, was the "*προξένος Λακεδαιμονίων*," the public host of the Lacedæmonians. Thucyd. p. 386.

⁶ Thucyd. mentions the shock of an earthquake which occasioned the dissolution of that assembly, before coming to any conclusion.

⁷ Thucyd. l. v. p. 374, et seq. Plat. in Alcibiad.

cause was ardent, whose numbers and courage were invincible, and after surrounding their enemies on every side, and depriving them of every resource, the glorious hope, or rather certainty, of the most complete and important victory, should have been sacrificed, in one moment, by the caprice, the cowardice, or the corruption of their general." The Argives lamented, "That their numerous enemies, whom they had a fair opportunity of engaging in their own country, should have been allowed to escape from their hands by a hasty and ill-judged composition." Nor did they confine their resentment to vain complaints. The most daring or most seditious attacked the houses of Thrasyllus and Alciphron. The rest soon joined in the tumult. The effects of the generals were plundered or confiscated; and their lives were saved, with difficulty, by the respected sanctuary of Argive Juno.

Olymp. Though the Greeks, and indeed
xc. 3. the ancients in general, seldom
A. C. 418. employed resident ambassadors in
foreign states, Alcibiades was then
invested with that character at Argos. His activity would not fail to promote the popular tumult, in which his own and the Athenian interest was concerned. On a future occasion he boasted, that, chiefly at his instigation, the Argives and their allies were persuaded to break the truce; a measure greatly facilitated by the long-expected arrival of the Athenian transports, conveying a reinforcement of twelve hundred soldiers, and a body of three hundred cavalry. Encouraged by this event, the Argives, regardless of the truce, attacked the ancient and wealthy city of Orchomenus in Arcadia, which, after a feeble resistance, submitted to their arms. They next proceeded to lay siege to the neighbouring town of Tegea, a design extremely contrary to the inclination of the Eleans, who were eager to chastise the inhabitants of Lepreum, a district on their own frontier. The Argives, however, paid no regard to their demands; and the Eleans, offended by this instance of contempt, returned home in disgust.

The Lacedæmonians learned with indignation the submission of Orchomenus, the siege of Tegea, and the open infraction of the treaty. They had formerly murmured against the imprudent or perfidious measures of king Agis; but when they felt the effects of his misconduct, their resentment became outrageous. In the first emotions of their animosity, they determined to destroy his house, and to subject him to a fine of several thousand pounds sterling, which, in all probability, he would have been unable to pay. But his eloquence and address appeased the general clamour; and, as the anger of popular assemblies is easily converted into pity, he was again taken into favour. His known talents for war recommended him to the command of the army; and he assured his countrymen, that his future services should speedily wipe off the stain from his character. The Spartans, however, first elected on this occasion ten counsellors to attend their kings in the field, to restrain their too precipitate resolves, and control their too absolute authority.

Having taken this precaution, the necessity of which seemed justified by recent experience, they summoned the assistance of their allies, whose ardour to renew hostilities was equal to their own. They proceeded with a numerous army (though inferior to that formerly collected, as their confederates beyond the Isthmus had not yet time to join them,) and marched directly to the town of Mantinæa, expecting either to take that place, or to oblige the enemy to defend it, by withdrawing their troops from the siege of Tegea. The approach of the Argives prevented the surprise of Mantinæa; and both armies, whose ambition or resentment had been so lately disappointed of an opportunity to display their valour or their fury, eagerly prepared for an engagement.

According to ancient custom, the leaders of the several nations addressed their respective troops. The Mantinæans were animated "by the sight of their city, for the defence of which, as well as for the safety of their wives and children, they were exhorted valiantly to contend. The event of the battle must determine the important alternative of dominion and servitude; dominion which they had lately assumed over various cities in Arcadia, and servitude, which they had already suffered under the cruel tyranny of Sparta." The Argives were reminded "of their ancient pre-eminence in Peloponnesus, which they had recently recovered, and which their honour was now called to maintain. They were reminded of the long and bloody wars which they had formerly carried on, in order to repel the usurpation of a powerful and ambitious neighbour. This was the same enemy who actually provoked their arms, and gave them an opportunity of revenging, in one day, the accumulated injustice of many centuries." The Athenians heard, and repeated, "That it was glorious to march at the head of gallant and faithful allies, and to show themselves deserving of their hereditary renown. They yielded to none in bravery; their power was unrivalled; and when they had overcome the Lacedæmonians, even in the Peloponnesus, their dominion would be more extensive and secure."

The Spartans briefly exhorted their followers, and each other, "to exert that innate valour which had ever animated their breasts, and which could receive no additional force from a tedious display of useless words." Thus saying, they marched with a slow and firm step, regulated by the sound of the flute, to meet the impetuous onset¹ of the Argives and Athenians. Above a thousand of the former, chosen from the flower of the noblest youth of Argos, had been employed, since the first dissensions occasioned by the peace of Nicias, in the constant exercise of arms, in order to maintain the honourable pretensions of their country. They behaved with signal bravery. The Athenians

¹ The admirable verses of Milton, who was a diligent reader of Thucydides, are the best commentary on this battle.

Anon they move
In perfect phalanx to the Dorian mood
Of flutes and soft recorders, such as raised
To height of noblest temper heroes old,
Arming to battle; and instead of rage,
Deliberate valour breathed firm and unmoved, &c.

Par. Lost, b. 1.

were not wanting to their ancient fame. The Mantinæans strenuously defended every thing most dear to them. But the allied army had been considerably weakened by the desertion of the Eleans; and the martial enthusiasm of king Agis, seconded by the persevering valour of the Spartans,² decided the fortune of the battle. The allies were repulsed, broken, thrown into disorder, and put to flight. The Spartans, unwilling to irritate their despair, or superstitiously observing an ancient maxim, which enjoined them "to make a bridge for a flying enemy," did not continue the pursuit, but speedily returned home to celebrate the Carnean festival, rejoicing in having restored the lustre of their arms, and recovered their authority in the Peloponnesus.

This, in fact, proved the immediate consequence of a battle, which was not so bloody as might have been expected, the vanquished having lost eleven, and the victors only three, hundred. But the revolutions of Greece chiefly depended on the fluctuating politics of domestic factions. The Spartans had a numerous party in Argos itself, who, emboldened by the recent victory of their friends, immediately took arms, abolished the popular government, destroyed the partisans of Athens, abjured the league with that state, and entered into a new confederacy with Sparta. This event happened a few weeks after the engagement, and towards the close of the fourteenth winter of the Peloponnesian war. During the two following years, Argos paid dearly for a moment of transient splendour, having undergone three bloody revolutions, which renewed the atrocities of Corcyrean sedition. The contest ended, as in Corcyra, in favour of the Athenians and democracy.

The affairs of the Peloponnesus had long occupied, without engrossing, the attention of Athens. The year preceding her alliance with Argos, the Athenians reduced the rebellious city of Scioné, in the peninsula of Palléné, against which their resentment had been provoked to the utmost fury, because the Scioneans, though inhabiting a country almost surrounded by the sea, had defied the naval power of Athens, and, amidst the misfortunes of that state, revolted to her enemies. The citizens of Scioné became the victims of a revenge equally cruel and imprudent. The males, above the age of puberty, were put to the sword; the women and children dragged into servitude;

the name and honours of the city extinguished for ever; and the territory planted with a new colony, consisting chiefly of Platæan exiles. These atrocious cruelties alarmed the terror, exasperated the resentment, and invigorated the resistance, of the neighbouring republics. Their defence was undertaken by Perdiccas, king of Macedon, whom the Athenians therefore interdicted the use of the Grecian seas. But that ambitious people made so little progress in reducing the Macedonian coast, that they finally desisted from this design, contenting themselves with guarding those places which still preserved their allegiance, with re-establishing domestic order, and with collecting the customary tribute from their numerous colonies and dependencies.

The productive industry diffused through all branches of the community, the equality of private fortune, the absence of habitual luxury, together with the natural advantages of their soil and climate, enabled the Greeks to flourish amidst furious and bloody wars. After a short period of tranquillity, their exuberant population overflowed, and was obliged to discharge itself in foreign colonies or conquests. Such a period Athens enjoyed for five years after the peace of Nicias, as the Macedonian and Argive wars only employed her activity, without exhausting her strength. The necessity of exerting her superfluous vigour in some useful and honourable design, was fatally experienced, in the year following, by the unfortunate island of Melos, one of the largest of the Cyclades, lying directly opposite to the Cape of Malea, the southern promontory of Laconia.

This beautiful island, sixty miles in circumference, of a circular form, of an agreeable temperature, and affording, in peculiar perfection,³ the usual productions of a fine climate, had early invited the colonization of the Spartans; and the happy settlement had enjoyed political independence for seven hundred years. The strength and importance of the capital, which had the same name with the island, may be understood by the armament, of thirty ships, and near three thousand soldiers, which the Athenians brought against it. Before they commenced hostilities, either by attacking the city, or by ravaging the country, they sent ambassadors to the Melians, in order to persuade them to surrender, without incurring the danger or the punishment of an unequal, and probably a fruitless, resistance. The cautious islanders, well acquainted with the eloquence and address of the enemy with whom they had to contend, denied them the permission to speak before the public assembly, but appointed a deputation of the magistrates, to hear and examine their demands. The Athenian ambassadors were received in the senate-house, where a most important and interesting conference was held,⁴ which, while it engages our compassion for the

² If the text is not corrupt, the words of Thucydides are very remarkable: Ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δὴ κατὰ πάντα τὴν ἡμετέραν Λακεδαιμονίαν ἐλαττωθέντες, τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐδείξαν οὐχ ἥσσον περιγινόμενοι. p. 304. "That the Lacedæmonians, exceedingly inferior as they appeared on this occasion to the enemy in military skill, showed themselves as much superior to them in true manly courage." It appears from the description of the battle, that the Lacedæmonians were defective, not in skill, but in discipline. In approaching the enemy, their right wing extended too far, which frequently happened from the desire of every soldier to cover his unarmed side by the shield of the next person on his right. In consequence of this tendency, the Lacedæmonian left wing was over-reached by the enemy's right. Agis ordered the Skiritæ and Brasidians to wheel from their place on the right, and lengthen the front of the left wing: commanding the battalions of Hipponoidas and Aristocles to fill up the vacuity occasioned by this movement. But these generals absolutely refused to obey orders, and were afterwards banished Sparta on that account. Thucyd. p. 303, et seq.

³ The island of Melos is every where impregnated with iron, bitumen, sulphur, and other minerals. It is described by Tournefort as a great laboratory. Its subterranean fires are supposed to give peculiar force and flavour to its wines and fruits.

⁴ Thucyd. l. v. p. 400, et seq.

unhappy victims of ambition, explains the prevailing sentiments and opinions of the Greeks in matters of war and government, and illustrates the daring injustice of the Athenian republic. The ambassadors began the dialogue, by observing, "That since the distrust of the Melians, probably arising from the conscious weakness of their cause, had refused them the liberty of speaking, in a continued oration, to the assembly of the people, they should use that mode of conference which seemed most agreeable to the inclinations of their adversaries, and patiently listen to the objections which might occur to any part of their discourse." *Melians*. "The proposal is just and reasonable; but you have come hither with an armed force, which renders you judges in your own cause. Though vanquished in debate, you may still conquer by arms; but if *we* yield in argument, we must submit to slavery." *Athenians*. "If you intend to talk of matters foreign to the subject, we have done." *M*. "It is surely excusable for those, whose all is at stake, to turn themselves on every side, and to suggest their suspicions and their doubts. But let the conference be carried on in the manner which you have proposed." *A*. "And, on both sides, let all superfluous arguments be omitted; either that *we*, having repelled and conquered the Persians, are entitled to govern the Greeks; or that *you*, being a colony of Lacedæmon, are entitled to independence. Let us speak like men of sense and experience, who know that the equal rules of justice are observed only by men of an equal condition; but that it belongs to the strong to command, and to the weak to obey; because such is the interest of both." *M*. "How can our interest and yours coincide?" *A*. "By submission, you will save your lives; and by preserving you, we will increase our own power." *M*. "Consider (for this also must be mentioned, since disregarding *justice*, you are governed only by *utility*) that your unprovoked invasion of the Melians will rouse the resentment of all Greece; will render all neutral states your enemies; and, if ever your empire should decline, (as what human grandeur is not subject to decay?) will expose you to a dreadful and just punishment." *A*. "The continuance of our empire is the care of fortune and the gods; the little that man can do to preserve it, *we* will not neglect. The liberty of Melos offends the pride of the neighbouring isles, and stirs them to rebellion. The interest of our present power must prevail over the apprehension of future danger." *M*. "While the Athenians are thus prepared to incur danger for the preservation of empire, and their subject islands to defy death for the hopes of freedom, would it not be the basest and most infamous cowardice in us, who have long enjoyed liberty, to decline any toil or danger for maintaining the most valuable and the most glorious of all human possessions?" *A*. "We are not come hither to dispute the prize of valour, but to offer terms of safety." *M*. "The event of war is uncertain; there is some hope in resistance, none in submission." *A*. "Flattering hope often deceives the prosperous and the powerful, but always destroys the weak and unfortunate, who, disregarding natural

means of preservation, have recourse to idle dreams of the fancy, to omens, oracles, divination, and all the fallacious illusions of a vain superstition." *M*. "We know that it will be difficult for the Melians to contend with the strength and fortune of Athens: yet we trust that the gods will support the justice of our cause; and that the Lacedæmonians, from whom we are descended, moved by a sense of honour, will defend their own blood." *A*. "Believe not that Athens will be forsaken by the gods. Ambition is implanted in man. The wisdom of providence, not an Athenian decree, has established the inevitable law, that the strong should govern the weak. As to the assistance of the Lacedæmonians, we sincerely congratulate your happy ignorance of their principles. Whatever equity prevails in their domestic institutions, they have but one rule respecting their neighbours, which is, to regulate all their transactions with them by their own conveniency." *M*. "It is chiefly that consideration which affords us hope, that they will not forsake an island which they have planted, lest they should be regarded as traitors, than which nothing could be more unfavourable to their interest, especially since Melos, lying in the neighbourhood of their own territories, would be a dangerous possession in the hands of an enemy." *A*. "The timid caution of the Lacedæmonians seldom takes the field, even against their inveterate enemies in the Peloponnesus, unless when their standard is attended by numerous allies. It is not to be imagined that, for the safety of a colony, they will alone cross the Cretan sea, to contend with the superior navy of Athens." *M*. "Should the Lacedæmonians be averse to sail, they can transport others in their stead; and the extent of the Cretan sea may elude the vigilance of your ships; or should that probability fail, the Lacedæmonians may attack your subjects on the continent, and accomplish the designs of the warlike Brasidas." *A*. "You are determined, it seems, to learn, by fatal experience, that fear never compelled the Athenians to desist from their designs; especially never to raise the siege of any place which they had once invested. For during the whole of this long conference, you have not mentioned a single particular capable of affording any just ground of confidence. Deceived by the splendour of words, you talk of honour and independence, rejecting the offers of a powerful state, whose arms you are unable to resist, and whose protection you might obtain at the expense of a moderate tribute. Lest shame should have any share in this dangerous behaviour, we shall leave you to consult privately, only reminding you once more, that your present deliberations involve the fate of your country."

The Athenian ambassadors retired; and shortly afterwards, the Melians recalled them, and "declared their unanimous resolution not to betray, in one unlucky hour, the liberty which they had maintained for seven hundred years; depending on the vigorous assistance of their Lacedæmonian kinsmen, and trusting especially in that divine providence which had hitherto most wonderfully preserved them

amidst the general convulsions of Greece. But they entreated the Athenians to accept their offers of neutrality, and to abstain from unprovoked violence." The ambassadors prepared for returning to the camp, leaving the commissioners with a sarcastic threat, "That of all men, in such a delicate situation, the Melians alone thought the future more certain than the past, and would grievously suffer for their folly, in preferring to the proposals of certain and immediate safety, the deceitfulness of hope, the instability of fortune, and the vain prospect of Lacedæmonian aid." The Athenians, irritated by opposition, invested, without delay, the capital of Melos, which was blocked up for several

months by sea and land. The besieged, after suffering cruelly by famine, made several desperate sallies, seized the Athenian magazines, and destroyed part of their works. But towards the end of winter, their resistance was defeated by the vigorous efforts of the enemy, combined with domestic treason. The males above the age of fourteen shared the unhappy fate of the Scioneans. The women and children were subjected to perpetual servitude, and five hundred new inhabitants, drawn from the neighbouring colonies of Athens, were sent to occupy the vacant lands, which had been cultivated and adorned for seven centuries by the labour of the exterminated Melians.¹

CHAPTER XIX.

Alcibiades promotes the Sicilian Expedition—Revolutions in that Island—Embassy to Athens—Extravagant Views of Alcibiades—Opposed by Nicias—The Athenians prepare to invade Sicily—Their Armament beheld with Suspicion by the Italian States—Deliberations concerning the Mode of carrying on the War—Alcibiades takes Catana by Stratagem—His Intrigues in Messenê—He is unseasonably recalled to Athens—Charged with Treason and Impiety—Escapes to Sparta—Nicias determines to attack Syracuse—Description of that City—The Athenians prevail in a Battle—Return to Catana and Nazos.

THE inhuman massacre of the Melians has been ascribed by an instructive, though often inaccurate biographer,² to the unfeeling pride of Alcibiades. But more ancient and authentic writers,³ whose silence seems to exculpate the son of Clinias from this atrocious accusation, represent him as the principal author of the expedition against Sicily; an expedition not more unjust in its principle than fatal in its consequences.

A. C. 479—468. The salutary union between the princes of Syracuse and Agrigentum triumphed, as we had occasion to relate, over the ambition and resources of Carthage. Sicily flourished under the virtuous administration of Gelon⁴ and Theron; but its tranquillity was disturbed by the dissensions of their immediate successors. Hieron king of Syracuse proved victorious in a long and bloody war, during which the incapacity and misfortunes of his rival Thrasideus emboldened the resentment of his subjects, already provoked by his injustice and cruelty.⁵ He escaped the popular fury, but fell a victim to his own despair; and the Agrigentines having expelled the family of an odious tyrant, instituted a republican form of policy.

The false, cruel, and avaricious Hieron (for such at least he is described⁶ in the first years of his reign) probably received little benefit from the dangerous influence of prosperity. But his mind was not incapable of reflection; and, in the course of a long sickness and con-

finement, he discovered the emptiness of such objects as kings are taught to admire, and had recourse to the solid pleasures of the mind. By conversing with Grecian philosophers, he learned the most important of all lessons, that of conversing with himself; a conversation which none but the most virtuous or the most vicious of men can long and frequently maintain, without deriving from it essential profit. With the improvement of his understanding, the sentiments of Hieron improved; his character and manners underwent a total change; and the latter years of his reign adorn the history of Sicily, and the age in which he lived.⁷ The poets Simonides, Æschylus, and Bacchilides, frequented his court, and admired the greatness of his mind, rather than of his fortune. The sublime genius of Pindar has celebrated the magnificent generosity of his illustrious patron. And in an age when writing was the picture of conversation, because men talked as they needed not have been ashamed to write, the impartial disciple of Socrates, who had nothing to hope or to fear from the ashes of a king of Sicily, has represented Hieron, in the dialogue entitled from his name,⁸ as a model of wisdom and virtue.

Olymp. xxviii. 3. It is a mortifying reflection that the inimitable qualities of a virtuous prince should naturally encourage the sloth, or irritate the vices of a degenerate successor. The glorious reign of Hieron was followed by the bloody tyranny of Thrasybulus; a wretch who, disgracing the throne and human nature, was expelled from Sicily by the just indignation of

¹ Thucyd. l. v. p. 410. ad fin.

² Plut. in Alcib.

³ Thucyd. l. v. Lysias Orat. cont. Alcib.

⁴ See above, p. 145.

⁵ Diodor. l. xi. c. lxi. et seq.

⁶ Diodor. Sic. l. xi. c. lxi.

⁷ Ælian. l. ix. c. vii.

⁸ Xenophon. Hieron.

his subjects. Resentment is more permanent than gratitude. The Syracusans forgot the fame of Gelon; they forgot the recent merit of Hieron; and, that they might never be again subjected to a tyrant like Thrasybulus, exchanged the odious power of kings for the dangerous fury of democracy.¹

The inferior cities having successively imitated the example of Agrigentum and Syracuse, the Grecian colonies in Sicily experienced the disorders of that tumultuous liberty which had so long prevailed in the mother country. Distracted by internal discord, and harassed by external hostility, they had neither leisure nor inclination to attend to the politics of Greece. The republic of Syracuse, which was alone capable of interposing, with effect, in the quarrels of that country, imitated, instead of opposing, the ambition of Athens. Most of the Dorian settlements had become confederates, or rather tributaries, to the Syracusans; and towards the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, that aspiring people, though torn by domestic factions, strenuously exerted their valour against the Ionic settlements of Leontium, Catana, and Naxos.

While these unhappy islanders struggled with the turbulence of a government more stormy than the whirlpools of Scylla and Charybdis, they likewise enjoyed, however, the peculiar advantages of democracy; which, of all political constitutions, presents the widest scope to the exercise of superior talents, and has always been the most productive in great men. The active fermentation of popular assemblies had given the eloquence of a Gorgias to Leontium, and the abilities of a Hermocrates to Syracuse. In the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, the former came to Athens to solicit the protection of that republic against the unjust usurpation of the Sicilian capital. His arguments convinced the judgment, and the brilliant harmony of his style transported the sensibility, of the Athenians. They immediately despatched twenty ships of war to the assistance of their Ionic brethren. Two years afterwards a similar request was made, and as readily complied with; and the Athenians seemed disposed to engage with vigour in the war, when the foresight of Hermocrates, alarmed by the intrusion of these ambitious strangers, promoted a general congress of the states of Sicily.

This convention was held at the central town of Gela; it was attended by the plenipotentiaries of all the Doric and Ionic cities. Hermocrates represented Syracuse; and illustrious as that republic was, his conduct proved him worthy its highest honours. While the representatives of other states dwelt on their particular grievances, and urged their separate interests, Hermocrates regarded and enforced only the general interest of Sicily. His arguments finally prevailed, and all parties were engaged to terminate their domestic contests,

lest the whole island should fall a prey to a foreign power.²

But a plan of union, so seasonable and salutary, depended on the transient influence of a single man, while the principles of discord were innumerable and permanent. Within a few years after this event, Leontium was taken and destroyed, its inhabitants reduced to the wretched condition of exiles, and its confederates, the Egestæans, closely besieged by the conjunct arms of Selinus and Syracuse. The unfortunate communities again sent an embassy to Athens, pleading the rights of consanguinity, and addressing not only the passions but the interest of their powerful allies. "The Athenians," they insisted, "were bound by every principle of sound policy to repress the growing greatness of Syracuse, which must otherwise become a formidable accession to the Peloponnesian league; and now was the time for undertaking that enterprise, while their Ionian kinsmen in Sicily were still capable of exerting some vigour in their own defence." In order to enforce these arguments, the ambassadors of Egesta or Segesta gave an ostentatious, and even a very false, description of the wealth of their republic; which, according to their account, was capable of furnishing the whole expense of the war. Their fellow citizens at home carried on the deception by a most unjustifiable artifice, displaying to the Athenian commissioners sent to confer with them, the borrowed riches of their neighbours, and raising, by extraordinary expedients, the sum of sixty talents of silver, to maintain, for a month, an Athenian fleet of sixty sail, as if they had purposed monthly to repeat this large subsidy, which at once exhausted their faculties.⁴

The arguments of their Sicilian allies were doubtless entitled to considerable weight with the Athenians; yet various reasons might have dissuaded that ambitious people from undertaking, at the present juncture, an expedition against the powerful republic of Syracuse. The cloud of war, which Pericles saw advancing with rapid motion from the Peloponnesus, had been at length dispelled by the valour and fortune of the Athenians; not, however, before the arms of Brasidas had shaken their empire to the foundation. The same storm might be again collected, if the Athenians removed their armies from home, especially if they were unfortunate abroad, since the wounded pride of Sparta would eagerly seize the first opportunity of revenge. The rebellion of the Macedonian cities was still unsubdued, and it would be highly imprudent and dangerous, before recovering the allegiance of these ancient possessions, to attempt the acquisition of new territories. Should the Athenian expedition against Sicily be crowned with the most flattering success, it would still be difficult, nay, impossible, to preserve such a distant and extensive conquest; but should this ambitious design fail in the execution, as there was too good reason to apprehend, the misfortunes of the Athenians, whose greatness was the object both of terror

¹ Aristot. de Repub. l. v. c. xli.
² Thucyd. p. 290.

³ Thucyd. p. 290.

⁴ Thucyd. p. 444.

and of envy, would encourage the rebellious spirit of their subjects and allies, excite the latent animosity of the Peloponnesians, and reinforce their ancient enemies by the resentment and hostility of Syracuse and her confederates, justly provoked by the daring invasion of their island.

These prudential considerations were unable to cool the ardour of the Athenian assembly, inflamed by the breath of their favourite Alcibiades. It is a just and profound observation of Machiavel, that the real powers of government are often contracted to a narrower point in republics than in monarchies; an observation which that sagacious statesman had learned from the experience of his native city, and which he might have confirmed by the history of the Greeks, whose political measures, and even whose national character, depended on the transient influence of a few individuals. Under the direction of Aristides and Themistocles, the Athenians displayed the soundest policy, adorned by unshaken probity, and by heroic valour. Cimon inspired the generous ambition which animated his own breast: a dignified grandeur and magnanimous firmness distinguished the long administration, I had almost said reign, of Pericles. The son of Clinias succeeded to the power and authority, without succeeding to the virtues of those great men, whom his pride disdained to imitate. Regardless of order and decency, with a licentious magnificence most offensive to the spirit of republican equality, he blended a certain elegance of manners which not only repelled censure, but attracted applause. Thus dispensed from observing the established formalities of private life, he expected that the glory of his administration might soar above the ordinary dictates of political prudence.⁵ Though he preferred what was useful to what was virtuous, he preferred what was brilliant to what was useful, and, disdaining the common gifts of valour and fortune, aspired at objects extraordinary and unattainable. The recovery of the Athenian possessions, and the re-establishment of an empire, already too extensive, might have satisfied the ambition of a bold and active statesman. But the extravagant hopes of Alcibiades expatiated in a wider field. The acquisition of Sicily itself he regarded only as a necessary introduction to farther and more important conquests. The intermediate situation of that beautiful and fertile island opened, on the one hand, an easy communication with the eastern front of Italy, which, from Brundisium to the Sicilian frith, was adorned by populous and flourishing cities; and on the other, afforded a short and safe passage to the northern shores of Africa, which, for many ages, had been cultivated and enriched by the united labours of the Greeks and Carthaginians. In his waking or sleeping dreams, Alcibiades grasped the wide extent of those distant possessions, by the resources of which he expected finally to subdue the pertinacious spirit, and obstinate

resistance, of the Peloponnesians. Thus secure at home, and sovereign of the sea, Athens might incorporate with her own the troops of the conquered provinces, and maintain an unshaken dominion over the most delightful portion of the earth, while her fortunate citizens, delivered from all laborious and mercenary cares, would be supported by the contributions of subject nations, and enabled to display, in their full extent, that taste for splendour and magnificence, that greatness of soul and superiority of genius, which justly entitled them to the empire of the world.⁶

Olymp. xci. 2. Allured by these extravagant, but flattering prospects of grandeur, the Athenians, in two successive assemblies, held at the short interval of five days, agreed to the resolution of making war against Sicily, and of raising such naval and military force as seemed necessary for carrying it on with vigour and success. While they still deliberated on the latter object, the virtuous Nicias, who had been named with Alcibiades and Lamachus to the command of the projected armament, omitted nothing that prudence could suggest, and patriotism enforce, to deter his countrymen from such a dangerous and fatal design. On this memorable occasion, he threw aside his usual timidity, and divested himself of that rigid regard for established forms, which was natural to his age and character. Though the assembly was convened to determine the proportion of supplies and troops, and the means of collecting them with the greatest expedition and facility, he ventured, contrary to ancient custom, to propose a different subject of debate; affirming, "That the interest of Athens was concerned, not in providing the preparations for the Sicilian invasion, but in re-examining the expediency of the war. The assembly ought not to be moved by the arguments and intreaties of the persecuted Egistæans, and fugitive Leontines, whom resentment had taught to exaggerate, and misery to deceive. Nor ought the vain phantom of glory and ambition to engage Athens in a design perhaps altogether impracticable, and, in the present juncture, peculiarly unseasonable; since it would be madness to excite the flames of a new war, before the ashes of the old were extinguished. The pleas of danger and self-defence were in the highest degree frivolous; for, should the dreaded power of Syracuse be extended over the whole of Sicily, the Athenians would have nothing to apprehend: this event would rather increase their security. In the actual state of the island, particular cities might be persuaded by fear, or interest, to court the protection of the Peloponnesian confederacy; but the victorious Syracuse would disdain to follow the standard of Sparta. Should the former republic, by an effort of uncommon generosity, subject the partial dictates of her pride to the general safety and honour of the Dorian name, sound policy, however, would still prevent her from endangering the precarious empire which she had obtained over her

⁵ See Plut. in Alcibiad. Isocrat. de Pace; above all, the animated picture in Plato's Republic, (l. viii. cap. cc. et seq.) of which Alcibiades, doubtless, was the original.

⁶ Isocrat. de Pace. Andocid. Orat. iii. p. 269, et Aristoph. Vesp. ver. 656.

neighbours, by strengthening the confederacy of Peloponnesus, of which the avowed design was to give liberty and independence to the Grecian cities. Should all remote views of policy be disregarded, yet immediate fear would deter the Syracusans from provoking the resentment of Athens, the effects of which they had not as yet experienced, but which, being unknown, must appear the more formidable. It was evident, therefore, that the Sicilian expedition might be omitted without danger; but if this enterprise, which had been hastily resolved on, were injudiciously executed, or if any of those misfortunes should happen, which are but too frequent in war, the Athenians would be exposed not only to danger, but to disgrace and ruin. The result of such an important deliberation ought not to be committed to the rash decision of youthful levity; which viewed the Sicilian war, as it did every other object, through the delusive medium of hope, vanity, and ambition; and, totally disregarding the expense and danger to be incurred by the republic, considered only the profits of military command, which might repair the wreck of exhausted fortunes, and supply a new fund for the indulgence of extravagant and licentious pleasures. He had in his eye a youth of that description, the principal author of the expedition, who was surrounded by a numerous band of adherents, determined to applaud his discourse and to promote his measures. It became the wisdom and dignity of the assembly to resist with firmness that juvenile conspiracy. In such a dangerous crisis, it was the duty of the president to dispense with ordinary forms, and to act, not merely as the instrument, but as the physician, of a diseased republic. The question ought to be debated a second time; and the Athenians ought to rescind the decree against Sicily, which had passed without sufficient examination, in the absence of several aged and respectable counsellors."¹

This discourse immediately called up Alcibiades, who, presuming on his credit with the assembly, acknowledged, "That he had aspired to the command in Sicily, and that he thought himself justly entitled to that honour. The extravagance of which he was accused, had redounded to the profit of his country; since his magnificence at the Olympic games, however it might be traduced by an abusive epithet, had extended the glory of Athens, and deserved the admiration of Greece. His youth and inexperience had effected what the policy of the wisest statesmen had often attempted in vain. A powerful confederacy had been formed against Sparta, even in the bosom of the Peloponnesus; and the terror of a domestic foe would long prevent the enmity of that rival state from interrupting the progress of Athenian grandeur. In an expedition, evidently directed to this glorious end, expense and danger ought not to be regarded, since wealth was usefully sacrificed to purchase victory and renown; and power was only to be preserved

by seizing every favourable opportunity to increase it. To the undertaking which he advised, no reasonable objection could be made; its expense would be furnished by the Egistæans, and other confederates; and the danger could not be great, as Sicily, however extensive and populous, was inhabited by a promiscuous crowd of various nations, without arms or discipline, devoid of patriotism, and incapable of union."²

The assembly murmured applause, confirmed their former decree, and testified for the war greater alacrity than before. Nicias perceived the violence of the popular current; still, however, he made one ineffectual effort to resist its force. "The success of an invader," he observed, "commonly depended on the weight and rapidity of his first unexpected impression, which confirmed the confidence of his friends, and excited dismay and terror in his enemies. If the expedition into Sicily must be undertaken in defiance of every difficulty and danger, it ought therefore to be carried into execution with the utmost vigour. The Athenians might thus secure the assistance of Naxos and Catana, which were connected by affinity with the Egistæans and Leontines. But there remained seven cities, and those far more powerful, with which they must prepare to contend; particularly Selinus and Syracuse, places well provided with ships, magazines, cavalry, archers, heavy-armed troops, and every object and resource most useful in defensive war. An armament simply naval would not be sufficient to cope with such a strength. Five thousand pikemen, with a proportional number of archers and cavalry, could not render the invasion successful. After arriving in Sicily, the towns must be besieged or stormed; workmen, with all sorts of machines and implements, must be collected for those purposes, and transported to an island from which, in the four winter months, a messenger could scarcely return to Athens. This necessary train, which would greatly encumber the fleet and army, must be subsisted in a hostile country. Besides a hundred galleys, a great number of tenders and victuallers would be required for the expedition. To collect such an immense mass of war, demanded, doubtless, astonishing ardour and perseverance; but if the Athenians intended to employ a smaller force, he must, in justice to his country and himself, decline accepting the command, since nothing less than what he had described could promise a hope of victory, or prevent the certainty of defeat."³

The last attempt of Nicias to dissuade his countrymen from this fatal enterprise, by magnifying the difficulty of its execution, produced an opposite effect. The obstacles, which were unable to conquer, only animated the courage of the assembly; and it was determined, that the generals should be invested with full authority to raise such sums of money, and to levy such a body of troops, as might ensure success to their arms. The domestic strength

¹ Thucyd. i. vi. p. 417, et seq. The Sicilian expedition is uninterruptedly related through the remainder of the sixth and seventh books of Thucydides. The collateral authority of Diodorus, Plutarch and the orators is of little importance.

² Thucyd. p. 422—426.

³ Thucyd. p. 427—429.

of the Athenians was unequal to the greatness of the undertaking: proper agents were despatched to demand an extraordinary contribution from their dependent states, as well as to summon the reluctant assistance of their more warlike allies. These auxiliary squadrons were ordered to sail to Corcyra, in which rendezvous the Athenians, towards the middle of summer, were ready to join their confederates.

The magnitude of the preparations increased the hopes and the ardour of all ranks of men in the republic. The old expected that nothing could resist such a numerous and well-equipped armament. The young eagerly seized an occasion to gratify their curiosity and love of knowledge in a distant navigation, and to share the honours of such a glorious enterprise. The rich exulted in displaying their magnificence; the poor rejoiced in the immediate assurance of pay sufficient to relieve their present wants,⁴ and in the prospect of obtaining by their arms the materials of future ease and happiness. Instead of finding any difficulty to complete the levies, the great difficulty consisted in deciding the preference of valour and merit among those who solicited to serve; and the whole complement of forces, to be employed by sea and land, consisted of chosen men.⁵

Amidst the general alacrity felt, or at least expressed, by people of all descriptions (for the dread of incurring public censure made several express what they did not feel,) Socrates⁶ alone ventured openly and boldly to condemn the expedition, and to predict the future calamities of his country. But the authority of a sage was incapable to check the course of that enthusiasm, which had not been interrupted by the anniversary festival of Adonis, an ancient and melancholy rite, which inauspiciously returned a few days preceding the embarkation. During this dreary ceremony, the streets of Athens were crowded with spectres clothed in funeral robes, the spacious domes and temples resounded with lugubrious cries; while the Grecian matrons, marching in slow procession, tore their dishevelled hair, beat their naked bosoms, and lamented in mournful strains the untimely death of the lover, and beloved favourite, of Venus.⁷

When the appointed day arrived, the whole inhabitants of Athens, whether citizens or strangers, assembled early in the Piræus, to admire the greatest spectacle ever beheld in a Grecian harbour. A hundred galleys were adorned with all the splendour of naval pomp: the troops destined to embark, vied with each other in the elegance of their dress and the brightness of their arms: the alacrity painted in every face, and the magnificence displayed

with profusion in every part of the equipage, represented a triumphal show, rather than the stern image of war. But the solidity and greatness of the armament proved that it was intended for use, not for ostentation. Amidst this glare of external pageantry which accompanied the adventurous youth, their friends and kinsmen could not suppress a few parting tears, when they considered the length of the voyage, the dangers of the sea, and the uncertainty of beholding again the dearest pledges of their affections. But these partial expressions of grief were speedily interrupted by the animating sounds of the trumpet, which issued at once from a hundred ships, and provoked sympathetic acclamations from the shore. The captains then offered solemn prayers to the gods, which were answered by corresponding vows from the spectators: the customary libations were poured out in goblets of gold and silver; and, after the triumphant Pæan had been sung in full chorus, the whole fleet at once set sail, and contended for the prize of naval skill and celerity, until they reached the lofty shores of Ægina, from whence they enjoyed a prosperous navigation to the rendezvous of their confederates at Corcyra.⁸

At Corcyra the commanders reviewed the strength of the armament, which consisted of a hundred and thirty-four ships of war, with a proportional number of transports and tenders. The heavy-armed troops, exceeding five thousand, were attended with a sufficient body of slingers and archers. The army, abundantly provided in every other article, was extremely deficient in horses, which amounted to no more than thirty. But, at a moderate computation, we may estimate the whole military and naval strength, including slaves and servants, at twenty thousand men.

With this powerful host, had the Athenians at once surprised and assailed the unprepared security of Syracuse, the expedition, however adventurous and imprudent; might, perhaps, have been crowned with success. But the timid mariners of Greece would have trembled at the proposal of trusting such a numerous fleet on the broad expanse of the Ionian sea. They determined to cross the narrowest passage between Italy and Sicily, after coasting along the eastern shores of the former, until they reached the Strait of Messina. That this design might be executed with the greater safety, they despatched three light vessels to examine the disposition of the Italian cities, and to solicit admission into their harbours. The greatest part of Magna Græcia had, indeed, been peopled by Dorians, naturally hostile to Athens. But from one Italian city the Athenians had reason to expect a very favourable reception. The effeminate Sybaris had been demolished, as related above,⁹ by the warlike inhabitants of Crotona, about the time that the Athenians, growing more powerful than their neighbours, began to seize every opportunity to extend their colonies and their dominion. Governed by such principles, they could not

⁴ The most expert and able seamen received a drachma (seven pence three farthings) as daily pay, besides donations from their respective captains. Thucyd. et Plut.

⁵ Thucyd. p. 430—433.

⁶ Plutarch joins Meton the astrologer with Socrates. But the story of Meton, who pretended madness, burned his house, and entreated the Athenians, that, amidst his domestic misfortunes, he might not be deprived of the comfort of his only son, is inconsistent with the narrative of Thucydides, which proves, that instead of compelling reluctance, there was occasion to repress forwardness, to embark.

⁷ Plut. in Nic. et Alcibiad.

⁸ Thucyd. l. vi. p. 432. et seq. Plut. in Nicia. Didor l. xiii. p. 332.

⁹ P. 145.

long overlook the happy situation of Sybaris, near to which they early formed an establishment that assumed the name of Thurium, from a salubrious fountain of fresh water;¹ and the colony was increased by a numerous supply of emigrants, who, under Athenian leaders, sailed from Greece thirteen years before the Peloponnesian war.²

The armament at Corcyra, whatever jealousy its power might create in other cities, was entitled to the gratitude of Thurium; presuming on which, the commanders, without waiting the return of the advice-boats, ordered the fleet to proceed, in three divisions, to the Italian coast. But neither the ties of consanguinity, nor the duties acknowledged by colonies towards their parent state, could prevail on the suspicious Thurians to open their gates, or even to furnish a market, to their Athenian ancestors. The towns of Tarentum and Locris prohibited them the use of their harbours, and refused to supply them with water; and they coasted the whole extent of the shore, from the promontory of Iapygium to that of Rhegium, before any one city would allow them to purchase the commodities for which they had immediate use. The magistrates of Rhegium granted this favour, but they granted nothing more; notwithstanding the earnest solicitations of Alcibiades and his colleagues, who exhorted them, as a colony of Eubœa, to assist their brethren of Leontium, whose republic the Athenians had determined to re-establish and to defend.³

While the armament continued at Rhegium, they were informed by vessels which had been purposely despatched from Corcyra, that the Egistæans, notwithstanding the boasted accounts lately given of their riches, possessed only thirty talents in their treasury. This disagreeable intelligence, together with the disappointment of assistance from any Italian city, occasioned a council of war, to consider what measures ought to be pursued in the Sicilian expedition. It was the opinion of Nicias, "that the Egistæans ought to be furnished with that proportion of ships only, the charges of which they were able to defray; and that the Athenian fleet, having settled, either by arms or by persuasion, the quarrels between them and their neighbours, should return to their own harbours, after sailing along the coast of Sicily, and displaying to the inhabitants of that island both their inclination and their power to protect the weakness of their allies."

Alcibiades declared, "That it would be shameful and ignominious to dissolve such a powerful armament, without performing some exploit worthy the renown of the republic; that, by the prospect of immediate and effectual support, the inferior cities might easily be alienated from the reluctant confederacy with Selinus and Syracuse; after which, the war ought to be carried on with the utmost vigour against those republics, unless they re-established the Leontines in their territory, and

gave complete satisfaction to the injured Egistæans.

Lamachus not only approved the active counsels of Alcibiades, but proposed a measure still more enterprising. "The Athenians ought not to waste time in unimportant objects. Instead of striking at the extremities, they ought to assault at once the heart and strength of the enemy. If they immediately attacked Syracuse, it would not only be the first, but the last city, which they would have occasion to besiege. Nor could the attempt fail, if undertaken without delay, before the Syracusans had time to recollect themselves, and to provide for their own defence; and while the Athenian troops, as yet undaunted by any check, enjoyed unbroken courage and blooming hopes."

This advice, which does equal honour to the spirit and good sense of Lamachus, was rejected by the timidity of Nicias, and probably by the vanity of Alcibiades. The latter perceived a flattering opportunity of exhausting all the resources of his eloquence and intrigue to get possession of the dependent cities, before he illustrated the glory of his arms in the siege of Syracuse. The fleet sailed from Rhegium to execute his plan, which was adopted by his colleagues, as forming the middle between the extremes of the respective opinions. A considerable detachment was sent to examine the preparations and the strength of Syracuse, and to proclaim liberty, and offer protection, to all the captives and strangers confined within its walls.

With another detachment Alcibiades sailed to Naxos, and persuaded the inhabitants to accept the alliance of Athens. The remainder of the armament proceeded to Catana, which refused to admit the ships into the harbour, or the troops into the city. But on the arrival of Alcibiades, the Cataneans allowed him to address the assembly, and propose his demands. The artful Athenian transported the populace, and even the magistrates themselves, by the charms of his eloquence; the citizens flocked from every quarter, to hear a discourse which was purposely protracted for several hours; the soldiers forsook their posts; and the enemy, who had prepared to avail themselves of this negligence, burst through the unguarded gates, and became masters of the city. Those of the Cataneans who were most attached to the interests of Syracuse, fortunately escaped death by the celerity of their flight. The rest accepted the proffered friendship of the Athenians. This success would probably have been followed by the surrender of Messenê, which Alcibiades had filled with distrust and sedition. But when the plot was ripe for execution,⁴ the man who had contrived, and who alone could conduct it, was disqualified from serving his country. The arrival of the Salaminian galley recalled Alcibiades to Athens, that he might stand trial for his life.

⁴ Thucydides says, "When Alcibiades knew he should be banished, he betrayed his accomplices to the party favourable to Syracuse, who immediately put their adversaries to death." Thucyd. p. 462. We shall see hereafter still more fatal consequences of his resentment against his country. But nothing can more strongly attest the turpitude of his character.

¹ Ὀνομασθὲν ἀπὸ τῆς κρήνης Θουρίων. Diodor. l. xii. p. 295.

² Suid. ad voc. Ἰυσίας.

³ Thucyd. p. 443.

It would be improper to suspend the course of an interesting narrative, by describing the causes and circumstances of this unexpected event, if they were not immediately connected with the subsequent history of the Sicilian expedition, and with the future fortune of the Athenians, who, after engaging, by the advice of one man, in the most romantic schemes of conquest which the madness of ambition had ever dared to entertain, injudiciously arrested the activity of that man in the execution of such extraordinary designs, as could only be accomplished by the wonderful resources of his singular and eccentric genius. It happened, that on the night preceding the intended navigation to Sicily, all the statues of Mercury, which had been erected in the Athenian streets as the boundaries of different edifices and tenements, were thrown down, broken, and defaced. One only image of the god, of uncommon size and beauty, was saved from the general wreck; it was afterwards called the statue of Andocides, as it stood before the house of the Athenian orator of that name. This daring insult was first ascribed to the wicked artifices of the Corinthians, who, it was supposed, might employ such an abominable and sacrilegious contrivance to deter the Athenian armament from sailing against their colony and kinsmen of Syracuse. But the enemies of Alcibiades availed themselves of the impious levity⁵ of his character, to direct the popular storm against the head of their detested foe. On the evidence of slaves, he was accused of having treated, with rude familiarity, other adored images of the gods; and Thesæus, the degenerate son of the magnanimous Cimon, impeached him of impiety towards the goddesses Ceres and Proserpine, whose awful ceremonies he had polluted and profaned; assuming, though uninitiated, the name and robes of the high priest, calling Polytion (in whose house this dreadful scene had been represented,) the torch-bearer, Theodorus the herald, and his other licentious companions the sacred brethren and holy ministers of those mysterious rites.⁶

Such an atrocious accusation alarmed the terrors of the Athenians; one assembly was summoned after another; and the panic became the more general, when it was understood that, during the same night in which the statues had been mutilated, a body of Peloponnesian troops had marched towards the Isthmus of Corinth. In the confused imagination of the vulgar, it was possible to unite the incompatible interests of superstition and of freedom; and they were persuaded by Andocles, and other artful demagogues, that the profanation of the mysteries, the defacing of the statues of Mercury,

the movement of the Peloponnesian troops, all announced a conspiracy to demolish the established form of popular government, the safety of which had, ever since the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ, formed an object of universal and most anxious solicitude.

Alcibiades defended himself, with his usual eloquence and address, against the malignity of a charge, unsupported by any adequate evidence. The soldiers and sailors, whose eagerness already grasped the conquest of Sicily, interceded for the deliverance of their commander, whom they regarded as the soul of that glorious enterprize. A thousand Argives and Mantinæans, who had enlisted, on this occasion, under the Athenian banners, declared their unwillingness to sail, unless they were accompanied by Alcibiades, whose valour and abilities alone had determined them to engage in such an important, but dangerous service. This powerful combination in his favour disappointed the present hopes, without disconcerting the future measures, of his enemies. They perceived that, were he brought to an immediate trial, it would be impossible to obtain sentence against him; but that were his person and influence removed to a distance from Athens, every thing might be hoped from the weakness, inconstancy, and credulity of the populace. It was therefore determined by this perfidious cabal, that such orators as had hitherto disguised, under the mask of friendship or admiration, their envy and hatred of Alcibiades, should declare in full assembly, "that it would be inconsistent with the clearest dictates of prudence and propriety, to involve in the tedious formalities of a judicial procedure, a citizen who had been elected general by the unanimous suffrage of his country, and whose presence was eagerly demanded by the affectionate ardour of his troops. The charges against him deserved, doubtless, to be seriously examined; but the present was not a proper time for such an investigation, which must blunt the courage of his followers, and interrupt the service of the republic. Let him sail, therefore, for Sicily, and at his return home he will either vindicate his innocence, or suffer the punishment of his guilt." Alcibiades perceived the poison concealed under this affected lenity, and testified his reluctance to leave behind him such abundant materials for the malice of informers. But his petition for an immediate trial was rejected by the assembly. He therefore set sail, probably flattering himself, that by the glory and success of his arms, he would silence the clamours, and defeat the machinations, of his accusers.

But this expectation was unfortunately disappointed. In a republican government, it is not more easy to excite, than it is difficult to appease, the fermentation of public discontents, especially if occasioned by any real or pretended diminution of freedom. The removal of Alcibiades gave full scope to the ebullitions of popular frenzy. The Athenians were continually assembled to inquire into the violation of the statues. Many respectable citizens were seized on suspicion, because they had, on former occasions, discovered principles hostile to

⁵ Democritus, the chief promoter of the Atomic philosophy, was younger than Anaxagoras, and elder than Socrates. His scholars, Diagoras and Protagoras, propagated his wild system at Athens towards the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. Whether Alcibiades embraced the barren doctrines of that miserable sect, or adhered to the divine philosophy of his master Socrates, or, more probably, fluctuated between them, he must, in all cases alike, have been obnoxious to the suspicion of impiety. Comp. Strabo. l. lxx. p. 703. Sext. Empiric. l. lix. 11. Laert. l. ii. in Democrit. Socrat. et Protag.

⁶ Plutarch. in Alcibiad.

the wild extravagance of democracy. Others were imprisoned on the evidence of Teucer, an obscure stranger, and Diopceithes, a calumnious demagogue. The violence of the public disorder opened a door to private vengeance. Every individual was desirous to see his personal enemies among the number of state criminals; and his resentment was invited falsely to accuse them, by an injudicious decree of the assembly, offering high rewards to those who should denounce the guilty, and even to the guilty themselves, who should denounce their associates.

Olymp. Among the persons who had been
xci. 2. seized on suspicion, was the crafty
A. C. 415. and intriguing Timæus, and the
profligate and impious Andocides,
the same whose statue of Mercury had escaped the general mutilation. The known character of these men naturally marked them out as peculiar victims of popular fury. As they were confined in the same prison, they had an opportunity of communicating their apprehensions, and of contriving means of safety. Timæus persuaded his friend (for the ties of common danger create between knaves a temporary friendship,) that it would be weakness to die by a false accusation, when he might save himself by a lie. Andocides turned informer. The prisoners whom he named were banished or put to death; the rest were set at liberty. The absent, among whom was Alcibiades, were recalled to stand trial. But they did not obey the summons sent them by the Salaminian galley. The wanderings and misfortunes of more obscure names are unknown. Alcibiades escaped to Thurium, and afterwards to Argos; and when he understood that the Athenians had set a price on his head, he finally took refuge in Sparta; where his active genius seized the first opportunity to advise and promote those fatal measures, which, while they gratified his private resentment, occasioned the ruin of his country.¹

The removal of Alcibiades soon appeared in the languid operations of the Athenian armament. The cautious timidity of Nicias, supported by wealth, eloquence, and authority, gained an absolute ascendant over the more warlike and enterprising character of Lamachus, whose poverty exposed him to contempt. Instead of making a bold impression on Selinus or Syracuse, Nicias contented himself with taking possession of the inconsiderable colony of Hyccæra. He ravaged, or laid under contribution, some places of smaller note, and obtained thirty talents from the Egistæans, which, added to the sale of the booty, furnished about thirty thousand pounds sterling,² a sum that might be usefully employed in the prosecution of an expensive war. But this advantage did not compensate for the courage inspired into the Syracusans by delay, and for the dishonour

sustained by the Athenian troops, in their unsuccessful attempts against Hybla and Himera, as well as for their dejection at being confined, during the greatest part of the summer, in the inactive quarters of Naxos and Catana.

The impatience of the Athenians murmured against these dilatory and ignoble proceedings, which appeared altogether unworthy the greatness of their armament, the generous spirit with which they felt themselves animated, and the ancient glory of the republic. Nicias, resisting the wary dictates of his own fear or foresight, determined to gratify the inclination of his troops by the vigour of his winter campaign. The conquest of Syracuse, against which he intended to lead them, might well excite the emulation of the combatants, since that powerful city formed the main obstacle to their ambition, and the principal bulwark not only of Sicily, but of the Italian and African shores.

Ancient Syracuse, of which the ruined grandeur still forms an object of admiration, was situate on a spacious promontory, washed on three sides by the sea, and defended on the west by abrupt and almost inaccessible mountains. The town was built in a triangular form, whose summit may be conceived at the lofty mountains Epipolé. Adjacent to these natural fortifications, the western or inland division of the city was distinguished by the name of Tyche, or Fortune, being adorned by a magnificent temple of that flattering divinity. The triangle gradually widening towards the base, comprehended the vast extent of Achradina, reaching from the northern shore of the promontory to the southern island Ortygia. This small island, composing the whole of modern Syracuse, formed but the third and least extensive division of the ancient; which was fortified by walls eighteen miles in circuit, enriched by a triple harbour, and peopled by above two hundred thousand warlike citizens or industrious slaves.³

When the Syracusans heard the first rumours of the Athenian invasion, they despised, or affected to despise them, as idle lies invented to amuse the ignorance of the populace. The hostile armament had arrived at Rhegium before they could be persuaded, by the wisdom of Hermocrates, to provide against a danger which their presumption painted as imaginary. But when they received undoubted intelligence that the enemy had reached the Italian coast; when they beheld their numerous fleet commanding the sea of Sicily, and ready to make a descent on their defenceless island, they were seized with a degree of just terror and alarm proportional to their false security. They condemned their former incredulity and indifference, which had been nourished by the interested adulation of the demagogue Athenagoras, who vainly assured them that the strength of Syracuse was sufficient not only to defy the assaults, but to deter the attempts of any Grecian foe. From the heights of presumption they plunged into the depths of despair, and their spirits were, with difficulty, restored by

¹ Plut. in Alcibiad. et Isocrates, and Lysias, in the Oration for and against the son of Alcibiades. Several facts and circumstances are differently represented in the orations of Andocides; but that orator was a party concerned.

² Thirty talents from the Egistæans,

amount to L. 5,812
The sale of slaves, &c. 23,250

Sum L. 29,062

³ Strabo. p. 266, et seq. et Thucyd. passim. l. vi.

the animating voice of Hermocrates, who was not more prudent in prosperity than intrepid in danger.⁴

By his exhortations they were encouraged to make ready their arms, to equip their fleet, to strengthen their garrisons, and to summon the assistance of their allies. These measures were undertaken with ardour, and carried on with unremitting activity; and the dilatory operations of the enemy not only removed the recent terror and trepidation of the Syracusans, but inspired them with unusual firmness. They requested the generals, whom they had appointed to the number of fifteen, to lead them to Catana, that they might attack the hostile camp. Their cavalry harassed the Athenians by frequent incursions, beat up their quarters, intercepted their convoys, destroyed their advanced posts, and even proceeded so near to the main body, that they were distinctly heard demanding, with loud insults, whether those boasted lords of Greece had left their native country, that they might form a precarious settlement at the foot of Mount Ætna.⁵

Provoked by these indignities, and excited by the impatient resentment of his own troops, Nicias was still restrained from an open attempt against Syracuse by the difficulties attending that enterprise. The distance between Catana and the Sicilian capital was more than thirty miles; but, after the most prosperous voyage, the Athenians could not expect, without extreme danger, to make a descent on the fortified coast of a powerful and vigilant enemy. If they determined to march by land, they must be harassed by the numerous cavalry of Syracuse, which actually watched their motions, and with whose activity, in a broken and intricate country, the strength of heavy-armed troops was exceedingly ill qualified to contend. To avoid both inconveniences, Nicias employed a stratagem. A citizen of Catana, whose subtle and daring genius, prepared alike to die or to deceive, ought to have preserved his name from oblivion, appeared in Syracuse as a deserter from his native city; the unhappy fate of which, in being subjected to the imperious commands, or licentious disorder of the Athenians, he lamented with perfidious tears, and with the plaintive accents of well-dissembled sorrow. "He was not the only man who bewailed, with filial compassion, the misfortunes and ignominy of his country. A numerous band of Cataneans, whose resentment was repressed by fear, longed to take up arms, that they might deliver themselves from a disgraceful yoke, and repel the tyranny of the invaders. Nor could the design fail of success, if Syracuse should second their generous ardour. The Athenians, so liberally endowed with courage and ambition, were destitute of wisdom and of discipline. They spurned the confinement of the military life; their posts were forsaken, their ships unguarded; they disdained the duties of the camp, and indulged in the pleasures of the city. On an appointed day it

would be easy for the Syracusans, assisted by the conspirators of Catana, to attack them unprepared, to mount their undefended ramparts, to demolish their encampment, and to burn their fleet." This daring proposal well corresponded with the keen sentiments of revenge which animated the inhabitants of Syracuse. The day was named; the plan of the enterprise was concerted, and the treacherous Catanean returned home to revive the hopes, and to confirm the resolution, of his pretended associates.

The success of this intrigue gave the utmost satisfaction to Nicias, whose armament prepared to sail for Syracuse on the day appointed by the inhabitants of that city for assaulting, with their whole force, the Athenian camp. Already had they marched, with this view, to the fertile plain of Leontium, when, after twelve hours' sail, the Athenian fleet arrived in the great harbour, disembarked their troops, and fortified a camp without the western wall, near to a celebrated temple of Olympian Jupiter, a situation which had been pointed out by some Syracusan exiles, and which was well adapted to every purpose of accommodation and defence. Mean while the cavalry of Syracuse, having proceeded to the walls of Catana, had discovered, to their infinite regret, the departure of the Athenians. The unwelcome intelligence was conveyed, with the utmost expedition, to the infantry, who immediately marched back to protect Syracuse. The rapid return of the warlike youth restored the courage of the aged Syracusans. They were joined by the forces of Gela, Selinus, and Camarina; and it was determined, without loss of time, to attack the hostile encampment.⁶

Only a few days elapsed before the Athenians gave them a fairer opportunity of revenge. The two armies prepared to engage, respectively inflamed by resentment and ambition; the one formidable in courage and numbers, the other elated by superior discipline and habitual victory. The Syracusan generals drew up their troops, sixteen, and the Athenians only eight, deep: but the latter had, in their camp, a body of reserve, which was kept ready for action on the first signal. Nicias went round the ranks, exhorting his soldiers by a short discourse, in which he observed, "that the strength of their present preparations was better fitted to inspire confidence, than the most eloquent speech with a weak army, especially as they contended against the Syracusans, a promiscuous crowd, whose presumption was founded on inexperience, and whose desultory ardour, however successful in predatory incursions, would yield to the first shock of regular war. They fought, indeed, in defence of their city; so did the Athenians and their allies, whom nothing but military valour and success would restore in safety to their respective countries."⁷ Having thus spoken, he led his troops to the enemy, who did not decline the engagement. The light-armed archers⁸ skirmished in the van: the

⁴ Thucyd. p. 436, et seq.

⁵ Plutarch. The sneer is differently expressed in Thucydides: "Whether they had not come to gain a settlement for themselves in a foreign country, rather than to replace the Leontines in their own." Thucyd. p. 455.

⁶ Thucyd. p. 445—457.

⁷ Ibid. p. 458 et 459.

⁸ Thucydides mentions, besides the archers (τοξοται), the λιθοβολοι and σφενδαριται, "the throwers of stones and slingers." P. 449. They were all ψιλλοι, as he says immediately below.

priests brought forth the accustomed sacrifices: the trumpets summoned for a general charge.

The attack was begun with fury, and continued with perseverance for several hours. Both sides were animated by every principle that can inspire and urge the utmost vigour of exertion, and victory was still doubtful, when a tempest suddenly arose, accompanied with unusual peals of thunder. This event, which little affected the Athenians, confounded the unexperienced credulity of the enemy, who were broken and put to flight. Nicias restrained the eagerness of his men in the pursuit, lest they should be exposed to danger from a body of twelve hundred Syracusan cavalry, who had not engaged in the battle, but who impatiently watched an opportunity to assault the disordered phalanx. The Syracusans escaped to their city, and the Athenians returned to their camp. In such an obstinate conflict the vanquished lost two hundred and sixty, the victors only fifty men; numbers that might occasion much surprise, if we reflected not that, to oppose the offensive weapons used by antiquity, the warriors

of Greece (in every circumstance so unlike the miserable and naked peasants of modern Europe, whose lives are sacrificed without defence, as without remorse, to the ambition of men whom the Greeks would have styled tyrants) being armed with the helmet and cuirass, the ample buckler, the firm corselet, and the manly greaves, they often displayed their skill, their courage, and their love of liberty, at a very small expense of human blood.

The voyage, the encampment, and the battle, employed the dangerous activity, and gratified the impetuous ardour of the Athenians, but did not facilitate the conquest of Syracuse. Without more powerful preparations, Nicias despaired of taking the place, either by assault, or by a regular siege. Soon after his victory he returned with the whole armament to Naxos and Catana; a measure which sufficiently proves that the late enterprise had been undertaken, not in consequence of any permanent system of operations formed by the general, but in compliance with the ungovernable¹ temper of his troops, whose ideas of military subordination were confined to the field of battle.

CHAPTER XX.

Preparations for the ensuing Campaign—The Athenians begin the Siege with Vigour—Distress and Sedition in Syracuse—Arrival of Gylippus—Who defeats the Athenians—Transactions in Greece—A second Armament arrives at Syracuse—Its first Operations successful—The Athenians defeated—Prepare to raise the Siege—Naval Engagement in the Great Harbour—Despondency of the Athenians—Stratagem of Hermocrates—The Athenians raise their camp—Melancholy Firmness of Nicias—Demosthenes capitulates—Nicias surrenders—Cruel Treatment of the Athenian Captives—Singular Exception.

NICIAS had reason to expect that his victory over the Syracusans would procure him respect and assistance from the inferior states of Sicily. His emissaries were diffused over that island and the neighbouring coast of Italy. Messengers were sent to Tuscany, where Pisa and other cities had been founded by Greek colonies.² An embassy was despatched to Carthage, the rival and enemy of Syracuse. Nicias gave orders to collect materials for circumvallation, iron, bricks, and all necessary stores. He demanded horses from the Egæans; and required from Athens reinforcements and a large pecuniary supply; and neglected nothing that might enable him to open the ensuing campaign with vigour and effect.³

¹ Without attending to this circumstance, the conduct of Grecian generals must, on many occasions, appear altogether unaccountable. The same observation applies to modern history preceding the peace of Munster. The famous war of thirty years, which ended in that peace, laid the foundation of the exact military subordination which distinguishes the present century. See Pere Bougeant, *Histoire de la Guerre de 30 Ans.*

² Strabo, p. 243, et p. 283, et seq.

³ It is remarkable that though Nicias, after the removal of Alcibiades, enjoyed the principal, or rather sole, command of the army, he acted quite contrary to the opinion which he had declared at the commencement of the expedition. The plan which he pursued was that of Alcibiades, not his

While the Athenians thus prepared for the attack of Syracuse, the citizens of that capital displayed equal activity in providing for their own defence. By the advice of Hermocrates, they appointed himself, Heraclides, and Sicannus; three, instead of fifteen generals. The commanders newly elected, both in civil and military affairs, were invested with unlimited power, which was usefully employed to purchase or prepare arms, daily to exercise the troops, and to strengthen and extend the fortifications of Syracuse. They likewise despatched ambassadors to the numerous cities and republics with which they had been connected in peace, or allied in war, to solicit the continuance of their friendship, and to counteract the dangerous designs of the Athenians.

The importance of the city Camerina, situate on the southern coast of Sicily, demanded the presence of Hermocrates himself. The Camerineans had given a very feeble and reluctant assistance to their allies of Syracuse; and the orator Euphemus employed all the resources of his genius to unite them to the Athenian con-

own: the views of the banished general still actuated the army; but the ardent spirit was withdrawn, that could alone ensure their success.

federacy. An assembly being summoned, Hermocrates informed them "That a desire to prevent the deception of the Camerineans, not the dread of the Athenian power, had occasioned his present journey. That restless and ambitious nation, which had so often kindled the flames of war on the continent of Greece, had lately sailed to Sicily, under pretence of re-establishing the affairs of the Leontines and Egestæans, but from a motive more selfish, which it was easy to conjecture, and impossible to mistake. Their real and only design was to sow dissension and disagreement among the Sicilian states, which, fighting singly, might be successively subdued. How could effrontery affirm, or simplicity believe, that the Athenians should undertake a voyage to vindicate the freedom of Egesta; they who oppressed, with all the rigours of slavery, the unhappy islanders of Eubœa, by whom Egesta had been built, and from whom its inhabitants were descended! Under pretence of delivering from the tyranny of the great king, the Greeks of Asia, of the Hellespont, of Thrace, and of the Ægean, they had conquered and enslaved those various countries. They actually employed the same perfidious contrivance against the safety of the Sicilians; but he trusted that their present undertaking, though carried on with equal artifice, would be attended with very different success; and that they would learn, by experience, to distinguish between the effeminate Ionians and Hellespontines, whose minds had been enfeebled and debased by the Persian yoke, and the magnanimous Dorians of Sicily, the genuine offspring of Peloponnesus, the source of valour and of liberty."⁴

Euphemus, the Athenian, repelled with force and spirit, these reproachful accusations. "The colonies of Athens were kept in a dependence, not less advantageous to themselves than honourable to the parent state. The general interest of Greece required that the same republic which at first had so bravely established, should still continue to maintain, the national independence. They who yield protection, must assume authority; but this authority the Athenians had exerted in a manner essential to their own and to the public safety. If they had subjected the neighbouring coasts and islands, their *interest* might justify that odious but necessary measure; and the same dictates of sound policy which induced them to conquer and to enslave the Hellespontine and Asiatic Greeks, would engage them to emancipate and to deliver the oppressed Sicilians. To this office they were invited by the Leontines and Egestæans; to this duty they were prompted by the ties of friendship and consanguinity; to this enterprise they were determined by the strongest of all motives, a well-grounded fear lest the inhabitants of Sicily (whose numbers and distance rendered it impossible for Athens to subdue, far less to retain them in subjection) should fall a prey to the watchful encroachments of Syracuse, and thus become an accession to the Peloponnesian confederacy." The Camerineans dreaded the distant ambition of

Athens, but dreaded still more the neighbouring hostility of Syracuse. Their fears dictated a reply in friendly and respectful terms; but they craved leave to preserve a neutrality between the contending powers, hoping, by this expedient, to irritate the resentment of neither, yet to defeat the designs of both.

Olymp. xci. 3. Mean while the expected reinforcements arrived from Athens.

A. C. 414. In addition to his original force, Nicias had likewise collected a body of six hundred cavalry, and the sum of four hundred talents; and, in the eighteenth summer of the war, the activity of the troops and workmen had completed all necessary preparations for undertaking the siege of Syracuse. The Athenian armament enjoyed a prosperous voyage to the northern harbour of Trogilé, and the troops were no sooner disembarked than they seized an opportunity of signalizing their valour against a body of seven hundred men, who marched to reinforce the garrison of Labdalus; an important fortress situate on the highest of the mountains which overlook and command the city. Three hundred Syracusans were killed in the pursuit; the rest took refuge behind their walls; and the castle of Labdalus was taken, and strongly guarded by the victors. The plan which Nicias adopted for conquering the city, was to draw a wall on either side from the neighbourhood of Labdalus, towards the port of Trogilé on the north, and towards the gulf, extending two leagues in circumference, and justly called the Great Harbour, on the south. When these circumvallations had surrounded the place by land, he expected, by his numerous fleet, to block up the wide extent of the Syracusan harbours. The whole strength of the Athenian armament was employed in the former operations; and as all necessary materials had been provided with due attention, the works rose with a rapidity which surprised and terrified the besieged. Their former as well as their recent defeat, deterred them from opposing the enemy in a general engagement; but the advice of Hermocrates persuaded them to raise walls, which might traverse and interrupt those of the Athenians.⁵ The imminent danger urged the activity of the workmen; the hostile bulwarks approached each other; frequent skirmishes took place, in one of which the brave Lamachus unfortunately fell a victim to his rash valour;⁶ but the Athenian troops maintained their usual superiority.

Encouraged by success, Nicias pushed the enemy with vigour. The Syracusans lost hopes of defending their new works, or of preventing the complete circumvallation of their city; and this despair was increased by the abundant supplies which arrived from all quarters to the besiegers, while the interest of Syracuse seemed to be universally abandoned by the indifference or cowardice of her allies. In the turbulent democracies of Greece, the moment of public danger commonly gave the signal for domestic sedition. The populace clamoured, with their usual licentiousness, against the incapacity or perfidy of their leaders, to whom alone

⁴ Thucyd. l. vi. p. 463, et seq.

⁵ Thucyd. l. vi. p. 463, et seq.

⁶ Plutarch in Nicias.

they ascribed their misfortunes. New generals were named in the room of Hermocrates and his colleagues; and this injudicious alteration increased the calamities of Syracuse, which at length prepared to capitulate.¹

Olymp. xci. 3. A. C. 414. While the assembly deliberated concerning the execution of a measure, which, however disgraceful, was declared to be necessary, a Corinthian galley, commanded by Gongylus, entered the central harbour of Ortygia, which being strongly fortified, and penetrating into the heart of the city, served as the principal and most secure station for the Syracusan fleet. The news immediately reached the assembly, and all ranks of men eagerly crowded around Gongylus the Corinthian, that they might learn the design of his voyage, and the intentions of their Peloponnesian allies. Gongylus announced a speedy and effectual relief to the besieged city.² He acquainted the Syracusans, that the embassy, sent the preceding year to crave the assistance of Peloponnesus, had been crowned with success. His own countrymen had warmly embraced the cause of their kinsmen, and most respectable colony. They had fitted out a considerable fleet, the arrival of which might be expected every hour. The Lacedæmonians also had sent a small squadron, and the whole armament was conducted by the Spartan Gylippus, an officer of tried valour and ability.

While the desponding citizens of Syracuse listened to this intelligence with pleasing astonishment, a messenger arrived by land from Gylippus himself. That experienced commander, instead of pursuing a direct course to Sicily, which might have been intercepted by the Athenian fleet, had landed with four galleys on the western coast of the island. The name of a Spartan general determined the wavering irresolution of the Sicilians. The troops of Himera, Selinus, and Gela, flocked to his standard; and he approached Syracuse on the side of Epipolæ, where the line of contravallation was still unfinished, with a body of several thousand men.

The most courageous of the citizens sallied forth to meet this generous and powerful protector. The junction was happily effected; the ardour of the troops kindled into enthusiasm; and they distinguished that memorable day by surprising several important Athenian posts. This first success re-animated the activity of the soldiers and workmen. The traverse wall was extended with the utmost diligence, and a vigorous sally deprived the enemy of the strong castle of Labdalus. Nicias perceiving that the interest of the Athenians in Sicily would be continually weakened by delay, wished to bring the fortune of war to the decision of a battle. Nor did Gylippus decline the engagement. The first action was unfavourable to the Syracusans, who had been imprudently posted in the defiles between their own and the enemy's walls, which rendered of no avail their superiority in cavalry and archers. The magnanimity of Gylippus acknowledged this error, for which he completely atoned by his judicious conduct in

the succeeding engagements. His forces were drawn up in a more spacious ground. The pikemen received the shock of the enemy's front. The horses and light-armed troops assailed and harassed their undefended flanks. The Athenians were thrown into disorder, repulsed, and pursued to their camp with considerable loss, and with irreparable disgrace.

The important consequences of this victory appeared in the subsequent events of the siege. The Syracusans soon extended their works beyond the line of circumvallation, so that it was impossible to block up their city, without forcing their ramparts. The besiegers, while they maintained the superiority of their arms, had been abundantly supplied with necessaries from the neighbouring territory; but every place was alike hostile to them after their defeat. The soldiers who went out in quest of wood and water, were unexpectedly attacked and cut off by the enemy's cavalry, or by the reinforcements which arrived from every quarter to the assistance of Syracuse; and they were at length reduced to depend, for every necessary supply, on the precarious bounty of the Italian shore.

Nicias, whose sensibility deeply felt the public distress, wrote a most desponding letter to the Athenians. He honestly described, and lamented, the misfortunes and disorders of his army. The slaves deserted in great numbers; the mercenary troops, who fought only for pay and subsistence, preferred the more secure and lucrative service of Syracuse; even the Athenian citizens, disgusted with the unexpected length and intolerable hardships of the war, abandoned the care of the galleys to inexperienced hands; an abuse too easily permitted by the captains, whose weakness and partiality had corrupted the discipline, and ruined the strength, of the fleet. Nicias frankly acknowledged his inability to check the disorder; observing, that he wrote to those who knew the difficulty of governing the licentious spirit of their domestic troops. He therefore exhorted the assembly, either to call them home without delay, or to send immediately a second armament, not less powerful than the first.

Olymp. xci. 4. A. C. 413. Gylippus and Hermocrates (for the latter had again assumed the authority due to his abilities) were acquainted with the actual distress, as well as the future hopes of the besiegers, who might derive, in consequence of Nicias's letter, more effectual succours from Attica than the besieged city could expect from Peloponnesus. They were prompted by interest therefore, as well as by inclination, to press the enemy on every side, and at once to assail them by sea and land. Besides the bad condition of the Athenian fleet, the absence of a considerable number of galleys employed in conducting the convoys of provisions, encouraged this resolution. The Corinthian squadron of twelve sail, long expected with anxiety, had escaped the dangers of a winter's voyage; and at the commencement of the ensuing spring, the harbours of Syracuse were crowded with the whole naval strength of Sicily. Hermocrates persuaded his countrymen, "That the advantages of skill and experience, which he honestly ascribed to the

¹ Thucyd. p. 487.

² Thucyd. p. 490.

Athenians, could not compensate their terror and confusion at being suddenly attacked by a superior force, on an element which they affected to command. Athens had assumed this boasted empire of the sea in repelling the invasion of Persia. Syracuse had a similar, yet stronger motive; and as she possessed greater power, was entitled to expect more distinguished success."

The principal squadrons of Syracuse lay in the harbour of Ortygia, separated, by an island of the same name, from the station of the Athenian fleet. While Hermocrates sailed forth with eighty galleys, to venture a naval engagement, Gylippus attacked the hostile fortifications at Plemmyrium, a promontory opposite to Ortygia, which confined the entrance of the Great Harbour. The defeat of the Syracusans at sea, whereby they lost fourteen vessels, was balanced by their victory at land, in which they took three fortresses, containing a large quantity of military and naval stores, and a considerable sum of money. In some subsequent actions, which scarcely deserve the name of battles, their fleet was still unsuccessful; but as they engaged with great caution, and found every where a secure retreat on a friendly shore, their loss was extremely inconsiderable. The want of success, in their first attempt, did not abate their resolution to gain the command at sea. The hopes of defending their country sharpened their invention, and animated their activity. They could not, indeed, contend with the Athenians in the rapidity of naval evolution, or in the skill of seamanship; but in the destined scene of action, there was little opportunity for displaying those advantages; and by strengthening, with unremitting labour, the prows of their ships, they compensated, by superior weight, the defect of velocity. They provided also a great number of small vessels, which might approach so near the hostile fleet, that the light-armed troops with which they were filled could aim their darts against the Athenian mariners.

By unexampled assiduity in completing these preparations, the Syracusans at length prevailed in a general engagement, which was fought in the Great Harbour. Seven Athenian ships were sunk, many more were disabled, and Nicias saved the remains of his shattered and dishonoured armament, by retiring behind a line of merchantmen and transports, from the masts of which had been suspended huge masses of lead, named dolphins, from their form, sufficient to crush, by their falling weight, the stoutest galleys of antiquity. This unexpected obstacle arrested the progress of the victors; but the advantages already obtained elevated them with the highest hopes, and reduced the enemy to despair.

Olymp. xci. 3. Sicily were attended by misfortunes at home, still more dreadful. A. C. 414. In the eighteenth year of the war, Alcibiades accompanied to Sparta the ambassadors of Corinth and Syracuse, who had solicited and obtained assistance to the besieged city. On that occasion the Athenian exile first acquired the confidence of the Spartans, by con-

demning, in the strongest terms, the injustice and ambition of his ungrateful countrymen, "whose cruelty towards himself equalled their inveterate hostility to the Lacedæmonian republic; but that republic might, by following his advice, disarm their resentment. The town of Decelia was situated on the Attic frontier, at an equal distance of fifteen miles from Thebes and Athens. This place, which commanded an extensive and fertile plain, might be surprised and fortified by the Spartans,³ who, instead of harassing their foes by annual incursions, might thus infest them by a continual war. The wisdom of Sparta had too long neglected such a salutary and decisive measure, especially as the existence of a similar design had often been suggested by the fears of the enemy, who trembled even at the apprehension of seeing a foreign garrison in their territory."

Olymp. xci. 4. This advice first proposed, and often urged, by Alcibiades, was adopted in the commencement of A. C. 413. the ensuing spring, when the warlike Agis led a powerful army into Attica. The defenceless inhabitants of the frontier fled before his irresistible arms; but instead of pursuing them, as usual, into the heart of the country, he stopped short at Decelia. As all necessary materials had been provided in great abundance, the place was speedily fortified on every side, and the walls of Decelia, which might be distinctly seen across the intermediate plain, bid defiance to those of Athens.⁴

The latter city was kept in continual alarm by the watchful hostility of a neighbouring garrison. The open country was entirely laid waste, and the usual communication was interrupted with the valuable island of Eubœa, from which, in seasons of scarcity, or during the ravages of war, the Athenians commonly derived their supplies of corn, wine, and oil, and whatever is most necessary to life. Harassed by the fatigues of unremitting service, and deprived of daily bread, the slaves murmured, complained, and revolted to the enemy; and their defection robbed the state of twenty thousand useful artisans. Since the latter years of Pericles, the Athenians had not been involved in such distress. But their present were far more grievous than their past sufferings. These had been chiefly occasioned by the temporary rage of the pestilence, the abatement of which there was always reason to expect; but those were inflicted by the unextinguishable hatred of a cruel and unrelenting foe.⁵

The domestic calamities of the republic did not, however, prevent the most vigorous exertions abroad. Twenty galleys, stationed at Naupactus, watched the motions of the Peloponnesian fleet destined to the assistance of Syracuse; thirty carried on the war in Macedonia, to reduce the rebellion of Amphipolis; a considerable squadron collected tribute, and

³ The Athenians, with their usual imprudence, facilitated the success of Alcibiades's intrigues. At the time they ought, if possible, to have soothed, they exasperated the Spartans to the utmost, by frequent incursions from Pylus, and by openly assisting the Argives. Thucyd. i. vi. sub fine.

⁴ Thucyd. p. 500, et seq.

⁵ Id. ibid.

levied soldiers, in the colonies of Asia; another, still more powerful, ravaged the coast of Peloponnesus. Never did any kingdom or republic equal the magnanimity of Athens; never in ancient or modern times, did the courage of any state entertain an ambition so far superior to its power, or exert efforts so disproportionate to its strength. Amidst the difficulties and dangers which encompassed them on every side, the Athenians persisted in the siege of Syracuse, a city little inferior to their own; and, undaunted by the actual devastation of their country, unterrified by the menaced assault of their walls, they sent, without delay, such a reinforcement into Sicily, as afforded the most promising hopes of success in their expedition against that island.¹

The Syracusans had scarcely time to rejoice at their victory, or Nicias to bewail his defeat, when a numerous and formidable armament appeared on the Sicilian coast. The foremost galleys, their prows adorned with gaudy streamers, pursued a secure course towards the harbours of Syracuse. The emulation of the rowers was animated by the mingled sounds of the trumpet and clarion; and the regular decoration, the elegant splendour, which distinguished every part of the equipment, exhibited a pompous spectacle of naval triumph. Their appearance, even at a distance, announced the country to which they belonged; and both the joy of the besiegers, and the terror of the besieged, acknowledged that Athens was the only city in the world capable of sending to the sea such a beautiful and magnificent contribution. The Syracusans employed not unavailing efforts to check the progress, or to hinder the approach, of the hostile armament; which, besides innumerable foreign vessels and transports, consisted of seventy-three Athenian galleys, commanded by the experienced valour of Demosthenes and Eurymedon. The pikemen on board exceeded five thousand; the light-armed troops were nearly as numerous; and, including the rowers, workmen, and attendants, the whole strength may be reckoned equal to that originally sent with Nicias,² which amounted to above twenty thousand men.

The misfortunes hitherto attending the operations in Sicily had lowered the character of the general; and this circumstance, as well as the superior abilities of Demosthenes, entitled him to assume the tone of authority in their conjunct deliberations. His advice, which Eurymedon highly approved, and in which the dilatory caution of Nicias finally acquiesced, was clear and simple. "They ought to avail themselves of the alarm which the unexpected arrival of such a powerful reinforcement had spread among the enemy; and instead of submitting to the tedious formalities of a siege, at once assault the walls of Syracuse. He trusted, by the valour of his troops, to obtain, in one day, the valuable reward of long and severe labours. But if the gods had otherwise determined, it would be time to desist from an enter-

prise, in which delay was equal to defeat, and to employ the bravery of the Athenian youth in repelling the invaders of their country."³

After ravaging the banks of the Anapus, and making some ineffectual attempts against the fortifications on that side, probably with a view to divert the attention of the enemy, Demosthenes chose the first hour of a moonshine night, to proceed with the flower of the army to seize the fortresses in Epipolé. The march was performed with successful celerity; the out-posts were surprised; the guards put to the sword; and three separate encampments, of the Syracusans, the Sicilians, and allies, formed a feeble opposition to the Athenian ardour. As if their victory had already been complete, the assailants began to pull down the wooden battlements, or to urge the pursuit with a rapidity which disordered their ranks.

Mean while, the vigilant activity of Gylippus had assembled the whole force of Syracuse. At the approach of the enemy his vanguard retired. The Athenians were decoyed within the intricate windings of the walls, and their irregular fury was first checked by the firmness of a Theban phalanx. A resistance so sudden and unexpected might alone have been decisive; but other circumstances were adverse to the Athenians: their ignorance of the ground, the alternate obscurity of night, and the deceitful glare of the moon, which, shining in the front of the Thebans, illumined the splendour of their arms, and multiplied the terror of their numbers. The foremost ranks of the pursuers were repelled; and, as they retreated to the main body, encountered the advancing Argives and Corcyreans, who, singing the Pæan in their Doric dialect and accent, were unfortunately taken for enemies. Fear, and then rage, seized the Athenians, who thinking themselves encompassed on all sides, determined to force their way, and committed much bloodshed among their allies, before the mistake could be discovered. To prevent the repetition of this dreadful error, their scattered bands were obliged at every moment to demand the watch-word, which was at length betrayed to their adversaries. The consequence of this was doubly fatal. At every rencounter the silent Athenians were slaughtered without mercy, while the enemy, who knew their watch-word, might at pleasure join, or decline, the battle, and easily oppress their weakness, or elude their strength. The terror and confusion increased; the rout became general; Gylippus pursued in good order with his victorious troops. The vanquished could not descend in a body with the celerity of fear, by the narrow passages through which they had mounted. Many abandoned their arms, and explored the unknown paths of the rocky Epipolé. Others threw themselves from precipices, rather than await the pursuers. Several thousands were left dead or wounded on the scene of action; and in the morning the greater part of the stragglers were intercepted and cut off by the Syracusan cavalry.⁴

¹ Thucyd. p. 501, et seq.

² Comp. Thucyd. supra citat. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 336. Plut. in Nicias.

³ Thucyd. l. vii. p. 519.

⁴ Thucyd. p. 520, et seq.

This dreadful and unexpected disaster suspended the operations of the siege. The Athenian generals spent the time in fruitless deliberations concerning their future measures, while the army lay encamped on the marshy and unhealthy banks of the Anapus. The vicissitudes of an autumnal atmosphere, corrupted by the foul vapours of an unwholesome soil, made a severe impression on the irritable fibres of men, exhausted by fatigue, dejected by disgrace, and deprived of hope. A general sickness broke out in the camp. Demosthenes urged this calamity as a new reason for hastening their departure, while it was yet possible to cross the Ionian sea, without risking the danger of a winter's tempest. But Nicias dissuaded the design of leaving Sicily until they should be warranted to take this important step by the positive authority of the republic. "Those who were actually the most bent on ignominious flight, would, after their return, be the foremost to accuse the weakness or the treachery of their commanders; and for his own part, he would rather die honourably in the field of battle, than perish by the unjust sentence of his country." Demosthenes and Eurymedon knew, by fatal experience, the irascible temper of an Athenian assembly; they only insisted, that the armament should at least remove to a more convenient station, from whence, after the troops had recovered their usual health and spirits, they might harass the enemy by continual descents, until they obtained an opportunity of fighting the Syracusan fleet on the open sea.

But even this resolution was strenuously opposed by Nicias, who knew by the secret correspondence which he maintained with certain traitors in Syracuse, that the treasury of that city had been exhausted by the enormous expense of two thousand talents already incurred in the war, and that the magistrates had stretched their credit to its utmost limits, in borrowing from their allies; and who therefore naturally flattered himself, that the vigour of their assistance would abate with the decay of their faculties. The colleagues of Nicias were confounded with the firmness of an opposition so unlike the flexible timidity of his ordinary character, and so inconsistent with the sentiments which he had often expressed concerning the Sicilian expedition. They imagined that he might rely on some more important ground of confidence, which his caution was unwilling to explain; they submitted therefore to his opinion, an opinion equally fatal to himself and to them, and to the armament which they commanded.⁵

Mean while the prudence of Gylippus profited of the fame of his victory, to draw a powerful reinforcement from the Sicilian cities; and the transports, so long expected from Peloponnesus, finally arrived in the harbour of Ortygia. The Peloponnesian forces had sailed from Greece early in the spring; and it is not explained for what reason they touched on the coast of Cyrenaica. There they continued for some months, that they might defend their Grecian brethren,

actually threatened by the barbarous assaults of the Lybians; and having conquered that dangerous enemy, they augmented their fleet with a few Cyrenian galleys,⁶ and safely reached Syracuse, the place of their first destination. This squadron formed the last assistance sent to either of the contending parties, and nothing farther was required to complete the actors in the following dreadful scene; for by the accession of the Cyrenians, Syracuse was either attacked or defended by all the various divisions of the Grecian name, which formed, in that age, the most civilized portion of the inhabitants of Asia, Africa, and Europe.

The arrival of such powerful auxiliaries to the besieged, and the increasing force of the malady, totally disconcerted the Athenians. Even Nicias agreed to set sail. Every necessary preparation was made for this purpose, and the cover of night was chosen, as most proper for concealing their own disgrace, and for eluding the vengeance of the enemy. But the night appointed for their departure was distinguished by an inauspicious eclipse of the moon, for so at least it was judged by the superstitious fears of Nicias, and by the ignorance of his diviners,⁷ even in the vain art which they professed. The voyage was deferred till the mystical number of thrice nine days. But before the expiration of that time it was no longer practicable; for the design was soon discovered to the Syracusans, and this discovery, added to the encouragement derived from the circumstances of which we have already taken notice, increased their eagerness to attack the enemy by sea and land. Their attempts failed to destroy, by fire-ships, the Athenian fleet. They were more successful in employing superior numbers to divide the strength, and to weaken the resistance, of an enfeebled and dejected foe. During three days there was a perpetual succession of military and naval exploits. On the first day fortune hung in suspense; the second deprived the Athenians of a considerable squadron commanded by Eurymedon; and this misfortune was embittered, on the third day, by the loss of eighteen galleys, with their crews.⁸

The Syracusans celebrated their victory with triumphant enthusiasm; while their orators "extolled and magnified the glory of a city, which, by its native prowess and single danger, had not only maintained the independence of Sicily, but avenged the injuries of the whole Grecian name, too long dishonoured and afflicted by the oppressive tyranny of Athens. That tyranny had been acquired and confirmed by the usurped sovereignty of the sea; but even on that element, the courage of Syracuse had defeated the experience of the enemy. Their renown would be immortal, if they accomplished the useful and meritorious work; and if, by intercepting the retreat, and destroying the armament of the Athenians, they crushed at once the power, and for ever humbled the pride, of that aspiring people."

⁶ Thucyd. p. 587.

⁷ The rules of divination, we are told, should have taught them, that the obscurity of an eclipse betokened a successful retreat. Plutarch. in Nicias.

⁸ Thucyd. p. 528, et seq.

⁵ Comp. Thucyd. p. 524. et Plut. in Nicias.

This design, suggested by the wisdom of Hermocrates, was eagerly adopted by the active zeal of his fellow citizens, who strove, with unremitting ardour, to throw a chain of vessels across the mouth of the Great Harbour, about a mile in breadth. The labour was complete before Nicias, totally occupied by other objects, attempted to interrupt it. After repeated defeats, and although he was so miserably tormented by the stone, that he had frequently solicited his recal, that virtuous commander, whose courage rose in adversity, used the utmost diligence to retrieve the affairs of his country. The shattered galleys were speedily refitted, and again prepared, to the number of a hundred and ten, to risk the event of a battle. As they had suffered greatly, on former occasions, by the hardness and massive solidity of the Syracusan prows, Nicias provided them with grappling-irons, fitted to prevent the recoil of their opponents, and the repetition of the hostile stroke. The decks were crowded with armed men, and the contrivance to which the enemy had hitherto chiefly owed their success, of introducing the firmness and stability of a military, into a naval engagement, was adopted in its full extent by the Athenians. When the fleet was ready for sea, Nicias recalled the troops from the various posts and fortresses still occupied by their arms, and formed them into one camp on the shore, where, on the day of battle, their ranks might be extended as widely as the vicinity of the Syracusan ramparts could safely permit; that a spacious retreat might be secured to the Athenian ships, if persecuted by their usual bad fortune; in which fatal alternative nothing remained, but to retire by land with the miserable remnant of the army. But Nicias did not yet despair, that the last efforts of his countrymen would break the enemy's chain at the mouth of the Great Harbour; and that they would return victorious, to transport their encamped companions to the friendly ports of Naxos and Catana.

Elevated by this hope, he forgot his bodily infirmities, and suppressed the anguish of his soul. With a cheerful and magnanimous firmness, he removed the dejection of the Athenians, exhorting them, before they embarked, by an affecting and manly speech, "to remember the vicissitudes of war, and the instability of fortune.¹ Though hitherto unsuccessful, they had every thing to expect from the strength of their actual preparations; nor ought men, who had tried and surmounted so many dangers, to yield to the weak prejudices of unexperienced folly, and cloud the prospect of future victory, by the gloomy remembrance of past defeat. They yet enjoyed an opportunity to defend their lives, their liberty, their friends, their country, and the mighty name of Athens; an opportunity which never could return, since the whole fortune of the republic was embarked in the present fleet." When Gylippus and the Syracusan commanders were apprised of the designs of the enemy, they hastened to the defence of the bar which had been thrown across the entrance of the harbour. It is uncertain for what reason

they had left open one narrow passage,² on either side of which they stationed a powerful squadron. Gylippus animated the sailors with such topics as the occasion naturally furnished, and returned to take the conduct of the land forces, leaving Sicanus, Agatharchus, and Pythen, the two first to command the wings, and the last, a citizen of Corinth, to command the centre, of the Syracusan fleet, which fell short of the Athenian by the number of twenty gallees. But the former was admirably provided with whatever seemed most necessary for attack or defence; even the Athenian grappling-irons had not been overlooked; to elude the dangerous grasp of these instruments, the prows of the Syracusan vessels were covered with wet and slippery hides.

Before the Athenians set sail, Nicias, that nothing might be neglected to obtain success, went round the whole armament, addressing, in the most pathetic terms, the several commanders by name, recalling to them the objects most dear and most respectable, which they were engaged by every tie of honour and affection to defend, and conjuring them by their families, their friends, and their paternal gods, to exert whatever skill or courage they collectively, or as individuals, possessed, on this ever memorable and most important occasion. He then returned to the camp with an enfeebled body and an anxious mind, committing the last hope of the republic to the active valour of Demosthenes, Eudemus, and Menander. The first impression of the Athenians was irresistible; they burst through the passage of the bar, and repelled the squadrons on either side. As the entrance widened, the Syracusans, in their turn, rushed into the harbour, which was more favourable than the open sea to their mode of fighting. Thither the foremost of the Athenians returned, either compelled by superior force, or that they might assist their companions. The engagement became general in the mouth of the harbour; and in this narrow space two hundred gallees fought, during the greatest part of the day, with an obstinate and persevering valour. It would require the expressive energy of Thucydides, and the imitative, though inimitable, sounds and expressions of the Grecian tongue, to describe the noise, the tumult, and the ardour of the contending squadrons. The battle was not long confined to the shock of adverse prows, and to the distant hostility of darts and arrows. The nearest vessels grappled, and closed with each other, and their decks were soon converted into a field of blood. While the heavy-armed troops boarded the enemy's ships, they left their own exposed to a similar misfortune; the fleets were divided into massive clusters of adhering gallees; and the confusion of their mingled shouts overpowered the voice of authority; the Athenians exhorting, not to abandon an element on which their republic had ever acquired victory and glory, for the dangerous protection of a hostile shore; and the Syracusans encouraging each other not to fly from an enemy, whose weakness or cowardice had long meditated flight.³

¹ Thucyd. p. 535, et seq.

² Καὶ τὸν κατὰ λείψανον διακλον. Thucyd. p. 451.

³ Thucyd. p. 543, et seq.

The singular and tremendous spectacle of an engagement more fierce and obstinate than any that had ever been beheld in the Grecian seas, restrained the activity, and totally suspended the powers, of the numerous and adverse battalions which encircled the coast. The spectators and the actors were equally interested in the important scene; but the former, the current of whose sensibility was undiverted by any exertion of mind or body, felt more deeply, and expressed more forcibly, the various emotions by which they were agitated.⁴ Hope, fear, the shouts of victory, the shrieks of despair, the anxious solicitude of doubtful success, animated the countenances, the voice, and the gesture of the Athenians, whose whole reliance centered in their fleet. When at length their gallees evidently gave way on every side, the contrast of alternate, and the rapid tumult of successive passions, subsided in a melancholy calm. This dreadful pause of astonishment and terror was followed by the disordered trepidation of flight and fear: many escaped to the camp: others ran, uncertain whither to direct their steps; while Nicias, with a small, but undismayed band, remained on the shore to protect the landing of their unfortunate gallees. But the retreat of the Athenians could not probably have been effected, had it not been favoured by the actual circumstances of the enemy, as well as by the peculiar prejudices of ancient superstition. In this well-fought battle, the vanquished had lost fifty, and the victors forty vessels. It was incumbent on the latter to employ their immediate and most strenuous efforts to recover the dead bodies of their friends, that they might be honoured with the sacred and indispensable rites of funeral. The day was far spent; the strength of the sailors had been exhausted by a long continuance of unremitting labour; and both they and their companions on shore were more desirous to return to Syracuse to enjoy the fruits of victory, than to irritate the dangerous despair of the vanquished Athenians.⁵

It is observed by the Roman orator,⁶ with no less truth than elegance, that not only the navy of Athens, but the glory and the empire of that republic, suffered shipwreck in the fatal harbour of Syracuse. The despondent degeneracy which immediately followed this ever memorable engagement was testified in the neglect of a duty which the Athenians had never neglected before, and in denying a part of their national character, which it had hitherto been their greatest glory to maintain. They abandoned to insult and indignity the bodies of the slain; and when it was proposed to them by their commanders to prepare next day for a second engagement, since their vessels were still more numerous than those of the enemy, they, who had seldom avoided a superior, and who had never declined the encounter of an equal force, declared, that no motive could induce them to withstand the weaker armament of Syracuse. Their only desire was to escape by land, under cover of the night, from a foe whom they had

not courage to oppose, and from a place where every object was offensive to their sight, and most painful to their reflection.⁷

The behaviour of the Syracusans might have proved extremely favourable to this design. The evening after the battle was the vigil of the feast of Hercules; and the still agitated combatants awakened, after a short and feverish repose, to celebrate the memory of their favourite hero, to whose propitious influence they probably ascribed the merit of the most splendid trophy that ever adorned the fame of Syracuse. From the triumph of victory, and grateful emotions of religious enthusiasm, there was an easy transition, in the creed and in the practice of the Greeks, to the extravagance of licentious joy, and the excesses of sensual indulgence. Sports, processions, music, dancing, the pleasures of the table, of the elegant arts, and of unguarded conversation, were incorporated in the texture of their religious worship. But the coincidence of a festival and a victory demanded an accumulated profusion of such objects as sooth the senses and please the fancy. Amidst these giddy transports, the Syracusans lost all remembrance of an enemy whom they despised; even the soldiers on guard joined the dissolute or frivolous amusements of their companions; and, during the greatest part of the night, Syracuse presented a mixed scene of secure gayety, of thoughtless jollity, and of mad and dangerous disorder.⁸

The firm and vigilant mind of Hermocrates alone withstood, but was unable to divert, the general current. It was impossible to rouse to the fatigues of war men buried in wine and pleasure, and intoxicated with victory; and, as he could not intercept by force, he determined to retard by stratagem, the intended retreat of the Athenians, whose numbers and resentment would still render them formidable to whatever part of Sicily they might remove their camp. A select band of horsemen, assuming the character of traitors, fearlessly approached the hostile ramparts, and warned the Athenians of the danger of departing that night, as many ambuscades lurked in the way, and all the most important passes were occupied by the enemy. The frequency of treason gained credit to the perfidious advice; and the Athenians, having changed their first resolution, were persuaded by Nicias to wait two days longer, that such measures might be taken as seemed best adapted to promote the safety and celerity of their march.⁹

The camp was raised on the third morning after the battle. Forty thousand men, of whom many were afflicted with wounds and disease, and all exhausted by fatigue, and dejected by calamity, exhibited the appearance, not of a flying army, but of a great and populous community, driven from their ancient habitations by the cruel vengeance of a conqueror. They had miserably fallen from the lofty expectations with which they sailed in triumph to the harbour of Syracuse. They had abandoned their fleet, their transports, the hopes of victory,

⁴ Thucyd. p. 544.
⁶ Cic. in Ver. v. 37.

⁵ Id. p. 545.

⁷ Thucyd. p. 545.
⁹ Id. p. 547.

⁸ Id. p. 546.

and the glory of the Athenian name; and these collective sufferings were enhanced and exasperated by the painful images which struck the eyes and the fancy of each unfortunate individual. The mangled bodies of their companions and friends, deprived of the sacred rites of funeral, affected them with a sentiment of religious horror, on which the weakness of human nature is happily unable to dwell. They removed their attention from this dreadful sight; but they could not divert their compassion from a spectacle still more melancholy, the numerous crowds of sick and wounded, who followed them with enfeebled and unequal steps, entreating, in the accent and attitude of unutterable anguish, to be delivered from the horrors of famine, or the rage of an exasperated foe. Amidst such affecting scenes, the heart of a stranger would have melted with tender sympathy; but how much more must it have afflicted the Athenians, to see their parents, brothers, children, and friends, involved in unexampled misery! to hear, without the possibility of relieving, their lamentable complaints! and reluctantly to throw the clinging victims from their wearied necks and arms! Yet the care of personal safety prevailed over every other care; for the soldiers, either destitute of slaves, or distrusting their fidelity, were not only encumbered by their armour, but oppressed by the weight of their provisions.¹

The superior rank of Nicias entitled him to a pre-eminence of toil and of wo; and he deserves the regard of posterity by his character and sufferings, and still more by the melancholy firmness of his conduct. The load of accumulated disasters did not sink him into inactive despondency. He moved with a rapid pace around every part of the army, and the ardour of his mind re-animating the languor of his debilitated frame, he exclaimed, with a loud and distinct voice, "Athenians and allies! there is yet room for hope. Many have escaped from still greater evils; nor ought you rashly to accuse either fortune or yourselves. As to me, who, in bodily strength, excel not the weakest among you (for you see to what a miserable condition my disease has reduced me,) and who, in the happiness of private life, and the deceitful gifts of prosperity, had long been distinguished above the most illustrious of my contemporaries, I am now confounded with affliction with the meanest and most worthless. Yet am I unconscious of deserving such a fatal reverse of fortune. My conduct towards men has been irreproachable; my piety towards the gods conspicuous and sincere. For this reason I am still animated with confidence; calamities, unmerited by guilt, are disarmed of their terrors. If we have incurred the indignation of the gods by our ambitious designs against Sicily, our offence, surely, is sufficiently expiated by past sufferings, which now render us the objects of compassion. Other nations have attacked their neighbours with less provocation, and have yet escaped with a gentler punishment; nor will experience warrant the belief, that for the frailties and errors of passion,

providence should impose penalties too heavy to be borne. We have the less reason to adopt an impious prejudice, so dishonourable to the gods, when we consider the means which their goodness has still left us to provide for our defence. Our numbers, our resolution, and even our misfortunes, still render us formidable. There is not an army in Sicily capable to intercept our course; much less to expel us from the first friendly territory in which we may fix our camp. If we can secure, therefore, our present safety, by a prudent, speedy, and courageous retreat, we may afterwards retrieve our lost honour, and restore the fallen glory of Athens; since the chief ornament of a state consists in brave and virtuous men, not in empty ships and undefended walls."²

The actions of Nicias fully corresponded with his words. He neglected none of the duties of a great general. Instead of leading the army towards Naxos and Catana, in which direction there was reason to apprehend many secret ambushes of the enemy, he conducted them by the western route towards Gela and Camerina; expecting, by this measure, to find provisions in greater plenty, as well as to elude the latent snares of the Syracusans. That nothing might be omitted which promised the hope of relief, messengers were immediately despatched to the neighbouring cities, which might possibly be tempted by their natural jealousy of the growing prosperity of Syracuse, to favour the retreat of the vanquished. The troops were then divided into two squares, as the most secure and capacious arrangement. Nicias led the van; Demosthenes conducted the rear; the baggage, and unarmed multitude, occupied the centre. In this order of march they passed the river Anapus, the ford of which was feebly disputed by an inconsiderable guard; and having proceeded the first day only five miles, they encamped in the evening on a rising ground, after being much harassed during the latter part of their journey by the Syracusan cavalry and archers, who galled them at a distance, intercepted the stragglers, and avoided, by a seasonable retreat, to commit the security of their own fortune with the dangerous despair of the Athenians. Next day, having marched only twenty furlongs, they reached a spacious plain, the convenience of which invited them to repose; especially as they needed a supply of water and provisions, which might be easily obtained from the surrounding country.³

Before this time, the enemy were apprized of their line of march; and, in order to interrupt it, they sent a numerous detachment to fortify the mountain of Acræum. This mountain, which probably gave name to the small town situate in its neighbourhood, intersected the direct road to Gela and Camerina. It was distant a few miles from the Athenian encampment, and a small degree of art might render it impregnable, since it was of a steep and rapid ascent, and encompassed on every side by the rocky channel of a loud and foaming torrent. In vain the Athenians attempted, on three successive days, to force the passage. They

¹ Thucyd. p. 548.

² Thucyd. p. 550.

³ Id. p. 552, et seq.

were repelled with loss in every new attack, which became more feeble than the preceding. In the first and most desperate, an accidental storm of thunder increased the courage of the Syracusans and the terror of the Athenians. A similar event had, in the first engagement after the invasion of Sicily, produced an opposite effect on the contending nations. But the hopes and the fears of men change with their fortune.

In the evening after the last unsuccessful contest, the condition of the Athenians was peculiarly deplorable. The numbers of the wounded had been increased by the fruitless attempts to pass the mountain; the enemy had continually galled and insulted them as they retreated to their camp; the adjacent territory could no longer supply them with the necessaries of life; and they must be compelled, after all their hardships and fatigues, to make a long circuit by the sea-shore, if they expected to reach, in safety, the places of their respective destination. Even this resolution (for there was no alternative,) however dreadful to men in their comfortless and exhausted state, was recommended by Nicias, who, to conceal his design from the enemy, caused innumerable fires to be lighted in every part of the camp.⁴ The troops then marched out under cover of the night, and in the same order which they had hitherto observed. But they had not proceeded far in this nocturnal expedition, when the obscurity of the skies, the deceitful tracks of an unknown and hostile country, filled the most timid or unfortunate with imaginary terrors. Their panic, as is usual in great bodies of men, was speedily communicated to those around them; and Demosthenes, with above one half of his division, fatally mistook the road, and quitted, never more to rejoin, the rest of the army.

The scouts of Gylippus and the Syracusans immediately brought intelligence of this important event, which furnished an opportunity to attack the divided strength of the Athenians. His superior knowledge of the country enabled Gylippus, by the celerity of his march, to intercept the smaller division, and to surround them on every side, in the difficult and intricate defiles which led to the ford of the river Erinios. There he assaulted them with impunity, during a whole day, with darts, arrows, and javelins. When the measure of their sufferings was complete, he proclaimed towards the evening, by the sound of the trumpet, and with the loud voice of the herald, freedom, forgiveness, and protection to all who should desert, and abandon the bad fortune of their leaders; an offer which was accepted by the troops of several Asiatic islands, and other dependent and tributary countries. At length he entered into treaty with Demosthenes himself, whose soldiers laid down their arms, and delivered their money (which filled the capacious hollow of four broad bucklers,) on condition that they should not suffer death, imprisonment, or famine.⁵ Notwithstanding the number of the deserters and of the slain, the remainder still amounted to six thousand, who

were sent to Syracuse with their captive general, under a powerful and vigilant escort, while the activity of Gylippus followed the flying battalions of the enemy, which had been conducted by Nicias to the distance of twenty miles, towards the fatal banks of the river Assinaros.

The Syracusans overtook the rear before the van could arrive at the lofty and abrupt margin of this rapid stream; and a herald was sent to Nicias, exhorting him to imitate the example of his colleague, and to surrender, without further bloodshed, to the irresistible valour of his victorious pursuers. Nicias disbelieved, or affected to disbelieve, the report; but when a confidential messenger, whom he was allowed to despatch for information, brought certain intelligence of the surrender and disgrace of Demosthenes, he also condescended to propose terms, in the name of the Athenians, engaging, on the immediate cessation of hostilities, to reimburse the magistrates of Syracuse for the expense of the war, and to deliver Athenian hostages (a citizen for a talent) until the debt should be liquidated.⁶

These terms were rejected by the Syracusans with disdain; and Gylippus having occupied the most advantageous posts on every side, attacked the army of Nicias with the same mode of warfare which had, two days before, proved so destructive to their unfortunate companions. During the whole day they bore, with extraordinary patience, the hostile assault, still expecting, under cover of the night, to escape the cruel vigilance of the enemy. But that hope was vain: Gylippus perceived their departure; and although three hundred men of determined courage gallantly broke through the guards, and effected their escape, the rest were no sooner discovered than they returned to their former station, and laid down their arms in silent despair. Yet the return of the morning brought back their courage. They again took up their arms, and marched towards the river, miserably galled and afflicted by the hostile archers and cavalry. Their distress was most lamentable and incurable: yet hope did not totally forsake them; for, like men in the oppression and languor of a consuming disease, they still entertained a confused idea, that their sufferings would end, could they but reach the opposite banks of the neighbouring river.⁷

The desire of assuaging their thirst encouraged this daring design. They rushed with frantic disorder into the rapidity of the stream; the pursuing Syracusans, who had occupied the rocky banks, destroying them with innumerable volleys of missile weapons. In the Assinaros they had a new enemy to contend with. The depth and force of the waters triumphed over their single, and shook their implicated strength. Many were borne down the stream. At length the weight of their numbers resisted the violence of the torrent; but a new form of danger and of horror presented itself to the eyes of Nicias. His soldiers turned their fury against each other, disputing, with the point of the sword, the unwholesome draughts of the agitated and

4 Thucyd. p. 552, et seq.

5 Id. p. 553.

6 Thucyd. p. 551.

7 Id.

turbid current. This spectacle melted the firmness of his manly soul. He surrendered to Gylippus, and asked quarter for the miserable remnant of his troops, who had not perished in the Assinaros, or been destroyed by the Syracusan archers and cavalry.¹ Before the commands of the Lacedæmonian general could pervade the army, many of the soldiers had, according to the barbarous practice of the age, seized their prisoners and slaves; so that the Athenian captives were afterwards distributed among several communities of Sicily, which had sent assistance to Syracuse. The rest, upon laying down their arms, were entitled to the pity and protection of Gylippus; who, after sending proper detachments to intercept and collect the stragglers, returned in triumph to the city with the inestimable trophies of his valour and conduct.

Nicias had little to expect from the *humanity* of a proud and victorious Spartan; but Demosthenes might naturally flatter himself with the hope of *justice*. He urged with energy, but urged in vain, the observance of the capitulation which had been ratified with due forms, on the faith of which he had surrendered himself and the troops entrusted to his command. The public prisoners, conducted successively to Syracuse, and exceeding together the number of seven thousand, were treated with the same inhuman cruelty. They were universally condemned to labour in the mines and quarries of Sicily:² their whole sustenance was bread and water: they suffered alternately the ardours of a scorching sun, and the chilling damps of autumn. For seventy days and nights they languished in this dreadful captivity, during which, the diseases incident to their manner of life were rendered infectious by the stench of the dead bodies, which corrupted the purity of the surrounding air. At length an eternal separation was made between those who should enjoy the happier lot of being sold as slaves into distant lands, and those who should for ever be confined to their terrible dungeons. The Athenians, with such Italians and Sicilians as had unnaturally embraced their cause, were reserved for the latter doom. Their generals, Nicias and Demosthenes, had not lived to behold this melancholy hour. Gylippus would have spared their lives, not from any motives of humanity and esteem, but that his joyous return to Sparta might have been graced by their presence. But the resentment of the Syracusans, the fears of the Corinthians; above all, the suspicious jealousy of those perfidious traitors who had maintained a secret correspondence with Nicias, which they dreaded lest the accidents of his future life might discover, loudly demanded the immediate execution of the captive generals.³ The Athenians of those times justly regretted

the loss of Demosthenes, a gallant and enterprising commander; but posterity will for ever lament the fate of Nicias, the most pious, the most virtuous, and the most unfortunate man of the age in which he lived.

Amidst this dark and dreadful scene of cruelty and revenge, we must not omit to mention one singular example of humanity, which broke forth like a meteor in the gloom of a nocturnal tempest. The Syracusans, who could punish their helpless captives with such unrelenting severity, had often melted into tears at the affecting strains of Euripides,⁴ an Athenian poet, who had learned in the Socratic school to adorn the lessons of philosophy with the charms of fancy, and who was regarded by the taste of his contemporaries, as he still is by many enlightened judges, as the most tender and pathetic, the most philosophical and instructive, of all tragic writers. The pleasure which the Syracusans had derived from his inimitable poetry, made them long to hear it rehearsed by the flexible voices and harmonious pronunciation of the Athenians, so unlike, and so superior, to the rudeness and asperity of their own Doric dialect. They desired their captives to repeat the plaintive scenes of their favourite bard. The captives obeyed; and affecting to represent the woes of ancient kings and heroes, they too faithfully expressed their own. Their taste and sensibility endeared them to the Syracusans, who released their bonds, received them with kindness into their families,⁵ and, after treating them with all the honourable distinctions of ancient hospitality, restored them to their longing and afflicted country, as a small but precious wreck of the most formidable armament that had ever sailed from a Grecian harbour. At their return to Athens, the grateful captives walked in solemn procession to the house of Euripides, whom they hailed as their deliverer from slavery and death.⁶ This acknowledgment, infinitely more honourable than all the crowns and splendour that ever surrounded the person, and even than all the altars and temples that ever adorned the memory of a poet,⁷ must have transported Euripides with the *second* triumph which the heart of man can feel. He would have enjoyed the *first*, if his countrymen had owed to his virtues the tribute which they paid to his talents; and if, instead of the beauty and elegance of his verses, they had been saved by his probity, his courage, or his patriotism; qualities which, still more than genius and fancy, constitute the real excellence and dignity of human nature.

⁴ See above, p. 171.

⁵ Ητοι τὸν τελευτῶν ἢ διδάσκον γερμανία, "He is either dead or teaching verses;" an expression first introduced at this time, was afterwards applied proverbially, in speaking of travellers in foreign countries, whose fate was uncertain

⁶ Plutarch. in Nicias.

⁷ See above, Chapter VI.

¹ Thucyd. p. 555.

² Id. p. 556.

³ Id. l. vii. ad fin.

CHAPTER XXI.

Consequences of the Athenian Misfortunes in Sicily—Formidable confederacy against Athens—Peculiar resources of free Governments—Naval Operations—Battle of Miletus—Intrigues of Alcibiades—The Athenian Democracy subverted—Tyrannical government of the Four Hundred—Battle of Eretria—Democracy re-established in Athens—Naval success of the Athenians—Triumphant return of Alcibiades—The Eleusinian Mysteries—and Plynteria.

IN the populous and extensive kingdoms of modern Europe, the revolutions of public affairs seldom disturb the humble obscurity of private life; but the national transactions of Greece involved the interest of every family, and deeply affected the fortune and happiness of every individual. Had the arms of the Athenians proved successful in Sicily, each citizen would have derived from that event an immediate accession of wealth, as well as of power, and have felt a proportional increase of honour and security. But their proud hopes perished for ever in the harbour of Syracuse. The succeeding disasters shook to the foundation the fabric of their empire. In one rash enterprise they lost their army, their fleet, the prudence of their experienced generals, and the flourishing vigour of their manly youth⁸—Irreparable disasters! which totally disabled them to resist the confederacy of Peloponnesus, reinforced by the resentment of a new and powerful enemy. While a Lacedæmonian army invested their city, they had reason to dread that a Syracusan fleet should assault the Piræus; that Athens must finally yield to these combined attacks, and her once prosperous citizens destroyed by the sword, or dragged into captivity, atone by their death or disgrace for the cruelties which they had recently inflicted on the wretched republics of Melos and Scioné.

The dreadful alternative of victory and defeat, renders it little surprising that the Athenians should have rejected intelligence, which they must have received with horror. The first messengers of such sad news were treated with contempt: but it was impossible long⁹ to withhold belief from the miserable fugitives, whose squalid and dejected countenances too faithfully attested the public calamity. Such evidence could not be refused; the arrogance of incredulity was abashed, and the whole republic thrown into consternation, or seized with despair. The venerable members of the Areopagus expressed the majesty of silent sorrow; but the piercing cries of wo extended many a mile along the lofty walls which joined the Piræus to the city; and the licentious populace raged with unbridled fury against the diviners

and orators, whose blind predictions, and ambitious harangues, had promoted an expedition eternally fatal to their country.¹⁰

The distress of the Athenians was too great to admit the comfort of sympathy; but had they been capable of receiving, they had little reason to expect, that melancholy consolation. The tidings so afflicting to them gave unspeakable joy to their neighbours; many feared, most hated, and all envied, a people who had long usurped the dominion of Greece. The Athenian allies, or rather subjects, scattered over so many coasts and islands, prepared to assert their independence; the confederates of Sparta, among whom the Syracusans justly assumed the first rank, were unsatisfied with victory, and longed for revenge: even those communities, which had hitherto declined the danger of a doubtful contest, meanly solicited to become parties in a war, which they expected must finally terminate in the destruction of Athens.¹¹

Should all the efforts of such a powerful confederacy still prove insufficient to accomplish the ruin of the devoted city, there was yet another enemy behind, from whose strength and animosity the Athenians had every thing to fear. The long and peaceful reign of Artaxerxes king of Persia, expired four hundred and twenty-five years before the Christian era. The two following years were remarkable for a rapid succession of kings, Xerxes, Sogdianus, Ochus; the last of whom assumed the name of Darius, to which historians have added the epithet of Nothus, the bastard, to distinguish this effeminate prince from his illustrious predecessor.¹² The first years of Darius Nothus were employed in confirming his disputed authority, and in watching the dangerous intrigues of his numerous kinsmen who aspired to the throne. When every rival was removed that could either disturb his quiet or offend his suspicion, the monarch sunk into an indolent security, and his voluptuous court was governed by the feeble administration of women and eunuchs.¹³ But in the ninth year of his reign Darius was roused from his lethargy by the revolt of Egypt and Lydia. The defection of the latter threatened to tear from his dominion the valuable provinces of Asia Minor; a consequence which he determined to prevent by employing the bravery of Pharnabazus, and the policy of the crafty Tissaphernes, to govern respectively the northern and southern districts of that rich and fertile peninsula. The abilities of these generals not only quelled the rebellion

⁸ Thucyd. l. vii. p. 557. Cicero goes further. Hic primum opes illius civitatis victæ, comminutæ, depressæque sunt: in hoc portu Atheniensium nobilitatis, imperii, gloriæ naufragium factum existimatur. Cicer. in Verrem, v. 37.

⁹ The calamity was so great that the boldest imagination had never dared to conceive its existence. Their minds being thus unprepared, the Athenians, says Thucydides, disbelieved καὶ τοῖς πρὸς τὴν στρατιάν οἱ αὐτοὶ τοῦ πόλεως διακρίνοντες: even those soldiers who escaped from this melancholy business. The stories of Plutarch in Nicias, of Athenæus, &c. may be safely condemned as fictions, since they are inconsistent with Thucydides's narrative.

¹⁰ Thucyd. l. viii. p. 558, et seq.

¹¹ Thucyd. l. viii. p. 558, et seq. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 348.

¹² Diodor. l. xii. p. 322. Ctesias, Persic. c. xiv. et seq.

¹³ Ctesias, c. xlvii.

in Lydia, but extended the arms of their master towards the shores of the *Ægean*, as well as of the *Hellespont* and *Propontis*; in direct opposition to the treaty which forty years before had been ratified between the Athenians, then in the height of their prosperity, and the unwarlike Artaxerxes. But the recent misfortunes of that ambitious people flattered the Persian commanders with the hope of restoring the whole Asiatic coast to the great king,¹ as well as of inflicting exemplary punishment on the proud city, which had resisted the power, dismembered the empire, and tarnished the glory of Persia.

The terror of such a formidable combination might have reduced the Athenians to despair; and our surprise that this consequence should not immediately follow, will be increased by the following reflection. Not to mention the immortal trophies of Alexander, or the extensive ravages of Zingis Khan, Tamerlane, and the Tartar princes of their race; the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and other nations of modern Europe, have, with a handful of men, marched victorious over the effeminate or barbarous coasts of the eastern and western world. The hardy discipline of Europe easily prevailed over the unwarlike softness of India and the savage ignorance of America. But the rapid success of all these conquerors was owing to their military knowledge² and experience. By the superiority of their arms and of their discipline, the Romans subdued the nations of the earth. But the Athenians afford the only example of a people, who, by the virtues of the mind alone, acquired an extensive dominion over men equally improved with themselves in the arts of war and government. They possessed, or were believed to possess, superior courage and capacity to the nations around them; and this opinion, which should seem not entirely destitute of foundation, enabled them to maintain, by very feeble garrisons, an absolute authority in the islands of the *Ægean*, as well as in the cities of the Asiatic coast. Their disasters and disgrace in Sicily destroyed at once the real and the ideal supports of their power; the loss of one third of their citizens made it impossible to supply, with fresh recruits, the exhausted strength of their garrisons in foreign parts; the terror of their fleet was no more; and their multiplied defeats, before the walls of Syracuse, had converted into contempt that admiration in which Athens had been long held by Greeks and Barbarians.

But in free governments there are many latent resources which public calamities alone can bring to light; and adversity, which, to individuals endowed with inborn vigour of mind, is the great school of virtue and of heroism, furnishes also to the enthusiasm of popular assemblies the noblest field for the display of national honour and magnanimity. Had the measures of the Athenians depended on one man, or even on a few, it is probable that the

selfish timidity of a prince, and the cautious prudence of a council, would have sunk under the weight of misfortunes, too heavy for the unsupported strength of ordinary minds. But the first spark of generous ardour, which the love of virtue, of glory, and the republic, or even the meaner motives of ambition and vanity, excited in the assembled multitude, was diffused and increased by the natural contagion of sympathy; the patriotic flame was communicated to every breast; and the social warmth, reflected from such a variety of objects, became too intense to be resisted by the coldness of caution and the damps of despair.

With one mind and resolution the Athenians determined to brave the severity of fortune, and to withstand the assaults of the enemy. Nor did this noble design evaporate in useless speculation; the wisest measures were adopted for reducing it to practice. The great work began, as national reformation ought always to begin, by regulating the finances, and lopping off every branch of superfluous expense. The clamour of turbulent demagogues was silenced; aged wisdom and experience were allowed calmly to direct the public councils; new levies were raised; the remainder of their fleet was equipped for sea; the motions of the colonies and tributary states were watched with an anxious solicitude, and every proper expedient was employed that might appease their animosity, or render it impotent.³ Yet these measures, prudent and vigorous as they were, could not, probably, have suspended the fall of Athens, had not several concurring causes facilitated their operation. The weak, dilatory, and ineffectual proceedings of the Spartan confederacy; the temporising, equivocal, and capricious conduct of the Persian governors; above all, the intrigues and enterprising genius of Alcibiades, who, after involving his country in inextricable calamities, finally undertook its defence, and retarded, though he could not prevent, its destiny.

In the year following the unfortunate expedition into Sicily, the Spartans prepared a fleet of a hundred sail, of which twenty-five galleys were furnished by their own sea-ports; twenty-five by the Thebans; fifteen by the Corinthians; and the remainder by Locris, Phocis, Megara, and the maritime cities on the coast of Peloponnesus. This armament was destined to encourage and support the revolt of the Asiatic subjects of the Athenians. The islands of Chios and Lesbos, as well as the city Erythræ on the continent, solicited the Spartans to join them with their naval force. Their request was enforced by Tissaphernes, who promised to pay the sailors, and to victual the ships. At the same time, an ambassador from Cyzicus, a populous town situate on an island of the Propontis, entreated the Lacedæmonian armament to sail to the safe and capacious harbours which had long formed the wealth and the ornament of that city, and to expel the Athenian garrisons, to which the Cyzicenes and their neighbours reluctantly submitted.

¹ Thucyd. l. viii. p. 560. et Ctesias, Persic. c. li.

² If that of the Tartars should be doubted, the reader may consult Mons. de Guignes's *Hist. des Huns*, and Mr. Gibbon's admirable description of the manners of the pastoral nations, v. li.

³ Thucyd. l. viii. p. 559. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 349.

The Persian Pharnabazus seconded their proposal; offered the same conditions with Tissaphernes; and so little harmony subsisted between the lieutenants of the great king, that each urged his particular demand with a total unconcern about the important interests of their common master.⁴ The Lacedæmonians held many consultations among themselves, and with their allies; hesitated, deliberated, resolved, and changed their resolution; and at length were persuaded by Alcibiades to prefer the overture of Tissaphernes and the Ionians to that of the Hellespontines and Pharnabazus.

The delay occasioned by this deliberation was the principal, but not the only cause which hindered the allies from acting expeditiously, at a time when expedition was of the utmost importance. A variety of private views diverted them from the general aim of the confederacy; and the season was far

Olymp. advanced before the Corinthians,
xcii. 1.

A. C. 412. who had been distinguished by excess of antipathy to Athens, were prepared to sail. They determined, from pride perhaps, as well as superstition, to celebrate,⁵ before leaving their harbours, the Isthmian games, consecrated to Neptune, the third of the Grecian festivals in point of dignity and splendour. From this ceremony the Athenians, though enemies, were not excluded by the Corinthian magistrates; nor did they exclude themselves, though oppressed by the weight of past misfortunes, and totally occupied by the thoughts of providing against future evils. While their representatives shared the amusements of this sacred spectacle, they neglected not the commission recommended by their country. They secretly informed themselves of the plan and particular circumstances of the intended revolt, and learned the precise time fixed for the departure of the Corinthian fleet. In consequence of this important intelligence the Athenians anticipated the designs of the rebels of Chios, and carried off seven ships as pledges of their fidelity. The squadron which returned from this useful enterprize, intercepted the Corinthians as they sailed through the Saronic gulf; and having attacked and conquered them, pursued and blocked them up in their harbours.⁶

Mean while the Spartans and their allies sent to the Ionian coast such squadrons as were successively ready for sea, under the conduct of Alcibiades, Chalcydeus, and Astyochus. The first of these commanders sailed to the isle of Chios, which was distracted by contending factions. The Athenian partisans were surprised and compelled to submit; and the city, which possessed forty galleys, and yielded in wealth and populousness to none of the neighbouring colonies, became an accession to the Peloponnesian confederacy. The strong and rich town of Miletus followed the example:

Eurythræ and Clazomené surrendered to Chalcydeus; several places of less note were conquered by Astyochus.

Olymp. When the Athenians received
xcii. 2. the unwelcome intelligence of these
A. C. 412. events, they voted the expenditure of a thousand talents, which in more prosperous times, they had deposited in the citadel, under the sanction of a decree of the senate and people, to reserve it for an occasion of the utmost danger. This seasonable supply enabled them to increase the fleet, which sailed under Phrynichus and other leaders, to the isle of Lesbos. Having secured the fidelity of the Lesbians, who were ripe for rebellion, they endeavoured to recover their authority in Miletus, anciently regarded as the capital of the Ionic coast. A bloody battle was fought before the walls of that place, between the Athenians and Argives on one side, and the Peloponnesians, assisted by the troops of Tissaphernes and the revolted Milesians, on the other. The Athenian bravery defeated on this occasion, the superior numbers of Greeks and Barbarians to whom they were opposed; but their Argive auxiliaries were repulsed by the gallant citizens of Miletus: so that in both parts of the engagement, the Ionic race, commonly reckoned the less warlike, prevailed over their Dorian rivals and enemies. Elevated with the joy of victory, the Athenians prepared to assault the town, when they were alarmed by the approach of a fleet of fifty-five sail which advanced in two divisions; the one commanded by the celebrated Hermocrates, the other by Theramenes the Spartan. Phrynichus prudently considered, that his own strength only amounted to forty-eight galleys, and refused to commit the last hope of the republic to the danger of an unequal combat. His firmness despised the clamours of the Athenian sailors, who insulted,⁷ under the name of cowardice, the caution of their admiral; and he calmly retired with his whole force to the isle of Samos, where the popular faction having lately treated the nobles with shocking injustice and cruelty, too frequent in Grecian democracies, were ready to receive with open arms the patrons of that fierce and licentious form of government.

The retreat of the Athenian fleet acknowledged the naval superiority of the enemy; a superiority which was alone sufficient either to acquire or to maintain the submission of the neighbouring coasts and islands. In other respects too, the Peloponnesians enjoyed the most decisive advantages. Their galleys were victualled, their soldiers were paid by Tissaphernes, and they daily expected a reinforcement of a hundred and fifty Phœnician ships, which, it was said, had already reached Aspendus, a seaport of Pamphylia. But, in this dangerous crisis, fortune seemed to respect the declining age of Athens, and, by a train of accidents, singular and almost incredible, enabled Alci-

⁴ Id. p. 561, et 562

⁵ "Πρὶν τὰ ἱσθμια διασπασθῶσι." The scholiast justly observes, the force of the "δια," "thoroughly, completely," i. e. until they had celebrated the games, the complete number of days, appointed by antiquity. Vid. *Æ. Port* ad loc. p. 563.

⁶ Thucyd. p. 564

⁷ Like Fabius,

"Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem."

ENNIVS apud Cic.

which Thucydides expresses with more vigour, "οὐδὲ ποτὶ τῷ πλοῦτι οὐκ εἶχε πλεονεξίας διακινδυνεύουσιν," p. 574.

biades, so long the misfortune and the scourge, to become the defence and the saviour of his country.

During his long residence in Sparta, Alcibiades assumed the outward gravity of deportment, and conformed himself to the spare diet, and laborious exercises, which prevailed in that austere republic; but his character and his principles remained as licentious as ever. His intrigue with Timea, the spouse of king Agis, was discovered by an excess of female levity. The queen, vain of the attachment of so celebrated a character, familiarly gave the name of Alcibiades to her son Leotychides; a name which, first confined to the privacy of her female companions, was soon spread abroad in the world. Alcibiades punished her folly by a most mortifying but well-merited declaration, boasting that he had solicited her favours from no other motive but that he might indulge the ambitious desire of giving a king to Sparta. The offence itself, and the shameless avowal, still more provoking than the offence, excited the keenest resentment in the breast of the injured husband.¹ The magistrates and generals of Sparta, jealous of the fame, and envious of the merit of a stranger, readily sympathized with the misfortune, and encouraged the revenge of Agis; and, as the horrid practice of assassination still disgraced the manners of Greece, orders were sent to Astyochus, who commanded in chief the Peloponnesian forces in Asia, secretly to destroy Alcibiades, whose power defied those laws which in every Grecian republic condemned adulterers to death.² But the active and subtle Athenian had secured too faithful domestic intelligence in the principal families of Sparta to become the victim of this execrable design. With his usual address he eluded all the snares of Astyochus: his safety, however, required perpetual vigilance and caution, and he determined to escape from a situation, which subjected him to such irksome constraint.

Publicly banished from Athens, secretly persecuted by Sparta, he had recourse to the friendship of Tissaphernes, who admired his accomplishments, and respected his abilities, which, though far superior in degree, were similar in kind to his own. Tissaphernes was of a temper the more readily to serve a friend, in proportion as he less needed his services. Alcibiades, therefore, carefully concealed from him the dangerous resentment of the Spartans. In the selfish breast of the Persian no attachment could be durable unless founded on interest; and Alcibiades, who had deeply studied his character, began to flatter his avarice, that he might ensure his protection. He informed him, that by allowing the Peloponnesian sailors a drachma, or sevenpence sterling, of daily pay, he treated them with a useless and even dangerous liberality: that the pay given by the Athenians, even in the most flourishing times, amounted only to three oboli; which proceeded, not from a disinclination to reward the skill and valour of their seamen, but from an experience, that if

they received more than half a drachma each day, the superfluity would be squandered in such profligate pleasures as enfeebled and corrupted their minds and bodies, and rendered them equally incapable of activity and of discipline. Should the sailors prove dissatisfied with this equitable reduction, the Grecian character afforded an easy expedient for silencing their licentious clamours. It would be sufficient to bribe the naval commanders and a few mercenary orators, and the careless and improvident seamen would submit, without suspicion, the rate of their pay, as well as every other concern, to the influence and authority of those who were accustomed to govern them.³

Tissaphernes heard this advice with the attention of an avaricious man to every proposal for saving his money; and so true a judgment had Alcibiades formed of the Greeks, that Hermocrates the Syracusan was the only officer who disdained, meanly and perfidiously, to betray the interest of the men under his command: yet through the influence of his colleagues, the plan of economy was universally adopted, and on a future occasion, Tissaphernes boasted that Hermocrates, though more coy, was not less corruptible than others, and that the only reason for which he undertook the patronage of the sailors, was to compel his own reluctance to comply with the exorbitance of his demands. This reproach illustrates the opinion entertained by foreign nations of Grecian virtue; but it is probably an aspersion on the fame of the illustrious Syracusan.

The intrigues of Alcibiades had sown jealousy and distrust in the Peloponnesian fleet: they had alienated the minds of the troops both from Tissaphernes and their commanders: the Persian was ready to forsake those whom he had learned to despise; and Alcibiades profited of this disposition to insinuate that the alliance of the Lacedæmonians was equally expensive and inconvenient for the great king and his lieutenants. "That these haughty republicans were accustomed to take arms to defend the liberties of Greece, a design totally inconsistent with the views of the Persian court. If the Asiatic Greeks and islanders aspired at independence, and hoped to deliver themselves from Athenian governors and garrisons, without submitting to pay tribute to Persia, they ought to carry on the war at their own expense, since they would alone reap the benefit of its success. But if Tissaphernes purposed to recover the ancient possessions of his master, he must beware of giving a decided superiority to either party, especially to the warlike Spartans. By an attention to preserve the balance even, between the hostile republics, he would force them to exhaust each other. Amidst their domestic contests an opportunity would soon arrive, when Darius, without danger or expense, might crush both, and vindicate his just hereditary claim to the dominion of all Asia."

These artful representations produced almost an open breach between Tissaphernes and his confederates. The advantage which Athens would derive from this rupture might have

¹ Plutarch. li. 49. in Alcibiad.

² Lysias in defence of Euphiletus, &c. p. 419.

³ Thucyd. p. 584, et. seq.

paved the way for Alcibiades to return to his country: but he dreaded to encounter that popular fury, whose effects he had fatally experienced, and whose mad resentment no degree of merit could appease; he therefore applied secretly to Pisander, Theramenes, and other persons of distinction in the Athenian camp. To them he deplored the desperate state of public affairs, expatiated on his own credit with Tissaphernes, and insinuated that it might be yet possible to prevent the Phœnician fleet at Aspendus from sailing to assist the enemy. Assuming gradually more boldness, as he perceived the success of his intrigues, he finally declared that the Athenians might obtain not merely the neutrality, but perhaps the assistance of Artaxerxes, should they consent to abolish their turbulent democracy, so odious to the Persians, and entrust the administration of government to men worthy to negotiate with so mighty a monarch.

When the illustrious exile proposed this measure, it is uncertain whether he was acquainted with the secret cabals which had been already formed, both in the city and in the camp, for executing the design which he suggested. The misfortunes, occasioned by the giddy insolence of the multitude, had thrown the principal authority into the hands of the noble and wealthy, who, corrupted by the sweets of temporary power, were desirous of rendering it perpetual. Many prompted by ambition, several moved by inconstancy, a few directed by a just sense of the incurable defects of democracy, were prepared to encounter every danger, that they might overturn the established constitution. In the third and most honourable class was Antiphon, a man of an exalted character, and endowed with extraordinary talents. The irresistible energy of his eloquence was suspected by the people. He appeared not in the courts of justice, nor in the assembly; but his artful and elaborate compositions often saved the lives of his friends. He was the invisible agent who governed all the motions of the conspiracy; and when compelled, after the ruin of his party, to stand trial for his life, he discovered an activity and force of mind that astonished the most discerning of his contemporaries.⁴ Pisander, Theramenes, and the other leaders of the aristocratical party, warmly approved the views of Alcibiades. The Athenian soldiers likewise, though they detested the impiety, admired the valour, of the illustrious exile, and longed to see him restored to the service of his country. All ranks lamented the dangerous situation of Athens; many thought that their affairs must become desperate, should Tissaphernes command the Phœnician fleet to co-operate with

that of Peloponnesus; and many rejoiced in the prospect of a Persian alliance, in consequence of which they would enter at once into the pay of that wealthy satrap.⁵

One man, the personal enemy of Alcibiades, alone opposed the general current. But this man was Phrynichus, whose prudent firmness as a commander we have already had occasion to remark. The courage with which he invited dangers many have equalled, but none ever surpassed the boldness with which he extricated himself from difficulties. When he perceived that his colleagues were deaf to every objection against recalling the friend of Tissaphernes, he secretly informed the Spartan admiral Astyochus, of the intrigues which were carrying on to the disadvantage of his country. Daring as this treachery was, Phrynichus addressed a traitor not less perfidious than himself. Astyochus was become the pensioner and creature of Tissaphernes, to whom he communicated the intelligence. The Persian again communicated it to his favourite Alcibiades, who complained in strong terms to the Athenians of the baseness and villany of Phrynichus. The latter exculpated himself with consummate address; but as the return of Alcibiades might prove fatal to his safety, he ventured, a second time, to write to Astyochus, gently reproaching him with his breach of confidence, and explaining by what means he might surprise the whole Athenian fleet at Samos; an exploit that must for ever establish his fame and fortune. Astyochus again betrayed the secret to Tissaphernes and Alcibiades; but before *their* letters could be conveyed to the Athenian camp, Phrynichus, who, by some unknown channel, was informed of this second treachery, anticipated the dangerous discovery, by apprising the Athenians of the enemy's design to surprise their fleet. They had scarcely employed the proper means to counteract that purpose when messengers came from Alcibiades to announce the horrid perfidy of a wretch who had basely sacrificed to private resentment the last hope of his country. But the messengers arrived too late; the prior information of Phrynichus, as well as the bold and singular wickedness of his design, which no common degree of evidence was thought sufficient to prove, were sustained as arguments for his exculpation; and it was believed that Alcibiades had made use of a stratagem most infamous in itself, but not unexampled among the Greeks, for destroying a man whom he detested.⁶

The opposition of Phrynichus, though it retarded the designs of Alcibiades, prevented not the measures of Pisander and his associates for abolishing the democracy. The soldiers at Samos were induced, by the reasons above mentioned, to acquiesce in the resolution of their generals. But a more difficult task remained; to deprive the people of Athens of their liberty, which, since the expulsion of the

⁴ Thucyd. l. viii. p. 600. A few lines above, Thucydides describes the character of Antiphon with expressive energy: *ἄνθρωπος Ἀθηναῖος τῶν κατ' ἰσχυρὸν ἀρετῇ τε οὐδένος ὑστέρως, καὶ κρατίστως ἐνδυσμῆναι γινόμενος, καὶ ἐν γλώσσῃ, ἐν πείρῃ.* "An Athenian, in virtue second to no man then living, endowed with the greatest vigour of thought, and the greatest power of expression." Plutarch in the very inaccurate and imperfect work, entitled, *The Lives of the Ten Orators*, tells us, that Antiphon was the first who wrote institutions of oratory; and that his pleadings were the most ancient that had come down to posterity. The character given by Plutarch of the writings of Antiphon agrees with the high commendation of Thucydides.

⁵ What influence this consideration must have had, may be conjectured from the information of Andocides, *Orat. iii.* who says, that in the course of this war the Spartans received, from their Persian allies, subsidies to the amount of five thousand talents, about a million sterling. The sum is prodigious, considering the value of money in that age.

⁶ Thucyd. p. 587—590.

of impeachment or trial;" a matter essential to the interests of the cabal, since by a strange contradiction in government, the Athenian orators and statesmen were liable to prosecution⁵ before the ordinary courts of justice, for such speeches and decrees as had been approved and confirmed by the assembly. In consequence of this act of indemnity, Pisander and his party boldly declared, that neither the spirit nor the forms of the established constitution (which had recently subjected them to such a weight of misfortunes) suited the present dangerous and alarming crisis. That it was necessary to new-model the whole fabric of government; for which purpose five persons (whose names he read) ought to be appointed by the people, to choose a hundred others; each of whom should select three associates; and the four hundred thus chosen, men of dignity and opulence, who would serve their country without fee or reward, ought immediately to be invested with the majesty of the republic. They alone should conduct the administration uncontrolled, and assemble, as often as seemed proper, five thousand citizens, whom they judged most worthy of being consulted in the management of public affairs. This extraordinary proposal was accepted without opposition: the partisans of democracy dreaded the strength of the cabal; and the undiscerning multitude, dazzled by the imposing name of five thousand, a number far exceeding the ordinary assemblies of Athens, perceived not that they surrendered their liberties to the artifice of an ambitious faction.⁶

But the conduct of the four hundred tyrants (for historians have justly adopted the language of Athenian resentment) soon opened the eyes and understanding of the most thoughtless. They abolished every vestige of ancient freedom; employed mercenary troops levied from the small islands of the Ægean, to overawe the multitude, and to intimidate, in some instances to destroy, their real or suspected enemies. Instead of seizing the opportunity of annoying the Peloponnesians, enraged at the treachery of Tissaphernes, and mutinous for want of pay and subsistence, they sent ambassadors to solicit peace from the Spartans on the most dishonourable terms. Their tyranny rendered them odious in the city, and their cowardice made them contemptible in the camp at Samos. Their cruelty and injustice were described, and exaggerated, by the fugitives who continually arrived in that island. The generous youth, employed in the sea and land service, were impatient of the indignities offered to their fellow citizens. The same indignities might be inflicted on themselves, if they did not vindicate their freedom. These secret murmurs broke out into loud and licentious clamours, which were encouraged by the approbation of the Samians. Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, two officers of high merit and distinction, though not actually entrusted with a share in the principal command,⁷ gave activity and boldness to

the insurgents. The abettors of the new government were attacked by surprise: thirty of the most criminal were put to death, several others were banished, democracy was re-established in the camp, and the soldiers were bound by oath to maintain their hereditary government against the conspiracy of domestic foes, and to act with vigour and unanimity against the public enemy.

Thrasybulus, who headed this successful and meritorious sedition, had a mind to conceive, a tongue to persuade, and a hand to execute, the most daring designs. He exhorted the soldiers not to despair of effecting in the capital the same revolution which they had produced in the camp. But should they fail in that design they ought no longer to obey a city which had neither wealth nor wisdom, neither supplies nor good counsel to send them. They were themselves more numerous than the subjects of the four hundred, and better provided in all things necessary for war. They possessed an island which had formerly contended with Athens for the command of the sea, and which, it was hoped, they might defend against every foe, foreign and domestic. But were they compelled to forsake it, they had still reason to expect that, with a hundred ships of war, and with so many brave men, they might acquire an establishment not less valuable elsewhere, in which they would enjoy, undisturbed, the invaluable possession of liberty. Their most immediate concern was to recall Alcibiades, who had been deceived and disgraced by the tyrants, and who not only felt with peculiar sensibility, but could resent with becoming dignity, the wrongs of his country and his own. The advice of Thrasybulus was approved; soon after he sailed to Magnesia, and returned in company with Alcibiades.

Near four years had elapsed since the eloquent son of Clinias had spoken in an Athenian assembly. Being presented by Thrasybulus to his fellow citizens, he began by accusing his fortune, and lamenting his calamities. "Yet his banishment ought not to affect him with permanent sorrow, since it had furnished him with an opportunity to serve the cause of his country. This event, otherwise unfortunate, had procured him the acquaintance and friendship of Tissaphernes; who, moved by his entreaties, had withheld the stipulated pay from the Peloponnesian forces, and who, he doubted not, would continue his good offices to the Athenians, supply them with every thing requisite for maintaining the war, and even summon the Phœnician fleet to their assistance." These were magnificent but flattering promises. In making them, Alcibiades however did not consult merely the dictates of vanity. They raised his credit with the army, who immediately saluted him general;⁸ they widened the breach between Tissaphernes and the Spartans; and they struck terror (when his speech got

expression leaves uncertain. The Scholiast, however, considers *οπλαρχευσεν* as synonymous with *του οπλαρχεου αρχωντι*. Thucyd. p. 604.

⁸ *Μετα των προτερον*—They associated him with the former commanders. But Thucydides immediately adds, *και τα πραγματα παντα αντιδιδεν*, and referred every thing to his management, p. 609.

⁵ By the *γραφη παρανομων*. See Chap. xiii.

⁶ Thucyd. et Lysias, ubi supra.

⁷ Neither generals nor admirals; for Thrasybulus only commanded a galley; and Thrasyllus served in the heavy-armed infantry, whether as an officer, or in the ranks, the

abroad) into the tyrants of Athens, who had provoked the resentment of a man capable to subvert their usurpation.

Alcibiades left the care of the troops to his colleagues Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, and withdrew himself from the applauses of his admiring countrymen, on pretence of concerting with Tissaphernes the system of their future operations. But his principal motive was to show himself to the Persian, in the new and illustrious character with which he was invested; for having raised his authority among the Athenians by his influence with the satrap, he expected to strengthen this influence by the support of that authority. Before he returned to the camp, ambassadors had been sent by the tyrants, to attempt a negotiation with the partisans of democracy, who, inflamed by continual reports of the indignities and cruelties committed in Athens, prepared to sail thither to protect their friends and take vengeance on their enemies. Alcibiades judiciously opposed this rash resolution, which must have left the Hellespont, Ionia, and the islands, at the mercy of the hostile fleet. But he commanded the ambassadors to deliver to their masters a short but pithy message: "That they must divest themselves of their illegal power, and restore the ancient constitution. If they delayed obedience, he would sail to the Piræus, and deprive them of their authority and their lives."¹

When this message was reported at Athens, it added to the disorder and confusion in which that unhappy city was involved. The four hundred who had acted with unanimity in usurping the government, soon disagreed about the administration, and split into factions, which persecuted each other as furiously as both had persecuted the people.² Theramenes and Aristocrates condemned and opposed the tyrannical measures of their colleagues. The perfidious Phrynichus was slain: both parties prepared for taking arms; and the horrors of a Corcyrean sedition were ready to be renewed in Athens, when the old men, the children, the women, and strangers, interposed for the safety of a city which had long been the ornament of Greece, the terror of Persia, and the admiration of the world.³

Had the public enemy availed themselves of this opportunity to assault the Piræus, Athens could not have been saved from immediate destruction. But the Peloponnesian forces at Miletus, long clamorous and discontented, had broken out into open mutiny, when they heard of the recall of Alcibiades, and the hostile intentions of Tissaphernes. To the duplicity of the satrap, and the treachery of their own captains, they justly ascribed the want of pay and subsistence, and all the misfortunes which they felt or dreaded. Their resentment was violent and implacable. They destroyed the Persian fortifications in the neighbourhood of Miletus; they put the garrisons to the sword; their treacherous commander, Astyocheus, saved his life by flying to an altar; nor was the tumult

appeased until the guilty were removed from their sight, and Myndarus, an officer of approved valour and fidelity, arrived from Sparta to assume the principal command.⁴

The dreadful consequences which must have resulted to the Athenians, if, during the fury of their sedition, the enemy had attacked them with a fleet of a hundred and fifty sail, may be conceived by the terror inspired by a much smaller Peloponnesian squadron of only forty-two vessels; commanded by the Spartan Hegesandridas. The friends of the constitution had assembled in the spacious theatre of Bacchus. Messengers passed between them and the partisans of Antiphon and Pisander, who had convened in a distant quarter of the city. The most important matters were in agitation, when the alarm was given that some Peloponnesian ships had been seen on the coast. Both assemblies were immediately dissolved. All ranks of men hastened to the Piræus; manned the vessels in the harbour; launched others; and prepared thirty-six for taking the sea. When Hegesandridas perceived the ardent opposition which he must encounter in attempting to land, he doubled the promontory of Sunium, and sailed towards the fertile island of Eubœa, from which, since the fortification of Decelia, the Athenians had derived far more plentiful supplies than from the desolated territory of Attica. To defend a country which formed their principal resource, they sailed in pursuit of the enemy, and observed them next day near the shore of Eretria, the most considerable town in the island.

The Eubœans, who had long watched an opportunity to revolt, supplied the Peloponnesian squadron with all necessaries in abundance; but instead of furnishing a market to the Athenians, they retired from the coast on their approach. The commanders were obliged to weaken their strength, by detaching several parties into the country to procure provisions; Hegesandridas seized this opportunity to attack them: most of the ships were taken; the crews swam to land; many were cruelly murdered by the Eretrians, from whom they expected protection; and such only survived as took refuge in the Athenian garrisons scattered over the island.⁵

The news of this misfortune was most alarming to the Athenians. Neither the invasion of Xerxes, nor even the defeat in Sicily, occasioned such terrible consternation. They dreaded the immediate defection of Eubœa; they had no more ships to launch; no means of resisting their multiplied enemies: the city was divided against the camp, and divided against itself. Yet the magnanimous firmness of Theramenes did not allow the friends of liberty to despair. He encouraged them to disburden the republic of its domestic foes, who had summoned, or who were at least believed to have summoned, the assistance of the Lacedæmonian fleet, that they might be enabled to enslave their fellow citizens. Antiphon, Pisander, and others most obnoxious, seasonably escaped; the rest submitted. A decree was passed, recalling Alci-

¹ Thucyd. *ibid.* et Plut. ii. 54. in Vit. Alcibiad.

² Lysias *adv. Agor.*

³ Thucyd. p. 610.

⁴ Thucyd. p. 611.

⁵ *Id.* p. 622.

biades, and approving the conduct of the troops at Samos. The sedition ceased. The democracy, which had been interrupted four months, was restored; and such are the resources of a free government, that even this violent fermentation was not unproductive of benefit to the state. The Athenians completed whatever had been left imperfect in former reformati-⁶ ons; and determined to defend, to the last extremity, the ancient glory of the republic.

Olymp. By the imprudent or perfidious
xcii. 2. conduct of their commanders, and
A. C. 411. the seditious spirit of their troops,
the Peloponnesians lost a seasonable opportunity to terminate the war with equal advantage and honour; and having neglected the prosperous current of their fortune, they were compelled long and laboriously to strive against an unfavourable stream. The doubtful Tissaphernes hesitated between the part of an open enemy, or a treacherous ally; the Spartans, who had formerly rejected the friendship, now courted the protection, of his rival Pharnabazus; to whose northern province they sailed with the principal strength of their armament, leaving only a small squadron at Miletus, to defend their southern acquisitions. The Athenians, animated by the manly counsels of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the generous defenders of their freedom, proceeded northwards in pursuit of the enemy; and the important straits, which join the Euxine and Ægean seas, became, and long continued, the scene of conflict. In the twenty-first winter of the war, a year already distinguished by the dissolution and revival of their democracy, the Athenians prevailed in three successive engagements, the event of which became continually more decisive. In the first, which was fought in the narrow channel between Sestos and Abydos, the advantages were in some measure balanced, since Thrasybulus took twenty Peloponnesian ships, with the loss of fifteen of his own. But the glory remained entire to the Athenians, who repelled the enemy, and offered to renew the battle.⁷ Not long afterwards, they intercepted a squadron of fourteen Rhodian vessels, near Cape Rhegium. The islanders defended themselves with their usual bravery. Myndarus beheld the engagement from the distance of eight miles, while he performed his morning devotions to Minerva in the lofty temple of Ilium. Alarmed for the safety of his friends, he rushed from that sacred edifice, and hastened with great diligence to the shore, that he might launch his ships, and prevent, by speedy assistance, the capture or destruction of the Rhodians.⁸ The principal Athenian squadron attacked him near the shore of Abydos. The

engagement was fought from morning till night, and still continued doubtful, when the arrival of eighteen galleys, commanded by Alcibiades, turned the scale of victory. The escape of the Peloponnesians was favoured by the bravery of Pharnabazus, who, at the head of his Barbarian troops, had been an impatient spectator of the combat. He gallantly rode into the sea, encouraging his men with his voice, his arm, and his example. The Spartan admiral drew up the greatest part of his fleet along the shore, and prepared to resist the assailants; but the Athenians, satisfied with the advantages already obtained, sailed to Sestos, carrying with them a valuable prize, thirty Peloponnesian galleys, as well as fifteen of their own, which they had lost in the former engagement. Thrasyllus was sent to Athens, that he might communicate the good news, and raise such supplies of men and money as could be expected from that exhausted city.⁹

The Spartans yielded possession of the sea, which they hoped soon to recover, and retired to the friendly harbours of Cyzicus, to repair their shattered fleet; while the Athenians profited of the fame of their victory, and the terror of their arms, to demand contributions from the numerous and wealthy towns in that neighbourhood. The several divisions returned to Sestos, having met with very indifferent success in their design; nor, without obtaining more decisive and important advantages, could they expect to intimidate such strongly fortified places as Byzantium, Selembria, Perinthus, on the European, or Lampsacus, Parium, Chalcedon, on the Asiatic, coast. It was determined therefore, chiefly by the advice of Alcibiades, to attack the enemy at Cyzicus; for which purpose they sailed, with eighty galleys, to the small island of Proconnesus, near the western extremity of the Propontis, and ten miles distant from the station of the Peloponnesian fleet. Alcibiades surprised sixty vessels in a dark and rainy morning, as they were manœuvring at a distance from the harbour, and skilfully intercepted their retreat. As the day cleared up, the rest sailed forth to their assistance; the action became general; the Athenians obtained a complete victory, and their valour was rewarded by the capture of the whole Peloponnesian fleet, except the Syracusan ships, which were burned, in the face of a victorious enemy, by the enterprising Hermocrates. The circumstances and consequences of this important action were related in few, but expressive words, to the Spartan senate, in a letter written by Hippocrates, the second in command, and intercepted by the Athenians: "All is lost; our ships are taken; Myndarus is slain; the men want bread; we know not what to do."¹⁰

The fatal disaster at Cyzicus prevented the Peloponnesians from obstructing, during the following year, the designs of the enemy, who took possession of that wealthy sea-port, as well as of the strong city Perinthus; raised a large contribution on Selembria; and fortified Chrysopolis, a small town of Chalcedonia, only

⁶ The government was brought back to its original principles, as established by Solon. Among other salutary regulations, it was enacted, that no one should receive a salary for any public magistracy. "And now," says Thucydides, "for the first time, in the present age at least, the Athenians modeled their government aright; and this enabled Athens again to raise her head." Thucyd. p. 623. It is remarkable, that neither Diodorus, Plutarch, nor any of the orators, make the least mention of these salutary regulations, which, however, lasted not long after the return of Alcibiades.

⁷ Thucyd. l. vii. p. 626.

⁸ Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. i. Diodor. xiii. p. 354.

⁹ Id. ibid.

¹⁰ Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. i. et Plut. p. 60. in Alcibiad.

three miles distant from Byzantium. In this new fortress they placed a considerable body of troops; and guarded the neighbouring strait with a squadron of thirty sail, commanded by Theramenes and Eubulus, and destined to exact, as tribute, a tenth from all ships which sailed through the Bosphorus into the Euxine sea.¹ The Peloponnesians were assisted by Pharnabazus in equipping a new fleet; but were deprived of the wise counsels of Hermocrates, whose abilities were well fitted both to prepare and to employ the resources of war. The success of the Asiatic expedition had not corresponded to the sanguine hopes of his countrymen; the insolent populace accused the incapacity of their commanders; and a mandate was sent from Syracuse, depriving them of their office, and punishing them with banishment. The conduct of Hermocrates is worthy of admiration. Having called an assembly, he deplored his hard fortune, but recommended the most submissive obedience to the authority of the republic. He then exhorted the sailors to name temporary commanders, till the arrival of those who had been appointed by their country. But the assembly, especially the captains and pilots, tumultuously called out, "That he and his colleagues ought to continue in the command." Hermocrates then conjured them "not to rebel against the government. When they should return home, they would then enjoy a fair opportunity to do justice to their admirals, by recounting the battles which they had won, by enumerating the ships which they had taken, and by relating how their own courage, and the conduct of their commanders, had entitled them to the most honourable place in every engagement by sea and land." At the earnest and unanimous entreaty of the assembly, he consented, however, to retain his authority, till the arrival of his successors. His colleagues imitated the example; and soon after this memorable scene, Demarchus, Mysco, and Potamis, the admirals named by the state, took the command of the Syracusan forces. Yet the soldiers and sailors would not allow their beloved leaders to depart, before taking in their presence a solemn oath to revoke their unjust banishment, whenever they themselves returned to Syracuse. On Hermocrates in particular, the captains and pilots bestowed many distinguished tokens of their affection and respect, which his behaviour had justly merited; for every morning and evening he had called them together, communicated his designs, asked their opinion and advice, reviewed the past, and concerted the future, operations of the war; while his popular manners and condescending affability secured the love of those who respected his skill, his vigilance, and his courage.²

Meanwhile Thrasyllus obtained at Athens the supplies which he had gone to solicit; sup-

plies far more powerful than he had reason to expect. They consisted in a thousand heavy-armed men, a hundred horse, and fifty galleys, manned by five thousand experienced seamen. That the sailors might be usefully employed on every emergence at sea or land, they were provided with the small and light bucklers, and darts, swords, and javelins, appropriated to the Grecian targeteers, who, uniting strength and velocity, formed an intermediate and useful order between the archers and pikemen. With these forces, Thrasyllus sailed to Samos, hoping to render the twenty-third campaign not less glorious than the preceding; and ambitious to rival, by his victories in the central and southern parts of the Asiatic coast, the fame acquired by Alcibiades and Thrasybulus in the north. His first operations were successful. He took Colophon, with several places of less note, in Ionia; penetrated into the heart of Lydia, burning the corn and villages; and returned to the shore, driving before him a numerous body of slaves, and other valuable booty. His courage was increased by the want of resistance on the part of Tissaphernes, whose province he had invaded; of the Peloponnesian forces at Miletus; and of the revolted colonies of Athens. He resolved, therefore, to attack the beautiful and flourishing city of Ephesus, which was then the principal ornament and defence of the Ionic coast. While his soldiers, in separate divisions, were making their approaches to the walls of that place, the enemy assembled from every quarter to defend the majesty of Ephesian Diana. A vigorous sally of the townsmen increased the strength of Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians, the latter of whom had been seasonably reinforced by a considerable squadron from Sicily. The Athenians were defeated, with the loss of three hundred men; and retiring from the field of battle, they sought refuge in their ships, and prepared to sail toward the Hellespont.³

During the voyage thither, they fell in with twenty Sicilian galleys, of which they took four, and pursued the rest to Ephesus. Having soon afterwards reached the Hellespont, they found the Athenian armament at Lampsacus, where Alcibiades thought proper to muster the whole military and naval forces: but, on this occasion, the northern army gave a remarkable proof of pride or spirit. They, who had ever been victorious, refused to rank with the soldiers of Thrasyllus, who had been so shamefully foiled before the walls of Ephesus. They submitted, however, though not without reluctance, to live in the same winter-quarters; from which they made a conjunct expedition against Abydus. Pharnabazus defended the place with a numerous body of Persian cavalry. The disgraced troops of Thrasyllus rejoiced in an opportunity to retrieve their honour. They attacked, repelled, and routed the enemy. Their victory decided the fate of Abydus, and their courage was approved by the army of Alcibiades, who embraced them as fellow-soldiers and friends.

¹ It is well known, that Mahomet the Second obtained the same end, by fortifying two castles, one on the Asiatic, and another on the European side. That near to Chrysopolis is called by the modern Greeks Neocastron; but the name of the town itself is now changed to Scutari, a place deemed by the Turks one of the suburbs of Constantinople.

TOURNEFORTE, Lettre 15.

² Xenoph. p. 431

³ Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 434.

Olymp.

xciii. 1.

A. C. 408.

For several years the measures of the Athenians had been almost uniformly successful; but the twenty-fourth campaign was distinguished by peculiar favours of fortune. The invasion of Sicily by the Carthagenians prevented that island from sending any effectual assistance to their Peloponnesian allies. The dangerous revolt of the Medes withheld the Persian reinforcements, which were necessary to support the arms of Pharnabazus.⁴ Both nations were repeatedly defeated by the Athenians, driven from their encampments and fortresses near the shore, and pursued into the inland country, which was plundered and desolated by the victors. The Athenians returned in triumph to attack the fortified cities, which still declined submission; an undertaking in which Alcibiades displayed the wonderful resources of his extraordinary genius. By gradual approaches, by sudden assaults, by surprise, by treason, or by stratagem, he in a few months became master of Chalcedon, Selembria, and at last of Byzantium itself. His naval success was equally conspicuous. The Athenians again commanded the sea. The small squadrons fitted out by the enemy successively fell into their power; and these multiplied captures, which were made with little difficulty, accumulated the trophies of the well-fought battles which we have already described. It was computed by the partisans of Alcibiades, that, since assuming the command, he had taken or destroyed two hundred Syracusan and Peloponnesian galleys; and his superiority of naval strength enabled him to raise such contributions, both in the Euxine and Mediterranean, as abundantly supplied his fleet and army with every necessary article of subsistence and accommodation.⁵

Olymp.

xciii. 2.

A. C. 407.

While the Athenian arms were crowned with such glory abroad, the Attic territory was continually harassed by king Agis, and the Lacedæmonian troops posted at Decelia. Their bold and sudden incursions frequently threatened the safety of the city itself; the desolated lands afforded no advantage to the ruined proprietors; nor could the Athenians venture without their walls, to celebrate their accustomed festivals. Alcibiades, animated by his foreign victories, hoped to relieve the domestic sufferings of his country; and after an absence of many years, distinguished by such a variety of fortune, eagerly longed to revisit his native city, and to enjoy the rewards and honours usually bestowed by the Greeks on successful valour. This celebrated voyage, which several ancient historians studiously decorated with every circumstance of naval triumph,⁶ was performed in the twenty-fifth summer of the war. Notwithstanding all his services, the cautious son of Clinias, instructed by adversity, declined to land in the Piræus, until he was informed that the assembly had repealed the decrees against him, formally revoked his banishment, and prolonged the term of his command. Even after this agreeable intelligence he was still unable

to conquer his well-founded distrust of the variable and capricious humours of the people; nor would he approach the crowded shore, till he observed, in the midst of the multitude, his principal friends and relations inviting him by their voice and action. He then landed amidst the universal acclamations of the spectators, who, unattentive to the naval pomp, and regardless of the other commanders, fixed their eyes only on Alcibiades. Next day an extraordinary assembly was summoned, by order of the magistrates, that he might explain and justify his apparent misconduct, and receive the rewards due to his acknowledged merit. The public anticipated his apology, by contrasting the melancholy situation of affairs when Alcibiades assumed the command with the actual condition of the republic. "At the former period Athens yielded the command of the sea: the enemy were every where victorious; the state was oppressed by foreign war, torn by sedition, without resources, and without hope. The address and dexterity of Alcibiades were alone capable to have disunited the councils, to have weakened and afterwards repelled the efforts, of a powerful confederacy; his activity and courage could alone have animated the dejection of the citizens to pursue the measures of offensive war: his abilities, his virtue, and his fortune, could alone have rendered those measures successful."

Before judges so favourably disposed to hear him, Alcibiades found no difficulty to make his defence; but it was difficult both for him and his friends to moderate the excessive transports of the people, who would have loaded their favourite with honours incompatible with the genius of a free republic, and which might, therefore, have proved dangerous to his future safety. He received with pleasure, the crowns and garlands, with other accustomed pledges of public gratitude and admiration; but he respectfully declined the royal sceptre, expressing a firm resolution to maintain the hereditary freedom of his country.⁷ Athens required not a king, but a general with undivided power, capable of restoring the ancient splendour of the commonwealth. To this illustrious rank, which had been filled by Themistocles and Cimon, the son of Clinias might justly aspire. He was appointed commander in chief by sea and land.⁸ A hundred galleys were equipped, and transports were prepared for fifteen hundred heavy-armed men, with a proportional body of cavalry.

Several months⁹ had passed in these preparations, when the Eleusinian festival approached; a time destined to commemorate and to diffuse the temporal and spiritual gifts of the goddess Ceres, originally bestowed on the Athenians, and by them communicated to the rest of Greece.¹⁰ Corn, wine, and oil, were the prin-

7 Com. Isocrat. Orat. pro Alcibiad. et Plut. in Alcibiad.

8 *Ἀναρχὴς πάντων ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ*. "He was chosen absolute commander of all." Xenoph. p. 440.

9 From the festivals Plynteria and Eleusinia, mentioned in the text, it appears that he arrived in July, and sailed in November.

10 Meursius, apud Gronov. Thesaur. has collected all the passages in ancient writers respecting this festival. It is said to have been celebrated in the month Boedromion, which, according to Father Petaut, answers to our Novem-

4 Diodorus. l. xiii.

5 Xenoph. Hellen. Diodor. l. xiii. Plut. in Alcibiad.

6 Duris apud Plut. in Alcibiad.

cial production of Attica; each of which had been introduced into that country by the propitious intervention of a divinity, whose festival was distinguished by appropriated honours. Minerva, who had given not only the olive, but what was regarded as far more valuable, her peculiar protection to the city of Athens, was rewarded with innumerable solemnities. Various also were the professions of gratitude expressed, in stated days of the spring and autumn, to the generous author of the vine. The worship of Ceres returned, indeed, less frequently; but was partly, on that account, the more solemn and awful; and partly, because distinguished by the Eleusinian mysteries, those hidden treasures of wisdom and happiness, which were poured out on the initiated in the temple of Eleusis. Fourteen¹ centuries before the Christian era, the goddess, it is said, communicated these invaluable rights to Eumolpus and Keryx, two virtuous men, who had received her in the form of an unknown traveller with pious hospitality.² Their descendants, the Eumolpidae and Kerykes, continued the ministers and guardians of this memorable institution, which was finally abolished by the great Theodosius, after it had lasted eighteen hundred years.³ The candidates for initiation were prepared by watching, abstinence, sacrifice, and prayer; and before revealing to them the divine secrets, the most awful silence was enjoined them. Yet enough transpired among the profane vulgar to enable us still to collect, from impartial⁴ and authentic testimony, that the mysteries of Ceres expressed by external signs the immortality of the human soul, and the rewards prepared in a future life for the virtuous servants of heaven. The secrecy enjoined by her ministers, so unworthy the truths which they taught, might justify the indifference of Socrates,⁵ whose doctrines, not less divine, were inculcated with unreserved freedom. But the fate of Socrates may justify in its turn, the circumspection of the hierophants of Ceres.

Besides the mysterious ceremonies of the temple, the worship of that bountiful goddess was celebrated by vocal and instrumental music, by public shows, and exhibitions, which continued during several days, and above all, by the

pompous procession, which marched for ten miles along the sacred road leading from Athens to Eleusis.⁶ This important part of the solemnity had formerly been intermitted, because the Athenians, after the loss of Decelia, were no longer masters of the road, and were compelled, contrary to established custom, to proceed by sea to the temple of Ceres. Alcibiades determined to wipe off the stain of impiety which had long adhered to his character, by renewing, in all its lustre, this venerable procession. He prepared to defend, by an armed force, the peaceful ministers and votaries of the gods, persuaded that the Spartans would either allow them to pass undisturbed, which must lessen the military fame of that people, or, if they attempted to interrupt the ceremony, must be exposed not only to the dangerous resistance of men animated by enthusiasm, but to the disgraceful charge of irreligion, and the general detestation of Greece. The priests, the heralds, and the whole body of the initiated, were apprized of his intention, and requested to hold themselves in readiness by the appointed day. Early in the morning the cavalry explored the adjoining country; the eminences were occupied by the light infantry and targeteers; and, after sufficient garrisons had been left to defend the Athenian walls and fortresses, the whole body of heavy-armed troops were drawn out to protect the Eleusinian procession, which marched along the usual road to the temple, and afterwards returned to Athens, without suffering any molestation from the Lacedæmonians; having united, on this occasion alone, all the splendour of war with the pomp of superstition.⁷

Soon after this meritorious enterprise, Alcibiades prepared to sail for Lesser Asia, accompanied by the affectionate admiration of his fellow citizens, who flattered themselves that the abilities and fortune of their commander would speedily reduce Chios, Ephesus, Miletus, and the other revolted cities and islands. The general alacrity, however, was somewhat abated by the reflection, that the arrival of Alcibiades in Athens coincided with the anniversary of the Plynteria,⁸ a day condemned to melancholy idleness, from a superstitious belief that nothing undertaken on that day could be brought to a prosperous conclusion. The celebrated Parthenon, whose remains still attest the magnificence of Pericles, was consecrated by the presence of a goddess, who realized the inspirations of Homer, as far as they were capable of being expressed by the genius of Phidias. Minerva, composed of gold and ivory, and twenty-six cubits high, was represented with the casque, the buckler, the lance, and all her usual emblems; and the warm fancy of the Athenians, enlivened and transported by the graceful majesty of her air and aspect, confounded the painful production of the statuary with the instantaneous creation of Jupiter. To confirm this useful allusion the crafty priests of the temple carefully washed and brightened the

ber. But as the Attic year was lunar, the months of that year could not exactly correspond to those of ours. In the computation of their months, the Greeks agreed not with other nations, nor even among themselves. Vid. Plut. in Vit. Romul. et Aristid.

¹ Marb. Arund. Epoch. 14.

² Diodor. l. v. Isocrat. Panegy. Pollux, l. viii. c. ix.

³ Zozim. Hist. l. iv.

⁴ I say impartial, because Isocrates, the scholar of Socrates, cannot be supposed to exaggerate the merit of ceremonies, which his master is said to have despised. The passage is remarkable: "Though what I am going to relate may be disfigured by tradition and fable, the substance of it is not the less deserving of your regard. When Ceres travelled to Attica in quest of her daughter, she received the most hospitable treatment, and those particular good offices which are known to the initiated. The goddess was not ungrateful for such favours, but in return conferred on our ancestors the two most valuable presents which either heaven can bestow, or mankind can receive; the practice of agriculture, which delivered us from the fierce and precarious manner of life, common to us with wild animals; and the knowledge of those sacred mysteries which fortify the initiated against the terrors of death, and inspire them with the pleasing hopes of a happy immortality." See Panegy. p. 94. et Euseb. Præpar. Evang. l. iii.

⁵ Laert. in Diogene.

⁶ Herodot. l. viii. c. lxxv. et Plut. in Alcibiad.

⁷ Plut. in Alcibiad.

⁸ Πλυντήριον, to wash; πλυντήριος, πλυντηρίος; and in the plural neuter, "the ceremony of ablution."

image, whose extraordinary lustre increased the veneration of the multitude. The Plynteria, during which the ceremony was performed, required uncommon secrecy and circumspection. The eyes and imagination of the vulgar might have become too familiar with their revered goddess, had they beheld her stripped of her accustomed ornaments, and observed every part of her form brightening into new beauty under the plastic hands of the priests. To pre-

vent this dangerous consequence, the Plynteria was veiled in mystic obscurity; the doors of the temple were shut; the sacred edifice was surrounded on all sides to intercept the approach of indiscretion or profanity; and the return of Alcibiades, the favourite hope of his country, happening on the inauspicious day when Minerva hid her countenance, was believed by many to announce the dreadful calamities which soon afterwards befell the republic.⁹

CHAPTER XXII.

Character of Lysander—His conference with Cyrus—He defeats the Athenian Fleet—Disgrace of Alcibiades—Lysander succeeded by Callicratidas—His Transactions with the Persians—with the Spartan Allies—Battle of Arginussa—Trial of the Athenian Admirals—Eteonicus checks a Mutiny of the Peloponnesian Troops—Lysander resumes the Command—Battle of Ægos Potamos—Spartan Empire in Asia—Siege and Surrender of Athens—Humiliation of the Athenians.

WHILE the superstitious multitude trembled at the imaginary anger of Minerva, men of reflection and experience dreaded the activity and valour of Lysander, who, during the residence of Alcibiades at Athens, had taken the command of the Peloponnesian forces in the East. The forms of the Spartan constitution required a rapid succession of
Olymp. generals; a circumstance, which,
xciii. 2. amidst the numerous inconveniences
A. C. 407. with which it was attended, enlarged the sphere of military competition, and multiplying the number of actors on the theatre of war, afforded an opportunity for the display of many illustrious characters, which must otherwise have remained in obscurity. In the rotation of annual elections, offices of importance and dignity will often be entrusted to men unworthy to fill them; but in the vast variety of experiments, abilities of the most distinguished order (if any such exist in the community) must some time be called into exertion, honoured with confidence, and armed with authority.

Such abilities the Spartans finally discovered in Lysander; a shoot of the Herculean stock, but not descended from either of the royal branches. He had been educated with all the severity of Spartan discipline; and having spent his youth and his manhood in those honourable employments¹⁰ which became the dignity of his birth, he approached the decline of life, when his superior merit recommended him to the chief command in a season of public danger. Years had added experience to his valour, and enlarged the resources, without abating the ardour of his ambitious mind. In his transactions with the world, he had learned to soften the harsh asperity of his national manners; to gain by fraud what could not be effected by force; and, in his own figurative

language, to "eke out the lion's with the fox's skin."¹¹ This mixed character admirably suited the part which he was called to act. His enterprising courage was successfully exerted in the hostile operations against the Greeks; his subtle and insinuating address gave him an ascendant in every negotiation with the Persians; and the re-union of those various qualities enabled him, in a few years, finally to terminate the war, and to produce an important and permanent revolution in the affairs of Athens, of Sparta, and of Greece.

Since the decisive action at Cy-
Olymp. zicus, the Peloponnesians, unable to
xciii. 2. resist the enemy; had been employ-
A. C. 407. ed in preparing ships on the coast of their own peninsula, as well as in the harbours of their Persian and Grecian allies. The most considerable squadrons had been equipped in Cos, Rhodes, Miletus, and Ephesus; in the last of which the whole armament, amounting to ninety sail, was collected by Lysander. But the assembling of such a force was a matter of little consequence, unless proper measures should be taken for holding it together, and for enabling it to act with vigour. It was necessary, above all, to secure pay for the seamen; for this purpose, Lysander, accompanied by several Lacedæmonian ambassadors, repaired to Sardis, to congratulate the happy arrival of Cyrus, a generous and valiant youth of seventeen, who had been entrusted by his father Darius with the government of the inland parts of Lesser Asia; or, in the language of the Persian court, with the command of the numerous troops, who rendezvoused in the plains of Kastolus.¹²

¹¹ This was said in allusion to the lion's skin of Hercules, to one who asked Lysander, "How he, who sprang from that hero, could condescend to conquer his enemies by fraud?" His character is diffusely described by Plutarch, t. iii. p. 4—15.

¹² This was the style of the letter, confirmed by the royal seal. *Καταπέμψας Κύρον παρὰ τὸν τῶν ἐς Καστωλὸν ἀφροζομένων.* Xenoph. p. 438.

⁹ Xenoph. p. 438. et Plut. in Alcibiad.

¹⁰ He had served in the army and navy; had been employed as ambassador in foreign states, &c. Plut. in Lysand.

Lysander complained to the young and magnanimous prince, "of the perfidious duplicity of Tissaphernes, by which the Athenians had been enabled to re-assume that ascendant in the East, which had formerly proved so dangerous and disgraceful to the Persian name. That satrap seemed on one occasion indeed, to have discovered the fatal tendency of his measures; and had attempted to check the victorious career of those ambitious republicans, by seizing the person of Alcibiades.¹ Pharnabazus had more effectually served the cause of his master, by his active valour in the field; by detaining the Athenian ambassadors, who had been sent to surprise the unsuspecting generosity of Darius;² and by supplying the Peloponnesians, after the unfortunate engagement at Cyzicus, with the means of preparing a new fleet, and with the necessaries and conveniences of life, while they were employed in this useful undertaking. But Tissaphernes was unwilling, and Pharnabazus was perhaps unable, to discharge the stipulated pay, without which the Grecian seamen and soldiers could not be kept together, or engaged to act with vigour against the common enemy." Cyrus replied, "That he had been commanded by his father to assist the Lacedæmonians, and to pay their troops with the most exact punctuality. That, for this purpose, he had carried with him five hundred talents (near a hundred thousand pounds sterling;) and if such a sum should be found insufficient, he would willingly expend his private fortune, and even melt down and coin into money the golden throne on which he sat."³

This discourse gave extraordinary satisfaction to his Grecian auditors; and Lysander endeavoured to avail himself of what, judging by his own character, he imagined might be nothing more than a sudden transport of generosity, by requesting that the seamen's pay might be raised from three oboli to an Attic drachma a day. Cyrus answered, "That, on this subject too, he had received express orders from his father.⁴ That the pay should continue on the ancient footing, and the Peloponnesians regularly receive thirty minæ (above ninety pounds sterling) a month, for every ship which they fitted out." Lysander acquiesced with some reluctance, determining to seize the first favourable

opportunity to renew his petition. But this instructive conversation may enable us to discover an important matter of fact omitted by historians. As the military and naval officers of the Greeks were not distinguished above the common men by the excessive inequality of their appointments, we may compute, from the monthly sum of thirty minæ, distributed at the rate of three oboli of daily pay, that the complement of each ship amounted to about two hundred and forty sailors; so that a fleet of ninety sail employed twenty-one thousand and six hundred men.

Before Lysander returned to Ephesus, he was invited by the Persian prince to a magnificent entertainment, at which, according to the custom of the age, the most serious matters were discussed amidst the freedom and intemperance of the table. This was a seasonable occasion for displaying the arts of insinuation and flattery, in which the Spartan was a complete master. He represented, without moderation, and without decency, the injustice and incapacity of Tissaphernes, who, as he was naturally the rival, might be suspected soon to become the personal enemy of Cyrus. He magnified the beauty, the strength, and the courage, of the young prince. His address in military exercises, and the extraordinary endowments of his mind (the fame of which had reached the most distant countries,) were extolled with the most elaborate praise. It is not improbable that he might find a topic of panegyric in a quality of which Cyrus was not a little vain; the capacity of bearing, without intoxication, a greater quantity of liquor than any of his equals;⁵ and he might possibly suggest, that of all the sons of Darius, Cyrus was the best qualified to succeed his father, to fill with dignity the Persian throne, and to emulate the glory of that illustrious hero whose name he bore, the immortal founder of the monarchy. But whatever were the topics of which he made use, it is certain that he excited the warmest emotions of friendship in the youthful breast of Cyrus, who drinking his health after the Persian fashion, desired him to ask a boon, with full assurance that nothing should be denied him. Lysander replied, with his usual address, "That he should ask what it would be no less useful for the prince to give, than for him to receive: the addition of an obolus a day to the pay of the mariners; an augmentation which, by inducing the Athenian crews to desert, would not only increase their own strength, but enfeeble the common enemy." Struck with the apparent disinterestedness of this specious proposal, Cyrus ordered him immediately ten thousand daricks (above five thousand pounds sterling;) with which he returned to Ephesus, discharged the arrears due to his troops, gave them a month's pay in advance, raised their daily allowance, and seduced innumerable deserters from the Athenian fleet.⁶

While Lysander was usefully employed in manning his ships, and preparing them for action, Alcibiades attacked the small island of

¹ This event, which happened in the twenty-first year of the war, is related by Xenophon, p. 429. It was omitted in the text, because Alcibiades soon effected his escape; and the treachery of Tissaphernes only displayed his own worthlessness, without hurting his enemies.

² This dishonourable transaction was approved even by Cyrus, which shows the disregard of the Persians to the laws of nations. He begged Pharnabazus to put the Athenians in his hands; at least, not to set them at liberty, that their countrymen might be ignorant of the measures in agitation against them. But a remorse of conscience seized Pharnabazus, who had sworn, either to conduct the ambassadors to the great king, or to send them to the Ionian coast; in consequence of which, the Athenians were released. Xenoph. p. 438.

³ Καὶ τὸν θρόνον κατακοψαίην, ἐν ᾧ καθέσθαι, ὅτε ἀργυροῦν καὶ χρυσόν. Literally, "that he would cut in pieces the throne on which he sat," which was composed of silver and gold.

⁴ Xenophon makes Cyrus answer with more art than truth, "ὅς τις καλῶς μὲν εἶπεν αὐτοὺς λίγισιν, οὐδὲν αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι παρ' αὐτῶν ἐπιστρίψαν αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν." Cyrus answered, "that they (Lysander and the Lacedæmonian ambassadors) spoke very reasonably, but that he could not act otherwise than he was commanded by his father.

⁵ Plut. in Sympos.

⁶ Plut. tom. iii. p. 7. Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 441. Diodor. l. xiii. 360.

Olymp. Andros. The resistance was more
xciii. 2. vigorous than he had reason to ex-
A. C. 407. pect; and the immediate necessity
of procuring pay and subsistence
for the fleet, obliged him to leave his work im-
perfect. With a small squadron he sailed to
raise contributions on the Ionian or Carian
coast,⁷ committing the principal armament to
Antiochus, a man totally unworthy of such an
important trust.⁸ Even the affectionate par-
tiality of Alcibiades seems to have discerned
the unworthiness of his favourite, since he gave
him strict orders to continue, during his own
absence, in the harbour of Samos, and by no
means to risk an engagement. This injunction,
as it could not prevent the rashness, might per-
haps provoke the vain levity of the vice-admiral,
who, after the departure of his friend, sailed to-
wards Ephesus, approached the sterns of Ly-
sander's ships, and with the most licentious
insults challenged him to battle. The prudent
Spartan delayed the moment of attack, until
the presumption of his enemies had thrown
them into scattered disorder.⁹ He then com-
manded the Peloponnesian squadrons to ad-
vance. His manœuvres were judicious, and
executed with a prompt obedience. The battle
was not obstinate, as the Athenians, who scarcely
expected any resistance, much less assault, sunk
at once from the insolence of temerity into the
despondency of fear. They lost fifteen vessels,
with a considerable part of their crews. The
remainder retired disgracefully to Samos;
while the Lacedæmonians profited of their vic-
tory by the taking of Eion and Delphinium.
Though fortune thus favoured the prudence
of Lysander, he declined to venture a second
engagement with the superior strength of Alci-
biades, who, having resumed the command,
employed every artifice and insult that might
procure him an opportunity to restore the tar-
nished lustre of the Athenian fleet.

But such an opportunity he could never again
find. The people of Athens, who expected to
hear of nothing but victories and triumphs,
were mortified to the last degree, when they
received intelligence of such a shameful defeat.
As they could not suspect the abilities, they
distrusted the fidelity of their commander.
Their suspicions were increased and confirmed
by the arrival of Thrasybulus,¹⁰ who, whether
actuated by a laudable zeal for the interest of
the public service, or animated by a selfish
jealousy of the fame and honours that had been

so liberally heaped on a rival, formally im-
peached Alcibiades in the Athenian assembly.
"His misconduct had totally ruined the affairs
of his country. A talent for low buffoonery
was a sure recommendation to his favour.
His friends were, partially, selected from the
meanest and most abandoned of men, who pos-
sessed no other merit than that of being sub-
servient to his passions. To such unworthy in-
struments the fleet of Athens was entrusted;
while the commander in chief revelled in de-
bauchery with the harlots of Abydus and
Ionia, or raised exorbitant contributions on the
dependent cities, that he might defray the ex-
pense of a fortress on the coast of Thrace, in
the neighbourhood of Byzantium, which he had
erected to shelter himself against the just ven-
geance of the republic."

Were it necessary to prove by examples the
deceitful emptiness of popular favour, this sub-
ject might be copiously illustrated from the
history of the Athenians. The same man,
whom a few months before they found it
impossible sufficiently to reward, was actually
exposed to the rage of disappointment and the
fury of revenge. They regretted the loss of
every moment which intervened between the
rapid progress of their resentment, and the exe-
cution of their vengeance. In the same assem-
bly, and on the same day, Alcibiades was ac-
cused, and almost unanimously condemned;
and that the affairs of the republic might not
again suffer by the abuse of undivided power,
ten commanders were substituted in his room;
among whom were Thrasyllus, Leon, Diomedon,
whose approved valour, and love of liberty,
justly recommended them to public honours;
Conon, a character as yet but little known, but
destined, in a future period, to eclipse the fame
of his contemporaries; and Pericles, who in-
herited the name, the merit, and the bad for-
tune, of his illustrious father. The new gene-
rals immediately sailed to Samos; and Alci-
biades sought refuge in his Thracian fortress.¹¹

They had scarcely assumed the command,
when an important alteration took place in the
Peloponnesian fleet. Lysander's year had ex-
pired, and Callicratidas, a Spartan of a very op-
posite character, was sent to succeed
Olymp. him. The active, ambitious, and
xviii. 3. intriguing temper of the former had
A. C. 406. employed as much assiduous and
systematic policy during the short term of his
precarious power, as if his authority had never
been to end. Though endowed with uncommon
vigour of mind, and with consummate pru-
dence (if prudence can belong to a character
deficient in justice and humanity,) he possessed
not those amiable and useful qualities which
alone deserve, and can alone obtain, public con-
fidence and respect. Lysander, sensible of this
imperfection, had recourse to the ordinary ex-
pedient by which crafty ambition supplies the
want of virtue. He determined to govern by
parties.¹² The boldest of the sailors were at-

⁷ Xenophon says, "Alcibiades sailed to Phocæa," which
is in Ionia; Plutarch says, "to the coast of Caria."

⁸ Diodorus gives his character in few words: "Ο δὲ
Ἀντιόχης ὡς τῇ φύσει προχίτρος, καὶ σπειδῶν διὰ τούτου
τὴν πρᾶξιν λαμπρὴν. Antiochus, naturally precipitate, and
desirous, by himself, to perform some splendid exploit."

⁹ "Διισπαρμένους τὰς ναυσι." Xenoph. p. 441.

¹⁰ Thrasybulus, we have seen, had a principal share in
bringing about the recall of Alcibiades. Nor was the latter
ungrateful to his benefactor. When the Athenians com-
mitted to him their whole military and naval force, "πᾶσαν
τὴν δύναμιν," and allowed him to name his own colleagues,
or rather substitutes, he named Thrasybulus and Adiman-
tus. Diod. l. xiii. p. 368. Considering this interchange of
good offices between Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, it is re-
markable that no Greek writer assigns any reason for the
animosity that soon afterwards broke out between them.
Plutarch says, that Thrasybulus was the bitterest of Alci-
biades's enemies, and imputes his accusation of him to enmity,
not to patriotism.

¹¹ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. sub. fin. Diodor. xiii. 67—74.

¹² His maxims breathed the odious party spirit, "That
it is impossible to do too much good to friends, or too much
evil to enemies. That children are to be deceived by tri-
nkets, men by oaths; and others equally flagitious." Plut.
in Lysand.

tached to his person by liberal rewards and more liberal promises. The soldiers were indulged in the most licentious disorders. In every city and in every island, Lysander had his partizans, whom he flattered with the hopes of obtaining the same authority over their fellow citizens, which the Spartans enjoyed over the inferior ranks of men in Laconia.¹

It was the general expectation at Ephesus, that the Spartans would, for once, depart from established practice, in order to prolong the command of such an able and successful officer. A universal clamour arose, when Callicratidas displayed his commission in the council of the confederates. The friends of Lysander affirmed, "That it was equally imprudent and ungenerous to check the victorious career of a deserving and fortunate commander; that the important charge of the fleet ought not to be entrusted to men who were destitute of experience, and perhaps of abilities; nor would it be just to sacrifice the interest of such a numerous and powerful confederacy to a punctilious observance of the Lacedæmonian laws." Lysander maintained a decent silence concerning the character of his successor, only observing that he resigned to him a fleet which commanded the sea. The noisy acclamations of the assembly confirmed his assertion.

But Callicratidas had a heart untainted with reproach, and incapable of fear. Unabashed by the seditious turbulence of his opponents, he replied, That he must withhold his assent to the magnified superiority of the Peloponnesian fleet, unless Lysander should set sail from Ephesus, coast along the isle of Samos (where the Athenians then lay,) and surrender his victorious squadrons in the harbour of Miletus. The pride of Lysander might have been confounded by this judicious and solid observation; but his ingenuity suggested a plausible or rather an elusive reply, "That he was no longer admiral."

Callicratidas then addressed the assembly, with the manly simplicity of an honest heart, which disdains the artifice of words, defies the insolence of power, and defeats the intrigues of policy. "Lacedæmonians and allies, I should have been contented to stay at home; nor does it greatly affect me that Lysander, or any other, should be held a better seaman than myself. Hither I have been sent by my countrymen to command the fleet, and my chief concern is to execute their orders, and to perform my duty. It is my earnest desire to promote the public interest; but you can best inform me whether I ought to continue here, or to return to Sparta." Wonderful is the power of honest intentions and unaffected firmness. The assembly listened with admiration; the partisans of Lysander were abashed; none ventured to object; and, after a considerable pause, all unanimously acknowledged that it became both Callicratidas and themselves to obey the orders of the Spartan government.²

Lysander, not a little mortified by the language of the assembly, reluctantly resigned his

employment; but determined to render it painful, and if possible, too weighty for the abilities of his successor. For this purpose he returned to the court of Cyrus, to whom he restored a considerable sum of money still unexpended in the service of the Grecian fleet, and to whom he misrepresented, under the names of obstinacy, ignorance, and rusticity, the unaffected plainness, the downright sincerity, and the other manly, but uncomplying, virtues of the generous Callicratidas. When that commander repaired to Sardis to demand the stipulated pay, he could not obtain admission to the royal presence. The first time that he visited the palace he was told that Cyrus was at table. It is well, said the unceremonious Spartan, I will wait till he has dined. The simplicity of this proceeding, confirmed the opinion which Lysander had given the Persians of his character; and his honest frankness, which was construed into low breeding, seemed a proper object of ridicule to the proud retainers of the court. He returned on another occasion, but without being admitted to see the young prince. The injustice of this treatment might have deserved his resentment, but it chiefly excited his contempt. He left the royal city, despising the pride and perfidy of his Persian allies, whose accidental importance depended on the precarious advantage of riches, and lamenting the domestic dissensions of the Greeks, which obliged them to court the favour of insolent Barbarians.

But Callicratidas could not, with honour or safety, return to the fleet at Ephesus, without having collected money to supply the immediate wants of the sailors. He proceeded, therefore, to Miletus and other friendly towns of Ionia; and having met the principal citizens, in their respective assemblies, he explained openly and fully the mean jealousy of Lysander, and the disdainful arrogance of Cyrus.³ "The unjust behaviour of both compelled him, much against his inclination, to have recourse to the confederate cities (already too much burdened) for the money requisite to support the war. But he assured them, that, should his arms prove successful, he would repay their favours with gratitude. Their own interest required a cheerful compliance with his demands, since the expedition had been principally undertaken to vindicate their freedom. He had, however, sent messengers to require effectual supplies from Sparta; but until these should arrive, it became the Greeks in general, but especially the Ionians, who had suffered peculiar injuries from the usurping tyranny of the great king, to prove to the world that, without the sordid assistance of his boasted treasures, they could prosecute their just designs, and take vengeance on their enemies." By those judicious and honourable expedients, Callicratidas, without fraud or violence, obtained such considerable, yet voluntary contributions, as enabled him to gratify the importunate demands of the sailors, and to return

¹ Idem, *ibid.* et Xenoph. Hellen.

² Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. v. et seq. et Plut. in Lysand.

³ It will appear in the sequel, that Callicratidas had formed a very false opinion of the Persian prince, whose neglect of a worthy man was occasioned by the perfidious suggestions of his retainers, the friends or creatures of Lysander.

with honour to Ephesus, in order to prepare for action.⁴

His first operations were directed against the isle of Lesbos, or rather against the strong and populous towns of Methymna and Mitylené, which respectively commanded the northern and southern divisions of that island. Besides the numerous citizens of an age to bear arms, Methymna was defended by an Athenian garrison. The place made a brave resistance; but the persevering efforts of Callicratidas exhausted its strength: Methymna was taken by storm, and subjected to the depredations of the Peloponnesian troops. The garrison and the slaves were treated as part of the booty. The confederates advised, that the Methymneans also should be sold into servitude; but Callicratidas assured them, that, while he enjoyed the command, there should not any Grecian citizen be reduced to the condition of a slave, unless he had taken arms to subvert the public freedom.⁵

Mean while Conon, the most active and enterprising of the Athenian commanders, had put to sea with a squadron of seventy sail, in order to protect the coast of Lesbos. But this design was attempted too late; nor, had it been more early undertaken, was the force of Conon sufficient to accomplish it. Callicratidas observed his motions, discovered his strength, and, with a far superior fleet, intercepted his retreat to the armament of Samos. The Athenians fled towards the coast of Mitylené, but were prevented from entering the harbour of that place by the resentment of the inhabitants, who rejoiced in an opportunity to punish those who had so often conquered, and so long oppressed, their city. In consequence of this unexpected opposition, the Athenian squadron was overtaken by the enemy. The engagement was more sharp and obstinate than might have been expected in such an inequality of strength. Thirty empty ships (for the most of the men swam to land) were taken by the Peloponnesians. The remaining forty were hauled up under the walls of Mitylené: Callicratidas recalled his troops from Methymna, received a reinforcement from Chios, and blocked up the Athenians by sea and land.⁶

The condition of Conon was most distressful. He was surrounded on all sides by a superior force; the town of Mitylené was hostile; his men were destitute of provisions, incapable of resistance, yet unwilling to surrender. In this melancholy situation, he attempted the only enterprise which could promise a hope of relief. The bravest and most experienced seamen were embarked in two swift-sailing vessels, one of which eluding the vigilance of the enemy, escaped in safety to the Hellespont, and informed the Athenians of the misfortunes and blockade at Lesbos. The intelligence was immediately communicated to Samos and to Athens; and the importance of the object, which was no less than the safety of forty ships, and above eight thousand brave men, excited uncommon exertions of activity. The Athenians reinforced

their domestic strength with the assistance of their allies; all able-bodied men were pressed into the service; and in a few weeks, they had assembled at Samos a hundred and fifty sail, which immediately took the sea, with a resolution to encounter the enemy.

Callicratidas did not decline the engagement. Having left fifty ships to guard the harbour of Mitylené, he proceeded, Olymp. xciii. 3. with a hundred and twenty to Cape A. C. 406. Malea, the most southern point of Lesbos. The Athenians had advanced, the same evening, to the islands, or rather rocks of Arginussæ, four miles distant from that promontory. The night passed in bold stratagems for mutual surprise, which were rendered ineffectual by a violent tempest of rain and thunder. At the dawn both armaments were eager to engage; but Hermon and Megareus, two experienced seamen, and the chief counsellors of Callicratidas, exhorted him not to commit the weakness of the Peloponnesians with the superior strength and numbers of the enemy. The generous and intrepid Spartan despised danger and death in comparison of glory; but either his magnanimity had not overcome the last imperfection of virtuous minds, and was averse to sacrifice personal glory to public utility, or he imagined that this utility could not be separated from an inflexible adherence to the martial laws of Lycurgus. He answered the prudent admonitions of his friends in these memorable words, which, according to the construction that is put on them,⁷ deserve our admiration or our pity. "My death cannot be destructive to Sparta, but my flight would be dishonourable both to Sparta and myself." So saying, he gave the signal for his ships to advance. The fight was long and bloody; passing, successively, through all the different gradations, from disciplined order and regularity to the most tumultuous confusion. The Spartan commander was slain charging in the centre of the bravest enemies. The hostile squadrons fought with various fortune in different parts of the battle, and promiscuously conquered, pursued, surrendered, or fled. Thirteen Athenian vessels were taken by the Peloponnesians; but, at length, the latter gave way on all sides: seventy of their ships were captured, the rest escaped to Chios and Phocæa.⁸

The Athenian admirals, though justly elated with their good fortune, cautiously deliberated concerning the best means of improving their victory. Several advised that the fleet should steer its course to Mitylené, to surprise the Pe-

⁷ Cicero de Offic. l. i. c. xxiv. takes the unfavourable side. "Inventi autem multi sunt, qui non modo pecuniam, sed vitam etiam profundere pro patria parati essent: iidem gloriæ jacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne republica quidem postulante; ut Callicratidas, qui cum Lacedæmoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello, multaque fecisset egregie; vertit ad extremum omnis, cum consilio non paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginussis removendam, nec cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant. Quibus ille respondit, Lacedæmonios, classem illa amissa aliam parare posse; se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse." Notwithstanding the respectable authority of Cicero, whoever attentively considers the laws of Lycurgus and the character of Callicratidas, will be disposed to believe, that an undeviating principle of duty, not the fear of losing his glory, formed the sublime motive of that accomplished Spartan.

⁸ Xenoph. p. 446. et Diodor. p. 384.

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. p. 444.

⁵ Xenoph. ubi supra. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 373.

⁶ Id.

loponnesian squadron which blocked up the harbour of that city. Diomedon recommended it as a more immediate and essential object of their care to recover the bodies of the slain, and to save the wreck of twelve vessels which had been disabled in the engagement. Thrasybulus observed, that by dividing their strength, both purposes might be effected. His opinion was approved. The charge of preserving the dying, and collecting the bodies of the dead, was committed to Theramenes and Thrasybulus. Fifty vessels were destined to that important service, doubly recommended by humanity and superstition. The remainder sailed to the isle of Lesbos, in quest of the Peloponnesians on that coast, who narrowly escaped destruction through the well-conducted stratagem of Eteonicus, the Spartan vice-admiral. Soon after the engagement a brigantine arrived at Mitylené, acquainting him with the death of Callicratidas, as well as with the defeat and flight of the Peloponnesian fleet. The sagacity of Eteonicus immediately foresaw the probable consequences of those events. The Athenians would naturally sail from Arginusæ to pursue their good fortune, and Conon, who was shut up at Mitylené, would be encouraged to break through the harbour, that he might join his victorious countrymen.

In order to anticipate those measures, and to facilitate his own retreat, the Spartan commander ordered the brigantine privately to leave the harbour, and to return, at the distance of a short time, with joyous acclamations and music, the rowers crowned with garlands, and calling out that Callicratidas had destroyed the last hope of Athens, and obtained a glorious and decisive victory. The contrivance succeeded; the Spartans thanked heaven for the good news by hymns and sacrifices; the sailors were enjoined to refresh themselves by a copious repast, and to profit of a favourable gale to sail to the isle of Chios; while the soldiers burned their camp, and marched northward to Methymna, to reinforce the garrison there, which was threatened by a speedy visit of the enemy.¹

While the prudent foresight of Eteonicus saved the Peloponnesian squadron at Mitylené, the violence of a storm prevented Theramenes and Thrasybulus from saving their unfortunate companions, all of whom, excepting one of the admirals and a few others who escaped by their extraordinary dexterity in swimming, were overwhelmed by the waves of a tempestuous sea; nor could their dead bodies ever be recovered. The Athenians were likewise disappointed of the immediate advantages which ought to have resulted from the engagement. Methymna was too strongly fortified to be taken by a sudden assault; they could not spare time for a regular siege; and when they proceeded to Chios in quest of the Peloponnesian fleet, they found it carefully secured in the principal harbour of that island, which had been put in a vigorous posture of defence. These unforeseen circumstances were the more disagreeable and mortifying to the commanders, because, immediately after the battle, they had

sent an advice-boat to Athens, acquainting the magistrates with the capture of seventy vessels;² mentioning their intended expeditions to Mitylené, Methymna, and Chios, from which they had reason to hope the most distinguished success; and particularly taking notice that the important charge of recovering the bodies of the drowned or slain had been committed to Theramenes and Thrasybulus, two captains of approved conduct and fidelity.

The joy which the Athenians received from this flattering intelligence was converted into disappointment and sorrow, when they understood that their fleet had returned to Samos, without reaping the expected fruits of victory. They were afflicted beyond measure with the total loss of the wreck, by which their brave and victorious countrymen had been deprived of the sacred rites of funeral; a circumstance viewed with peculiar horror, because it was supposed, according to a superstition consecrated by the belief of ages, to subject their melancholy shades to wander a hundred years on the gloomy banks of the Styx, before they could be transported to the regions of light and felicity. The relations of the dead lamented their private misfortunes; the enemies of the admirals exaggerated the public calamity; both demanded an immediate and serious examination into the cause of this distressful event, that the guilty might be discovered and punished.

Amidst the ferment of popular discontents, Theramenes sailed to Athens, with a view to exculpate himself and his colleague Thrasybulus. The letter sent thither before them had excited their fear and their resentment; since it rendered them responsible for a duty which they found it impossible to perform. Theramenes accused the admirals of having neglected the favourable moment to save the perishing, and to recover the bodies of the dead; and, after the opportunity of this important service was irrecoverably lost, of having devolved the charge on others, in order to screen their own misconduct. The Athenians greedily listened to the accusation, and cashiered the absent commanders. Conon, who during the action remained blocked up at Mitylené, was entrusted with the fleet. Protomachus and Aristogenes chose a voluntary banishment. The rest returned home to justify measures which appeared so criminal.³

Among the inestimable rules of jurisprudence, invented by the wisdom of Athens, we may remark that beneficial institution which subjects the life, the character, and the fortune of individuals, not to the capricious will of an arbitrary judge, but to the equitable decision of the public. In every case, civil and criminal, the rights of an Athenian citizen were entrusted to the judgment of his peers; who, according as the question was more or less important, consisted of a committee, more or less numerous, of the popular assembly. But, in order to unite the double advantages of law and liberty, the nine archons, or chief magistrates, men of approved wisdom and fidelity, respectively pre-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. et Diodor. p. 384.

² Xenoph. says sixty-nine; Diodorus, seventy-seven.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. c. vii. et seq. Diodor. xiii. 76-97.

sided in the several courts of justice, received complaints, examined the parties, directed process, and regularly conducted the suit through its various steps and stages. In matters of general concernment, such as treason, perfidy, or malversation of men in power, the senate of the five hundred, or rather the Prytanes, who presided in the senate, performed the functions of the magistrate, and the whole body of the people, convened in full assembly, executed the office of judge and jury. It belonged to the Prytanes to prescribe the form of action or trial, and to admit the accuser to implead or impeach his antagonist. The cause was then referred to the people, who as judges of the fact, gave their verdict, and, as judges of the law, passed their sentence or decree. Such were the regulations which reason had established, but which passion and interest commonly rendered ineffectual.

Archedemus, an opulent and powerful citizen, and Callixenus, a seditious demagogue, partly moved by the intreaties of Theramenes, and partly excited by personal envy and resentment, denounced the admirals to the senate. The accusation was supported by the relations of the deceased, who appeared in mourning robes, their heads shaved, their arms folded, their eyes bathed in tears, piteously lamenting the loss and disgrace of their families, deprived of their protectors, who had been themselves deprived of those last and solemn duties to which all mankind are entitled. A false witness swore in court, that he had been saved, almost by miracle, from the wreck, and that his companions, as they were ready to be drowned, charged him to acquaint his country how they had fallen victims to the cruel neglect of their commanders. During these proceedings it happened that the people had met to celebrate the Apatouria, or festival in January, so named because the Athenians then presented their sons, who had reached their seventh year, to be inscribed in the register of their respective tribes. Callixenus, presuming on the evidence given in the senate, and on the actual disposition of the assembly, proposed the following resolution: "That the cause of the admirals should be immediately referred to the people; that the suffrages should be given by tribes, in each of which the criers should make proclamation, having prepared two urns to receive the white and black beans; if the latter were more numerous, the admirals should be delivered to the eleven men, the executioners of public justice, their estates confiscated, and the tenth part consecrated to Minerva."

This unjust decree, which deprived the commanders of the benefits of a separate trial, of an impartial hearing, and of the time as well as the means necessary to prepare a legal defence, was approved by a majority of the senate, and received with loud acclamations by the people, whose levity, insolence, pride, and cruelty, all eagerly demanded the destruction of the admirals. In such a numerous assembly, two men alone, Euryptolemus and Axiochus, defended the cause of law and justice. The former impeached Callixenus for proposing a resolution inconsistent with all the forms of legal pro-

cedure. But the rabble made a violent uproar, calling out that none should attempt, with impunity, to abridge their sovereign power. The Prytanes, who attended, as usual, to direct and control the proceedings of the multitude, endeavoured to moderate the ferment: but they were licentiously told, that if they did not concur with the opinion of the majority, they should be involved in the same accusation with the admirals. This absurd menace, (such was the popular frenzy) might be carried into immediate execution. The senators were intimidated into a reluctant compliance with measures which they disapproved, and by which they were for ever to be disgraced. Yet the philosophic firmness of Socrates disdained to submit. He protested against the tameness of his colleagues, and declared that neither threats, nor danger, nor violence, could compel him to conspire with injustice for the destruction of the innocent.

But what could avail the voice of one virtuous man amidst the licentious madness of thousands? The commanders were accused, tried, condemned; and, with the most irregular precipitancy, delivered to the executioner. Before they were led to death, Diomedan addressed the assembly in a short but ever-memorable speech. "I am afraid, Athenians! lest the sentence which you have passed on us, prove hurtful to the republic. Yet I would exhort you to employ the most proper means to avert the vengeance of heaven. You must carefully perform the sacrifices which, before giving battle at Arginusæ, we promised to the gods in behalf of ourselves and of you. Our misfortunes deprive us of an opportunity to acquit this just debt, and to pay the sincere tribute of our gratitude. But we are deeply sensible that the assistance of the gods enabled us to obtain that glorious and signal victory." The disinterestedness, the patriotism, and the magnanimity of this discourse, must have appeased (if any thing had been able to appease) the tumultuous passions of the vulgar. But their headstrong fury defied every restraint of reason or of sentiment. They persisted in their bloody purpose, which was executed without pity: yet their cruelty was followed by a speedy repentance, and punished by the sharp pangs of remorse, the intolerable pain of which they vainly attempted to mitigate by inflicting a well-merited vengeance on the worthless and detestable Callixenus.⁴

The removal of the Athenian admirals, and the defeat and death of the Spartan Callicratidas, suspended for several months the military and naval operations on both sides. The behaviour of Philocles and Adimantus, who had been joined in authority with Conon, were better fitted to obstruct than promote the measures of that brave and prudent commander. The former was a man of a violent and impetuous temper, unaccustomed to reflection, destitute of experience, and incapable of governing others, or himself. The latter possessed perhaps the virtue of humanity, but was destitute of spirit and activity, qualities so usual in his age and

⁴ Xenoph. et Diodor. *ibid.*

country. Though ready with his tongue, he was slow with his hand, careless of discipline, negligent of duty, and suspected of a treasonable correspondence with the public enemy.

Eteonicus, who commanded the Spartans and their confederates, was a man of a very different character. But the distressful situation of affairs prevented him from displaying his abilities in any important enterprise. His armament was inferior in strength; his sailors were disheartened by defeat; he had not money to pay them; even their subsistence at Chios was very sparing and precarious. These vexatious circumstances increased the mutinous spirit by which the confederates were too naturally animated. They reproached the ungenerous parsimony of the Chians, whom they had taken arms to defend; they spurned the authority of their commander, and in order to obtain those advantages which their services deserved, and which had been unjustly denied them, they determined to become rich at once by seizing and plundering the large and wealthy capital of that flourishing island. The design, though secretly formed, was avowed with open boldness. The conspirators, whose numbers seemed to promise success, or at least to secure impunity, assumed a badge of distinction, that they might encourage each other, and intimidate their opponents. Eteonicus was justly alarmed with the progress of sedition. It was dangerous to attack the insurgents by force: if he destroyed them by fraud, he might be exposed to the reproach and obliquy of Greece. The conduct which he pursued was conceived with an enterprising courage, and executed with a resolute firmness. With only fifteen faithful and intrepid followers, armed with concealed daggers, he patrolled the streets of Chios. The first man whom they met distinguished by a reed (for that was the badge of conspiracy) was put to death, and a crowd collecting to know why the man had been slain, they were told it was for wearing a reed on his casque. The report was immediately spread through every quarter of the city. The reedmen (as they were called) were confounded at discovering a conspiracy more secret and more formidable than their own. They dreaded that every man whom they met might know and kill them; and, as they had not time to assemble for their mutual defence, they hastily threw away the reeds, which exposed them to the dangerous assault of their unknown enemies.

Olymp. The character of Eteonicus, as far as we can judge from his actions, justly entitled him to the command; but the partiality both of Cyrus and of the confederates eagerly solicited the return of Lysander. The Spartans, though inclined to gratify them, were perplexed by an ancient law enacted in the jealousy of freedom to prohibit the same person from being twice entrusted with the fleet. That they might not violate the respect due to the laws, while at the same time they complied with the request of their powerful allies, they invested Aracus, a weak and obscure man, with the name of admiral, and sent out Lysander as second in command. The latter was received

at Sardis, by the Persian prince, with the warmest demonstrations of joy. He was supplied with money to satisfy the immediate wants of the troops; and, as Cyrus at that time happened to make a journey into Upper Asia, the revenues of his wealthy province were consigned, in his absence, to the management of his Spartan friend. Such powerful resources could not long remain unemployed in the active hands of Lysander. His emissaries assiduously engaged or pressed the Ionian and Carion seamen. The harbours of Asia Minor, particularly the port of Ephesus, glowed with the ardour of naval preparation, and in a few months Lysander sailed to the Hellespont with a hundred and fifty galleys, and attacked the important town of Lampsacus. The place, though vigorously defended by the natives as well as by the Athenian garrison, was at length taken by storm; and according to the barbarous practice of the age, abandoned to the licentious rapacity, the avarice, the lust, and the fury, of the conquerors.¹

The languid and imprudent measures of the Athenians at Samos accuse the abilities of Tydeus, Menander, and Cephisodotus, who had been lately joined in command with Canon and his unworthy colleagues. They sailed too late to save Lampsacus, but as they possessed a hundred and eighty galleys, a force superior to Lysander's, they anchored on the opposite, or European side of the Hellespont, at the distance of fifteen furlongs, in order to provoke the enemy to an engagement. Their unfortunate station was the mouth of the *Ægos Potamos*, or river of the goat, distinguished by that name on account of some small islands, which rising high above the surface of the waters, exhibit to a lively imagination the appearance of that animal. This place was injudiciously chosen, since it afforded very insecure riding; and was distant two miles from Sestos, the nearest town from which the fleet could be supplied with necessaries. Alcibiades, who in his Thracian retirement was unable to withdraw his attention from the war in which he had long acted such a distinguished part, modestly admonished his countrymen of their imprudence; but he was arrogantly reproached for presuming, while an exile and an outlaw, to give advice to the admirals of Athens. Their subsequent conduct too faithfully corresponded with this insolence and folly. Despising the inferiority of the Peloponnesian fleet, they advanced in order of battle to the harbour of Lampsacus; and when the enemy moved not from their station, they returned in triumph as acknowledged masters of the sea. The prudence of Lysander perceived and indulged their presumption. During four days he bore, with extraordinary patience, their repeated insults, affecting the utmost disinclination to an engagement, carefully retaining his fleet in a place of security, and regularly despatching a few swift-sailing vessels to observe the motions and behaviour of the Athenians when they returned from their daily cruise to the road of *Ægos Potamos*.

¹ Plot. to Lysand.

Olymp.
xciii. 4.
A. C. 405.
December.

The fifth day they again bore up with the Peloponnesians, and provoked them to battle with more daring menaces than on any former occasion. As they flattered themselves with an undoubted prospect of success, they yielded without reserve to all the petulance of prosperity, and debated in what manner they should treat the Lacedæmonian prisoners who had the misfortune to fall into their power. The cruel Philocles proposed to cut off their right hands, that those enemies of Athens might be equally incapable to manage the oar and to brandish the spear; and this bloody resolution, though opposed by Adimantus, was approved by the majority of his colleagues. After insulting the enemy in a manner the most mortifying and disgraceful, they retired with an air of exultation mingled with contempt. The Peloponnesian spy-boats followed them as usual at a convenient distance, and observed that they had no sooner reached their stations than the seamen landed, straggled about the shore, advanced into the inland country in quest of provisions or amusement, indulged in indolence, or revelled in disorder. The advice-boats returned with uncommon celerity to convey the welcome intelligence to Lysander, who had embarked the troops, cleared his ships, and made every necessary preparation to avail himself of the favourable opportunity to effect by stratagem what it might have been dangerous to attempt by force. When his scouts approached the middle of the channel, they hoisted their shields (for that was the appointed signal,) and at the same moment the Peloponnesian squadrons were commanded to set sail, that they might surprise the hostile fleet, and indulge that resentment and animosity which had been rendered more violent and furious by the long and prudent restraint of their commander. The victory was complete, if that can be called a victory where there was scarcely any resistance. The vigilant activity of Conon endeavoured seasonably to assemble the strength of the Athenians; but his advice was disdained by officers incapable and unworthy of command, and his orders were despised by seamen unaccustomed and unwilling to obey. At length they became sensible of the danger when it was too late to avoid it. Their ships were taken, either altogether empty, or manned with such feeble crews as were unable to work, much less to defend them. The troops and sailors who flocked to the shore from different quarters, and with disordered precipitation, were attacked by the regular onset and disciplined valour of the Peloponnesians. Those who fought were slain; the remainder fled into the inmost recesses of the Chersonesus, or took refuge in the Athenian fortresses which were scattered over that peninsula. When Lysander reviewed the extent of his well-merited success, he found that of a fleet of a hundred and eighty sail, only nine vessels had escaped, eight of which were conducted by Conon to the friendly island of Cyprus, while the ninth carried to Athens the melancholy news of a disaster equally unexpected and fatal. A hundred and seventy-one galleys, and three thou-

sand prisoners (among whom were Philocles and Adimantus,) rewarded the patience and fortitude of Lysander, who returned with his invaluable spoil to Lampsacus, amidst the joyous acclamations of naval triumph.²

Before pursuing the natural consequences of an event the most important that had hitherto happened in all the Grecian wars, it was necessary for Lysander to decide the fate of the Athenian prisoners, against whom the confederates were animated by all that unrelenting hatred which is congenial to the stern character of republicans exasperated by continual provocation and recent insult. The injustice and cruelty of that ambitious people were carefully described and maliciously exaggerated in the dreadful tribunal of their enemies. "It would be tedious to enumerate, though it was impossible ever to forget, their multiplied and abominable crimes, of which so many individuals, and so many communities, had been the innocent and unhappy victims. Even of late they had destroyed without remorse, and without the shadow of necessity, the helpless crews of a Corinthian and an Andrian vessel. The gods had averted the atrocious resolution proposed by the bloody Philocles, of which the author and the approvers were equally criminal; nor could those deserve pardon who were incapable of pity." Such discourse, which resounded from every quarter of the assembly, declared, without the necessity of a formal vote, the unanimous decree of the confederates. As the prisoners had been stripped of their arms, there was nothing to be feared from their numbers and despair. They were conducted into the presence of their armed judges; and, as a prelude to the inhuman massacre, Lysander sternly demanded of Philocles what he deserved to suffer for his intended cruelty. The Athenian replied with firmness, "Accuse not those whom you are entitled to judge, but inflict on us the same punishment which we, in a different fortune, would have inflicted on our enemies." The words were scarcely ended when Lysander hacked him in pieces. The Peloponnesian soldiers followed the bloody example of their commander. Of three thousand Athenians, Adimantus alone was spared, either because he had opposed the detestable resolution of Philocles, or because he had engaged in a treacherous correspondence with the Spartans.³

² Xenoph. p. 456, et seq. et Plut. in Lysand. By the battle of Ægos Potamos the Athenians lost the empire of the sea, which they had acquired by the consent of their maritime allies in the fourth year of the seventy-fifth Olympiad. They enjoyed, therefore, that sovereignty, or empire as they styled it, from the year 477 till the year 405 before Christ; that is, a period of seventy-two years. This important computation is not to be found in any ancient writer; and no two authors agree in calculating the duration of the Athenian empire. Lysias in his Funeral Oration, p. 93, says, "During seventy years in which the Athenians commanded the sea." Diodorus Siculus (ad Olymp. 95. 1.) says, the Athenians commanded the sea sixty-five years. Isocrates in one place (i. p. 174.) agrees with Lysias; in another (ii. p. 200.) with Diodorus. Andocides (Orat. iii. p. 286.) states it at eighty-five years. Lycurgus (adv. Leoc. p. 145.) at ninety. Dionysius Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. sub. init.) at sixty-eight. Demosthenes, as we shall see below, states it variously at forty-five, sixty-five, and seventy-three years.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. Plutarch. in Lysand.

It might be expected, that immediately after an event which gave him the command of the sea, Lysander should sail to the Piræus, and assault the unfortunate city, which was already grievously oppressed by the Lacedæmonian army at Decelia. But the sagacious Spartan foresaw the numerous obstacles that opposed his conquest of Athens, and prudently restrained the eagerness of the troops and his own. The strongly fortified harbours of that capital, the long and lofty walls which surrounded the city on every side, the ancient renown and actual despair of the Athenians, must render the siege, if not altogether fruitless, at least difficult and tedious; and the precious moments wasted in this doubtful enterprise might be employed in attaining certain, immediate and most important advantages.

On the coast neither of Greece nor of Asia, nor of any of the intermediate islands, was there a naval force capable of contending with the fleet of Lysander, nor any fortified place in all those countries (except the city of Athens alone) sufficient to resist the impression of his army. It was a design, therefore, which might well deserve his ambition, and which was not condemned by his prudence, to establish or confirm the Lacedæmonian empire over those valuable and extensive coasts. The populous cities of Byzantium and Chalcedon were attacked and taken during the astonishment and terror occasioned by the dreadful and irreparable misfortune of their Athenian allies. After these important acquisitions, Lysander sailed to the island of Lesbos, reduced Mitylené, and confirmed the allegiance of Methymna. While he extended his arms over the neighbouring islands, as well as the maritime towns of Lydia and Caria, a powerful squadron, commanded by the enterprising valour of Eteoniceus, ravaged the shores of Macedon, subdued the seaports of Thrace, and rode victorious in the Hellespont and Propontis, the Ægean and Euxine seas. In six or eight months after the Athenian disaster at Ægos Potamos, the fairest portion of the ancient world, the most favoured by nature, and the most adorned by art, reluctantly submitted to the power, or voluntarily accepted the alliance of Sparta.

During this long series of triumphs, Lysander never lost sight of the reduction of Athens; an object important in itself, and necessary to the completion of his extensive plan. The vigilance of the Peloponnesian squadrons prevented the usual supplies of foreign grain from reaching the distressed city. In all the towns which surrendered, or which were taken by storm, the Athenian garrisons were saved from immediate death, only on condition that they returned to their native country. By such contrivances the crafty Spartan expected that the scarcity of provisions would soon compel the growing multitude of inhabitants to submit to the Lacedæmonian army at Decelia. But the Athenians, who despised the assaults of the enemy, braved the hardships of famine. Even after Lysander had blocked up their harbours with a hundred and fifty sail, they still defended, with vigour, their walls and ramparts; patiently endured

fatigue and hunger; and beheld with obstinate unconcern, the affliction of their wives and children. Amidst the ravages of death and disease, which advanced with increasing horror, they punished, with the utmost severity, the ignoble cowardice of Archestratus, who first mentioned capitulation, and declared that the same moment should put an end to their independence and their lives.

But notwithstanding the melancholy firmness of the popular assembly, a numerous and powerful party in the state was governed rather by interest than by honour; and the greatest enemies of Athenian liberty flourished in the bosom of the republic. The aristocratical leaven of the four hundred had infected the whole body of the senate; and not only the inconstant Theramenes, but several other men of abilities and influence, who had been most active in subverting that cruel tyranny, regretted the restoration of democracy to a people, who (as they had recently proved in many parts of their conduct) were unable to enjoy, without abusing, the invaluable gift of freedom. In republican governments, the misfortunes which ought to bind all ranks of men in the firmest and most indissoluble union, have often little other tendency than to exasperate the political factions which tear and distract the community. Amidst every form of public distress, the Athenians caballed, clamoured, accused and persecuted each other; and the faction of the nobles, who acted with superior concert, vigour, and address, destroyed, by dark insinuations, false witnesses, perjury, and every other species of legal fraud and cruelty, the seditious Cleophon, and other turbulent demagogues, who might most effectually have opposed their measures.¹

When these obstacles were removed, Theramenes (whose recent merit prevented the suspicion of the assembly) proposed an embassy to Lacedæmon, which should request a suspension of hostilities, and obtain, if possible, some moderate terms of accommodation. He named himself, with nine colleagues, as the persons best qualified to undertake this important commission; flattering the people in the clearest and least ambiguous terms, with an undoubted prospect of success. A decree was immediately passed, investing the ambassadors with full powers. They assumed the sacred badge of their inviolable character, reached in safety the Spartan camp, held a conference with king Agis, and afterwards repaired to the Lacedæmonian capital. During four months they carried on their pretended negotiation with the senate, the kings, the ephori, and especially with Lysander, whose authority, being unknown to the ancient constitution of Sparta, was far more extensive than that of all the other magistrates together. With him, principally, the plan was concerted for compelling the Athenians to submit to terms of peace, which they must have regarded as worse, not only than war, but death.² The fortifications of their harbours were to be demolished, as well as the long walls which joined

¹ Lysias, p. 272.

² Lysias against Eratosthenes, p. 273.

them with the city: they were to surrender all their ships, but twelve; to resign every pretension to their ancient possessions in foreign parts; to recall from banishment the surviving members of the late tyrannical aristocracy; to follow the standard of Sparta in war; and, in peace, to mould their political constitution after the model which that victorious republic might think fit to prescribe.

When Theramenes produced these unexpected fruits of his boasted negotiation, the Athenians had no longer either strength or spirit to resist, or even courage to die. During the long absence of their ambassadors, the siege had been carried on with redoubled vigour. The Lacedæmonians, reinforced by the Thebans as well as by their numerous allies of Peloponnesus, had invested the city on every side, the harbours were closely blocked up by Lysander, who had become master of Melos, Ceos, Ægina, and Salamis; islands so near to Athens that they were almost regarded as a part of the Attic territory. The greatest misery prevailed within the walls; the famine was intolerable, and the diseases more intolerable than the famine. The full period of thrice nine years had elapsed, which, if we may credit a most accurate and faithful historian,³ had been assigned by repeated oracles and predictions, as the destined term of the Peloponnesian war and of the Athenian greatness. The principal leaders of the democracy had been cut off by the perfidious snares of their opponents, who were prepared to bear a foreign yoke, provided they might usurp domestic tyranny. That odious faction was ready to approve the measures of Theramenes, who might intimidate the dejected assembly by declaring (a most melancholy truth) that the severity of the Lacedæmonians, excessive as it seemed, was yet moderation and lenity when compared with the furious and unextinguishable rage of the Thebans and Corinthians, who maintained that the Athenians deserved not any terms of accommodation; that their crimes ought to be persecuted with unrelenting vengeance; their proud city demolished with such perfect destruction, that not even its vestige should remain; and the insolent inhabitants

utterly extirpated from Greece, which they had so long disturbed by their ambition, and provoked by their tyranny and cruelty. Such an argument Theramenes might have employed, if it had been necessary to employ any argument, to justify his negotiation with the Spartans, which was confirmed and ratified by the voice of the aristocratical cabal, and submitted to, rather than accepted, by the majority of the assembly, with the gloomy silence of despair.

Olymp. On the sixteenth of May, the day on which the Athenians had xciv. 1. been accustomed to celebrate the A. C. 404. anniversary of the immortal victory of Salamis, the hostile armament took possession of their harbours; the combined army entered their gates. The walls and fortresses of the city of Minerva, which the generous magnanimity of its inhabitants, preferring the public safety to their own, had abandoned in defence of Greece to the fury of a barbarian invader, were ungratefully levelled to the ground by the implacable resentment of the Greeks; who executed their destructive purpose with all the eagerness of emulation, boasting, amidst the triumphs of martial music, that the demolition of Athens would be regarded, in succeeding ages, as the true era of Grecian freedom. Yet after they had satisfied their vengeance, they seemed to regret its effects. The day was concluded with a magnificent festival, in which the recitation of the poets formed as usual, the principal ornament of the entertainment. Among other pieces was rehearsed the *Electra* of Euripides, and particularly that affecting chorus, "We come, O daughter of Agamemnon! to thy rustic and humble roof." The words were scarcely uttered, when the whole assembly melted into tears, the forlorn condition of that young and virtuous princess, expelled the royal palace of her father, and inhabiting a miserable cottage, in want and wretchedness, recalling the dreadful vicissitudes of fortune which had befallen Athens, once mistress of the sea, and sovereign of Greece, but deprived, in one fatal hour, of her ships, her walls, and her strength, and reduced from the pride of power and prosperity, to misery, dependence, and servitude, without exerting one memorable effort to brighten the last moment of her destiny, and to render her fall illustrious.⁴

³ The words of Thucydides, l. v. p. 362. are very remarkable. "He remembers, that from the first commencement of hostilities, it had been constantly prophesied that the war would last thrice nine years; which, of all predictions, was alone firm and stable;" or as the idiom of the Greek language will bear "the most firm and stable."

⁴ Xenoph. *Hellen.* l. ii. c. i. et seq. Diodor. l. xiii. 104—107. Plut. in *Lysand.* p. 438. Lysias in *Eratoeth.* et *Agorat.*

CHAPTER XXIII.

Rapacity and Cruelty of the Spartan Government—The Thirty Tyrants in Athens—Persecution of Lysias and his Family—Theramenes opposes the Tyrants—Sanguinary Speech of Critias—Death of Theramenes—Persecution and death of Alcibiades—Thrasybulus seizes Phylé—Defeats the Tyrants—Memorable Speech of Thrasybulus—Oath of Amnesty—Not faithfully observed.

THE conquest of Athens, and the acknowledged dominion of Sparta, terminated the memorable war of twenty-seven years. It still remained for Lysander to reduce the island of Samos,¹ which enjoys the honourable distinction of being the last settlement in the East that defied the ambition of Pericles, and the last which submitted to the arms of Lysander. The conquered islands and cities suffered still greater vexations under the Spartan, than they had done under the Athenian empire. Among the hostile factions² which ambition or danger had formed in those turbulent republics, Lysander always preferred that party which possessed most craft and least patriotism. At the head of this cabal he placed a Spartan Harmostes, or governor, on whose obsequious cruelty he could depend. The citidels were garrisoned by mercenaries; a tyrannical faction insulted as subjects, those whom they had envied as rivals, or dreaded as enemies; and every species of license and disorder was exercised, with a presumption that could be equalled only by the tameness with which it was endured.³ The Asiatic Greeks regretted the dishonourable yoke of Persia; they regretted the stern dominion of Athens; both of which seemed tolerable evils, compared to the oppressive cruelty of Sparta and Lysander. The contributions of which they had formerly so much complained, no longer appeared exorbitant. Lysander was the first and the last conqueror who imposed on those feeble communities the enormous tribute of a thousand talents.⁴

The unrelenting severity of Sparta has usually been ascribed to the personal character of her general, whose natural arrogance and cruelty were heightened and confirmed by the sud-

den exaltation of his fortune. From the simple citizen of a small, and then unfortunate republic, he became, in a few years, the arbiter of Greece. Athens acknowledged his authority; the smaller cities courted his protection; venal poets and orators extolled him with odes and panegyrics; he was honoured with crowns and statues, and worshipped by hymns and sacrifices.⁵ Yet it is obvious to remark, that what ever might be the temper and manners of Lysander, his country is justly accountable for the wrongs which he was allowed to commit with impunity; and it is uncertain whether another general, placed in the same situation, would have acted on different principles; since the nature of the Spartan institutions, and the ambitious views of the republic, seemed to demand and justify uncommon exertions of severity. In the administration of their domestic government, five or six thousand Spartans tyrannised over thirty thousand Lacedæmonians; these tyrannised, with still greater rigour, over thrice that number of slaves; and it was natural to expect, that when the slaves were associated with the troops,⁶ all these descriptions of men, Spartans, Lacedæmonians and Helots, would tyrannise, with the emulation of cruelty, over their conquered subjects.

The scanty materials of ancient history cannot enable us minutely to explain the humiliation and distress of the Asiatic Greeks, oppressed by the double tyranny of the Spartans, and of their fellow citizens. Contemporary writers, who beheld this scene of misery and desolation, seem at a loss for words to impress its horror. Isocrates endeavours to grasp the amplitude of the subject in the vague language of general description; by strokes of exaggeration and hyperbole, he supplies the place of clear and positive information; but all the copiousness and energy of the Greek tongue sink beneath the heavy afflictions of that unfortunate people; and the mind of the orator seems to labour with a thought which he is unable to express.⁷ It is not, however, from such rheto-

1 Comp. Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 461. et Plut. iii. p. 31. in Lysand. Lysias adv. Eratoth. p. 274. et Diodor. p. 306. It is remarkable that Xenophon and Lysias, both contemporaries, should differ in a matter of chronology; the one placing the conquest of Samos before, and the other after, Lysander's voyage to Athens.

2 These were the *συνωμοτικαὶ ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς*, mentioned by Thucydides and Xenophon: "associations, or rather conspiracies, for mutual defence in courts of justice, and for mutual assistance in obtaining offices of power."

3 Instead of the sweet draught of Liberty, Sparta, according to Theopompus, gave Greece the bitter cup of Slavery. In the city of Miletus, he sacrificed at once eight hundred men, of the democratical faction, to the implacable rage of their adversaries. Plut. in Lysand.

4 Diodorus, p. 400. says, *πλεον τῶν χιλίων τετρακτῶν καὶ ἑνιοῦτον*, "more than a thousand talents yearly;" that is, above two hundred thousand pounds. It may be computed from Plut. in Lysand. et Xenoph. p. 462. that Lysander sent home a still larger sum after the surrender of Samos. The law of Lycurgus respecting gold and silver, which had been long virtually, was now formally, abolished. The use of the precious metals was allowed to the state, but forbidden to individuals, under pain of death. The prohibition, however, was universally disregarded; many Spartans possessed abundance of gold and silver; none incurred the penalty of the law. Compar. Plut. et Xenoph. loc. citat. et Isocrat. in Archidam.

5 Plut. in Lysand.

6 The Helots then took the title of *νοδομῶδες*, Libertini, *δυνάται δὲ το νοδομῶδες ελευθέρων ἤδη εἰναι*. Thucyd. l. v. p. 533. From some passages in Isocrates (Panegy. et de Pace,) it should seem that Lysander often appointed these freed men to offices of great trust and authority.

7 See the oration of Isocrates on the peace, p. 171, &c. In the panegyric of Athens, speaking of the aristocratical factions supported by Lysander and the Lacedæmonians, Isocrates says, they consisted of wretches, "whose cruelty and injustice are unexampled in the history of mankind. From what indignity did they abstain? Into what excesses were they not transported? They, who regarded the most factious as the most faithful; the most treacherous as the most deserving. Their crimes proved infectious, and changed the mildness of human nature into savage ferocity," &c. See p. 52, &c.

rical descriptions that we can attain an adequate and satisfactory knowledge of the Spartan administration: history delights in plain and authentic facts; and the rigorous treatment of the Athenians themselves, will best represent the hardships inflicted on their Asiatic colonies and dependencies.

The Athenians had surrendered their fleet; their walls and harbours were demolished; their citadel was occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison, commanded by Callibius, the friend of Lysander; and their government was usurped by thirty men, the dependents and creatures of Sparta. The furious and profligate Critias formed a proper head for this aristocratical council, whose members have been justly branded in history under the name of the Thirty Tyrants.⁸ On pretence of delivering the state from the malice of informers, and the turbulence of seditious demagogues, they destroyed the most valuable portion of the community.⁹ Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and a son who inherited not only the opulence, but the virtues of his illustrious father, was condemned to death; Leon, the most public-spirited, and Antiphon, the most eloquent of his contemporaries, shared the same fate; Thrasybulus and Anytus were banished. Whoever was known to be powerful, was regarded as dangerous; whoever was supposed to be rich, was accused as criminal. Strangers and citizens were involved in one promiscuous ruin.¹⁰

Amidst this general wreck of whatever was most worthy and respectable, I shall select the persecution of Lysias and his family, the only transaction of that kind, recorded with such circumstances as answer the ends of history. Cephalus, the father of that ingenious orator, was by birth a Syracusan. The friendship of Pericles persuaded him to settle in Athens, where, under the protection of that powerful statesman, he obtained wealth and honours. His inoffensive and generous character escaped the enmity and persecution to which the opulent Athenians were commonly exposed; and he enjoyed the rare felicity of living thirty years in the midst of continual trials and impeachments, without being obliged to appear as plaintiff or defendant in any litigation. His sons, Lysias and Polemarchus, inherited his innocence, his generosity, and his good fortune. Though possessed of the most valuable accomplishments, natural and acquired, the brothers prudently kept aloof from the dangerous paths of public life; contented with their domestic felicity, they aspired not to the rank of Athenian citizens; but liberally contributed to supply the exigencies of the state, from the profits of a flourishing manufacture of shields, which

they carried on by the labour of a hundred and twenty slaves. The cruelty of the thirty tyrants, from whose rapacious eye neither obscurity could conceal, nor merit defend, occasioned the death of Polemarchus, and the immediate misfortunes, as well as the future glory of Lysias, who acted a distinguished part in overturning that detestable tyranny, and in bringing its authors and abettors to condign punishment.¹¹

The history is related by himself with perspicuous precision and graceful simplicity: "The tyrants Theognis and Piso acquainted their associates, that many strangers established at Athens were disaffected to the government. This was a plausible pretence for rifling the effects of these unhappy men; a measure to which the thirty were not only excited by avarice, but prompted by fear. Money was become necessary for the preservation of their power, which, being founded on usurpation, and tyrannically administered, could only be maintained by the influence of corruption, and the mercenary aid of foreign troops. The life of man, therefore, they regarded as a matter of little moment; the amassing of wealth was the principal object of their desire; to gratify which, ten strangers were at once devoted to destruction. In this number, indeed, were two poor men; a base and cruel artifice to persuade you, Athenians, that the remaining eight had been condemned, not for the sake of their riches, but in order to preserve the public tranquillity; as if the interest of the public had ever been the concern of that tyrannical cabal! Their infamous design was executed with inhuman cruelty. Their victims were taken in their beds, at supper, in the privacy of domestic retirement. Me they seized exercising the rites of hospitality; my guests were rudely dismissed; I was delivered into the custody of the worthless Piso. While his accomplices continued in the workshop, taking a list of our slaves and effects, I asked him, 'Whether money could save my life?' 'Yes, a considerable sum.' 'I will give you a talent of silver.' This he consented to accept, as the price of my safety; and to such a melancholy situation was I reduced, that it afforded me a momentary consolation to depend on the precarious faith of a man, who (as I well knew) despised every law, human and divine. But my comfort was of short duration; for I had no sooner opened my coffer to pay him the talent, than he ordered his attendant to seize the contents, consisting of three talents of silver, a hundred Daricks, three hundred Cyzicenes, and three silver cups. I entreated Piso to allow me a small sum to defray the expense of my journey. But he desired me to be thankful to escape with my life. Going out together, we met the tyrants Melobius and Mnesitheides, returning from the workshop. They inquired, where we were going? Piso answered, to examine the house of my brother Polemarchus. They desired him to proceed; but commanded me to follow them to the house of Damasippus. Piso whispered

⁸ Their names are preserved in Xenophon, *Hellen.* ii. 3.

⁹ Xenoph. p. 462. which Cæsar, *ap. Sallust. de Bello Catil. c. 51.* evidently had in view, "*Lacedæmonii devictis Atheniensibus, triginta viros imposuere. . . . Hi primo cœpere pessimum quemque, et omnibus invisum, indemnatum necare. Eo populus lætari, et merito dicere fieri. Post ubi paulatim licentia crevit juxta bonos et malos libidinos interficere. . . . Ita civitas, servitute oppressa stultæ lætitiæ graves pœnas dedit.*"

¹⁰ Xenoph. i. ii. p. 463, et seq. ¹

¹¹ See the Life of Lysias, and the Orations there referred to, p. 110, et seq.

me to be silent, and to fear nothing, because he would immediately come there. Upon our arrival, we found Theognis guarding several of my companions in calamity. I increased the number of his prisoners; but obtained an opportunity to represent my innocence and misfortunes to Damasippus, entreating him, by our past friendship, to employ his influence in my behalf. He assured me of his intention to intercede with Theognis, whose avarice would easily persuade him to betray his trust. While they conversed on this subject, I took advantage of my knowledge of the house to escape through three secret passages, which all happened to be open and unguarded; and fortunately reaching the country-house of my friend Archimaus, a ship-master, sent him to the city, that he might bring me intelligence of my brother. He discovered, that the tyrant Erasthenes had dragged him from the road, and conducted him to prison, where he was ordered to drink hemlock. At this melancholy news, I sailed to Megara, under cover of the night. Our effects became the property of the tyrants, whose mean avarice spared not the smallest trifle belonging to us. Even the gold ear-rings of Polemarchus's wife were forcibly torn away by the brutal Melobius."¹

The Thirty justified these abominable acts of cruelty by the authority of a servile senate, which they still allowed to subsist as the instrument and accomplice of their tyranny. It could not be expected, however, that in a city accustomed to the utmost liberty of opinion and freedom of debate, a body of five hundred, or even of thirty men, should continue to agree in the same odious and oppressive measures. The first seeds of discord, or rather the first symptoms of repentance, appeared in the speeches and behaviour of the bold and active Theramenes; who, though the principal author of the usurpation, was already disposed by the humanity of his nature, or by the singular inconstancy of his temper,² to destroy the work of his own hands. His strenuous endeavours were used to save the innocent and unhappy victims whom his furious colleagues daily devoted to destruction; under his protection the citizens assembled, and expressed their resentment or despair; and it was justly apprehended that the government of the Thirty might be dissolved by the same means, and by the same man, who had set on foot and subverted the short-lived tyranny of the four hundred. The present usurpation, indeed, was defended by a Lacedæmonian garrison; but the Thirty dreaded the influence of Theramenes over the foreign troops; they dreaded still more his influence over the Athenian citizens. When they considered the precarious tenure of their authority, and the unjust violence of their administration, they reflected on the past with pain, and viewed the future with terror. But they had gone too far to retreat, and nothing re-

mained but to prep the tottering fabric of their power by enlarging its base. Three thousand citizens were invited to participate in the advantages and dangers of their government. The rest were disarmed and treated with an increase of severity.

Theramenes vainly opposed the criminal designs of his colleagues, who implicitly submitted their opinions to the implacable fury of Critias. He it was who chiefly encouraged them boldly to persevere, and to remove every obstacle to the unlimited gratification of their passions. The safety of Theramenes, he assured them, was no longer compatible with their own. His delicacy, real or affected, was totally inconsistent with the spirit of the present administration; nor could the government of Thirty, any more than that of one tyrant, admit of being curiously canvassed, or fastidiously opposed. These sentiments being received with approbation, we might expect that Theramenes should have been destroyed by that sudden and open violence which had proved fatal to so many others. But as the most daring violators of the laws of society are obliged to establish and observe some rules of justice, in their conduct towards each other, it had been resolved by the Thirty, that, amidst the violent and capricious outrages which they committed against their subjects, none of their own number should be put to death without the benefit of a trial before the senate; a privilege extending to the three thousand entrusted with the use of arms, and sufficiently denoting the miserable condition of the other citizens. The senate was assembled to try Theramenes; but this tribunal was surrounded by armed men. When the pretended criminal appeared, Critias addressed the court in a speech too remarkable ever to be forgotten.

"Should you imagine, O senators! considering the great numbers who have suffered death, that we have been guilty of unnecessary cruelty, you will alter that opinion on reflecting that revolutions of government must always be attended with bloodshed; but particularly when a populous city like Athens, which has been long pampered with liberty, is reduced under the dominion of a few. The actual form of administration was imposed by the Lacedæmonians as the condition of the public safety. In order to maintain its authority we have removed those seditious demagogues, whose democratical madness hath occasioned all our past calamities. It is our duty to proceed in this useful work, and to destroy, without fear or compassion, all who would disturb the public tranquillity. Should a man of this dangerous disposition be found in our own order, he ought to be punished with double rigour, and treated not only as an enemy, but as a traitor. That Theramenes is liable to this accusation appears from the whole tenor of his conduct. He concluded the treaty with the Lacedæmonians; he dissolved the popular government; he directed and approved the first and boldest measures of our administration: but no sooner did difficulties arise than he deserted his associates, declared his opposition to their designs, and undertook the protection of the populace.

¹ See the discourses of Lysias against Agoratus and Erasthenes, p. 258, et seq.

² Thucyd. viii. 68, et seq. Lysias advers. Erastoth. Xenophon paints him more favourably; and Aristot. apud Plat. iii. 337. et Diodor. p. 350, et seq. still more favourably than Xenophon.

When the weather was fair and favourable, he pursued the same course with his companions, but on the first change of wind, he thought proper to alter his navigation. With such an irresolute steersman it is impossible to govern the helm of the republic, and to guide the vessel to her destined harbour. This dangerous inconsistency ought, indeed, to have been expected from a man to whose character perfidy is congenial. He began his political career under the direction of his father Hagnon, a violent partisan of democracy. He afterwards changed his system, in order to obtain the favour of the nobles. He both established and dissolved the government of the four hundred; and the whole strain of his behaviour proves him unfit to govern, and unworthy to live."³

Theramenes made a copious and persuasive defence, acknowledging, "That he had often changed his conduct, but denying that he had ever varied his principles. When the democracy flourished, he had maintained the just rights, but repressed the insolence, of the people. When it became necessary to alter the form of the republic, in compliance with the command of the Spartans, he had supported the legal power, but opposed the tyranny, of the magistrates. Under every administration of government he had approved himself the friend of moderation and justice, which he still continued, and ever would continue, to recommend and enforce, convinced that those virtues alone could give stability and permanence to any system of government, whether aristocratical or popular."

The senators murmured applause, unawed by the presence of Critias and his associates. But this furious tyrant made a signal to the armed men, who surrounded the senate-house, to show the points of their daggers; and then stepping forward, said, "It is the duty, O senators! of a prudent magistrate, to prevent the deception and danger of his friends. The countenance of those brave youths (pointing to his armed partisans) sufficiently discovers that they will not permit you to save a man who is manifestly subverting the government: I, therefore, with the general consent, strike the name of Theramenes from the list of those who have a right to be tried before the senate; and, with the approbation of my colleagues, I condemn him to immediate death." Roused by this unexpected and bloody sentence, Theramenes started from his seat, and sprang to the altar of the senate-house, at once imploring the compassion, and urging the interest of the spectators, whose names, he observed, might be struck out, and whose lives might be sacrificed, as unjustly and cruelly as his own. But the terror of armed violence prevented any assistance or intercession; and the eleven men (for thus the Athenian delicacy styled the executioners of public justice) dragged him from the altar, and hurried him to execution.

In proceeding through the market-place the unhappy victim of tyranny invoked the favour and gratitude of his fellow citizens, who had often been protected by his eloquence, and de-

fended by his valour. But the impudent Satyrus, the chief minister of vengeance both in authority and cruelty, sternly told him, that if he continued his lamentations and uproar he should soon cry in good earnest:⁴ "And shall I not," said Theramenes, "though I remain silent?" When he drank the fatal hemlock, he poured a libation on the ground with a health to the honest Critias; circumstances unworthy to relate, if they proved not, that even in his last moments, he was forsaken neither by his facetiousness nor by his fortitude.⁵

The death of Theramenes delivered the tyrants from the only restraint which tended to control their insolence, and to moderate their cruelty. They might now indulge in all the licentiousness of outrage, without the fear of reproach or the danger of resistance. Their miserable subjects were driven from the city, from the Piræus, from their houses, their farms, and their villages, which were divided among the detestable instruments of an odious usurpation. Nor did the tyrants stop here. A mandate was published, enforced by the authority of the Spartan senate, prohibiting any Grecian city to receive the unfortunate fugitives. But this inhuman order was almost universally disobeyed; the sacred laws of hospitality prevailed over the terror of an unjust decree; Thebes, Argos, and Megara, were crowded with Athenian exiles.⁶

In exercising those abominable acts of cruelty, the Thirty probably consulted the immediate safety of their persons, but they precipitated the downfall of their power. The oppressed Athenians, whose sufferings seemed no longer tolerable, required only a leader to rouse them to arms, and to conduct them to victory and to vengeance. This danger the tyrants had greater reason to apprehend, since they could not expect a reinforcement to the garrison, while the efforts of Lysander and the Spartans were principally directed towards the extension of their Asiatic conquests. The abilities and resentment of Alcibiades pointed him out as the person best qualified to undertake the arduous and honourable design of reassembling the fugitives, and of animating them with courage to recover their lost country. That illustrious exile had been driven from his Thracian fortress by the terror of the Lacedæmonians, then masters of the Hellespont, and had acquired a settlement under the protection of Pharnabazus, in the little village of Grynium in Phrygia, where, undisturbed by the dangerous contentions of war and politics, he enjoyed an obscure happiness in the bosom of love and friendship. But the cruel fears of the tyrants pursued him to this last retreat.

⁴ Οτι οὐκ ἐμύθετο, ἢ μὴ σιωπῆσειν. Literally, that he would cry out unless he were silent. The inaccurate language of the executioner furnished occasion to the smart reply of Theramenes.

⁵ Xenoph. p. 470. The glorious death of Theramenes cancelled the imperfections of his life. That his character was inconstant, most writers allow. Lysias adversus Erastosten. accuses him of many deliberate crimes; but he died in a virtuous cause, and, however he acted, left the scene gracefully. "Quam me delectat Theramenes! quam elato animo est! Etsi enim flemus, cum legimus, tamen non miserabiliter vir clarus moritur." Cic. Tusc. Quæst.

⁶ Diodor. l. xiv. p. 236.

Lysander told Pharnabazus that the sacrifice of Alcibiades was necessary for the safety of that form of government which had been recently established in Athens, and which it was the interest both of Sparta and of Persia to maintain. A private reason (which will afterwards appear) prevailed with the satrap to pay immediate attention to this bloody advice. A band of armed Phrygians was sent to surprise and destroy Alcibiades. Such was the fame of his prowess, that these timid assassins durst not attack him in broad-day, or by open force. They chose the obscurity of night to surround and set fire to his house, which, according to the fashion of the country, was chiefly composed of light and combustible materials. The crackling noise of the flames alarmed Alcibiades, whose own treacherous character rendered him always suspicious of treachery. He snatched his sword, and, twisting his mantle round his left arm, rushed through the flaming edifice, followed by his faithful Arcadian friend, and by his affectionate mistress Timandra.¹ The cowardice of the Phrygians, declining to meet the fury of his assault, covered him with a shower of javelins. But even these Barbarians spared the weakness and the sex of Timandra, whose tears and entreaties obtained the melancholy consolation of burying her unfortunate lover; a man whose various character can only be represented in the wonderful vicissitudes of his life and fortune; and who, though eminently adorned with the advantages of birth, wealth, valour, and eloquence, and endowed with uncommon gifts of nature and acquirements of art, yet deficient in discretion and probity, involved his country and himself in inextricable calamities.

Although the life of Alcibiades had been highly pernicious to his country, his death, at this particular juncture, might be regarded as a misfortune, if the Athenian exiles at Thebes had not been headed by a man who possessed his excellences, unmingled with his defects and vices. The enterprising courage of Thrasybulus was animated by the love of liberty; and while he generally followed² the rules of justice and humanity, he had magnanimity to conceive, abilities to conduct, and perseverance to accomplish, the boldest and most arduous designs. Having communicated his intentions to the unhappy fugitives in Thebes and Megara, he encouraged a body of seventy intrepid followers to seize the important fortress of Phyla, situate on the Boeotian and Athenian frontier. This daring enterprize alarmed the tyrants, who marched forth with the flower of their troops to dislodge the new garrison. But the natural strength of the place baffled their assault; and, when they determined to invest it, the unexpected violence of a tempest, accompanied with an extraordinary fall of snow,³ obliged them to desist from their undertaking. They returned with precipitation to Athens, leaving behind part of their attendants and

baggage, which fell a prey to the garrison of Phyla; the strength of which continually augmented by the confluence of Athenian exiles, and soon increased from seventy, to seven hundred, men.

The tyrants had just reason to apprehend that these daring invaders might ravage the surrounding country, and even attack the capital. Alarmed by this danger, they despatched several troops of horse, with the greater part of their Lacedæmonian mercenaries, who encamped in a woody country, at the distance of fifteen furlongs from Phyla, in order to watch the motions and repress the incursions of the enemy. But these forces, which had been sent to guard the territory and city from surprise, were themselves surprised by Thrasybulus, who silently marched forth in the night, posted his men amidst the concealed intricacies of the forest, and suddenly attacked the Lacedæmonians before they had time to recollect themselves, or even to stand to their arms. The dread of an ambush probably prevented the wary general from following them to any great distance from the garrison. A hundred and twenty men were slain in the pursuit; a trophy was erected; the baggage and arms were conveyed in triumph to Phyla.⁴

The news of this disaster inspired the Thirty with such terror that they no longer regarded a demolished city like Athens as proper for their residence. They determined to remove to the neighbouring town of Eleusis, which, in case of extremity, seemed more capable of defence. The three thousand, who were entrusted with the use of arms, accompanied them thither, and assisted them in treacherously putting to death all such of the Eleusinians as were thought disaffected to the usurpation. Under pretence of mustering the inhabitants, those unhappy men were singly conducted through a narrow gate leading to the shore, where they were successively disarmed, bound, and executed, by the cruel instruments of tyranny.⁵

Mean while the garrison of Phyla continually received new reinforcements. The orator Lysias, whose domestic sufferings have been recently described, collected three hundred men to take vengeance on the murderers of his brother, and the authors of his own banishment.⁶ These useful supplies encouraged Thrasybulus to attempt surprising the Piræus, the inhabitants of which, consisting chiefly of tradesmen, merchants, and mariners, bore with great impatience and indignation the injuries of a subordinate council of Ten, the obsequious imitators of the Thirty. This enterprise was crowned with success, although the tyrants brought forth their whole force to oppose it. Having intercepted their march to the place, Thrasybulus occupied a rising ground, which gave him a decisive advantage in the engagement.

Before leading his men to action, he animated their valour and resentment, by reminding them, that the enemy on the right consisted of those Lacedæmonians whom only five days be-

¹ Corn. Nepos, et Plut. in Alcibiad.

² His conduct, as will appear hereafter, was not uniform.

³ *Επιχειρήματα της νύκτος χιόνι παμπληθές.* Zenoph. p. 471.

⁴ Xenoph. p. 471

⁵ *Id. ibid.*

⁶ Justin. l. v. c. ix. The compiler, with his usual inaccuracy, says Lysias Syracusanus orator.

fore they had shamefully routed and put to flight; that the troops on the left were commanded by the Thirty tyrants, who had unjustly driven them into banishment, confiscated their property, and murdered their dearest friends. "But the gods have finally given us the opportunity (long ardently desired) to face our oppressors with arms in our hands, and to take vengeance on their multiplied wickedness and cruelty. When they invested us at Phyla, the gods, consulting our safety, ruffled the serenity of the sky with an unexpected tempest. The assistance of Heaven enabled us, with a handful of men, to raise a trophy over our numerous foes; and the same divine Providence still favours us with the most manifest marks of partiality. The enemy are drawn up in a deep and close array; they must be obliged to ascend the eminence; the javelins of their rear cannot reach beyond their van; while, from the reverse of these circumstances, no weapon of ours needs be discharged in vain. Let us avail ourselves, therefore, of an arrangement evidently produced by the favour of Heaven; each soldier remembering, that he never can achieve a more honourable victory, or obtain a more glorious tomb."⁷

The revered authority of the priest enforced the exhortation of the general. He promised them complete success, provided they forbore to charge till one of their men were killed or wounded: "Then," added he, "I will conduct you on to victory, though I myself shall fall." He had scarcely ended, when the enemy threw their javelins; upon which, as if guided by a divine impulse, he rushed forward to the attack. Both parts of his prediction were accomplished. The battle was neither long nor bloody; but Critias and Hippomachus, the two most violent of the tyrants, were left among the slain. Thrasybulus judiciously avoided to pursue the scattered fugitives, who being superior in number, might still rally and renew the battle, if he quitted the advantage of the ground. But having proceeded to the foot of the hill, he stopped the ardour of his troops, and commanded the herald Cleocritus to proclaim with a loud voice, "Wherefore, Athenians! would you fly from your countrymen? Wherefore have you driven them from the city? Why do you thirst for their blood? We are all united by religious, civil, and domestic ties. Often, with combined arms, have we fought by sea and land, to defend our common country and common freedom. Even in this unnatural civil war, excited and fomented by the ambition of impious and abominable tyrants, who have shed more blood in eight months, than the Peloponnesians, our public enemies, in ten years, we have lamented your misfortunes as much as our own; nor is there a man whom you have left on the field of battle, whose death does not excite our sympathy, and increase our affliction." The tyrants, dreading the effect of a proclamation well calculated to sow the seeds of disaffection, led off their troops with great precipitation; and Thrasybulus, without stripping the dead, marched to the Piræus.⁸

Next day the Thirty, shamefully discomfited in the engagement, and deprived of Critias, their furious but intrepid leader, took their melancholy seats in council with strong indications of expected ruin. Their unfortunate subjects accused their commanders, and each other; a new sedition arose; nor was the ferment allayed, until the tyrants had been deprived of their dignity, and ten magistrates (one elected from each tribe) appointed in their room.⁹ The surviving tyrants, with those who were too closely united with them in guilt, not to be united in interest, fled to Eleusis.

It might be expected that the decemvirs, who now assumed the government, should have been deterred from injustice by the fatal example of their predecessors. But in the turbulent republics of Greece, however free in theory, men were little acquainted with the benefits of practical liberty. Whether the nobles, or people, or a prevailing faction of either; whether party in the state obtained the chief administration, their authority was almost alike oppressive and tyrannical. Alternately masters and slaves, those fierce republicans were either unable or unwilling to draw that decisive and impervious line between the power of government, and the liberty of the subject; a line which forms the only solid barrier of a uniform, consistent, and rational freedom.

The Ten had no sooner been invested with the ensigns of command, than they showed an equal inclination with the Thirty to obey the Lacedæmonians, and to tyrannise over their fellow-citizens.¹⁰ After various skirmishes, which happened in the course of two weeks, and generally proved honourable to the bravery and conduct of Thrasybulus, the tyrants both in Eleusis and in Athens despatched messengers to solicit farther assistance from Sparta and Lysander. That active and enterprising leader employed his usual diligence to protect the government which he had established. At the head of a powerful body of mercenaries, he marched to the Piræus, which he invested by land; while his brother Libys, who commanded a considerable squadron, blocked up the harbour.¹¹

These vigorous exertions restored the hopes and courage of the tyrants; nor can it be doubted that Thrasybulus and his followers must have speedily been compelled to surrender, had the Spartan commanders been allowed to act without control. But the proud arrogance of Lysander, and the rapacious avarice of his dependents, provoked the indignation and resentment of whatever was most respectable in his country. The kings, magistrates, and senate, conspired to humble his ambition; and, lest he should enjoy the glory of conquering Athens a second time, Pausanias, the most popular and beloved of the Spartan princes, hastily levied the domestic troops, and a considerable body of Peloponnesian allies, and marching through the Isthmus of Corinth encamped in the neighbourhood of Athens; little solicitous to increase the dissensions in that city, provided he could anticipate and thwart the measures of Lysander.

⁷ Xenoph. p. 473. et Diodor. l. xiv. p. 414.

⁸ Xenoph. p. 474.

⁹ Ibid. et Isocrat. ii. p. 426.

¹⁰ Lysias advers. Eratosth. p. 212, et seq.

¹¹ Xenoph. p. 476. et Diodor. ubi. supra.

Olymp.
xciv 2.

A. C. 403.

While the two Lacedæmonian armies discovered, in the distance of their encampments, a disunion of their views and interests, an incident happened which determined Pausanias to undertake the protection of Thrasybulus and his adherents; a resolution to which he was naturally inclined from opposition to an envied and odious rival. Diognotus, an Athenian of an amiable and respectable character, brought him the children of Niceratus and Eucrates; the former the son, the latter the brother, of the great Nicias, with whom the Spartan king was connected by the hereditary ties of hospitality and friendship. Having placed the helpless infants on his knees, he conjured him, by his religious regard for the memory of their much-respected ancestor, to pity their innocence and weakness, and to defend them against the cruel tyranny of a worthless faction, ambitious to cut off and destroy whatever was distinguished by birth, wealth, or virtue.¹ This affecting scene, had it failed to touch the heart of Pausanias, must at least have afforded him a plausible pretence for embracing the party of Thrasybulus, which numbered among its adherents the friends and family of Nicias, who had long been suspected of an undue attachment to the Spartan interest.

Before he could fully persuade the enemy of his favourable intentions, several bloody skirmishes were fought, in which the partisans of democracy defended the Piræus with unequal force, but with uncommon resolution.² At length Pausanias made them understand, that, instead of destroying their persons, he wished to protect their liberties. In Athens his emissaries made known this unexpected revolution, which excited a numerous party to throw off the yoke of the tyrants, and to desire a reconciliation with their fellow citizens in the Piræus. The deputies were favourably received by the Spartan king, and sent, under his protection, to propose overtures of accommodation to the ephori and senate. The messengers of Lysander and the tyrants endeavoured to traverse this negotiation; but notwithstanding *their* opposition, the Spartans appointed fifteen commissioners, who, in conjunction with Pausanias, were empowered to settle the affairs of Athens.³

With the approbation, or rather by the command, of those ministers, the Athenian factions ceased from hostility; the tyrants were divested of their power; the foreign garrison was withdrawn; and the popular government re-established. This important revolution was remarkable for its singular mildness. The authors and instruments of the most oppressive usurpation recorded in the annals of any people, were allowed to retire in safety to Eleusis. Thrasybulus conducted a military procession to the temple of Minerva in the citadel, where the acknowledgments of thanks and sacrifice were offered to that protecting divinity, who had restored the virtuous exiles to their country, and healed the divisions of the state. The citizens

who had been banished, and those who had driven them into banishment, joined in this solemn exercise of religious duty; after which, convening in full assembly, they were addressed by Thrasybulus in these memorable words;

"The experience of your past transactions may enable you, men of Athens! to know each other, and to know yourselves. On what pretence could you, who drove us from the city, abet a tyrannical faction? Why would you have enslaved your fellow citizens? On what superiority of merit could you found your claim of dominion? Is it that you are more honest and virtuous? Yet the people whom you insulted never relieved their poverty by unjust gain; whereas the tyrants whom you served, increased their wealth by the most oppressive rapacity. Is it that you are more brave and warlike? Yet this injured people, alone and unassisted, and almost unarmed, have overcome your superior numbers, reinforced by the Lacedæmonian garrison, the powerful succours of Pausanias, and the experienced mercenaries of Lysander. As you must yield the prize both of probity and of prowess, so neither can you claim the honour of superior prudence and sagacity. You have been not only conquered in war, but overcome in negotiation, by the people whom you despised; to whom your Lacedæmonian masters have delivered you, like biting curs,⁴ bound and muzzled, to be justly punished for your unprovoked insolence and audacity. But as to you, my fellow sufferers and fellow exiles! you, who shared the hardships of my banishment, and who now share the triumph of my victorious return, I exhort you to forgive and forget our common injuries. Let the dignity of your sentiments adorn the splendour of your actions. Prove yourselves superior to your enemies, not only in valour but in clemency, that moderation may produce concord, and concord strength."

The effect of this generous enthusiasm, excited and diffused by Thrasybulus, appeared in a very extraordinary resolution of the assembly. During the usurpation of the Thirty, a hundred talents had been borrowed from the Lacedæmonians, to support the rigorous cruelty of a government which had banished five thousand,⁵ and put to death, untried, fifteen hundred citizens. The repayment of this sum was not to be expected from the people at large, against whose interest and safety it had been so notoriously employed. Yet the Athenians unanimously resolved, on this occasion, that the money should be charged indiscriminately on them all.⁶ This unexampled generosity might have encouraged even the enfeebled party of the tyrants to return from Eleusis. But they were too sensible of their guilt to expect forgiveness or impunity. Having fortified their insecure residence, in the best manner that their circumstances could permit, they began to prepare arms; to collect mercenaries; and to try, anew, the fortune of war. But their unequal

¹ Lysias adv. Polluchum, p. 323. and the translation of Lysias, p. 231.

² Xenoph. Diodor. Lysias, ubi supra.

³ Xenoph. p. 478.

⁴ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς δακνύοντας κύνας δησμένους πρὸς δόξασι. Xenoph. Hellen. ii. sub fin. In their comparisons the ancients, it is well known, regarded justness more than dignity.

⁵ Isocrat. in Areopag. p. 345. says upwards of five hundred. Diodorus says the one-half of the citizens.

⁶ Isocrates, ibid. et p. 495. of the translation.

hostility, the effect of rage and despair, was easily defeated by the vigour of the new republic. The most obnoxious leaders sealed, with their blood, the safety of their adherents, who submitted to the clemency of Thrasybulus. That fortunate and magnanimous commander generously undertook their cause, and obtained a decree of the people for restoring them to the city, for reinstating them in their fortunes and privileges, and for burying in oblivion the memory of their past offences.⁷ The assembly even ratified, by oath, this act of amnesty, of which both the idea and the name have been adopted by most civilized nations, and extolled

by all historians, ancient and modern; who, dazzled by the splendour of a transaction so honourable to Thrasybulus and to Athens, have universally forgot to mention, that the conditions of the amnesty were not faithfully observed. Yet there is the fullest evidence to prove,⁸ that, when the tyrants were no more, the abettors of their usurpation were accused, convicted, and punished, for crimes of which they had been promised indemnity by a solemn oath. So true it is, that the Athenians had wisdom to discern, but wanted constancy to practise, the lessons of sound policy, or even the rules of justice.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Accusation of Socrates—Artifices of his Accusers—His Defence—Condemnation—Address to the Judges—His Conversation in Prison—and Death—Transient Persecution of his Disciples—Writings of Cebes—Æschines—State of Philosophy—Of the Fine Arts—Of Literature—Herodotus—Thucydides—Xenophon—Transition to the public Transactions of Greece—The Spartans invade Elis—The Messenians driven from Greece—History of Cyrene—Of Sicily—War with Carthage—Siege of Agrigentum—Reign of Dionysius—Sicily the first Province of Rome.

IT were well for the honour of Athens, if none but the cruel abettors of an aristocratical faction had experienced the unjust rigour of its tribunals. But among the first memorable transactions, after the re-
Olymp. xcv. 1. establishment of democracy, hap-
A. C. 400. pened the trial and condemnation of Socrates; a man guiltless of every offence but that of disgracing, by his illustrious merit, the vices and follies of his contemporaries. His death sealed the inimitable virtues of his useful and honourable life; it seemed to be bestowed as a favour, not inflicted as a punishment; since, had Socrates, who had already passed his seventieth year, yielded to the decays of nature, his fame would have descended less splendid, certainly more doubtful, to posterity.

The remote cause of his prosecution was the ludicrous farce of Aristophanes, entitled the Clouds; to which we had occasion formerly to allude. In this infamous performance, Socrates is introduced denying the religion of his coun-

try, corrupting the morals of his disciples, and professing the odious arts of sophistry and chicanery. The envy of a licentious populace, which ever attends virtue too independent to court, and too sincere to flatter them, gradually envenomed the shafts of the poet, and malignantly insinuated that the pretended sage was really such a person as the petulance of Aristophanes had described him. The calumny was greedily received, and its virulence imbibed by the craft of designing priests and ambiguous demagogues, as well as by the resentment of bad poets and vain sophists, whose pretended excellences the discernment of Socrates had unmasked, and whose irritable temper his sincerity had grievously offended.⁹ From such a powerful combination it seems extraordinary that Socrates should have lived so long, especially since, during the democracy, he never disguised his contempt for the capricious levity, injustice, and cruelty of the multitude, and during the usurpation of the Thirty openly arraigned the vices, and defied the authority of those odious tyrants. His long escape he himself ascribed to his total want of ambition. Had he intermeddled in public affairs, and endeavoured, by arming himself with authority, to withstand the corruptions of the times, his more formidable opposition would have exposed him to an earlier fate.¹⁰ Notwithstanding his

⁷ Among these offences were reckoned the arbitrary laws enacted during their usurpation. All these laws were annulled, and those of Solon, Clisthenes, Pericles, &c. re-established. It appears that the Athenians embraced the same opportunity of examining their ancient laws, abolishing such as no longer suited the condition of the times, and enacting some new ones. Andocid. Orat. i. de Myst. p. 212. et Demost. adv. Timocrat. p. 469. The year in which the democracy was restored, or, in other words, the archonship of Euclides, was regarded, therefore, as an important era in Athenian jurisprudence. The only material alterations on record consist, 1. In the law confining the right of voting in the assembly to those born of Athenian mothers. Formerly it sufficed that the father was a citizen, the condition of the mother not being regarded. Athenæus, xiii. p. 285. et Mark. in Vit. Lysie, p. 55. 2. In the law of Demophantus, requiring the citizens to take an oath that no personal danger should prevent them from doing their utmost to deliver their country from tyrants. Vid. Lycurg. adv. Leocr. p. 180. et Andoc. de Myst. p. 220.

⁸ See Lysias's Orations against Agoratus and Eratosthenes, from p. 233. to p. 280.

⁹ The causes of his persecution, which are hinted at in Xenophon's Apology for Socrates, are more fully explained in that written by Plato. Vid. Plat. Apolog. Socrat. sect. vi. From these two admirable treatises of practical morality, together with the first chapter of Xenophon's Memorabilia, and Plato's Phædo, the narrative in the text is principally extracted.

¹⁰ The memorable words of Socrates will for ever brand the stern unfeeling spirit of democracy. Εὐ γὰρ ἵσται ὁ ἀνδρὶς Ἀθηναῖος, εἰ ἴγῃ παλαιοὶ ἐπὶ χεῖρσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ πολιτικά πρᾶγματα, παλαιοὶ μὲν ἀπολλύμενοι, καὶ οὗτοι ἐν ὑμῶς ὀφεί-

private station, it seems still to have appeared remarkable to his disciples, that amidst the litigious turbulence of democracy, his invidious fame and merit should have escaped persecution during a long life of seventy years.

When his enemies finally determined to raise an accusation against him, it required uncommon address to give their malignant calumnies the appearance of probability. Socrates conversed in public with every description of men, in all places, and on all occasions. His opinions were as well known as his person, and ever uniform and consistent; he taught no secret doctrines; admitted no private auditors; his lessons were open to all; and that they were gratuitous, his poverty, compared with the exorbitant wealth of the sophists who accused him, furnished abundant proof. To balance these stubborn circumstances, his enemies confided in the hatred of the jury and judges, composed of the meanest populace, and the perjury of false witnesses, which might be purchased at Athens for the small sum of a few drachmas. They trusted, however, not less in the artifices and eloquence of Miletus, Anytus,¹ and Lycon; the first of whom appeared on the part of the priests and poets; the second, on that of the politicians and artists; the third, on that of the rhetoricians and sophists.²

From the nature of an accusation, which principally respected religion, the cause ought to have been regularly tried in the less numerous but more enlightened tribunal of the Areopagus; yet it was immediately carried before the tumultuary assembly, or rather mob of the Heliaea,³ a court, for so it was called, consisting of five hundred persons, most of whom were liable, by their education and way of life, to be seduced by eloquence, intimidated by authority, and corrupted by every species of undue influence.

In a degenerate age and nation, few virtuous or able men ever acquired popularity merely by their virtues or abilities. In such a nation, should a person, otherwise estimable, be unfor-

ληκεῖν οὐδὲν οὐτὶς οὐκ ἐμνοῦνται· καὶ τοὶ μὴ ἀχθεσθὲ λέγοντι τ' ἀληθῆ, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οὐτὶς σωθῆσθαι, οὐτὶς οὐκ οὐδὲν πλεονεκτησάμενος ἐναντιούμενος, καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ πτανομὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ ἀντὶ καίον ἔστι τῶντι μαχόμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ ἐμὲ μάλιστα ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθῆσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἐμνοῦνται. Plut. Apolog. Socrat. c. xiii. "You well know, Athenians! that had I formerly intermeddled in public affairs I should formerly have perished, without benefiting either you or myself. Be not offended; but it is impossible that he should live long who arraigns and manfully opposes the injustice and licentiousness of you, Athenians! or of any other multitude. A champion for virtue, if he would survive but a few years, must lead a private life, and not interfere in politics."

¹ Some personal reasons are glanced at why Miletus and Anytus stepped forth as accusers. Vid. Andocid. Orat. i. et Xenoph. Apol. Socrat. Libanius has swelled to a long story, and strangely disfigured the hint of Xenophon. Apol. Soc. p. 642, et seq.

² Plato Apol. Soc. c. x.

³ This appears from innumerable circumstances, some of which are mentioned below, though Meursius, in his Treatise on the Areopagus (vid. Gronov. Thesaur. vol. 5,) maintains that Socrates was tried in that court; an opinion which has been generally followed, but which the slightest attention to the works of the Athenian orators is sufficient to disprove. Vid. Isoc. Orat. Areopag. Lysias adv. Andocid. p. 108. et Andocid. Orat. i. p. 215. The oath to which Socrates alludes in Xenophon's Apology, c. iv. can only apply to the Heliaea. It is recited at length by Demosthenes, Orat. cont. Timocrat.

tunately cursed with ambition, he must endeavour to gratify it at the expense of his feelings and his principles, and can attain general favour only in proportion as he ceases to deserve it. Uncomplying integrity will meet with derision; and wisdom, disdaining artifice, will grovel in obscurity, while those alone will reach fame, or fortune, or honour, who, though endowed with talents just beyond mediocrity, condescend to flatter the prejudices, imitate the manners, gratify the pride, or adopt the resentments, of an insolent populace.

The superior mind of Socrates was incapable of such mean compliances. When called to make his defence, he honestly acknowledged that he himself was much affected by the persuasive eloquence of his adversaries, though, in truth, if he might use the expression, they had said nothing to the purpose.⁴ He then observed, that the fond partiality of his friend Chærephon, having asked the Delphic oracle, whether any man was wiser than Socrates?—the oracle replied, that Socrates was the wisest of men. In order to justify the answer of that god, whose veracity they all acknowledged, he had conversed with every distinction of persons, most eminent in the republic; and finding that they universally pretended to know many things of which they were ignorant, he began to suspect, that in this circumstance he excelled them, since he pretended to no sort of knowledge of which he was not really master. What he did know, he freely communicated, striving, to the utmost, to render his fellow citizens more virtuous and more happy; an employment to which he believed himself called by the god, "whose authority I respect, Athenians! still more than yours."

The judges were seized with indignation at this firm language from a man capitally accused, from whom they expected, that according to the usual practice, he would have brought his wife and children to intercede for him by their tears,⁵ or even have employed the elaborate discourse which his friend Lysias, the orator, had composed for his defence; a discourse alike fitted to detect calumny, and to excite compassion. But Socrates, who considered it as a far greater misfortune to commit, than to suffer an injustice, declared, that he thought it unbecoming his fame, and unworthy his character, to employ any other defence than that of an innocent and useful life. Whether to incur the penalties of the delinquency with which he was falsely charged ought to be regarded as an evil, the gods alone knew. For his part he imagined that he should have no reason for sorrow at being delivered from the inconveniences of old age, which were ready to overtake him, and at being commanded to quit life⁶ while his mind,

⁴ The simplicity of the original is inimitable—Καὶ τοὶ ἀληθῆς γὰρ, ὡς εἶπες εἰπὼν, οὐδὲν εἰρηκασί. Plut. Apol.

⁵ These circumstances, which are mentioned both by Xenophon and Plato, prove that Socrates was tried before a popular tribunal. It is well known that the Areopagus rigorously proscribed all such undue methods of biasing the judgment and seducing the passions. Vid. Demosth. in Nesp. et Aristocrat. Æschin. in Timarch. Lucian. Hermotim. et Isocrat. Areopag.

⁶ Xenophon says, that he writes Socrates' Defence, after so many others, who had already executed that task with

still active and vigorous, was likely to leave behind him the most agreeable impression in the remembrance of his friends.

The firm magnanimity of Socrates could not alter the resolution of his judges; yet such is the ascendancy of virtue over the worst of minds, that he was found guilty by a majority of only three voices.⁷ The court then commanded him, agreeably to a principle which betrays the true spirit of democratical tyranny, to pass sentence of condemnation on himself, and to name the punishment which ought to be inflicted on him. The punishment, said Socrates, which I deserve for having spent my whole life in endeavouring to render my fellow citizens wiser and better, and particularly in striving to inspire the Athenian youth with the love of justice and temperance, is "To be maintained, during the remainder of my life, in the Prytæneum; an honour due to me, rather than to the victors in the Olympic games, since as far as depended on me, I have made my countrymen more happy *in reality*; they only in *appearance*." Provoked by this observation, by which they ought to have been confounded, the judges proceeded to pass sentence, and condemned Socrates to drink hemlock.⁸

This atrocious injustice excited the indignation of his numerous friends and disciples, most of whom had accompanied him to the court; but it awakened no other passion in the illustrious sage than that of pity for the blind prejudices of the Athenians. He then addressed that part of the court who had been favourable to him, or rather to themselves, since they had avoided the misfortune of passing an unjust sentence, which would have disgraced and imbittered the latest moment of their lives. "He considered them as friends with whom he would willingly converse for a moment, upon the event which had happened to him, before he was summoned to death. From the commencement of the prosecution, an unusual circumstance, he observed, had attended all his words and actions, and every step which he had taken in the whole course of his trial. The dæmon, who on ordinary occasions had ever been so watchful to restrain him, when he prepared to say or do any thing improper or hurtful, had never once withheld him, during the whole progress of this affair, from following the bent of his own inclination. For this reason he was apt to suspect that the fate which the court had decreed him, although they meant it for an evil, was to him a real good. If to die was only to change the scene, must it not be an advantage to remove from these pretended judges to Minos, Rhadamanthus, and other real judges, who, through their love of justice, had been exalted by the divinity to this important function of government? What delight to live and converse with the immortal heroes and poets of antiquity! It becomes you also, my friends! to be of good comfort with regard to death, since no evil, in life or death, can befall virtuous men, whose true interest is ever the concern of heaven. For

my part I am persuaded that it is better for me to die than to live, and therefore am not offended with my judges. I entreat you all to behave towards my sons, when they attain the years of reason, as I have done to you, not ceasing to blame and accuse them, when they prefer wealth or pleasure, or any other frivolous object, to the inestimable worth of virtue. If they think highly of their own merit, while in fact it is of little value, reproach them severely, Athenians! as I have done you. By so doing you will behave justly to me and to my sons. It is now time for us to part. I go to die, you to live; but which is best, none but the divinity knows."⁹

It is not wonderful that the disciples of Socrates should have believed the events of his extraordinary life, and especially its concluding scene, to be regulated by the interposition of a particular providence.¹⁰ Every circumstance conspired to evince his unalterable firmness, and display his inimitable virtue. It happened, before the day of his trial, that the high-priest had crowned the stern of the vessel, which was annually sent to Delos, to commemorate by grateful acknowledgments to Apollo, the triumphant return of Theseus from Crete, and the happy deliverance of Athens from a disgraceful tribute.¹¹ This ceremony announced the commencement of the festival, which ended with the return of the vessel; and, during the intervening time, which was consecrated to the honour of Apollo, it was not lawful to inflict any capital punishment. Contrary winds protracted the ceremony thirty days, during which Socrates lay in prison, and in fetters. His friends daily visited him, repairing, at the dawn, to the prison gate, and impatiently waiting till it opened. Their conversation turned on the same subjects which had formerly occupied them; but afforded not that pure unmixed pleasure which they usually derived from the company of Socrates. It occasioned, however, nothing of that gloom which is naturally excited by the presence of a friend under sentence of death. They felt a certain pleasing melancholy, a mixed sensation of sorrow and delight, for which no language has assigned a name.¹²

When the fatal vessel arrived in the harbour of Sunium, and was hourly expected in the Piræus, Crito, the most confidential of the

⁹ Plato Apol. sub fin.

¹⁰ According to Plato nothing happened in this transaction *ανευ θείας μοίρας*. Plat. Apol. Yet in the Phædo. sub. init. he says, *τυχὴ τις αὐτῷ, ὡς ἐλκεῖται*! συνιᾶν. But *τυχὴ* here refers not to the cause, but to the effect; not to blind chance, but to an unaccountable disposition of events produced by a particular interposition of the divinity. In this sense the word is used not only by philosophers but orators, particularly Demosthenes, as we shall see below.

¹¹ See p. 18.

¹² This is admirably described by Plato: *Ἄλλα πῶς ὁ σὸς πόνος τὸν μὲν παῖδα παρὲν, καὶ τὴν ἀγῆς κεραιὴν—ἀπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκινησμένη οὐκ αὖτις λυγρῆς*. The following circumstances are inimitable: *Καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχιδόν τι οὕτω δεικνύμεθα, ὥστε μὴ γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρυρροεῖς εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν διαφθερόντως Ἀπολλωνόδερος οἰσθῆναι γὰρ τὸν ἀνδρα καὶ τὸν τροχὸν αὐτοῦ*. Phædo. viii. c. ii. Socrates alone felt none of these sensations; but as Montaigne, who had seized his true character, says, *Et qui ne reconnoisse en luy, non seulement de la fermeté et de la constance (c'étoit son assiette ordinaire quo celle là) mais je ne scay quel contentement nouveau et une allegresse enjouée en ses propos et façons dernières*.

sufficient skill and fidelity, in order to illustrate one point much insisted on by Socrates, "That it was better for him to die than to live." Xenoph. Apol. sub init.

⁷ Plato Apol.

⁸ Ibid.

disciples of Socrates,¹ first brought the melancholly intelligence; and, moved by the near danger of his admired friend, ventured to propose a clandestine escape, showing him at the same time that he had collected a sufficient sum of money to corrupt the fidelity of his keepers. This unmanly proposal, which nothing but the undistinguishing ardour of friendship could excuse, Socrates answered in a vein of pleasantry, which showed the perfect freedom of his mind, "In what country, O Crito! can I escape death? where shall I fly to elude this irrevocable doom, passed on all human kind?" To Apollodorus, a man of no great depth of understanding, but his affectionate and zealous admirer, who said, "That what grieved him beyond measure was, that such a man should perish unjustly," he replied, stroking the head of his friend, "And would you be less grieved, O Apollodorus! were I deserving of death?"² When his friends, and Crito especially, insisted, "That it would be no less ungenerous than imprudent, in compliance with the hasty resolution of a malignant or misguided multitude, to render his wife a widow, his children orphans, his disciples for ever miserable and forlorn, and conjured him, by every thing sacred, to save a life so inestimably precious;" Socrates assumed a tone more serious, recalled the maxims which he professed, and the doctrines which he had ever inculcated, "That how unjustly soever we were treated, it could never be our interest to practice injustice; much less to retort the injuries of our parents or our country; and to teach, by our example, disobedience to the laws." The strength of his arguments, and still more, the unalterable firmness and cheerful serenity that appeared in his looks, words, and actions,³ silenced the struggling emotions of his disciples. The dignity of virtue elevated their souls; they parted with tears of inexpressible admiration, and with a firm purpose to see their master earlier than usual on the fatal morning.

Having arrived at the prison-gate, they were desired to wait without, because the Eleven (so the delicacy of Athens styled the executioners of public justice) unloosed the fetters of Socrates, and announced to him his death before the setting of the sun. They had not waited long, when they were desired to enter. They found Socrates just relieved from the weight of his bonds, attended by his wife Xantippé, who bore in her arms his infant son. At their appearance, she exclaimed, "Alas! Socrates, here come your friends, whom you for the last time behold, and who for the last time behold you!" Socrates, looking at Crito, desired some one to conduct her home. She departed, beating her breast, and lamenting with that clamorous sorrow natural to her sex⁴ and her character.

Socrates, mean while, reclining on the couch with his usual composure, drew his leg towards him, and gently rubbing the part which had

been galled by the fetters, remarked the wonderful connection between what men call pleasure, and its opposite, pain. The one sensation, he observed (as just happened to his leg after being delivered from the smart of the iron,) was generally followed by the other. Neither of them could long exist apart; they are seldom pure and unmixed; and whoever feels the one, may be sure that he will soon feel the other. "I think, that had Æsop the fabulist made this reflection, he would have said, that the divinity, desirous to reconcile these opposite natures, but finding the design impracticable, had at least joined their summits; for which reason pleasure has ever since dragged pain after it, and pain pleasure."

The mention of Æsop recalled to Cebes, the Theban, a conversation which he had recently had with Euenus of Paros, a celebrated elegiac poet, then resident in Athens.⁵ The poet asked Cebes, "Why his master, who had never before addicted himself to poetry, should since his confinement have written a hymn to Apollo, and turned into verse several of Æsop's fables?" The Theban seized the present opportunity to satisfy himself in this particular, and to acquire such information as might satisfy Euenus, who, he assured Socrates, would certainly repeat his question. The illustrious sage, whose inimitable virtues were all tinged, or rather brightened, by enthusiasm, desired Cebes to tell Euenus, "That it was not with a view to rival him, or with a hope to excel his poetry (for that, he knew, would not be easy,) that he had begun late in life this new pursuit. He had attempted it in compliance with a divine mandate, which frequently commanded him in dreams to cultivate music. He had, therefore, first applied to philosophy, thinking that the greatest music; but since he was under sentence of death, he judged it safest to try likewise the popular music, lest any thing should on his part be omitted, which the gods had enjoined him. For this reason, he had composed a hymn to Apollo, whose festival was now celebrating; and not being himself a mythologist, had versified such fables of Æsop as happened most readily to occur to his memory. Tell this to Euenus—bid him farewell; and farther, that if he is wise, he will follow me; for I depart, as it is likely, to-day; so the Athenians have ordered it."

The last words introduced an important conversation concerning suicide, and the immortality of the soul. Socrates maintained, that though it was better for a wise man to die than to live, because there was reason to believe that he would be happier in a future than in the present state of existence, yet it could never be allowable for him to perish by his own hand, or even to lay down life without a sufficient motive, such as that which influenced himself, a respectful submission to the laws of his country. This interesting discussion consumed the greatest part of the day. Socrates encouraged his disciples not to spare his opinions from delicacy to his present situation. Those who were of his mind he exhorted to

¹ Finding Socrates in a profound sleep, he reposed himself by his side till he awoke. Plat. *ibid.*

² Xenoph. et Plat. *ibid.*

³ Καὶ ῥήματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ βυδίσματα φειδῶς. Xenoph. *Apol.*

⁴ Βοήσαντες καὶ κοπτομένης and a little above, "οἱ αἰσθηταὶ αἱ γυναικες." Phædo, sect. iii.

⁵ The following narrative, to the death of Socrates, is entirely borrowed from the Phædo, to which it is therefore unnecessary at every moment to refer.

persevere. Entwining his hand in the long hair of Phædo, "These beautiful locks, my dear Phædo, you will this day cut off;⁵ but were I in your place, I would not again allow them to grow, but make a vow (as the Argives did in a matter of infinitely less moment) never to resume the wonted ornament of my beauty, until I had confirmed the doctrine of the soul's immortality."

The argument of Socrates convinced and consoled his disciples, as they have often done the learned and virtuous in succeeding times. "Those who had adorned their minds with temperance, justice, and fortitude, and had despised the vain ornaments and vain pleasures of the body, could never regret their separation from this terrestrial companion. And now," continued he, in the language of tragedy, "the destined hour summons me to death; it is almost time to bathe, and surely it will be better that I myself, before I drink the poison, should perform this ceremony, than occasion unnecessary trouble to the women after I am dead." "So let it be," said Crito; "but first inform us, Socrates, in what we can do you pleasure, respecting your children, or any other concern." "Nothing new, O Crito! but what I have always told you. By consulting your own happiness, you will act the best part with regard to my children, to me, and to all mankind; although you bind not yourselves by any new promise. But if you forsake the rules of virtue, which we have just endeavoured to explain, you will benefit neither my children, nor any with whom you live, although you should now swear to the contrary." Crito then asked him, "How he chose to be buried?" "As you please, provided I don't escape you." Saying this, he smiled, adding, that as to his *body*, they might bury it as seemed most decent, and most suitable to the laws of his country.

He then retired into the adjoining chamber, accompanied only by Crito; the rest remained behind, like children mourning a father. When he had bathed and dressed, his sons (one grown up, and two children,) together with his female relations,⁶ were admitted to him. He conversed with them in the presence of Crito, and then returned to his disciples near sun-set, for he tarried long within. Before he had time to begin any new subject, the keeper of the prison entered, and standing near Socrates, "I cannot," said he, "accuse you, O Socrates! of the rage and execrations too often vented against me by those here confined, to whom, by command of the magistrates, I announce that it is time to drink the poison. Your fortitude, mildness, and generosity, exceed all that I have ever witnessed; even now I know you pardon me, since I act by compulsion; and as you are acquainted with the purport of my message,

farewell, and bear your fate with as much patience as possible." At these words the executioner, hardened as he was in scenes of death, dissolved in tears, and turning from Socrates, went out. The latter following him with his eye, replied, "And you also, farewell; as to me, I shall obey your instructions." Then looking at his disciples, "How truly polite," said he, "is *the man*!" During my confinement, he often visited and conversed with me; and now, how generously does he lament my death! But let the poison be brought, that we may obey his orders."

Crito then said, "Still, O Socrates! there is time; the sun still brightens the tops of the mountains. Many have I known, who have drank the poison late in the night, after a luxurious supper and generous wines, and lastly, after enjoying the embraces of those with whom they were enamoured.⁸ But hasten not; it is yet time." "With good reason," said Socrates, these persons did what you say, because they believed thereby to be gainers; and with good reason I shall act otherwise, because I am convinced that I should gain nothing but ridicule by an over-anxious solicitude for life, when it is just ready to leave me." Crito then made a sign to the boy who waited; he went, ground the hemlock, and returned with him who was to administer it. Socrates perceiving his arrival, "Tell me," said he, "for you are experienced in such matters, what have I to do?" Nothing further than to walk in the apartment till your limbs feel heavy; then repose yourself on the couch." Socrates then taking the cup in his hand, and looking at him with ineffable serenity, "Say, as to this beverage, is it lawful to employ any part of it in libation?" The other replied, "There is no more than what is proper to drink." "But it is proper," rejoined Socrates, "and necessary, if we would perform our duty, to pray the gods that our passage hence may be fortunate." So saying, he was silent for a moment, and then drank the poison with an unaltered countenance. Mingling gentleness with authority, he stilled the noisy lamentations of his friends, saying, that in order to avoid such unmanly complaints, he had before dismissed the women. As the poison began to gain his vitals, he uncovered his face, and said to Crito, "We owe a cock to Æsculapius; sacrifice it, and neglect it not." Crito asked, if he had any thing further to command? But he made no reply. A little after, he was in agony—Crito shut his eyes. Thus died Socrates; whom, his disciples declared, they could never cease to remember, nor remembering, cease to admire. "If any man," says Xenophon inimitably, "if any man, a lover of virtue, ever found a more profitable companion than Socrates, I deem that man the happiest of human kind."⁹

The current of popular passions appears no-

⁵ The ceremony of cutting off the hair at funerals was mentioned above, p. 217, where the transaction of the Argives, alluded to in the text, is related.

⁶ The οἰκίαι γυναῖκες of Plato. This expression seems to have given rise to the absurd fable, that Socrates had two wives, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, and others; and the absurd explication of that irregularity, "that the Athenians, after the pestilence, had allowed polygamy, at least bigamy, to repair the ravages of that dreadful malady."

⁷ Ο ανδραπαρς, the term for the executioner.

⁸ Συγγινόμενους γ' εἰς οὐκον ἢ ἐν τυχεῖσι ἐπιθυμούντες. Phæd. c. xlviii. What an extraordinary picture of Athenian manners!

⁹ Plato speaks with equal feeling, or rather enthusiasm. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ μιμηθῆναι, καὶ αὐτὸν λυγόντα, καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα, ἐμὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ πάντων ἡδιστόν. Phæd. c. ii.

where more uniform than in the history of Athens. The factitious resentment excited against Socrates by such improbable calumnies, as even those who were the readiest to receive and to disseminate, could never seriously believe, extended itself with rapidity to his numerous friends and adherents. But fortunately for the interest of letters and humanity, the endemic contagion was confined within the Athenian frontiers. Plato, Antisthenes, Æschines, Critobulus, and other Athenians, wisely eluded a storm which they had not strength to resist. Some took refuge in Thebes with their fellow-disciples, Simmias, Cebes, and Phædonas; others found protection in Megara from Euclid and Terpsion. This persecution of philosophy, however, was accidental and transient. Mingled sentiments of pity, shame, and resentment, soon gave a new direction to the popular fury, which raged with more destructive, yet far juster cruelty, against the accusers and judges of Socrates.¹ Many were driven into exile; many were put to death; several perished in despair, by their own hands. The illustrious sage was honoured by signal monuments of public admiration;² his fame, like the hardy oak, derived vigour from years;³ and increased from age to age, till the superstition of the Athenians at length worshipped, as a god,⁴ him whom their injustice condemned as a criminal.

The persecution, the death, and the honours of Socrates, all conspired to animate the affection, and to increase the zeal, of his disciples. Their number had been great in his lifetime: it became greater after his death; since those who followed, and those who rejected his doctrines, alike styled themselves Socratic philosophers. His name was thus adopted and profaned by many sects, who, while they differed widely from each other, universally changed, exaggerated, or perverted the tenets of their common master. Among the genuine followers of Socrates, Xenophon, as will appear hereafter, unquestionably merits the first place. Plato comes next, yet separated by a long interval. In the same class may be ranked Cebes the Theban, Æschines, Crito, and Simon, Athenians. The table of Cebes, which has been transmitted to modern times, contains a beautiful and affecting picture of human life, delineated with accuracy of judgment, and illuminated by the splendour of sentiment. Three remaining dialogues of Æschines breathe the same sublime spirit, and abound in irresistible persuasions to virtue: "That happiness is attained, not by gratifying, but by moderating the passions; that he alone is rich and powerful, whose faculties exceed his desires; that virtue is true wisdom, and being attended with the only secure happiness which can be enjoyed in the present life, must, according to the unalterable laws of Providence, be crowned with immortal felicity hereafter."

¹ Plutarch. de Invid. p. 538.

² Statues, altars, even a chapel called Socrateion. Vide Diogen. in Socrat.

³ Crescit occulto, velut arbor, ævo

Fama Marcelli—

HORACE.

⁴ Or rather as a demi-god; but the boundaries were not very accurately ascertained, though that is attempted by Arrian, in Expedit. Alexand. l. iv. p. 86

The remains of Cebes and Æschines, and far more, as will appear in the sequel, the copious writings of Plato and Xenophon, may enable us to discriminate the philosophy of Socrates, from that of the various sects who misrepresented or adulterated his opinions. The establishment of these sects belongs not to the period of history now under our review. But the foundation of their respective tenets, which had been laid in a former age, was confirmed by the philosophers who flourished in the time of Socrates. Of these, the most distinguished were Euclid of Megara, Phædo of Elis, Aristippus of Cyrené, Antisthenes of Athens. The two first restored the captious logic of the sophists; Aristippus embraced their licentious morality. While the schools of Elis and Megara studied to confound the understanding, that of Cyrené laboured to corrupt the heart. Antisthenes set himself to oppose these pernicious sects, deriding the refined subtleties of the sceptics, and disdaining the mean pleasures of the Epicureans.⁵ To prefer the mind to the body, duty to interest, and virtue to pleasure, were the great lessons of Antisthenes. Yet this sublime philosophy he carried to extravagance,⁶ affecting not only to moderate and govern, but to silence and extirpate the passions, and declaring bodily pleasure not only unworthy of pursuit, but a thing carefully to be avoided as the greatest and most dangerous of evils. His rigid severity of life deceived not the penetration of Socrates. The sage could discern, that no small share of spiritual pride lurked under the tattered cloak of Antisthenes.

While philosophy, true or false, thus flourished in Greece, a propitious destiny watched over the imitative arts, which continued, during half A. C. a century of perpetual wars and revolutions, to be cultivated with equal assiduity and success. The most distinguished scholars of Phidias were Alcámenes of Athens, and Agoracritus of the isle of Paros. They contended for the prize of sculpture in their respective statues of Venus; and the Athenians, it is said, too partially decided in favour of their countryman. Agoracritus, unwilling that his work should remain in a city where it had met with so little justice, sold it to the borough of Rhamnus. There it was beheld with admiration, and soon passed for a production of Phidias' himself. The sculptor Cteselaus excelled in heroes. He chose noble subjects, and still farther ennobled them by his art.⁷ His contemporary Patrocles distinguished himself by his statues of Olympic victors, and particularly of celebrated wrestlers.

⁵ I anticipate these names. The scepticism of Pyrrho, as will be explained hereafter, arose from the quibbling sophisms of the schools of Elis and Megara. Epicurus, having adopted and refined the selfish philosophy of Aristippus, had the honour of distinguishing by his name, the Epicurean sect.

⁶ His follower, Diogenes, as will appear in the sequel, pushed this extravagance still further. They both taught in the suburb of Athens called the Cynosarges, from which they and their disciples were called Cynics. In a subsequent part of this work, it will be explained, how the Cynical philosophy gave rise to Stoicism, so called, because Zeno and his followers taught at Athens in the "Stoa pœcile," the painted portico.

⁷ Vid. Suid. et Hesych. voc. Παμπεύς.

⁸ Plin. l. xxxv.

Assisted by Canachus, he made the greatest work mentioned during the period now under our review, thirty-one figures of bronze, representing the respective commanders of the several cities or republics, who, under the conduct of Lysander, obtained the memorable victory of Ægos Potamos. They were erected in the temple of Delphian Apollo, together with the statue of Lysander himself, crowned by Neptune. Inferior artists⁹ were employed to copy the statues of various divinities, dedicated at the same time, and in the same place, by the Lacedæmonian conqueror.

It appears not, however, that, during the Peloponnesian war, any new style was attempted either in sculpture or painting. The artists of that period contented themselves with walking in the footsteps of their great predecessors. The same observation applies to music and poetry; but eloquence, on the contrary, received a new form, and flourishing amidst the tumults of war and the contentions of active life, produced that concise, rapid, and manly character of composition which thenceforth distinguished the Attic writers. The works of Homer, Sophocles, and Pindar, left few laurels to be gained by their successors. It was impossible to excel, it was dangerous to rival them. Great genius was required to start, without disgrace, in a career where such candidates had run. But great genius is rare, and commonly disdains imitation; and the first poetical prizes being already carried off, men who felt the animation and vigour of their own powers, naturally directed them to objects which possessed the charms of novelty, and promised the hope of excellence.

Even in prosaic composition the merit and fame of Herodotus and Democritus¹⁰ (not to mention authors more ancient) opposed very formidable obstacles to the ambition of their successors. In a work no less splendid than important, the father of profane history had deduced the transactions between the Greeks and Barbarians, from the earliest accounts till the conclusion of the Persian war; a work including the history of many centuries, and comprehending the greatest kingdoms and empires of the ancient world. This extensive subject was handled with order and dignity. The episodes were ingeniously interwoven with the principal action. The various parts of the narrative were so skilfully combined, that they mutually reflected light on each other. Geography, manners, religion, laws, and arts, entered into the plan of his work; and it is remarkable that the earliest of historians agrees more nearly, as to the design and form of his undertaking, with the enlightened writers of the present century, than any historical author in the long series of intervening ages.

His language was the picture of his mind;

natural, flowing, persuasive; lofty on great occasions,¹¹ affecting in scenes of distress,¹² perspicuous in narration, animated in description. Yet this admired writer has sometimes inserted reports romantic and incredible. Of many, indeed, of the fables of Herodotus, as ignorance conceited of its knowledge long affected to call them, subsequent experience has proved the reality; modern discoveries and voyages seem purposely directed to vindicate the fame of a writer, whom Cicero¹³ dignifies with the appellation of Prince of Historians. Of other wondrous tales which he relates, his own discernment showed him the futility. Whatever is contrary to the analogy of nature he rejects with scorn. He speaks with contempt of the Ægepodes, and of the one-eyed Arimaspi, and of other ridiculous and absurd fictions which have been adopted, however, by some credulous writers even in the eighteenth century. But Herodotus thought himself bound in duty to relate what he had heard, not always to believe what he related.¹⁴ Having travelled into Egypt and the east, he recounts, with fidelity, the reports current in those remote countries. And his mind being opened and enlarged by an extensive view of men and manners, he had learned to set bounds to his disbelief, as well as to his credulity. Yet it must not be dissembled that the fabulous traditions, in which he too much abounds, give the air of romance to his history. Though forming, comparatively, but a small part of the work, they assume magnitude and importance, when invidiously detached from it.¹⁵ It thus seems as if this most instructive author had written with a view rather to amuse the fancy than to inform the understanding. The lively graces of his diction tend to confirm this supposition. His mode of composition may be regarded as the intermediate shade between epic poetry and history. Neither concise nor vehement, the general character of his style is natural, copious, and flowing;¹⁶ and his manner throughout breathes the softness of Ionia, rather than the active contention of Athens.

11 Longinus cites as an example of the sublime, Herodot. l. vii. c. ix. The whole expedition of Xerxes is written with an elevation becoming the subject.

12 See the affecting story of Adrastus, l. i. c. xxxv.

13 L. ii. de Orator.

14 Εγὼ δὲ οφείλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πιστεύειν γὰρ μὴ οὐ παντάπαστι οφείλω. Herodot. l. vii. c. ccli. p. 433.

15 The reproaches which Juvenal (Satyr. 10.) and Plutarch (in his treatise entitled the Malignity of Herodotus) make to this great historian, are fully answered by Aldus Manutius, Camerarius, and Stephanus. Plutarch, forsooth, was offended that his countrymen made so bad a figure in the history of Herodotus. The criticisms of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a writer of more taste and discernment than Plutarch, does ample justice to the father of history.

16 Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, l. iii. c. ix. distinguishes two kinds of style; the continuous and the periodic. The former flows on without interruption, until the sense is complete. The latter is divided by stops, into due proportions of duration, which are easily felt by the ear, and measured by the mind. The former style is tiresome, because in every thing men delight to see the end; even racers, when they pass the goal, are quickly out of breath. Herodotus is the most remarkable instance of the continuous style. In his time scarcely any other was in use; but it is now entirely laid aside. So far Aristotle, who seems rather unjust to Herodotus, since many parts of his work are sufficiently adorned by periods, although the loose style in general prevails. But the partiality of his countryman Dionysius completely avenges the wrongs of Herodotus.

9 See their names in Pausan. l. x. p. 625, et seq.

10 Itaque video visum esse nonnullis Platonis et Democriti locutionem, etsi absit a versu, tamen quod incitatus feratur, et clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius poema putandum, quam comicorum poetarum. Cicero ad M. Brutum Orator, c. xx. See also de Orator. l. i. c. xi. It is impossible to read Lucretius, without fancying, if we recollect Cicero's criticisms on Democritus, that we are perusing the long lost works of that great philosopher.

In this light Herodotus appeared to the Athenians in the age immediately succeeding his own. At the Olympic games he had read his work with universal applause. Thucydides, then a youth, wept mixed tears of wonder and emulation.¹ His father was complimented on the generous ardour of a son, whose early inquietude at another's fame announced a character formed for great designs and illustrious exertions. But Herodotus had pre-occupied the subjects best adapted to historical composition; and it was not till the commencement of the memorable war of twenty-seven years, that Thucydides, amidst the dangers which threatened his country, rejoiced in a theme worthy to exercise the genius, and call forth the whole vigour of an historian. From the breaking out of this war, in which he proved an unfortunate actor, he judged that it would be the greatest, the most obstinate, and important that had ever been carried on. He began therefore to collect, and treasure up, such materials as were necessary for describing it; in the selection, as well as in the distribution of which, he afterwards discovered an evident purpose to rival and surpass Herodotus. Too much indulgence for fiction had disgraced the narrative of the latter: Thucydides professed to be animated purely by the love of truth. "His relation was not intended to delight the ears of an Olympic audience. By a faithful account of the past, he hoped to assist his readers in conjecturing the future. While human nature remained the same, his work would have its use, being built on such principles as rendered it an everlasting possession, not a contentious instrument of temporary applause."² The execution corresponded with this noble design. In his introductory discourse he runs over the fabulous ages of Greece, carefully separating the ore from the dross. In speaking of Thrace, he touches, with proper brevity, on the fable of Tereus and Progne;³ and in describing Sicily, glances at the Cyclops and Lestrigons. But he recedes, as it were, with disgust, from such monstrous phantoms, and immediately returns to the main purpose of his history. In order to render it a faithful picture of the times, he professes to relate not only what was done, but what was said, by inserting such speeches of statesmen and generals as he had himself heard, or as had been reported to him by others. This valuable part of his work was imitated by all future historians, till the improvement of military discipline on the one hand, and the corruption of manners on the other, rendered such speeches superfluous. Eloquence once served as an incentive to courage, and an instrument of government. But the time was to arrive, when the dead principles of fear and interest should alone predominate. In most countries of Europe, despotism has rendered public assemblies a dramatic representation; and in the few, where men are not enslaved by a master, they are the slaves of pride, of avarice, and of faction.

Thucydides, doubtless, had his model in the short and oblique speeches of Herodotus; but

in this particular he must be acknowledged far to surpass his patron. In the distribution of his subject, however, he fell short of that writer. Thucydides, aspiring at extraordinary accuracy, divides his work by summers and winters, relating apart the events comprehended in each period of six months. But this space of time is commonly too short for events deserving the notice of history, to be begun, carried on, and completed. His narrative, therefore, is continually broken and interrupted: curiosity is raised without being satisfied, and the reader is transported, as by magic, from Athens to Corcyra, from Lesbos to Peloponnesus, from the coast of Asia to Sicily. Thucydides follows the order of time; Herodotus the connection of events: in the language of a great critic, the skill and taste of Herodotus have reduced a very complicated argument into one harmonious whole; the preposterous industry of Thucydides has divided a very simple subject into many detached parts and scattered limbs of history, which it is difficult again to reduce into one regular body.⁴ The same critic observes, that Herodotus's history not only possesses more art and variety, but displays more gayety and splendour. A settled gloom, doubtless, hangs over the events of the Peloponnesian war: but what is the history of all wars, but a description of crimes and calamities? The austere gravity of Thucydides admirably corresponds with his subject. His majesty is worthy of Athens, when she commanded a thousand tributary republics. His concise, nervous, and energetic style, his abrupt brevity, and elaborate plainness, admirably represent the contentions of active life, and the tumult of democratical assemblies. Demosthenes, whom Dionysius himself extols above all orators, transcribed eight times, not the elegant flowing smoothness of Herodotus, but the sententious, harsh, and often obscure annals of Thucydides.⁵

Thucydides left his work unfinished in the twenty-first year of the Peloponnesian war. It was continued by Xenophon, who deduced the revolutions of Greece through a series of forty-eight years to the battle of Mantinea; a work which enables us to pursue the important series of Grecian history.

To a reader accustomed to contemplate the uniform and consistent operations of modern policy, it must appear extraordinary that, at the distance of less than two years from the subversion of the Athenian democracy by a Spartan general, the same turbulent form of government should have been re-established with new splendour, by the approbation, and even the assistance, of a Spartan king. The reasons explained in the preceding chapter may lessen, but cannot altogether remove, his surprise; and, in order fully to comprehend the causes of this event, it is necessary to consider not only the internal factions which distracted the councils of Sparta, but the external objects of ambition or revenge which solicited and employed her arms.

While the fortune of the Peloponnesian war still hung in doubtful suspense, the peaceful in-

¹ Suidas, Photius, Marcellinus.

² Thucyd. in Proem.

³ Ovid. Metam. l. vi.

⁴ Dionys. Halicarn. de Herodot. et Thucyd.

⁵ Ibid.

habitants of Elis often testified an inclination to preserve an inoffensive neutrality, that they might apply, with undivided attention, to their happy rural labours, to the administration of the Olympian festival, and to the indispensable worship of those gods and heroes to whom their territory was peculiarly consecrated. The continual solicitation of Sparta, and the unprovoked violence of Athens, determined the Elians to declare for the former republic; but of all the Spartan allies they were the most lukewarm and indifferent. In time of action their assistance was languid and ineffectual, and when the regular return of the Olympic solemnity suspended the course of hostilities, they showed little partiality or respect for their powerful confederates, whose warlike and ambitious spirit seemed incompatible with the enjoyment of their own contemplative tranquillity. This omission of duty was followed by the actual transgression of the Elians. In conjunction with the Mantinæans and Argives they deserted the alliance of Sparta; defended themselves by arms against the usurpations of that republic; and excluded its members from consulting the oracle, and from partaking of the games and sacrifices celebrated at Olympia.⁶ These injuries passed with impunity until the successful issue of the war of Peloponnesus disposed the Spartans to feel with sensibility, and enabled them severely to chastise every insult that had been offered them during the less prosperous current of their fortune.

While Pausanias and Lysander settled the affairs of Athens and of Asia, Agis, the most warlike of their princes, levied a powerful army, to inflict a late, but terrible vengeance on the Elians. That he might attack the enemy unprepared, he led his forces through the countries of Argolis and Achaia, entering the Elian territory by the way of Larissa, and intending to march by the shortest road to the devoted capital. But he had scarcely passed the river Larissus, which gives name to the town, and separates the adjoining provinces of Elis and Achaia, when the invaders were admonished, by repeated shocks of an earthquake, to abstain from ravaging a country which enjoyed the immediate protection of Heaven. Into such a manaco, at least, this terrible phenomenon was interpreted by the superstition of the Spartan king, who immediately repassed the river, and, returning home, disbanded his army. But the hostility of the Spartans was restrained, not extinguished. Having offered due supplications and sacrifices to sanctify the impious invasion, the ephori, next year, commanded Agis again to levy troops, and to enter the Elian territory. No unfavourable sign checked the progress of his arms. During two summers and autumns, the country was desolated; the villages burned or demolished; their inhabitants dragged into captivity; the sacred edifices were despoiled of their most valued ornaments; the porticos, gymnasia, and temples, which adorned the city of Jupiter, were many of them reduced to ruins.

The Spartans neither alone incurred the guilt,

nor exclusively enjoyed the profits of this cruel devastation. The Elian invasion furnished a rich harvest of plunder to the Arcadians and other communities of Peloponnesus, whose rapacious lust was enflamed by the virgin bloom of a country which had long been protected by religion against the ravages of war. When the principal property of the Elians was destroyed or plundered, the Spartans at length granted them a peace, on condition that they surrendered their fleet, acknowledged the independence of the inferior towns and villages, which were scattered along the delightful banks of the Penens and the Alpheus, and modelled their internal government according to the plan prescribed by their conquerors.⁷

The war of Elis occupied, but did not engross, the attention of the Spartans; nor did the punishment of that unfortunate republic divert them from other projects of revenge. The Messenians were not their accidental and temporary, but their natural and inveterate, foes; and might justly expect to feel the unhappy consequences of their triumph. After the destruction of Messenê, and the long wanderings and misery of its persecuted citizens, the town of Naupactus, situate on the northern shore of the Corinthian gulf, furnished a safe retreat to a feeble remnant of that ancient community; which, flourishing under the protection of Athens, spread along the western coast, and planted a considerable colony in the neighbouring island of Cephallenia. We have already described the memorable gratitude of the Messenians, who were the most active, zealous, and, according to their ability, the most useful allies of Athens in the Peloponnesian war. But their assistance (and assistance far more powerful than theirs) proved ineffectual; and the time was now arrived when they were to suffer a severe punishment for their recent as well as ancient injuries. The resentment of Sparta drove them from Naupactus and Cephallenia. The greater part escaped to Sicily; above three thousand sailed to Cyrenaica, the only countries inhabited by the Hellenic race, which lay beyond the reach of the Lacedæmonian power.⁸

From the era of this important migration, the names of Sicily and Cyrenaica will seldom occur in the present history; on which account it may not be improper briefly to explain the causes which withdrew from the general sphere of Grecian politics a fruitful and extensive coast, and an island not less fruitful and extensive, and far more populous and powerful. The insulated situation of these remote provinces, while it rendered it extremely inconvenient for Greece to interfere in their affairs, peculiarly exposed them to two evils, which rendered it still more inconvenient for them to interfere in the affairs of Greece. Removed from the protection of their Peloponnesian ancestors, both the Cyreneans and Sicilians often endured the oppression of domestic tyrants, and often suffered the ravages of foreign barbarians.

The inhabitants of Cyrenaica alternately carried on the war against the Libians and Car-

⁶ Thucyd. l. v.

⁷ Xenophon Hellen. l. iii. c. 2. Diodor. l. xiv. p. 404.

⁸ Diodor. l. xiv. p. 415.

thaginians.¹ They were actually oppressed by the tyrant Ariston. Soon afterwards they recovered their civil liberty;² but were compelled frequently to struggle for their national independence. Though often invaded, their country was never subdued by any barbarian enemy; and their liberties survived the republics of their European brethren, since they reluctantly submitted for the first time to the fortunate general of Alexander, who, in the division of his master's conquests, obtained the fertile and wealthy kingdom of Egypt.³

The revolutions of Sicily are far better known than those of Cyrené, and still more worthy to be remembered. During the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, the assistance given by Syracuse to the Lacedæmonians became gradually more faint and imperceptible, and at length it was totally withdrawn. This was occasioned by the necessity of defending the safety of the whole island, in which that of the capital was involved, against the formidable descents of the Carthaginians, whom the invitation of Segesta and several inferior cities at variance with their powerful neighbours, the hopes of acquiring at once those valuable commodities, the annual purchase of which drained Africa of such immense treasures, and, above all, the desire of revenging the death of Hamilcar, and the dishonour of the Carthaginian name in the unfortunate siege of Himera, encouraged to undertake and carry on various expeditions for the entire subjugation of Sicily.

Hannibal, the grandson of Hamilcar, was entrusted with the conduct of the war, which commenced the four hundred and tenth, and continued, with little intermission, till the four hundred and fourth year before the Christian era. The domestic troops of Carthage were reinforced by their African allies. Considerable levies were made among the native Spaniards and Italians, who had long envied the splendour, and dreaded the power of the Greeks, to whose conquest and colonies they saw no bounds. The united army exceeded a hundred thousand men, and was conveyed to the southern shore of Sicily in a proportionable number of transports and galleys.⁴

The design of Hannibal, as far as it appears from his measures, was to conquer successively the smaller and more defenceless towns, before he laid siege to Syracuse, whose natural strength, recently improved by art, bidding defiance to assault, could only be taken by blockade. The first campaign was rendered memorable by the conquest of Selinus and Himera; the second by the demolition of Agrigentum; the third by the taking of Gela. The inferior cities of Solas, Egesta, Motya, Ancyra, Entelta, and Panormus, either invited the Carthaginian arms, or surrendered without resistance. The invaders might have proceeded to the siege of Syracuse, the main object of

their expedition; but pestilence followed the bloody havoc of war, and swept off, in undistinguished ruin, the victors and the vanquished. Not only the general, but the most numerous portion of his troops, had fallen a prey to this calamity; and Hamilcar, who succeeded to the command, contented himself with leaving garrisons in the towns which had been conquered, and returned to Africa with the enfeebled remains of his armament, which communicated the pestilential infection to Carthage, where it long raged with destructive fury.⁵

According to the genius of Grecian superstition, it was natural to ascribe the sufferings of the Carthaginians to the unexampled cruelty and impiety with which, in their successive ravages, they had deformed the fair face of Sicily. It would be useless and disgusting to describe the horrid scenes of bloodshed and slaughter transacted in the several places which presumed to resist their power. Whatever atrocities could be invented by the unprincipled license of the Italians, approved by the stern insensibility of the Spaniards, and inflicted by the implacable revenge of the Africans, were committed in the miserable cities of Selinus, Himera, Gela, and Agrigentum. After the taking of Himera, Hannibal sacrificed in one day three thousand of its inhabitants to the manes of his grandfather, who in the first Carthaginian invasion, had perished before its walls; and the lot of these unhappy victims, dreadful as it was, might justly be an object of envy to the long tormented natives of Gela and Selinus.

Yet of all Sicilian cities, the fate of Agrigentum seemed the most worthy to be deplored, from the striking contrast of its fallen state with its recent splendour and prosperity. The natural beauties⁶ of Agrigentum were secured by strength, and adorned with elegance; and whoever considered either the innumerable advantages of the city itself, or the gay cultivation of the surrounding territory, which abounded in every luxury of the sea and land, was ready to pronounce the Agrigentines the most favoured inhabitants of the earth. The exuberant fertility of the soil, particularly the rich luxuriance of the vines and olives,⁷ exceeded every thing that is related of the happiest climates, and furnished the materials of a lucrative commerce with the populous coast of Africa, which was very sparingly provided in those valuable plants. The extraordinary wealth of the Agrigentines was displayed in the magnificence of public edifices, and in the splendid enjoyment of private fortunes. They had begun, and almost completed, the celebrated temple of Jupiter, built in the grandest style of architecture employed by the Greeks on the greatest and most solemn occasions. Its walls were encompassed by pillars without, and adorned by pilasters within; and its magnitude far exceeded the ordinary dimensions of ancient temples, as it extended three hundred and forty feet in length, sixty in breadth, and a hundred and

¹ Aristot. Polit. Sallust. de Bell. Jugurth.

² Diodor. l. xiv. p. 415.

³ Diodor. l. xix. p. 715. et Strabo. l. xvii. p. 636.

⁴ Diodor. Sicul. l. xiii. c. 43. et seq.

⁵ Diodor. l. xiii. c. 70. et seq.

⁶ The following particulars in the text, concerning Agrigentum, we learn from Diodorus Siculus, p. 374—379. Valer. Maxim. l. iv. 8. Athenæus, l. i. c. 3.

⁷ Diodorus celebrates the height of the vines, which we are not used to consider as a proper subject of panegyric.

twenty in height, without including the lofty and spacious dome. The grandeur of the doors and vestibule corresponded with the simple majesty of the whole edifice, whose sculptured ornaments represented, with finished elegance, and with a laborious accuracy that distinguished each particular figure, the defeat of the Giants, and the taking of Troy; respectively, the most illustrious exploits of Grecian gods, and Grecian heroes.

This noble monument, consecrated to piety and patriotism, might be contrasted, by a philosophic mind, with others destined to a very different purpose. Without the walls of Agrigentum, an artificial pond, or rather lake, thirty feet deep and near a mile in circumference, was continually replenished with a rare variety of the most delicate fishes, to furnish a sure supply to the sumptuous extravagance of public entertainments. But nothing could rival the elegance and beauty of the tombs and sepulchres erected by the Agrigentines, to perpetuate the fame of their coursers which had obtained the Olympic prize; and, if we believe the testimony of an eye-witness,⁸ to commemorate the quails and other delicate birds, which were cherished with an affectionate and partial fondness by the effeminate youth of both sexes. Such capricious and absurd abuses of opulence and the arts might be expected amidst the mortifying discrimination of ranks, and the enormous superabundance of private riches, which distinguished the Agrigentines. The labour of numerous and active slaves cultivated agriculture and manufactures with extraordinary success. From the profit of these servile hands many citizens attained, and exceeded, the measure not only of Grecian, but of modern wealth. A short time before the siege of the town, Hexenitus returned in triumph from Olympia, with three hundred chariots, each drawn by two milk-white horses of Sicilian blood. Antisthenes had eclipsed this magnificence in celebrating the marriage of his daughter. But every native of Agrigentum yielded the fame of splendour to the hospitable Gellias, whose palace could entertain and lodge five hundred guests, who had been clothed from his wardrobe, and whose cellars, consisting of three hundred spacious reservoirs, cut in the solid rock, daily invited the joyous festivity of strangers and citizens.

Before the second Carthaginian invasion, the Agrigentines, warned by the fate of Selinus and Himera, had prepared whatever seemed most necessary for their own defence. Their magazines were stored with provisions, their arsenals with arms. Elevated by the confidence of prosperity, they had courage to resist the first impressions of their enemies; but, corrupted by the vices of wealth and luxury, they wanted fortitude to persevere. Their allies in Sicily and Italy showed not that degree of ardour which might have been expected in a war which so deeply concerned them all: yet, by the partial assistance of Syracuse, Gela, and Camerina, as well as several Grecian allies in Italy, the Agrigentines stood the siege eight months, dur-

ing which, the Carthaginians employed every resource of strength and ingenuity. At length the place was reduced to great difficulties by means of immense wooden machines, drawn on wheels, which enabled the besiegers to fight on equal ground with those who defended the walls. But before any breach was effected, the greater part of the inhabitants determined to abandon the city.

In the obscurity of night, they departed with their wives and families, and many of them fortunately escaped to Gela, Syracuse, and Leon-tium. Others, wanting courage for this dangerous resolution, or unwilling to survive the fate of their country, perished by their own hands. A third class, more timid, or more superstitious, shut themselves up in the temples, expecting to be saved by the protection of the gods, or by the religious awe of the enemy. But the Barbarians no more respected what was sacred, than what was profane. The consecrated statues, and altars, and offerings, were confounded with things the most vile, and plundered or destroyed in the promiscuous ruin. One memorable act of despair may represent the general horror of this dreadful scene. With his numerous friends, and most valued treasure, the humane and hospitable Gellias had taken refuge in the temple of Minerva; but when he understood the universal desolation of his country, he set fire to that sacred edifice, choosing to perish by the flames rather than by the rage of the Carthaginians.⁹

Near fourscore years before the demolition of Agrigentum, Sicily Olymp. xciii. 1. had acquired immortal glory, by defeating more numerous invaders; A. C. 408. but, at that time, the efforts of the whole island were united and animated by the virtues and abilities of Gelon; whereas, amidst the actual dangers and trepidation of the Carthaginian war, the Sicilians were distracted by domestic factions. Syracuse had banished the only man whose consummate wisdom, and approved valour and fidelity, seemed worthy to direct the helm in the present tempestuous juncture. In the interval between the siege of Himera and that of Agrigentum, the patriotic Hermocratus had returned to Sicily; and, at the head of his numerous adherents, had attempted to gain admission into the capital. But the attempt was immediately fatal to himself; and, in its consequences, destructive of the public freedom. His partisans, though discomfited and banished, soon found a leader qualified to avenge their cause, and to punish the ingratitude of Syracuse.

This was the celebrated Dionysius, a youth of twenty-two years; of mean parentage, but unbounded ambition; destitute (if we believe historians) of almost every virtue, and possessed of every talent; and whose fortune it was, to live and flourish amidst those perturbed circumstances of foreign war and civil dissension, which are favourable to the elevation of superior minds. Though esteemed and entrusted by Hermocrates, who could more easily discern the merit of his abilities, than discover the dan-

⁸ Timæus apud Diodor. l. xiii.

⁹ Diodorus, p. 379

ger of his ambition, Dionysius had gained friends in the opposite faction, by whose interest he was recalled from exile. His services in the Carthaginian war raised him to eminence. He excelled in valour; he was unrivalled in eloquence; his ends were pursued with steady perseverance; his means were varied with convenient flexibility; the appearance of patriotism rendered him popular, and he employed his popularity to restore his banished friends.

The gratitude of one party, and the admiration of both, enabled him to attain the command of the mercenaries, and the conduct of the war.

Olymp. But he was less solicitous to conquer the Carthaginians than to enslave his fellow-citizens, whose factious turbulence rendered them unworthy of liberty. By the affected dread of violence from his enemies, he obtained a guard for his person, which his artful generosity easily attached to his interest; and the arms of his troops, the influence and wealth of Phillistus, the historian of Sicily, who was honoured with the appellation of the second Thucydides,¹ above all his own crafty and daring ambition, enabled him, at the age of twenty-five, to usurp the government of Syracuse, which he held for thirty-eight years.

Olymp. During his long and active-reign he was generally engaged in war; sometimes with the Carthaginians, sometimes with his revolted subjects. Yet in both contests he finally prevailed, having reduced the Carthaginian power in Sicily, and appeased, or intimidated domestic rebellion. His actual condition, however splendid, he regarded only as a preparation for higher grandeur. He besieged and took Rhegium, the key of Italy: nor could the feeble confederacy of the Italian Greeks have prevented the conquest of that country, had not the renewed hostilities of the Carthaginians, and fresh discontents at home, interrupted the progress of his arms. This growing storm he resisted as successfully as before, and transmitted, to a degenerate son, the peaceful inheritance of the greatest part of Sicily; after having strengthened, with wonderful art, the fortifications of the capital; enlarged the size, and improved the form of the Syracusan galleys; invented the military catapults, an engine of war which he employed, with great advantage, in the siege of Motya and Rhegium; and not only defended his native island against foreign invasion, but rendered its power formidable to the neighbouring countries.

His poetical labours were the least uniformly successful of all his undertakings. His verses, though rehearsed by the most skilful rhapsodists of the age, were treated with signal contempt at the Olympic games. A second time he renewed his pretension to literary fame in that illustrious assembly; but his ambassador was insulted by the most humiliating indignities; and the orator Lysias pronounced a discourse, in which he maintained the impropriety of admitting the representative of an impious

tyrant to assist at a solemnity consecrated to religion, virtue, and liberty.² The A. C. 387. oration of Lysias leaves room to suspect that the plenitude of Dionysius's power, rather than the defect of his poetry, exposed him to the censure and derision of the Olympic spectators; and this suspicion receives strong confirmation by considering, that, in the last year of his reign, he deserved and obtained the poetic crown at Athens; a city renowned for the impartiality of its literary decision.³

It is remarkable, that, with such an active, vigorous, and comprehensive mind; with such a variety of talents, and such an accumulation of glory, Dionysius should be universally held out and branded, as the most conspicuous example of an odious and miserable tyrant, the object of terror in his own, and of detestation in succeeding ages. Yet the uncorrupted evidence of history will prove, that the character of Dionysius was not decisively flagitious. His situation rendered it artificial; and he is acknowledged often to have assumed the semblance of virtue. Always crafty and cautious; but by turns, as it suited his interest, mild, affable, and condescending; or cruel, arrogant, and imperious: nor did the Syracusans feel the rigour of his tyranny, until they had justly provoked it by an insurrection, during which they treated his wife and children with the most barbarous and brutal fury. But there are two circumstances in the character of Dionysius which peculiarly excited the indignation of the moralists of Greece and Rome, and which the moderation or the softness of modern times will be disposed to consider with less severity. He had usurped the government of a free republic; a crime necessarily heinous in the sight of those who held the assassination of a tyrant to be the most meritorious exertion of human virtue; and he professed an open contempt for the religion of his country; a crime of which the bare suspicion had brought to death the most amiable and respected of men. Yet the impiety of Dionysius was only the child of his interest, and sometimes the parent of his wit. He stripped a celebrated statue of Jupiter of a golden robe, observing, that it was too heavy in summer, and too cold in winter. For a reason equally ingenious he deprived Æsculapius of his golden beard; asserting, that such a venerable ornament ill became the son of the beardless Apollo. But if he despoiled the altars and statues, he increased and improved the fleets and armies, of Syracuse, which were successfully employed against the public enemy. And to the general current of satire and declamation against this extraordinary man,⁴ may be opposed the opinion of Polybius and Scipio Africanus, the most illustrious characters of the most illustrious age of Rome: "That none

² Life of Lysias, p. 117. Dionys. Halicar. de Demosth.
³ Isocrat Panegyri.

⁴ The authentic history of the reign of Dionysius is copiously recorded by Diodorus Siculus, l. xiv. et xv. To relate the numerous and improbable stories told of him by Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca, and other moralists, would be to transcribe what it is not easy to believe. The reader may consult, particularly, Plut. ex. edit. Paris, in Moral. pp. 78 et 83. De Garrul. p. 508. In Dion. p. 961; and various passages of Cicero de Officiis, and Tusculan. Quæst.

¹ Cicero de Orator. l. xi.

ever concerted his schemes with more prudence, or executed them with more boldness, than Dionysius the Elder."

His son, Dionysius the Younger, exceeded his vices without possessing his abilities. The reign of this second tyrant was distracted and inglorious. His kinsman Dion, the

Olymp. amiable disciple of Plato, endeavoured to correct the disorders of his ungoverned mind. But the task

Olymp. was too heavy for Dion, and even for Plato himself. The former, unable to restrain the excesses of the

A. C. 362. prince, undertook the defence of the people. His patriotism interrupted, but did not destroy, the tyranny of Dionysius, which was finally abolished, twenty-two years after he first mounted the throne, by the magnanimity of Timoleon.⁵ This revolution happened only two years before Corinth, the country of Timoleon, as well as the other republics of Greece, submitted to the arms of Philip of Macedon; and, having lost their own independence, be-

came incapable of asserting the freedom of their colonies.

New tyrants started up in Syracuse, and almost in every city of Sicily, and held a precarious sway under the alternate protection of the Carthaginians and

Olymp. Romans. The citizens of Syracuse, cxlii. 1. mindful of their ancient fame, de-

A. C. 212. throned their usurpers, and enjoyed considerable intervals of liberty. But at length the Romans gained possession of the place; the persevering valour of Marcellus, assisted by the treachery of the garrison, prevailing, after a siege of three years, over the bold efforts of mechanical power, directed by the inventive genius of Archimedes.⁶ The reduction of the capital was immediately followed by the conquest of the adjoining territory; and Sicily came thus to be regarded as the eldest province of Rome, and the first country, without the limits of Italy, which had taught that victorious republic to taste and enjoy the sweets of foreign dominion.⁷

CHAPTER XXV.

Death of Darius Nothus—Cyrus disputes the Succession with his elder Brother Artaxerxes—Character of Cyrus—State of Lower Asia under his administration—His Strength and Resources—His Expedition into Upper Asia—Describes the vast Army of his Brother—Battle of Canaxa—Death of Cyrus—His Grecian Auxiliaries victorious—Their Treaty with Tissaphernes—Perfidious Assassination of the Grecian Generals—Artaxerxes sends to the Greeks to demand their Arms—Conference on that Subject.

WHILE the operations of war conspired with the revolutions of government, to detach the Grecian colonies in Italy, Sicily, and

Olymp. Cyrené, from the general interests and politics of the mother country, xciv. 1. a series of events, not less curious

A. C. 404. than important, connected, in the closest intimacy, the history of Greece with the annals of the Persian empire. The same memorable year which terminated the destructive war of Peloponnesus brought to a conclusion the active and prosperous reign of Darius Nothus. He named as his successor Artaxerxes, styled Mnemon, from the strength of his memory; and persisted in this choice, notwithstanding the opposition of the artful and ambitious Parysatis, who employed her extensive influence over the mind of an old and uxorious husband, to obtain the kingdom for Cyrus, the younger brother of Artaxerxes, and the peculiar favourite of his mother. The rivalry of the young princes, both of whom were at court during the last illness of Darius, unhappily degenerated into enmity; and a circumstance, which would

be thought immaterial in the present age, increased the indignation of Cyrus. The birth of Artaxerxes had happened before the accession of his father to the throne, but Cyrus was born the son of a king; a distinction which, however frivolous it may appear in modern times, had engaged Darius Hystaspes to prefer Xerxes, the younger of his sons, to his elder brother Artabazanes.⁸

The precedent, established by such an illustrious monarch might have enforced the partial arguments of Parysatis, and both might have been confirmed by the strong claim of merit, since Cyrus early discovered such talents and virtues, as fitted him to fill the most difficult, and to adorn the most exalted, station. At the age of seventeen, he had obtained the government of Lydia, Phrygia, and Cappadocia; and the same mandate of Darius, which destroyed his hopes of succession to the Persian throne, rendered him hereditary satrap of those valuable provinces. On the demise of that monarch, Cyrus prepared to return to Asia Minor, attended by the same escort with which he had come to Susa; a faithful body of three hundred heavy-armed Greeks, commanded by Xenias, an Arcadian. But when he prepared to leave court, a very criminal and unfortunate incident retarded his departure. The selfish and perfi-

⁵ Corn. Nepos. Diodorus Sicul. Plut. Dion.

⁶ Polyb. Excerpt. l. viii. Plut. in Marcell.

⁷ Livy, l. xxiv. et Cicero in Verrem in few words—*Omnium exterarum gentium princeps Sicilia ad amicitiam fidemque, P. R. applicuit; primaque omnium, id quod ornamentum imperii est, provincia est appellata: prima docuit majores nostros, quam præclarum esset exteris gentibus imperitare.*

⁸ Herodot. l. vii. c. ii.

dious Tissaphernes, who expected to divide the spoils of the young prince, accused him of treason. He was apprehended by order of Artaxerxes; but the powerful protection of Parysatis, who, though she loved only one, was beloved, or at least feared, by both of her sons, defended his life, vindicated his honour, and restored him in safety to his government.

The danger that had threatened his person could not much affect the heroic fortitude of Cyrus; but the affront offered to his dignity sunk deep into his heart; and from the moment that he recovered his freedom, he determined to revenge his injuries,¹ or to perish in the attempt. In the despotic countries of the East, as there is scarcely any intermediate gradation between the prince and people, and scarcely any alternative but that of dominion or servitude, a discontented or rebellious subject must either stifle his animosity, submit to die, or aspire to reign.² The magnanimity of Cyrus naturally preferred the road of danger and glory; he prepared not only to punish the injustice, but to usurp the throne of Artaxerxes, defended as it was by a million of armed men, and protected both by the power of superstition, and by the splendour of hereditary renown. The design would have been great, but romantic, if the young prince had not enjoyed very extraordinary resources in the powers of his own mind, in the affectionate attachment of his Barbarian subjects, and, above all, in the fidelity and valour of his Lacedæmonian allies.

Whether we consider what he said, or what he did, the testimony of his contemporaries, or the more unerring testimony of his life and actions, Cyrus appears to have been born for the honour of human nature, and particularly for the honour of Asia, which, though the richest and most populous quarter of the globe, has never, in any age, abounded in great characters. From the age of seven years, he had been trained, at the gate of the palace, to shoot with the bow, to manage the horse, and to speak truth; according to the discipline instituted by the great founder of the monarchy, and well adapted, in an age of simplicity, to form the princes and nobles of Persia. But in the course of two centuries, the progress of refinement and luxury, the infectious example of a corrupt court, and the perfidious lessons of the world, had perverted, or rendered ineffectual, a very salutary system of education; and the grandees of Persia, whatever proficiency they made in their exercises, felt so little regard for veracity, that (as will abundantly appear in the sequel) they seldom spoke but with a view to deceive, and rarely made a promise which they did not break, or took an oath which they did not violate. The behaviour of Cyrus was totally the reverse. He equalled, and surpassed his companions in all exterior accomplishments. But while his manly beauty, his bodily activity and address, and the superior

courage, as well as skill, which he displayed in hunting, horsemanship, and every military exercise, commanded the admiration of the multitude; he himself seems not to have estimated such superficial advantages beyond their real worth. He regarded integrity of heart as the only solid basis of a great character. His probity was uniform, his word sacred, his friendship inviolable. In the giddy season of youth, he yielded, with uncommon docility, to the admonitions of experience. Neither wealth, nor birth, nor rank, but age and virtue, were the objects of his respect: and his behaviour, equally meritorious and singular, was justly and universally admired.

His subjects in Lesser Asia, in particular, were seized with the most pleasing astonishment, when, instead of a greedy and voluptuous satrap, eager only to squeeze, to amass, and to enjoy, they beheld a prince who preferred the public interest to his own; who alleviated the weight of taxes, that he might encourage the operations of industry; whose own hands gave the useful example of rural labour;³ whose decisions united justice and mercy; and whose active vigilance introduced (what neither before nor since the government of Cyrus has been known in the Asiatic peninsula) such a regularity of police, as rendered intercourse safe, and property secure.

The virtues of justice and integrity, when accompanied with diligence and abilities, must procure such a degree of respect for the administration, as will naturally be extended to the person, of a prince. But something farther is required, not to obtain the public gratitude and esteem, but to excite the affectionate ardour of select and devoted friends; without the assistance of whom, it is seldom possible to accomplish any great and memorable design. Cyrus excelled all his contemporaries in the art both of acquiring and of preserving the most valuable friendships. His gratitude overpaid every favour; his liberality was large, yet discerning; and his donatives were always enhanced by the handsome and affectionate manner in which they were bestowed. When he discovered a man really worthy of his confidence and esteem, he was not satisfied with giving him a partial share of his affections; he gave his heart entire: and it was his constant prayer to the gods, that he might live to requite and surpass the good offices of his friends, and the injuries of his enemies.⁴

With such sentiments and character, Cyrus acquired the firm attachment of a few, and the willing obedience of all his Barbarian subjects, in the populous provinces which he commanded, whose united strength exceeded a hundred thousand fighting men; who, unwarlike as they were, yet excelled, both in bravery and in skill, the effeminate troops of Upper Asia.

They were probably indebted for this advantage to their intercourse with the Greeks, whose disciplined valour, far more than the numbers of his Barbarians, encouraged Cyrus to undertake an expedition for acquiring the empire of the

¹ Xenoph. Anabes. l. i. c. i. This was the origin of his resentment, which Xenophon expresses with great delicacy; *ὁ δὲ κινδυνιστὰς καὶ ἀτιμωθὴς, βουλευόμενος ὅπως μὴ τότε ἐπὶ ἰσθμῷ περὶ τὸ ἀδινῶν, &c.* He asserted independence, the first wish of every great mind.

² "Cyrus determined no longer," says Xenophon, "to depend on his brother; ἀλλὰ ἢ δύναται βασιλεύσειν αὐτὸς εἰσέναι, but, if possible, to reign in his stead."

³ Xenoph. *ibid.* Cic. in Senect. Plut. in Lysand. have all celebrated this part of his character.

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii.

East. By the most important services he had deserved the gratitude of the Lacedæmonian republic; which had been raised, chiefly by his assistance, to the head of Greece, and to the command of the sea. In return for that favour, so inestimable in the sight of an ambitious people, the Spartans readily complied with his request, by sending into Asia eight hundred heavy-armed men, under the command of the intrepid Cheirisophus; and they charged their admiral, Samius, who had succeeded Lysander in the government of the Ionian coast, faithfully to co-operate with Cyrus, by employing his powerful fleet in whatever service the Persian prince might think proper to recommend.⁵ Had they done nothing more than this, Cyrus might well have approved their useful gratitude; especially as their alliance, securing him on the side of Europe, enabled him, without danger, to drain his western garrisons, and to augment the strength of his army. But the friendship of the Spartans carried them still farther. They allowed him to recruit his forces in every part of their dominions; and the generous munificence of Cyrus had acquired numerous partisans well qualified to raise and to command those valuable levies. Clearchus the Spartan, Menon the Thessalian, Proxenus the Bœotian, Agias the Arcadian, and Socrates the Achæan, all alike devoted to the interest and glory of the Persian prince, collected, chiefly from their respective republics, above ten thousand heavy-armed men, and near three thousand archers and targeteers.

These preparations, which were carried on with silence and celerity, deceived the haughty indolence of the Persians; but they could not escape the vigilance of Alcibiades, who then resided at Grynium, a town of Phrygia, under the protection of Pharnabazus. Moved by resentment against the Lacedæmonians, or ambitious of gaining merit with the great king, he desired an escort from the satrap, that he might undertake with safety a journey to Susa, in order to acquaint Artaxerxes with the hostile designs of his brother. Pharnabazus, who possessed not the merit, desired the reward of the discovery; and therefore (as we formerly had occasion to relate)⁶ readily gratified the request of Lysander, by the destruction of Alcibiades.

Olymp. xcv. 1. A. C. 400. But neither the intelligence conveyed by the Persian governor, nor the repeated solicitations of Tissaphernes, nor the consciousness of his own injustice and cruelty, could rouse Artaxerxes from the profound security of his repose. Cyrus completed his levies without molestation, and almost without suspicion; and prepared, in the beginning of the year four hundred before Christ, to march from the Ionian coast into Upper Asia, at the head of a hundred thousand Barbarians, and above thirteen thousand Greeks. His journey towards Babylon, his defeat and death in the plain of Cynaxa, the retreat and dispersion of his followers, and the memorable return of the Greeks to their native country, have been related by the admired disciple of Socrates (whom the

friendship of Proxenus, the Bœotian, recommended to the service and esteem of Cyrus,) with such descriptive beauty, with such profound knowledge of war and of human nature, and with such inimitable eloquence, as never were re-united in the work of any one man but that of Xenophon the Athenian. The retreat was principally conducted by Xenophon himself; which has enabled him to adorn his narrative with such an affecting variety of incidents and characters as will always serve to prove that the force of truth and nature is far superior to the powers of the most fertile fancy. It would be an undertaking not only hardy, but presumptuous, to invade the province of such an accomplished writer, if the design of the present work did not oblige us to select the principal circumstances which illustrate the condition of the times, and connect the expedition of Cyrus with the subsequent history of Greece.

Having assembled his forces at Sardis, the Persian prince was carried, by the activity of his resentment or ambition, with the utmost celerity, towards Upper Asia. In ninety-three marches he travelled through the central provinces of Lydia, Phrygia, Cappadocia; traversed the mountains of Cilicia; passed unresisted through Syria; crossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus; and after penetrating the desert, entered the confines of Babylonia. In a journey of above twelve hundred miles, his numerous army experienced fewer difficulties than might naturally be expected. The fertile territory of Asia Minor supplying them abundantly with provisions, enabled them to proceed commonly at the rate of fifteen or sixteen miles a-day; and almost every second day brought them to a large and populous city. The dependent satraps or viceroys of Lycaonia and Cilicia were less solicitous to defend the throne of Artaxerxes, than anxious to protect their respective provinces from plunder and devastation. But the former experienced the severity of an invader whom he had the weakness to oppose, without the strength or courage to resist.⁷

Syennesis, governor of Cilicia, had reason to fear that his country might be plundered with equal rapacity. He endeavoured, therefore, to avail himself of the natural strength of a province whose southern boundaries are washed by the sea, and which is defended on other sides by the winding branches of Mount Taurus.⁸ Towards the west is but one pass, called by Arrian the Gates of Cilicia;⁹ sufficient to admit only one chariot at a time, and rendered dark and difficult by steep and almost inaccessible mountains. These were occupied by the troops of Syennesis, who, had he maintained his post, might have easily prevented the passage of an army. But the timid Cilician had not trusted in arms alone for the defence of his country. By the order, or at least with the permission of her husband, his queen, the beautiful Epyaxa, had met Cyrus at Cylene, on the frontiers of Phrygia; and, according to the

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii.

⁶ See above, p. 206.

⁷ Xenoph. Anab. l. i. p. 248.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Arrian. Exped. Alexand. l. ii. p. 31.

custom of the East, presented her acknowledged liege-lord and superior with gold, silver, and other costly gifts. But the greatest gift was her youth and beauty, which she submitted, it is said, to the enamoured prince, who after entertaining her with the utmost magnificence and distinction,¹ restored her to Cilicia by a near, but difficult road, which led across the mountains.

To the escort which accompanied her, Cyrus added a considerable body of Greeks commanded by Menon the Thessalian. The greater part arrived at Tarsus, the capital, before the army of Cyrus reached the gates of Cilicia; but two companies, amounting together to a hundred men, were missing, and supposed to have been destroyed by the mountaineers, while they wandered in quest of booty. Syennesis was mortified at hearing that the enemy had already entered his province. But when he likewise received intelligence that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed round from Ionia, in order to co-operate with the army, the disagreeable news totally disconcerted the measures of his defence. He fled in precipitation, abandoning his tents and baggage to the invaders. Cyrus crossed the mountains without opposition, and traversed the beautiful irriguous plains of Cilicia, which were adorned with trees and vines, and abounded in sesame, panic, millet, wheat, and barley. In four days he arrived at the large and rich city of Tarsus, which was plundered by the resentment of the Greeks, for the loss of their companions.

Cyrus immediately sent for the governor, who had removed from his palace, and, attended by the greater part of the inhabitants, had taken refuge among the fastnesses in the neighbouring mountains. By the assurances of Epyaxa, her timorous² husband was with much difficulty persuaded to put himself in the power of a superior, to whom, as the price of his safety, he carried large sums of money. Cyrus courteously accepted the welcome supply, which the demands of his troops rendered peculiarly seasonable; and, in return, honoured Syennesis with such presents as were deemed of great value by the kings of the east. They consisted in a Persian robe, a horse with a golden bit, a chain, bracelets, and scimitar of gold, the restoration of prisoners, and the exemption of Cilicia from farther plunder.³

During their luxurious residence at Tarsus, the Greeks were corrupted by prosperity. They

disdained to obey their commanders, and refused to continue their journey. The design of marching to Babylon, though it was not unknown to Clearchus, or to the Spartan senate, had been concealed from the soldiers, lest their impatience or their fears might be alarmed by the prospect of such a long and dangerous undertaking. At Tarsus they first discovered their suspicions of deceit, which immediately broke out into licentious clamours. They insulted the majesty of Cyrus; they reproached the perfidy of their generals; and their anger was ready to vent itself in open sedition, when the ferment was appeased by the address and prudence of Clearchus. While he privately assured Cyrus of his best endeavours to make the affair take a favourable turn, he openly embraced the cause of the soldiers, affected deeply to feel their grievances, and eagerly concurred with every measure that seemed proper to remove them. His eloquence and his tears diverted the design of immediate hostility. An assembly was summoned to deliberate on the actual posture of affairs. Several, of their own accord, offered their opinion; others spoke as they had been directed by Clearchus. One counsellor, who was heard with applause, advised them to pack up their baggage, and to demand guides or ships from Cyrus, to facilitate their return. Another showed the folly of this request from a man whose measures they had traversed, and whose purpose they had endeavoured to defeat.⁴ They surely could not trust in guides given them by an enemy; nor could it be expected that Cyrus should part with his ships, which were evidently so necessary to the success of his expedition. At length it was determined to send commissioners to treat with Cyrus, that he might either, by granting the demands of the Greeks, prevail on them to follow him, or be himself prevailed on to allow them to return home; and the difference was thus finally adjusted, by promising each soldier a darick and a half, instead of a darick, of monthly pay.⁵

When this storm was happily appeased, the enemy left Tarsus, and marched five days through the fertile plains of Cilicia, till they arrived at Issus, the last town of the province; large, rich, and populous; and only fifteen miles distant from the frontier of Syria. This wealthy province was defended by two fortresses, called the Gates of Syria and Cilicia. They extended from the mountains to the sea. The interval of three furlongs between them

¹ She requested Cyrus to show her his troops. He complied; and attended her coach in an open car. But the curiosity of Epyaxa had almost cost her dear. "When the Barbarians were reviewed, the Greeks were ordered to their arms, and commanded to advance, as to a charge; after which, the soldiers of their own accord, ran with shouts to their tents. The Barbarians were thrown into consternation; Epyaxa quitted her coach; the Greeks returned laughing to their tents; and Cyrus rejoiced at seeing the terror with which the Greeks had inspired the Barbarians." Xenoph. Anab. i. i. p. 247.

² Pride, as well as fear, seems to have actuated Syennesis; ο δὲ οὐδὲ προτίειν οὐδὲν πρὸς κρείττονι αὐτοῦ εἰς χεῖρας εἰλθεῖν εἶπεν, οὐδὲ τότε Κύρου εἰναι ἡδύλα, πρὶν ἢ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ παῖσι; "Syennesis declared, that he had never formerly put himself in the power of a man in any respect superior to himself; nor would he then go to Cyrus, till his wife persuaded him," &c. A true picture of oriental manners, meanness varnished with pride!

³ Xenophon. Anab. p. 249.

⁴ This passage is translated as follows by Mr. Spelman: "After him another got up, showing the folly of the man who advised to demand the ships, as if Cyrus would not resume his expedition. He showed also how weak a thing it was to apply for a guide to that person whose undertaking we had defeated." If Cyrus resumed his expedition, it could not be said that his undertaking was defeated; nor is this the proper meaning of the word *λυμαινομίαν*, which signifies to hurt or weaken. I am sensible that by an easy transition, it sometimes signifies to corrupt, to destroy, to defeat; but in the passage before us, if a translator should choose to explain it by any of those words, he must say, "whose undertaking we had begun, endeavoured, or purposed to defeat;" an explanation of *λυμαινομίαν*, which is justified by the analogy of the Greek language, and which the sense absolutely requires. This is one of the few minute mistakes which I have discovered in Mr. Spelman's most accurate translation.

⁵ Xenoph. Anab. p. 250. et seq.

contained several passes, narrow and intricate, besides the rapid Kernas, which flowed in the middle, one hundred feet in breadth. It was on this occasion that Cyrus experienced the full advantage of the Lacedæmonian assistance. A fleet of sixty sail, conducted by Pythagoras the Spartan, who had succeeded Samius in the naval command, prepared to land the Greeks on the eastern side of the gates, which must have exposed the Syrian works to a double assault; but the cowardice of Abracomas, who commanded the numerous forces of Syria and Phœnicia, rendered the execution of this measure unnecessary. The design, alone, was sufficient to terrify him. He abandoned his forts, and fled with precipitation before the approach of an enemy.⁶

Cyrus thenceforth proceeded without meeting with any appearance of opposition, and in fifteen days' march, reached the banks of the Euphrates. At Thapsacus, which in some eastern languages signifies the ford,⁷ this noble river is above half a mile in breadth, but so shoaly that the navigation is reckoned dangerous even for boats which draw very little water. The shallowness increases in the autumnal season, which happened to be the time that the army passed the Euphrates, which no where reached above the breast. This favourable circumstance furnished an opportunity to the inhabitants of Thapsacus to flatter Cyrus, that the great river had visibly submitted to him as its future king.⁸ Elevated by this auspicious prediction, he pursued his journey through Mesopotamia, part of which was anciently comprehended under the name of Syria.⁹ While he proceeded through this fertile country he did not forget that a laborious march of seventeen days, through a barren desert, must conduct him to the cultivated plains of Babylon.

Having amply provided for this dangerous undertaking, he performed it with uncommon celerity, both in order to avoid risking the want of provisions, and, if possible, to take his enemy unprepared. For several days the army marched, without interruption, through the province of Babylonia; and, on the fifth, came to a deep and broad ditch, which had been recently dug to intercept, or retard, their passage. But as this defence was left altogether unguarded, and the great king had taken no measures to protect the most valuable portion of his dominions, it was generally believed that he had laid aside the design of venturing an engagement. The troops of Cyrus therefore, who had hitherto maintained their ranks with circumspection, no longer observed any order of march; their arms were carried in wagons, or on sumpter horses; and their general, in his car, rode in the van with few armed attendants. While they proceeded in this fearless contempt of the enemy, and approached the plain of Cynaxa, which is within a day's journey of Babylon,¹⁰

Patagyas, a Persian, and confidential friend of Cyrus, came riding towards them in full speed, his horse all in a foam, calling aloud successively in his own language, and in Greek, that the king was at hand with a vast army.¹¹

The experienced Greeks, who best knew the danger of being attacked in disorder, were most sensibly alarmed by this sudden surprise. Cyrus, leaping from his car, put on his corslet, mounted his horse, seized his javelin, commanded his troops to arm, and ordered every man to his post. His orders were readily obeyed; and the army advanced, several hours, in order of battle. It was now mid-day; yet no enemy appeared: but in the afternoon they perceived a dust like a white cloud, which gradually thickened into darkness, and overspread the plain. At length the brazen armour flashed; the motion, the ranks, and spears, were distinctly seen. In the front were innumerable chariots, armed with scythes in a downward, and, in an oblique direction. The cavalry, commanded by Tissaphernes, were distinguished by white corslets; the Persians by wicker bucklers; the Egyptians by wooden shields reaching down to their feet. These formed the chief strength of Artaxerxes; but the various multitude of nations, marching in separate columns according to their respective countries, had scarcely any armour of defence, and could annoy the enemy only at a distance, with their slings, darts, and arrows.¹²

While the hostile battalions approached, Cyrus, accompanied by Pigres the interpreter, and a few chosen attendants, all mounted on horses of extraordinary swiftness, rode through the intermediate space, observing the numbers and disposition of the enemy. He had learned from deserters, that the troops of the great king amounted to twelve hundred thousand, divided into four equal bodies of men, respectively commanded by the four generals, Tissaphernes, Gobrias, Arbaces, and Abracomas. The last, however, had not yet joined; nor did he reach Babylonia until five days after the battle. But, notwithstanding this defect, the numbers of Artaxerxes were still sufficient to perform whatever numbers can accomplish. According to the custom of the East, the king, surrounded by a chosen body of cavalry, occupied the centre of the army, as the place of greatest security, and most convenient for issuing his orders with promptitude and effect. But such was the extent of ground covered by the various nations whom he commanded, that even his centre reached beyond the left wing of the army of Cyrus; who, therefore, called aloud to Clearchus to advance opposite to the king's guard, because, if that should be broken, the work would be done. But Clearchus was unwilling to withdraw the Greeks from the Euphrates, lest they should be surrounded by the enemy; he therefore kept his post, assuring Cyrus of his utmost care to make all go well.

⁶ Xenoph. Anabaz. p. 253. et seq.

⁷ Foster's Geographical Dissertation on Xenophon's Retreat.

⁸ Xenoph. p. 255.

⁹ So it is called by Xenoph. *ibid.*

¹⁰ I have used an indeterminate expression to denote the uncertain situation of those places as described by Strabo, l. ii. et Plut. in Artaxerxes. Mr. Spelman justly

observes, that the error of Xenophon (unnoticed by any former translator,) who makes the distance between Babylon three thousand and sixty stadia, is so enormous, that it can only be owing to a mistake of the transcriber.

¹¹ Xenoph. p. 263.

¹² Xenoph. p. 263, et seq.

The disobedience of Clearchus, and the distrust of Cyrus, threw away the fortune of the day, which involved the fate of Persia, and the renown of Greece. For although, by skilful evolutions, Clearchus eluded the armed chariots and cavalry of the enemy; though the Greeks, by their countenance and shouts alone, put to flight the opposing crowd, who could not endure the sight of their regular array, their burnished arms, or hear without terror the martial sounds of their harmonious *Pœans*, intermixed with the clanging of their spears against their brazen bucklers; yet the great king, perceiving the rapid pursuit of the Greeks, and that nothing opposed him in front, commanded his men to wheel to the left, and advanced with celerity in order to attack the rear of the enemy. If this design had been carried into execution, it is probable that the Greeks, having prevailed on the first onset, would immediately have faced about, and, animated by the joy of victory, and their native ardour, have repelled and routed the troops of Artaxerxes.

But the impatience of Cyrus defeated this favourable prospect. He observed the movement of his brother, and eagerly rode to meet him, at the head of only six hundred horse. Such was the rapid violence of his assault, that the advanced guards of the king were thrown into disorder, and their leader, Artagerxes fell by the hand of Cyrus, who, with all his great qualities, had not learned to distinguish between the duties of a soldier and a general. By a seasonable retreat he might still, perhaps, have saved his life, and gained a crown. But his eye darting along the ranks, met that of his brother. He rushed forward, with a blind instinctive fury, crying out, "I see the man!" and, penetrating the thick globe of attendants, aimed his javelin at the king, pierced his corslet, and wounded his breast. His eagerness to destroy the enemy prevented proper attention to save himself. From an uncertain hand he received a severe wound in the face, which, however, only increased the fury with which he assaulted his brother. Various and inconsistent accounts were given of the death of Cyrus, even by those who assisted in this memorable engagement. The crowd of historians thought it incumbent on them to make him die like the hero of a tragedy, after many vicissitudes of fortune, and many variations of misery. *Dion* and *Ctesias*,¹ the longer to suspend the curiosity of their readers, kill him as with a blunted weapon; but *Xenophon* is contented with saying, that he fell in the tumultuary conflict of his attendants with the guards of Artaxerxes, who zealously defended their respective masters; and that eight of his most confidential friends lay dead upon him, thus sealing with their blood their inviolable affection and fidelity.²

Such was the catastrophe of this audacious and fatal enterprise; after which the troops of Artaxerxes advanced, in the ardour of success, and proceeded without encountering any resistance to the hostile camp; Ariæus leading off the forces of Lesser Asia, dejected and dis-

mayed by the loss of their prince and general. Among the valuable plunder in the tents of Cyrus, the Barbarians found two Grecian women, his favourite mistresses, the elder of Phocæa, the younger of Miletus. The former, whose wit and accomplishments heightened the charms of her beauty, received and deserved the name of *Aspasia*, from the celebrated mistress of Pericles, whose talents she rivalled, and whose character she too faithfully resembled. The young Milesian likewise fell into the hands of the enemy; but while carelessly guarded by the Barbarians, intent on more useful plunder, escaped unobserved, and arrived naked in the quarter of the Greeks, where a small guard had been left to defend the baggage.

Mean while Clearchus, at the head of the Grecian phalanx, pursuing the fugitives, had been carried above the distance of three miles from Artaxerxes. But when he heard that the Barbarians were in his tent; and perceived, that, tired with plunder, they advanced to attack his rear, he faced about in order to receive them. The time was spent till sun-set, in various dispositions made by the cavalry of Artaxerxes; but neither the soldiers, nor their commanders, had courage to come within the reach of the Grecian spear. They fled in scattered disorder, wherever the Grecians advanced; who, wearied with marching against an enemy that seemed incapable to fight, at length determined to return to their camp; wondering that neither Cyrus himself appeared, nor any of his messengers.³ They arrived in the beginning of the night; but found their tents in disorder, their baggage plundered, their provisions destroyed or spent. They chiefly regretted the loss of four hundred carriages filled with wine and flour, which had been provided by the foresight of Cyrus, as a resource in time of want. Even these were rifled by the king's troops; and the Greeks, whom the sudden appearance of the enemy had not allowed to dine, were obliged to pass the night without supper; their bodies exhausted by the fatigue of a laborious day, and their minds perplexed by the uncertain fate of their allies.⁴

At the approach of light, they prepared to move their camp, when the messengers of Ariæus arrived, acquainting them with the death of Cyrus. The new commander, they said, had assembled the troops of Lesser Asia in their former encampment, about twelve miles from the field of battle; where he intended to continue that day, that the Greeks might have time to join him; but if they delayed, he would next day proceed, without them, towards Ionia, with the utmost expedition. When the Greeks recovered from the consternation into which they were thrown by these unexpected and melancholy tidings, Clearchus replied, "Would

³ In relating this battle, I have followed the advice of *Plutarch* in Artaxerxes, who says, "that *Xenophon* has described it with such perspicuity, elegance, and force, as sets the action before the eyes of his reader, and makes him assist with emotion at every incident, not as past, but as present. A man of sense, therefore, will despair to rival *Xenophon*; and, instead of relating the action in detail, will select such circumstances only as are most worthy of notice."

⁴ *Xenoph.* p. 270 et seq.

¹ *Apud Plutarch. in Artaxerx.*

² *Xenoph.* p. 266.

to God Cyrus were alive! but since he is dead, let Ariæus know, that we have conquered the king; that his troops have every where fled before us; and that now no enemy appears to resist our arms. You may, therefore, assure Ariæus, that if he will come hither, we will place him on the Persian throne, which is the just reward of our victory." With this proposal the messengers departed, and Clearchus led his troops to the field of battle, to collect provisions, which were prepared by using for fuel the wooden bucklers, shields, and arrows, of the Barbarians.⁵

Next morning heralds arrived from Artaxerxes, who entertained a very different opinion from that expressed by Clearchus, concerning the issue of the battle. Among these respected ministers was Philinus, a fugitive Greek, a man esteemed by Tissaphernes, both as a skilful captain and as an able negociator. When the chiefs were assembled, Philinus, speaking for his colleagues, declared it to be the will of the great king, who had defeated and killed Cyrus, "That the Greeks, who had now become the slaves of the conqueror, should surrender their arms." The demand was heard with universal indignation. One desired him to tell the king, "to come and take them;" another, "that it was better to die, than to deliver up their arms." Xenophon spoke to the following purpose: "We have nothing, as you see, O Philinus! but our arms, and our valour. While we keep possession of the one, we can avail ourselves of the other: but if we deliver up our arms, we also surrender our persons. Do not therefore expect that we shall throw away the only advantages which we still enjoy; on the contrary, be assured, that, relying on our arms and our valour, we will dispute with you those advantages which you possess." Clearchus enforced the sentiments of Xenophon, which were confirmed by the army; and Philinus, after a fruitless attempt to discover the immediate designs of the Greeks, returned with his colleagues to the Persian camp.⁶

Mean while, Ariæus replied to the honourable embassy which had been sent him, "That there were many Persians of greater consideration than himself, who would never permit him to be their king; he repeated his desire that the Greeks should join him; but, if they declined to come, persisted in his resolution of returning with all haste to Ionia." This proposal was approved by the propitious indications of the victims: the army marched in order of battle to the encampment of Ariæus; who, with the most distinguished of his captains, entered into treaty with the Grecian commanders, binding themselves by mutual oaths to perform to each other the duties of faithful and affectionate allies. Having ratified this engagement by a solemn sacrifice, they proceeded to deliberate concerning their intended journey. It was determined, that instead of traversing the desolated country by which they had arrived at the field of battle, they should direct their course towards the north, by which means they would avoid the desert, acquire provisions in greater

plenty, and cross the great rivers, which commonly diminish near their source, with less difficulty and danger. They resolved also to perform their first marches with all possible expedition, in order to anticipate the king's approach; since with a small force he would not dare to follow, and with a great army he would not be able to overtake them.⁷

This plan of retreat proposed by Ariæus, had the dishonourable appearance of flight; but fortune proved a more glorious conductor. Such was the effect of the Grecian courage and firmness on the counsels of Artaxerxes, that he, who had so lately commanded the soldiers to surrender their arms, sent heralds to them the day following to treat of a truce. This memorable agreement, the consequences of which were so calamitous, yet so honourable to the Greeks, was concluded by the intervention of Tissaphernes; who engaged, on the part of his master, to furnish them with a market, to cause them to be treated as friends in the countries through which they marched, and to conduct them without guile into Greece. For the Greeks, on the other hand, Clearchus and the generals swore, that they should abstain from ravaging the king's territories; that they should supply themselves with meat and drink only, when, by any accident, the market was not provided; but when it was, that they should purchase whatever they wanted for a reasonable price.⁸

When this business was transacted, Tissaphernes returned to the king, promising to come back as soon as possible. But on various pretences, he delayed twenty days; during which the Persians had an opportunity to practise with Ariæus. By the dread of punishment, if he persisted in rebellion; by the promise of pardon, if he returned to his allegiance; and, above all, by the warm solicitation of his kinsmen and friends, that unsteady Barbarian was totally detached from the interest of his Grecian allies. His conduct gave just ground to suspect this disposition, which became fully evident after the return of Tissaphernes. From that moment Ariæus no longer encamped with the Greeks, but preferred the neighbourhood of that perfidious satrap. Yet, for three weeks, no open hostility was committed; the armies, fearing, and feared by each other, pursued the same line of march; Tissaphernes led the way; and, according to agreement, furnished the Greeks with a market; but treacherously increased the difficulty of their journey, by conducting them by many windings through the canals and marches between the Tigris and Euphrates. When they had crossed the former river, they continued to march northward along its eastern banks, always encamping at the distance of two or three miles from the Barbarians. Yet this precaution was unable to prevent the parties sent out to provide wood or forage from quarrelling with each other. From reproachful words, they soon proceeded to hostile actions; and these partial encounters were likely to produce the worst consequences, by inflaming the

⁵ Xenoph. p. 272.

⁶ Id. p. 273.

⁷ Xenoph. p. 276.

⁸ Ibid. p. 281, et seq.

latent, but general animosity, which it had been so difficult to stifle or conceal.¹

At length they arrived at the fatal scene, where the river Zabatus, flowing westward from the mountains of Media, pours its tributary waters into the broad stream of the Tigris. The Grecian generals, and particularly Clearchus, who had long seen and lamented the unfortunate jealousies prevailing among those who had sworn mutual fidelity, proposed a conference between the commanders, in order amicably to explain and remove every ground of hatred and complaint. Tissaphernes and Arisæus, as well as their colleague Orontes, eagerly desired the conference, though their motives were very different from those which actuated Clearchus. A measure so agreeable to both parties was, without difficulty, carried into execution; and the Greeks, on this occasion alone, forsook that prudence and caution, which, both before and after, uniformly governed their conduct. Five generals, and twenty captains, repaired to the tent of Tissaphernes; only two hundred soldiers followed them, under pretence of going to market. Clearchus with his colleagues, Menon, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, were conducted into the satrap's apartment; the rest, whether captains or soldiers, were not allowed to enter. The separation occasioned fear and distrust. The appearance of armed Barbarians increased the terror. A gloomy silence prevailed; when, on a given signal, those within the tent were apprehended, and those without cut to pieces. At the same time the Persian cavalry scoured the plain, destroying whomsoever they encountered. The Greeks were astonished at this mad excursion, which they beheld from their camp; until Nicarchus, an Arcadian, came, miserably mangled, and informed them of the dreadful tragedy that had been acted.²

Upon this intelligence they ran to their arms, expecting an immediate assault. But the cowardly Barbarians, not daring to engage in open and honourable war, endeavoured to accomplish their designs by the same impious treachery with which they had begun them. Instead of advancing in a body to attack the Grecian camp, they sent Arisæus, Arteazus, and Mithridates, persons whose great credit with Cyrus

might prevent their intentions from being suspected by the enemy. They were attended by three hundred Persians, clad in complete armour. When they drew near to the Greeks, a herald called out, "That, if any of the generals or captains were present, they should advance, in order to be made acquainted with the king's pleasure." Cheirisophus the Lacedæmonian, who, next to Clearchus, had hitherto maintained the greatest influence over the army, happened to be absent with a party of foragers. But the remaining generals, Cleanor the Orchomenian, and Sophonetus the Stymphalian, proceeded with caution from the camp, accompanied by Xenophon the Athenian, who (though only a volunteer) followed the commanders, that he might learn what was become of his friend Proxenus.³ When they came within hearing of the Barbarians, Arisæus said, "Clearchus, O Greeks! having violated his oath, and the articles of peace, is punished with just death; but Proxenus and Menon, who gave information of his crimes, are rewarded with the king's favour. Of you the king demands your arms, which, he says, are now his property, because they belonged to Cyrus, who was his slave." Cleanor the Orchomenian, speaking in the name of the rest, replied to this demand with the utmost indignation, reproaching the perfidy of Arisæus, who had betrayed the friends and benefactors of his master Cyrus; and who co-operated with the enemy of that master, the deceitful and impious Tissaphernes. The Persian endeavoured to justify himself, by repeating his accusation of Clearchus. Upon which Xenophon observed, "That Clearchus, if guilty of perjury, had been justly punished; but where are Proxenus and Menon, who are *your* benefactors, and *our* commanders? Let them, at least, be sent to us, since it is evident that their friendship for both parties will make them advise what is best for both." This reasonable request it was impossible to elude; and the Barbarians, after long conferring together, departed without attempting an answer.⁴ Their mean duplicity in this interview sufficiently indicated the unhappy treatment of the Grecian commanders, who were kept in close captivity, and afterwards sent to Artaxerxes, by whose order they were put to death.

¹ Xenoph. p. 282.

² Xenoph. p. 286, et seq.

³ Xenoph. p. 288, et seq.

⁴ Ibid. p. 289.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Consternation of the Greeks—Manly Advice of Xenophon—Their Retreat—Difficulties attending it—Surmounted by their Skill and Perseverance—Their sufferings among the Carduchian Mountains—They traverse Armenia—First behold the Sea from Mount Theches—Defeat the Colchians—Description of the southern Shore of the Euxine—Transactions with the Greek Colonies there—The Greeks arrive at Byzantium—Enter into the Service of Seuthes—His History—Conjunct Expeditions of the Greeks and Thracians—The Greeks return to the Service of their Country.

THE perfidious assassination of their commanders converted the alarm and terror, that had hitherto reigned in the Grecian camp, into consternation and despair. This dreadful catastrophe completed the afflictions of men distant above twelve hundred miles from their native land; surrounded by craggy mountains, deep and rapid rivers; by famine, war, and the treachery of their allies, still more formidable than the resentment of their enemies. The soldiers reflected, that it was dangerous to depart, yet more dangerous to remain; provisions could be acquired only by the point of the sword; every country was hostile; although they conquered one enemy, another would be still ready to receive them; they wanted cavalry to pursue the Barbarians, or to elude their pursuit; victory itself would be fruitless; defeat, certain ruin.

Amidst these melancholy reflections they had spent the greater part of the night; when Xenophon the Athenian, inspired, as he acknowledges, by a favourable dream, and animated, as his conduct proves, by the native vigour of a virtuous mind, roused and emboldened by adversity, undertook, amidst the general dejection and dismay, the care of his own and of the public safety. Having assembled the captains belonging to the division of his beloved Proxenus, he faithfully represented to them their situation, which, dangerous as it was, ought not to sink brave men to despair. Even in the worst circumstances, fortitude, and fortitude alone, could afford relief. They had been deceived, but not conquered, by the Barbarians; whose perfidious violation of faith, friendship, and hospitality, rendered them odious and contemptible to men and gods; the gods, who were the umpires of the contest, and whose assistance could make the cause of justice and valour prevail over every superiority of strength and numbers.⁵

The manly piety of Xenophon was communicated, by a generous sympathy, to the breasts of his hearers; who, dispersing through the various quarters of the camp, summoned together the principal officers in the army. To them Xenophon addressed a similar discourse, encouraging them by every argument that religion, philosophy, experience, and particularly their own experience, and that of the Grecian history, could afford, to expect success from their own bravery, and the favour of heaven, and to disdain the offers of accommodation (if such should be made) from their impious foes, whose insidious friendship had always proved more hurtful than their open enmity.

The hearty approbation of the Spartan Cheirisophus added weight and authority to the persuasive eloquence of the Athenian; who farther exhorted them to substitute commanders in the room of those whom they had lost; to disentangle themselves from every superfluous incumbrance that might obstruct the progress of their march, and to advance with all expedition towards the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates, in the form of a hollow square, having the baggage and those who attended it in the middle, and presenting the valour of their battalions on every side to the enemy. These resolutions were unanimously approved by the council, after which they were referred to the assembled troops, by whom they were readily confirmed, and carried into immediate execution.⁶ Timasion, Xanthicles, Cleanor, Philysias, succeeded to the late commanders; Xenophon supplied the place of Proxenus; and so ably was the ascendant of Spartan and Athenian virtue maintained by him and Cheirisophus, that the names of their unequal colleagues will seldom occur in the following narrative of their retreat.

The greater part of the day had been employed in these necessary measures; and in the afternoon, the troops having passed the Zabatus, pursued their march in the disposition recommended by Xenophon. But they had not proceeded far, before their rear was harassed by the Persian archers and cavalry, which afforded them a very inauspicious presage of the hardships to which they must be continually exposed in eighteen days' journey along the level frontiers of Media. It was difficult to repel these light skirmishers, and impossible to attack them without being exposed to considerable loss; because a detachment of heavy-armed men, or even of targeteers, could not overtake them in a short space, nor could they continue the pursuit without being cut off from the rest of the army. Xenophon, with more valour than prudence, tried the unfortunate experiment; but was obliged to retreat fighting, and brought back his men wounded, disheartened, and disgraced.⁷

But this unfortunate event neither disheartened nor disgraced the commander. He ingenuously acknowledged his error, which, pernicious as it was, had taught the Greeks their wants. They wanted cavalry and light-armed troops; the former of which might be obtained by equipping for war the baggage-horses which had been taken from the enemy; and the latter might be supplied by the Rhodians (well skilled in the sling,) of whom there were great num-

⁵ Xenoph. p. 295.

⁶ Xenoph. p. 299.

⁷ Ibid. p. 305, et seq.

bers in the army. This advice was approved; a company of fifty horsemen was soon raised, the men vying with each other to obtain the honour of this distinguished service; and two hundred Rhodians were drawn from the ranks, who furnished themselves with slings and leaden balls, which they threw twice as far as the stones employed by the Barbarians. The horsemen wore buff coats and corslets; they were commanded by Lycius the Athenian.¹

The utility of these preparations was discovered as soon as the enemy renewed their assaults, with a thousand horse, and four thousand slingers and archers. The newly-raised troops advanced with boldness and celerity, being assured that their unequal attack would be sustained by the targeteers and heavy-armed men. But the Persians, not waiting to receive them, fled in scattered disorder; the Greeks pursued, took many prisoners, made great slaughter, and mangled the bodies of the slain, in order to terrify, by such a dreadful spectacle of revenge, their cowardly and perfidious enemies.²

After this advantage, the army continued to march along the banks of the Tigris, and the western boundaries of Media, meeting with many rich and populous villages, from which they were supplied with provisions; and admiring, as they passed along, the immense walls, the lofty and durable pyramids, the spacious but deserted cities, which testified the ancient greatness of that flourishing kingdom, before the Medes reluctantly submitted to the oppressive government of Persia. The Barbarians still endeavoured to annoy them, but with very little success, unless when they passed a bridge, or any narrow defile. On such occasions, the square form, in which they had hitherto marched, was found doubly inconvenient.³ In order to traverse such a passage, the soldiers were obliged to close the wings, and to crowd into a narrow space, which disordered the ranks, and made them obstruct each other. When they had crossed the bridge or defile, they were again obliged to run with all haste, in order to extend the wings, and resume their ranks, which occasioned a void in the centre, and much disheartened the men, thus exposed to the sudden attack of the pursuers.

To obviate both inconveniences, the Greeks separated from the army six companies, each consisting of a hundred men. These were subdivided into smaller bodies, of fifty and twenty-five, each division of the company, as well as the whole, commanded by proper officers. When it became necessary to close the wings, in order to pass a defile, these troops staid behind, thus disburdening the army of a superfluous mass, and thereby enabling them to proceed without confusion in their ranks. After the passage was effected, the army might again extend the wings, and assume the same loose arrangement as before, without exposing the centre to danger; because the vacuity left there was immediately supplied by the detached companies; the opening, if small, being filled up by the six divisions of a hundred men

each; if larger, by the twelve divisions of fifty; and if very large, by the twenty-four divisions of twenty-five;⁴ as the same number of men, in proportion to the number of columns into which they were divided, would occupy a wider extent of ground.⁵

With this useful precaution the Greeks performed a successful march to the mountains of the Carduchians, where the enemy's cavalry could no longer annoy them. But here they found new difficulties, far more formidable than those with which they had hitherto been obliged to contend. The Tigris, on their left, was so deep and rapid, that the passage appeared absolutely impracticable. Before them rose the high and craggy mountains, which overshadowed the river, inhabited by a warlike race of men, whose barbarous independence had always defied the hostilities of Persia, as that of their successors, the modern Curdes, does the arms of the Turk, to whom they are but nominally subject.⁷ While the Greeks doubted what course to pursue, a certain Rhodian undertook to deliver them from their perplexity, provided they gave him a talent, to reward his labour. "I shall want, besides," continued he, "two thousand leather bags, which may be obtained by flaying the sheep, goats, oxen, and asses, which the country affords in such numbers as we see around us. The skins may be blown, tied at the ends, and fastened together by the girths belonging to the sumpter horses, then covered with fascines, and lastly with earth. I shall use large stones instead of anchors; every bag will bear two men, whom the fascines and earth will prevent from slipping, and whom, with very little labour on their part, the rapidity of the current will waft across the river."⁸

This ingenious contrivance was commended, but not carried into execution; the Grecians having learned from some prisoners recently taken, that the road through the country of the Carduchians would soon conduct them to the spacious and plentiful province of Armenia. Thither they fearlessly penetrated, regardless of the report, that under a former reign, a Persian army of a hundred and twenty thousand men had been cut off by those fierce barbarians, whose manners were more rude and inhospitable than the mountains which they inhabited. At the approach of the Greeks, the Carduchians retired to their fastnesses, leaving the villages in the plain at the mercy of the invaders. The troops were restrained from injury; but their inoffensive behaviour, and kind invitations to peace, were regarded with contempt by the common enemies of the Greeks, of the Persians, and of human kind. They

⁴ Xenoph. 310.

⁵ I have explained this matter minutely, because the words of Xenophon are mistaken by great military writers. Major Mauvillon, a skilful engineer and excellent scholar, proposes a transposition of the words of Xenophon, that the greater gaps may be filled up by the greater divisions. He justly observes, that no translator or commentator has taken notice of the difficulty that naturally presents itself on reading the passage, which, however, I hope is sufficiently perspicuous in the text. See *l'Essai sur l'Influence de la Poudre à Canon*, &c. a work which, I believe, no military man can read without receiving from it instruction and entertainment.

⁶ Xenoph. p. 315.

⁸ Xenoph. p. 314.

⁷ Rauwolf's Travels.

¹ Xenoph. p. 307.

² Ibid. 308.

³ Ibid. p. 310.

seized every opportunity to obstruct the march of the army; and though unprepared for a close engagement, used with extraordinary effect their bows, three cubits long, which they bent by pressing the lower part with their left foot. The arrows were near as long as the bows; and their irresistible points pierced the firmest shields and corslets. The Greeks employed their skill in tactics, and their valour, to elude, or to repel, the assault of these dangerous foes, from whom they suffered more in seven days than they had done in as many weeks from the bravest troops of Artaxerxes.⁹ At length they arrived at the river Centrites, two hundred feet broad, which forms the southern boundary of Armenia, having just reason to rejoice that they had escaped the weapons of the Carduchians, whose posterity, the Parthians,¹⁰ with the same arms and address, became formidable to Rome, when Rome was formidable to the world.¹¹

The month of January was employed in traversing the fruitful plains of Armenia,¹² which are beautifully diversified by hills of easy ascent. Teribazus, the Persian governor of the province, entered into an agreement with the generals, that if they abstained from hostilities, he would not obstruct their march, but furnish them plentifully with provisions. But this league was perfidiously violated. The Greeks had recourse to arms; pursued Teribazus; assaulted and plundered his camp.¹³ Next day they were exposed to a more dangerous contest, in which neither skill nor valour could avail. The snow fell in such quantities during the night, as completely covered the men with their arms. Their bodies were benumbed and parched with the piercing coldness of the north wind. Many slaves and sumpter horses perished, with about thirty soldiers. The rest could scarcely be persuaded by Xenophon to put themselves in motion, which was known to be the only remedy for their distress; and as the severity of the weather still continued during the remainder of their march through Armenia, several soldiers lost their sight by the glare of the snow, and their toes and fingers by the intenseness of the cold.¹⁴ The eyes were best defended by wearing something black before them; the feet were preserved by constant motion in the day, and by stripping bare in the night.

From Armenia they proceeded to the country of the Taochians, who, alarmed by the approach of an unknown enemy, had abandoned the valleys, and taken refuge on the mountains, with their wives, children, and cattle. Hither also they had conveyed all their provisions; so that the Greeks were obliged to attack these fastnesses, otherwise the army must have been starved. The Barbarians boldly defended them, by letting fly innumerable volleys of stones

down the precipices. But this artillery was at length exhausted; the Greeks became masters of the heights; and a dreadful scene followed. The women first threw their children down the rocks, and then themselves. The men imitated this frantic example of despair; so that the assailants made few prisoners, but took a considerable quantity of sheep, oxen, and asses.¹⁵

From thence the army proceeded with uncommon celerity through the bleak and rocky country of the Chalybeans; marching, in seven days about a hundred and fifty miles. The Chalybeans were the fiercest nation in all those parts. They wore, for their defence, linen corslets, greaves, and helmets; they carried a short falchion at their girdles; and attacked with pikes fifteen cubits long. Instead of discovering any symptoms of flight or fear, they sang, danced, and rejoiced, at the approach of an enemy. They boldly defended their villages, not declining even a close engagement with the Greeks; who could supply themselves with nothing from this inhospitable and warlike country, but, in their dangerous march through it, subsisted entirely on the cattle lately taken from the Taochians.¹⁶

The river Harpasus, four hundred feet broad, separated the territories of the Chalybeans and Scythians. From the latter the Greeks met with little resistance, in a march of thirteen days, which brought them to the lofty mount Theches, a place held in particular devotion by the inhabitants of the neighbouring territory. The vanguard had no sooner ascended this sacred mountain, than the army were alarmed by loud shouts, which continued to redouble with increasing violence. It was imagined that some new form of danger had appeared, or that some new enemy was ready to assail them. The rear advanced with all possible expedition to the assistance of their companions; but having arrived within hearing, were seized with the most pleasing astonishment, when their ears were saluted from every quarter with the repetition, "The sea! the sea!" the sight of which, a sight so long wished in vain, at first filled them with transports of tumultuous joy, and afterwards recalled more distinctly the remembrance of their parents, their friends, their country, and every object of their most tender concern.¹⁷ The soldiers, with tears in their eyes, embraced each other, and embraced their commanders; and then, as by a sudden consent of sympathy (for it was never known by whose orders,) heaped up a mount of stones, which they covered with barbaric arms, as a trophy of their memorable journey through so many fierce and hostile nations.

The distant prospect of the Euxine made them forget that they had not yet attained the end of their labours. A space, indeed, of less than sixty miles intervened; but it was covered by the trackless forests of the Macronians, and by the abrupt and intricate windings of the Colchian mountains. A fortunate circumstance enabled them without difficulty to surmount the

⁹ Xenoph. p. 213—226.

¹⁰ Strabo, l. xvi. p. 515.

¹¹ Plut. in Crasso et Marc. Anton.

¹² There the Greeks found πάντα τὰ βρώσιμα, ὅσα ἰστίον ἀγαθὰ, ἰέρια, σίτον, οἶνους παλαιούς, ὑμνίδας, ἀστραφίδας, ὅσπρια παντοδαπά; "all kinds of necessaries, and even luxuries, victims, corn, old fragrant wines, dried grapes, and all sorts of pulse."

¹³ Xenoph. p. 328.

¹⁴ Xenoph. p. 329. et seq.

¹⁵ Xenophon, p. 338.

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 379.

¹⁶ Ibid. 338.

first of those obstacles. Among the Grecian targeteers was a man who understood the language of the Barbarians. He had been carried to Athens in his youth, where he had served as a slave. At the sight of the Macronians, he recognized his long-forgotten countrymen; and having addressed them in terms of friendship and respect, engaged them to exchange presents, and to enter into alliance with the Greeks,¹ whom they plentifully supplied with provisions, and having cut down the trees that interrupted their passage, conducted them in three days to the western frontier of Colchos.

This country, so famous in the fables of antiquity,² was inhabited by an ancient colony of Egyptians, who long preserved pure from any foreign admixture, not only their original language, but the singular manners, and the more singular rites and ceremonies, of their mother country.³ Though distinguished in other respects from the neighbouring nations, whom they detested, and to whom they seemed detestable, they agreed with them in their jealousy of the Greeks, whose flourishing colonies along the southern shores of the Euxine threatened the safety of their dominions. They assembled therefore from all quarters, occupied the heights, and prepared to dispute the passage with obstinacy. Their numbers, their discipline, their arms, but, still more, their situation, rendered them formidable. If the Greeks advanced in a phalanx, or full line, their ranks would be broken by the inequalities of the ground, the centre would be disordered, and the superior numbers of the enemy would outreach either wing.⁴ These inconveniences might partly be remedied by making such parts of the line, as had an easy ascent, wait for the slow and difficult progress of their companions through more abrupt and inaccessible mountains; and, by extending the phalanx in length, and leaving very few men in file, their front might be rendered equal to that of the Colchians. But the first of these operations would have too long exposed the army to the darts and arrows of the Barbarians, and the second would have so much enfeebled the line, as must have rendered it liable to be penetrated. Amidst this choice of difficulties, Xenophon proposed, and the proposal was readily approved by his colleagues, that the heavy-armed men should be divided into companies of a hundred each, and that each division should be thrown into a separate column. The wide intervals between the columns might thus enable the smaller army to extend on the right and left beyond the enemy's line; each company or division might ascend the mountain wherever they found it most convenient; the bravest men might be led first to the charge; the depth of the columns⁵ could not possibly be penetrated; nor could the enemy fall into the intervals between them, with-

out being cut off by the divisions on either side, which might be arranged in such a manner as to relieve, encourage, and support each other.

This judicious disposition was attended with the expected success. The heavy-armed men formed eighty companies; the targeteers and archers, divided into three bodies, each of about six hundred men, flanked the army on the right and left. Their third division, consisting chiefly of Arcadians, occupied a distinguished place in the centre. Thus disposed for battle, the wings of the Grecian army, and particularly the targeteers and archers, who were most capable of expedition, advanced with celerity to the attack. The enemy, who saw them approach, and who perceived that on either hand they outreached their line, fled to the right and left in order to receive them. By this movement they left a void in their centre, towards which the Arcadian targeteers, supported by the nearest columns, advanced with rapidity, and soon gained the summit. They could thus fight on equal terms with the Barbarians, who, thinking they had lost all when they lost the advantage of the ground, no longer offered resistance, but fled on every side with disordered trepidation, leaving the Greeks masters of the field of battle, as well as of the numerous villages in that neighbourhood,⁶ and within two days' march of the Euxine sea, without any other enemy to oppose their long-disputed passage thither.

The southern shore of the Euxine, which actually presents one uniform scene of effeminate indolence and sullen tyranny, anciently contained many barbarous but warlike tribes, totally independent on each other, and scarcely acknowledging any dependence on the king of Persia. That part which extends towards the east and the borders of Mount Caucasus, and which afterwards formed the kingdom of the great Mithridates, was inhabited by the Colchians, Drillians, Mysonæcians, and Tybareniens; the middle division was possessed by the Paphlagonians, who gloried in the irresistible prowess of their numerous cavalry; and the western parts, extending two hundred miles from Heraclea to the Thracian Bosphorus, were occupied by the inhospitable Bithynians; a colony of Thrace, who excelled and delighted in war, which, like their ancestors in Europe, they carried on with a savage fury.⁷

Amidst the formidable hostility of those numerous nations, arose, at wide intervals, several Grecian cities, which enlivened the barbaric gloom, and displayed the peculiar glory of their arts and arms. Sinopé, the mother and the queen of those cities, was advantageously situated on a narrow isthmus which joined its territory, consisting in a small but fertile peninsula,⁸ to the province of Paphlagonia. The foundation of Sinopé remounted to the highest antiquity, and was ascribed to Antolycus, one of the Argonauts.⁹ The city was afterwards in-

1 Xenoph. p. 340.

2 See p. 14, et seq.

3 Herodot. l. xi. c. civ.

4 Idem, p. 341.

5 The *λοχος ορθιος* is defined by Arian to be a body of men, with the files longer than the ranks; that is, with more men in depth than in front. The *φάλαγγξ*, without any epithet, means the contrary. But the *φάλαγγξ ορθία* is an army, as the same author tells us, *ὅταν ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ πορεύηται*, that is, having more men in depth than in front, and employing, for some extraordinary reason, what is naturally the line of march as an order of battle.

6 Xenoph. p. 342.

7 See Dionysius Periegetes, and Arrian's Periplus.

8 Tournefort, v. iii. p. 46. says it is about six miles in circumference.

9 See the account of the Argonautic expedition, p. 15, et seq. Strabo, l. xii. p. 548. who gives us this information, says further, that Lucillus, when he took the town, carried away the statue of Antolycus.

creased by a powerful accession of Milesians. It possessed convenient harbours on either side of the isthmus. The peninsula was surrounded by sharp rocks, which rendered it inaccessible to an enemy; and the sea abounded with the tunny fish, which flow in shoals from the Palus Mæotis, where they are supposed to be bred,¹⁰ to the Euxine and Propontis.

Such multiplied advantages rendered the Sinopians populous and powerful. They diffused their colonies to the east and west. It is not improbable that they founded Heraclea,¹¹ on the frontier of Bithynia; and it is certain that they built Cotyora in the territory of the Tybarensians, Cerasus in that of the Mysonæcians, and Trapezus in that of the Drillians.

Trapezus, or Trebizond, was the first friendly city at which the Grecians arrived, after spending more than a twelvemonth in almost continual travelling and war. The numerous inhabitants of this flourishing sea-port, which has now decayed into the much-neglected harbour of Platana,¹² received them with open arms, generously supplied their wants, and treated them with all that endearing yet respectful hospitality of kinsmen, who commiserated their sufferings and admired their virtue. The Grecians, on their part, displayed a very just and becoming sense of the evils which they had escaped, and of their actual security. In the fervour of religious gratitude they paid the solemn vows and sacrifices which they had promised to Jupiter the preserver, and the other gods and heroes, whose bountiful protection had hitherto conducted them through so many known, and so many concealed dangers. They afterwards celebrated, with much pomp and festivity, the gymnastic games and exercises; an entertainment equally agreeable to themselves, to the citizens of Trebizond, and to the divinities whom they both adored. When these essential duties, for such the Greeks deemed them, had been performed with universal satisfaction, the soldiers, who were unwilling to be burdensome to their Trebizontian friends, found sufficient employment in providing for their own subsistence, and that of their numerous attendants. For several days they ravaged the neighbouring villages of the Colchians and Drillians; and while they cruelly harassed the enemies, they carefully respected the allies, of Trebizond. Their repeated devastations at length desolated the country immediately around them, so that the foraging parties could no longer set out and return on the same day; nor could they penetrate deep into the territory, without being endangered by the nocturnal assaults of the Barbarians. These circumstances rendered it necessary for them to think of leaving Trebi-

zond; on which account an assembly was convened to fix the day of their departure, and to regulate the mode and plan of their future journey.¹³

In this important deliberation the soldiers very generally embraced the opinion of Antileon of Thuria, who told them that, for his part, he was already tired with packing up his baggage, marching, running, mounting guard, and fighting, and now wished, after all his labours, to perform the remainder of the journey like Ulysses, and, stretched out at his ease, to be carried asleep¹⁴ into Greece. That this pleasing proposal might be put in execution, Cheirisophus sailed to the Hellespont, hoping to obtain ships from Anaxibius, who commanded the Spartan fleet in that sea. But in case such a request could not be conveniently granted, the soldiers determined to demand a few ships of war from the inhabitants of Trebizond, with which they intended to put to sea, and capture whatever merchantmen they could meet with in the Euxine, in order to employ them as transports.¹⁵

Several weeks elapsed without bringing any news of Cheirisophus, or promising any hope of assistance from the Spartan admiral. Mean while the Grecian pirates, for they deserve no better name, infested the Euxine sea. Dexippus, the Lacedæmonian, with a degree of perfidy worthy of his commission, betrayed his companions, and sailed off with the galley which he commanded.¹⁶ But Polycrates, the Athenian, behaved with an ardour and fidelity which even robbers sometimes display in their transactions with each other; and his successful diligence soon collected such a number of vessels as served to transport to Cerasus the aged, the infirm, the women and baggage; while the strength of the army, consisting of men below forty years of age, reached the same place in three days' march.¹⁷

The colony of Cerasus, or Cerazent, was delightfully situated near the sea, among hills of easy ascent, covered in every age¹⁸ with whole woods of cherry-trees, from which, in all probability, the place derived its name.¹⁹ From thence the voluptuous Lucullus, in the six hundred and eightieth year of Rome, first brought into Italy this delicious fruit, which ancient naturalists scarcely believed capable of thriving in

13 Xenoph. 343. et seq.

14 Thus was Ulysses transported by the Phæacians, who placed him sleeping on the shore of Ithaca:

Οι δὲ εὐδόντ' ἐν νηὶ βόη ἐτι πόντον ἄγοντες
Κυτθίσαν εἰν Ἰθάκῃ, *Odyss.* xiii. 134.

The beautiful images which the poet, in the same book, gives of the pleasures of rest, after immoderate labour, played about the fancy of Antileon:

Καὶ τὴν ἐνδύμοις ὑπνὸς ἐπὶ βλεφάρουσιν ἐπίπτε
Νηλεΐδος, ἡδίστος, θανάτω ἀγχιότατοιοικας. *v.* 80.

And again, "The ship cut the waves with a rapidity, which the flight of the swiftest hawk could not accompany, carrying a man.

Ὅς πρὶν μὲν μάλ' ἀπὸ πολλὰ πηδ' ἄλγος ἐν κατὰ θυμὸν,
Ἀνδρῶν τε πτολίεθρος, ἀλγέειν τε κυμάτων πείρων·
Δὴ τότε γ' ἄγχιμας εὐδῆ, λελασμένος ὅσσ' ἐκπρονέει."

15 Xenoph. p. 345.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid. p. 349.

18 Tournefort.

19 Κεράσος, cerasus, cerise, cherry. For a similar reason Tadmor in the desert was called Palmyra, a *palmis*, the palm tree. Tournefort mentions it as the opinion of St. Jerom, that the place gave name to the fruit. The difference is not material.

10 Tournefort, Voyage au Levant.

11 Strabo, l. xii. p. 542. calls Heraclea a colony of the Milesians, by whom we may understand the Sinopians, who were themselves a colony of that people. Xenophon, however, called Heraclea a colony of Megareans. Xenoph. Anab. p. 358.

12 Tournefort, l. xvii. This place, however, is still large but depopulated; containing more woods and gardens than houses, and those only of one story; yet the town retains the form of an oblong square, the modern walls being built on the ruins of the ancient, the shape of which occasioned the name of Trapezus, from the Greek word signifying a table. Tournefort, *ibid.*

an Italian sky; but which actually adorns the bleakest and most northern regions of our own island. At Cerasus the Greeks remained ten days, disposing of their booty, supplying their wants, and reviewing the army, which still amounted to eight thousand six hundred men, the rest having perished by fatigue, war, cold, and sickness.¹

After this necessary delay, the less active portion again embarked, while the vigorous youth pursued their journey through the romantic country of the Mosynæcians; a barbarous, yet powerful tribe, who received their singular denomination from the wooden houses, or rather towers, which they inhabited;² and which, either by chance or design, were scattered in such a manner among the hills and valleys, that at the distance of eight miles, the villages could hear and alarm each other.³ The army next proceeded through the dark and narrow district of the Chalybeans, who subsisted by the working of iron; and whose toilsome labours, rugged mountains, and more rugged manners,⁴ must have formed a striking contrast with the smiling plains, the pastoral life,⁵ the innocent and hospitable character of their Tyberenian neighbours; who treated the Greeks with every mark of friendship and respect, and conducted them, with attentive civility, to the city of Cotyora.

It might be expected, that the army, having reached the country of their friends and kinsmen, should have been disposed peaceably to enjoy the fruits of their past labours and dangers. If they were unwilling to expose themselves to fresh hostilities from the warlike inhabitants of Paphlagonia and Bithynia, they might have waited the arrival of ships from Sinopé and Heraclea, or from the Spartan admiral in the Hellespont, who would either retain them in his own service, or transport them to the Chersonesus, to Byzantium, and to other cities and territories, which, being lately conquered by Sparta, required the vigilant protection of brave and numerous garrisons. But it is more easy for men to repel the assaults of external violence, than to elude the effects of their own ungovernable passions. The Greeks were involved in real danger, in proportion as they attained apparent security. During the long course of their laborious journey, the terror of unknown Barbarians hanging over them, preserved their discipline and their union. But the air of a Grecian colony at once dissolved both. They, who in the remote regions of the East had acted with one soul, and regarded each other as brethren, again felt the unhappy influence of their provincial distinctions. The army was divided by separate interests, as well as by partial attachments. Those who had acquired wealth, desired to return home to enjoy it. Those who were destitute of fortune, longed to plunder friends and foes, Greeks and Barbarians. The commanders despised and deceived the troops; the troops clamoured against, and insulted the commanders. Both were really in

the wrong; and both suspected and accused each other of imaginary crimes, of which none were guilty.

Xenophon, who, with wonderful address, has justified himself from every reproach⁶ that can reflect either on his understanding or his heart, does not deny an imputation to which he was exposed by discovering (somewhat, perhaps, unseasonably) the just and extensive views of a philosopher. When he surveyed the southern shores of the Euxine, covered in ancient times, as well as they are at present, with tall and majestic forest trees, admirably adapted to ship-building; when he considered the convenience of the harbours, and the productions of the neighbouring territory, consisting in flax, iron, and every commodity most necessary in raising a naval power, he was ambitious of establishing a new settlement, which the numbers, the valour, and the activity of his followers, must soon render superior to the other Grecian colonies on the Euxine, or perhaps in any part of Asia. But this noble design, which might have proved so useful and honourable to the army, was blasted by the mean jealousy of his enemies. Xenophon was reproached with forming projects equally romantic and dangerous; and accused of an intention to keep the soldiers from home, that they might continue dependent on himself, and that he might increase his own fame and fortune at the risk of the public safety.⁷

The mutinous and distracted spirit of the troops rendered all their future measures weak and wavering. The terror which they inspired, and their wants, which it was necessary to supply, made them very unwelcome guests at Cotyora, Sinopé, and Heraclea, at which places they continued several months, under pretence of waiting for transports, but mean while plundering the neighbouring country, laying the cities under contribution, and threatening them with burdens that exceeded their faculties. The inhabitants of Heraclea, while they affected to consider those unreasonable demands, removed their effects from the villages, shut the gates of their city, and placed armed men on the walls. Cheirisophus had by this time returned with vessels from Anaxibius, the Spartan admiral, but not sufficiently numerous to transport so great an army. The soldiers thus disappointed of their hopes, and discontented with their commanders, and with each other, rashly undertook, in separate bodies, the dangerous journey through Bithynia, a country extending two hundred miles from Heraclea to Byzantium, and totally inhabited, or rather wasted, by the Thynians, a Thracian tribe, the most cruel and inhospitable of the human race. In this expedition they lost above a thousand men; and the destruction must have been much greater, had not the generous activity of Xenophon seasonably led his own division to the assistance of those who had deserted his standard. Cheirisophus was soon afterwards killed by a medicine which he had taken in a fever. The sole command devolved on Xenophon; not by appointment, but by the voluntary submission of

¹ Xenoph. p. 349.

³ Xenoph. p. 351.

⁵ Dionysius Periegetes qualifies them by the epithet *πολυγενής*, abounding in sheep.

² *Μοσύναι* and *οικισμοί*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 354.

⁶ Xenoph. p. 367.

⁷ Xenoph. p. 259, et seq.

the troops to his superior mind. He at length taught them to defeat the irregular fury of the Thynians; and after taking many slaves and much useful booty, conducted them in safety to Chrysopolis,⁸ which is now known by the name of Scutari, and considered as the Asiatic suburb of Constantinople.

The neighbourhood of a Grecian colony seemed infectious to the temper of the troops. At Byzantium their mutinous spirits were again thrown into fermentation. Cleander, the governor of that city, who had come to meet them, narrowly escaped death during the fury of a military sedition. Their behaviour rendered them the objects of terror to all the inhabitants of those parts. The Lacedæmonians dreaded the assistance of such dangerous allies; and the satrap Pharnabazus, alarmed for the safety of his province, practised with Anaxibius, who commanded in the Hellespont, to allure them, by fair promises, into Europe. Gained by the bribes of the Persian, not only Anaxibius, but his successor Aristarchus, made proposals of advantage to the army, which he had not any intention to fulfil. The troops, enraged at this disappointment, and still more at the treachery of the Spartan commanders, would have attacked and plundered Byzantium, had they not been restrained by the wisdom and authority of Xenophon, who, struggling like a skilful pilot against the violence of a tempest, prevented the execution of a measure which must have exposed them to immediate danger, and covered them with eternal infamy.⁹

With tears and prayers, he conjured them "not to tarnish, by the destruction of a Grecian city, the glory of a campaign signalized by so many illustrious victories over the Barbarians. What hopes of safety could they entertain, if, after unsuccessfully attempting to dethrone the king of Persia, they should provoke the resentment of Sparta? Destitute as they were of friends, of money, of subsistence; and reduced by their misconduct to a handful of men, could they expect to insult with impunity the two greatest powers in the world? The experience of late years ought to correct their folly. They had seen that even Athens, in the zenith of her greatness, possessed of four hundred galleys, an annual revenue of a thousand talents, and ten times that sum in her treasury; Athens, who commanded all the islands, and occupied many cities both in Asia and Europe, among which was Byzantium itself, the present object of their frantic ambition, had yielded to the arms of Sparta, whose authority was actually acknowledged in every part of Greece. What madness, then, for men in their friendless condition, a mixed assemblage of different nations, to attack the dominions of a people whose valour was irresistible, and from whose vengeance it was impossible for them to fly, without flying from their country, and taking refuge among those hostile Barbarians, from whom, for near two years past, they had met with nothing but cruelty, injustice, persecution, and treachery?"

The judicious representations of Xenophon saved Byzantium; but it is probable that nei-

ther the weight of argument, nor the power of eloquence, would have long restrained the discontented and needy troops from attempting other enterprises of a similar nature, if an opportunity had not fortunately presented itself of employing their dangerous activity in the service of Seuthes, a bold and successful adventurer of Lower Thrace. Mæsadæ, the father of Seuthes, reigned over the Melandepians, the Thynians, and the Thracians, who inhabited the European shores of the Propontis and Euxine sea. The licentious turbulence of his subjects, compelled him to fly from his dominions. He took refuge with Medocus, king of the Odrysians, the most powerful tribe in Upper Thrace, with whose family his own had long been connected by the sacred ties of hospitality. Medocus kindly received, and generously entertained, the father; and, after his decease, continued the same protection and bounty to his son, Seuthes. But the independent spirit of the young prince disdained, as he expresses it, to live like a dog at another man's table. He desired horses and soldiers from Medocus, that he might acquire subsistence for himself. His request was granted; his incursions were successful; the terror of his name filled all the maritime parts of Thrace; and there was reason to believe that if he could join the Grecian forces to his own, he might easily regain possession of his hereditary dominions.¹⁰

For this purpose he sent to Xenophon Medosades, a Thracian, who, understanding the Greek language, usually served him as ambassador. The terms of the treaty were soon agreed on. Seuthes promised each soldier a cyzicene (about eighteen shillings sterling,) the captains two cyzicenes, and the generals four, of monthly pay. The money, it was observed, would be clear gain, as they might subsist by plundering the country; yet such of the booty as was not of a perishable nature, Seuthes reserved for himself, that by selling it in the maritime towns, he might provide for the pay of his new auxiliaries.¹¹

Having communicated their designs to the army, the Grecian commanders followed Medosades to the camp of Seuthes, which was distant about six miles from the coast of Perinthus, a city of considerable note in the neighbourhood of Byzantium. They arrived after sun-set, but found the Barbarians awake and watchful. Seuthes himself was posted in a strong tower; horses ready bridled stood at the gate; large fires blazed at a distance, while the camp itself was concealed in darkness; precautions, however singular, yet necessary against the Thynians, who were deemed, of all men, the most dangerous enemies in the night. The Greeks were permitted to enter. Seuthes received them with rustic hospitality; before entering on business, challenged them to drink in large horns full of wine; then confirmed the promises of his ambassador; and still farther allured Xenophon by the hopes of receiving, besides the stipulated pay, lands and cattle, and an advantageous establishment on the seashore.

⁸ Xenoph. p. 277, et seq.

⁹ Xenoph. p. 399, et seq.

¹⁰ Xenoph. p. 303, et seq.

¹¹ Idem, ibid

Next day the Grecian army joined the camp of their new master. The commanders were again entertained with a copious feast, in which Seuthes displayed all his magnificence. After supper, the buffoons and dancers were introduced, the cup went briskly round, and the whole assembly were dissolved in merriment. But Seuthes knew how far to indulge, and when to restrain, the joys of festivity. Without allowing his revels to disturb the stillness of the night, he rose with a martial shout, imitating a man who avoided a javelin; and then addressing the Grecian captains without any sign of intoxication, desired them to have their men ready to march in a few hours, that the enemy, who were as yet unacquainted with the powerful reinforcement which he had received, might be taken unprepared, and conquered by surprise.¹

The camp was in motion at midnight; it was the middle of winter, and the ground was in many parts covered with a deep snow. But the Thracians, clothed in skins of foxes, were well prepared for such nocturnal expeditions. The Greeks suffered much² by the cold; but the rapidity of their march, animated by the certain prospect of success, made them forget their sufferings. Wherever they arrived, the villages were attacked and plundered, the houses were burned, many captives and cattle were taken, and the ravages of that bloody night sufficiently represent the uniform scene of cruelty, by which, in the course of a few weeks, Seuthes compelled into submission the inhabitants of that fertile and populous slip of land that lies between the Euxine and Propontis. But the possession of this territory, which formed the most valuable portion of his hereditary dominions, could not satisfy his ambition. He turned his arms northwards, and overran the country about Salmydessus, a maritime city situate at the mouth of a river of the same name, which flows from the southern branch of mount Hæmus into a spacious bay

1 Xenoph. p. 406. et seq.

2 Ην δὲ χιών πολλή, καὶ ψυχρὸς οὗτος ὥστε τὸ ὕδωρ οἱ ἐσθροῦντο ἐπὶ δειπνόν, ἐπὶ γυνυτο, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀγγυίοις· καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πολλὰ καὶ εἰς ἀπικκιστο καὶ ὠτα. There was much snow, and the cold so intense, that the water froze as they were carrying it to supper, and the wine in the vessels. Many of the Greeks also lost their ears and noses. Xenoph. p. 408.

of the Euxine. There the allied army repeated the same destructive havoc which they had already made in the south; and avenged, by their cruel incursions, the cause of violated hospitality; for the Barbarians of those parts were so much accustomed to plunder the vessels which were often ship-wrecked on their shoaly coast, that they had distinguished it by pillars, in the nature of land-marks, to prevent intestine quarrels, by ascertaining the property of the spoil.³

In the space of two months after his junction with the Greeks, Seuthes extended his possessions several days' march from the sea; his numerous, but unskilful enemies, fighting singly were successively subdued; each vanquished tribe increased the strength of his army; the Odrysians, allured by the hopes of plunder, flocked to his standard, and the growing prosperity of his fortune, no longer requiring the support, disposed him to neglect the services, of his Grecian auxiliaries.⁴ The ungrateful levity of the Barbarian was encouraged by the perfidious counsels of his favourite Heraclides of Maronea, one of those fugitive Greeks, who having merited punishment at home for their wickedness, obtained distinction abroad by their talents; men sullied with every vice, prepared alike to die or to deceive, and who having provoked the resentment of their own countrymen by their intrigues and their audacity, often acquired the esteem of foreigners by their valour and eloquence, their skill in war, and dexterity in negotiation. Heraclides strongly exhorted his master to defraud the Greeks of their pay, and to deliver himself from their troublesome importunities, by dismissing them from his service. But the fears, rather than the delicacy of Seuthes, prevented him from complying with this advice; he lost his honour without saving his money; and the Grecian generals had an early opportunity to reproach his perfidy and ingratitude, being soon called to engage in a more honourable war,⁵ kindled by the resentment of Artaxerxes against the presumption of the Spartans, who had so strenuously supported the unfortunate rebellion of Cyrus.

3 Xenoph. p. 408.

5 Idem. p. 427.

4 Idem. p. 414, et seq.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Tissaphernes makes War on the Greeks, by order of Artaxerxes—Attacks the Æolian Cities—Expedition of Thimbron—He is succeeded by Dercyllidas—His treaty with Tissaphernes—Agesilaus King of Sparta—Cinadon's Conspiracy—Agesilaus Commander of the Grecian Forces in Asia—His Success—Tissaphernes succeeded by Tithraustes—Great Views of Agesilaus—War kindled in Greece—League against Sparta—Campaign of Lysander in Bœotia—His Death.

IT does honour rather to the modesty than to the judgment of Xenophon, that he has excluded, from his general history of Grecian affairs, the account of an expedition, in which he himself acted so distinguished a part, and which immediately occasioned very important transactions both in Asia and in Europe. After the downfall of Athenian greatness, the Spartans were naturally exposed to the jealousy and resentment of Persia, by their dominion in Greece, by their conquests on the coast of Asia, by the pre-eminence of their naval power, and especially by their open participation in the rebellious designs of Cyrus. The former circumstances rendered their republic the rival of the king of Persia; but their co-operation with an ambitious rebel rendered them the personal enemies of Artaxerxes. His resolution to chastise their audacity was communicated to Tissaphernes, who, after harassing the retreat of the Greeks to the foot of the Carduchian mountains, beyond which he had not courage to follow them, returned with a powerful army towards Lower Asia, to resume the government of Caria, his hereditary province, as well as to take possession of the rich spoils of Cyrus, bestowed on him by the gratitude of his master, in return for his recent and signal services against that dangerous pretender to the throne.

Honoured with this magnificent present, Tissaphernes was farther entrusted with executing the vengeance of the great king against the Spartans. Without any formal declaration of war, which the late hostilities in the East seemed to render unnecessary, he attacked the Æolian cities; the satrap Pharnabazus readily entered into his views, and concurred with all his measures. The Lacedæmonian garrison, supported by the townsmen, defended themselves with their usual courage, earnestly soliciting, however, a reinforcement from home, which might enable them to resist and to surmount such an unexpected danger.⁶

On this important occasion, the Spartan senate and assembly were not wanting to the assistance of their garrisons, or to the hopes of their Æolian allies. They immediately levied a body of five thousand Peloponnesian troops, and demanded a considerable supply from the Athenians. The latter sent them three hundred horsemen, who having served under the thirty tyrants, were cheerfully sacrificed to this dangerous duty by the partisans of the new democracy. The command of the joint forces was entrusted to the Spartan Thimbron, who

had orders,⁷ as soon as he arrived in Æolis, to take into pay the Greeks who had engaged in the expedition of Cyrus, and who were actually employed in the dishonourable service of an ungrateful Barbarian. The mean and perfidious behaviour of Seuthes, who, in his new character of prince, still retained his original manners of a Thracian robber, rendered the proposal of joining Thimbron extremely agreeable to Xenophon, who conducted to the Lacedæmonian standard six thousand men, the venerable remains of an army exhausted and ennobled by unexampled toils and dangers.⁸

Having received this powerful reinforcement, Thimbron opened the campaign against the lieutenant of Artaxerxes, at the distance of two years after Cyrus had marched from Ephesus to dispute the crown of Persia. The first impressions of the Grecian arms were attended with considerable success. Thimbron took, or regained, the towns of Pergamus, Teuthrania, Halisarnia, Myrina, Cymé, and Grynium. But the walls of Larissa, a strong city in the Troade, defied his assault; the vigilant garrison baffled all his contrivances for depriving them of fresh water; and, assisted by the inhabitants of the place, made a vigorous sally, repelled the besiegers, and burned or demolished their works.

Nothing but continual action, and an uninterrupted career of victory, could restrain the licentious passions of the troops, composed of a motley assemblage from so many different, and often hostile communities. Their seditious spirit rendered them formidable to each other, and to the Greeks of Asia. Their rapacity spared not the territories of the Lacedæmonian allies, who loudly complained to the senate, ascribing the violence of the troops to the weakness of the general. In consequence of this representation, Thimbron was recalled and disgraced,⁹ and the command, for which he seemed so ill qualified, was bestowed on Dercyllidas, a man fertile in resources, who could often vary his conduct, without changing his principles; who knew when to relax, and when to enforce the discipline of the camp; and who, to the talents of an able general, added the reputation of being the best engineer of his times. By a judicious direction of the machines of war which he invented, or improved, Dercyllidas overcame the obstinacy of Larissa; and in the space of eight days, reduced eight other cities in the province of Pharnabazus. The rapidity of his conquests recommended him to the Spartan senate, and his moderate use of victory en-

⁷ Xenoph. Hellen. p. 550. Diodor. p. 416.

⁸ Xenoph. Anab. l. vii. p. 427.

⁹ Xenoph. p. 481.

⁶ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 480. Diodor. Sicul. l. xiv. p. 416.

deared him to the Asiatic colonies. He lessened their taxes, encouraged their industry, heard their complaints with candour, and decided their differences with the most impartial justice. Disdaining the cruel example of his predecessors, he imposed not any arbitrary exactions on the peaceful citizens and husbandmen; and lest the maintenance of his troops should prove burdensome to the allies and subjects of Sparta, he fixed his winter quarters in Bithynia, where the valour of Xenophon and his followers had lately spread the terror of the Grecian name.

Olymp. xcv. Early in the spring, commissioners were sent from Sparta to A. C. 497. inspect the affairs of Asia, and to prorogue, for another year, the authority of Dercyllidas, provided their observations and inquiries confirmed the very favourable accounts that had been given of his administration. On their arrival at Lampsacus, where the army was then assembled, they visited the camp, and assured the soldiers, that the magistrates of the republic as much approved their conduct in the last, as they had condemned it in the preceding, year. A captain, expressing the sense of the multitude, replied, that the different behaviour of the troops, now and formerly, was yet less different than the characters of Thimbron and Dercyllidas. This testimony of military approbation was not more flattering to the general, than satisfactory to the commissioners; who afterwards, at his request, visited the neighbouring towns of Æolis and Ionia, and found them in a condition extremely happy and flourishing.¹

Before taking leave of Dercyllidas, they acquainted him, that the inhabitants of the Thracian Chersonesus had lately sent to Sparta an embassy, requesting assistance against the fierce Barbarians who inhabited the adjoining territory; and that, should circumstances permit him to afford protection to those industrious and distressed Greeks, he would perform a signal service to the state. The inactivity of Tissaphernes, who, notwithstanding the powerful army which he had conducted from Upper Asia, still expected further reinforcements from the East, encouraged the Grecian general to undertake this useful and meritorious enterprise. The Chersonesus was one of the most fertile² and best cultivated spots in the ancient world. In an extent of fifty miles in length, and fifteen in breadth, it contained eleven rich and flourishing cities, and several commodious harbours. The fields, producing the most valuable grains, were interspersed and adorned with delightful plantations and orchards, as well as with lawns and meadows, stored with all sorts of useful cattle. Had this beautiful country enjoyed an insular form, its happiness would have been complete; but a neck of land, thirty-seven furlongs in breadth, joined it to the territories of the fiercest tribes in Thrace. The troops of Dercyllidas could easily have repelled their inroads. They might have punished their cruelty by destroying their miserable villages in the open country; but the Barbarians would have found a secure

refuge in their woods and mountains, and whenever the army was withdrawn, would have again poured down on the helpless Chersonesus with their native fury, heightened by revenge. Dercyllidas afforded a more useful assistance to those unhappy Greeks; and employed in their defence, not the courage, but the labour, of his soldiers. With incessant toil, begun in the spring, and continued almost to the autumn, they formed a strong wall across the isthmus; the space was marked out, and the labour distinctly apportioned to the separate communities from which the army had been levied; and the spur of emulation was sharpened by the incitement of gain, the general in person superintending the work, and bestowing rewards (lavishly furnished by the wealthy Chersonites) on the most diligent and deserving.³

Dercyllidas had scarcely returned from this employment, justly ennobled by its utility, when the combined forces of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes appeared in the neighbourhood of Ephesus. This general collected his whole strength in order to give them battle; the European soldiers displayed a noble ardour for action; but the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast, who had flocked to his standard, were intimidated by the sight of an enemy whose numbers far exceeded their own. This panic might have proved fatal, had not the troops of Tissaphernes felt the horror which they inspired. They recollected the bravery of the ten thousand who had accompanied Cyrus; they perceived that the forces with whom they now had to contend exceeded that number; but they did not reflect that the army of Dercyllidas was swelled by the degenerate Greeks of Æolis and Ionia, whose minds had been enfeebled and degraded by a long series of oppression. The cowardice of the Persians engaged Tissaphernes, much against the inclination of Pharnabazus, to propose a conference; the cowardice of the Ionians engaged Dercyllidas to accept the proposal. Hostilities were thus suspended; mutual hostages were given; overtures of peace were made; and messengers were despatched for instructions to the Spartan council, and to the court of Persia.

The design of Tissaphernes, however, was only to gain time by amusing the enemy. The most solemn oaths and engagements had long lost their power over his perfidious mind. He treacherously watched an opportunity to renew the war, waiting with impatience for the promised reinforcements from the East, and especially for the equipment of a fleet, which Artaxerxes was preparing with silence and celerity, in the ports of Phœnicia. The secret preparations were communicated to the Spartan magistrates by the patriotism of Herodas, a Syracusan, who, animated by the love of Greece, betrayed his Phœnician master. The Spartans were alarmed with the danger, indignant at the treachery of Tissaphernes, and perhaps displeased with the too easy credulity of their general. But the death of king Agis had given them, in the person of their first magistrate, a commander who equalled Dercyllidas in merit, and who has far surpassed him in renown.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 487.

² Περὶ φερτάτης καὶ πρὸς τὴν. Xenoph. p. 488.

³ Xenoph. p. 488.

The destructive expedition against the Eleans was the last exploit of the long and warlike reign of Agis. On his death-bed he acknowledged for his son Leotychides, whose legitimacy, the levity or the guilt of his mother Timæa had exposed to just suspicion. But this late avowal of a successor, whom he had so long disowned, did not satisfy the partisans of Agesilaus, who was the brother of Agis on the side of his father Archidamus, but younger by many years, being born of a different mother, and failing Leotychide, the nearest heir to the throne. Under a diminutive and ignoble form, Agesilaus concealed a vigorous and fervid mind, a manly elevation of character, a generous ambition of soul. These respectable qualities, adorned by the milder virtues of modesty, candour, condescension, and unlimited complaisance for his friends, early attracted the notice, and merited the esteem of the first names of Sparta; and of none more than Lysander, who, as his personal hopes of grandeur were blasted by the universal jealousy and resentment that had been justly excited in Sparta against his ostentatious abuse of power, confined all his projects of ambition to the aggrandisement of his favourite. That eloquence and address,⁴ which would have been ineffectual if employed for himself, succeeded in behalf of another; and by the influence and intrigues of Lysander, still more than by the strong claims of justice and of merit, Agesilaus was declared successor to the vacant throne; and, at the distance of about two years, commander in chief of the Greek forces in Asia; an office less splendid in name than that of king of Sparta, but carrying with it more solid weight and authority.

In the interval of these successive honours, he approved his attentive vigilance in the service of the republic, of which the safety, and even the existence, was endangered by a daring and bloody conspiracy. A youth named Cinadon, distinguished above his companions by extraordinary strength and agility, was not less conspicuous for undaunted courage and ambition. Descended of an obscure family, Cinadon felt and regretted the mortifying partiality of the government under which he lived. His pride was deeply wounded with the reflection, that whatever abilities his youth might promise, and his manhood mature, the unfortunate circumstances of his birth must for ever exclude him from the principal dignities of the state, which circulated among a few Spartan families, without the possibility of extending beyond that very limited sphere. The warmth of his character, and the impetuosity of his passions, prompted him to seek justice and revenge; nor was his

blind and headlong ferocity alarmed by the means, however atrocious, that must lead to this favourite end. He communicated the horrid design to men of his own, and of an inferior condition, exaggerating their cruel treatment by a stern aristocracy, which he contrasted with the mild equality of the neighbouring communities; and perhaps asserting, that if they must submit to a master, it would be better to have one than many; that even the subjects of a monarchy enjoyed greater equality and liberty than the members of the Spartan republic,⁵ since the former all equally participated in those preferments and honours, to which not only the slaves, the Helots, and freedmen, but the whole body of the Lacedæmonian people, were forbidden to aspire. After this general representation, he neglected not, what was more effectual and important, to arraign the arrogance and cruelty of particular senators, and to inflame the resentment of individuals against their private and domestic foes; nor did he forget to encourage them all with the certain prospect of success, by contrasting their own strength and numbers with the weakness of an enemy, who might be taken unarmed, and cut off by surprise.⁶

The time for action approached, and the author of the conspiracy commanded his associates to stay at home, that they might be ready at a call. Agesilaus, mean while, performed the accustomed vows and sacrifices for the safety of the republic; the appearance of the entrails announced some dreadful and concealed danger; a second victim was slain, and the signs were still more unfavourable; but after examining the third sacrifice, the priest exclaimed, "We seem, O Agesilaus! to be in the midst of our enemies." Soon afterwards, a person, whose name has not been thought worthy of record, denounced Cinadon to the magistrates, as guilty of a treasonable design, of which he had endeavoured to render himself an accomplice. When the informer was desired to explain his declaration more fully, he told them, that Cinadon having conducted him to the great square of the city, which, being destined for the public assembly and the market, was the usual place of rendezvous, desired him to count the number of Spartans whom he saw in that spacious resort. That he counted the king, the ephori, the senators, and about forty others, and then asked Cinadon, for what purpose he had required him to take that seemingly useless trouble? Because, replied the conspirator, I reckon the Spartans to be enemies, and all the rest, whose great numbers you behold in the market-place, to be friends. Nor does this proportion apply to Sparta only; in the farms and villages adjacent to the city, we shall in each house and family have one enemy, the master, but all the servants will be our friends. Cinadon then acquainted him with the object and cause of the conspiracy, which had been formed by men of probity and fortitude, and which was soon to be communicated to the slaves, pea-

⁴ The partisans of Leotychides, in pleading his cause before the assembly, alleged an oracle that exhorted the Spartans to beware of a lame reign. This pointed at Agesilaus, who limped in walking. But Lysander, by one of those ready and unexpected turns, which often decide the resolutions of numerous assemblies, directed the battery of the oracle against Leotychides, asserting, that it was the lameness of the title only which Apollo must have had in view, since it was a matter indifferent to the gods whether the Spartan kings walked gracefully; but a matter of high importance whether they descended from Hercules, the son of Jupiter, or Alcibiades, an Athenian profligate and exile. Com. Plat. in Agesil. et Lysand. et Xenoph. Agesil. Panegy. et Hellen. l. iii. p. 493.

⁵ This language I have often heard from the subjects of a modern republic, whose citizens are not more remarkable for their firmness in maintaining power, than for their moderation in exercising it.

⁶ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 493, et seq.

sants, and the whole body of Lacedæmonian people, whose animosity against the Spartans was too violent to be concealed. That the greatest part of the conspirators, being trained for war, had arms in their hands; that the shops of the armourers, the tools of those artificers who wrought in metal, wood, and stone, and even the instruments of agriculture, might furnish such weapons to the rest, as would fully answer the purpose against unarmed men.

This alarming intelligence roused the activity, without shaking the firmness, of the Spartan magistrates. It would have been imprudent to seize Cinadon in the capital, as they were unacquainted with the extent of his resources, and the number of his associates. On pretence of the public service, they contrived to send him to Anlon (for in similar expeditions they had often employed his ready arm and enterprising valour,) that he might seize, in that licentious city, and bring within the reach of justice, several daring violators of the Spartan laws, among whom was a very beautiful woman, who corrupted the manners of young and old.¹ The senate prepared wagons for conveying the prisoners, and furnished every thing necessary for the journey. A body of chosen horsemen was appointed to accompany Cinadon, who set out without suspecting that this long train of preparation was destined against himself alone. But no sooner had he reached a proper distance from the city, than he was seized as a traitor, and compelled, by the terror of immediate death, to denounce his accomplices. Their names were sent to the senate, who instantly secured their persons. Cinadon, Tisamenes, a priest, and the other leaders of the conspiracy, were scourged through the city, gored with instruments of torture, and finally relieved by death.

The rash enterprise of Cinadon still filled the Spartans with alarm, xevi. 1. when intelligence was conveyed of the formidable preparations of Artaxerxes, against whom the persuasive influence of Lysander encouraged them to employ the great and solid, but as yet unknown abilities, of their young and warlike prince. Since the reign of Agamemnon, Agesilaus was the first Grecian king who led the united forces of his country to make war in Asia; and his expedition, though not less important than the exploits of the sons of Atreus and Achilles, is much inferior in renown; because the panegyric of Xenophon, warm and splendid as it is, even beyond the usual colour of his compositions, must yet, like all the works of man, be for ever eclipsed by the lustre of the Iliad. But the conquests of Agesilaus, however different in fame, yet surpassed in misfortune, the war of Troy. Both were pernicious to the interests of Greece; but of the two, the victories of Agesilaus proved the most fatal, not indeed in their immediate, but in their remote consequences.

In the spring of the year three hundred and ninety-six before Christ, he left Sparta, with three thousand Lacedæmonian freedmen, and a

body of foreign troops amounting to six thousand, chiefly collected from the confederate cities of Peloponnesus. Since the irregular and unjustifiable conduct of Agis, in his unfortunate expedition against Argos, the Spartan kings were usually attended in the field by a council of ten senators, whose concurrence was held necessary in all public measures. Agesilaus demanded a council, not of ten, but of thirty Spartans: a refined stroke of policy, which strongly indicates that artful dexterity with which, during a long administration, he uniformly promoted the views of his interest and ambition. By augmenting the number of the council, he diminished its importance. Each member, as he possessed less weight and influence, felt himself less concerned in the honour of the body; and the whole were more easily swayed and governed by the king. Lysander alone, whose name in Asia was illustrious or terrible, rivalled for awhile the power of Agesilaus. But the colleagues of Lysander were the first to dispute his pretensions, and to control his authority. Agesilaus availed himself of their envy, and listened too easily to the dictates of selfishness, in humbling the arrogance of a rival who had been the chief author of his own greatness. By thwarting the measures of Lysander, by denying his requests, by employing him in offices unbecoming his dignity,² he rendered him contemptible in the eyes of those by whom he had been so long feared. This ungenerous treatment of a benefactor, as well as the aspiring pride of the benefactor himself, which could excite such black ingratitude in an otherwise virtuous breast, doubly prove the instability of friendship between ambitious minds. After a disgraceful rupture, which ended in an affected reconciliation, Lysander was sent by Agesilaus and his council to command the Lacedæmonian squadron in the Hellespont, an inactive and subordinate service, in which he could not expect an opportunity to perform any thing worthy of his ancient fame. He returned, therefore, in a few months to Sparta, covered with disgrace, enraged by disappointment, and vowing implacable revenge against the cruel ingratitude of his friend, which he felt more deeply than the injustice of all his enemies together.

Agesilaus fixed his head-quarters at Ephesus, a place recommended by its central situation, as the most convenient rendezvous for the recruits which flocked to his standard from every part of the coast; at the same time that such a station enabled him to conceal from the enemy which of their provinces was the intended object of his invasion. Thither Tissaphernes sent an embassy, demanding the reason of such mighty preparations. Agesilaus replied, "That the Greeks in Asia might enjoy the same liberty with their brethren in Europe." The messengers of Tissaphernes had orders to declare, that the king was inclined to acknowledge the ancient freedom and independence of the Grecian colonies; that the report of his hostile intentions against either of them or the mother

¹ Ἀγαγὼν δ' ἐκείλους τὴν γυναικὰ ἢ καλλίστην μὲν εὐχέτο αὐτοῖς εἶναι, λυμνίσσασθαι δ' ἰσχυρὰ τοὺς ἀφικνούμενους Λακιδæμονίων καὶ πρῶτον πάντων καὶ νεώτερον. Xenoph. p. 494.

² Lysander was known in the East as a conqueror; Agesilaus made him a commissary. Vid. Plut. in Agesil. et Lysand. et Xenoph. Hellen. l. 3. p. 497.

country was totally void of foundation; and that, in consequence of the recent transactions between Tissaphernes and Dercyllidas, ambassadors might shortly be expected from Susa, empowered to ratify a firm and lasting peace between Artaxerxes and the Greeks. Until this desirable work should be completed, Tissaphernes earnestly desired a continuation of the truce, which, on his side, he was ready to seal by whatever formalities Agesilaus thought proper to require. The Spartan king frankly avowed his suspicions of treachery; yet being unwilling to embroil his country in an unnecessary war, he despatched Dercyllidas, with two members of the Spartan council, to renew his late engagements with Tissaphernes. The perfidious satrap swore and deceived for the last time. No sooner had he received the long expected auxiliaries from the east, than he commanded Agesilaus to leave Ephesus, and to evacuate the coast of Asia; if he delayed to comply, the weight of the Persian arms would enforce obedience. The prudent, or pious Spartan, while his friends were alarmed with this unexpected declaration, assumed an unusual gaiety of countenance, observing, that he rejoiced to commence the war under such favourable auspices, since the treachery of Tissaphernes must render the gods his enemies.

Mean while he prepared to encounter the insidious arts of the satrap, with equal, but more innocent address. It was industriously given out, that he intended to march into the province of Caria, the favourite residence of Tissaphernes, which was adorned by his voluptuous parks and palaces, and strengthened by a fortress, the repository of his treasures. The intervening cities were ordered to mend the roads, to furnish a market, and to prepare every thing most necessary to facilitate the march of the Grecian army. Tissaphernes, not doubting that Caria was the intended scene of war, especially as the mountainous nature of that province rendered it improper for horse, in which the Greeks were very poorly provided, encamped with his own numerous cavalry in the plains of the Meander, in order to intercept the passage of the enemy. But Agesilaus having posted a sufficient garrison in Ephesus, left that city, and turning to the north, advanced by rapid marches into Phrygia, the rich plunder of which rewarded the active diligence of his soldiers. The selfish satrap was unwilling to relieve the province of Pharnabazus, by weakening the defence of his own; and accordingly remained inactive on the fruitful banks of the Meander, whose winding stream skirts the northern frontier of Caria, still suspecting an invasion of the Greeks from Ephesus and the neighbouring sea-ports. During the greatest part of the summer Agesilaus ravaged Phrygia; the Barbarians were shamefully defeated in several rencounters; at length they ceased to resist his arms; nor attempted even to harass his retreat, when, having gratified the just resentment of his country, he returned, loaded with spoil, to winter in Ephesus.³

In the Phrygian expedition, Agesilaus shared,

and surpassed, the toils of the meanest soldier, from whom he refused to be distinguished by his dress, his food, or his accommodations, by day or night. The inactive season of the year was most diligently and usefully employed. Ephesus and the neighbouring towns glowed with the ardour of military preparation. The Phrygian wealth was employed to urge the hand of industry. Shields, spears, swords, and helmets, filled every shop, and crowded every magazine. The inhabitants of the country were allured by great rewards to form their best horses to the discipline of the field; and the wealthy citizens were exempted from the service of the ensuing campaign, upon condition only that they furnished a horseman, properly equipped, to perform their vicarious duty. The veteran soldiers, as well as the new levies, were daily exercised within the walls of Ephesus, in those martial amusements which represented a faithful image, and which formed the best school, of war. Agesilaus often condescended to dispute the prize of valour or dexterity; his popular manners endeared him to the troops; the superiority of his talents commanded their willing obedience; they vied with each other in loyalty to their prince; they vied in gratitude to the gods with their prince himself, who, as often as he obtained the crown of victory, dedicated the honourable reward in the admired temple of Ephesian Diana. "What then (adds a soldier, a philosopher, and a man of piety) might not be expected from troops, who delighted in the exercise of war, respected their general, and revered their gods?"⁴

Olymp. The expectation of Xenophon, who beheld the interesting scenes at xcvi. 2. Ephesus, which he has inimitably A. C. 395. described, was fully gratified by the success of the ensuing campaign. Agreeably to the annual revolution of offices in the Lacedæmonian republic, a commission of thirty Spartans were sent early in the spring to supply the place of Lysander and his colleagues. Among the members of this new council Agesilaus distributed the various departments of military command. The superior abilities of Herripidas were entrusted with the veteran army who had served under Cyrus. Xenocles was appointed to conduct the cavalry. Mygdo commanded the Asiatic levies; Scythes, the Lacedæmonian freedmen; for himself, as his peculiar care, the general reserved the faithful and warlike body of Peloponnesian allies, chosen from the flower and vigour of many flourishing republics. With a view to encourage his soldiers before taking the field, he ordered the Phrygian prisoners to be brought forth, stripped, and exposed to sale. The Greeks viewed with contempt the delicate whiteness of their skins, their flaccid muscles, their awkward motions, their shapeless forms, their unwieldy corpulence, and the effeminate softness of their whole persons. Such an enemy they considered as nothing superior to an army of women.⁵

Agesilaus had declared that he would be no longer satisfied with ravaging the extremities,

3 Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 498, et seq.

4 Xenoph. Panegy. Agesil.

5 Xenoph. p. 500.

but was determined to attack the centre of the Persian power. Tissaphernes, fearful of being deceived by a second feint, again conducted his squadrons to the banks of the Meander, and reinforced with the flower of his infantry the garrisons of Caria, which (as the contrary had been industriously reported) he concluded to be the main object of approaching hostilities. But the Spartan was too able a general to repeat the same game. On this occasion therefore he carried into execution the design which had been made public, marched toward the royal city of Sardis, and ravaged the adjoining territory without opposition. He had acquired much valuable booty, and shaken the fidelity of the Lydians, before any enemy appeared to resist his progress. That resistance, which was made too late, proved ineffectual. After several successful skirmishes, he defeated the Persians in a general engagement on the banks of the Pactolus, surrounded and took their camp, in which, beside other riches, he found seventy talents of silver. He likewise expected to have taken the unrelenting enemy of the Greeks, the perfidious Tissaphernes; but that crafty traitor, suspecting the event of the battle, had thrown himself, with a considerable body of troops, within the strong walls of Sardis, where his cowardice continued to reside, displaying the inglorious pride of pomp and luxury, while the provinces of Artaxerxes fell a prey to the hostile invader. The time of his punishment, however, was now arrived. His whole life had been disgraceful to himself; but its last scene had disgraced the arms of his master, who cancelled, by one stroke of royal ingratitude, the merit of innumerable perfidies and cruelties committed for his service. Tithraustes was sent from court to take off the head of the obnoxious satrap; who, being allured to a conference, was caught by his own arts,¹ and met with a just fate; although the author of his death was, perhaps, the only man in Persia or in Greece with whom Tissaphernes had any claim of merit.

Tithraustes, who had come from Babylon escorted by a powerful body of cavalry, possessed the mandate of the great king for assuming the government of Lower Asia, and the conduct of the war. Having removed the only rival who had interest or ability to dispute this extensive and honourable commission, his next care was to send an embassy to Agesilaus, which, instead of indicating the character of a great general (for such Tithraustes was esteemed in the East,) betrayed the mean and temporising genius of his worthless predecessor. The ambassadors were instructed to declare, "That Tissaphernes, the author of those troubles which embroiled Greece and Persia, had suffered a just death; and that the king, who had been too long deceived by his artifices, was now ready to acknowledge the independence of the Grecian colonies, on condition that Agesilaus withdrew his troops from Asia." The Spartan honestly replied, "That the alternative of war

or peace depended, not on himself, but on the resolution of the assembly and senate; nor could he remove his forces from the East without the express command of his republic." The artful satrap perceiving that it was impossible for him to interrupt, determined at least to divert, the course of hostilities. None knew better than Tithraustes the use of money as an instrument of negotiation. He condescended to purchase from Agesilaus, by a very large sum, the tranquillity of Lydia; and as it seemed a matter of indifference to the Spartan king whichever part of the Persian dominions felt the weight of his invasion, he evacuated that province, and again entered Phrygia.

While he pursued his march northwards, he was overtaken in xvi. 3. Ionio by a welcome messenger from A. C. 394. home, who delivered him a letter, testifying the grateful admiration of his countrymen, prolonging the term of his military command, and entrusting him with the numerous fleet, which had sailed two years before, to counteract the designs of the enemy.² This fleet, consisting of ninety galleys, was actually commanded by Pharax, who, during the glorious career of Agesilaus's victories, had silently performed very useful and meritorious service. The naval preparations of Artaxerxes, which, as above mentioned, first excited the alarm in Greece, were still carried on with activity. Various squadrons were equipped in the harbours of Phœnicia, Cilicia, and other maritime provinces, of which the combined strength far exceeded the fleet of Greece. But the vigilant diligence of Pharax prevented their union. His ships were victualled by Nephres, the rebellious viceroy of Egypt; with whom, in the name of Sparta, he had contracted an alliance. The ports of Cyprus, Rhodes, and the Greek cities in the Carian Chersonesus, were open to his cruisers. Availing himself of those important advantages, he steered with rapidity along the hostile shores; and seasonably dividing or combining his fleet, effectually restrained the enemy from making their projected descents on Peloponnesus, and even deterred them from sailing the Asiatic seas.³ Agesilaus, unmindful of this essential service, which had prevented any diversion of the Greek forces in the East, deprived Pharax of the command, and substituted in his stead Pisander, a near relation of his own, who possessed indeed the ambitious valour and manly firmness of the Spartan character, but neither the experience nor the abilities, sufficient to qualify him for this weighty trust.

The first effects of this fatal error were eclipsed by a momentary blaze of glory. Agesilaus entered Phrygia; attacked, conquered, and pursued Pharnabazus; who, flying from post to post, was successively driven from every part of his valuable province.⁴ The fame of the Grecian victories struck terror into the neighbouring countries. Cotys,⁵ or Corylas, the

² Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 501.

³ Isocrat. Panegy. He does not give the name of the admiral, which we find in Xenophon's Gr. Hist.

⁴ Xenophon compares him to the Scythian Nomades.

⁵ He is called Cotys in Xenoph. Gr. Hist. Plutarch, and Diodorus; and Corylas in Xenoph. Anabaz. l. v. p. 370.

¹ Polyænus, l. vii. This fact is mentioned with few circumstances in Diodorus, and with none in Xenophon, p. 501.

proud tyrant of Paphlagonia, who disdained the friendship of the great king,⁶ sent humbly to request that the native valour of his numerous and invincible cavalry might be associated with the Spartan arms.⁷ The inferior satraps, and especially their oppressed subjects, courted the protection of Agesilaus, expecting that the unknown dominion of Greece would be lighter than the yoke of Persia, of which they had long felt and regretted the severity. The deceitful Ariæus, who had shared the guilt, without sharing the punishment of Cyrus, could never be heartily reconciled to a master against whom he had once rebelled. His actual wealth, and ancient honours, gave him a powerful influence over the numerous Barbarians, who had followed the standard of Cyrus and his own; and whose discontented spirits might easily be inflamed into a second revolt.⁸ The commotion was general in Lesser Asia; and, as Egypt had already rebelled, Agesilaus, at the head of about twenty thousand Greeks, and innumerable Barbarian allies, might entertain a very rational expectation to shake the throne of Artaxerxes; especially as the experience of his friend and admirer, Xenophon, who was still the companion of his arms, must have powerfully encouraged him to that glorious enterprise.⁹

But an undertaking of which the success, however splendid, could not probably have been followed by any solid advantages, because the diminutive territory and population of Sparta formed a basis far too feeble to support such a weight of conquest, was blasted in the bloom of hope, by intelligence equally unexpected and distressful. Tithraustes, who knew the power of gold over the Grecian councils, determined, with the approbation of the king his master, to give full play to this main-spring of politics. The Cretan and Ægean seas were carelessly guarded by the unsuspecting confidence of the new admiral. Tithraustes perceived the neglect; and despatched, without any fear of capture, various emissaries into Greece, well qualified, by bribes and address, to practise with the discontented and factious demagogues, the natural enemies of Sparta, of aristocratic government, and of the public tranquillity.¹⁰

The principal instrument of these secret negotiations was Timocrates of Rhodes, a man of an intriguing and audacious spirit, who carried with him no less a sum than fifty talents (above nine thousand pounds sterling,) which he distributed, with lavish promises of future bounty, to Cyclon of Argos, to Timolaus and Polyanthes of Corinth, to Androclides Ismenias and Galaxadorus of Thebes; names for the most part obscure in the annals of war, but important in the history of domestic faction. The tyranny of Sparta was the perpetual theme of these venal hirelings, not only in their respective communities, but in every quarter of Greece, to which they were successively carried with a

mercenary diligence. They painted in the strongest colours the injustice, the cruelty, and the immeasurable ambition of that haughty republic, who had made soldiers of her slaves, that she might make slaves of her allies. The destructive and impious devastation of the sacred territory of Ellis was arraigned with every term of reproach. The same calamities, it was prophesied, must soon overwhelm the neighbouring countries, unless they prepared (while it was yet time to prepare) for a vigorous defence; since Sparta pursued her conquests in Asia with no other view but to lull the security, and rivet the chains, of Greece.¹¹

Strong as these invectives may appear, and interested as they certainly were, they did not exceed the truth; and, what is of more importance, they were addressed to men well disposed to believe them. Since the subversion of the Athenian power, the imperious government of Sparta had rendered her almost alike odious to her old, and to her new, confederates. The former, and particularly the Corinthians, Arcadians, and Acæans, complained with the warmth which justice gives, that, after sharing the toils and dangers of the Peloponnesian war, they had been cruelly deprived of the fruits of victory. The latter, and especially such communities as had revolted from Athens, lamented that their blood and treasure had been spent in vain. They had fought for freedom and independence; but their valour had been rewarded by a more intolerable servitude. Argos had long been the enemy, and Thebes aspired to become the rival, of Sparta. Above all, the Athenians, animated by the patriotism of Thrasylus, their deliverer from the Spartan yoke, longed to employ the first moments of returning vigour in the pursuit of glory and revenge.

The corruption of these morbid humours, which must have soon fermented of themselves, was accelerated by the mercenary emissaries of Tithraustes. The occasion, too, seemed favourable for assaulting the domestic strength of a republic, whose arms were ambitiously employed in extending her distant conquests. The conduct of the Thebans had already announced this design. They not only refused assistance to Agesilaus towards carrying on his eastern campaign, but treated him without respect or decency, while he crossed their dominions; and, were not ambition blind, he must have perceived and resented their hostility, and have delayed to undertake his expedition against Asia, till he had extinguished the seeds of war in Greece.

But, notwithstanding the concurring causes which hastened a rupture, such was the terror of the Spartan name, increased by the recent glory of Agesilaus, that none of her numerous enemies had courage openly to take arms, and to avow their just animosity. After various, but secret conferences, held in the principal cities, it was determined to wound that republic through her allies, the Phocians, who were distinguished, amidst the very general discontent, by their unshaken attachment and fidelity. The Locri Ozolæ, a fierce and insolent people,¹²

⁶ Xenoph. *ibid.*

⁷ Plut. in *Agesil.*

⁸ *Ibid.* Diodor. l. xiv. p. 439.

⁹ Diodor. *ibid.* et Xenoph. *Agesil. Panegy. et Plut. in Agesil.*

¹⁰ Xenoph. p. 513. et seq.

¹¹ Xenoph. p. 514

¹² Thucyd. l. i. p. 4. et p. 47.

who lived in the neighbourhood of Phocia, were easily persuaded to levy contributions from a district on their eastern frontier, to which they had not the smallest claim, and of which the dominion had been long a matter of dispute between the Phocians and Thebans. Both these states seem to have been injured, and exactly in the same degree, by this aggression; but the Phocians, who were the enemies of the Locri, took arms to revenge, while the Thebans, who were their friends, prepared to abet, their injustice. They expected, and their expectation was gratified, that the Spartans would quickly interfere in a quarrel that affected the most important interests of their Phocian allies; a measure which tended precisely to that issue which prudence and policy required, since the Thebans would be compelled to arm in their own defence, and must appear to all the neutral states of Greece, and even to their Lacedæmonian enemies, to be undesignedly dragged into a war, not from an inclination to commit, but from the necessity to repel, injuries.¹

The irascible pride of Sparta, ever prone to chastise the smallest offences with unbounded severity, conspired with the most sanguine hopes of Thebes and her allies. Instead of condescending to remonstrate, instead of demanding satisfaction, instead of ordering the Thebans to evacuate the territory of Phocia, and to abstain from future injury, the Spartans flew to arms, and marched to invade Bœotia. On the first rumour of hostilities, the activity of Lysander had been employed to assemble their northern confederates, the Maleans, Heracleans, with those who inhabited the villages of Doris and Mount Ceta. He penetrated into the Theban territory, gained Lebadea by force, Orchomenus by address, and prepared to assault the walls of Haliartus, which, next to Thebes, was the strongest of the Bœotian cities. The difficulty of this enterprise made him despatch a messenger to hasten the arrival of Pausanias, the Spartan king, who had led forth six thousand Peloponnesians, to co-operate with this experienced commander. The unfortunate messenger was taken, by the scouts of the Thebans, and with him a letter, in which Lysander had signified his purpose, and appointed the time of rendezvous with Pausanias, that they might surprise Haliartus with their combined forces.²

At the same time that this useful intelligence was brought to Thebes, there arrived in that city a powerful reinforcement of Athenian troops, who, though their own capital was unwall'd and defenceless, had been persuaded by Thrasybulus to brave the resentment of Sparta. To these generous auxiliaries the Thebans committed their city, their wives, their children, and every object of their most tender concern; while the warlike youth, and almost all those of a military age, assembled in complete armour, set out in the dead of night, and performing a journey of fifteen miles with silence and celerity,

reached, while it was yet dark, the gates of Haliartus. Their unexpected arrival struck a pleasing terror into their friends, who were affected still more deeply, when they understood the cause of this nocturnal expedition. The Thebans dispelled their fear, and animated their hope, expecting not only to save Haliartus, but to obtain a signal advantage over the unsuspecting confidence of the assailants.

For this purpose, they sent a strong detachment to lie in ambush without the walls. The rest, reinforced by the townsmen, formed themselves in battle array, and stood to their arms, behind the gates. Lysander arrived in the morning; but Pausanias, who had not received his message, still continued in the neighbourhood of Platæa. The soldiers, flushed by recent victory, disdained to depend on the tardy motions of their auxiliaries. They requested Lysander to lead them against the place; a measure to which he was otherwise much inclined, being eager to snatch the glory to himself, without dividing it with Pausanias, his rival and enemy.

He approached the town, and boldly began the attack, perceiving the walls and battlements to be unguarded. But before any breach was made, the different gates at once flew open, while the Thebans and Haliartians rushed forth with one consent, and with irresistible fury. Lysander, with a priest who attended him, was slain on the first onset. His men began to rally, but the Thebans, posted in ambush without the city, occasioned a new terror. The enemy every where gave way; above a thousand fell in the field of battle, the rest were routed, put to flight, and pursued with great slaughter.³

The first intelligence of this fatal disaster brought Pausanias to the scene of action, that he might examine the full extent of the calamity. It would have been fruitless to attempt the siege of Haliartus; but it was necessary to carry off the bodies of the slain. Pausanias held a council of war, to determine whether this pious duty should be effected by force, or whether he might condescend to solicit the humanity of the victors. Force seemed dangerous, as the principal destruction had happened immediately under the walls of the place, which it would be impossible to approach without suffering extremely from the missile weapons of the enemy, and without being exposed to a second attack, perhaps more bloody than the first. It was therefore unanimously resolved to send a Spartan herald to Haliartus, requesting leave to bury the dead. The demand was granted, on condition that the Peloponnesian army should immediately evacuate Bœotia. Pausanias complied, and returned to Sparta. His want of success, rather than his demerit, subjected him to trial and condemnation. He escaped capital punishment by flying to Tegea, where he soon afterwards sickened and died. His son Agesipolis assumed the Spartan sceptre, which, at that juncture, required the direction of more experienced hands.⁴

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. ad fin. Diodor. xiv. 82. Plutarch. in Lysand. p. 448, et seq.

² Xenoph. Hellen. p. 503, et seq.

³ Xenoph. l. iii. p. 505, et seq. Plutarch. in Lysand.

⁴ Ibid.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Recall of Agesilatus from the East—He invades Bœotia—Victory of Evagoras King of Cyprus—His Friendship with Conon—The latter entrusted with the Persian Fleet—He defeats the Lacedæmonians—Battle of Coronæa—The Corinthian War—Conon rebuilds the Walls and Harbours of Athens—Conquests of Conon and Thrasybulus—Peace of Antalcidas.

Olymp. xcvi. 3. **T**HE defeat at Haliartus, which exasperated, without humbling, the Spartans, confirmed the courage of their enemies, and hastened the defection of their allies. The league was openly ratified and avowed by the republics of Thebes, Argos, Athens, and Corinth. The spirit of revolt seized Eubœa, pervaded the provinces of Acarnania, Leucas, Ambracia, the rich cities of Chalcis, and the warlike principalities of Thessaly.⁵ The whole fabric of the Spartan power, raised and cemented by a war of twenty-seven years, was shaken to the foundation; their victorious leaders were no more; nor did any resource remain, but that of recalling Agesilaus from his Asiatic victories, that the fortune and valour of this accomplished general might sustain the falling ruins of his country. He received the fatal scytale,⁶ intimating his recall, at the important crisis of his fortune. He had completed his preparations for marching into Upper Asia, and his heart already beat with the ardour of promised conquest and glory.⁷

Having assembled the confederates, he communicated the revered order of the republic, with which he expressed his resolution immediately to comply. The generous troops, having associated their own honour with the renown of the general, testified their grief and their reluctance by tears and entreaties. But Agesilaus remained firm in his purpose, to obey the command of Sparta, to set bounds to his triumphs in the East, and to turn the direction of his arms towards a less promising field, to which he was summoned by the danger of his country.⁸ Before crossing the Hellespont, he detached four thousand veteran soldiers, to strengthen the Asiatic garrisons; several of which he visited in person, every where assuring his friends, that it was his most earnest wish to rejoin them in Asia, whenever the troubles of Greece should permit his absence.

The greater part of the army, and particularly the new levies of Ionians and Æolians, who had passed their apprenticeship in arms under his fortunate standard, declared, with tears of affection, that they never would abandon their beloved general. Agesilaus encouraged this disposition, which was extremely favourable to his views; and lest it might be nothing but a sally of temporary enthusiasm, artfully secured its permanence, by proposing the distribution of

valuable rewards, in the Thracian Chersonesus; to such officers as brought the best companies of foot or cavalry for the service of his intended expedition. He was able to perform his promises with a generous magnificence; since, after defraying the necessary expenses of the war, he carried from Asia above a thousand talents, or a hundred and ninety-three thousand pounds sterling.⁹

When the whole forces were assembled in the Chersonesus, they probably amounted to about ten thousand men. Their nearest route into Greece lay through the same countries that had been traversed near a century before by Xerxes; but the activity of Agesilaus accomplished in a month what, to eastern effeminacy, had been the journey of a laborious year. In the long interval of time between these celebrated expeditions, the Barbarians of Thrace and Macedon, through whose countries it was necessary to march, seem not to have made much improvement in the arts of war or peace. They were still undisciplined and disunited; and their desultory arms were alike incapable of opposing the Spartan and the Persian. Agesilaus descended without resistance into the plains of Thessaly, where his progress was stopped for a moment by the numerous cavalry of that country, whose petty princes had acceded to the alliance formed against the ambition of Sparta. By a judicious disposition of his forces, and by evolutions equally skilful and rapid, he speedily surmounted this obstacle. To the charge of the Thessalian cavalry, he opposed the weight of his heavy-armed men, by whom the enemy were routed and put to flight. Then with his own horsemen, who would have proved an unequal match for the unbroken vigour of the Thessalians, he pursued them with great slaughter, took many prisoners, and erected a trophy of his victory, between the mountains Prantes and Narthactum,¹⁰ which form the western boundary of the extensive plain of Coronæa.

Instead of continuing his journey through the hostile country of Locris, whose weakness he disdained to chastise, he marched through the friendly territories of Doris and Phocis, that he might turn the shock of the war against the daring and rebellious Thebans. He found them in arms with their powerful allies, rather provoked, than discouraged, by a bloody but decisive battle, which, soon after the disaster at Haliartus, had been fought against the Lacedæmonians at Epiecia, a small town on the common frontier of Corinth and Sicyon. The confederate army was still about twenty thousand strong; the forces of Agesilaus fully equalled that number, as he had received considerable

⁵ Diodor. l. xiv. p. 443. Xenoph. Hellen. l. iii. p. 507.

⁶ See c. xii. p. 151.

⁷ Plutarch. in Agesil. et Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 513.

⁸ Xenoph. Hellen. et Panegy. Agesil. et Plutarch. in Agesil. bestow seemingly immoderate praises on this resolution; but it is to be considered, that in the tumultuary governments of Greece, it was not uncommon to behold a successful general, proud of the zeal and strength of his followers, set at defiance the feeble authority of his republic.

⁹ Xenoph. Hellen. et Panegy. Agesil. et Plutarch. in Agesil. et Diodor. p. 441.

¹⁰ Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 517.

supplies from Sparta and Phocis; and as the secondary cities, particularly Orchomenus of Bœotia, and Epidaurus of Argolis, had joined his arms, prompted by their usual envy and resentment against their respective capitals. The hostile battalions approached; those of Agesilaus marching, in good order, from the banks of the Cephissus, while the Thebans impetuously descended from the mountains of Helicon. Before they arrived at the scene of action, in the Bœotian plain of Coronæa,¹ a city thirty miles distant from Thebes, the superstition of both armies was alarmed by an eclipse of the sun; and the wisdom of Agesilaus was alarmed, far more justly, by most unexpected intelligence from the East.²

Since his unfortunate partiality had entrusted the Lacedæmonian fleet to the obstinacy and inexperience of his kinsman Pisander, the Persian, or rather Phœnician, squadrons had been committed to the direction of a far more able commander. After the decisive engagement at Ægos-Potamos, which was followed by the taking of Athens, and the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, Conon, the Athenian admiral, escaped with a few galleys into the harbour of Salamis, the capital of the isle of Cyprus. That city, and a considerable part of the island, was then subject to Evagoras, a man whom the voice of panegyric represents as governing with consummate wisdom,³ a kingdom, which he had acquired by heroic valour. This admired prince boasted a descent from Teucer, who, returning from the siege of Troy eight hundred years before the reign of Evagoras, had founded the first Grecian colony on the Cyprian shore. During that long space of time, Salamis had undergone various revolutions. Evagoras was born and educated, under the reign of an usurper, who fell by the dagger of an assassin, who in his turn assumed the crown. Evagoras fled to Cilicia, obtained the protection of the satrap of that province, returned to Salamis with a handful of men, surprised and dethroned the new tyrant, to whom he was not bound by any tie of allegiance.

From the moment that he began to reign, he discovered the most partial fondness for Athens, in whose language, arts, and institutions, his youth had been liberally instructed; and which afterwards formed the study and delight of his manhood, the amusement and consolation of his declining age. But unfortunately for the sensibility and affectionate gratitude of Evagoras towards a country to which he owed his education and his happiness, he lived at a period when, before the situation of his principality enabled him to afford any effectual assistance to Athens, he beheld that proud republic deprived of the splendour and dominion which she had enjoyed above seventy years. He lamented her misfortunes with a filial tenderness, and received with the kindest hospitality her oppressed and afflicted citizens. The virtuous and enterprising Conon deserved his affection

and esteem, and soon acquired the unlimited confidence of a mind congenial to his own. They acted with the happiest concert for the security and aggrandisement of the little kingdom, alluring new inhabitants from Greece, increasing their arts and industry, extending navigation and commerce; and, in a short time, Salamis was able to fit out a considerable naval power, and to subdue and incorporate with her own subjects several of the neighbouring communities. The great king, who had long been considered as lord paramount of Cyprus, interfered not in the domestic concerns of the island, provided he received from thence his small customary tribute. The flourishing state of Evagoras's affairs might enable him to pay, and to exceed, the stipulated sum; though it is probable that he early meditated, what he afterwards attempted to accomplish, the deliverance of his country from this mark of bondage.

But a design which actually engaged him more deeply, and to which he was strongly incited by the ardent solicitations of Conon, was the restoration of Athens (which he considered as his adoptive country and parent) to that state of glory and pre-eminence from which she had miserably fallen. The virtuous and patriotic friends (for as such contemporaries described them) are represented as pilots and mariners watching the tides and currents, and catching every propitious gale that might facilitate the execution of this hazardous enterprise. The victories of Agesilaus in the East, which threatened to shake the throne of Artaxerxes, furnished an opportunity too favourable to escape their vigilance. Conon had been already recommended to the great king by Evagoras; and the recommendation had been enforced by Pharnabazus, who knew and admired his merit. The experienced skill of the illustrious Athenian, and of his countrymen Hieronymus and Nicodemus, had assisted in equipping the Barbarian squadrons in the Cilician and Phœnician harbours. But the abilities of Phrax, the Spartan admiral, and the cowardice or negligence of the Persian commanders, hitherto rendered useless a fleet of near three hundred sail, which was ill manned, and which often wanted money.

The activity of Conon undertook to remedy these evils. He left Cilicia, travelled to Thapsacus, embarked in the Euphrates; and, as his vessel was moved by the combined impulse of winds, oars, and stream, he descended with rapidity along the winding channel to Babylon.⁴ The only obstacle to his intended conference with Artaxerxes was, his unwillingness to degrade the Athenian character by depressing the body, bending the knee, and paying the usual marks of respectful submission, which were readily granted by Barbarians to the monarch of the East; but which the Greeks refused to man, and reserved for the majesty of the gods. This difficulty, however, was at length obviated by those whose mutual interest strongly solicited an interview. Conon represented to the trembling monarch, who was still agitated by

¹ The places distinguished by that name are described by Strabo, p. 407, 410, 411, and 434.

² Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 518. Plot. in Agesil.

³ Isocrates's panegyric of Evagoras may be entitled the picture of a great king: the character is only too perfect.

⁴ Diodorus, l. xiv. p. 442.

the terror of Agesilaus's victories, the necessity of opposing the Spartans vigorously by sea. Their fleet alone had acquired, and maintained, the command of the Asiatic coast. A single defeat at sea would excite their allies to revolt, and drive their armies from Asia. But to obtain this advantage, the great king must employ an admiral worthy to command, and men willing to obey. In looking for the first, the valour of Pharnabazus could not escape his notice. The second might be purchased by money. And should Artaxerxes entrust him with the requisite sum, he pledged his life that he would soon collect such a number of sailors (chiefly from the Grecian coasts and islands) as would enable him to defeat the fleet of Sparta, and to compel that republic to abandon her eastern conquests. The proposal pleased Artaxerxes, the money was raised, and Conon returned to Cilicia to accomplish his undertaking.

From various sea-ports of Asia, from the smaller Greek cities, the reluctant subjects of Sparta, from several maritime towns whose inhabitants were ready to serve any master for pay, but chiefly from the powerful islands of Rhodes and Cyprus, he soon collected a naval force exceeding his most sanguine hopes; and

Olymp. which might have enabled him (independent of the Barbarian squadrons commanded by Pharnabazus) A. C. 394. to contend on nearly equal terms with Pisander! With their combined strength, Conon and Pharnabazus sailed westward in quest of the hostile fleet, persuaded that the rash confidence of the Spartan admiral would not decline battle with a superior enemy. As the united armament doubled the northern point of Rhodes, they perceived the Lacedæmonian squadron, amounting to near a hundred galleys, in the capacious bay which is formed between the projections of the Dorian shore, and the small islands called Sporades, from the careless irregularity with which they seem to have been scattered by the hand of nature.⁵ The unexpected approach of such a formidable fleet did not shake the sullen obstinacy of Pisander. He commanded (as it had been foreseen) his men to prepare for battle. They bore up against the enemy, but on a nearer survey were alarmed and terrified with the excessive disproportion of numbers. The greater part turned their prows, and retired towards the friendly shore of Cnidus. Pisander advanced in the admiral galley, and died fighting bravely in defence of the Spartan honour, vainly endeavouring to maintain, by the vigour of his arm, what had been betrayed by the weakness of his counsels. The victors pursued; and after destroying great numbers of the enemy, took and carried off fifty galleys; a capture sufficient to decide the fate of any Grecian republic.⁶

⁵ Virgil expresses, in few words, the geography described in the text:

— Et crebris legimus freta consita terris.

Virg. *Æneid.* iii. v. 129.

⁶ Polybius seems to consider the battle of Cnidus as the era at which the Spartans lost the command of the sea, which they had acquired by their victory at *Ægos-Potamos*. He says, their dominion lasted twelve years. This number, however, is too large for the interval between those

Olymp. It was the intelligence of this battle, of which he anticipated the consequences, in the loss of the A. C. 394. Spartan dominions from Cnidus to Byzantium, that justly alarmed and afflicted the patriotic breast of Agesilaus. He assembled the troops, honestly confessed the death of Pisander, but artfully declared, that, though the admiral was slain, his fleet had obtained a complete victory, for which it became himself and them to pay the usual tribute of thanks and sacrifices to the protecting gods. He then crowned himself with a chaplet of flowers, and set the example of performing this pious duty. The devout stratagem was attended with a very salutary effect; for in a skirmish between the advanced guards, immediately preceding the battle, the Lacedæmonian troops, animated by their imagined victory in the East, defeated and repelled the enemy. Mean while the main bodies of either army advanced into the plain of *Coronea*, at first in awful silence; but having approached within a furlong of each other, the Thebans raised a universal shout, and ran furiously to the charge. Their impetuosity bore down every thing before them; but the troops immediately commanded by Agesilaus, repelled the left wing of the enemy, chiefly consisting of Argives and Athenians. Already those who surrounded his person saluted him as conqueror, and adorned him with the crown of victory; when it was told, that the Thebans had broke and totally routed the Orchomenians, and were advancing to seize the baggage. Agesilaus, by a rapid evolution, prepared to intercept them, in order to frustrate this design. The Thebans perceived this movement, wheeled about, and marched in an opposite direction, that they might join, and rally their allies, who fled towards the mountains of *Helicon*. In the rencounter which followed Xenophon is disposed to admire rather the valour, than the prudence, of the Spartan king. Instead of allowing the Thebans to pass, that he might attack their rear and flanks, he boldly opposed their progress, and assailed their front. The shock was terrible; their shields meeting, clashed; they fought, slew, and were slain. No voice was heard, yet none was silent; the field resounded with the noise of rage and battle:⁷ and this was the most desperate and bloody scene of an action, itself the most desperate and bloody of any in that age. At length, the firmness of the Thebans effected their long-attempted passage to *Helicon*; but could not encourage their allies to renew the engagement. The Spartans thus remained masters of the field, the sight of which seems to have deeply affected a spectator whose mind

battles, as appears from the text. Other writers say, that the Lacedæmonian empire, which the Greeks speak of as synonymous with the command of the sea, lasted thirty years, reckoning from the battle of *Ægos-Potamos* to the defeat at *Leuctra*. But this number again is too small for the interval between those events; a remarkable proof of the carelessness of Greek writers in matters of chronology. See *Isocrat. de Pace*, et *Cassub. ad Polyb.* vol. iii. p. 97—99. edit. Gronov.

⁷ Καὶ κρηυγὴ μὲν οὐδεμίᾳ παρήν, οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ σιγῇ φάνη δι' τῆς ἡν τοιαυτῇ, οἷον οὐδὲν τι καὶ μὲν παρρηγοῦντ' αὐτ. Xenoph. *Agesilaus*, c. xii. Such passages, inimitable in any other language, show the superiority of the Greek.

was habituated to such objects of horror. It was covered with steel and blood, with the bodies of friends and foes heaped promiscuously together, with transfixed bucklers and broken lances, some strewed on the ground, others deeply adhering in the mortal wounds which they had inflicted, and others still grasped by the cold and insensible hands of the combatants who had lately fought with such impetuous ardour.¹

Agésilas himself had received several wounds from various kinds of weapons; yet did he restrain his resentment in the moment of victory. When informed that about four-score of the enemy had taken refuge in a neighbouring temple of Minerva, he religiously respected the right of sanctuary, ordered his soldiers to abstain from hurting them, and even appointed a body of horse to conduct them to a place of security. The next day was employed by the victors in erecting a trophy on the scene of this important action; while the enemy acknowledged their defeat, by requesting the bodies of the slain. Notwithstanding his fatigue and wounds, Agésilas then travelled to Phocis, that he might dedicate the tenth of his Asiatic spoil (amounting to above a hundred talents) in the temple of Delphian Apollo. Having returned towards the Peloponnesus, he disbanded his eastern troops, most of whom were desirous to revisit their respective cities; his Peloponnesian, and even Lacedæmonian forces inclined also to return home, that they might reap the fruits of harvest;² and the general, probably to avoid a journey painful to his wounds, sailed to Sparta, and joined in the celebration of the Hyacinthian festival.

Olymp. xvi. 3. A. C. 394. Olymp. xcviii. 2. A. C. 387. The sea-fight of Cnidus, and the battle of Coronæa, were the most important and decisive actions in the Bæotian or Corinthian war, which lasted eight years. The contending republics seem at once to have put forth their strength; and afterwards to have retained their resentment when they had lost the power of gratifying it. Petty hostilities indeed were carried on by mutual inroads, and ravages in the spring and autumn; the Lacedæmonians issuing from Sicyon, and the Thebans from Corinth. The inhabitants of the latter city had eagerly promoted the alliance against Sparta; but when their country was made the seat of war, they began to repent of this rash measure. The noble and wealthy part of the community, who had most to fear, as they had most to lose, talked of a separate peace; and as they were abetted by a majority of the people, their dependents or clients, they intended to summon an assembly which might confirm this laudable resolution. But the partisans of Timolaus and Polyanthes, who, though the mercenaries of a Barbarian slave, were the patrons of Corinthian liberty, anticipated a design so unfavourable to their interests, by committing one of the most horrid massacres recorded in history. They chose the Eucleian

festival,³ a circumstance which seemed to blacken the atrocity of a crime which nothing could aggravate. Many of the citizens were then enjoying themselves in the market-place, or assembled at the dramatic entertainments. The assault was rapid and general. The Corinthians were assassinated in the circles of conversation, some in the public walks, most in the theatre; the judges on the bench, the priests at the altar: nor did those monsters cease from destroying, till they had cut off whoever they deemed most willing, or most able to oppose their measures. The great body of the people, who perceived that even the temples, and adored images of the gods (whose knees they grasped,) afforded not any protection to the victims of this impious fury, prepared to fly from their country; when they were restrained, first, by the lamentable cries of their wives and children, and then by the declaration of the assassins, that they intended nothing farther than to deliver the city from traitors, the partisans of Sparta and slavery. This abominable massacre infected Corinth with the plague of sedition, which silently lurked, or openly raged, in that unfortunate republic, during the six following years. The Spartans and Argives assisted their respective factions; Corinth was alternately subject to the one and the other, but always to a foreign power; and of the two Corinthian harbours, which were considered as an important part of the capital, the Lechæum was long garrisoned by the Spartans, while the Cenchreæ remained in possession of the Argives.

After the battles of Chidus and Coronæa, there was not any general engagement by land or sea; and it is worthy of observation, that the partial actions, which happened on either element, generally followed the bias of those important victories. Success for the most part attended the sailors of Athens, and the soldiers of Sparta; though the naval exploits of Teleutias, the kinsman of Agésilas, who surprised the Piræus with twelve galleys, took many merchantmen, destroyed several ships of war, and scoured the coast of Attica, formed an exception extremely honourable to that commander; and the military advantages of Iphicrates the Athenian, though unimportant in their consequences, announced those great talents for war, which afterwards rendered him so illustrious. But, in general, Agésilas and the Spartans maintained their superiority in the field; while Conon, Thrasybulus, and Chabrias, proved successful against Thimbron, Anaxibius, and the other naval commanders of the enemy.⁴

In the actual state of Greece, the respective successes of the contending powers were not accompanied by proportional advantages. The Lacedæmonians derived not any solid or permanent benefit from their victory at Coronæa, unless we account as such the gratification of their revenge, in ravaging without resistance the Argive and Bæotian territory; but their defeat at Cnidus deprived them in one day of the fruit of many laborious campaigns, since,

¹ Xenoph. Agesil. c. xii.

² The solar eclipse, mentioned above in the text, fixes the battle of Coronæa to the fourteenth of August.

³ Xenophon, with the superstitious insensibility of his age, dwells on the enormous impiety of this choice.

⁴ Diodor. l. xiv. ad Olym. xvi. 4. and Xenoph. Hellen. l. iv. p. 5.

with the assistance of a superior naval force, and with the command of the Persian treasury, Conon found little difficulty in detaching for ever from their dominion the whole western coast of Lesser Asia. This enterprise must have been effected with uncommon rapidity, and, unless the Persian fleet kept the sea in the middle of winter (which is not at all probable,) could only employ about three months. The measures taken by the Spartans, either to preserve or to recover their important possessions in the East, have scarcely deserved the notice of history, if we except their resistance at Abydos, a place less famous for this memorable defence, (such is the love of fiction, and the contempt of truth!) than for the fabulous amours of Hero and Leander. Dercyllidas had obtained the government of this strong and populous town, as the reward of his military services. Instead of imitating the pusillanimity of the neighbouring governors, many of whom, alarmed by the disaster at Cnidus, fled in precipitation from the places entrusted to their command, Dercyllidas assembled the Abydenians; assured them that one naval defeat had not ruined the power of Sparta,⁵ who even before she had attained the sovereignty of the sea, now unfortunately lost, was able to reward her benefactors, and to punish her enemies. "The moment of adversity furnished an occasion to display their inviolable attachment to the republic; and it would be glorious for them alone, of all the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast, to brave the power of Persia." Having confirmed the courage of the Abydenians, he sailed to the town of Sestos, across the most frequented and narrowest passage of the Hellespont. Sestos was the principal place of the Thracian Chersonesus, the inhabitants of which owed their protection and safety to the useful labours of Dercyllidas;⁶ and this claim of merit enabled him to secure their allegiance. The fidelity of these towns, amidst the general defection of the coast of Europe and of Asia, prevented the inconveniences and hardships to which the expelled Spartans, who had been employed in the garrisons of those parts, must have been otherwise exposed; and delivered them from the necessity of undertaking a winter's journey to the Peloponnesus, through the territories of many hostile republics. The unfortunate governors and garrisons, who had fled, or who had been driven from the places of their respective command, took refuge within the friendly walls of Sestos and Abydos. Their numbers increased the security of those cities, and enabled Dercyllidas, who excelled in the art of fortification, to put them in such a posture of defence as baffled the attempts of Conon and Pharnabazus.

But the success of these commanders was still sufficiently complete; and the importance of their services excited the warmest gratitude in the breast of Artaxerxes. The merit of the

satrap was acknowledged soon afterwards, by his obtaining in marriage the daughter of the great king.

Olymp. xcv. 4. A. C. 393. The patriotic Conon neither desisted nor received any personal reward; but employed his favour with Artaxerxes to retrieve the affairs of Athens, the interest of which formed the honourable motive that had alone engaged, and that still retained him, in the Persian service. He inflamed the resentment which both Pharnabazus and his master had justly conceived against Sparta, and encouraged them, early in the spring, to send their victorious armament towards Greece, to retaliate the ravages committed in the East by the arms of Agesilaus. But he instructed them, that if they would render their vengeance complete, and humble for ever the Spartan pride, they must raise the fallen rival of that imperious republic. The disbursement of a sum of money, which would be scarcely felt by the treasury of Persia, might suffice to rebuild the walls and harbours of Athens; a measure by which they would inflict the deepest wound on the power, as well as on the pride, of their ambitious enemy. The proposal was heard with approbation; the expense was liberally supplied; the Persian fleet set sail, reduced the Cyclades and Cythera, ravaged the coast of Laconia, and, after performing in detached squadrons whatever seemed most useful for the Persian service, assembled in the long-deserted harbours of the Phalerus, Munichia, and Piræus. There, the important task of restoring the ancient ornaments and defence of the city of Minerva, was begun, carried on, and accomplished, with extraordinary diligence. The ready service of the crews belonging to the numerous fleet, assisted the industry of mercenary workmen, whom the allurements of gain had brought from every quarter of Greece; and the labour of both was seconded and encouraged by the voluntary and eager exertions of the Boeotians and Argives; but, above all, by the zeal of the Athenians themselves, who justly regarded their actual employment as the second foundation of their once glorious capital.

Olymp. xcvii. 1. A. C. 392. The work was completed before the return of spring; and the mortifying intelligence, when brought to Sparta, affected the magistrates of that republic with the cruellest anxiety. They were ready to abandon for ever the prospect of recovering their lost dominion in the East; they were desirous to obtain an accommodation with Artaxerxes on the most humiliating terms; they were willing to deprive themselves of the only advantage yet in their power, to forego even the pleasure of revenge, and to abstain from ravaging the territories of their neighbours and enemies, provided only the great king and his satraps would grant them a condition, with which it was easy to comply, since it required nothing but that they should cease to lavish their own money in raising the dangerous power of the Athenians. For effecting this purpose, they sent successive embassies to the court of Persia, as well as to Teribazus, who had lately succeeded Tithraustes in the govern-

⁵ The remarkable expression of Xenophon shews the importance of this defeat in the general estimation of the Abydenians, and of Dercyllidas himself, though he would fain dissemble it. Εἰς τὴν δὲ οὐκ οὐτως εἶχον, ὡς τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἰκετὶς τῶν Αἰώνων, οὐδὲν μὲν ἐστὶν ἰσχυρὸν. "The matter stands not thus, that because we have been worsted in the sea fight, we are therefore nothing."

⁶ See above, p. 298.

ment of the southern provinces. They industriously neglected Pharnabazus, from whom they could not reasonably expect any favour, as the hostilities of Agesilaus had peculiarly excited the resentment of that warlike satrap.

Among the ministers employed by Sparta, in this negotiation, was Antalcidas, a man whose prior history is little known. He appears to have had an intercourse of hospitality with several noble Persians;¹ it is not improbable that he had served under the standard of Cyrus, and perhaps continued in the East during the successive expeditions of Thimbron, Dercyllidas, and Agesilaus. If we except the artful and daring Lysander, Sparta never employed a more proper agent to treat with the Barbarians. Antalcidas was bold, eloquent, subtle, complying, a master in all the arts of insinuation and address, and equally well qualified, by his abilities and vices, to execute an insidious commission at a corrupt court. The revered institutions of his country were the objects of real or well-feigned contempt; he derided the frugal self-denying maxims of the divine Lycurgus; but peculiarly delighted the voluptuous, cowardly, and treacherous satraps and courtiers, when he directed the poisoned shafts of his ridicule against the manly firmness, the probity, and the patriotism of Leonidas and Callicratidas, names equally glorious to Sparta and dishonourable to Persia.

The success of such a minister, almost ensured by his own character and talents, was hastened by the imprudent ambition of Conon and the Athenians, too soon and too fatally intoxicated by the deceitful gifts of prosperity. When this illustrious commander co-operated with Pharnabazus in expelling the Lacedæmonians from the East, he earnestly exhorted the satrap to confirm the Asiatic Greeks in the enjoyment of their ancient liberties, lest the fear of oppression might suggest the means of resistance, and oblige them to form a general alliance for their own defence, which might prove favourable to Artaxerxes. In this plausible advice the patriotic Athenian had a farther view than it was possible for the Persian at that time to discover. After rebuilding the walls and harbours of Athens, he requested Pharnabazus, who prepared to return to his province, that he might be allowed, for a few months longer, to employ a squadron of Persian ships, in conjunction with his own, to infest the territories of Sparta and her allies. The satrap, naturally unsuspecting, and perhaps betrayed by his resentment, readily granted this demand. But Conon, unmindful of his promised operations against the common enemy, thought only of promoting the interest of his republic. He sailed to the Cyclades, to Chios, to Lesbos, and even to the coast of Eolis and Ionia, displayed the strength of his armament, described the flourishing fortune of Athens, and endeavoured to persuade or to compel the astonished Asiatics and islanders to acknowledge the just authority of their ancient metropolis or sovereign, who having risen more splendid from her ruins, required only the attachment of her former allies and subjects, to

resume her wonted power, and recover her hereditary renown.

The success of this extraordinary enterprise is not particularly described, nor is the omission material, since this last expedition of Conon had not any other permanent effect but that of ruining himself. His unjustifiable ambition furnished powerful weapons to the dexterity of Antalcidas, who represented him as guilty of the most unexampled audacity, aggravated by the most perfidious ingratitude, in attempting to alienate and to conquer the king's dominions, even by the assistance of the king's forces, to which both his country and himself owed so many recent and signal benefits. The accusation was probably rendered more welcome to Teribazus, by the jealousy which he naturally entertained of the neighbouring satrap, the friend of Conon, and his own rival. But after the last unwarrantable transaction of the Athenian, which he could defend only by the obsolete Greek maxim, that every thing is lawful to a man in the service of his country, even his late colleague Pharnabazus seems to have withdrawn from him the protection and friendship by which he had been so long distinguished, so that the influence of that powerful satrap formed not any opposition to the negotiations and intrigues of Antalcidas. The Athenians, however, sent Dion, Hermogenes, with other emissaries, to watch and counteract his measures. Conon was named at the head of this deputation; and as he knew not the full extent of Teribazus's animosity, inflamed and exasperated by the address of Antalcidas, he expected that the personal presence of a man, who had formerly served the Persians with fidelity and success, might obtain an easy pardon from the satrap, and perhaps prove useful to the affairs of Athens. The Bœotians and Argives likewise sent their ambassadors, who had instructions to act in concert with Conon and his colleagues. But their overtures were little regarded, while those of Antalcidas met with warm approbation from Teribazus.

The Lacedæmonian ambassador declared that he had been commanded to offer such terms of peace as suited equally the dignity and the interest of the great king. "The Spartans resigned all pretensions to the Greek cities in Asia, which they acknowledged to be dependencies of the Persian empire. Why should Artaxerxes then continue to lavish his treasures in vain? since the Spartans not only ceded to him the immediate object of dispute, but earnestly desired to promote the future prosperity of his dominions, by settling the affairs of Greece, as best answered his convenience. For this purpose they were ready to declare all the cities and islands, small and great, totally independent of each other; in consequence of which there would not be any republic sufficiently powerful thenceforth to disturb the tranquillity of Persia." These conditions, which the most insolent minister of the great king might himself have dictated, were too advantageous not to be liable to suspicion. But Teribazus was so blinded by partiality for the Spartan minister, that he seems not to have entertained the smallest doubt of his sincerity. The terms of

¹ Xenoph. Hellen.

peace were transmitted to the court of Susa, that they might be approved and ratified by Artaxerxes. The subtlety of Antalcidas was rewarded by a considerable sum of money; and the patriotism of Conon (a patriotism which had carried him beyond the bounds of justice and propriety) was punished by immediate death,² or by an ignominious confinement.³ His fate is variously related; but his actions justly rank him with the first of Grecian names; and the fame of an illustrious father was supported and rivalled by that of his son Timotheus.⁴

It might have been expected that a plan of accommodation, so advantageous and honourable for Persia, should have been readily accepted by Artaxerxes. But the negotiation languished for several years, partly on account of the temporary disgrace of Teribazus, who was succeeded by Struthas; a man who, moved by some unknown motive, warmly espoused the interest of the Athenians; and partly by the powerful solicitations and remonstrances of the Boeotian and Argive ambassadors, who accused the sincerity, and unveiled the latent ambition of Sparta.

Mean while the war was carried on with unremitting activity. The Lacedæmonians and their allies sallied from their strong garrisons in Sicyon and the Lechæum, to destroy the harvests and the villages of their Peloponnesian enemies. The Boeotians and Argives retaliated these injuries by several hostile incursions into the territories of Sparta; while the Athenians, as if they had again attained the command of the sea, bent the whole vigour of their republic towards an element long propitious to their ancestors.

The recent splendour of Conon had eclipsed the ancient and well-merited renown of Thrasybulus, whose extraordinary abilities, and more extraordinary good fortune, had twice rescued his country from the yoke of tyrants. But after the lamented death or captivity of the former, the Athenian fleet, amounting to forty sail, was entrusted to Thrasybulus; who, having scoured the Ægean sea, sailed to the Hellespont, and persuaded or compelled the inhabitants of Byzantium, and several other Thracian cities, to abolish their aristocratic government, and to accept the alliance of Athens. His activity was next directed against the isle of Lesbos, in which the Lacedæmonian interest was still supported by a considerable body of troops. Having landed his men, he joined battle with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Methymna, and obtained a complete victory, after killing with his own hand Therimachus, the Spartan governor and general. The principal cities of the island acknowledged the Athenian power, and seasonably reinforced the fleet, by the terror of which they had been subdued. Encouraged by this success, Thrasybulus sailed toward Rhodes, in order to assist the democratic faction, who equally contended for the interest of Athens and their own.

Before proceeding, however, to that important island, he determined to multiply the re-

sources, and to confirm the affections, of the fleet. For this purpose he raised considerable supplies of whatever seemed most necessary for his expedition from the maritime towns of Asia, and at length entered the mouth of the Eurymedon (the glorious scene of Cymon's victories) and levied a heavy contribution on Aspendus, the principal sea-port and capital of Pamphylia. But here his good fortune ended.⁵ The patient timidity of the Barbarians had endured the public depredation, to which they were long accustomed; but even their servility could not brook the private rapacity and intolerable exactions of the sailors and troops, which were imputed (not perhaps without reason) to the unrelenting avarice of the commander. The resentment of the Pamphylians overcame their cowardice. They attacked the Grecian tents in the night, and surprised the security of Thrasybulus, who thus fell a sacrifice to a very unjustifiable defect, which, if we may believe a contemporary writer, greatly debased the dignity of his otherwise illustrious character.⁶

The unjust treatment of Aspendus, which had been retorted by such signal revenge, would never perhaps have reached the ears of Artaxerxes, had not his voluptuous indolence been beset by the active importunity of Antalcidas. This vigilant and artful minister let slip no opportunity to rouse the jealousy of the great king against the Athenians, his hereditary foes, and to obliterate his resentment against the Spartans, his recent but less natural enemies. The severe exactions from Pamphylia, a province acknowledging his authority, afforded a powerful topic of persuasion, which the Spartan ambassador could not fail to employ; but it is uncertain whether even this important argument would have conquered the reluctance of the Persian monarch to concur with the measures of a people, who had enabled the rebellious Cyrus to dispute his throne, and who had recently invaded and plundered, not a maritime city, but the interior provinces of the empire. His interest and inclination were combated by his resentment and his pride; when his fluctuating irresolution was at length decided by the Athenians, whose mad imprudence crowned the triumph of Antalcidas.

The signal victories of Conon and Thrasybulus, and the rising fortune of Athens, encouraged Evagoras king of Salamis, who had received some late cause of disgust, to execute his long-meditated design of revolting from Persia. Egypt was actually in rebellion; Artaxerxes had undertaken a war against the barbarous Carduchians,⁷ who were by no means a

⁵ Corn. Nep. in Vit. Thrasybul.

⁶ Lysias against Ergocles. This Ergocles was the friend and confidant of Thrasybulus. He had assisted him in expelling the thirty tyrants, and had recently accompanied him in his expedition to the coast of Thrace, mentioned in the text. The military exploits of Thrasybulus in Thrace were highly honourable and meritorious; but his private behaviour was the reverse. He stuck at nothing by which he could enrich himself or his dependants. Ergocles was condemned to death for the share which he had taken in this unjustifiable peculation and rapacity. Lysias's Oration against Ergocles and Philocrates. See likewise Aristophanes Ecclesiaz. v. 356. and Schol. ad locum.

⁷ These and the following circumstances concerning the

² Isoc. Panegy.

³ Xenoph. Gr. Hist. i. iv.

⁴ Dinarch. adv. Demosth. p. 94. et Corn. Nepos, in Vit. Conon, et Timoth.

contemptible enemy. These were very favourable circumstances; but the Persian fleet, which, after performing the service for which it had been equipped, had continued to lie inactive in the Phœnician and Cilician harbours, was ready to be employed in any new enterprise. The skilful and experienced bravery of the king of Salamis, seconded by the youthful ardour of his son Protagoras, obtained an easy victory over the first squadrons that were sent to invade his island. But there was reason to dread the arrival of a far superior force. In this danger Evagoras requested, and obtained, the assistance of the Athenians; who not only enjoyed peace with Persia, but whose ambassadors were endeavouring to prevent that court from making peace with their enemies.

Olymp. This extraordinary measure of a
xcviii. 1. people, in preferring their gratitude
A. C. 388. to their interest; a gratitude which
they might have foreseen to be useless to him whom they meant to oblige, and pernicious to the most important interests of their republic, finally determined Artaxerxes to espouse the cause of the Spartans; and to dictate the terms of a general peace, almost in the same words which had been proposed by Antalcides: "That the Greek cities in Asia, with the island of Cyprus and the Peninsula of Clazomené, should be subject to Persia; Athens should be allowed to retain her immemorial jurisdiction in the isles of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; but all the other republics, small and great, should enjoy the independent government of their own hereditary laws. Whatever people rejected these conditions, so evidently calculated for preserving the public tranquillity, must expect the utmost indignation of the great king, who, in conjunction with the republic of Sparta, would make war, on their perverse and dangerous obstinacy, by sea and land, with ships and money."¹

Olymp. Teribazus and Antalcidas return-
xcviii. 2. ed from the East, charged with the
A. C. 387. definitive resolutions, or rather the
haughty mandate of Artaxerxes, which had been confirmed by the unalterable sanction of the royal signet. There was reason, however, to apprehend that Thebes, Athens, and Argos, might still reject the terms of a peace proposed by their avowed enemies, pernicious to their particular and immediate interests, and equally disadvantageous and dishonourable to the whole Grecian name. The remembrance of the glorious confederacy, for defending the Asiatic colonies against the oppression of Barbarians, could not indeed much influence the degenerate councils of those republics; but the Thebans must resign, with reluctance, their real or pretended authority over the inferior cities of Bœotia; the Argives must unwillingly withdraw their garrison from Corinth, and leave that important capital in the power of the aristocratic or Lacedæmonian faction; and the Athenians must abandon, with

regret, the fruits of their recent victories, and the hopes of recovering their ancient grandeur. The opposition of these states had been foreseen by Antalcidas, who took the most effectual measures to render it impotent. By the assistance of Persian money he equipped a fleet of eighty sail, from the mercenary sea-ports of Greece and Asia, from the intermediate isles, and even from the coasts of Italy and Sicily. This armament was independent of the squadrons with which Teribazus prepared to attack the isles of Cyprus, if the presumption of Evagoras, unassisted and alone, should dare to provoke his hostility. The satrap also had collected a very considerable army, which was ready to embark for Greece, and to co-operate with Agesilaus, who had assembled the domestic troops and allies of Sparta to march, at the first summons, against any city or republic that might reject the peace of Antalcidas.² These vigorous preparations, intimidating the weakness of the confederates, compelled them into a reluctant compliance with the terms of the treaty. The Thebans made the strongest and most obstinate resistance; but their pretensions were finally silenced by the threats of the Spartan king, the inveterate enemy of their republic. The Bœotian cities were acknowledged to be independent, and admitted as parties in the peace. The Argives retired from Corinth, which, being deserted by the leaders of the democratical faction, became a faithful ally to Sparta. The military and naval operations ceased, tranquillity was restored, and the armies and fleets were, on both sides, disbanded and dissolved.³

But amidst this universal and most obsequious submission to the court of Persia, one man avowed his discontent and prepared to maintain his opposition. The article respecting Cyprus was loudly rejected by Evagoras, who asserted the independence of his native island; and, with a magnanimity that formed a striking contrast with the degenerate and disgraceful softness of his Grecian allies, set the power of Artaxerxes at defiance. Evagoras trusted to the resources of his own vigorous mind, to the superior skill of his seamen, and to the assistance of Acoris king of Egypt. But the numerous squadrons of Teribazus prevailed over all his hopes. He was discomfited in a naval engagement; his territories were invaded and ravaged; he was reduced to his capital Salamis; and even Salamis was threatened with a siege. His resistance had already exceeded what his strength warranted, or what his dignity required. His enemies were incapable of perseverance, or unwilling to drive him to despair. He resigned his numerous and recent conquests in Cyprus, but retained
Olymp. possession of the ancient princi-
xcviii. 4. pality of Teucer, which his fortu-
A. C. 385. nate arms had recovered from an usurper; and submitted, without dishonour, to imitate the example of many preceding princes of Salamis, and to acknowledge himself the tributary of the king of Persia.⁴

war of Cyprus are scattered through Diodorus, Isocrates's Panegyric of Athens, and the Panegyric of Evagoras.

¹ The last words are literally translated from Xenoph. p. 550. See likewise Diodor. l. xiv. c. cx. Plut. Agesyl. p. 608: and Artaxerx. p. 1022.

² Τῆς στ Ανταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλομένης. Xenoph. p. 277

³ Διελύθη μιν τὰ πικρία, &c. Xenoph. p. 551.

⁴ Diodor. l. xv. p. 462.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Reflections upon the Peace of Antalcidas—Ambitious views of Sparta—State of Arcadia—Siege of Mantinea—Olynthian Confederacy—The Spartans make War on Olynthus—Submission of that Republic—Pella becomes the Capital of Macedon—Phœbidas seizes the Theban Citadel—The Measure approved by Agesilaus—Conspiracy of the Theban Exiles—The Theban Democracy restored.

THE peace of Antalcidas forms an important and disgraceful era in the Grecian history. The valuable colonies in Asia, the cause, the object, and the scene, of so many memorable wars, were resigned and abandoned for ever to the power of a Barbarian master. The king of Persia dismembered the distant dependencies, and controlled the domestic arrangements of a people who had given law to his ancestors.⁶ Their ancient confederacies were dissolved; the smaller cities were loosened from dependence on their powerful neighbours; all were disunited and weakened; and Greece felt the languor of peace without enjoying the benefits of security.

But if the whole Grecian name was dishonoured by accepting this ignominious treaty, what peculiar infamy must belong to the magistrates of Sparta, by whom it was proposed and promoted? What motives of advantage could balance this weight of disgrace? Or, rather, what advantage could the Spartans derive from such ignoble condescension as seemed totally unworthy of their ancient power, but far more unworthy of their actual renown? This question, like most political questions, may be best answered by facts; and the transactions which both preceded and followed the peace of Antalcidas clearly discover and ascertain the secret, but powerful, causes of that dishonourable, and seemingly disadvantageous, measure.

The ambition of making conquests in the East, which it now appeared impossible to retain, had deprived the Lacedæmonians of an authority, or rather dominion in Greece, acquired by the success of the Peloponnesian war, and which they might have reasonably expected to preserve and to confirm. Not only their power, but their safety, was threatened by the arms of a hostile confederacy, which had been formed and fomented by the wealth of Persia. Athens, their rival, their superior, their subject, but always their unrelenting enemy, had recovered her walls and fleet, and aspired to command the sea. Thebes and Argos had become sensible of their natural strength, and disdained to acknowledge the pre-eminence, or to follow the standard, of any foreign republic. The inferior states of Peloponnesus were weary of obeying every idle summons to war, from which they derived not any advantage but that of gratifying the ambition of their Spartan masters. The valuable colonies in Macedon and Thrace, and particularly the rich and populous cities of the Chalcidic region, the bloodless conquests of the virtuous Brasidas, had forsaken the interest of Sparta, when Sparta forsook the interest of justice. Scarcely any

vestige appeared of the memorable trophies erected in a war of twenty-seven years. The eastern provinces (incomparably the most important of all) were irrecoverably lost; and this rapid decline of power had happened in the course of ten years, and had been chiefly occasioned by the fatal splendour of Agesilaus's victories in Asia.

About a century before, and almost on the same scene, the Spartans had been first deprived of their hereditary fame, and prescriptive honours.⁷ Almost every interference, in peace or war, with the Ionian colonies, had hurt the interests of their republic. They naturally began to suspect, therefore, that such distant expeditions suited not the circumstances of Sparta, an inland city, with a fertile territory, but destitute of arts, industry, and commerce; and whose inhabitants, having little genius for the sea, were naturally unable to equip, or to maintain, such a naval force as might command the obedience of an extensive coast, attached by powerful ties to their Athenian rivals. The abandoning, therefore, of what they could not hope to regain, or, if regained, to preserve, seemed a very prudent and salutary measure; since, in return for this imaginary concession, they received many real and important advantages. They were appointed to superintend and to direct the execution of the treaty; and in order to make their authority effectual, entitled to demand the assistance of Persian money, with which they might easily purchase Grecian soldiers. The condition requiring the smaller cities to be declared free and independent (although the dexterity of Antalcidas had proposed it as the best means of preventing the future invasion of Asia,) was peculiarly beneficial to the Spartans. It represented them as the patrons of universal liberty, and restored them that honourable reputation which they had long lost. From the nature of the condition itself, it could only apply to such places as being kept in a reluctant subjection, still possessed courage to vindicate their freedom. In the secondary towns of Messenia and Laconia, the stern policy of Sparta had crushed the hope, and almost the desire, of obtaining this inestimable benefit. The authority of other capitals was less imperious and imposing; the sovereign and subject were more on a footing of equality; and it was a maxim in Greece, "That men are disposed to reject the just rights of their equals, rather than to revolt against the unlawful tyranny of their masters."⁸ But Sparta expected not only to detach the inferior com-

⁷ See above, p. 151.

⁸ Thucyd. *passim*. See particularly the speech of the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, c. xv. p. 187.

⁶ See the Articles of the Treaty concluded in 449 A. C. p. 156.

munities from their more powerful neighbours, but to add them to the confederacy of which she formed the head; and by such multiplied accessions of power, of wealth, and of fame, to re-establish that solid power in Greece, which had been imprudently abandoned for the hope of Asiatic triumphs.¹

That such considerations of interest and ambition, not a sincere desire to promote the public tranquillity, had produced this perfidious treaty, could not long be kept secret; notwithstanding the various artifices employed to conceal it. Thebes and Argos were required to comply with the terms of the peace; but no mention was made of withdrawing the Lacedæmonian garrisons from the places which they occupied. Lest this injustice might occasion general discontent, the Athenians were allowed the same privilege. The possession of the unimportant isles of Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros, flattered their vain hopes, and lulled them into false security; and, as they expected to reap the fruits of the victories of Conon and Thrasylus, they were averse to renew the war for the sake of their allies, whose interests were now separated from their own. Meanwhile the Spartan emissaries negotiated and intrigued in all the subordinate cities, encouraging the aristocratical factions, and fomenting the animosities of the citizens against each other, and against their respective capitals. The jealousies and complaints, which had been principally occasioned by these secret cabals, were usually referred to the Spartan senate; whose affected moderation, under pretence of defending the cause of the weak and the injured, always decided the contest in the way most favourable for themselves. But the warlike disciples of Lycurgus could not long remain satisfied with these juridical usurpations. They determined to take arms, which they probably hoped to employ with such artful dexterity as might prevent any general, or very dangerous, alarm; beginning with such cities as had not entered into the late confederacy against them, gradually extending their hostilities to the more powerful members of that confederacy; and thus conquering successively those whose entire and collective strength it would have been vain to assail.²

Olymp. The first victim of this ambitious policy was the flourishing republic
xcviii. 3. of Mantinea, whose territory was
A. C. 336. situate almost in the centre of Arcadia, itself the centre of the Peloponnesus. The origin of Mantinea was the same with that of Tegea, Stymphalis, Heræa, Orchomenus, and other neighbouring cities, which had grown into populousness and power from the scattered villages of shepherds inhabiting the valleys and mountains of Arcadia. The exuberant fertility, the inland situation, the generous warmth, yet lively verdure,³ together with the picturesque and animating scenery of this delightful region, seemed pecu-

liarily adapted to inspire, and to gratify, the love of rural happiness; and to afford, in all their elegance and dignity, *those sublime and sacred joys of the country*, which the genius of ancient poets hath felt, and described with such affecting sensibility. Every district of Arcadia was marked and diversified by hills, some of which, could we credit the inaccuracy of geographical description, ascend two miles in perpendicular height,⁴ and which supply innumerable streams, that water and fertilize the rich valleys which they enclose and defend. This secure and insulated position of their territory long preserved the Arcadians ignorant and uncorrupted; and a little before the period of history now under review, they were distinguished by the innocent simplicity of their manners, and by their fond attachment to a pastoral life. But the turbulent ambition of their neighbours had often obliged them to employ the sword instead of the sheep-hook. They had *reluctantly* taken arms; yet, when compelled by necessity, or excited by honour, the mountaineers of Arcadia had displayed such stubborn valour; and exerted such efforts of vigour and activity, as made their services eagerly desired, and purchased with emulation, by the surrounding states. Nor had they trusted to their personal strength and bravery alone for the defence of their beloved possession. Having quitted their farms and villages, they had assembled into walled towns, from which their numerous garrisons were ready to sally forth against a hostile invader. The dangerous vicinity of Sparta had early driven the companions of Pan and the Nymphs from the vocal woods of mount Mænalus,⁵ into the fortifications of Tegea, formerly the principal city of the province,⁶ but afterwards rivalled and surpassed by Mantinea, which was become an object of jealousy and envy, not only to the neighbouring cities of Arcadia, but even to Sparta herself.

In the year immediately following the treaty of Antalcidas, Lacedæmonian ambassadors were sent to Mantinea, to discharge a very extraordinary commission. Having demanded an audience of the assembly, they expressed the resentment of their republic against a people, who, pretending to live in friendship with them, had in the late war repeatedly furnished with corn their avowed enemies the Argives. That, on other occasions, the Mantineans had unguardedly discovered their secret hatred to Sparta, rejoicing in her misfortunes, and envying her prosperity. That it was time to anticipate this dangerous and unjust animosity; for which purpose the Spartans commanded them to demolish their walls, to abandon their proud city, and to return to those peaceful villages in which their ancestors had lived and flourished.⁷ The Mantineans received this proposal with the indignation which it merited; the ambassadors

¹ Vid. Isocrat. de Pace, passim.

² Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. p. 551. and Diodor. l. xv. p. 448.

³ These circumstances are common to Arcadia with the other mountainous districts of Greece, as well as with the islands of the Archipelago. TOURNEFORT.

⁴ Descript. Græc. apud Gronov. vol. i.

⁵ Mænalus argutumque nemus pinosque loquentes
Semper habet; semper pastorum ille audit amores
Panaque, &c. Virg. Ecl. viii. v. 22.

⁶ Herodot. l. vi. c. 105.

⁷ Xenoph. Hellen. l. v. c. 2, et seq. Diodor. l. xv. c. 7, et seq.

retired in disgust; the Spartans declared war; summoned the assistance of their confederates; and a powerful army, commanded by king Agesipolis, invaded the hostile territory.

But the most destructive ravages could not bend the resolution of the Mantinæans. The strength and loftiness of their walls bade defiance to assault; nor could a regular siege be undertaken with certain success, as the magazines of Mantinæa were abundantly stored with various kinds of grain, the crops of the former year having been uncommonly plentiful. Agesipolis, however, embraced this doubtful mode of attack, and drew first a ditch, and then a wall, entirely round the place, employing one part of his troops in the work, and another in guarding the workmen. This tedious service exhausted the patience of the besiegers, without shaking the firmness of the Mantinæans. The Spartans were afraid to detain longer in the field their reluctant confederates; but Agesipolis proposed a new measure, which was attended with complete and immediate success. The river Ophis, formed by the collected torrents from mount Anchisius, a river broad, deep, and rapid, flowed through the plain, and the city of Mantinæa. It was a laborious undertaking to stop the course of this copious stream; which was no sooner effected, than the lower parts of the walls of Mantinæa were laid under water. According to the usual practice of the Greeks, the fortifications of this place were built of raw bricks, which being less liable to break into chinks, and to fly out of their courses, were preferred as the best defence against the battering-engines then in use. But it is the inconvenience of raw bricks, to be as easily dissolved by water, as wax is melted by the sun.⁸ The walls of Mantinæa began to yield, to shake, to fall in pieces. The activity of the inhabitants propped them with wood, but without any permanent advantage; so that, despairing of being able to exclude the enemy, they sent to capitulate, requesting that they might be permitted to keep possession of their city, on condition that they demolished their fortifications, and followed, in peace and war, the fortune of Sparta.

Olymp. Agesipolis and his counsellors refused to grant them any other terms
xcviii. 4. of peace than those which had been
A. C. 385. originally proposed by the republic. He observed, that while they lived together in one populous city, their numbers exposed them to the delusions of seditious demagogues, whose address and eloquence easily seduced the multitude from their real interest, and destroyed the influence of their superiors in rank, in wealth, and in wisdom, on whose attachment alone the Lacedæmonians could safely depend. They insisted, therefore, that the Mantinæans should destroy their houses in the city; separate into four distinct communities;⁹ and return to those villages which their ancestors had inhabited. The terror of an immediate assault made it necessary to comply with this humiliat-

ing demand; but the most zealous partisans of democracy, to the number of sixty, afraid of trusting to the capitulation, were allowed to fly from their country; which is mentioned as an instance of moderation¹⁰ in the Lacedæmonian soldiers, who might have put them to death as they passed through the gates.

Olymp. This transaction was scarcely
xcix. 1. finished, when the Spartan magis-
A. C. 384. trates seized an opportunity of the domestic discontents among the Phliasians, to display the same tyrannical spirit, but with still greater exertions of severity. The little republic of Phlius, like every state of Greece in those unfortunate, at least turbulent times, was distracted by factions. The prevailing party banished their opponents, the friends of Sparta and aristocracy. They were allowed to return from exile, in consequence of the commands and threats of Agesilaus;¹¹ but met not with that respectful treatment which seemed due to persons who enjoyed such powerful protection. They complained, and Agesilaus again interfered, by appointing commissioners to try and condemn to death the obnoxious Phliasians; an odious office, which must have been executed with unexampled rigour, since the city of Phlius, which had hitherto been divided by a variety of interests, thenceforward continued invariably the steadfast ally of Sparta.¹²

Mean while ambassadors arrived from Acanthus and Apollonia, two cities of the Chalcidicé, requesting the Lacedæmonian assistance against the dangerous ambition of Olynthus. This city, of which we had occasion to mention the foundation towards the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was situate nine miles from the sea, in a fertile and secure district, between the rivers Olynthus and Amnias, which flow into the lake Bolyca, a name improperly bestowed on the inmost recess of the Toronaic gulf. The vexatious government of Athens first drove the maritime communities of the Chalcidic region within the walls of Olynthus; the oppressive tyranny of Sparta obliged them to strengthen those walls, as well as to provide sufficient garrisons to defend them; and the subsequent misfortunes of these domineering republics, together with the weakness of Macedon, encouraged and enabled the inhabitants of Olynthus thus successfully to employ, in offensive war, the forces which had been raised with no other view than to maintain their own independence. The towns which they subdued were either incorporated or associated with their own; and Olynthus became the head of a confederacy, whose extent, power, resources, and hopes, occasioned just alarm among the neighbouring communities of Greeks and Barbarians. They had already conquered the southern shores of Macedon, which comprehended the delightful regions of Chalcis and Pieria, indented by two great and two smaller bays, and affording, in the highest perfection, the united benefits of agriculture, pasturage, and com-

⁸ This is the expression of Pausanias, in Arcad. who mentions the name of the river Ophis, omitted by Xenophon and Diodorus.

⁹ Xenophon says four, Diodorus five.

¹⁰ Or rather of good discipline; *παιδεία*. The nobles of the Mantinæans, *οι ειλτιστοι των Μαντινιων*, were not so temperate; vide Xenoph. p. 552.

¹¹ Xenoph. in Agesyl. et Hel'en. l. v. p. 553.

¹² Id. l. vii. p. 625.

merca. They aspired at acquiring the valuable district of mount Pangæus, whose timber and mines alike tempted their ambition and avarice; and Olynthus being favourably situate in the centre of the Chalcidicé, itself the centre of the Macedonian and Thracian coasts, might have preserved and extended her dominion, if the ambassadors of Acanthus and Apollonia had not completely effected the object of their commission at Sparta. They applied to the ephori, who introduced them to the greater assembly, consisting not only of the Spartans and Lacedæmonians, but of the deputies sent by their confederates. Cleigenes, the Acanthian, spoke in the name of his colleagues: "We apprehend, O Lacedæmonians, and allies! that amidst the multiplied objects of your care and correction, you have overlooked a great and growing disorder which threatens, like a pestilence, to infect and pervade Greece. The ambition of the Olynthians has increased with their power. By the voluntary submission of the smaller cities in their neighbourhood, they have been enabled to subdue the more powerful. Emboldened by this accession of strength, they have wrested from the king of Macedon his most valuable provinces. They actually possess Pella, the greatest city in that kingdom; and the unfortunate Amyntas is on the point of abandoning the remainder of his dominions, which he is unable to defend. There is not any community in Thrace capable to stop their progress. The independent tribes of that warlike but divided country, respect the authority, and court the friendship of the Olynthians, who will doubtless be tempted to extend their dominion on that side, in order to augment the great revenues which they derive from their commercial cities and harbours, by the inexhaustible mines in mount Pangæus. If this extensive plan should be effected, what can prevent them from acquiring a decisive superiority by sea and land? and should they enter into an alliance with Athens and Thebes (a measure actually in contemplation,) what will become, we say not, of the hereditary pre-eminence of Sparta, but of its independence and safety? The present emergency, therefore, solicits, by every motive of interest and of honour, the activity and valour of your republic. By yielding a reasonable assistance to Acanthus and Apollonia, which, unmoved by the pusillanimous example of their neighbours, have hitherto spurned the yoke, and defied the threats of Olynthus, you will save from oppression two peaceful communities, and check the ambition of an usurping tyrant. The reluctant subjects of the Olynthians will court your protection; and the Chalcidian cities will be encouraged to revolt, especially as they are not yet inseparably linked with the capital by the ties of intermarriage and consanguinity, and by the interchange of rights and possessions.¹ When such a connection shall take place, (for the Olynthians have made a law to encourage it,) you will be unable to break the force of this powerful and dangerous confederacy."

The speech of Cleigenes, and the ambitious

views of the republic to which it was addressed, afford reason to conjecture that the ambassadors neither asked any thing in favour of their own communities, nor urged any accusation against Olynthus, which had not been previously suggested by the Olymp. xcix. 2. Spartan emissaries in Macedon. A. C. 383. The reception given to the proposal of Cleigenes tends to confirm this conclusion. The Lacedæmonians, with affected impartiality and indifference, desired the opinion of their allies, before declaring their own. But there was not any occasion to declare what none could be so blind as to mistake. The confederates with one consent, but especially those who wished to ingratiate themselves with Sparta,² determined to undertake the expedition against Olynthus. The Spartans commended their resolution, and proceeded to deliberate concerning the strength of the army to be raised, the mode of levying it, and the time for taking the field. It was resolved, that the whole forces should amount to ten thousand effective men; and a list was prepared, containing the respective contingents to be furnished by the several cities. If any state should be unable to supply the full complement of soldiers, money would be taken in their stead, at the rate of half a drachm a day (or three-pence halfpenny) for each man; but if neither the troops nor the money were sent in due time, the Lacedæmonians would punish the disobedience of the obstinate or neglectful, by fining them eight times the sum which they had been originally required to contribute.

The ambassadors then rose up, and Cleigenes, again speaking for the rest, declared that these were indeed noble and generous resolutions; but, unfortunately, could not be executed with such promptitude as suited the urgency of the present crisis. The dangerous situation of Acanthus and Apollonia demanded immediate assistance. He proposed, therefore, that those troops which were ready, should instantly take the field; and insisted on this measure as a matter of the utmost importance to the future success of the war.

The Lacedæmonians acknowledged the expediency of the advice; and commanded Eudamidas, with two thousand men, to proceed without delay to Macedon, while his brother Phœbidas collected a powerful reinforcement, in order to follow him. A very extraordinary event, which we shall have occasion fully to explain, retarded the arrival of those auxiliaries, until the season for action had been nearly spent. But Eudamidas, with his little band, performed very essential service. He strengthened the garrisons of such places as were most exposed to assaults from the enemy; the appearance of a Spartan army encouraged the spirit of revolt among the allies and subjects of Olynthus; and soon after his march into the Chalcidicé, Eudamidas received the voluntary surrender of Potidæa, a city of great importance in the isthmus of Pallené.

Such was the first campaign of a war which

¹ Επιγυμνίαι καὶ ἰγυτήσεις παρελλήλαιοι. Xenoph. p. 555.

² Καὶ μάλιστα οἱ βουλευόμενοι χερζιστά τοις Λακεδαιμονίοις. Xenoph. p. 555.

lasted four years, and was carried on under four successive generals. Eudamidas, too much elated by his first success, ravaged the Olynthian territory, and unguardedly approached the city. He was intercepted, conquered, and slain, and his army dispersed or lost.³

Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus, whose naval exploits have been already mentioned with applause, assumed the conduct of this distant expedition, with a body of ten thousand men. He was assisted by Amyntas, king

Olymp. of Macedon, and still more effectually by Derdas, the brother of that

xcix. 3. prince, and the governor, or rather

A. C. 382. sovereign, of Elymea, the most western province of Macedon, which abounded in cavalry. By the united efforts of these formidable enemies, the Olynthians, who had been defeated in various rencounters, were shut up within their walls, and prevented from cultivating their territory. Teleutias at length marched with his whole forces, in order to invest, or if he found an opportunity, to assault the place. His surprise and indignation were excited by the boldness of the Olynthian horse, who ventured to pass the Amnias in sight of such a superior army; and he ordered the targeteers, who were commanded by Tlemonidas, to repel their insolence. The cavalry made an artful retreat across the Amnias, and were fiercely pursued by the Lacedæmonians. When a considerable part of the latter had likewise passed the river, the Olynthians suddenly faced about, and charged them. Tlemonidas, with above a hundred of his companions, fell in the action. The Spartan general beheld with grief and rage the successful bravery of the enemy. Grasping his shield and lance, he commanded the cavalry, and the remainder of the targeteers, to pursue without intermission; and, at the head of his heavy-armed men, advanced with less order than celerity. The Olynthians attempted not to stop their progress, till they arrived under the walls and battlements. At that moment the townsmen mounted their ramparts, and assailed the enemy with a shower of darts and arrows, and every kind of missile weapon, which greatly added to the confusion occasioned by the rapidity of their march. Mean while the flower of the Olynthian troops, who had been purposely drawn up behind the gates, sallied forth with irresistible violence; Teleutias, attempting to rally his men, was slain in the first onset; the Spartans who attended him gave ground; the whole army was repelled, and pursued with great slaughter, while they fled in scattered disorder towards the friendly towns of Acanthus, Apollonia, Spartolus, and Potidæa.⁴

This mortifying disaster did not cool the ardour of the Spartans for gaining possession of Olynthus. In the year three hundred and

Olymp. eighty-one before Christ, which was

xcix. 4. the third of the war, they sent Age-

A. C. 381. sipolis, with a powerful reinforce-

ment, into Macedon. The arrival of this prince early in the spring, revived the hopes of the vanquished, and confirmed the

attachment of the Lacedæmonian allies. He invaded and ravaged such parts of the Olynthian territory as had been spared in former incursions, and took by storm the strong city of Torona. But while he prepared to avail himself of these advantages for rendering his success complete, he was seized by a calenture, a disease incident to warm climates, and, as the name expresses, affecting the patient with a painful sensation of burning heat, which he is eager to extinguish by the most violent and dangerous remedies.⁵ Agesipolis had lately visited the temple of Apollo at Aphytis, a maritime town on the Toranaic gulf. In the paroxysm of this disorder, he longed for the fanning breezes, the shady walks and groves, and the cool crystalline streams, of that delightful retreat. His attendants indulged his inclination, but could not save his life. He died on the seventh day of the disease, within the precincts of the consecrated ground. His remains, embalmed in honey, were conveyed to Sparta.⁶ His brother Cleombrotus succeeded to the throne; and Polybiades, a general of experience and capacity, was invested with the command in Macedon.

Olymp. Polybiades, imitating the exam-

c. 1. ple of his predecessors, conducted

A. C. 380. a powerful reinforcement against

Olynthus, which was completely surrounded by land, while a squadron of Lacedæmonian galleys blocked up the neighbouring harbour of Mecyberna. The events of the siege, which lasted eight or ten months, have not been thought worthy of record. It is probable that the Olynthians no longer ventured to sally forth against such a superior force: yet they must have been exceedingly distressed by famine before their obstinacy could be determined to capitulate. They formally relinquished all claim to the dominion of the Chalcidicæ: they ceded the Macedonian cities to their ancient sovereign; and engaged, by solemn oaths, to obey, in peace and war, the commands of their Spartan confederates and masters.⁷ In consequence of this humiliating treaty, or rather of this absolute submission of the Olynthians, Polybiades led off his victorious army, and Amyntas forsook the royal residence of *Ægæ* or *Edessa*, and re-established his court at *Pella*, a place of great strength and beauty, situate on an eminence, which, with an adjoining plain of considerable extent, was defended by the rivers *Axius* and *Lydias*, and by impervious lakes and morasses. The city was distant only fifteen miles from the *Ægean* sea, with which it communicated by means of the above mentioned rivers. It had been of old founded by Greeks, by whom it was recently conquered and peopled; but in consequence of the misfortunes and surrender of Olynthus, *Pella* became, and thenceforth continued, the capital of Macedon.

⁵ It is supposed, with great probability, that the sailors who suddenly disappear in the Mediterranean, during the heat of summer, have been attacked in the night by the calenture, and have thrown themselves into the sea. *Cyclopæd. Par. ad voc.* The disorder is examined by Dr. Shaw, *Phil. Trans. Abridg. vol. iv.*

⁶ Xenoph. p. 564.

⁷ Ibid. p. 565.

³ Xenoph. p. 556.

⁴ Idem. p. 561, 6t seq.

The commencement, and especially the conclusion of the Olynthian war, breathed the same spirit with the peace of Antalcidas, and proved the degenerate ambition of the Spartans, who were prepared to aggrandise the Barbarians on every side, in order to obtain their assistance towards extending their own dominion in Greece. This selfish and cruel system of policy deserved the indignation and resentment of the whole Grecian name, who were at length excited against Sparta by a very extraordinary transaction, to which we already had occasion to allude. When Eudamidas undertook the expedition against Olynthus, it was intended that his brother Phœbidas should follow him at the head of eight thousand men. This powerful reinforcement marched from Peloponnesus, and, in their journey northwards, encamped in the neighbourhood of Thebes, which was then torn by the inveterate hostility of contending factions. Ismenias, whose name has already occurred on a very dishonourable occasion, headed the democratical party; Leontiades supported the interest of Sparta and aristocracy; and both were invested with the archonship, the chief magistracy in the commonwealth. It is not absolutely certain that Phœbidas had previous orders to interfere in this dissension,¹ when he was accosted by Leontiades, "who exhorted him to seize the opportunity which fortune had thrown in his way, of performing a signal service to his country. He then explained to the Lacedæmonian the distracted state of Thebes, and the facility with which he might become master of the citadel; so that while his brother Eudamidas was carrying on the war against Olynthus, he himself would acquire possession of a much greater city."²

A contemporary historian, whose known partiality for the Lacedæmonians disposed him to regard this singular enterprise as Olymp. an act of private audacity, represents Phœbidas as a man of a light and vain mind, who loved the fame of a splendid action more than life itself, and who embraced, with childish transports of joy,³ the proposal of Leontiades. The mode of executing their plan was soon settled between them. To elude suspicion, Phœbidas made the usual preparations for continuing his journey, when he was suddenly recalled by his associate. It was the month of July; the heat was intense, and, at mid-day, few or no passengers were to be seen in the roads or streets. The Theban matrons celebrated the festival of Ceres, and prayed that bountiful divinity to preserve the hope of a favourable harvest. The appropriated scene of their female worship was the Cadmæa, or citadel, of which the gates had been purposely thrown open, and which was totally defenceless, as the males were universally excluded from this venerable ceremony.

Every circumstance conspired to facilitate the design of Leontiades, who conducted the Lacedæmonians to the fortress, without finding the smallest opposition. He immediately descended to the senate, which, though it usually assembled in the Cadmæa, was then sitting in the market-place; declared that the Lacedæmonians had acted by his advice, and without any purpose of hostility; seized Ismenias with his own hand as a disturber of the public peace, and ordered the other leaders of the republican faction to be taken into safe custody. Many were caught and imprisoned, and about four hundred escaped to Athens.⁴

When the news of this event reached Sparta, the senate and assembly resounded with real or well-feigned complaints against the madness of Phœbidas, who, unprovoked by any injury, had violently seized a place in alliance and amity with the republic. Agesilaus, however, undertook his defence; his ambitious mind had long fomented the domineering arrogance of his country; possibly he had prompted the enterprise of Phœbidas, which he warmly approved; and his influence being as extensive as his abilities, he easily persuaded his countrymen to justify the fortunate rashness⁵ of that commander, by keeping possession of the Theban citadel.

During five years the Spartans maintained, in the Cadmæa, a garrison of fifteen hundred men. Protected by such a body of foreign troops, which might be reinforced on the shortest warning, the partisans of aristocracy acquired an absolute ascendant in the affairs of the republic, which they conducted in such a manner as best suited their own interest, and the convenience of Sparta. Without pretending to describe the banishments, confiscations, and murders, of which they were guilty, it is sufficient for the purpose of general history to observe, that the miserable victims of their vengeance suffered similar calamities to those which afflicted Athens under the thirty tyrants. The severity of the government at length drove the Thebans to despair; and both the persecuted exiles abroad, and the oppressed subjects at home, prepared to embrace any measures, however daring and hazardous, which promised them a faint hope of relief.⁶

Among the Theban fugitives who had taken refuge in Athens, and whose persons were now loudly demanded by Sparta, was Pelopidas, the son of Hippocles, a youth, whose distinguished advantages might have justly rendered him an object of envy, before he was involved in the misfortunes of his country. He yielded to none in birth; he surpassed all in fortune; he excelled in the manly exercises so much esteemed by the Greeks, and was unrivalled in qualities still more estimable, generosity and courage. He had an hereditary attachment to the democratic form of policy; and, previous

¹ Diodorus boldly asserts, that Phœbidas acted by orders of his republic, and that the feigned complaints against him were nothing but a mask to disguise or to conceal the injustice of the community.

² Xenoph. p. 297, et seq. Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. p. 457.

³ *Ανιμεσις* is the expression used by Xenophon.

⁴ Xenoph. p. 557.

⁵ To save appearances, however, Phœbidas was fined. Even his accusers were offended, not at his injustice, but at his acting without orders. Xenoph. *ibid.* et Plutarch. vii. ii. p. 336.

⁶ Xenoph. Hellen. i. v. c. iv. Plut. in Pelopid. *dem de Genio Socratis*, p. 322, et seq.

to the late melancholy revolution, was marked out by his numerous friends and adherents as the person most worthy of administering the government. Pelopidas had often conferred with his fellow sufferers at Athens about the means of returning to their country, and restoring the democracy; encouraging them by the example of the patriotic Thrasybulus, who, with a handful of men, had issued from Thebes, and effected a similar, but still more difficult, enterprise. While they secretly deliberated on this important object, Mello, one of the exiles, introduced to their nocturnal assembly his friend Phyllidas, who had lately arrived from Thebes; a man whose enterprising activity, singular address, and crafty boldness, justly entitle him to the regard of history.

Phyllidas was strongly attached to the cause of the exiles; yet, by his insinuating complaisance, and officious servility, he had acquired the entire confidence of Leontiades, Archias, and the other magistrates, or rather tyrants,⁷ of the republic. In business and in pleasure, he rendered himself alike necessary to his masters; his diligence and abilities had procured him the important office of secretary to the council; and he had lately promised to Archias and Philip, the two most licentious of the tyrants, that he would give them an entertainment, during which they might enjoy the conversation and the persons of the finest women in Thebes. The day was appointed for this infamous rendezvous, which these magisterial debauchees expected with the greatest impatience; and, in the interval, Phyllidas set out for Athens, on pretence of private business.⁸

In Athens, the time and the means were adjusted for executing the conspiracy. A body of Theban exiles assembled in the Thriasian plain, on the frontier of Attica, where seven,⁹ or twelve,¹⁰ of the youngest and most enterprising, voluntarily offered themselves to enter the capital, and to co-operate with Phyllidas in the destruction of the magistrates. The distance between Thebes and Athens was about thirty-five miles. The conspirators had thirteen miles to march through a hostile territory. They disguised themselves in the garb of peasants, arrived at the city towards evening with nets and hunting poles, and passed the gates without suspicion. During that night, and the succeeding day, the house of Charon, a wealthy and respectable citizen, the friend of Phyllidas and a determined enemy of the aristocracy, afforded them a secure refuge, till the favourable moment summoned them to action.

The important evening approached, when the artful secretary had prepared his long-expected entertainment in the treasury. Nothing had been omitted that could flatter the senses, and lull the activity of the mind in a dream of pleasure. But a secret and obscure rumour, which had spread in the city, hung, like a drawn dagger, over the voluptuous joys of the festivity. It had been darkly reported, that some unknown strangers, supposed to be a party of the exiles, had been received into the house of Charon. All

the address of Phyllidas could not divert the terror of his guests. They despatched one of their lictors or attendants to demand the immediate presence of Charon. The conspirators were already buckling on their armour, in hopes of being immediately summoned to execute their purpose. But what was their astonishment and terror, when their host and protector was sternly ordered to appear before the magistrates! The most sanguine were persuaded that their design had become public, and that they must all miserably perish, without effecting any thing worthy of their courage. After a moment of dreadful reflection, they exhorted Charon to obey the mandate without delay. But that firm and patriotic Theban first went to the apartment of his wife, took his infant son, an only child, and presented him to Pelopidas and Mello, requesting them to retain in their hands this dearest pledge of his fidelity. They unanimously declared their entire confidence in his honour, and entreated him to remove from danger a helpless infant, who might become, in some future time, the avenger of his country's wrongs. But Charon was inflexible, declaring, "That his son could never aspire at a happier fortune, than that of dying honourably with his father and friends."

So saying, he addressed a short prayer to the gods, embraced his associates, and departed. Before he arrived at the treasury, he was met by Archias and Phyllidas. The former asked him, in the presence of the other magistrates, whose anxiety had brought them from table, "Who are those strangers said to have arrived the other day, and to be now entertained in your family?" Charon had composed his countenance so artfully, and retorted the question with such well-dissembled surprise, as considerably quieted the solicitude of the tyrants, which was totally removed by a whisper of Phyllidas, "That the absurd rumour had doubtless been spread for no other purpose but that of disturbing their pleasures."

They had scarcely returned to the banquet, when Fortune, as if she had taken pleasure to confound the dexterity of Phyllidas, raised up a new and most alarming danger. A courier arrived from Athens with every mark of haste and trepidation, desiring to see Archias, to whom he delivered a letter from an Athenian magistrate of the same name, his ancient friend and guest. This letter revealed the conspiracy; a secret not entrusted to the messenger, who had orders, however, to request Archias to read the despatch immediately, as containing matters of the utmost importance. But that careless voluptuary, whose thoughts were totally absorbed in the expected scene of pleasure, replied with a smile, "Business to-morrow;" deposited the letter under the pillow of the couch, on which, according to ancient custom, he lay at the entertainment; and resumed his conversation with Phyllidas concerning the ladies, whom he had promised to introduce. Matters were now come to a crisis; Phyllidas retired for a moment; the conspirators were put in motion; their weapons concealed under the flowing swell of female attire, and their countenances overshadowed and hid by a load of crowns and gar-

⁷ Τῶν πρὸς Ἀρχίαν τυραννίδας. Xenoph.

⁸ Xenoph. p. 566.

⁹ Plutarch in Pelopid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

lands. In this disguise they were presented to the magistrates intoxicated with wine and folly. At a given signal they drew their daggers, and effected their purpose.¹ Charon and Mello were the principal actors in this bloody scene, which was entirely directed by Phyllidas. But a more difficult task remained. Leontiades, with other abettors of the tyranny, still lived, to avenge the murder of their associates. The conspirators, encouraged by their first success, and conducted by Phyllidas, gained admission into their houses successively, by means of the unsuspected secretary. On the appearance of disorder and tumult, Leontiades seized his sword, and boldly prepared for his defence. Pelopidas had the merit of destroying the principal author of the Theban servitude and disgrace. His associates perished without resistance; men whose names may be consigned to just oblivion, since they were distinguished by nothing memorable but their cruel and oppressive tyranny.

The measures of the conspirators were equally vigorous and prudent. Before alarming the city, they proceeded to the different prisons, which were crowded with the unfortunate victims of arbitrary power. Every door was open to Phyllidas. The captives, transported with joy and gratitude, increased the strength of their deliverers. They broke open the arsenals, and provided themselves with arms. The streets of Thebes now resounded with alarm and terror; every house and family were filled with confusion and uproar; the inhabitants were universally in motion; some providing lights, others running in wild disorder to the public places, and all anxiously wishing the return of day, that they might discover the unknown cause of this nocturnal tumult.

During a moment of dreadful silence, which interrupted the noise of sedition, a herald proclaimed, with a clear and loud voice, the death of the tyrants, and summoned to arms the friends of liberty and the republic. Among others who obeyed the welcome invitation was Epaminondas, the son of Polymnis, a youth of the most illustrious merit; who united the wisdom of the sage, and the magnanimity of the hero, with the practice of every mild and gentle virtue; unrivalled in knowledge and in eloquence; in birth, valour, and patriotism, not inferior to Pelopidas, with whom he had contracted an early friendship. The principles of the Pythagorean philosophy,² which he had diligently studied under Lysis of Tarentum, rendered Epaminondas averse to engage in the conspiracy, lest he might imbue his hands in civil blood.³ But when the sword was once drawn, he appeared with ardour in defence of his friends and country; and his example was followed by many brave and generous youths who had reluctantly endured the double yoke of domestic and foreign tyranny.

Olymp. The approach of morning had brought the Theban exiles, in arms, c. 3. from the Thriasian plain. The partisans of the conspirators were con-

tinually increased by a confluence of new auxiliaries from every quarter of the city. Encompassed by such an invincible band of adherents, Pelopidas and his associates proceeded to the market-place; summoned a general assembly of the people; explained the necessity, the object, and the extent of the conspiracy; and, with the universal approbation of their fellow citizens, restored the democratic form of government.⁴

Exploits of valour and intrepidity may be discovered in the history of every nation. But the revolution of Thebes displayed not less wisdom of design, than enterprising gallantry in execution. Amidst the tumult of action, and ardour of victory, the conspirators possessed sufficient coolness and foresight to reflect that the Cadmeæ, or citadel, which was held by a Lacedæmonian garrison of fifteen hundred men, would be reinforced, on the first intelligence of danger, by the resentful activity of Sparta. To anticipate this alarming event, which must have rendered the consequences of the conspiracy incomplete and precarious, they commanded the messenger, whom, immediately after the destruction of the tyrants, they had despatched to their friends in the Thriasian plain, to proceed to Athens, in order to communicate the news of a revolution which could not fail to be highly agreeable to that state, and to solicit the immediate assistance of the Athenians, whose superior skill in attacking fortified places was acknowledged by Greeks and Barbarians. This message was attended with the most salutary effects. The acute discernment of the Athenians eagerly seized the precious opportunity of weakening Sparta,⁵ which, if once neglected, might never return. Several thousand men were ordered to march; and no time was lost, either in the preparation, or in the journey, since they reached Thebes the day after Pelopidas had re-established the democracy.

Olymp. The seasonable arrival of those auxiliaries, whose celerity exceeded c. 3. ed the most sanguine hopes of the A. C. 378. Thebans, increased the ardour of the latter to attack the citadel. The events of the siege are variously related.⁶ According to the most probable account, the garrison made a very feeble resistance, being intimidated by the impetuous alacrity and enthusiasm, as well as the increasing numbers of the assailants, who already amounted to fourteen thousand men, and received continual accessions of strength from the neighbouring cities of Boeotia. Only a few days had elapsed, when the Lacedæmonians desired to capitulate, on condition of being allowed to depart in safety with their arms. Their proposal was readily accepted; but they seem not to have demanded, or at least not to have obtained, any terms of advantage or security for those unfortunate Thebans, whose attachment to the Spartan interest strongly solicited their protection. At the first alarm of sedition, these unhappy men, with their wives

¹ Xenoph. p. 567. Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. l. xv. p. 470.

² See p. 141—146.

³ Plutarch. de Genio Socratis, p. 279, et passim.

⁴ Xenoph. Diodor. et Plutarch. ibid.

⁵ Dinarch. Orat. contra Demosth. p. 100.

⁶ Diodorus differs entirely from Xenophon and Plutarch, whom I have chiefly followed.

and families, had taken refuge in the citadel. The greater part of them cruelly perished by the resentment of their countrymen; a remnant only was saved by the humane interposition

of the Athenians.⁷ So justly had Epaminondas suspected, that the revolution could not be accomplished without the effusion of civil blood.

CHAPTER XXX.

The Bœotian war—Unsuccessful attempt of Sphodrias against the Piræus—Doubts concerning Xenophon's Account of that transaction—Agésilas invades Bœotia—Military Success of the Thebans—Naval Success of the Athenians—Congress for Peace under the Mediation of Artaxerxes—Epaminondas, Deputy from Thebes—Cleombrotus invades Bœotia—Battle of Leuctra—State of Greece—Jason of Thessaly—His Character and Views—Assassinated in the midst of his Projects.

THE emancipation of Thebes gave a deep wound to the pride and tyranny of Sparta; and the magistrates of the latter republic prepared to punish, with due severity, what they affected to term the unprovoked rebellion of their subjects. The Thebans firmly resolved to maintain the freedom which they had assumed; and these dispositions on both sides occasioned a memorable war, which, having lasted with little interruption during seven years, ended with the battle of Leuctra, which produced a total revolution in the affairs of Greece.

The ardent mind of Agésilas had long inspired, or directed, the ambitious views of his country. He enjoyed the glory, but could not avoid the odium, attached to his exalted situation; and fearing to increase the latter, he allowed the conduct of the Theban war to be committed to the inexperience of his unequal colleague. In the heart of a severe winter, Cleombrotus, with a well-appointed army, entered Bœotia. His presence confirmed the obedience of Thespiae, Platæa, and other inferior communities. He defeated some straggling parties of the Thebans, repelled their incursions, ravaged their territory, burned their villages, but attempted not to make any impression on the well-defended strength of their city. After a campaign of two months, he returned home, leaving a numerous garrison in Thespiae, commanded by Sphodrias, a general of great enterprise, but little prudence.

Mean while the Athenians, alarmed by the nearer view of danger, publicly disavowed the assistance which they had given to Thebes; and having disgraced, banished, or put to death,⁸ the advisers of that daring measure, renewed their alliance with Sparta. The Thebans felt the full importance of this defection, and left nothing untried to prevent its fatal tendency, a design (could we believe tradition) in which they succeeded by a very singular stratagem. The light and rash character of Sphodrias was well known, we are told, to the Theban chiefs, who employed secret emissaries to persuade him, by arguments most flattering to

his passions, to attack by surprise the imperfectly repaired harbour of Athens. These artful ministers of deceit represented to Sphodrias, that it was unworthy of his dignity, and of his valour, to employ the arms of Sparta in a predatory war, while an object of far more importance and glory naturally solicited the activity of his enterprising mind. "The Thebans, indeed, were vigilant in guard; and, being animated by the enthusiasm of newly-recovered freedom, were determined, rather than surrender, to bury themselves under the ruins of their country. But their secret and perfidious ally, whose assistance had recently enabled them to throw off the Spartan yoke, was lulled in security. The moment had arrived for crushing the implacable hatred of the Athenians, by surprising the Piræus, their principal ornament and defence; an action which would be celebrated by posterity above the kindred glory of Phœbidas, who, during the time also of an insidious peace, had seized the Theban citadel."⁹

The distance between Thebes and Thespiae, which was not more than twenty miles, furnished an easy opportunity for carrying on these secret practices; but the distance, which exceeded forty miles, between Thebes and Athens, rendered the enterprise of Sphodrias abortive. He marched from Thespiae with the flower of his garrison, early in the morning, expecting to reach the Piræus before the dawn of the succeeding day. But he was surprised by the return of light in the Thriasian plain. The borough of Eleusis was alarmed; the report flew to Athens, and the citizens, with their usual alacrity, seized their arms, and prepared for a vigorous defence. The mad design, and the still greater madness of Sphodrias, in ravaging the country during his retreat, provoked the fury of the Athenians. They immediately seized the persons of such Lacedæmonians as happened to reside in their city. They sent an embassy to Sparta, complaining, in the most indignant terms, of the insult of Sphodrias. The Spartans disavowed his conduct. He was recalled and tried, but saved from death by the authority of Agésilas. This powerful protection was obtained by the intercession of his son Cleonymus, the beloved companion of Archidamus, the son and succes-

⁷ Xenoph. et Plutarch. ibid.

⁸ Xenoph. p. 334. I have endeavoured to reconcile Xenophon and Dinarchus, cited above.

⁹ Xenoph. p. 340. Diodorus, p. 472.

sor of the Spartan king. Archidamus pleaded, with the modest eloquence of tears, for the father of a friend, his equal in years and valour, with whom he had been long united in the most tender affection. Cleonymus declared on this occasion, that he should never disgrace the ardent attachment of the royal youth: and illustrious as Archidamus afterwards became, Xenophon affirms, that his early and unalterable love of Cleonymus forms not the shade, but rather the fairest light, of his amiable and exalted character.¹

Such is the account of this transaction, given originally by Xenophon, and faithfully copied by other writers, ancient and modern. But there is some reason to suspect that Agesilaus was not totally unacquainted with the ambitious and unwarrantable design of Sphodrias; that the Spartans would have approved the measure, had it been crowned with success; and that even the philosophic Xenophon, a partial admirer of Agesilaus and the Lacedæmonians, has employed the persuasive simplicity of his inimitable style, to varnish a very unjustifiable transaction. Such, at least, it appeared to the Athenian assembly, who, offended by the crime, were still more indignant at the acquittal, of Sphodrias. From that time they began to prepare their fleet, to enlist sailors, to collect and to employ all the materials of war, with a resolution firmly to maintain the cause of Thebes and their own.

Olymp. While they were busied in such
c. 4. preparations, Agesilaus repeatedly
A. C. 377. invaded Bœotia, without perform-
et Olymp. ing any thing worthy of his former
ci. 1. renown. His army amounted to
A. C. 376. eighteen thousand foot, and fifteen
hundred horse. The enemy were
assisted by a considerable body of mercenaries,
commanded by Chabrias the Athenian, who
finally repelled the Spartan king from Thebes,
by a stratagem not less simple than uncommon.
The Theban army prepared to act on the de-
fensive against a superior force, and occupied a
rising ground in the neighbourhood of their
city. Agesilaus detached a body of light-armed
troops, to provoke them to quit this advanta-
geous post; but the Thebans cautiously main-
tained their ground, and obliged the enemy to
draw out their whole forces, in order to dis-
lodge them. Chabrias, waiting their approach,
commanded his troops to execute a new move-
ment, which he had recently taught them for
such an emergency. They supported their ad-
vanced bodies on their left knee, extended their
shields and spears, and thus firmly maintained
their ranks.² Alarmed at the determined bold-

ness of an unusual array, which seemed to bid him defiance, Agesilaus withdrew his army from the capital, and contented himself with committing further ravages on the country.

Olymp. In the skirmishes which hap-
ci. 2. pened after his retreat, the The-
A. C. 375. bans proved repeatedly victori-
ous. He returned home, and continued at
Sparta during the following year, to be cured
of his wounds; where he suffered the mortify-
ing reproaches of his adversary Antalcidas, "for
teaching the Thebans to conquer." The gene-
rals who succeeded him had not better success.
Phœbidas, the original author of the war, who
had been appointed governor of Thespiæ, was
defeated and slain, with the greatest part of the
garrison of that place. Pelopidas, with his
own hand, killed the Spartan commander in
the action at Tanagra; and in the pitched bat-
tle of Tegyra, the Lacedæmonians, though
superior in number, were broken and put to
flight; a disgrace which, they reflected with
sorrow, had never befallen them in any former
engagement.

Olymp. While the war was thus carried
ci. 1. on by land, the Athenians put to
A. C. 376. sea, and gained the most distin-
guished advantages on their favour-
ite element. The Lacedæmonian fleet, of sixty
sail, commanded by Pollis, was shamefully de-
feated near the isle of Naxos, by the skilful
bravery of Chabrias, who performed alternately,
and with equal abilities, the duties of admiral
and general.³ But the principal scene of ac-
tion was the Ionian sea, where Timotheus⁴ and
Iphicrates every where prevailed over the com-
manders who opposed them. The fleet of
Sparta was totally ruined by the victors, who
repeatedly ravaged the coasts of Laconia,⁵ and
laid under heavy contributions the islands of
Corcyra, Zacynthus, Leucadia, and Cephalenia.
Even the isles and cities more remote from the
scene of this naval war; particularly the valua-
ble island of Chios, and the important city of
Byzantium, deserted their involuntary connec-
tion with the declining fortune of Sparta, and
once more accepted the dangerous alliance of
the Athenians.⁶

These hostile operations, which weakened,
without subduing, the spirit of the vanquished,
were interrupted by the solicitations and bribes
of the king of Persia, who earnestly promoted
the domestic tranquillity of Greece, that he
might enjoy the assistance of its arms in crush-
ing a new rebellion in Egypt. His emissaries
met with equal success in Athens and Sparta,
which were alike weary of the war, the former

¹ Xenoph. p. 570.

² The words of Nepos, in Chabrias, are better explained by reading, "Qui obnixo genu scuto, pro jactaque hasta, impetum excipere hostium docuit." This agrees with the statue of Chabrias in the Villa Borghese, whose singular attitude has given so much trouble to antiquaries. Winkelman conjectures this master-piece of art to be the most ancient statue in Rome, from the form of the letters in the name Agasias with which it is inscribed. He observes, that it is erroneously supposed to be a gladiator, since the Greeks never honoured gladiators with such monuments; and the style of the workmanship proves it more ancient than the introduction of that inhuman spectacle into Greece. The body of the statue is advanced and rests on the left

thigh; the right arm grasps a javelin, or spear; around the left is seen a leather thong, or handle of a shield. It seems, says Winkelman, the particular attitude of a warrior on some dangerous emergency. What this emergency was, the learned and ingenious Lessing fortunately discovered, by the words of Cornelius Nepos. "Hoc (the stratagem of Chabrias) usque eò tota Græcia famâ celebratam est, ut illo statu Chabrias sibi statum fieri voluerit, quæ publicè ei ab Atheniensibus in foro constitutaest."

³ Xenoph. p. 577. Diodor. l. xv. ad Olymp. ci. 1.

⁴ Corn. Nep. in Vit. Timoth. et Dinarch. adv. Demosth. Such was the good fortune of Timotheus, that the satirical artists of the times painted him asleep, covered with a net, in which the cities and islands entangled and caught them selves. Plutarch. de invid. et odio.

⁵ Xenoph. p. 578.

⁶ Id. ibid.

having little more to hope, and the latter having every thing to fear, from its continuance. Many of the inferior states, being implicitly governed by the resolves of these powerful republics, readily imitated their example. And so precarious and miserable was the condition of them all, in that disorderly period, that about twenty thousand men abandoned their homes and families, and followed the standard of the Persians. The merit of Iphicrates justly entitled him to the command of his countrymen, which was unanimously conferred on him. But the expedition produced nothing worthy of such a general, who in a few months returned to Athens, disgusted with the ignorant pride, and slothful timidity, of the Persian commanders, who durst not undertake any important enterprise, without receiving the slow instructions of a distant court.⁷

Olymp. ci. 3. A. C. 374. Mean while the Thebans, who, elated by a flow of unwonted prosperity, had proudly disregarded the representations of Artaxerxes, profited of the temporary diversion made by the Egyptian war, to reduce several inferior cities of Bœotia. The walls of Thespisæ were rased to the ground; Plataea met with the same fate; and its inhabitants, after suffering the cruellest indignities, were driven into banishment. It might be expected that the unfortunate exiles should have sought refuge in Sparta, whose authority they had uniformly acknowledged, since the dishonourable peace of Antalcidas. But so dissimilar were the fluctuating politics of Greece to the regular transactions of modern times (governed by the lifeless but steady principle of interest,) that the Plataeans had recourse to Athens, a city actually in alliance with the people by whom they had been so unjustly persecuted. Their eloquence, their tears, the memory of past services, and the promise of future gratitude, prevailed on the Athenian assembly, who kindly received them into the bosom of their republic, and expressed the warmest indignation against their insolent oppressors.⁸

Olymp. cii. 1. A. C. 372. This affecting transaction threatened to deprive the Thebans of an ally, to whom they were in a great measure indebted for their prosperity. Their subsequent conduct tended still farther to widen the breach. They marched troops into Phocis, with an intention to reduce that country. They heard with equal disdain, the remonstrances of their friends, and the threats of their enemies. Their unusual arrogance totally alienated the Athenians, who seemed finally disposed to conclude a lasting peace with Sparta, on the principles of the treaty of Antalcidas, that their respective garrisons should be withdrawn from foreign parts, and the communities, small as well as great, be permitted to enjoy the independent government of their own equitable laws. The interest of the king of Persia, who still needed fresh supplies to carry on the Egyptian war,

induced him to employ his good offices for promoting this specious purpose; and a convention of all the states was summoned to Sparta, whither the Thebans deigned indeed to send a representative; but a representative, whose firmness and magnanimity were well fitted to sustain and elevate the aspiring pretensions of his republic.

In effecting this glorious revolution, which gave freedom to Thebes, as well as in the military operations, which immediately followed that important event, the youthful merit of Pelopidas had acquired the fame of patriotism, valour, and conduct. The nobility of his birth, and the generous use of his riches, increased the ascendant due to his illustrious services. Every external advantage, the manly grace of his person, the winning affability of his deportment, his superior excellence in the martial exercises so highly prized by the Greeks, and especially by the Thebans, gained him the admiration of the multitude; or, in other words, of the legislative assembly of his country. He had been successively elected, during six years, to the first dignity of the republic; nor had the Thebans ever found reason to repent their choice.⁹ Yet in the present emergency, when they were required to appoint a deputy for the convention at Sparta (the most important charge with which any citizen could be entrusted,) Pelopidas, with all his merit, was not the minister whom they thought proper to employ.

Epaminondas, naturally his rival, but always his friend, had hitherto been contented with a subordinate station: yet every office which he exercised, whether in the civil or military department, derived new lustre from his personal dignity. His exterior accomplishments were not inferior to those of Pelopidas; but he had learned from the philosophy of Lysis the Pythagorean, to prefer the mind to the body, merit to fame, and the rewards of virtue to the gifts of fortune. He resisted the generous solicitations of his friends to deliver him from the honourable poverty in which he was born; continuing poor from taste and choice, and justly delighting in a situation, which is more favourable, especially in a democratical republic, to that freedom and independence of mind which wisdom recommends as the greatest good. Nor was he more careless of money than avaricious of time, which he continually dedicated to the study of learning and philosophy, or employed in the exercise of public and private virtue. Yet to become useful he was not desirous to be great. The same solicitude which others felt to obtain, Epaminondas showed to avoid, the dangerous honours of his country. His ambitious temper would have been better satisfied to direct, by a personal influence with the magistrates, the administration of government from the bosom of his beloved retirement,¹⁰ when the unanimous voice of the citizens, and still more the urgency of the times, called him to public life; and such

⁷ Corn. Nepos. in Iphicrat. Diodorus, l. xv. ad Olymp. c. iv.

⁸ Diodor. l. xv. ad Olymp. et Isocrat. Orat. pro Plat.

⁹ Plut. in Pelopid.

¹⁰ The conduct of Epaminondas coincides with, and confirms, the account above given of the Pythagorean philosophy

was his contempt for the glory of a name, that had he lived in a less turbulent period, his exalted qualities, however admired by select friends, would have probably remained unknown to his contemporaries and posterity.

Such was the man to whose abilities and eloquence the Thebans committed the defence of their most important interests in the general congress of the Grecian states. The Athenians sent Antocles and Callistratus; the first a subtle,¹ the second an affecting orator.² Agesilaus himself appeared on the part of Sparta. Matters were easily adjusted between those leading republics, who felt equal resentment at the unhappy fate of Thebes and Plataea. They lamented their mutual jealousy, and unfortunate ambition, which had occasioned so many bloody and destructive wars; and commemorated the short but glorious intervals of moderation and concord, which had tended so evidently to their own and the public felicity. Instructed by fatal experience, it was time for them to lay down their arms, and to allow that tranquillity to themselves and to their neighbours, which was necessary to heal the wounds of their common country. The peace could not be useful or permanent, unless it were established on the liberal principles of equality and freedom, to which all the Grecian communities were alike entitled by the treaty of Antalcidas. It was proposed, therefore, to renew that salutary contract, which was accepted by the unanimous consent of Athens, of Sparta, and of their respective confederates.

Epaminondas³ then stood up, offering to sign the treaty in the name of the Boeotians. "The Athenians," he took notice, "had signed for all the inhabitants of Attica; the Spartans had signed not only for the cities of Laconia, but for their numerous allies in all the provinces of the Peloponnesus. Thebes was entitled to the same prerogatives over her dependent cities, which had anciently acknowledged the power of her kings, and had recently submitted to the arms of her citizens." Agesilaus, instead of answering directly a demand which could neither be granted with honour, nor denied with justice, asked, in his turn, Whether it was the intention of the Thebans to admit, in terms of the treaty, the independence of Boeotia? Epaminondas demanded, Whether it was the intention of Sparta to admit the independence of Laconia? "Shall the Boeotians," said the king, with emotion, "be free?" "Whenever," replied Epaminondas with firmness, "you restore freedom to the Lacedaemonians, the Messenians, and the oppressed communities of Peloponnesus, whom, under the name of allies, you retain in an involuntary and rigorous servitude."

Then turning to the deputies of the allies, he represented to them the cruel mockery by which they were insulted. "Summoned to deliberate concerning the general freedom and independence, they were called to ratify a peace, which, instead of establishing these invaluable and sacred rights, confirmed the stern tyranny of an imperious master." That "the cities, small and great, should be free," was the verbal condition of the treaty; but its real drift and import was, that Thebes should give freedom to Boeotia, and thereby weaken her own strength, while Sparta kept in subjection the extensive territories of her confederates, in whose name she had signed that perfidious contract, and whose assistance she expected, and could demand, towards giving it immediate effect. If the allies persisted in their actual resolution, they consented to destroy the power of Thebes, which was the only bulwark to defend them against Spartan usurpation: they consented to continue the payment of those intolerable contributions with which they had long been oppressed; and to obey every idle summons to war, of which *they* chiefly suffered the fatigues and dangers, while the advantage and glory redounded to the Spartans alone. If they felt any respect for the glorious name of their ancestors; if they entertained any sense of their own most precious interests, they would be so little disposed to promote the reduction of Thebes, that they would imitate the auspicious example of that ancient and noble city, which had acquired the dignity of independent government, not by inscriptions⁴ and treaties, but by arms and valour.

The just remonstrances of Epaminondas made a deep impression on the deputies. Agesilaus, alarmed at its effect, answered him in a strain very different from that despotic brevity⁵ which the Spartans usually affected. His speech was long and eloquent. He reasoned, prayed, threatened. The deputies were awed into submission, less perhaps by the force of his eloquence, than by the terror of the Spartan armies ready to take the field. But the words of Epaminondas sunk deep into their hearts. They communicated, at their return, the powerful impression to their constituents; and its influence was visible in the field of Leuctra, and in the events which followed that memorable engagement.

As the Grecian states were accustomed to grant more unreserved powers to their generals and ministers, than are allowed by the practice of modern times, we must be contented to doubt, whether, in this important negotiation, Epaminondas acted merely by the extemporary impulse of his own mind, or only executed, with boldness and dignity, the previous instructions of his republic. It is certain, that his refusal to acknowledge the freedom of Boeotia, not only excluded Thebes from the treaty, but exposed her to the immediate vengeance of the confederates; and according to the received principles of modern policy, there is reason to

¹ *Επιστελες εντος*. Xenoph. l. vi.

² The pathetic pleading of Callistratus, for the citizens of Oropus, first inspired Demosthenes with the ambition of eloquence. Plut. in Demosth.

³ The convention of Sparta is noticed by Xenophon, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Cornelius Nepos. The first writer is silent with regard to Epaminondas. Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos furnish the hints which I have made use of in the text. It is not impossible that there were two conventions, at different times, respecting the same object. In that case, Xenophon must have totally omitted one of them.

⁴ The public deeds and transactions of the Greeks were inscribed on pillars of marble. Thucyd. et Xenoph. passim.

⁵ Epaminondas said, or more probably it was said for him, that he had compelled the Spartans to lengthen their monosyllables. Plut. in Agesil.

accuse both the prudence and the justice of the admired Theban; his prudence, in provoking the strength of a confederacy, with which the weakness of any single republic seemed totally unable to contend; and his justice, in denying to several communities of Bœotia their hereditary laws and government. Yet the conduct of Epaminondas has never been exposed to such odious reproaches. Success justified his audacity; and the Greeks, animated by an ambitious enthusiasm to aggrandise their respective cities, were taught to dignify by the names of patriotism and magnanimity, qualities which, in the sober judgment of posterity, would be degraded by very different appellations. There are reasons, however, not merely specious, by which Epaminondas might justify his conduct at an impartial bar. He could not be ignorant that Thebes, unassisted and alone, was unable to cope with the general confederacy of Greece: but he knew that this confederacy would never exist but in words, since the jealousy of several states, and particularly of Athens, would be disposed rather to commiserate, than to increase, the calamities of a people at variance with Sparta.⁶ He perceived the effect of his spirited remonstrances on the most steadfast adherents of that republic; and contemplating the circumstances of his country, and of the enemy, he found several motives of encouragement to the seeming unequal contest.

The Spartans had been weakened by the defection and loss of their dominions, and dejected by their unfortunate attempts to recover them. They had been deprived of their prescriptive honours, and had forsaken their hereditary maxims. Their ancient and venerable laws had in a great measure ceased to govern them; and the seeds of those corruptions were already sown, which have been censured by philosophers and statesmen with equal justice and severity.⁷ Nor were they exposed to the usual misfortunes, only, of a degenerate people; the institutions of Lycurgus formed one consistent plan of legislation, which could not be partially observed and partially neglected. While the submissive disciples of that extraordinary lawgiver remained satisfied with their simplicity of manners, their poverty, and their virtue, and had scarcely any other object in view, but to resist the solicitations of pleasure, and to repel the encroachments of enemies, the law, which discouraged a commercial intercourse with foreign nations, and which excluded strangers, whatever merit they might possess, from aspiring to the rank of citizens, was an establishment strictly conformable to the peculiar spirit of the Lacedæmonian constitution. But when Sparta abandoned the simplicity of her primitive maxims, became ambitious, wealthy, triumphant, and almost continually engaged in war, not as the means of defence, but as the instrument of power and conquest, consistency required that she should have laid aside her pretensions to those exclusive honours which she no longer deserved. When she relinquished the virtuous pre-eminence of her an-

cestors, the warlike inhabitants of Peloponnesus were not unworthy to be ranked with her citizens; and by admitting them to this honour, she would have given them an interest in her victories, and rendered them willing partners of her danger. But, instead of adopting this generous policy, which possibly might have rendered her what Rome, with more wisdom indeed, but not with more virtue or more valour, afterwards became, the mistress of the world, she increased her pretensions in proportion to the decline of her merit; spurned the inequality of a federal union, to which the Peloponnesians were entitled; deprived even the Lacedæmonians of their just share in the government, and concentrated all power and authority within the senate and assembly of Sparta. A long course of almost uninterrupted hostilities had deprived her of the best half of her citizens, whose numbers were continually diminishing, without the possibility of ever being repaired; nor could it be difficult to overthrow an empire which depended on the address and bravery of about four thousand warriors, the splendour of a great name, and the reluctant assistance of insulted allies and oppressed subjects.⁸

The consideration of these circumstances, which could not fail to present themselves to the sagacity of Epaminondas, might have encouraged him to set the threats of his adversaries at defiance, especially when he reflected on the actual condition of Thebes, whose civil and military institutions had recently acquired new spirit and fresh vigour.

The Thebans, with their subjects or neighbours in Bœotia, had been long regarded as an unworthy and faithless race, with strong bodies but ignoble souls, and infamous among the Greeks, on account of their ancient alliance with Xerxes and the Barbarians. The divine genius of Pindar had not redeemed them from the character of a sluggish and heavy people, noted even to a proverb for stupidity.⁹ From the age of that inimitable writer, they appear, indeed, to have been little addicted to the pursuit of mental excellence; but they uniformly continued to cultivate, with peculiar care, the gymnastic exercises, which gave the address and dexterity of art to the ponderous strength of their gigantic members. To acquire renown in war, such people only wanted that spark of ethereal fire which is kindled by a generous emulation. The tyranny of Sparta first animated their inactive languor. Having spurned an oppressive yoke, they boldly maintained their freedom; and, in the exercise of defensive war, gained many honourable trophies over enemies who had long despised them. Success enlivened their hopes, inflamed their ambition, and gave a certain elevation to their national character, which rendered them as ambitious of war and victory,

⁸ The condition of Sparta, represented in the text, is taken from the history of the times in Xenophon and Diodorus, from Aristotle's *Politics*, l. ii. c. 9. the Oration of Archidamus, and the Panathænean Oration of Isocrates. The last writer reduces the number of Spartan citizens to two thousand; a diminution principally occasioned by the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea which happened a considerable time before the composition of that discourse.

⁹ Bœotum in crasso jurares aëre natum. Hor. *Epist.* i. l. 11.

⁶ Xenophon hints at this disposition, l. vi. p. 608.

⁷ Aristot. *Polit.* l. ii. c. 9.

as they had formerly been anxious for peace and preservation. They had introduced a severe system of military discipline; they had considerably improved the arms and exercise of cavalry; they had adopted various modes of arranging their forces in order of battle, superior to those practised by their neighbours. Emulation, ardour, mutual esteem, and that spirit of combination, which often prevails in turbulent and distracted times, had united a considerable number of their citizens in the closest engagements, and inspired them with the generous resolution of braving every danger in defence of each other. This association originally consisted of about three hundred men, in the prime of life, and of tried fidelity, and commanded by Pelopidas, the glorious restorer of his country's freedom. From the inviolable sanctity of their friendship, they were called the Sacred Band, and their valour was as permanent as their friendship. During a long succession of years, they proved victorious wherever they fought; and at length fell together, with immortal glory, in the field of Chæronæa, with the fall of Thebes, of Athens, and of Greece. Such, in general, were the circumstances and condition of those rival republics,¹ when they were encouraged by their respective chiefs to decide their pretensions by the event of a battle.

In the interval of several months, between the congress at Sparta and the invasion of Bœotia, Agesilaus and his son Archidamus collected the domestic strength of their republic, and summoned the tardy aid of their confederates. Sickness prevented the Spartan king from taking the field in person; but his advice prevailed with the ephori and senate, to command his colleague Cleombrotus (who, in the former year, had conducted a considerable body of troops into Phocis, in order to repel the Thebans from that country,) to march without delay into the hostile territory, with assurance of being speedily joined by a powerful reinforcement. The rendezvous was appointed in the plain of Leuctra, which surrounded an obscure village of the same name, situate on the Bœotian frontier, almost at the equal distance of ten miles from the sea and from Platæa. The plain was encompassed on all sides by the lofty ridges of Helicon, Cithæron, and Cynocephalæ; and the village was hitherto remarkable only for the tomb of two Theban damsels, the daughters of Scedasus, who had been violated by the brutality of three Spartan youths. The dishonoured females had ended their disgrace by a voluntary death; and the afflicted father had imitated the example of their despair, after imploring vengeance in vain from gods and men.²

The Spartans and their confederates joined forces in this neighbourhood, after repelling a few Theban detachments which guarded the defiles of Mount Helicon. Their army amounted to twenty-four thousand foot, and sixteen hundred horse. The Thebans could not muster half that strength, after assembling all their

troops, which had been scattered over the frontier, in order to oppose the desultory irruptions of the enemy. Their cavalry, however, nearly equalled those of the Spartans in number, and far excelled them in discipline and in valour. Epaminondas exhorted them to march, and repel the invaders, if they would prevent the defection of Bœotia, and avoid the dangers and disgrace of a siege. They readily obeyed, and proceeded to the neighbouring mountains, on which having encamped, they obtained a commanding view of the forces in the plain.

Having heard an account of the superior numbers of the enemy, the Thebans still determined to give them battle. But as the eyes are the most timorous of the senses, they were seized with terror and consternation at beholding the massy extent of the Spartan camp. Several of the colleagues of Epaminondas (for he had no fewer than six) were averse to an engagement, strongly dissuading the general from this dangerous measure, and artfully increasing the panic of the troops, by recounting many sinister omens and prodigies. The magnanimous chief opposed the dangerous torrent of superstitious terror, by a verse of Homer,³ importing, that to men engaged in the pious duty of defending their country, no particular indication was necessary of the favourable will of heaven, since they were immediately employed in a service peculiarly agreeable to the gods. At the same time, he counteracted the dejection of their imaginary fears, by encouragements equally chimerical. It was circulated, by his contrivance, that the Theban temples had opened of their own accord, in consequence of which the priestesses had announced a victory; that the armour of Hercules, repositied in the Cadmæa, had suddenly disappeared, as if that invincible hero in person had gone to battle in defence of his Theban countrymen; above all, an ancient oracle was carefully handed about, denouncing defeat and ruin to the Spartans near the indignant tomb of the daughters of Scedasus. These artifices gained the multitude, while arguments more rational prevailed with their leaders, of whom the majority at length ranged themselves on the side of the general.

Before conducting them to battle, Epaminondas displayed his confidence of victory, by permitting all those to retire, who either disapproved his cause, or were averse to share his danger; a permission which the Thebians first thought proper to embrace. The unwarlike crowd of attendants, whose services were useless in time of action, gradually seized the same opportunity to leave the camp. The swelling multitude appeared as a second army to the Spartans, who sent a powerful detachment to oppose them. The fear of being cut off by the enemy threw them back on the Thebans, whose hopes were enlivened by the unexpected return of such a considerable reinforcement. Thus encouraged, they determined unanimously to stand by their admired chief, and either to defend their country, or to perish in the attempt;

¹ Plut. in Pelopid. v. 11. p. 355—366.

² Xenoph. p. 595.

³ Εἰς οἶκον ἀγέτορες ἀνδρῶν ἀνδρῶν. Il. xii. v. 243.

and the ardour of the troops equalling the skill of the general, the union of such advantages rendered them invincible.

Cleombrotus had disposed his forces in the form of a crescent, according to an ancient and favourite practice of the Spartans. His cavalry were posted in squadrons along the front of the right wing, where he commanded in person. The allies composed the left wing, conducted by Archidamus. The Theban general, perceiving this disposition, and sensible that the issue of the battle would chiefly depend on the domestic troops of Sparta, determined to charge vigorously with his left, in order to seize or destroy the person of Cleombrotus; thinking that should this design succeed, the Spartans must be discouraged and repelled; and that even the attempt must occasion great disorder in their ranks, as the bravest would hasten, from every quarter, to defend the sacred person of their king. Having resolved, therefore, to commit the fortune of the day to the bravery of the left division of his forces, he strengthened it with the choice of his heavy-armed men, whom he drew up fifty deep. The cavalry were placed in the van, to oppose the Spartan horse, whom they excelled in experience and valour. Pelopidas, with the Sacred Band, flanked the whole on the left; and deeming no particular station worthy of their prowess, they were prepared to appear in every tumult of the field, whither they might be called, either by an opportunity of success, or by the prospect of distinguished danger. The principal inconvenience to which the Thebans were exposed, in advancing to the charge, was that of being surrounded by the wide-extended arms of the Spartan crescent. This danger the general foresaw; and in order to prevent it, he spread out his right wing, of which the files had only six men in depth, and the ranks proceeding in an oblique line, diverged the farther from the enemy, in proportion as they extended in length.

Olymp. cii. 2. The action began with the cavalry, which, on the Spartan side, consisted chiefly of such horses as were A. C. 371. kept for pleasure by the richer citizens in times of peace; and which, proving an unequal match for the disciplined valour of the Thebans, were speedily broken, and thrown back on the infantry. Their repulse and rout occasioned considerable disorder in the Lacedæmonian ranks, which was greatly heightened by the impetuous onset of the Sacred Band. Epaminondas availed himself of this momentary confusion to perform one of those rapid evolutions which commonly decide the fortune of battles. He formed his strongest, but least numerous division, into a compact wedge, with a sharp point and with spreading flanks; expecting that the Lacedæmonians, as soon as they had recovered their ranks, would attack the weaker and more extended part of his army, which, from the oblique arrangement in which it had been originally drawn up, seemed prepared for a retreat. The event answered his expectation. While the Lacedæmonians advanced against his right wing, where they found little or no resistance, he rushed forward with his left; and darting like the beak of a gal-

ley⁴ on the flank of the enemy, bore down every thing before him, until he arrived near the post occupied by Cleombrotus. The urgency of the danger recalled to their ancient principles the degenerate disciples of Lycurgus. The bravest warriors flew from every quarter to the assistance of their prince, covered him with their shields, and defended him with their swords and lances. Their impetuous valour resisted the intrepid progress of the Thebans, till the Spartan horsemen, who attended the person of Cleombrotus, were totally cut off, and the king himself, pierced with many wounds, fell on the breathless or expiring bodies of his generous defenders. The fall of the chief gave new rage to the battle. Anger, resentment, and despair, by turns agitated the Spartans. According to the superstitious ideas of paganism, the death of their king appeared to them a slight misfortune, compared with the disgraceful impiety of committing his mangled remains to the insults of an enemy. To prevent this abomination, they exerted their utmost valour, and their strenuous efforts were successful. But they could not obtain any further advantage. Epaminondas was careful to fortify his ranks, and to maintain his order of battle; and the firmness and rapidity of his regular assault gained a complete and decisive victory over the desperate resistance of broken troops. The principal strength of the allies had hitherto remained inactive, unwilling rashly to engage in a battle, the motives of which they had never heartily approved. The defeat of the Lacedæmonians, and the death of Cleombrotus, decided their wavering irresolution. They determined, almost with one accord, to decline the engagement; their retreat was effected with the loss of about two thousand men; and the Thebans remained sole masters of the field.⁵

The care of burying the dead, and the fear of reducing the enemy to despair, seemed to have prevented Epaminondas from pursuing the vanquished to their camp; which, as it was strongly fortified, could not be taken without great slaughter of the assailants. When the Lacedæmonians had assembled within the defence of their ditch and rampart, their security from immediate danger allowed them time to reflect with astonishment and sorrow on the humiliating consequences of their recent disaster. Whether they considered the number of the slain, or reflected on the mortifying loss of national honour, it was easy for them to perceive, that, on no former occasion, the glory of their country had ever received such a fatal wound. Many Spartans declared their disgrace too heavy to be borne; that they never would permit their ancient laurels to be buried under a Theban trophy; and that, instead of craving their dead under the protection of a treaty, (which would be acknowledging their defeat,) they were determined to return into the field, and to recover them by force of arms. This manly, but dangerous resolution, was condemned in the council of war, by the officers

⁴ Xenophon employs this expression on a similar occasion, in relating the battle of Mantinea.

⁵ Xenoph. p. 596. et seq. ad Plat. vol. ii. 356. et seq.

of most experience and authority. They observed, that of seven hundred Spartans who fought in the engagement, four hundred had fallen; that the Lacedæmonians had lost one thousand, and the allies two thousand six hundred. Their army indeed still outnumbered that of the enemy; but their domestic forces formed scarcely the tenth part of their strength, nor could they repose any confidence in the forced assistance of their reluctant confederates, who, emboldened by the misfortunes of Sparta, declared their unwillingness to renew the battle, and scarcely concealed their satisfaction at the humiliation and disgrace of that haughty and tyrannical republic. Yielding, therefore, to the necessity of this miserable juncture, the Spartans sent a herald to crave their dead, and to acknowledge the victory of the Thebans.¹

Before they found it convenient to return home, the fatal tidings had reached their capital; and on this memorable occasion, the Spartans exhibited that striking peculiarity of behaviour, which naturally resulted from the institutions of Lycurgus. Availing himself of the extraordinary respect which uncultivated nations bestow on military courage, in preference to all other virtues and accomplishments, that legislator allowed to the man who had lost his defensive armour, or who had fled in the day of battle, but one melancholy alternative, more dreadful than death to a generous mind. The unfortunate soldier was either driven into perpetual banishment, and subjected to every indignity which, in a rude age, would naturally be inflicted by the resentment of neighbouring and hostile tribes; or, if he submitted to remain at home, he was excluded from the public assemblies, from every office of power or honour, from the protection of the laws, and almost from the society of men, without the shadow of a hope ever to amend his condition. The influence of this stern law, which seems to have been forgotten in the field of Leuctra, was illustrated in a very striking manner, after that unfortunate battle.

The messenger of bad news arrived, while the Spartans, according to annual custom, were celebrating, in the month of July, gymnastic and musical entertainments, and invoking heaven to preserve the fruits of the approaching autumn. Being introduced to the Ephori, he informed them of the public disaster. These magistrates commanded the festival to proceed; sending, however, to each family a list of the warriors whom it had lost, and enjoining the women to abstain from unavailing lamentations. Next day, the fathers and other relations of such as had perished in the field of battle, appeared in the public places, dressed in their gayest attire, saluting and congratulating each other on the bravery of their brethren or children. But the kinsmen of those who had saved themselves by a shameful flight, either remained at home, brooding in silence over their domestic affliction, or, if they ventured abroad, discovered every symptom of unutterable anguish and despair. Their persons were shamefully neglected, their garments rent, their arms

folded, their eyes fixed immoveably on the ground; expecting, in humble resignation, the sentence of eternal ignominy ready to be denounced by the magistrate against the unworthy causes of their sorrow.² But, on this critical emergency, the rigour of the Spartan discipline was mitigated by Agesilaus, whom the number and rank of the criminals deterred from inflicting on them the merited punishment. He endeavoured to atone for abandoning the spirit of the laws, by what may appear a very puerile expedient; "Let us suppose," said he, "the sacred institutions of Lycurgus to have slept during one unfortunate day, but henceforth let them resume their wonted vigour and activity:" a sentence extravagantly praised by many writers, as preserving the authority of the laws, while it spared the lives of the citizens. But as, on the one hand, we cannot discover the admired sagacity of Agesilaus in dispensing this act of lenity; so, on the other, we cannot condemn as imprudent the act itself, which the present circumstances of his country rendered not only expedient, but necessary. If Sparta had been the populous capital of an extensive territory, the lives of three hundred citizens might, perhaps, have been usefully sacrificed to the honour of military discipline. But a community exceedingly small, and actually weakened by the loss of four hundred members, could scarcely have survived another blow equally destructive. No distant prospect of advantage, therefore, could have justified such an unseasonable severity.

When the intelligence was diffused over Greece, that the Thebans, with the loss of only three hundred men, had raised an immortal trophy over the strength and renown of Sparta, the importance of this event became every where conspicuous. The desire, and hope, of a revolution in public affairs, filled the Peloponnesus with agitation and tumult. Eleans, Arcadians, and Argives, every people who had been influenced by Spartan councils, or intimidated by Spartan power, openly aspired at independence. The less considerable states expected to remain thenceforth unmolested, no longer paying contributions, nor obeying every idle summons to war. The more powerful republics breathed hatred and revenge, and gloried in an opportunity of taking vengeance on the proud senators of Sparta, for the calamities which they had so often inflicted on their neighbours.

But amidst this general ferment, and while every other people were guided rather by their passions and animosities, than by the principles of justice or sound policy, the Athenians exhibited an illustrious example of political moderation.³ Immediately after the battle of Leuctra, a Theban herald, adorned with the emblems of peace and victory, had been despatched to Athens, in order to relate the particulars of the engagement, and to invite the Athenians to an offensive alliance against a republic, which had ever proved the most dangerous, as well as the most inveterate enemy of their

¹ Xenoph. p. 596, et seq. et Plut. vol. ii. p. 366, et seq.

² Xenoph. p. 596.

³ Ibid. p. 598

country. But the assembly of Athens, governed by the magnanimity, or rather by the prudence, of Timotheus and Iphicrates, determined to humble their rivals, not to destroy them.

The ancient and illustrious merit of the Spartans, their important services during the Persian war, and the fame of their laws and discipline, which still rendered them a respectable branch of the Grecian confederacy, might have a considerable influence in producing this resolution. But it chiefly proceeded from a jealousy of the growing power of Thebes, the situation of whose territories might soon render her a more formidable opponent to Athens, than even Sparta herself. This political consideration for once prevailed over a deep-rooted national antipathy. The Theban herald was not received with respect, nor even with decency. He was not entertained in public, according to the established hospitality of the Greeks; and although the senate of the Five Hundred (who usually answered foreign ambassadors) was then assembled in the citadel, he was allowed to return home without receiving the smallest satisfaction on the subject of his demand. But the Athenians, though unwilling to second the resentment, and promote the prosperity of Thebes, prepared to derive every possible advantage from the misfortunes and distress of Sparta. Convinced that the inhabitants of Peloponnesus would no longer be inclined to follow her standard, and share her danger and adversity, they eagerly seized the opportunity of delivering them for ever from her yoke; and, lest any other people might attain the rank which the Spartans once held, and raise their own importance on the ruins of public freedom, ambassadors were sent successively to the several cities, requiring their respective compliance with the treaty of Antalcidas. Against such as rejected this overture, war was denounced in the name of Athens and her allies; which was declaring to all Greece, that the battle of Leuctra had put the balance of power in her hands, and that she had determined to check the ambition of every republic whose views were too aspiring.⁴

Disappointed of the assistance of Athens, the Thebans had recourse to an ally not less powerful. The extensive and fertile territory of Thessaly, which had been so long weakened by division, was fortunately united under the government of Jason of Pheræ, a man whose abilities and enterprising ambition seemed destined to change the face of the ancient world.⁵ To the native virtues of hospitality and magnificence, which peculiarly distinguished his country, Jason added indefatigable labour and invincible courage, with a mind capable to conceive the loftiest designs, and a character ready to promote them by the meanest artifices.⁶ His family descended from the ancient kings of the heroic ages, and formed the wealthiest house in Pheræ, which had already attained considerable pre-eminence over the neighbouring cities of Thessaly. By contrivances extremely unworthy of that greatness

to which they frequently conducted, Jason received his brothers and kinsmen, and appropriated almost the sole use of his domestic splendour. With this he hired a well-appointed body of mercenaries, by whose assistance acquired greater authority in Pheræ, than former general or king had ever enjoyed.⁷ the government of a single city could not satisfy his aspiring mind. By stratagem, by surprise, or by force, he extended his dominion over the richest parts of Thessaly; and ready to grasp the whole, when his designs were obstructed by the powerful opposition Polydamas the Pharsalian.⁸

Next to Pheræ and Larissa, Pharsalus was largest and most flourishing city in that northern division of Greece. But the inhabitants distracted by factions, exhausted their strength in civil discord and sedition, until a ray of wisdom illuminating both parties, they committed their differences, and themselves, to the probity and patriotism of Polydamas, which were equally respected at home and abroad. For several years Polydamas commanded the citadel, administered justice and the finances with strict diligence and fidelity, as might reasonably be entitled him to the glorious appellation of saviour of his country. He firmly opposed and counteracted the secret practices, as well as open designs, of Jason, who eagerly solicited his friendship by every motive that could assuage a mind of less determined integrity.

At a conference which was held between them at Pharsalus, where Jason had come alone and unattended, the better to gain the confidence of a generous adversary, the Pheræan displayed the magnitude of his power and resources, which it seemed impossible for the weakness of Pharsalus to resist; and promised that, on surrendering the citadel of that place which must otherwise soon yield to force, Polydamas should enjoy in Thessaly the second rank after himself; that he would regard him as his friend and colleague; nor could there remain a doubt that their united labours might raise their common country to that station in Greece which it had been long entitled to hold. That the subjugation of the neighbouring states opened vaster prospects, which forced themselves irresistibly on his mind, when he considered the natural advantages of Thessaly, the fertility of the soil, the swiftness of the horse, the disciplined bravery and martial ardour of the inhabitants, with whom no nation in Europe, or in Asia, was able to contend.

Polydamas heard with pleasure the praise of his native land, and admired the magnanimity of Jason. But he observed, that his fellow citizens had honoured him with a trust which it was impossible for him ever to betray, and that their community still enjoyed the alliance of Sparta, from which the neighbouring cities had revolted. That he was determined to demand the protection of that republic; and if the Lacedæmonians were willing and able to afford him any effectual assistance, he would defend to the last extremity the walls of Pharsalus. Jason commended his integrity and p

⁴ Xenoph. p. 602.

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. i. et seq.

⁶ Polyæn. Stratagem.

⁷ Plut. Polit. et san. tuend.

⁸ Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. i. et seq.

triotism, which, he declared, inspired him with the warmer desire to obtain the friendship of such an illustrious character.

Soon afterwards Polydamas went to Sparta, and proposed his demand in the council; exhorting the magistrates not only to undertake the expedition, but to undertake it with vigour; for if they expected to oppose the forces of Jason by their undisciplined peasants, or half-armed slaves, they would infallibly bring disgrace on themselves, and ruin on their confederates. The Lacedæmonians were deeply engaged in the Theban war, which had been hitherto carried on unsuccessfully. They prudently declined, therefore, the invitation of Polydamas; who, returning to Thessaly, held a second conference with Jason. He still refused to surrender the citadel, but promised to use his best endeavours for making the Pharsalians submit of their own accord; and offered his only son as a pledge of his fidelity. Jason accepted the offer, and, by the influence of Polydamas, was soon afterwards declared captain-general of Pharsalus and all Thessaly; a modest appellation, under which he enjoyed the full extent of royal power.¹

He began his reign by adjusting, with equity and precision, the proportion of taxes, and the contingent of troops, to be raised by the several cities in his dominions. The new levies, added to his standing army of mercenaries, amounted to eight thousand horse, twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, and such a body of targeteers, as no nation of antiquity could match.² But numbers formed the least advantageous distinction of the army of Jason. Every day he exercised his troops in person; dispensed rewards and punishments; cashiered the slothful and effeminate; honoured the brave and diligent with double, and sometimes treble pay, with large donatives in money, and with such other presents as peculiarly suited their respective tastes. By this judicious plan of military administration, the soldiers of Jason became alike attached to their duty, and to the person of their general, whose standard they were ready to follow into any part of the world.³

He began his military operations by subduing the Dryopes,⁴ the Dolopians, and the other small but warlike tribes, inhabiting the long and intricate chain of mounts Oeta and Pindus, which form the southern frontier of Thessaly. Then turning northwards, he struck terror into Macedon, and compelled Amyntas to become his ally, and most probably his tributary. Thus fortified on both sides, he retaliated the inroads of the Phocians, who had long profited of the divisions, and insulted the weakness, of his country; and by conquering the small and uncultivated district of Epirus, which then formed a barbarous principality under Alcetas,⁵ an an-

cestor of the renowned Pyrrhus, he extended the dominion of Thessaly from the Ægean to the Ionian sea, and encompassed, as with a belt, the utmost breadth of the Grecian republics.

It cannot be doubted, that the subjugation, or at least the command, of those immortal commonwealths, was the aim of the Thessalian prince, who declared to his friends, that he expected, by the assistance of Greece, to imitate the glorious example of Cyrus and Agesilaus, and to effect, by the united strength of the confederacy, what these generals had nearly accomplished by a body of ten or twelve thousand soldiers.⁶ While the Spartans, however, preserved their long-boasted pre-eminence, and regarded it as their hereditary and unalienable right to conduct their confederates to war, Jason could not hope to attain the principal command in an Asiatic expedition. As the natural enemy of that haughty people, he rejoiced in their unprosperous war against the Thebans; nor could he receive small satisfaction from beholding the southern states of Greece engaged in perpetual warfare, while he himself maintained a respected neutrality, and watched the first favourable occasion of interfering, with decisive effect, in the final settlement of that country.

He seldom ventured indeed into the Peloponnesus; but, in order to examine matters more nearly, he undertook, upon very extraordinary pretences, several journeys to Athens and Thebes. From policy, and perhaps from inclination, he had formed an intimate connection with the most distinguished characters of those republics, and particularly with Pelopidas and Timotheus. The latter, after serving his country with equal glory and success, was, according to the usual fortune of Athenian commanders, exposed to a cruel persecution of his rivals and enemies, which endangered his honour and his life. On the day of trial the admirers and friends of that great man appeared in the Athenian assembly, in order to intercede with his judges; and among the rest, Jason, habited in the robe of a suppliant, humbly soliciting the release of Timotheus, from a people who would not probably have denied a much greater favour to the simple recommendation of so powerful a prince.⁷ In a visit to Thebes, he endeavoured to gain or secure the attachment of Epaminondas, by large presents and promises; but the illustrious Theban, whose independent and honourable poverty had rejected the assistance of his friends and fellow citizens, spurned with disdain the insolent generosity of a stranger.⁸ Yet, by the intervention of Pelopidas, Jason contracted an engagement of hospitality with the Thebans, in consequence of which he was invited to join their arms, after their memorable victory at Leuctra.

The Thessalian prince accepted the invitation, though his designs respecting Greece were not yet ripe for execution. He was actually

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. c. 1, et seq. et Diodor. Sicul. l. xv. p. 488.

² Xenophon expresses it more strongly; *πλεονεξτικον γὰρ μὴν ἱκανον πρὸς παντας ἀνθρώπους ἀντιταχθῆναι*, p. 600.

³ Xenoph. p. 600.

⁴ Strabo. l. viii. p. 299.

⁵ In speaking of Arrybas (the son of Alcetas, and the grandfather of Pyrrhus,) who received his education at

Athens, Justin says, "Quanto doctior majoribus suis, tanto et gratior populo fuit. Primus itaque leges et senatum annosque magistratus et reipublice formam composuit. Et ut a Pyrrho sedes, sic vita cultior populo ab Arryba statuta."

⁶ Xenoph. p. 600.

⁷ Demosthenes et Cornel. Nepos in Timoth.

⁸ Plut. Apophtheg.

engaged in war with the Phocians, of which, whatever might be the pretence, the real object was to obtain the superintendence of the Delphic oracle, and the administration of the sacred treasure. To avoid marching through a hostile territory, he ordered his galleys to be equipped, as if he had intended to proceed by sea to the coast of Bœotia. His naval preparations amused the attention of the Phocians, while Jason entered their country with a body of two thousand light horse, and advanced with such rapidity that he was every where the first messenger of his own arrival.

By this unusual celerity, he joined, without encountering any obstacle, the army of the Thebans, who were encamped in the neighbourhood of Leuctra, at no great distance from the enemy. Instead of an auxiliary, Jason thought it more suitable to his interest to act the part of a mediator. He exhorted the Thebans to rest satisfied with the advantages which they had already obtained, without driving their adversaries to despair; that the recent history of their own republic, and of Sparta, should teach them to remember the vicissitudes of fortune. The Lacedæmonians, on the other hand, he reminded of the difference between a victorious and vanquished army. That the present crisis seemed totally adverse to the re-establishment of their greatness; that they should yield to the fatality of circumstances, and watch a more favourable opportunity to restore the tarnished lustre of their arms. His arguments prevailed; hostilities were suspended; the terms of a peace were proposed and accepted: but it is remarkable, that the Spartans and their allies had so little confidence in this sudden negotiation, that they decamped the night following, and continued to march homeward, with the diligence of distrust and fear, until they got entirely beyond reach of the Thebans.⁹

Jason had not, probably, more confidence in a treaty hastily concluded between enemies, whose resentments were irritated and inflamed by so many mutual injuries offered and retorted. Nothing could have been more contrary to his views than a sincere and lasting peace between these powerful republics; but as this was not to be apprehended, he wished to obtain the reputation of appeasing the dissensions of Greece; a

circumstance of great importance to the accomplishment of his ambitious designs.

In his return home, he demolished the walls of Heraclea, a town situate near the straits of Thermopylæ; not fearing, says his historian,¹⁰

Olymp. that any of the Greek states should
cii. 3. invade his dominions from that side,

A. C. 370. but unwilling to leave a place of
such strength on his frontier, which,

if seized by a powerful neighbour, might obstruct his passage into Greece. Thither he determined to return at the celebration of the Pythian games, at which he meant to claim the right of presiding, as an honour due both to his piety and to his power. He commanded, therefore, the cities and villages of Thessaly to fatten sheep, goats, swine, and oxen, and proposed honourable rewards to such districts as furnished the best victims for the altars of Apollo. Without any burdensome imposition on his subjects, he collected a thousand oxen, and, of smaller cattle, to the number of ten thousand. At the same time, he prepared the whole military strength of his kingdom, by whose assistance, still more effectually than by the merit of his sacrifices, he might maintain his pretensions to the superintendence of the games, the direction of the oracle, and the administration of the sacred treasure, which he regarded as so many previous steps to the conquest of Greece and Asia. But, amidst these lofty projects, Jason, while reviewing the Phærean cavalry, was stabbed by seven youths, who approached him, on pretence of demanding justice against each other. Two of the assassins were despatched by his guards. Five mounted fleet horses, which had been prepared for their use, and escaped to the Grecian republics, in which they were received with universal acclamations of joy, and honoured as the saviours of their country from the formidable power of a brave but ambitious tyrant.¹¹ The projects and the empire of Jason perished with himself; Thessaly, as we shall have occasion to explain, relapsed into its former state of division and weakness: but it is the business of history to relate not only great actions, but great designs; and even the designs of Jason announce the approaching downfall of Grecian freedom.

⁹ Xenoph. p. 600.

¹⁰ Xenoph. p. 599.

¹¹ Xenoph. et Diodor. ibid. et Valerius Maximus, l. ix.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Tumults in the Peloponnesus—Invasion of Laconia—Epaminondas rebuilds Messene—Foundation of Megalopolis—Archidamus restores the Fortune of Sparta—Affairs of Thessaly and Macedon—Negotiations for Peace—The Pretensions of Thebes rejected—Epaminondas invades the Peloponnesus—Revolutions in Achaia—Speech of Archidamus in the Spartan Council—Designs of Thebes—Disconcerted by Athens—Pelopidas's Expedition in Thessaly—The Arcadians seize the Olympic Treasure—Battle of Mantinea—Agésilas's Expedition into Egypt.

THE death of Jason removed the terror of Greece; but of a country which owed its safety to the arm of an assassin, the condition may justly be regarded as extremely unstable and precarious. There elapsed, however, thirty-three years of discord and calamity, before the Greeks finally experienced, in Philip of Macedon, such ambition and abilities as enabled him fully to accomplish the lofty designs of the Thesalian. The history of this last stage of tumultuous liberty comprehends the bloody, but indecisive wars, which exhausted Greece during eleven years that intervened between the battle of Leuctra, and the accession of Philip to the Macedonian throne, together with the active reign of that prince; a memorable period of twenty-two years, illuminated by the success and glory of Macedon, and clouded by the disgrace and ruin of the Grecian republics.

Olymp. The unexpected issue of the battle of Leuctra was doubly prejudicial to the Spartans, by weakening their own confederacy, and strengthening that of their enemies. In less than two years after that important event, the alliance in Peloponnesus, over which Sparta had so long maintained an ascendant, was totally dissolved, and most cities had changed not only their foreign connections, but their domestic laws and government. During the same period, the confederacy, of which Thebes was the head, had, on the contrary, been very widely extended. Many communities of the Peloponnesus courted her protection; and, in the north of Greece, the Acarnanians, Locrians, Phocians, the whole breadth of the continent, from the Ionian to the Ægean sea, and even the isle of Eubœa, increased the power, and in some measure acknowledged the dominion of Thebes. The history of these revolutions is very imperfectly related by ancient writers; but their consequences were too remarkable not to be attended to and explained. The Peloponnesians, after being delivered from the oppression of the Spartan yoke, were subjected to the more destructive tyranny of their own ungovernable passions.¹ Every state and every city was torn by factions which frequently blazed forth into the most violent seditions. The exiles from several republics were nearly as numerous as those who had expelled them. Fourteen hundred were banished from Tegea; two thousand² were slain

in Argos; in many places the contending factions alternately prevailed; and those who, in the first encounter, had got possession of the government and the capital, were sometimes attacked³ and conquered by the numerous fugitives, who formed a camp in the adjoining territory. The Mantinæans alone seem to have acted wisely. With one accord, and with equal diligence, they laboured to rebuild their walls, which the insolence of Sparta had demolished. The work was soon brought to a conclusion; and the Mantinæans, united in one democracy, fully determined thenceforth to preserve the strength of their city, which appeared necessary to maintain their political independence.

Neither the Thebans nor the Spartans immediately interfered in this scene of disorder. The former found sufficient employment for their arms and negotiations in the northern parts of Greece; and the latter were so much humbled by their defeat at Leuctra, that they contented themselves with preparing to defend the banks of the Eurotas, and to repel the expected assault of their capital. For this purpose they had armed the aged and infirm, who were legally exempted from military service.⁴ They had commanded into the field even those citizens who were employed in such sacred and civil offices as are deemed most useful in society; and, as their last resource, they talked of giving arms to the Helots. But the convulsions of Peloponnesus soon supplied them with less dangerous auxiliaries.⁵ The incensed partisans of aristocracy, who had been expelled from Argolis, Achaia, and Arcadia, had recourse to the most ancient and distinguished patrons of their political principles. Encouraged by this seasonable reinforcement, the Spartans set at defiance the Theban invasion, by which they had been so long threatened, and sent a considerable detachment to recover their lost authority in Arcadia. But it was the fate of Sparta, to regain neither in that, nor in any other state of the Peloponnesus, the influence which she had lost in the field of Leuctra. Polytropos, who commanded her allies in this expedition, was defeated and slain in the first rencounter with the Arcadians and Lycomedes, their intrepid and magnanimous leader. Nor did Agésilas perform any thing decisive against the enemy. He was contented with ravaging the villages and delightful fields of Arcadia, in which he met with little resistance from the inhabitants, who declined an engagement, until they should be joined by the Theban confederacy, whose assistance they had sent to solicit, and had just reason to expect.⁶

¹ Diodorus, l. xv. p. 371, et seq. Isocrat. in Archidam. et de Pace.

² This number is made out by comparing different authors, and uniting in one view the different scenes of the sedition, which is called the Scytalism by Diodorus (ubi supra,) and Pausanias (Corinth,) from the Greek word σκυτάλη, signifying a club, which, it seems, was the principal instrument of slaughter.

³ Diodorus, l. xv. p. 371, et seq.

⁴ Xenoph. l. vi. p. 597.

⁶ Xenophon. l. vi. p. 605.

⁵ Id. p. 603.

Olymp. cii. 4. A. C. 369. At length the far-renowned Thebans took the field, having carefully pondered their own strength, and collected into one body the flower and vigour of their numerous allies. They were accompanied by the warlike youth of the towns and villages of Bœotia, by the Acarnanians, Phocians, Locrians, and Eubœans, and by a promiscuous crowd of needy fugitives, who were attracted to their camp by the allurements of plunder. They had no sooner arrived on the frontier of Arcadia, than they were joined by the inhabitants of that country, as well as by the Elians and Argives. This united mass of war exceeded any numbers, that either before or afterwards, ever assembled in Greece under one standard, amounting to fifty, some say to seventy thousand men.⁷ The Thebans, and the rest of the Bœotians, were commanded by Epaminondas and Pelopidas, to whom the generous admiration of their colleagues had voluntarily resigned their authority. Apprised of the march of such a formidable army, conducted by generals of such unquestionable merit, Agesilaus prepared to evacuate Arcadia, a measure which he fortunately effected, before his soldiers beheld the fires kindled in the hostile camp, and thus avoided the disgrace of retiring before the enemy.⁸ His unresisted devastation of the territory which he had invaded, as well as his successful retreat, gave fresh spirits to his followers, and made them return with better hopes to defend their own country, which was now threatened with invasion.

The Thebans, though they had no longer any occasion to protect the Arcadians from insult, were determined,⁹ by many powerful motives, to employ the vast preparations which they had collected. Their particular resentment against Sparta was heightened by the general voice of their allies, who exhorted them to embrace an opportunity which, perhaps, might never return, utterly to destroy a people who neither could enjoy tranquillity, nor allow their neighbours to enjoy it. The inhabitants of Carya, and of several other towns in Laconia, declared their resolution to revolt from Sparta, as soon as the enemy should enter their boundaries. In a council of war summoned by the Theban generals, it was therefore determined to march without farther delay into the Lacedæmonian territories, to lay waste the country, and if possible, to take possession of the capital.

That this resolution might be executed with the greater celerity and effect, the army was thrown into four divisions, destined, by separate roads, to break into the devoted province, to join forces at Sellasia, and thence to march in one body to Sparta. The Bœotians, Elians, and Argives penetrated, without opposition, by the

particular routes which had been assigned them. But when the Arcadians, who formed the fourth division of the army, attempted to traverse the district Sciritis, the brave Ischilas, who guarded that important pass, determined to repel them, or to perish. The example of Leonidas at Thermopylæ kindled a generous enthusiasm in the breast of this gallant Spartan. The number of the Arcadian levies so far exceeded his own, that death seemed the sure reward of his courage. Yet he exhorted all those to decline danger who were not ambitious to share it. He even commanded the youth to leave his camp before the engagement, deeming their lives too precious to be risked in so desperate an enterprise. He, with the old soldiers who followed him, chose the present opportunity to meet a glorious death in defence of their country. But their lives were sold dearly. The action was long doubtful: the loss of the Arcadians great; nor did the battle cease till the last of the Spartans had perished.¹⁰

The confederates having soon after assembled at Sellasia, the place of rendezvous, marched forward to Sparta, burning and destroying all before them. During five hundred years Laconia had not experienced a similar calamity. The guards who defended the city were thrown into consternation. The women were terrified by the smoke and tumult raised by the invaders; a spectacle, concerning which it had been their usual boast, that they alone of all the Grecian females, had never beheld it in their native land. Alarmed by the danger which threatened them, and which they were sensible of their own inability to repel, the Spartans embraced the doubtful expedient of giving arms to their peasants and slaves, whom they commonly treated with such an excess of cruelty. Not less than six thousand of these unhappy men were engaged, by threats or promises, to undertake the reluctant defence of the proud tyrants, whom they detested. Their formidable numbers increased the general panic, which had seized the magistrates and citizens, and which did not finally cease until the arrival of a powerful body of men from Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, and Pallené; cities which, though they had ever opposed the despotism, were unwilling to permit the destruction of Sparta.

This seasonable reinforcement not only removed the consternation of the Spartans, but made them pass with rapidity from the depths of despondency to the joys of success. The kings and magistrates could scarcely restrain their impetuosity from rushing into the field: and this martial enthusiasm, guided by the consummate prudence of Agesilaus, enabled them to repel the first assaults of the enemy, and to convince them that every succeeding attempt to get possession of the city, must be attended with such fatigue, and danger, and loss of men, as could not be compensated by the success of that enterprise. The conduct of Agesilaus, during this critical emergency, has been highly

⁷ The numbers differ in Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. Pausan. Bœotic. Diodorus, l. xv. and Plut. in Pelopid.

⁸ Xenoph. p. 606.

⁹ They at first opposed the eagerness of the Arcadians, Elians, and Argives, for invading Laconia, considering *ὅτι δυσμεγέλην αὐτοῖς μὲν ἡ Λακωνικὴ ἐγγίσητο εἰς αὐτοὺς, φρουρὰς δὲ καθίσταναι ἐνεμιζόντων ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑπεροδωτοῖς*. "That it would be difficult to penetrate into a country defended by the natural strength of its frontier, or by vigilant garrisons." Xenoph. p. 607.

¹⁰ Xenoph. l. vi. p. 607, et Diodor. l. xv. p. 376. The former indeed adds *ἵνα μὴ τις ἀμφιγυνεὺς διαφύγῃ*. "Unless, perhaps, some one escaped unknown through the enemy."

extolled by all writers,¹ and never beyond its merit. By a well-contrived ambush in the temple of the Tyndaridæ,² he defeated the designs of the assailants: by very uncommon presence of mind,³ he quelled a dangerous insurrection; and, while, by force or stratagem, he overcame the united efforts of domestic and foreign enemies, he negotiated the most powerful assistance for the relief of his country.

Immediately after the battle of Leuctra the Athenians had declared their resolution to renew and confirm the treaty of Antalcidas, which, though it diminished the grandeur, yet secured the tranquillity of Greece, and prevented the weakness of any one republic from falling a prey to the ambition of another. But notwithstanding this declaration, which was universally approved by their neighbours, they had, either from resentment or from policy, remained above two years spectators of the decline of the Lacedæmonian, and the growth of the Theban league. Whatever uneasiness might be occasioned by the increasing strength of their new rival, was sufficiently balanced by the decay and downfall of their ancient and inveterate enemy. But though, doubtless, they ardently desired the ruin of the Spartan power, they could not sincerely approve the cruel destruction of their persons, and of their city. When informed of the terrible devastation of Laconia, they naturally felt a return of compassion for a people whose exploits, on many memorable occasions, had done such signal honour to the Grecian name.

The emissaries of Agesilaus, whose superior mind had assumed dictatorial power amidst the distress of his country, seized the favourable opportunity to urge, with the Athenians, many motives of action, which seldom operate amidst the cold lifeless politics of modern times. They took notice that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had often mutually assisted each other in seasons of distress, and that the most glorious era of their story was that in which the two republics had united their councils and measures against a common enemy. That when the spirit of rivalry and ambition had unhappily divided Greece, and the Athenians were exposed to the calamities of a long and unfortunate war, they had been protected by the humanity of Sparta against the implacable rage of the Thebans, who wished to demolish the city of Athens, and to reduce its territory to the barren solitude of the Crisean plain. That by the moderation of Sparta, the Athenians had not only been saved from the vengeance of foreign enemies, but delivered from the yoke of domestic tyrants, and the cruel ty-

ranny of the Pisistratidæ. The merit of these services deserved the reward of gratitude; the hereditary renown of Athens urged her to protect the miserable; and justice demanded that she should assert, and maintain, the conditions of a recent treaty, which she herself had proposed, and which the Thebans, after accepting, had so manifestly violated.

A loud and discordant murmur ran through the assembly. Some approved the demand, others observed that the Spartans changed their language with their fortune; that they had formerly, and probably would again, whenever they became powerful, assume a very different tone, and, instead of colouring by false disguises, display in its native force, their inveterate enmity to Athens. That the late treaty of peace could not entitle them to any assistance, since they themselves had begun the war by the invasion of Arcadia; a war undertaken from the unjust motive of supporting the tyrannical usurpation of the nobles of Tegea over the rights of their fellow citizens.

Together with the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, had come those of Corinth and Phlius, cities eminently distinguished by an unshaken fidelity to their ancient confederate and protector. Cleiteles the Corinthian, observing what turn the debate was likely to take, stood up and said, "Were it a matter of doubt, Athenians! who are the aggressors, the melancholy experience of our state would remove the difficulty. Since the renovation of the peace of Antalcidas, the Corinthians, surely, have not committed hostilities against any power in Greece. Yet the Thebans have entered our territory, cut down our trees, burned our houses, plundered our cattle and effects. How, then, can you refuse your assistance to those who have been so manifestly injured, in direct violation of the treaty, to which, at your express desire, they acceded and swore?" The assembly loudly approved the discourse of Cleiteles, which was supported and confirmed by the arguments and eloquence of Patrocles the Phliasian.

"It is manifest, I think, to all of you, Athenians! that should Sparta be destroyed, Athens must be the next object of the hostility of Thebes, since that city alone would then stand in the way of her ambition. The cause of the Lacedæmonians therefore is, in fact, your own. You must embrace it with ardour, as the last opportunity which the gods perhaps will afford you, of defending the general freedom at the head of your allies, and of preventing the dangerous domination of the Thebans; the effects of which, you, who are their neighbours, would feel with peculiar severity. By taking this resolution, which is equally generous and salutary, you will acquire a fund of merit, not only with the Spartans, than whom none were ever more mindful of favours, or more ambitious of honest fame, but also with us their allies, who, since we have continued faithful to our friends in their adversity, cannot be suspected of ingratitude to our prosperous benefactors. I have heard with admiration how, in ancient times, the injured and afflicted always had recourse to Athens, and were never disappointed of relief. I now no longer hear, but see, the

1 Xenoph. at Plat. in Agesilao. Diodorus, l. xv. et Pausanias Lacon.

2 Castor and Pollux, so called from their mother Tyndaris, or Leda.

3 The mutineers had entered into a conspiracy to seize an important post in the city. Agesilaus observed them as they marched thither, and immediately suspecting their design, called out, that they had mistaken his orders; adding his meaning to be, that they should separate into different divisions, and repair to the several posts which he named. The conspirators naturally concluded that he knew nothing of their purpose, and separating, as he commanded, could never afterwards find an opportunity to unite in such numbers as rendered them dangerous.

Lacedæmonians, with their faithful allies, soliciting your protection against the Thebans, whose unrelenting cruelty could not persuade Sparta, in the height of her resentment and of her power, to desolate your country, and to reduce you into servitude. Your ancestors acquired just renown by saving the dead bodies of the Argives, to whom the impiety of Thebes denied the sacred rights of burial.⁴ How much greater renown will redound to you, when the Lacedæmonians, by your generous assistance, shall be saved from death. It was deemed meritorious in them to have defended the children of Hercules against the unnatural persecution of Eurystheus; but it will be far more glorious for you to have defended not only the descendants of that hero, the hereditary kings of Lacedæmon, but, along with them, the senate, the magistrates, the people; in one word, to have delivered the whole nation from a danger dreadful in itself, and otherwise inevitable. During the prosperity of their empire, the Lacedæmonians prevented your destruction by a decree, which displayed their humanity, without exposing their safety. You are called to defend the Lacedæmonians, not by inactive decrees, but by arms and courage. Arm, then, in their behalf; and, forgetful of recent animosities, repay the important services which, in the Barbarian war, the valour of Sparta rendered to Athens and to all Greece."

The assembly was so deeply affected by the persuasive discourse of the Phliasian, that they refused to hear any thing in opposition to it, and determined, almost unanimously, to take the field. Iphicrates was named general; twelve thousand men were ordered to repair to his standard; the sacrifices were propitious; the troops took a short repast; and such was their ardour to meet the enemy, that many of them marched forth without waiting the orders of their commander.⁵

Epaminondas, mean while, had committed dreadful devastation in Laconia. His repulse from the capital had exasperated his hostilities against the country. He had desolated the fertile banks of the Eurotas, which were thick planted with houses, and abounding in all the conveniences of life known to the austere simplicity of Sparta. He had assaulted Helos and Gythium; and, traversing the whole province, had destroyed the villages by fire, and the inhabitants by the sword. Even these terrible ravages did not satisfy his resentment; he determined, that the invasion of Laconia should not be a temporary evil, which the labour of years might repair; and for this purpose employed an expedient, which, even after he might evacuate their country, must leave the Lacedæmonians exposed to the rage of an implacable enemy.

Olymp. We have had occasion to relate
ciii. 2. the various fortunes of the Messe-
nians. About three centuries be-
A. C. 369. fore the period now under review,

their city had been demolished by the Spartans; their territory had been seized, and divided among that people; the ancient inhabitants had been reduced into servitude, and compelled to cultivate their paternal fields for the benefit of cruel masters; or dispersed in miserable banishment, over Greece, Italy, and Sicily. After two centuries of humiliation and calamity, the humanity, or perhaps the policy of Athens, took compassion on this unfortunate race, and settled them in the territory of Naupactus, and the neighbouring island of Cephallenia. The Messenians displayed their gratitude by important services during the Peloponnesian war; but their most vigorous exertions could not long retard the declining fortune of Athens. The event of that war rendered Sparta the arbiter of Greece; and the Messenians were the first objects of her memorable tyranny, being universally enslaved, banished, or put to death. It is probable that the scattered remains of this miserable community would flock from every quarter to the standard of Epaminondas, rejoicing in an opportunity to retaliate the unrelenting persecution of a people, who now suffered the calamities which they had so often inflicted. But the general voice of history ascribes to Epaminondas the merit of assembling the Messenians.⁶ It is certain, that he rebuilt their city, and put them in possession of their territory; an act of generous compassion which inflicted a most unexpected and cruel punishment on the Spartans, who beheld the ashes of a nation, which they had twice endeavoured to extinguish, revive and flourish in their neighbourhood; continually increase by the accession of Spartan subjects and slaves; and, encouraged by a Theban garrison, and their own inveterate hostility, watch every favourable occasion to exert the full power of their vengeance.⁷

Epaminondas had accomplished this extraordinary enterprise, when he received intelligence of the motions of the Athenian army commanded by Iphicrates. That illustrious general had allowed the ardour of his troops to evaporate, by pursuing a conduct which it is impossible, at this distance of time, to explain, but which the military historian⁸ condemns, as highly unworthy of his former renown. When celerity was of the utmost importance, he wasted several precious days at Corinth, without any necessity, or even pretence, for this unseasonable delay. His soldiers loudly demanded to meet the enemy, or even to assault the walls of Argos, the strongest and most populous city in Peloponnesus, and not inferior to Thebes itself in active animosity against their common foe. Iphicrates, however, embraced none of those measures, but led his army towards Arcadia; expecting, perhaps, what actually happened, that the news of his arrival there would deliver Laconia from the hostile invader.

It cannot be imagined, indeed, that Epaminondas feared the issue of an engagement with

⁴ See p. 17. The facts alluded to in the text are related in all the panegyrics of Athens, by Plato, Lysias, Isocrates, and Thucydides.

⁵ This whole transaction is explained in Xenoph. p. 609—613.

⁶ Plutarch. in Pelopid. Diodor. l. xv. p. 491. Pausan. Messen. p. 265.

⁷ Diodor. l. xv. c. 16.

⁸ Xenoph. l. vi. versus finem.

the Athenians. But he was justly alarmed with the interest which even that people had taken in the danger of Sparta. The indignation and resentment which they, the rivals and enemies of the injured, discovered on this occasion, taught him what sentiments his conduct must excite in more impartial states, should he persist in his original plan, destroy the Lacedæmonian capital, and, as the orator Leptines expressed it, "pluck out an eye of Greece."¹ Many concurring causes tended also to accelerate his departure. The Arcadians were called home to defend their houses and families. The Elians and Argives were anxious to secure their booty by an expeditious retreat. Even the Thebans were weary of an expedition which had consumed several winter months, a season in which they were not accustomed to keep the field. Provisions likewise grew scarce; and Epaminondas, pressed by difficulties on every side, prepared to evacuate the Lacedæmonian territories; but not (in the words of Xenophon) until "every thing of value had been consumed or plundered, poured out, or burned down."²

At the same time that the Thebans left Laconia, Iphicrates withdrew the Athenians from the country which they had invaded. The two armies filed off, as by mutual consent, and returned to their respective cities by separate roads, without any attempt to interrupt the progress of each other. Iphicrates was blamed for allowing an enemy, heavy with plunder, and exhausted by the fatigue of a winter's campaign, to pass unmolested through the isthmus of Corinth. Pelopidas and Epaminondas were accused and tried before the Theban assembly, for protracting the term of their command beyond the time limited by law. The former discovered less courage than might have been expected from his impetuous and daring character. He, who had never feared the sword of an enemy, trembled at the angry voice of his insolent accusers. But Epaminondas displayed, on this occasion, the superiority of philosophical firmness, seated in the mind, to that constitutional courage which is the result of blood and spirits. The latter is sufficient for a day of battle; but the former alone can yield support in every vicissitude of fortune.

Instead of observing the formality of a regular defence, the illustrious Theban undertook the invidious task of pronouncing his own panegyric.³ After relating his exploits, without amplification, and without diminution, he concluded by observing, "that he could submit to death without reluctance, secure of immortal fame, earned in the service of his country." The seditious demagogues were awed by his magnanimity; the anger of the assembly against himself and his colleague dissolved in admiration; and Epaminondas was conducted from the tribunal with as much glory as from the field of Leuctra.

From the invasion of Laconia to the general engagement at Mantinea, there elapsed six

years of indecisive war and tumultuous activity; battles lost and gained, conquests made and abandoned, alliances concluded and broken; treaties of peace proposed, accepted, and violated, by those who felt the unhappy effects of dissensions which their rancorous animosity was unwilling to terminate. In examining the history of this period, we may perceive the same confusion in the relation, which appears at first sight to have been in the events themselves. It is necessary, however, to reduce them into the form of a regular narrative. In important concerns, numerous bodies of men, however they may act without effect, cannot be supposed to act entirely without design: their motives, unsteady and capricious as they often are, form the invisible chain which it is the business of the historian to investigate and to follow; since it is otherwise impossible that the transactions which he describes, should afford either real instruction, or any rational entertainment.

Early in the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians, with the few allies who still adhered to their cause, despatched an embassy to Athens, in order to strengthen the bands of amity and union with that republic.

Olymp. ciii. 1.
A. C. 368. In the conference held for that purpose, it appeared that the Spartans were either very deeply affected by the recent obligations conferred on them, or that they very earnestly desired the continuance of similar favours. They acknowledged that the experience, the bravery, the naval victories and fortune of Athens, justly entitled her to the sovereignty of the Grecian seas; and when this concession, which had hitherto been withheld with such disdain, could not satisfy the more patriotic, or rather the less generous, members of the assembly, they condescended to grant another acknowledgment still more inconsistent with the pride of their hereditary pretensions; that in such military expeditions as were undertaken by the joint forces of both republics, the command should be equal and alternate; so that an army of Lacedæmonians (a thing hitherto unexampled) would be commanded during half the campaign by Athenian generals. Patrocles the Phliasian, whose eloquence and address had been distinguished in the former negotiation, was not less active in the present; chiefly by his intervention, matters were finally adjusted; an alliance of the most intimate kind was concluded between the two republics; and, by the assistance of the generous Phliasian, the Spartans obtained this important advantage, without the disgrace of many ineffectual overtures, or the mortification of long supplicatory speeches, which they deemed of all things the most grievous.⁴

The Spartan negotiations, so fortunate in Athens, were equally successful with Dionysius tyrant of Sicily, and Artaxerxes king of Persia. The former, himself a Dorian, naturally lamented the humiliation and distress of a people, who, during seven hundred years, had formed the principal ornament and defence of the Dorian race; and the latter pursued his ordinary system of politics, of assisting the weaker party,

¹ Aristot. Rhetor. l. iii. c. 10.

² Xenoph. p. 612.

³ Plat. de sui Laude, p. 540.

⁴ Xenoph. p. 613—616.

in order to balance the contending powers, and to perpetuate the hostilities of Greece.

While the Lacedæmonians gained strength by these important alliances, their enemies took the field. The Arcadians began the campaign by entering the territory of Palléné, an Achæan republic, which still remained faithful to Sparta. The country was laid waste, the villages burned, the city taken by storm, and the garrison, consisting of three hundred men, partly Lacedæmonians, put to the sword. Soon after this success, the Arcadians were joined by the Elians and Argives. Epaminondas likewise marched southward at the head of the Thebans, their foot amounting to seven thousand, and their cavalry to five hundred. Before he reached the Isthmus, the Lacedæmonians had been reinforced by a body of two thousand Sicilian troops, agreeably to their treaty with Dionysius; and the Athenians had taken the field, under the command of Chabrias, actually the most respected, or at least the most popular, of their generals. It was naturally the object of the Spartan and Athenian commanders, to prevent the junction of Epaminondas with his southern allies. For this purpose they strongly guarded, and even fortified the Isthmus; an expedient which had not been put in practice since the expedition of Xerxes. The Thebans, however, broke through, took Sicyon, and assaulted Corinth. But Chabrias, who happened at this time to enjoy the alternate command, repulsed them with such loss, that Epaminondas judged proper to retire homeward; on which account he was blamed and disgraced by his countrymen, who, insolent with prosperity, thought themselves entitled always to conquer.

The unexpected retreat of the Thebans, of which it is not easy to conjecture the real cause,⁵ occasioned much dissatisfaction among their confederates, particularly the Arcadians. This simple, but warlike people, had obtained distinguished honour in several recent expeditions. They were usually conducted by the Mantinæan Lycomedes, a man gallant in enterprise and persevering in execution; rich, noble, eloquent, generous, and affable. Under a commander equally respected and beloved, the Arcadians found nothing too arduous for their courage. In regular engagements, they commonly proved victorious wherever they fought. But their principal merit was displayed in ambushes and surprise, and all the dangerous stratagems of desultory war. When a favourable occasion summoned their activity, neither length of way, nor difficult mountains, nor storms, nor darkness, could interrupt their course, or prevent their unexpected assault.⁶ Unassisted and alone, they had often defeated superior strength and numbers; and when, together with their Peloponnesian allies, they served under the Theban standard, their prowess had been acknowledged and admired by the united army.

The repulse and retreat of Epaminondas gave

relief and splendour to the recent glory of Arcadia, and inspired Lycomedes with an ambition which he easily communicated to his countrymen. He told them, "That they were the most ancient, the most populous, and surely not the least warlike community in Peloponnesus; but that they had hitherto neglected to profit of the advantages which they possessed. In the memorable war of twenty-seven years, they had joined with the Lacedæmonians, whom they had raised to an authority, of which the Arcadians, as well as the rest of Greece, felt the intolerable oppression. That of late years they had acted with the Thebans, who, by their assistance chiefly, had attained a very alarming degree of power, which they occasionally exerted or remitted, as suited their own convenience, without the smallest regard to the interest of their confederates. If this power should be increased, might not the yoke of Thebes become as grievous as that of Sparta? It was time for the Arcadians to know their own worth; to disdain following the standard of any foreign state; and not only to vindicate their freedom, but to claim their just pre-eminence." The assembly applauded the manly resolution of Lycomedes; and, in order to render it effectual, determined to keep possession of such places as they had taken from the Lacedæmonians or their allies in Elis and Achaia, and to complete their conquests in these and the neighbouring provinces of Peloponnesus.

For several months they met with little interruption in this design, ciii. 2. the Spartans, after the departure A. C. 367. of their auxiliaries, not venturing to take the field until the beginning of the ensuing year, when they received a new supply of troops from Dionysius, and both troops⁷ and money from Artaxerxes. The Theban arms were actually employed in Thessaly and Macedon, as we shall have occasion hereafter to relate; so that every circumstance conspired to hasten the march of Agesilaus and the Lacedæmonians. But the infirmities incident to old age made him decline the command, which was entrusted to his son Archidamus; his colleague Agesipolis not possessing great abilities either for war or government.

The rapid success of Archidamus, who seemed destined to restore the declining fortune of Sparta, justified the prudent choice of the magistrates and people. He expelled the hostile garrisons from the inferior cities of Laconia, stormed Caryæ, and put the rebellious inhabitants to the sword. From thence he hastened to Arcadia, laid waste the southern frontier of that province, and prepared to attack the populous city of Parrhasia, when the united strength of the Arcadians, commanded by Lycomedes, and reinforced by the Argives, approached to its relief. Their arrival made Archidamus withdraw to the hills that overhang the obscure village of Midea. While he encamped there, Cissidas, who commanded the Sicilians, declared that the time limited for his absence

⁵ The Theban demagogues, as we learn from Diodorus and Plutarch, accused Epaminondas of treacherous correspondence with the enemy, or at least of secretly favouring their cause; but this is altogether improbable.

⁶ Vid. Xenoph. 618, et seq.

⁷ Xenophon's expression is lively; καὶ μόνον ἀνδρῶν ἡγούμενος, "thinking him the only man." L. vii. p. 618.

⁸ These were not Persians, but ξένικοι, "Greek mercenaries." Xenoph. l. vii. p. 619.

was expired, and, without waiting an answer, ordered his forces to prepare their baggage, and to march towards Laconia. But the nearest passage into that country had been seized by the Messenians. In this difficulty Cissidas applied to Archidamus, who hastened to his defence. The Arcadians and Argives at the same time decamped. The hostile armies encountered near the joining of the two roads which led towards Sparta from Midea and Eutresios. As soon as Archidamus beheld the enemy prepared for an engagement, he commanded the Spartans to form, and when they were ready to advance, addressed them as follows: "Fellow citizens and friends! if we are still brave, we may look forward with confidence; we may yet retrieve our affairs, and deliver down the republic to posterity as we received it from our ancestors. Let us strive, then, by one glorious effort, to recover our hereditary renown; and let us cease being the reproach (instead of what the Spartans once were, the ornament and defence) of our friends, our parents, our families, and our country."

While he yet spoke, it thundered on the right, though the day was clear and serene. The soldiers, roused by the noise, looked towards the direction from which it came, and beheld, in a consecrated grove at no great distance, an altar and statue of Hercules, the great progenitor of Archidamus and the Spartan kings. Animated by the wonderful concurrence of such auspicious circumstances, they were transported with an enthusiasm of valour, and impetuously rushed against their opponents, in full confidence of victory. The enemy, who thought they had to do with a vanquished and spiritless people, were astonished at their mien and aspect as they advanced to the attack. The few who waited their approach, were totally destroyed; many thousands perished in the pursuit; it is said by ancient historians,¹ that the Spartans lost not a man. Archidamus erected a trophy, and despatched a messenger to Sparta. The people were assembled, when he communicated his extraordinary intelligence. The aged Agesilaus shed tears of joy. The ephori and senators sympathised with the emotions of their king. The patriotic weakness was communicated from breast to breast; the amiable contagion spread; the sternest members of this numerous assembly dissolved in softness, and melted in sensibility.²

The Spartans were prevented from reaping the full fruits of this victory, by a considerable reinforcement which the Arcadians soon afterwards received from Thebes. By the assistance of these troops, the Menalians and Parrhasians, who, from their situation on the southern frontier of Arcadia, were most exposed to the incursions of the enemy, found means to execute a design said to have been formerly suggested by Epaminondas. They abandoned twenty straggling and defenceless villages; and choosing an advantageous situation in the centre of their territory, erected a fortress there,

which they surrounded with a strong wall. The benefit of security attracted new inhabitants; the walls were extended; the place acquired the magnificent name of Megalopolis,³ the last city built by the Greeks, while they preserved the dignity of independent government.⁴

The temporary success of the Spartans under Archidamus, which is generally ascribed to the valour of that commander, was principally occasioned by the withdrawing from Peloponnesus, at a very critical juncture, the numerous army of Thebes, which was at that time called northward, in order to take an important and honourable part in the affairs of Macedon and Thessaly. Since the atrocious murder of the heroic Jason, the latter kingdom had been afflicted by a continued train of crimes and disorders. Just gratitude and respect towards the memory of their generous and warlike chief, engaged the Thessalians to perpetuate the honours of his family. He was succeeded by his brothers Polydore and Polyphron; of whom the latter, not being able to endure the restraint of a limited, much less of a divided rule, attained, by the assassination of his colleague, the sole dominion of Thessaly. His stern despotism was abolished by the hand of Alexander, who avenged the blood of his kinsman⁵ Polydore, the only meritorious action of his life. For Alexander (as his character is represented to us) exceeded the cruelties of Polyphron, and of all the detested tyrants that have ever been condemned to the infamy of history. The Thessalians were delivered from such a monster by the domestic conspiracy of his wife Thebé, the daughter of Jason, and her brothers Tisiphonus, Pitholaus, and Lycophron; who governed with precarious sway, till the power and address of Philip destroyed their usurpation, and rendered their distracted country, which seemed incapable of freedom, a province of Macedonia. Such, in few words, were the revolutions of Thessaly; but the bloody reign of Alexander demands more particular attention, being connected with the general revolutions of Greece.

A cautious reader will always receive, with some distrust, the accounts transmitted by ancient republicans of the lives and actions of tyrants.⁶ The popular histories of Alexander remind us of the fanciful descriptions of Busiris or Pygmalion. Yet it cannot be doubted that the tyrant of Thessaly was cruel to his subjects, perfidious to his allies, implacable to his enemies, a robber by land, and a pirate at sea;⁷ but that it was his usual diversion to bury men alive, to enclose them in the skins of

3 "The great city."

4 I have melted together Pausanias in Bœotic. and Diodorus, l. xv. p. 384. but followed the chronology of the latter.

5 His brother, uncle, or father, according to different authors.

6 The acceptance of the word tyrant in Greek history is well known. The Greeks called τυραννοί, "tyrants," those who had acquired sovereignty in states formerly republican. Thessaly, Sicily, Corinth, &c. were governed, not by βασιλεις, but τυραννοί, "not by kings, but tyrants; whereas Macedonia, which had never been subject to any species of popular government, was ruled, not by τυραννοί, but βασιλεις "not by tyrants, but kings."

7 These are the works of Xenophon, p. 601.

1 Xenoph. l. vii. p. 620. Diodor. et Plut. ubi supra.

2 Xenoph. ibid. He observes, οὕτω κοινόν τι καὶ χαρὰ καὶ λύπη, δακρυὰ ἴσθιν. "So common are tears to joy and sorrow."

wild beasts, as a prey to ravenous dogs, to mutilate and torture children in the presence of their parents,⁸ can scarcely be reconciled with his shedding tears for the imaginary sufferings of Hecuba and Andromaché, during the representation of the Troades.⁹ It is true, that he is said to have been ashamed of this weakness, and to have left the theatre with confusion; but what could have engaged a monster, such as Alexander is described, to listen to the pathetic strains of the tender Euripides? What pleasure, or what pain, could a tyger, thirsting for human blood, receive from such an entertainment? Although we abstract from his story many incredible fictions, Alexander might well deserve the resentment of the Thessalians. His injured subjects took arms, and solicited the protection of Thebes, whose justice or ambition readily embraced their cause. As Epaminondas still continued under the displeasure of his country, the Theban army was conducted by Pelopidas and Ismenias. Their arrival struck terror into the conscious breast of the tyrant, who, without daring to trust his defence to the numerous guards and mercenaries by whom his usurpation was supported, implored the clemency of the Theban generals, submitting to the most humiliating conditions which their wisdom might judge proper to exact for the future security of his subjects.¹⁰

Olymp. This transaction was scarcely
ciii. 2. ended, when the Thebans, whose
A. C. 367. reputation and success rendered
them the most proper mediators in the affairs of their neighbours, were invited into Macedon, which, since the death of Amyntas II. had been a prey, during six years, to all the calamities of a disputed succession. Amyntas left three legitimate sons, Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip, and a natural son, Ptolemy, whose intrigues chiefly occasioned the disorders of the kingdom. He could not prevent the accession of Alexander to the throne, as that prince had attained the age of manhood at the time of his father's death. But he embittered and shortened his reign, which lasted only one year; after which Ptolemy assumed the reins of government, as guardian of the minority of Perdiccas, and protector of Macedon. It soon appeared, however, that his ambition would not rest satisfied with the borrowed power of a regent. He gained a considerable party to his interest, baffled the opposition of Perdiccas's partisans, and boldly usurped the sovereignty. The friends of that unfortunate prince had recourse to the justice and power of Thebes. Pelopidas entered Macedon at the head of his army; restored the numerous exiles whom Ptolemy had banished; asserted the just rights of Perdiccas to the throne; and, after receiving hostages from the contending factions, among whom was Philip, the younger brother of Perdiccas, afterwards king of Macedon, and conqueror of Greece, returned towards Thessaly, having finally re-established the tranquillity of the neighbouring kingdom.¹¹

Olymp. In his journey through a country
ciii. 2. where he had so lately acted the
A. C. 367. part of a judge and master, it seemed as if little danger could reasonably be apprehended. Pelopidas had sent before him a considerable detachment of his army, to conduct the Macedonian hostages towards Thebes. With the remainder he marched securely through the territory of his Thessalian confederates, when he was informed that Alexander had come to meet him at the head of his mercenaries. Even this suspicious circumstance could not undeceive the sanguine credulity of the Theban chief. He imagined that the tyrant had taken this measure in order to show him respect, and to justify himself against some recent complaints of his injured subjects. With an imprudence which all historians agree to condemn,¹² both Pelopidas and Ismenias threw themselves into the hands of a traitor, who gloried in despising laws human and divine. They were instantly seized by his order, carried to Pheræ, bound, imprisoned, and exposed to the insulting eyes of an invidious multitude.

It might be expected that the Theban soldiers should have been animated with indignation and rage at the unexampled treatment of their beloved chiefs. But their numbers were too small to contend with the Thessalian mercenaries; and when a powerful reinforcement arrived from Bœotia, they fatally experienced, in the first encounters with the enemy, the absence of Pelopidas, and the degradation of his magnanimous friend. The army was reduced to the utmost difficulties, encompassed on every side, unwilling to fight, and unable to fly. The troops justly accused the inexperience of their commanders, remembering their glorious campaigns in the Peloponnesus, where they contended with far more formidable enemies. Epaminondas, who had commanded them on those memorable occasions, actually served in the ranks. The soldiers with one accord saluted him general. The singular abilities of this extraordinary man soon changed the posture of affairs; the tyrant was defeated in his turn, and compelled to retire. Epaminondas, instead of pushing him to extremity, which might have turned his desperate fury against the valuable lives of the Theban prisoners, hovered round with a victorious army, ostentatiously displayed the advantages of military skill and conduct; and while he kept Alexander in continual respect and fear, yet left him sufficient time for repentance and submission. This judicious plan of operations was attended with success. The tyrant implored peace; but he only received a truce of thirty days, on condition of restoring the persons of Pelopidas and Ismenias.¹³

Those who love to find in history events extraordinary and romantic, would not easily excuse my omitting to mention the interview of Pelopidas, during his imprisonment, with the

⁸ Plut. in Pelopid.

⁹ Plut. de Fort. Alexand.

¹⁰ Diodor. l. xv. c. xvir. and Plut. in Pelopid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Besides Diodorus and Plutarch, the sage Polybius severely arraigns the imprudent confidence of Pelopidas. Polyb. Casaub. t. ii. p. 98. Polybius in that passage speaks of the expedition as an embassy. I have carefully compared the different writers, and adopted the account that seemed most probable and consistent.

¹³ Plut. in Pelopid. et Diodorus, ibid.

Thessalian queen. The daughter of the heroic Jason united the beauty of the one sex with the courage of the other, and was beloved by her husband with such love as a tyrant can feel, which is always corrupted by suspicion. At her earnest and repeated entreaties, Thebé was permitted to see, and converse with, the Theban general, whose merit and fame she had long admired. But his appearance did not answer her expectation. At beholding his neglected and squalid figure, she was seized with an emotion of pity, and exclaimed, "How much, Pelopidas, do I lament your wife and family." "You, Thebé! are more to be lamented," replied the Theban hero, "who, without being a prisoner, continue the voluntary slave of a perfidious and cruel tyrant." The expression is said to have sunk deep into the heart of the queen, who remembered the reproach of Pelopidas, when ten years afterwards, she supported the courage, and urged the hand, of the assassins of Alexander.¹ But this moral narrative, however strongly authenticated, cannot be attentively read without occasioning some degree of scepticism concerning the history of Alexander. Had he been the monster which delineate, who never entered the apartment of his wife without an armed attendant, who slept in a lofty inaccessible tower, to which he mounted by a ladder, and which was guarded by a fierce dog,² it is incredible that he should have permitted an interview between a secret and open enemy.

Nor will it be easy to reconcile with the fierceness of the Thessalian, another anecdote, which has probably been invented to display the magnanimity of Pelopidas, but which displays still more strongly the patience of Alexander. During the confinement of the former at Phæræ, the latter is said to have exceeded his usual cruelties towards the inhabitants of that city. Pelopidas consoled their affliction, and encouraged them to hope for vengeance. He even sent to reproach the absurdity of the tyrant, in destroying daily so many innocent men, from whom he had nothing to fear, while he allowed an enemy to live, who would employ the first moment of freedom to punish his manifold enormities. "And is Pelopidas so desirous to die?" was the answer of the Thessalian. "Yes," replied the prisoner, "that you may the sooner perish, having rendered yourself still more obnoxious to gods and men."³ The resentment of Pelopidas, if ever it was expressed, proved an empty boast; for immediately after his deliverance, the Theban army was, for very urgent reasons, withdrawn from Thessaly.

Olymp. The Theban expedition in the
ciii. 2. north had allowed the Spartans, in
A. C. 367. some degree, to recover their in-
fluence in the south of Greece.

Archidamus had obtained a complete victory over the Arcadians, the bravest and most powerful of the confederates. The crafty⁴ Antalcidas, with Euthycles,⁵ a Spartan of abilities and intrigue, had been sent as ambassadors to Persia, in order to hasten the supplies of troops, or money, expected from that country. It was time for Thebes to assert her interest in the Peloponnesus, and to counteract the dangerous negotiations of her enemies with Artaxerxes. Epaminondas, whose recent and illustrious merit had silenced the unjust clamours of faction, was confirmed in his military command; and Pelopidas, whose unfortunate adventure in Thessaly was ascribed less to his own imprudence than to the treachery of Alexander, was despatched to the East, as the person best qualified to conduct a negotiation with the ministers of the great king. He was accompanied by the ambassadors of Elis, Argos, and Arcadia; those of Athens followed soon afterwards; so that there appeared, for the first time, a general congress of the Grecian states, to settle and adjust their interests at the court of a foreign prince. It might be expected, that a scene so new and interesting should have excited the attention of historians; yet they have left us ignorant in what city of his dominions Artaxerxes received the Greeks. At their arrival, the king treated Antalcidas with that partial kindness due to an ancient guest and favourite; but at their public audience, the appearance, the fame, and the eloquence of Pelopidas, more majestic than that of Athens, more nervous than that of Sparta,⁶ entitled him to a just preference, which the king, whose rank and temper alike disdained restraint, was at no pains to conceal.

The Theban represented, that in the battle of Platæa, fought above a century ago, and ever since that memorable engagement, his countrymen had uniformly adhered to the interest of Persia, at the risk of losing whatever men hold most precious. That the dangerous war in which they were actually engaged, had been occasioned by their open and steady opposition to the measures of the Spartans, previous to their destructive invasions of Asia. The imperious pride of Agesilaus could never forget the affront offered him at Aulis, when, in imitation of Agamemnon, he intended to offer sacrifice before his embarkation. He had begun hostilities without justice, and carried them on without success. The field of Leuctra had been alike fatal to the strength and glory of Sparta; nor would that ambitious republic have reason to boast of its recent success in Arcadia, if, at that unfortunate juncture, the Thebans had not been prevented, by reasons equally important and honourable, from assisting their Peloponnesian confederates. Timagoras the Athenian, guided by motives which ancient⁷ history has not con-

¹ Xenoph. p. 601.

² Cicero de Offic. l. 2. Plut. in Pelopid. But the story, as related by Xenophon, is divested of such improbable fictions; and Xenophon seems hardly to believe all he relates. He says, *λεγειται υπο τινων*,—and repeats that it was a hear say, a few sentences below.

³ Plutarch. in Pelopid.

⁴ Plut. in Artaxerx.

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen.

⁶ Plut. in Pelopid.

⁷ The extraordinary behaviour of Timagoras deserves attention. He co-operated with the enemy of his country, and the ambassador of a state actually at war with it. We may guess his motives by his rewards. He received from the king of Persia, at his departure, gold and silver, and other valuable presents, particularly a bed of curious construction, with Persian slaves to make it, the

descended to explain, seconded, with vigour and address, the arguments of the illustrious Theban. In vain did Leon, the colleague of Timagoras, remonstrate against his perfidy. The other deputies were confounded by his impudence; and before they had time to express their astonishment and indignation, the king desired Pelopidas to explain the object of his commission, and the demand of his countrymen. The Theban replied, that he had been sent to propose and ratify a treaty between his republic and Persia, on conditions equally advantageous to both, since the carrying of them into execution would destroy the power of those states which had hitherto occasioned so much disturbance and danger to all their neighbours. His proposals were, that the Athenians should be commanded to lay up their fleet, and that the fertile country of Messenia should be declared totally independent of Sparta. If any opposition to the treaty were made by these powers, that war should be levied against them by Persia, Thebes, and their allies; and if the inferior cities of Greece declined to engage in so just a cause, that their obstinacy should be punished with an exemplary severity. The king approved these articles, which were immediately consigned to writing, confirmed by the royal seal, and read aloud to the ambassadors. On hearing the clause which related to Athens, Leon exclaimed, with the freedom peculiar to his country, "The Athenians, it seems, must look out for some other ally, instead of the king of Persia." After this daring threat, the ambassadors took leave, and returned to Greece with all possible expedition.⁸

Pelopidas was accompanied by a Persian of distinction, entrusted with the instrument, containing the treaty. On his arrival in Thebes, the people were immediately assembled, and being acquainted with the happy fruits of his embassy, they commended his diligence and dexterity. Without losing a day, messengers were despatched to demand the attendance of representatives from the Grecian states, whose interests were all alike concerned in the late important negotiation. It does not appear that either Athens or Sparta condescended to obey the summons. The convention, however, was very numerous. The Persian read the treaty, showed the king's seal, and, in the name of his master, required the agreement to be ratified with the formality of oaths usually employed on such oc-

Greeks being little acquainted with that operation, and he was carried in a sedan to the sea shore at the king's expense. Yet this man had the effrontery to return to Athens, and to appear in the public assembly. He knew the force of eloquence and intrigue over the capricious minds of his countrymen; he knew that the practice of receiving bribes was so usual, that the Athenians had lost the proper sense of its baseness. He perhaps remembered the pleasant proposal of Epicrates, that instead of nine Archons, the Athenians should annually elect nine ambassadors, chosen from the poorest citizens, who might return rich from Persia. Epicrates had acquired a very undue proportion of wealth by this infamous means, as we learn from an oration of Lysias. Yet the Athenians were less indignant at his guilt, than delighted with his humour. Timagoras, however, was not so fortunate; he was accused by his colleague Leon, and condemned to death, not, if we may credit Plutarch, because he had betrayed his trust, and accepted bribes, but because the Athenians were extremely displeased that Pelopidas had effected the object of his commission at the Persian court. Plut. in Pelopid.

⁸ Xenoph. p. 621, et seq.

casions. The representatives almost unanimously declared that they had been sent to hear, not to swear; and that before the treaty could be ratified by general consent, its conditions must be previously discussed in the particular assembly of each independent republic. Such was the firm, but moderate answer of the other deputies; but the high-spirited Lycomedes went farther than his colleagues. His friend and countryman, Antiochus, who had lately acted as the ambassador of Arcadia at the Persian court, returned disgusted by the contempt shown towards his country by the great king, who hesitated not to prefer Elis to Arcadia. In giving an account of his embassy to the Ten Thousand (the name usually bestowed on the Arcadians since the re-union of their tribes in Mantinea and Megalopolis,) he indulged himself in many contumelious expressions against Artaxerxes and his subjects, which were greedily listened to by the resentment and envy of his hearers. "Neither the wealth nor the power of the great king were so great in reality as flattery and falsehood represented them. The golden plane-tree, which had often been so ostentatiously described, could scarce afford shade to a grasshopper. He himself had been an attentive observer; yet all he could find in Persia was the idle retinue of vice and luxury, bakers, butlers, and cooks, a useless and servile train; but men fit to contend with the Greeks, he neither himself saw, nor thought it possible for others to discover." The proud disdain of Antiochus had been communicated entire to the breast of Lycomedes. He declared, that Arcadia needed not any alliance with the great king; and that were such a matter in agitation, Thebes would not be the proper place to determine it, since every convention tending to a general peace ought to be held in that country which had been the principal scene of war.

The Theban magistrates discovered the mingled symptoms of disappointment, indignation, grief, and rage. They accused Lycomedes as a traitor to Thebes, and an enemy to his country; but he despised their empty clamours, and, without deigning an answer, walked from the assembly, and was followed by all the deputies of Arcadia. Notwithstanding this severe mortification, the Thebans did not abandon the ambitious project at which they had long aimed. Nothing favourable, they perceived, could be expected in the general congress of the states, so that they allowed the assembly to break up without insisting farther on their demands. But at the distance of a short time, they renewed the same proposal to the several republics, beginning with Corinth, one of the weakest, yet most wealthy, in hopes that whatever opposition the overtures of the king of Persia, and their own, had found in the united strength and confidence of the assembled confederacy, few single states at least would venture to provoke the indignation of such powerful adversaries. But in this, too, they were disappointed. The Corinthians declined entering into any alliance with the king of Persia, and set his power at defiance. The magnanimous example was imitated by their neighbours; the secret practices of the Thebans were equally

fruitless with their open declarations and demands.

Olymp. Epaminondas encouraged his countrymen to acquire, by arms, that
ciii. 3. pre-eminence which they had vainly
A. C. 366. expected to obtain by negotiation.

His renown, justly increased by the recent transactions in Thessaly, rendered his influence irresistible. He was again entrusted with the command of a powerful army, with which, for the third time, he invaded the Peloponnesus. The Elians and Arcadians, though hostile to each other, were alike disposed for rebellion against Thebes; but instead of marching into their territories, a measure which might have engaged them to settle their private differences, and to unite against the common enemy, Epaminondas endeavoured to quash their disaffection by the rapid conquest of Achaia, which, stretching along the Corinthian gulf, skirted the northern frontiers of Elis and Arcadia. From the nature of their government the Achæans usually enjoyed more tranquillity than their neighbours. They possessed not any great town, whose needy and turbulent inhabitants, seduced by popular demagogues, could rouse the whole province to arms and ambition. Towards the east and the isthmus of Corinth, the cities of Sicyon and Phlius had long been regarded as separate republics, unconnected with the general body of the Achæan nation. Ægium enjoyed the prerogative of constituting the usual place of convention for the states of Achaia; but Dymé, Tirtæa, and Pellené, scarcely yielded to Ægium in populousness and power, and seem, with several places of inferior note, to have formed so many separate and independent communities, all alike subject to the same equitable system of Achæan laws. Immediately before the Theban invasion the aristocracy had acquired an undue weight in the constitution of Achaia, so that the principal nobles and magistrates were no sooner informed of the approach of an enemy, than they flocked from all quarters of the province to meet Epaminondas, soliciting his favour and friendship, and little anxious about the independence of their country, provided they might preserve their personal privileges and private fortunes. The people perceiving themselves betrayed by those who ought to have been their protectors, abandoned all thoughts of resistance. Epaminondas accepted the submission of the magistrates, and received pledges of their engagement, that Achaia should thenceforth adhere to the interest of Thebes, and follow the standard of that republic.¹

This conquest, which was effected without striking a blow, and without producing any internal revolution of government, was destructive and bloody in its consequences. Epaminondas, for reasons not sufficiently explained, returned with his army to Thebes; but before he arrived there, various complaints against his conduct had been made in the Theban assembly. The Arcadians and Argives complained, that a people, who knew by their own recent experience the inconveniences of aristocracy,

should have confirmed that severe form of government in a dependent province. The democratic faction in Achaia secretly sent emissaries to second the complaint. The enemies of Epaminondas seized the favourable opportunity of accusing and calumniating that illustrious commander, and the capricious multitude were persuaded to condemn his proceedings, and to send commissioners into Achaia, who, with the assistance of the populace, as well as of a considerable body of mercenaries, dissolved the aristocracy, banished or put to death the nobles, and instituted a democratic form of policy. The foreign troops had scarcely left that country, when the exiles, who were extremely numerous and powerful, returned with common consent, and, after a bloody and desperate struggle, recovered their ancient influence in their respective cities. The leaders of the populace were now, in their turn, put to death or expelled; the aristocracy was re-established; and the magistrates, knowing that it was dangerous to depend on the unsteady politics of Thebes, craved the protection of Sparta, which was readily granted them. The Achæans approved their gratitude by ravaging the northern, while the Lacedæmonians infested the southern frontier of Arcadia; and that unhappy province felt and regretted the inconvenience of its situation between two implacable enemies.²

Olymp. Sicyon, though governed by the
ciii. 3. Achæan laws, did not follow, on
A. C. 366. this occasion, the example of its
neighbours. That unfortunate city, which had long been the seat of luxury and the arts, was reserved for peculiar calamities. Euphron, a bold, crafty, and ambitious demagogue, having already acquired great credit with the Lacedæmonians, was desirous of obtaining equal consideration among the enemies of that people, hoping, by so many foreign connections, to render himself absolute master of his little republic. For this purpose he secretly reminded the Arcadians and Argives, that "Sicyon, having the same laws and government, would naturally embrace the same alliance with the neighbouring cities; but the danger of this event he would undertake to remove, with very slender assistance from Argos and Arcadia." The admonition was not lost; a body of armed men arrived at Sicyon; Euphron assembled the people; the government was changed; new magistrates were appointed, and Euphron was entrusted with the command of the national force, consisting chiefly of mercenaries. Having obtained this, he obtained all. By caresses, bribes, and flattery, the troops were gained over to his party, and became attached to his person. His colleagues in the government were removed by secret treachery or open violence. His private enemies were held the enemies of the state, accused, condemned, and banished; and their confiscated estates augmented the wealth of Euphron, whose rapacity knew no bounds, sparing neither the property of individuals nor the public treasury, nor the consecrated gold and silver

which adorned the temples of Sicyon. The sums amassed by such impious means enabled him to confirm his usurpation. He augmented the number of his mercenary guards, who, while they oppressed the republic, were useful auxiliaries to the Argives and Arcadians. Whatever these nations thought proper to command, the soldiers of Euphron were ready to obey; and partly by this alacrity in their service, partly by bribing³ the principal men in Argos and Arcadia, the crafty tyrant expected to prevent those neighbouring communities from interfering in the domestic affairs of Sicyon.

Such was the venality and corruption of the Greeks, that this detestable policy was attended with success, until Æneas, the Stymphalian, obtained the command of the Arcadians. This man, availing himself of the vicinity of Sicyon to Stymphalus, the place of his birth and residence, had formed a connection with the oppressed citizens of the former. Æneas, perhaps, had not sufficiently shared the largesses of Euphron; perhaps the humanity of his nature⁴ lamented the sufferings of the Sicyonians. Whatever was his motive, it is certain that he endeavoured to expel their tyrant, and to restore their liberty.

Euphron, however, had the dexterity to engage successively in his favour the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Thebans. He spared neither pains, nor promises, nor bribes. He was commonly his own ambassador; and his activity and abilities must have risen far above the ordinary pitch, to engage the principal states of Greece, one after another, to support, in direct opposition to their principles, the tyranny of a single man. Insurrections at home, and hostilities from abroad, at length occasioned his downfall. He escaped to Thebes with the greatest part of his treasure. His enemies sent proper persons to counteract his intrigues there. The money, however, and the address of Euphron, prevailed with the Theban magistrates, and he expected to be restored in triumph by the Thebans, as he had already been by the Athenians. But the Sicyonians, who followed him to Thebes, perceiving his familiarity⁵ with the principal men of that city, had recourse to the only expedient that seemed capable of frustrating his designs, and assassinated Euphron in the Cadmea, while the Theban archons and senators were assembled within the walls of that edifice.⁶

The murderers were seized, and the atrocity, as well as the indignity of their crime, was strongly represented to the senate by one of the archons, who probably regretted the death of Euphron, as the loss of a wealthy client. The criminals denied the fact, till one, bolder than the rest, not only avowed but justified the assassination as equally lawful, advantageous, and honourable. And so little horror do men feel at crimes which prevail in their own age,

and with which their fancies are familiar, that the assassins were unanimously acquitted by the Theban senate, whose award was approved by the assembly.⁷

Olymp.

ciii. 3.

A. C. 366.

Mean while the war languished on both sides, and the hostile confederacies were on the point of being dissolved. The Athenians and Arcadians, equally disgusted with their respective allies, concluded a treaty of peace and mutual defence, by the intervention of Lycomedes the Mantinian, who was slain in his return from Athens by a party of Arcadian exiles. This negotiation gave general alarm; the Arcadians, who had entered into treaty with Athens, were the allies of Thebes; and the united strength of these three republics was at that time sufficient to subdue and enslave the rest of Greece. The terror was increased when it appeared that the Athenians had little inclination to evacuate several places in the Corinthian territory which they had undertaken to defend against the Arcadians and Thebans. By seasonable vigilance the Corinthians anticipated a design, too unjust to be publicly avowed; they cautiously dissembled their fears; graciously thanked Chares, who had arrived with an Athenian fleet on pretence of offering them his service, but took care not to admit him within their harbours; and by extreme kindness and condescension, accompanied with warm professions of gratitude for the protection hitherto afforded them, they got rid of the foreign garrisons, without coming to an open rupture with the Athenians. But the narrow escape which they had made, and the dread of being exposed in future to any similar danger, made them extremely solicitous to promote a general peace on the terms proposed by Artaxerxes and the Thebans. Motives of the same kind influenced the cities of Achaia, and the little republic of Phlius, which, together with Corinth, were the only allies that remained faithful to Sparta. A similarity of interests occasioned a close communication of views and measures among all those communities; who agreed, by common consent, to despatch an embassy to Sparta, requesting that she would accept the conditions of peace lately offered by Thebes, or if she thought it inconsistent with honour to cede her just pretensions to Messenê, that she would allow her faithful but helpless allies to enter into a separate negotiation with the Theban republic.

The reasonableness, and even modesty, of this request must have been apparent to the Spartans, when they reflected on the useful services of the allies, and considered how much they had already suffered in their cause. The Phliasians, in particular, had, during five years, given such illustrious proofs of their unshaken adherence to Sparta, as stand unrivalled in the history of national honour and fidelity. Situated in the midst of enemies, they had continually, since the battle of Leuctra, suffered the invasions and assaults of the Thebans, Arcadians, and Argives. Their territory was totally wasted; their city closely besieged; their cita-

³ Τα μὲν τοὶ καὶ κέρμασι διαπραττито. Xenoph. p. 624.

⁴ Xenophon seems to approve this reason. He says Æneas, the Stymphalian, νομίζας οὐκ ἀνέκτως εἶναι τὰ ἐν Σικωνί. "Thinking the grievances of the Sicyonians intolerable."

⁵ ὡς δὲ ἐπεὶ αὐτὸν οὐκ ὀλίγως τοῖς ἀρχούσι συνόντα. Xenoph. p. 630.

⁶ Xenoph. l. vii. p. 630.

⁷ Xenoph. ibid. p. 631, et seq.

del, more than once, surprised and taken; their wealth, public and private, was exhausted, and they subsisted precariously on provisions brought from Corinth, for the payment of which they pledged their beasts of burden and instruments of agriculture. Yet under the pressure of these multiplied calamities, they had preserved their fidelity inviolate; they had disdained to accept the peace which the Thebans offered them on condition of their forsaking Sparta; even, at last, they were determined to negotiate with Thebes for neutrality alone; nor had they humbly solicited permission to embrace this measure, until Corinth, the only source of their subsistence, seemed ready to forsake them.¹

The strength of such arguments urged by the eloquence of Patrocles the Phliasian, might have softened, if any thing could have softened, the inflexible temper of the Spartan senate, and disposed that assembly to prefer the interest of their allies, and their own immediate safety, to the insisting on a fruitless claim to Messenë, which, unaided and alone, they could never expect to maintain. But the pretensions of this extraordinary people seem to have become more lofty, in proportion to their inability to support them; and, on that particular occasion, the proud obstinacy, natural to the Spartans, was increased by an animated speech of Archidamus, full of the most confident hopes, and glowing with all the warmth of his age and character.

He spoke with contempt concerning the defection of the confederates. "The Phliasians, the inhabitants of Corinth and Achaia, may, without exciting surprise, express an anxiety for peace; safety, not glory, is their aim. But the Spartans have a character to sustain, which it would be infamous to relinquish. They expect not barely to exist, but to enjoy fame and honour, the true sweeteners of existence; and, if that be impossible, they must perish! Yet is not their situation desperate: a nation cannot be reduced to any condition of distress, in which a warlike genius, and a well-regulated government, may not afford relief. But in military experience and abilities, we are still unrivalled; and such a system of policy as we enjoy, no other people can boast. We enjoy, besides, temperate and laborious habits, the contempt of pleasure and wealth, an ardour for martial glory, and an ambition of honest fame. These are powerful auxiliaries, when protected by the immortal gods, whose oracles anciently approved our just conquest of Messenë. Nor, though the Corinthians and Achæans forsake us, shall we be destitute of warlike allies. The Athenians ever jealous of Thebes, their most formidable neighbour, will again take arms in our cause. Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily, gives us hope of farther assistance; the king of Egypt, and many princes of Asia, declared enemies of Artaxerxes, are all naturally our friends. We possess, besides, though not the persons and actual service, the hearts and affections at least, of whatever is most eminent in Greece. In all the republics, whoever is dis-

tinguished by his fame, his wealth, or his virtues, though he may not accompany our standard, secretly wishes success to our arms. I am of opinion, too, that the crowd² of Peloponnesus, that mob on which we at first too vainly relied, will at length return to their duty. They have obtained none of these advantages, the vain prospect of which urged them to revolt. Instead of acquiring the independent government of their own laws, they have fallen a prey to lawless anarchy, or been subjected to the inhuman cruelty of tyrants. The bloody seditions, of which they once knew the nature by report only, they have long experienced; and there are actually more exiles from particular cities, than were formerly from all Peloponnesus. But even banishment is happiness to those who, while they remained at home, butchered each other at the altars; and who, instead of that peaceful abundance which they enjoyed under the Spartan government, perished for want of bread. Such is the condition of the Peloponnesians, whose lands have been laid waste, their cities desolated, and that constitution and those laws, under which they once lived the happiest of men, overturned from the foundation. We might subdue them by force; but that is not necessary; they will voluntarily return to their allegiance, and solicit our protection, as alone capable to alleviate their misery, and prevent their total ruin.

"But had we nothing of this kind to expect, and were the one half of Greece not more disposed to injure us, than the other to abet their injustice, I have still one resolution to propose, harsh indeed and severe, but becoming those sentiments which have ever animated the Spartans. Prosperity, that conceals the infamy of cowardice, robs fortitude of half its glory. It is adversity alone that can display the full lustre of a firm and manly character. I propose, therefore, that rather than cede a territory, which your ancestors acquired by the blood and labour of twenty victorious campaigns, you should remove from Sparta your wives, children, and parents, who will be received with kindness in Italy, Sicily, Cyrenë, and many parts of Asia. Those who are fit to bear arms must also leave the city, and carry nothing from thence that may not easily be transported. They must, then, fix on some post well fortified by nature, and which art may render secure against every hostile assault. This, thenceforth, must be their city and country; and from this, as a centre, they must on all sides infest the enemy, until either the Thebans remit their arrogance, or the last of the Spartans perish."³

The speech of Archidamus expressed the general sense of his country. The allies were dismissed with permission to act as best suited their convenience, but with assurance that Sparta would never listen to any terms of accommodation while deprived of Messenë. With this answer the ambassadors returned to their respective cities. Soon afterwards they were despatched to Thebes, where, having proposed their demands, they were offered admission into

¹ Xenoph. 624. et 634.

² Οχλος. Isocrat. in Arcid. He means the Arcadians, Elians, &c. formerly allies of Sparta.

³ Isocrat. in Archidam.

the Theban confederacy. They answered, that this was not peace, but only a change of the war; and at length, after various propositions and reasonings, they obtained the much-desired neutrality.⁴

Olymp. The Spartans, thus deserted on
civ. 1. every side, would probably have
A. C. 364. been the victims of their pride and
obstinacy, if circumstances, unfore-
seen by Archidamus, had not prevented the
Thebans and Arcadians from carrying on the
war with their usual animosity. Projects of
glory and ambition had disarmed the resent-
ment of Epaminondas. That active and en-
terprising leader, who thought that nothing was
done, while any thing was neglected, had set
himself to render Thebes mistress of the sea.
The attention and labour of the republic was
directed to this important object; preparations
were made at Aulis with silence and celerity;
and when the design seemed ripe for execution,
Epaminondas sailed to Rhodes, Chios, and
Byzantium, to concert measures with those
maritime states, which had already begun to
feel the severe yoke of the Athenians, and be-
come eager to shake it off. But the vigilance
of the latter, who had sent out a strong fleet
under Laches, a commander of reputation and
ability, prevented the dangerous consequences
of this defection; and the Theban arms were,
at the same time, summoned to a service which
more immediately concerned their interest and
honour.

Olymp. Alexander, the tyrant of Pheræ,
civ. 1. began once more to display the re-
A. C. 364. sources of his fertile genius, and the
inhuman cruelty of his temper. His
numerous mercenaries, whom he collected and
kept together with singular address, and the
secret assistance of Athens, enabled him to
overrun the whole territory, and to gain posses-
sion of all the principal cities, of Thessaly.⁵
The oppressed Thessalians had recourse to
Thebes, whose powerful protection they had so
happily experienced on former occasions, and
whose standard they had uniformly followed,
with an alacrity which afforded a sufficient
pledge of their gratitude. The Thebans de-
creed to assist them with ten thousand men,
and the command was entrusted to Pelopidas,
the personal enemy of Alexander. But the day
appointed for the march was darkened by an
eclipse of the sun, which greatly diminished the
army, as Pelopidas was unwilling to exact the
reluctant services of men dispirited by the ima-
ginary terrors of superstition. Such only as,
despising vain omens, desired to follow their
beloved general, were conducted into Thessaly;
and being joined by their allies in that country
near the town of Pharsalus, they encamped at
the foot of the mountains of Cynoscephalæ.

The tyrant approached with an army twenty
thousand strong, boldly offering them battle.
Nor did Pelopidas decline the engagement,
though his foot were, in number, inferior to the
enemy. The action began with the cavalry,
and was favourable to the Thebans; but the
mercenaries of Alexander having gained the

advantage of the ground, pressed with vigour
the Theban and Thessalian infantry. In this
emergency, Pelopidas rode up, and encouraging
the retiring troops with his voice and action,
gave them such fresh spirits, that Alexander did
not doubt their having received a considerable
reinforcement. The mercenaries were pressed
in their turn, and thrown into disorder. Pello-
pidas darting his eye through their broken ranks,
espied Alexander in the right wing rallying his
men, and preparing to advance with his usual
intrepidity. At this sight the Theban was no
longer master of his passion. Naturally a foe
to tyrants, he beheld a personal foe in the tyrant
Alexander. Accompanied by a few horsemen,
he impetuously rushed forward, calling aloud
to his adversary, and challenging him to single
combat. Alexander, fearing to meet the man
whom he had injured, retired behind his guards,
who received, first with a shower of javelins,
and then with their spears, the little band of
Pelopidas; who, after producing such carnage⁶
as Homer ascribes to the rage of Diomed or
Achilles, fell a victim to the blindness of his
own ungovernable fury. Mean while, his troops
advancing to the relief of their general, the
guards of the tyrant were repelled; the The-
bans, with their allies, proved victorious in
every part of the battle; the enemy were dis-
persed in flight, and pursued with the loss of
three thousand men.

But the death of Pelopidas threw a gloom
over the victory. He was lamented by the
Thebans and Thessalians with immoderate de-
monstrations of sorrow. Accompanied by an
innumerable crowd of real mourners, his body
was carried in procession to Thebes. The
Thessalians, in whose service he had fallen, re-
quested the honour of supplying the expenses
of his funeral, which was celebrated with every
circumstance of sad magnificence. The multi-
tude recollected the eclipse which preceded his
departure, and which, as they believed, an-
nounced his misfortune; and, in allusion to that
fatal omen, exclaimed, "that the sun of Thebes
was set, and her glory departed for ever." The
Thebans appointed Malcitas and Diogeiton to
the command in Thessaly. The tyrant was
again defeated, and stripped of all his conquests.
But what appears extraordinary, he was allow-
ed to live and reign in Pheræ,⁷ while the neigh-
bouring cities entered into a close alliance with
Thebes.

The foreign expeditions which have been de-
scribed, were not the only causes that diverted
the attention of the Thebans from the affairs of
Peloponnesus. While Epaminondas was em-
ployed abroad in the fleet, and Pelopidas in
Thessaly, the government of Thebes was on the
point of being overturned by an aristocratical
faction. The inhabitants of Orchomenus, the
second city in Bœotia, and anciently the rival
of Thebes,⁸ entered into this conspiracy, which
was to be executed at the annual review of the

⁶ Diodorus says, that the bodies of those whom he slew covered a long tract of ground. Plutarch is equally hyperbolic. The battles of Homer rendered the marvellous in military description too familiar to the Greek historians, I mean Diodorus, Plutarch, Pausanias; Thucydides and Xenophon knew their duty better.

⁷ Diodorus, l. xv. c. 20.

⁸ Pausanias Bœotic.

⁴ Xenoph. ubi supra.

⁵ Plutarch. in Pelopid.

Orchomenian troops. But the plot was discovered by the fears or the repentance of some accomplices, who became informers. The cavalry of Orchomenus, to the number of three hundred, were surrounded and cut to pieces in the Theban market-place. Nor did this vengeance satisfy the enraged multitude, who marched in a body to Orchomenus, besieged and took the city, razed it to the ground, put the men of full age to the sword, and dragged their wives and children into captivity.¹

Olymp. While operations, destructive or
civ. 1. fruitless, employed the activity of
A. C. 364. Thebes, her allies in Arcadia were
occupied with designs still more
blameable. Their own strength and numbers,
together with a confidence in Athens, their new
confederate, encouraged the Arcadians to give
full scope to their ambition, by which they had
been long animated. To pave the way for the
total conquest of the Peloponnesus, in which
they had already obtained a dangerous ascend-
ant, they began by wresting several places from
the Elians, the least warlike, and most wealthy,
of their neighbours. The Elians, worsted in
every encounter with the enemy, craved the
assistance of Sparta, which being reinforced by
the Achæans (notwithstanding the neutrality
so recently stipulated,) made several vigorous,
but unsuccessful efforts, for the defence of the
Elian territory. The Arcadians still pushed
their conquests in that country, gaining one
town after another, and at length Olympia it-
self, the most precious jewel of the Elians, and
the greatest ornament of the Peloponnesus.
As possessors of the sacred city, and by virtue
of a pretended right derived from the inha-
bitants of Pisa, an ancient but decayed place in
the neighbourhood of Olympia, the Arcadians
prepared to celebrate the hundred and fourth
Olympiad, the time of which was at hand. At
the approach of this august solemnity, the con-
course, as usual, was great from every part of
Greece; hostilities were suspended; and all
parties united in common amusements, and
common ceremonies of religion.

The prayers and sacrifices were performed, and the military games had begun, when the performers and spectators were alarmed by the sudden clashing of armour, and the sight of a real battle. The Elians had marched forth with their whole forces, and surprised the Arcadians, who, with two thousand Argives, and a body of Athenian cavalry amounting to four hundred, guarded the sacred groves and temples of Olympia. The vigour of their unexpected assault successfully repelled these intruders, who fled in disorder through the streets, and were pursued by the Elians with an inspired valour, "since," says Xenophon, "Heaven alone can do, in one day, what no other power can accomplish but in great length of time; make cowards courageous."² The Arcadians, however, recovering from their consternation, began to rally. The assailants were resisted with obstinacy; but did not retire, till having lost Stratolas their com-

mander, with other brave men, they retreated in good order, after giving a conspicuous proof of their courage and intrepidity to those who had long despised the softness of their unwarlike character. The Arcadians renewed the guard with double vigilance; fortified the avenues that led to the Stadium and Hippodrome; and having taken these necessary precautions against a second surprise, proceeded with the remaining ceremonies of the festival, which, though brought to an undisturbed conclusion, was never acknowledged in the records of the Elians.

After celebrating the Olympic games, the mixed concourse of people returned to their respective homes, and the Arcadians found themselves sole masters of the city and temple of Jupiter, containing the collected treasures of many centuries, the rich gifts of vanity and superstition. Opportunity, joined to want, is naturally the mother of injustice. The Arcadians, who, to promote their ambitious designs, had raised a body of standing troops called Eparitai, laid hold of the sacred treasure, in order to pay those mercenaries, whose demands they were otherwise incapable of satisfying, without great inconvenience. The Mantinæans first protested against this unwarrantable rapacity. Instead of accepting their proportion of the plunder, they imposed, for the payment of the mercenaries, a tax on themselves, of which they transmitted the produce to the archons, or magistrates, appointed by the Ten Thousand to administer the general concerns of the Arcadian nation. The archons, who had themselves freely handled the sacred money, represented to their constituents the affected delicacy of the Mantinæans as an obstinacy extremely dangerous to the states of Arcadia, and insinuated that this unseasonable regard for justice and piety most probably concealed some very criminal design.³

The Ten Thousand, or, as we should say, the States-General, listened to this insidious accusation; and summoned the municipal magistrates of Mantinæa to appear and answer for their conduct. They refused to obey; a detachment of the Eparitai was sent to bring them by force; the Mantinæans shut their gates. This firmness roused the attention of the States; and many members of weight in that assembly began to suspect that the Mantinæans must possess some secret ground of confidence, that encouraged them to set at defiance an authority which they were bound to revere. They reflected first on the alarming consequences to which Arcadia might be exposed by plundering the shrines of Jupiter; and then on the injustice and impiety of the deed itself. These sentiments, enforced by the superstition of the age, spread with rapidity in the assembly; it was determined thenceforth to abstain from a consecrated fund, the violation of which might prove dangerous to themselves, and entail a curse on their posterity; and, to prevent the bad consequences of the desertion of the Eparitai, whose pay must thereby be diminished, many wealthy Arcadians, who could subsist on their private incomes, enrolled themselves in their stead.

¹ Diodor. l. xv. c. 20.

² Τοιούτοι γενόμενοι οἶοντες τὴν ἀρετὴν θεῶς μὲν ἀνέμπνευσας δύνασθαι καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἀποδείξαι· ἀνδρῶποι οὐδε μὲν ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ τοῦς μὴ οὕτως ἀλκιμοῦς ποιήσιν· π. 639.

³ Xenoph. l. vii. p. 638, et seq. et Diodor. l. xv. c. 21.

These measures, though approved by the States, gave great uneasiness to the archons, to the mercenaries, and to all who had shared the Olympic spoil, lest they might be called to account for their rapacity, and compelled to refund the sums which they had embezzled. To prevent this danger, they had recourse to the Thebans, from whom they requested immediate assistance, on pretence that the States of Arcadia were ready to revolt to Sparta. The States, on the other hand, sent an embassy requesting the Thebans not to pass the Isthmus, until they should receive further invitation. Nor were they satisfied with barely counteracting the negotiations of their enemies. Having determined not to derive any benefit from the wealth of Olympia, they thought proper to restore that city, as well as the direction of the games, to those who had, from time immemorial, enjoyed both, and to conclude a peace with the Elians, who solicited it with much earnestness, as a measure highly conducive to the general interest of the Peloponnesus.

The congress, assembled for this beneficial purpose, was held at Tegea, and consisted of deputies from Elis, and from many cities of Arcadia. When matters were seemingly adjusted to the satisfaction of all parties, entertainments, as usual, were prepared; and the deputies, except those of Mantinea, most of whom were invited home by the vicinity of their city, remained at Tegea to celebrate the feast of peace. While they were employed in drinking and merriment, the archons, and such others as dreaded the consequences of this hasty accommodation, addressed themselves to a Theban general, who commanded a considerable body of Boeotian troops that had long garrisoned Tegea, in order to secure the fidelity of that place and the adjacent territory. The Theban had himself made free with the sacred treasure, and was therefore easily prevailed on to embrace any measure that might prevent an inquiry into that enormous crime. Nothing appeared so proper for this purpose as to seize and detain the unsuspecting deputies, who consisted of the leading men from most cities of Arcadia. This scheme was no sooner proposed, than carried into execution. The gates of Tegea were secured; a body of armed men surrounded the place of entertainment; the deputies, who had prolonged to a late hour the joys of festivity, were taken unprepared, and conducted to various places of confinement, their number being too great for one prison to contain.⁴

Next day, the Mantinæans, being apprised of this unexpected event, despatched messengers, demanding some few of their citizens who happened to remain at Tegea, after the departure of their companions; and at the same time acquainting the magistrates of that place, the archons, and the Theban general, that no Arcadian could be put to death without a fair and open trial. They likewise, without loss of time, despatched an embassy to the several cities of Arcadia, rousing them to arms in their own defence, and exhorting them to rescue their imprisoned citizens, and to avenge the insult of-

fered to the general body of their nation. When those who had committed the outrage, and especially the Theban general, were acquainted with the vigour of these proceedings, they began to be more alarmed than before. As they had seized but few Mantinæans, they could derive little advantage from the hostages of that city, whose resentment they had most reason to fear. They were sensible of deserving the indignation of Arcadia; and that the general voice of Greece must condemn the irregularity and violence of their measures. Intimidated by such reflections, the Theban commander at once set the prisoners at liberty; and, appearing next day before an assembly as numerous as could be collected in such troublesome times, endeavoured to excuse his conduct, by saying, that he had heard of the march of the Lacedæmonian army towards the frontier, and that several of the deputies, whom he had seized, were prepared to betray Tegea to the public enemy. The Arcadians were not the dupes of this shallow artifice; yet they abstained from punishing their own wrongs, and sent ambassadors to Thebes, who might describe the injury that had been committed, and impeach the criminals.⁵

Upon hearing the accusation, Olymp. Epaminondas, who was then general of the Boeotians, declared, that civ. 2. his countrymen had done better in seizing, than in discharging the Arcadians, whose conduct was highly blameable in making peace without the advice of their confederates. "Be assured," continued he to the ambassadors, "that the Thebans will march into Arcadia, and support their friends in that province." This resolution, which expressed the general sense of the republic, was heard with great indignation by the Arcadian states, and their allies of Elis and Achaia. They observed, that the Thebans could not have felt, much less have expressed, any displeasure at the peace of Peloponnesus, if they had not deemed it their interest to perpetuate the divisions and hostilities of a country which they wished to weaken and to subdue. They entered into a stricter alliance with each other, and prepared for a vigorous defence; sending ambassadors to Athens and Sparta, that the former might be ready to thwart the measures of a neighbouring and rival state, and that the latter might take arms to maintain the independence of that portion of Greece, of which the valour of Sparta had long formed the strength and bulwark.

During these hostile preparations, Olymp. Epaminondas took the field with civ. 2. all the Boeotians, with the Eubœans, A. C. 363. and with a strong body of Thessalians, partly supplied by Alexander, and partly raised by the cities which Pelopidas had recently delivered from the yoke of that cruel tyrant. Upon his arrival in the Peloponnesus, he expected to be joined by the Argives, the Messenians, and several communities of Arcadia, particularly the inhabitants of Tegea and Megalopolis. With these hopes, he proceeded southward to Nemea, an ancient city in the Argive territory, distinguished by the games

⁴ Xenoph. p. 640.

⁵ Xenoph. p. 641.

celebrated in honour of Hercules. There he encamped for several days, with an intention to intercept the Athenians, whose nearest route into Peloponnesus lay through the district of Nemea; convinced that nothing could more contribute, than an advantage over that people in the beginning of the campaign, to animate the courage, as well as to increase the number of the Theban partisans in every part of Greece. But this scheme was defeated by the prudence of the Athenians, who, instead of marching through the Isthmus, sailed to the coast of Laconia, and proceeded from thence to join their confederates at Mantinæa. Apprised of this design, Epaminondas moved his camp, and marched forward to Tegea, which being strongly fortified, and enjoying a lofty and central situation, was judiciously chosen as the place of rendezvous for his Peloponnesian confederates. Having continued several weeks at Tegea, he was much disappointed that none of the neighbouring towns sent to offer their submission, and to solicit the protection of the Theban arms. This waste of time gave him the more uneasiness, as his command was limited to a short term. The strength of the enemy at Mantinæa was continually increasing. Agesilaus had already conducted the Lacedæmonians to the frontier of Arcadia. If *they* likewise should join, the combined forces would prove superior to the army of Epaminondas, which amounted to thirty thousand in number, and of which the cavalry alone exceeded three thousand. Considering these circumstances, he suddenly determined on an enterprise, which, if crowned with success, would render the present hitherto fruitless expedition not unworthy of his former fame.

Having decamped with his whole army in the night, he performed a hasty march of thirty miles, in order to surprize Sparta; and had not the extraordinary swiftness of a Cretan deserter apprised Agesilaus of the danger, that city would have been taken unprepared, and totally incapable of defence.¹ The bulk of the Lacedæmonian army had proceeded too far on the road to Mantinæa, to anticipate the design of the enemy; but the aged king, with his son Archidamus, returned, with a small but valiant band, to the defence of Sparta. The engagement which followed, as related by Xenophon, appears one of the most extraordinary that history records. Epaminondas had employed every precaution which his peculiar sagacity could suggest; he did not approach Sparta by those narrow roads, where a superiority of numbers would afford him small advantage; he did not draw up his forces in the plain, in which, while entering the town, they might have been annoyed with missile weapons; nor did he allow an opportunity of surprising him by stratagem or ambuscade, in the management of which the Spartans were at all times so dexterous. Seizing an eminence which commanded the town, he determined to descend into it with every advantage on his side, and without the seeming possibility of being exposed to any in-

convenience. But the issue of so well-concerted an enterprise, the historian hesitates whether to refer to a particular providence of the gods, or to ascribe to the invincible courage of men actuated by despair. Archidamus, with scarcely a hundred men, opposed the progress of the enemy, cut down the first ranks, and advanced to assault the remainder. Then, strange to relate! those Thebans, says Xenophon, who breathed fire, who had so often conquered, who were far superior in number, and who possessed the advantage of the ground, shamefully gave way. The Spartans pursued them with impetuosity, but were soon repelled with loss; for the divinity, whose assistance had produced this extraordinary victory, seems also to have prescribed the limits beyond which it was not to extend.²

Epaminondas, foiled in an attempt which promised such a fair prospect of success, did not sink under his disappointment. As he had reason to believe that the whole forces at Mantinæa would be withdrawn from that place to the defence of Sparta, he immediately sounded a retreat, returned to Tegea with the utmost expedition, and allowing his infantry to take time for rest and refreshment, he, with admirable presence of mind, ordered the horse to advance forward to Mantinæa, (which was distant only twelve miles,) and to maintain their ground until his arrival with the rest of the army. He expected to find the Mantinæans totally unprepared for such a visit; and as it was then autumn, he doubted not that most of the townsmen would be employed in the country, in reaping and bringing in the corn. His plan was wise, and well executed. The situation of the Mantinæans corresponded to his hopes. But it seemed as if fortune had delighted to baffle his sagacity. Before the Theban forces arrived at Mantinæa, a numerous and powerful squadron of Athenian cavalry entered that place, commanded by Hegelochus, who then first learned the departure of the allies to protect the Lacedæmonian capital. He had scarcely received this intelligence, when the Thebans appeared, and, advancing with great rapidity, prepared to effect the purpose of their expedition. The Athenians had not time to refresh themselves; they had eat nothing that day; they were inferior in number; they knew the bravery of the Theban and Thessalian cavalry, with whom they must contend; yet, regardless of every consideration but the safety of their allies, they rushed into the field, stopped the progress of the assailants, and, after a fierce and bloody engagement, which displayed great courage on both sides, obtained an acknowledged victory. The enemy craved the bodies of their dead; the victors erected a trophy of their useful valour, which had saved the corn,

¹ Xenophon says, ὅτι καὶ νικῶντας πανταπασι τοὺς ἄλλους τὸν ἀνυπομένον. Xenophon p. 644. "As a nest quite destitute of its defenders."

² Plutarch tells a story on this occasion, of a young Spartan named Isadas, who stripped naked, anointed himself with oil, sallied forth with a spear in one hand, and a sword in the other, and traced his path in blood through the thickest of the enemy. He returned unhurt, was crowned for his valour, but fined for fighting without his shield. Plut. in Agesil. To a modern reader, Xenophon's account of the battle will appear a pompous description of the effect of panic terror with which the Thebans were inspired, by finding, instead of νικῶντας ἄνθρωπον, "a defenceless nest," the vigorous opposition of men in arms.

cattle, slaves, women, and children³ of Mantinæa from falling a prey to the invaders.

The repeated misfortunes, which would have broken the spirit of an ordinary commander, only determined Epaminondas to a general engagement, in which he might either wipe off the memory of his late disgrace, or obtain an honourable death, fighting to render his country the sovereign of Greece. The confederates had re-assembled at Mantinæa, strengthened by considerable reinforcements. Fresh succours had likewise arrived to the Thebans. Never had such numerous armies⁴ taken the field during the perpetual war in which those unhappy republics were engaged. But battles become really interesting, not so much by the number of the troops, as by the conduct of the generals. It is worth while, says the military historian,⁵ to observe the operations of Epaminondas on this memorable occasion. Having ranged his men in battalions, he led them, not along the plain, which was the nearest road to Mantinæa, but turning to the left, conducted them by a chain of hills which joined that city and Tegea, and skirted the eastern extremity of both. The enemy, apprised of his march, drew up their forces before the walls of Mantinæa; the Lacedæmonians, and such Arcadians as had embraced the more honourable cause, in the right wing, the Athenians in the left, the Achæans and Elians forming the main body. Mean while Epaminondas marched slowly along, extending his circuit, as if he wished to decline the engagement. Having approached that part of the mountain which faced the hostile army, he ordered his men to halt, and to lay down their arms. His former movements had occasioned great doubt and perplexity; but now it seemed evident that he had laid aside all thoughts of fighting that day, and was preparing to encamp. This opinion, too lightly conceived, proved fatal to the enemy. They abandoned their arms and their ranks, dispersed in their tents, and lost not only that external arrangement, but that inward preparation,⁶ that martial ardour of mind, which ought to animate soldiers at the near prospect of an engagement. Epaminondas seized the decisive moment of attack. Facing to the right, he converted the column of march into an order of battle. His troops were thus disposed instantaneously in the same order in which he meant to fight. At the head of his left wing, which consisted of the flower of the Bœotians, and which, as at the battle of Leuctra, he formed into a firm wedge, with a sharp point, and with spreading flanks, he advanced against the Spartans and Mantinæans; and trusting the event of the battle to the rapid impulse of this unexpected onset, he commanded the centre and right wing, in which he placed less confidence, to proceed with a slow pace, that they might not come up and grapple with the opposing divisions of the enemy, until the victory of his left wing had taught them to conquer.

Olymp.

civ. 2.

A. C. 363.

This judicious design was crowned with merited success. The enemy, perceiving the dreadful shock to which they were exposed, flew to their arms, put on their bucklers and helmets, bridled their horses, and suddenly resumed their ranks; but these different operations were performed with the trepidation of surprise and haste, rather than with the ardour of hope and courage; and the whole army had the appearance of men prepared rather to suffer, than to inflict, any thing cruel or terrible.⁷ The Spartans and Mantinæans, drawn up in firm order, sternly waited the first brunt of the assailants. The battle was fierce and bloody, and after their spears were broken, both parties had recourse to their swords. The wedge of Epaminondas at length penetrated the Spartan line, and this advantage encouraged his centre and right wing to attack and repel the corresponding divisions of the enemy. The Theban and Thessalian cavalry were equally successful. In the intervals of their ranks Epaminondas had placed a body of light infantry, whose missile weapons greatly annoyed the enemy's horse, who were drawn up two deep. He had likewise taken the precaution to occupy a rising ground on his right with a considerable detachment, which might take the Athenians in flank and rear, should they advance from their post. These prudent dispositions produced a victory, which Epaminondas did not live to complete or improve. In the heat of the battle he received a mortal wound,⁸ and was carried to an eminence, which was afterwards called the Watch-tower,⁹ probably that he might the better observe the subsequent operations of the field. But with the departure of their leader was withdrawn the spirit which animated the Theban army. Having impetuously broken through the hostile ranks, they knew not how to profit of this advantage. The enemy rallied in different parts of the fields and prevailed in several partial encounters. All was confusion and terror. The light infantry, which had been posted amidst the Theban and Thessalian horse, being left behind in the pursuit, were received and cut to pieces by the Athenian cavalry, commanded by Hegelochus. Elated with this success, the Athenians turned their arms against the detachments placed on the heights, consisting chiefly of Eubœans, whom they routed and put

⁷ Παντες δε πεισόμενοις τε μάλλον η ποιηθουσιν ιωκισαν. Xenoph. p. 646.

⁸ Pausanias, in Arcad. says, that Epaminondas was killed by Gryllus, the son of Xenophon the Athenian; and, as a proof of this assertion, mentions a beautiful picture of the battle of Mantinæa, in the Ceramicus of Athens, as well as the monument of Gryllus, erected by the Mantinæans on the field of battle; both subsisting in the time of Pausanias, and both ascribing to this Athenian the honour of killing Epaminondas. Plutarch, in Agesilao, says, that Anticrates, a Spartan, killed Epaminondas with a sword; that his posterity were thence called Machairionidas; and that, as late as the days of Plutarch, they enjoyed certain immunities and honours as a recompense for the merit of their ancestor Anticrates in destroying the worst enemy of Sparta. Gryllus the son of Xenophon fell in the battle of Mantinæa; and the words, or rather the silence of his father, is very remarkable concerning the death of Epaminondas: "The Theban column broke the Spartans, but when Epaminondas fell, the rest knew not how to use the victory." What sublimity in this passage, if Gryllus really slew Epaminondas!

⁹ Pausan. ubi supra.

³ Xenophon, l. vii. p. 644.

⁴ Diodorus, l. xv. c. 21.

⁵ Xenoph. p. 645.

⁶ Ελυσεν μιν των πολικων την εν ταις ψυχαις προς την μαχην παρασκευην· ελυσεν δε των εν ταις συνταξεσιν. Xenoph. p. 645.

to flight, after a terrible slaughter. With such alternations of victory and defeat ended this memorable engagement. Both armies, as conquerors, erected a trophy; both craved their dead, as conquered;¹ and this battle, which being certainly the greatest, was expected to have proved the most decisive ever fought among the Greeks, produced no other consequence but that general languor and debility long remarkable in the subsequent operations of those hostile republics.

When the tumult of the action ceased, the most distinguished Thebans assembled around their dying general. His body had been pierced with a javelin; and the surgeons declared, that it was impossible for him to survive the extraction of the weapon. He asked whether his shield was safe? which being presented to him, he viewed it with a languid smile of melancholy joy. He then demanded, whether the Thebans had obtained the victory? Being answered in the affirmative (for the Lacedæmonians indeed had first sent to demand the bodies of their slain,) he declared himself ready to quit life without regret, since he left his country triumphant. The spectators lamented, among other objects of sorrow, that he should die without children, who might inherit the glory of his name, and the fame of his virtues. "You mistake," said he with a cheerful presence of mind, "I leave two fair daughters; the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, who will transmit my renown to the latest ages." So saying, he ordered the weapon to be extracted, and immediately expired. The awful solemnity of his death corresponded with the dignified splendour of an active and useful life. He is usually described as a perfect character;² nor does the truth of history oblige us to detract any thing from this description, except that in some instances, and particularly in his last fatal invasion of the Peloponnesus, he allowed the blaze of patriotism to eclipse the mild light of justice and benevolence. He was buried in the field of battle, where his monument still existed, after four centuries, in the time of Pausanias, with an inscription in elegiac verse, enumerating his exploits. Hadrian, then master of the Roman world, added a second column, with a new inscription,³ in honour of a character, whom that unsteady emperor had genius to admire, but wanted firmness to imitate.

An elegant Roman writer gives a brief but comprehensive panegyric of Epaminondas, that during his lifetime Thebes was the arbiter of Greece; whereas both before and afterwards, that republic continually languished in servitude or dependence.⁴ But this observation

betrays the inaccurate partiality of a biographer, who often exalts the glory of a favourite hero, at the expense of historic truth. By the death of Epaminondas, Thebes was deprived of her principal ornament and defence, the source of her confidence, and the spring of her activity; and her councils were thenceforth less ambitious, and her arms less enterprising.⁵ But six years after that event, she controlled the decisions of the Amphictyonic council, and, instead of being reduced to a condition of dependence, her power was still formidable to the most warlike of her neighbours.

Soon after the battle of Mantinea, a general peace was proposed under the mediation of Artaxerxes, who wanted Grecian auxiliaries to check the insurrections in Egypt and Lesser Asia, which disturbed the two last years of his reign. The only condition annexed to this treaty was, that each republic should retain its respective possessions. The Spartans determined to reject every accommodation until they had recovered Messenia; and as Artaxerxes had uniformly opposed this demand, they transported forces into Egypt, to foment the defection of that province. At the head of a thousand heavy-armed Lacedæmonians, and ten thousand mercenaries, Agesilaus supported one rebel after another, having successively set on the throne Taches and Nectanebas.⁶ In this dishonourable war he amassed considerable wealth, by means of which he probably expected to retrieve the affairs of his country.

But returning home by Cyrenaica, he died on that coast, in the eighty-fourth year of his age, and forty-first of his reign.⁷ His character has been sufficiently illustrated in the course of this work. He was the greatest, and the most unfortunate of the Spartan kings. He had seen the highest grandeur of Sparta, and he beheld her fall. During the time that he governed the republic, his country suffered more calamities and disgrace than in seven centuries preceding his reign. His ambition and his obstinacy, doubtless, contributed to her disasters; yet so natural were the principles from which he acted, so probable his hopes of success, and so firm and manly his struggles for victory, that a contemporary writer, who could see through the cloud of fortune, ventured to bestow on Agesilaus a panegyric,⁸ which exalts him beyond the renown of his most illustrious predecessors.

unum adjunxero, quod nemo est inficiat; Thebas et ante Epaminondam natum, et post ejus interitum, perpetuo alieno parvisse imperio; contra ea, quamdiu ille præfuerit reipublicæ, caput fuisse totius Græciæ. Corn. Nepos, in Epam.

⁵ Vid. Polyb. Hist. l. vi. c. xli.

⁶ Plut. in Agesilao. Diodorus, l. xv. c. xxii.

⁷ Diodor. ibid.

⁸ Ο λόγος εις Ἀγισιλαον, by Xenophon.

¹ Xenoph. l. vii. ad fin.

² Cicero Acad. Quest. l. i. et Passim. Plutarch. Corn. Nepos. Pausan.

³ Vid. Pausan. in Arcad. et Bæotic.

⁴ Hujus de virtutibus vitæque satis erit dictum, si hoc

CHAPTER XXXII.

State of Greece after the Battle of Mantinea—The Amphictyonic Council—Returning prosperity of Athens—Vices resulting from its Government—Abuses of the judiciary power—Of the Theatre—Degeneracy of Grecian Music—Extreme Profligacy of the Athenians—The Vices of Chares render him the Idol of the Multitude—The Social War—Banishment of Timotheus and Iphicrates—Disgraceful Issue of the War—Philosophy—Statuary—Praxiteles—The Cnidian Venus—Painting—Pamphilus, Nicias, Zeuxis—Literature—Xenophon—His Military Expeditions—Religious and Literary Retreat—Lysias—Isocrates—Plato—His Travels—He settles in the Academy—His great Views—Theology—Cosmogony—Doctrine of Ideas—Of the Human Understanding—The Passions—Virtues—State of Retribution—Genius, and Character.

WITH the battle of Mantinea ended⁹ the bloody struggle for dominion, which had long exhausted Thebes and Sparta. In that, or in the preceding engagements, they had lost their ablest generals, and the flower of their troops. No Theban arose to emulate the magnanimity of Epaminondas, and to complete the designs of that illustrious patriot. Archidamus, who succeeded to the Spartan throne, imperfectly justified the high opinion conceived of his early wisdom and valour. Weakened by their wounds, and fatigued by exertions long and fruitless, those republics sunk into such weakness, as encouraged pretensions of their neighbours that had long lain dormant.

Olymp. During the superiority, or, in the
civ. 4. language of ancient writers, during
A. C. 361. the empire of Athens, Sparta, and
Thebes, the majesty of the Amphictyonic council had degenerated into an empty pageant. Its deliberations were confined to matters of mere form; it regulated some ceremonies of superstition; it superintended games and spectacles; it preserved peace and good order among the crowd of strangers who assembled, at stated times, to consult the oracle of Apollo. But for more than a century past, the public measures of the Greeks had been directed by councils held, not at Delphi, the residence of the Amphictyons, but in Athens, Sparta, or Thebes, in one or other of which the allies convened on every important emergency, acknowledging, by their presence there, the respective authority of those capitals which were regarded as the heads of their several confederacies. But when first the Peloponnesian, then the Boeotian war, and last of all the battle of Mantinea, had levelled the greatness, and overthrown the proud tyranny of those domineering republics, the Amphictyonic council once more emerged from obscurity; and the general states of Greece having assembled according to their national and hereditary forms, spurned the imperious dictates of any single community.

⁹ Xenophon's Greek history likewise ends with that battle. Henceforth we follow Plutarch and Diodorus, from whom we learn the principal circumstances of great events, which the orators Isocrates and Demosthenes, Aristotle's Treatise of Politics, and Xenophon's Discourses on the Revenues and Government of Athens, will enable us more fully to explain.

Olymp.
cv. 1.—
cv. 2.
A. C.
360—358.

While this event strengthened the federal union, and tended to restore the primitive equality of the Grecian states, various circumstances concurred to revive the aspiring ambition of Athens. During the Boeotian war, the Athenians had acted as auxiliaries only; without making such efforts as enfeebled their strength, their arms had acquired great lustre. Their powerful rivals were humbled and exhausted: experience had taught them the danger of attempting to subdue, and the impossibility of keeping in subjection, the territories of their warlike neighbours: but the numerous islands of the Aegean and Ionian seas, the remote coasts of Thrace and Asia, invited the activity of their fleet, which they might now employ in foreign conquests, fearless of domestic envy. It appears, that soon after the death of Epaminondas, Euboea again acknowledged the authority¹⁰ of Athens; an event facilitated by the destruction of the Theban partisans, belonging to that place, in the battle of Mantinea. From the Thracian Bosphorus to Rhodes, several places along both shores submitted to the arms of Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates; men, who having survived Agesilaus and Epaminondas, were far superior, in abilities and in virtue, to the contemporary generals of other republics. The Cyclades and Corcyra courted the friendship of a people capable to interrupt their navigation and to destroy their commerce. Byzantium had become their ally, and there was reason to hope that Amphipolis would soon be rendered their subject. Such multiplied advantages revived the ancient grandeur of Athens, which once more commanded the sea, with a fleet of near three hundred sail, and employed the best half of her citizens and subjects in ships of war or commerce.¹¹

This tide of prosperity, which flowed with

¹⁰ Comp. Diodor. l. xvi. p. 513. and Demosthenes de Chersoneso, sub fine; and Aechines in Ctesiphont. It appears, however, from these authors, that the Thebans soon afterwards endeavoured to recover Euboea. The Athenians again rescued it from their power, at the exhortation of Timotheus, whose pithy speech is commended by Demosthenes: "What, my countrymen, the Thebans in the island, and you still deliberating! Why not already in the harbour? why not embarked? why is not the sea covered with your navy?" Demosthen. ubi supra.

¹¹ Xenoph. Hellen. l. vii. p. 615. Diodorus l. xv. c. xi. Isocrat. Panegy. and de Pace.

most apparent force immediately after the battle of Mantinea,¹ has been supposed productive of very important consequences. While Epaminondas lived, the Athenians, it is said, were kept vigilant in duty through jealousy and fear; but after the death of this formidable enemy, they sunk into those vices which occasioned their ruin. This specious remark is not founded in truth. Two centuries before the birth of Epaminondas, the injustice, the avarice, the total corruption of the Athenians, is forcibly described by one of the most respectable of their countrymen,² who composed a system of wise laws in order to ascertain their rights, and to reform their manners. But it was difficult to correct abuses that seem inherent in the nature of democracy, which, even as regulated by Solon, but still more as new-modeled by Pericles, left the citizens tyrants in one capacity, and slaves in another. The division of the executive power of government among the archons, the senate, assembly, and even various committees of the assembly, rendered it impossible to perceive, or prevent, the hand of oppression. Men knew not from what quarter their safety might be assailed; and being called to authority in their turn, they, instead of making united opposition to the injustice of their magistrates, contented themselves with inflicting the same injuries which they had either previously suffered, or still apprehended, from the malice of their enemies. Nor is this inconvenience peculiar to the Greek republics. While human nature remains unchanged, and the passions of men run in their ordinary channel, the right to exercise power will commonly be attended with a strong inclination to abuse it. Unless power, therefore, be counteracted by liberty; unless an imperious line of separation be drawn between prerogative and privilege, and that part of the constitution which sustains its political life, be kept separate and distinct from that which tends to corruption, it is of little consequence whether a country be governed by one tyrant or a thousand; in both cases alike the condition of man is precarious, and force prevails over law.

This radical defect in the Grecian policies produced many ruinous consequences in affairs foreign and domestic, which were commonly directed by the selfish passions of a few, or the fluctuating caprices of the multitude, rather than by the rational and permanent interest of the community. But as diseases and other accidents often bring to light the latent weakness and imperfections of the body, so the vices of the Athenian government first appeared in their full magnitude after the unfortunate war of Peloponnesus; and, although the excess of the malady sometimes checked itself, and returns of ease and prosperity sometimes concealed its virulence, yet the deep-rooted evil still maintained its destructive progress, till it wrought the ruin of the constitution.

In the tumultuary governments of Greece, where the judiciary power frequently prevailed over the legislative, the sources of dissension were innumerable; while the feeble restraint of laws, ill administered, was unable to counteract their force. Although hereditary distinctions were little known or regarded, the poor and rich formed two distinct parties, which had their particular views and separate interests. In some republics the higher ranks bound themselves, by oath, to neglect no opportunity of hurting their inferiors.³ The populace of Athens commonly treated the rich as if they had entered into an engagement not less atrocious.⁴ During the intervals of party rage, private quarrels kept the state in perpetual fermentation. Beside the ordinary disputes concerning property, the competitions for civil offices, for military command, for obtaining public honours, or eluding punishments or burdens, opened an ever-flowing source of bitter animosity. Among this litigious people, neighbours were continually at variance. Every man was regarded as a rival and enemy, who had not proved himself a friend.⁵ Hereditary resentments were perpetuated from one generation to another; and the seeds of discord being sown in such abundance, yielded a never-failing crop of libels, invectives, and legal prosecutions. The usual employment of six thousand Athenians consisted in deciding law-suits, the profits of which afforded the principal resource of the poorer citizens. Their legal fees amounted annually to a hundred and fifty talents; the bribes which they received, sometimes exceeded that sum; and, both united, formed a sixth part of the Athenian revenues,⁶ even in the most flourishing times. As the most numerous but most worthless class of the people commonly prevailed in the assembly, so they had totally engrossed the tribunals; and it was to be expected that such judges would always be more swayed by favour and prejudice than by law and reason. The law punished with death the man guilty of giving bribes; but "we," say the Athenian writers,⁷ "advance him to the command of our armies; and the more criminal he becomes in this respect, with the higher and more lucrative honours is he invested." Those who courted popular favour, lavished not only their own, but the public wealth, to flatter the passions of their adherents; an abuse which began during the splendid administration of Pericles,⁸ extended more widely under his unworthy successors; and, though interrupted during the calamities of the republic, revived with new force on the first dawn of returning prosperity.⁹

In the license of democratic freedom, the citizens, poor and rich, thought themselves alike entitled to enjoy every species of festivity. Pericles introduced the practice of exhibiting not only tragedies, but comedies, at the public expense, and of paying for the admission of the

¹ Justin. l. vi. c. ix. first made this observation, which has been so frequently repeated.

² See above, p. 162. and the elegiac verses of Solon preserved in Demosthenes Orat. πρὸς Περικλέα; a title that can only be translated by a paraphrase "the misconduct of Æschines in his embassy."

³ Aristot. Polit. Isocrat. et Lysias, passim.

⁴ Xenoph. de Rep. Athen.

⁵ See Lysias passim. et Xenoph. Memorab. l. ii. p. 748, et seq.

⁶ Aristot. Vesp.

⁷ Isocrat. de Pace, et Demosthenes, passim.

⁸ Thucydides, p. 108, et seq.

⁹ Plut. in Pericle.

populace. At the period of which we write, a considerable portion of the revenue was appropriated to the theatre; and some years afterwards,¹⁰ a law was proposed by the demagogue Eubulus, and enacted by the senate and people, rendering it capital to divert, or even to propose diverting, the theatrical money to any other end or object.¹¹

Of all amusements known in polished society, the Grecian theatre was, doubtless, the most elegant and ingenious; yet several circumstances rendered it peculiarly liable to abuse. The great extent of the edifices in which plays were represented, naturally introduced masques, the better to distinguish the different persons,¹² or characters, of the drama; since the variations of passion, with the correspondent changes of countenance, which form the capital merit of modern performers, could scarcely have been observed by an immense crowd of people, many of whom must have been placed at a great distance from the scene. The same causes, together with the inimitable harmony of the Greek language, gave rise to musical declamation,¹³ which might sometimes fortify passion, but always rendered speech more slow and articulate, and therefore more easily heard by the remote part of the audience. In combining the different parts of a tragic fable, the poet naturally rejects such incidents as are improper for representation. These, if necessary for carrying on the action of the piece, are supposed to be transacted elsewhere, and barely related on the theatre. The time required for such events, when they are not simultaneous with those exhibited on the stage, necessarily interrupts the representation, and leaves room for the choral songs, which being incorporated with the tragedy, heightens its effect, and increases the spectator's delight; consequences extremely different from those attending the act-tunes and detached airs of modern plays and operas, universally condemned by good judges, as suspending the action, and destroying the interest of the drama, and only affording opportunities to effeminate throats to shine in trills and divisions, at the expense of poetry and good sense. But in ancient, as well as modern times, the corrupt taste of the licentious vulgar was ever at variance with the discerning judgment of the wise and virtuous. The form and arrangement of the Grecian tragedy was exactly imitated in the extravagant pieces of Aristophanes, and his profligate contemporaries and successors.¹⁴ These pernicious productions formed the favourite entertainment of the populace. The masque, disguising the countenance of the performer, allowed him to indulge in the most unblushing license of voice and gesture; the de-

clamation was effeminate and vicious; above all, the music became glaring, tawdy, voluptuous, and dissolute in the highest degree, and suited only that perverse debauchery of soul from which it originally sprung, and which it served afterward to inflame and nourish.¹⁵

A mysterious cloud hangs over the Grecian music, to which effects are ascribed far transcending the actual power of that art. Yet we cannot refuse our assent to the concurring testimony of ancient writers, who refer to this principle the extreme degeneracy and corruption which almost universally infected the Athenians at the period now under review. Causes which operate on the many, are not easily mistaken; but should we still doubt the cause, the effect at least cannot be denied. The Athenian youth are said to have dissipated their fortunes, and melted the vigour of mind and body, in wanton and expensive dalliance with the female performers on the theatre.¹⁶ Weary and fastidious with excess of criminal indulgence, they lost all capacity or relish for solid and manly occupations; and at once deserted the exercises of war, and the schools of philosophers. To fill up the vacuities of their listless lives, they, as well as persons more advanced in years, loitered in the shops of musicians, and other artists;¹⁷ and sauntered in the forum and public places, idly inquiring after news, in which they took little interest, unless some danger alarmed the insipid uniformity of their pleasures.¹⁸ Dice, and other games of chance, were carried to a ruinous excess; and are so keenly stigmatized by the moral writers of the age, that it should seem they had begun but recently to prevail, and prove fatal.¹⁹ The people at large were peculiarly addicted to the sensual gratifications of the table; and, might we believe a poet quoted by Athenæus, had lately bestowed the freedom of their city (once deemed an honour by princes and kings)²⁰ on the sons of Chærephilus, on account of the uncommon merit of their father in the art of cookery.²¹

Idleness, indulgence, and dissipation, had reduced the greater part of the Athenian citizens to extreme indigence. Although landed property was more equally divided in Greece than in any modern country, we are told that about one fourth of the Athenians were totally desti-

15 Aristotle, l. viii. de Republ. says ironically, "Every kind of music is good for something; that of the theatres is necessary for the amusement of the mob; being well suited to the perversion of their minds and manners, and let them enjoy it." Plato, Aristoxenus, and Plutarch, bitterly complain of the corruption of music, as the main source of vice and immorality. That art, which had anciently been used as the vehicle of religious and moral instruction, was employed in the theatres to excite every voluptuous and dissolute passion. Plato de Legibus, l. iii. Aristoxenus, quoted by Athenæus, l. xiv. et Plutarch. de Musica. In speaking of the vices of London, a writer, who had the spirit of an ancient legislator, says, "That were a man permitted to make all the ballads of a nation, he needed not care who should make its laws." Fletcher of Sakoun's Works, p. 266.

16 Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534. who gives a general description of Athenian profligacy.

17 Isocrat. in Areopag. and Lysias's defence of a poor man accused before the senate, translated in the Life of Lysias, p. 114.

18 Demosthen. Philipp. passim.

19 Athenæus, l. xii. Lysias in Alcibiad.

20 Demosthen. de Republic. ordinand.

21 Athenæus, l. iii. p. 119.

10 Before Christ 340, according to S. Petrus, de Leg. Attic. p. 385.

11 Plutarch. in Pericle, et Demosthen. Oration. passim.

12 It is well known that the word *persona* originally signified a masque, from *personæ*, because the ancient masks, both Greek and Roman, were so made as to increase and invigorate sound.

13 Notwithstanding the assertions of Casaubon, Gratina, &c. the Greeks in ancient times seem not to have been acquainted with the absurd practice of dividing the acting and speaking between two persons. This is mentioned by Livy, as the invention of Titus Andronicus, who flourished 240 years before Christ.

14 See p. 172.

tute of immoveable possessions.¹ Their dress was frequently so mean and dirty, that it was difficult, by their external appearance, to distinguish them from slaves; a circumstance which arose not from slovenliness, but from poverty, since we are assured that such as could afford the expense spared no pains to adorn their persons; and that many who danced during summer in embroidered robes, spent the winter in places too shameful to be named.² And how is it possible (to use the words of their own authors)³ that wretches destitute of the first necessities of life should administer public affairs with wisdom? We find accordingly, that they were extremely ill qualified for executing those offices with which they were entrusted. As the lower ranks had in a great measure engrossed the administration of justice, it was not uncommon to bribe the clerks employed in transcribing the laws of Solon, to abridge, interpolate, and corrupt them. What is still more extraordinary, such a gross artifice frequently succeeded; nor was the deceit discovered until litigant parties produced in court contradictory laws.⁴ When their negligence could not be surprised, their avarice might be bribed; justice was sold; riches, virtue, eminence of rank or abilities, always exposed to danger, and often ended in disgrace.⁵ For those needy Athenians, who formed the most numerous class in the republic, endeavoured to alleviate their misery by a very criminal consolation; persecuting their superiors, banishing them their country, confiscating their estates, and treating them on the slightest provocation, and often without any provocation at all, with the utmost injustice and cruelty.⁶ Though occasionally directed by the equity of an Aristides, or the magnanimity of a Cimon, they, for the most part, listened to men of an opposite character. He who could best flatter and deceive them obtained most of their confidence. With such qualifications, the turbulent, licentious, and dissolute, in a word, the orator who most resembled his audience, commonly prevailed in the assembly; and specious or hurtful talents carried off the rewards due to real merit. Isocrates⁷ assures us of the fact; and Xenophon⁸ affirms, that it is perfectly conformable to the nature and principles of the Athenian form of government.

With such principles and manners, the Athenians required only a daring and profligate

leader, to involve them in designs the most extravagant and pernicious. Such a personage presented himself in Chares, whose soldier-like appearance, blunt address, and bold impetuous valour, masked his selfish ambition, and rendered him the idol of the populace. His person was gigantic and robust, his voice commanding, his manners haughty; he asserted positively, and promised boldly; and his presumption was so excessive, that it concealed his incapacity not only from others, but from himself. Though an enterprising and successful partisan, he was unacquainted with the great duties of a general; and his defects appear the more striking and palpable, when compared with the abilities of Iphicrates and Timotheus, his contemporaries, who prevailed as often by address as by force, and whose conquests were secured to the republic by the moderation, justice, and humanity, with which they had been obtained, and with which they continued to be governed. Chares proposed a very different mode of administration; he exhorted his countrymen to supply the defects of their treasury, and to acquire the materials of those pleasures which they regarded as essential to their happiness, by plundering the wealth of their allies and colonies. This counsel was too faithfully obeyed; the vexations, anciently exercised against the tributary and dependent states, were renewed and exceeded.⁹ The weaker communities complained, and remonstrated, against this intolerable rapacity and oppression; while the islands of Chios, Coos, Rhodes, as well as the city of Byzantium, prepared openly to revolt, and engaged with each other to repel force by force, until they should obtain peace and independence.¹⁰

Olymp. Chares, probably the chief instrument, as well as the adviser, of
cv. 3. the arbitrary measures which had
A. C. 358. occasioned the revolt, was sent out with a powerful fleet and army, to quash at once the hopes of the insurgents. He sailed towards Chios, with an intention to seize the capital of that island, which was supposed to be the centre and prime mover of rebellion. The confederates, informed of his motions, had already drawn thither the greatest part of their force. The city of Chios was besieged by sea and land. The islanders defended themselves with vigour. Chares found it difficult to repulse their sallies. His fleet attempted to enter their harbour without success; the ship of Chabrias alone penetrated thus far; and that able commander, whose valour and integrity merited a better fortune, though deserted by the fleet, yet forsook not the ship entrusted to him by the republic. His companions threw away their shields, and saved themselves by swimming to the Athenian squadron, which was still within their reach. But Chabrias, fighting bravely, fell by the darts of the Chians, preferring an honourable death to a disgraceful life.¹¹

Encouraged by advantages over an enemy who had at first affected to despise them, the insurgents augmented their fleet, and ravaged the isles of Lemnos and Samos. The Atheni-

¹ See the Discourse of Lysias upon a proposal for dissolving the ancient government of Athens. Lysias's orations were chiefly written in the space of twenty years, between 404 and 384 before Christ. They afford a uniform picture of the poverty, misery, and vices of his contemporaries; which the reader will find abridged in the introduction to my translation of that writer. The Athenian affairs became more flourishing after the fall of Thebes and Sparta. Their resources were again exhausted by the war with their allies. The revenues were greatly raised by the conquests of Timotheus, Phocion, &c. and the good management of Lycurgus and Demosthenes. Plut. in Lycurg. in lib. de Dec. Orator.

² Isocrates on reforming the government of Athens.

³ Isocrat. et Xenoph. de Repub. Athen.

⁴ Life of Lysias, prefixed to his Orations, p. 116.

⁵ See Lysias's pleadings throughout.

⁶ Isocrates de Pace; and the numerous examples of that kind, which have already occurred in this history.

⁷ In his oration on reforming the government of Athens.

⁸ In his treatise de Republic. Athen.

⁹ Diodor. l. xvi. et Isocrat. de Pace.

¹⁰ Diodor. l. xvi. pp. 413. 423.

¹¹ Nepos. in Chabr. et Diodor. l. xvi. p. 423. et seq.

ans, indignant that the territories of their faithful allies should fall a prey to the depredations of rebels, fitted out, early in the next year, a new armament under the command of Mnestheus, the son of Iphicrates, and son-in-law of Timotheus, expecting that the new commander would respectfully listen to the advice of those great men, who perhaps declined acting as principals in an expedition where Chares possessed any share of authority. That general had raised the siege of Chios, and now cruised in the Hellespont; where, being joined by Mnestheus, the united squadrons amounted to a hundred and twenty sail. It was immediately determined to cause a diversion of the enemy's forces from Samos and Lemnos, by laying siege to Byzantium. The design succeeded; the allies withdrew from these islands, collected their whole naval strength, and prepared vigorously for defending the principal city in their confederacy.

The hostile armaments approach each other, with a resolution to join battle, when a sudden and violent storm arose, which rendered it impossible for the Athenians to bear up to the enemy, or even to keep the sea, without being exposed to shipwreck. Chares alone confidently insisted on commencing the attack, while the other commanders, more cautious and experienced, perceived the disadvantage, and declined the unequal danger.¹² His impetuosity, thus overruled by the prudence of his colleagues, was converted into resentment and fury; he called the soldiers and sailors to witness their opposition, which he branded with every odious epithet of reproach; and, with the first opportunity, despatched proper messengers to Athens, to accuse them of incapacity, cowardice, and total neglect of duty. The accusation was supported by venal orators in the pay of Chares.

Timotheus and Iphicrates were tried capitally. The former trusted to his innocence and eloquence; the latter used a very extraordinary expedient to sway the judges, conformable, however, to the spirit of that age, when courts of justice were frequently instruments of oppression, governed by every species of undue influence, easily corrupted and easily intimidated. The targeteers, or light infantry, who had been armed, disciplined, and long commanded, by Iphicrates, enjoyed the same reputation in Greece, which the Fabian soldiers afterwards did in Italy. They were called the Iphicratenian troops, from the name of their commander, to whom they owed their merit and their fame, and to whose person (notwithstanding the strictness of his discipline) they were strongly attached by the ties of gratitude and esteem. The youngest and bravest of this celebrated band readily obeyed the injunctions of their admired general; surrounded, on the day of trial, the benches of the magistrates; and took care seasonably to display the points of their daggers.¹³

It was the law of Athens, that, after preliminaries had been adjusted, and the judges assembled, the parties should be heard, and the trial begun and ended on the same day; nor could any person be twice tried for the same offence. The rapidity of this mode of procedure favoured the views of Iphicrates. The magistrates were overawed by the imminence of a danger, which they had neither strength to resist nor time to elude. They were compelled to an immediate decision; but, instead of the sentence of death, which was expected, they imposed a fine¹⁴ on the delinquents, which no Athenian citizen in that age was in a condition to pay. This severity drove into banishment those able and illustrious commanders. Timotheus sailed to Chalcis in Eubœa, and afterwards to the isle of Lesbos, both which places his valour and abilities had recovered for the republic, and which, being chosen as his residence in disgrace, sufficiently evince the mildness of his government, and his moderation in prosperity. Iphicrates travelled into Thrace, where he had long resided. He had formerly married the daughter of Cotys, the most considerable of the Thracian princes; yet he lived and died in obscurity;¹⁵ nor did either he or Timotheus thenceforth take any share in the affairs of their ungrateful country.¹⁶ Thus did the social war destroy or remove Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus, the best generals whom Greece could boast; and, the brave and honest Phocion excepted, the last venerable remains of Athenian virtue.¹⁷

Olymp. By the removal of those great men, Chares was left to conduct, cv. 4. uncontrolled, the war against the A. C. 357. allies; and to display the full extent of his worthlessness and incapacity. His insatiable avarice rendered him intolerable to the friends of Athens; his weakness and negligence exposed him to the contempt of the insurgents. He indulged his officers and himself in a total neglect of discipline; the reduction of the rebels was the least matter of his concern; he was attended by an effeminate crowd of singers, dancers, and harlots,¹⁸ whose luxury exhausted the scanty supplies raised by the Athenians for the service of the war.¹⁹ In order to satisfy the clamorous demands of the soldiers, Chares, regardless of the treaties subsisting between Athens and Persia, hired himself and his forces to Artabazus, the wealthy satrap of Ionia, who had revolted from his master Artaxerxes Ochus, the most cruel and de-

guilty of that crime?" "By no means," replied the other. "And can you then imagine," replied the hero, "that Iphicrates should be guilty?" Quintilian l. v. c. xii.

14 One hundred talents, about twenty thousand pounds.

15 Diodorus only says, that he was dead before the battle of Chæronæa, which happened twenty years after his banishment.

16 Nepos says, that after the death of Timotheus, the Athenians remitted nine parts of his fine; but obliged his son Conon to pay the remaining tenth, for repairing the walls of the Piræus, which his grandfather had rebuilt from the spoils of the enemy.

17 *Military virtue.* Hæc extrema fuit ætas imperatorum Atheniensium, Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheus; neque post illorum obitum quisquam dux in illa urbe fuit dignus memoria. Nepos in Timoth. The biographer forgets Phocion.

18 Athenæus, l. xii. p. 534.

19 Demosthen. Philipp. 1.

12 We are not informed by Diodorus or Nepos, why the disadvantage and danger were on the side of the Athenians; probably, being better sailors, they expected to profit of their skill in *manœuvre*, which the storm rendered useless and unavailing.

13 It was probably during this trial, that Iphicrates being reproached with betraying the interests of his country, asked his accuser, "Would you, on a like occasion, have been

testable tyrant that ever disgraced the throne of Cyrus. The arms of the Greeks saved Artabazus from the implacable resentment of a monster incapable to pity or forgive; and their meritorious services were amply rewarded by the lavish gratitude of the satrap.

Olymp. This transaction, how extraordinary soever it may appear to the
cvi. 1. modern reader, neither surprised nor
A. C. 356. displeased the Athenians. They were accustomed to allow their commanders in foreign parts to act without instructions or control; and the creatures of Chares loudly extolled his good management in paying the Grecian troops with Persian money. But the triumph of false joy was of short duration. Ochus sent an embassy to remonstrate with the Athenians on their unprovoked infraction of the peace; and threatened, that unless they immediately withdrew their forces from Asia, he would assist the rebels with a fleet of three hundred sail. This just menace, want of success against the confederates, together with a reason still more important, which will soon come to be fully explained, obliged the Athenians to recall their armament from the east, and to terminate the social war, without obtaining any of the purposes for which it had been undertaken. The confederates made good the claims which their boldness had urged; regained complete freedom and independence;¹ and lived twenty years exempt from the legal oppression of subsidies and contingents, till they submitted, with the rest of Greece, to the arms and intrigues of Philip, and the irresistible fortune of the Macedonians.

Notwithstanding the decay of martial spirit, the extravagance of public councils, and the general corruption of manners, which prevailed in Athens, and in other cities of Greece, the arts and sciences were still cultivated with ardour and success. During the period now under review, the scholars of Hippocrates and Democritus enriched natural philosophy with many important discoveries.² The different branches of mathematics, mechanics, and astronomy, received great improvements from Eudoxus³ of Cnidus, Timæus⁴ of Locri, Archytas of Tarentum, and Meton of Athens.⁵ The Megaric school flourished under Stilpo, the most learned and acute of that disputations sect, which, from its continual wranglings, merited the epithet of contentious.⁶ The doctrines of Aristippus were maintained by his daughter Areté, and improved by Hegesias and Annecris, who paved the way for Epicurus.⁷ The severe philosophy of Antisthenes had fewer followers.⁸ But Diogenes alone was equal to a sect.⁹

Statuary was cultivated by Polycletus and Canachus of Sicyon, by Naucydes of Argos, and by innumerable artists in other cities of Greece, Italy, and Ionia. The works of Po-

lycletus were the most admired. His greatest work was the colossal statue of Argive Juno, composed of gold and ivory. Bronze and marble, however, still furnished the usual materials for sculpture. The Grecian temples, particularly those of Delphi and Olympia, were enriched with innumerable productions of this kind, during the period to which our present observations relate. One figure of Polycletus acquired peculiar fame. From the exactness of the proportions,¹⁰ it was called the rule, or standard. Even Lysippus, the contemporary and favourite of Alexander, regarded it as a model of excellence, from which it was imprudent to depart.

Olymp. Between Polycletus and Lysip-
pus flourished Praxiteles, whose
cv. 1. works formed the intermediate
A. C. 460. shade between the sublime style, which prevailed in the age of Pericles, and the beautiful, which attained perfection under Lysippus and Apelles, in the age of Alexander. The statues of Praxiteles bore a similar relation to those of Phidias; which the paintings of Guido and Correggio bear to those of Julio Romano and Raphael. The works of the earlier artists are more grand and more sublime, those of the later more graceful and more alluring; the first class being addressed to the imagination, the second to the senses. The works of Praxiteles were in the Ceramicus of Athens; but neither in the Ceramicus, nor in any part of the world, was a statue to be seen equal to his celebrated Venus, which long attracted spectators from all parts to Cnidus. Praxiteles made two statues of the goddess at the same time, the one clothed, the other naked. The decent modesty of the Coans preferred the former; the latter was purchased by the Cnicians, and long regarded as the most valuable possession of their community. The voluptuous Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, languished after this statue; to purchase such unrivalled charms, he offered to pay the debts of Cnidus, which were immense; but the Cnicians determined not to part with an ornament from which their republic derived so much celebrity. "Having considered," says an ancient author,¹¹ "the beautiful avenues leading to the temple, we at length entered the sacred dome. In the middle stands the statue of the goddess, in marble of Paros. A sweet smile sits on her lips; no garment hides her charms; the hand only, as by an instinctive impulse, conceals those parts which modesty permits not to name. The art of Praxiteles has given to the stone the softness and sensibility of flesh. O Mars, the most fortunate of the gods!" But it is impossible to translate his too faithful description into the

1 Diodor. p. 424.

2 Galenus de Natur. Facultat. et Hippocrat. *Περὶ ὑγίαινης*, &c.

3 Laert. l. viii. sect. 86. et Suid. in Eudox.

4 Jambl. de Pythagor. 5 Censorin. de Die natal.

6 *Ἐπιστήμη*. Laert. l. vi. sect. 107.

7 Laertius et Suidas.

8 Ælian. Var. Histor. l. x. c. xvi.

9 We shall have occasion to speak more fully of Diogenes hereafter.

10 Winckelmann, p. 653. and his translator Mr. Huber, vol. iii. p. 34. differ from Pliny, l. 35. c. 19. They confound the statue, called the Rule, or Canon, with another called the Doryphorus, because grasping a spear. Pliny's words are, "Polycletus Sicyonius Diadumenum fecit molliter juvenem, centum talentis nobilitatum; idem et Doryphorum viriliter puerum. Fecit et quem canona artifices vocant, lineamenta artis ex eo potentes, velut a lege quadam; solusque hominum artem ipse (forte ipsam) fecisse, artis opere judicatur." They have followed Cicero de Clar. Orator. c. 86.—yet Cicero, speaking incidentally on the subject, might more naturally mistake than Pliny, writing expressly on sculpture.

11 Lucian. Amor.

decency of modern language; a description more animated and voluptuous than even the chisel of Praxiteles.

The honour which Polycletus and Praxiteles acquired in sculpture, was, during the same age, attained in painting by Eupompus and Pamphilus of Sicyon, by Euphranor of Corinth, by Apollodorus and Nicias of Athens; above all by Zeuxis and Timanthes.¹² The works of Eupompus are now unknown, but in his own times his merit and celebrity occasioned a new division of the schools, which were formerly the Grecian and the Asiatic; but after Eupompus, the Grecian school was subdivided into the Athenian and Sicyonian. Pamphilus, and his scholar Apelles, gave fresh lustre to the latter school, which seems to have flourished longer than any other in Greece, since the paintings exhibited at the celebrated procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus were all the productions of Sicyonian masters.¹³

Few works of Pamphilus are described by ancient authors. His picture of the Heraclidæ, carrying branches of olive, and imploring the assistance of the Athenians, has not, however, escaped the vigilant eye of national vanity.¹⁴ He was by birth a Macedonian, but well versed in literature and science, which he thought indispensably necessary to a painter. He received about two hundred pounds from each of his scholars, and seems to have been the first who put a high price on his works. He lived to enjoy his fame, and rendered his profession so fashionable, that it became customary in Sicyon, and afterwards in other parts of Greece, to instruct the sons of wealthy families in the arts of design. This liberal profession was forbidden to slaves; nor, during the existence of Grecian freedom, did any celebrated production in sculpture or painting come from servile hands.¹⁵

Euphranor, the Corinthian, excelled both in painting and statuary. The dignity of his heroes was admired. He painted the twelve gods. He said that his Theseus had fed on flesh, that of Parrhasius on roses. He wrote on colours and symmetry. Apollodorus the Athenian was deemed the first who knew the force of light and shade.¹⁶ His priest in prayer,

and his Ajax struck with lightning, were held in high estimation. Nicias, his fellow-citizen, excelled in female figures, and in all the magic of colouring. His Calypso, Iö, and Andromeda, claimed just fame; but his greatest composition was the Necromantela of Homer.¹⁷ Attalus king of Pergamus (for Nicias lived to a great age) offered twelve thousand pounds for this picture; but the artist, who was extremely wealthy, gave it in a present to his native country. Praxiteles, when asked which of his statues he most valued, answered, "Those of which the models were retouched by Nicias."

Zeuxis is said to have been born at Heraclea, but it is uncertain in which of the cities known by that name. He acquired great wealth by his works; at length he refused money, boasting that no price could pay them. The modesty of his Penelopé was equal to a lesson of morality. He painted Hercules strangling the serpents in the presence of the astonished Amphitryon and Alcmena. His picture dedicated in the temple of Juno Lucina, at Agrigentum, has been often mentioned. Being allowed to view the naked beauty of that populous city, it is known that he chose as models five virgins, whose united charms were expressed in this celebrated piece. His greatest work was Jupiter sitting on his throne, and surrounded by the gods.¹⁸

calls different persons the first in the art, and even in the same branch of it. The warmth of his fancy leaves him no time for calculating the weight of his expressions. His credulity, love of wonder, and inaccuracy, cannot be defended. Yet his judgments on pictures and statues are not without their merit; since the perfection of those works of art consists in making a deep impression, in transporting and elevating the affections, and in raising that glow of sentiment, which Pliny is so happy in communicating to his readers.

17 Long before all the celebrated works of art, Homer had viewed nature with a picturesque eye. For the innumerable pictures copied from him, see Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. l. ii. c. vi. p. 345. Homer gave the idea of what is grand and pathetic in intellect, which painters and statuary translated into what is touching and awful to the eye.

18 Valerius Maximus, l. iii. c. vii. speaks of his Helena painted for the city of Crotona. On his naked Helen Zeuxis inscribed the following lines of Homer:

Οὐ νημεσίς, Τρώας καὶ εὐκνημίδας Ἀχαιοὺς
Τοιᾷ μὲν γυναικὶ πολὺν χρόνον αἰγυῖα πασχέειν·
Λίγως ἀθανάτης θύης εἰς ὅσα σοικεῖν. IL iii. v. 156

"They cried, No wonder such celestial charms
For nine long years have set the world in arms:
What winning graces! what majestic mien!
She moves a goddess, and she looks a queen." POPE.

Pope has paraphrased the last line, "For she is wonderfully like to the immortal gods." This must have sounded nobly to the Greeks, who would doubtless have considered "looking a queen," as a sinking in poetry. But I have cited the lines, to show by what different means poetry and painting attain the same end. Both Homer and Zeuxis convey an high idea of Helen's beauty; but Homer does it by the effects of this beauty, which could animate the cold age of Priam, Panthoos, &c. whom he has just inimitably described:

Γῆρας δὲ πολέμοιο παπυμῖνοι, ἀλλ' ἠγορεύει
Εὐδαί, τέττιγι-σύν σοικότες οἶτι καὶ ὕλην
Διὸς εἰς ἱζομῖνοι ὅσα λειροίσαν ἱεῖσι.

When the Greek monk, Constantinus Manasses (Chron. p. 20.) describes the beauty of Helen,

Ἦν ἡ γυνὴ περιπαλλὴς, εὐφρενς, εὐχερυστάτη,
Εὐπαρεῖος, εὐπερσώπος, βωπῆς, χιονοχρῆυς·

and so on, through a dozen of lines, the imagination of the reader cannot follow him; each epithet of beauty drives the preceding from the memory; and we fancy that we see a man laboriously rolling stones up one side of a hill, which

12 Pliny, in his 35th book. I have paid little attention to his pretended Epochs of Art, when inconsistent with the information of more ancient authors. The Greek historians, from whom he copied this part of his work, found it convenient, at every pause in their narrative, to give some account of men who had distinguished themselves in the arts and sciences, of whom they had no opportunity to make mention in relating public transactions, and describing wars and negotiations. The era of every peace furnished a proper resting place to the historian; from which he looked back, and collected the names worthy to be handed down to posterity. Every such era, therefore, Pliny, and after him Winckelmann, have considered as an epoch of art; not reflecting, that arts do not suddenly arise and flourish, and when once they flourish, do not suddenly decay; since the mind long retains the impulse which it has received; and the active powers of man, when once directed to their proper objects, are not easily lulled to repose.

13 Athen. Deipn. l. v. p. 196.

14 Aristoph. Plut. v. 385.

15 Plin. l. xxxv. c. xxxvi. sect. 8.

16 This is the commendation of Plutarch. Pliny speaks more highly of Apollodorus. "Festinas ad lumina artis, in quibus primus refuleit Apollodorus Atheniensis . . . neque ante eum tabula ullius ostenditur, quæ teneat oculos." Pliny's praises often clash with each other. He frequently

Timanthes reached the highest perfection of his art; but his genius surpassed the art itself. In his sacrifice of Iphigenia, a gradation of sorrow was seen in the faces of the spectators. It was carried to the utmost height, consistent with beauty, in the countenance of her uncle Menelaus. But Agamemnon, who was still more deeply afflicted with the unhappy fate of his daughter, veiled his face with his robe. In several others of his pieces, Timanthes discovered the power of transporting the mind beyond the picture. He painted to the fancy rather than to the eye. In his works, as in the description of Homer and Milton, more was understood than expressed.

The power of expression was carried to a degree of perfection which it is not easy to believe, and scarcely possible to comprehend. The civil and military arrangements of the Greeks gave, doubtless, great advantages to their artists in this respect. Aristides, a Theban painter, represented the sacking of a town; among other scenes of horror, a child was painted clinging to the breast of its wounded mother, who "felt and feared,¹ that after she was dead, the child should suck blood instead of milk." Parrhasius of Ephesus, in an earlier age, personified the people of Athens, in a figure that characterised them as at once cruel and compassionate, proud and humble, brave and cowardly, elevated and mean. Such discriminations, as well as such complications of passion, are unquestionably beyond the reach of modern art, and will therefore, by many, be pronounced impossible. It is worthy of remark, that the same Parrhasius, who seems to have united the excellences of Dominichino, Raphael, and Correggio, was distinguished by the gliding motion of his outline, and the sweetness with which it melted into the ground.²

Ideal beauty, just proportion, natural and noble attitudes, a uniform greatness of style, are acknowledged to have equally belonged to the ancient painters and statuaries. But the vanity or envy of modern times is unwilling to allow any merit to the former, which the remains of the latter do not justify and confirm. The Greek painters, therefore, have been supposed deficient in colouring; and this supposition has been supported by the words of Pliny:

immediately roll down the other. Ariosto's description of the beauty of Alcina (cant. viii.) is in the same bad taste. How different is Virgil's "Pulcherrima Dido." Virgil knew the difference between poetical and picturesque images. Our English romances abound with examples of this species of bad taste, arising from mistaking the boundaries of distinct, though kindred arts. See above, p. 180.

¹ These are the words of Pliny.

² Pliny considers this as the perfection of art. "Hæc est in pictura summa sublimitas. Corpora enim pingere et media rerum, est quidem magni operis; sed in quo multi gloriam tulerint. Extrema corporum facere, et desinentis picturæ modum includere, rarum in successu artis invenitur. Ambire enim debet se extremitas ipsa, et sic desinere, ut promittat alia post se; ostentatque etiam quæ occultat." Ibid. c. xxxvi. sect. 5. Mr. Falconer, in his observations on this passage, is of a different opinion. He thinks it more difficult to paint the middle parts, than the shades and tones which round the extremities of objects; because the former, though exposed to the light, must have their form, relief, depth, and all the tints of nature. He instances the heads painted by Rubens and Vandyck seen in front. Pliny, had he lived in latter times, might have instanced, in his turn, the sweet outlines and inimitable softness of Correggio.

"With four colours only, Apelles, Echion, Melanthius, and Nicomachus produced those immortal works which were singly purchased by the common wealth of cities and republics." The colours were white, red, yellow, and black. It has been often said that with these only on his palette, a painter cannot colour like nature, far less attain the magic of the *clair obscure*. Yet a great artist of our own country thinks that four colours are sufficient for every combination required. "The fewer the colours, the cleaner, he observes, will be their effect. Two colours mixed together will not preserve the brightness of either of them single, nor will three be as bright as two."³ Pliny says, that Apelles spread over his pictures, when finished, a transparent liquid like ink, which increased the clearness and brilliancy of the whole, while it softened the glare of too florid colours. This, according to the same excellent painter, is a true and artist-like description of scrambling or glazing, as practised by the Venetian school, and by Correggio, in whose works, as well as those mentioned by Pliny, it was perceptible only to such as closely examined the picture. He very reasonably concludes, therefore, that if the master-pieces of ancient painting remained, we should probably find them as correctly drawn as the Laocœon, and as admirably coloured as the glowing productions of Titian.

That the Greeks were acquainted with the effect of the *clair obscure*, or the distribution of all the tones of light and shade relatively to the different plans of the picture, has been denied by those who allow them the highest excellence in colouring single figures. They might excel, it has been said, in a solo, but were incapable of producing a full piece for a concert of different instruments. Whether this observation be well founded can only be discovered by carefully examining ancient authors, from whom it would appear that even in this branch the Greek painters were not deficient.⁴

Of all the arts cultivated during the period now under review, none attained higher proficiency than composition in prose. The history of Thucydides was continued by Xenophon; but we should form a very imperfect notion of this amiable writer were we to judge him by his Grecian history, to which he seems not to have put the last hand. Yet in this, as well as in his more finished works, we see the scholar of Socrates; and, of all others, the scholar who most resembled his master in his sentiment and expression,⁵ in the excellences

³ See Sir Joshua Reynolds' notes on Mr. Mason's translation of Fresnoy's Art of Painting.

⁴ In speaking of Nicias, Pliny says, "Lumen et umbras custodivit, atque ut emineret e tabulis picturæ maxime custodivit." Unless the *clair obscure* be meant, the second member of this sentence is a pleonasm. Another passage is highly to the purpose, l. xxxv. c. xi. "Tandem se ars ipsa distinxit, et invenit lumen atque umbras, differentia colorum alterna via sese excitante. Deinde adjectus est splendor, alius hic quam lumen: quem, quia inter hoc et umbrum esset, appellaverunt tonon; commissuras verd colorum et transitus, harmogen." *Clair obscure* in painting is something like counterpoint in music; and if the ancients cultivated neither of them, perhaps the more substantial parts of the arts lost nothing by the neglect. In melody and design, effect and expression, they probably excelled the most boasted productions of later ages.

⁵ See the description which Alcibiades gives of Socrates's eloquence, in Plato's Symposium.

as well as in the respectable weaknesses⁶ of his character. The same undeviating virtue, the same indefatigable spirit, the same erect probity, the same diffusive benevolence, the same credulity, the same enthusiasm, together with that unaffected propriety of thought and diction, whose native graces outshine all ornaments of art.

This admirable personage, who, had he lived before the Athenians were grown too conceited to learn, and too corrupt to mend, might have proved the saviour of his country, reached his fiftieth year in a happy obscurity, enjoying the confidential society of Socrates and a few select friends. Of these Proxenus, an illustrious Theban exile, who well knew the worth of Xenophon, invited him to Sardis, from a desire to introduce him to Cyrus, the brother of Artaxerxes, and governor of Lower Asia, whose friendship he himself had found more valuable than the precarious honours of his capricious and ungrateful republic. Xenophon communicated the proposal to Socrates, who, suspecting that the Athenians might not relish his friend's design, because the Persians were then allied with Sparta, desired him to consult the oracle of Delphi.⁷ This counsel was but partially followed; for Xenophon, who seems to have been fond of the journey, asked not the oracle whether it ought to be undertaken, but only by virtue of what prayers and sacrifices it might be rendered successful. Socrates approved not this precipitation; yet as the god had answered, he thought it necessary for Xenophon to obey. The important consequences of this resolution to the Ten Thousand Greeks who followed the standard of Cyrus, have been related in a former part of this work. After his glorious retreat from Upper Asia, Xenophon remained several years on the western coast, and shared the victories of his admired Agesilaus, with whom he returned to Greece, and conquered in the battle of Coronæa.

Mean while a decree of banishment passed against him in Athens. But having acquired considerable riches in his Asiatic expedition, he had deposited them at Ephesus with the Sacristan of Diana's temple, with this injunction, that if he perished in battle, his wealth should be employed in honour of the goddess. Having survived the bloody engagement of Coronæa, which he afterwards so affectingly described in his Hellenica, he settled in the town of Scilluns, a new establishment formed by the Lacedæmonians, scarce three miles distant from Olympia. Megabyzus, the Sacrist of Diana, came to behold the games, and faithfully restored his deposit, with which Xenophon, as enjoined by an oracle, purchased in that neighbourhood a beautiful spot of ground, watered by the Sellenus, a name which coincided with that of the river near Ephesus. On the banks of Elian Sellenus, Xenophon erected a temple,

incomparably smaller indeed, yet similar in form to the great temple of Diana. His image of the goddess resembled that at Ephesus, as much as a figure in cyprus could resemble a statue of gold. The banks of the river were planted with fruit-trees. The surrounding plains and meadows afforded excellent pasture. The adjoining forests and mountains abounded in wild boar, red deer, and other species of game. There Xenophon's sons often hunted with the youth of the neighbouring towns and villages; and the whole inhabitants of the country round were invited and entertained by him at an annual festival sacred to Diana. A modest inscription on a marble column, erected near the temple, testified the holiness of the place. "This spot is dedicated to Diana. Let him, whoever shall possess it, employ the tenth of its annual produce in sacrifice, and the remainder in keeping in repair, and in adorning the temple. His neglect will not be overlooked by the goddess."⁸ By this inscription, wherein Xenophon ventures not to mention the name of the founder, his mind seems to forebode the calamities which at last befel him. In the war between the Lacedæmonians and Elians, the town of Scilluns, together with the circumjacent territory, was seized by Elian troops; and the amiable philosopher and historian, who had, in this delightful retreat, composed those invaluable works, which will inspire the last ages of the world with the love of virtue, was compelled, in the decline of life, to seek refuge in the corrupt and licentious city of Corinth.

His Expedition, his Grecian History, his description of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian governments, have been noticed in their proper place. The *Cyropædeia*, or institutions of the elder Cyrus, is a philosophical romance, intended to exemplify the doctrines taught by Socrates in the *Memorabilia*, and to prove the success which naturally attends the practice of wisdom and virtue in the great affairs of war and government. The highest panegyric of this work is, that many learned men have mistaken it for a true history, and, deceived by the inimitable *naïveté* and persuasiveness of the narrative, have believed it possible that, during the various stages of a long life, Cyrus should have invariably followed the dictates of the sublimest philosophy. In his *Œconomics*, Xenophon undertakes the humbler but not less useful task, of regulating the duties of domestic life. The dialogue, entitled *Hiero*, paints the misery of tyrants contrasted with the happiness of virtuous princes, in colours so lively, and in lines so expressive, that an admirer of the ancients might challenge the ingenuity of modern ages to add a single stroke to the picture. In speaking of the works of Xenophon, we must not forget his treatise on the Revenues of Athens. It was written long after his banishment. Instead of resenting the obdurate cruelty of his countrymen, he gave them most judicious and seasonable advice concerning the improvement of the public revenues, which, there is reason to believe, was in part adopted.

The orators Lysias and Isocrates flourished in the period now under review. The former

⁶ It is remarkable that the superstitious belief of Xenophon in celestial warnings, of which see innumerable examples, particularly *Anab.* l. iii. c. v. l. v. c. viii. and l. vi. c. 1. never encouraged him to any thing imprudent or hurtful, and never restrained him from any thing useful or virtuous. The admonitions likewise of Socrates's *dæmon* were always the same with the dictates of right reason.

⁷ *Anab.* l. v. p. 356, et seq.

⁸ *Xenoph. Anab.* l. v. p. 356, et seq.

was distinguished by the refined subtilty of his pleadings; the latter by the polished elegance of his moral and political orations.¹ Isocrates ventured not to speak in public, neither his constitution nor his voice admitting the great exertions necessary for that purpose. His school of oratory and composition was frequented by the noblest youths of Athens, of the neighbouring republics, and even by foreign princes; and as his maxims were borrowed from the Socratic school, his long and honourable labours tended to keep alive some sparks of virtue among his degenerate countrymen.²

But the man of learning in that age, whose abilities, if properly directed, might have most benefited his contemporaries, was the celebrated Plato, a man justly admired, yet more extraordinary than admirable. The same memorable year which produced the Peloponnesian war gave birth to Plato. He was descended from the Codridæ, the most illustrious as well as the most opulent family in Athens. His education was worthy of his birth. The gymnastic formed and invigorated his body; his mind was enlarged and enlightened by the studies of poetry³ and geometry, from which he derived that acuteness of judgment, and that warmth of fancy, which, being both carried to excess, render him at once the most subtle and the most flowery writer of antiquity.⁴ In his twentieth year he became acquainted with Socrates; and having compared his own poetical productions with those of his immortal predecessors in this walk of literature, he committed the former to the flames, and totally addicted himself to philosophy. During eight years he continued an assiduous hearer of Socrates; an occasional⁵ indisposition prevented him from assisting at the last conversations of the sage, before he drank the fatal hemlock. Yet these conversations, as related to him by persons who were present, Plato has delivered down to the admiration of posterity; and the affecting sensibility with which he minutely describes the inimitable behaviour of Socrates, on this trying occasion, proves how deeply the author was interested in his subject.

Fear or disgust removed the scholar of Socrates from the murderers of his master. Having spent some time in Thebes, Elis, and Megara, where he enjoyed the conversation of several of his fellow-disciples, the love of knowledge carried him to Magna Græcia; from thence he

sailed to Cyrené, attracted by the fame of the mathematician Theodorus; Egypt next deserved his curiosity, as the country to which the science of Theodorus owed its birth, and from which the Pythagoreans in Magna Græcia derived several tenets of their philosophy.

At his return to Athens, Plato could have little inclination to engage in public life. The days were past when the virtues of a Solon, or of a Lycurgus, could reform the manners of their countrymen. In early periods of society, the example and influence of one able and disinterested man may produce a happy revolution in the community of which he is a member. But in the age of Plato, the Athenians had fallen into dotage and imbecility. His luxuriant fancy compares them sometimes to old men, who have outlived their senses, and with whom it is vain to reason; sometimes to wild beasts, whom it is dangerous to approach; sometimes to an unfruitful soil, that chokes every useful plant, and produces weeds only.⁶ He prudently withdrew himself from the scene, which presented nothing but danger or disgust, and purchased a small villa in the suburbs near the academy, or gymnasium, that had been so elegantly adorned by Cimon.⁷ To this retirement, his fame attracted the most illustrious characters in his age: the noblest youths of Athens daily frequented the school of Plato; and here he continued above forty years, with little interruption except from his voyages into Sicily, instructing his disciples, and composing his Dialogues, to which the most distinguished philosophers in ancient and modern times are greatly indebted, without excepting those who reject his doctrines, and affect to treat them as visionary.

The capacious mind of Plato embraced the whole circle of science. The objects of human thought had, previously to his age, been reduced, by the Pythagoreans, to certain classes or genera;⁸ the nature of truth had been investigated; and men had distinguished the relations,⁹ which the predicate of any proposition can bear to its subject. The sciences had already been divided into the natural and moral; or, in the language of Plato, into the knowledge of divine and human things. The frivolous art of syllogism was not as yet invented; and the logic of Plato¹⁰ was confined to the more useful subjects of definition and division, by means of which he

¹ See the Lives of Lysias and Isocrates, prefixed to my translation of their works.

² Ibid.

³ Diogen. Laert. l. ii.

⁴ Plato's dialogues are so different from each other, in point of thought and expression, that, if we knew not the versatility of his genius, it would be difficult to believe them the works of one man. He is over-refined, wire-drawn, and trifling, in the Cratylus, Parmenides, Meno, Theætetus, and Sophistes. He is flowery, pompous, and tumid, in his Timæus, Panegyric, Symposium, and Phædrus. But in those invaluable writings, the Apology, Crito, Alcibiades, Gorgias, Phædo, and the greater part of his books of laws, in which he adheres to the doctrines of Socrates, and indulges, without art or affectation, the natural bent of his own genius, his style is inimitably sweet and attractive, always elegant, and often sublime. His Republic, which is generally considered as his greatest work, abounds in all the beauties, and in all the deformities, for which he is remarkable. See Dionys. Halicarn. de Platon.

⁵ ΠΛΑΤΩΝ ΔΕ (ΟΙΜΗΝ) ΗΣΘΙΝΕΙ. Phædo, 2.

⁶ Republic. l. vi. p. 38.

⁷ See above, p. 138.

⁸ Many less perfect divisions had probably been made before Archytas of Tarentum distinguished the ten Categories. Simplicius et Jamblichus apud Fr. Patricium, Discuss. Peripatet. t. ii. p. 182. This division, the most perfect of any that philosophers have yet been able to discover, Plato learned from Archytas. It consisted in substances and modes. The former are either primary, as all individual substances, which neither are in any other subject, nor can be predicated of it; or secondary, which subsist in the first, and can be predicated of them, to wit, the genera and species of substances. Of modes there are nine kinds, quantity, quality, relation, habit, time, place, having, doing, and suffering. Aristot. de Categor.

⁹ These are called by logicians the five Predicables, or more properly, the five classes of Predicates. They are the genus, species, specific difference, property, and accident. The use of these distinctions is universal in every subject requiring definition and division; yet if meant to comprehend whatever may be affirmed of any subject, the enumeration is doubtless incomplete.

¹⁰ The science properly called Logic was invented by Aristotle; the division of the sciences into Logic, Physics,

attempted to fix and ascertain not only the practical doctrines of morals and politics, but the abstruse and shadowy speculations of mystical theology. It is much to be regretted that this great and original genius should have mistaken the proper objects as well as the natural limits of the human understanding, and that most of the inquiries of Plato and his successors should appear extremely remote from the public transactions of the times in which they lived. Yet the speculations in which they were engaged, how little soever they may be connected with the political revolutions of Greece, seem too interesting in themselves to be entirely omitted in this historical work, especially when it is considered that the philosophy of Plato and his disciples has been very widely diffused among all the civilized nations of the world; that during many centuries, it governed with uncontrolled sway the opinions of the speculative part of mankind; and that the same philosophy still influences the reasonings, and divides the sentiments, of the learned in modern Europe.

The lively, but immethodical, manner in which the opinions of Plato are explained by himself, renders it difficult to collect and abridge them. The great number of interlocutors in his dialogues, the irony of Socrates, and the continual intermixture of Plato's own sentiments with those of his master, heighten the difficulty, and make it impossible, from particular passages, to judge of the scope and tendency of the whole. The works of Xenophon, however, may enable a diligent student to separate the pure ore of Socrates from the adventitious matter with which it is combined in the rich vein of Platonism; and by carefully comparing the different parts of the latter, he may with certainty determine the principal designs of its author.

From this view of the subject, it would appear that Plato aimed at nothing less, than to reconcile the appearances of the natural and moral world with the wise government of a self-existent unchangeable cause; to explain the nature and origin of the human mind, as well as of its various powers of perception, volition, and intellect; and, on principles resulting from these discoveries, to build a system of ethics, which, in proportion as it were followed by mankind, would promote not only their independence and security in the present world, but their happiness and perfection in a future state of existence.

Let us look where we will around us, we shall every where, said Plato, perceive a passing procession:¹¹ the objects which compose the material world, arise, change, perish, and are succeeded by others, which undergo the same revolutions.¹² One body moves another, which impels a third, and so forwards in succession; but the first cause of motion resides not in any of them. This cause acts not fortuitously; the

regular motions of the heavenly bodies,¹³ the beautiful order of the seasons, the admirable structure of plants and animals, announce an intelligent Author.¹⁴ It is difficult by searching to find out the nature of the Divinity, and impossible by words to describe it; yet the works which he has done, attest his power, his wisdom, and his goodness, to be greater than human imagination can conceive.¹⁵ In the self-existent cause, these attributes must unite. He is therefore unchangeable¹⁶ since no alteration can increase his perfections, and it would be absurd to suppose him ever inclined to diminish them.¹⁷

Impelled by his goodness, the Deity, viewing in his own intellect the ideas or archetypes of all possible existence, formed the beautiful arrangement of the universe from that rude indigested matter, which, existing from all eternity, had been for ever animated by an irregular principle of motion.¹⁸ This principle, which Plato calls the irrational soul of the world, he thought sufficiently attested, in the innumerable deviations from the established laws of nature, in the extravagant passions of men, and in the physical and moral evil, which, in consequence of these deviations and passions, so visibly prevail in the world. Without admitting a certain stubborn intractability, and disorderly wildness, essential to matter, and therefore incapable of being entirely eradicated or subdued, it seemed impossible to explain the origin of evil under the government of Deity.¹⁹

From these rude materials, God, according to the fanciful doctrine of Plato, formed the four elements, and built the beautiful structure of the heavens and the earth, after the model of those eternal exemplars,²⁰ or patterns, which subsist

13 By these he meant the fixed stars; the motions of the planets he ascribed to another cause, as will appear below.

14 Plato de Legibus, l. x. p. 609.

15 Timæus. p. 477. et de Reipub. l. ii. p. 144.

16 For the immutability of the Deity, Plato, contrary to his general custom, condescends to use an argument from induction: "Even of material things, the most perfect least feel the effects of time, and remain longest unaltered." De Reipub. p. 150.

17 Ibid. p. 150.

18 Politic. p. 120, et seq. et Timæus, passim.

19 De Legibus, l. x. p. 608. Philem. p. 160.

20 These exemplars, or *παράδειγμα*, are the ideas of Plato, which are so much misrepresented by many of the later Platonists, or Eclectics. He names them, indifferently, *ἰδέαι*, *εἰδῆ*, *εἰδόμεναι*, *τὰ κατὰ ταύτα*, et *οὐρανίαι εἰδή*. The two last expressions are used to distinguish them from the fleeting and perishable forms of matter. Plato represents these ideas as existing in the divine intellect, as beings entirely mental, not objects of any of the senses, and not circumscribed by place or time. By the first universal cause, these ideas were infused into the various species of created beings, in whom (according to Ammonius, in Porphyry. Introduct. p. 29.) they existed, as the impression of a seal exists in the wax to which it has been applied. In its pre-existent state, the human mind viewed these intelligible forms in their original seat, the field of truth. But since men were imprisoned in the body, they receive their ideas from external objects, as explained in the text. Such is the doctrine of Plato. But many of the later Platonists, and even several writers of the present age, have imagined that he ascribed to ideas a separate and independent existence. Vid. Brucker. Histor. Philosoph. p. 695, et seq. Gedike. Histor. Philosoph. ex Ciceron. Collect. p. 183, et seq. Monboddo, Origin of Language, vol. i. c. ix. Of all the absurdities embraced by philosophers, this doubtless would be the greatest, to believe eternal unchangeable patterns of the various genera and species of things existing apart, and independent of the mind by which these abstract notions are conceived. It is not extraordinary therefore, that many writers of the Alexandrian school, whose extravagant fancies could fix and embody metaphysical abstractions, and realize intellectual ideas, should animate and personify the

and Ethics, was first given by his contemporary Xenocrates. Vid. Brucker. de Aristot. et Xenocrat. Of Aristotle more hereafter.

11 This was borrowed from Heraclitus, who expressed the same idea, by saying, that all corporeal things were in a perpetual flux. Vid. Platon. in Theætet. p. 83. et in Sophist. p. 108.

12 Timæus, sub initio.

in the divine intelligence.¹ Considering that beings possessed of mental powers were far preferable to those destitute of such faculties, God infused into the corporeal world a rational soul, which; as it could not be immediately combined with body, he united to the active, but irrational principle, essentially inherent in matter.² Having thus formed and animated the earth, the sun, the moon, and the other visible divinities, the great father of spirits proceeded to create the invisible gods and dæmons,³ whose nature and history Plato describes with a respectful reverence for the religion of his country.⁴ After finishing this great work, the God of gods, again contemplating the ideal forms in his own mind, perceived there the exemplars of three species of beings, which he realized in the mortal inhabitants of the earth, air, and water. The task of forming these sensible, but irrational beings, he committed to the inferior divinities; because, had this last work likewise proceeded from his own hands, it must have been immortal like the gods.⁵ The souls of men, on the other hand, he himself formed from the remainder of the rational soul of the world. They first existed in the state of dæmons, only invested with a thin ethereal body. Having offended God by neglecting their duty, they were condemned to unite with the gross corporeal mass, by which their divine faculties are so much clogged and encumbered.⁶

It was necessary briefly to explain the metaphysical theology of Plato, how visionary soever it may appear, because the doctrine of ideal forms, together with that of the pre-existent state of the human mind, are the main pillars of his philosophy. Before their incarceration in the body, the souls of men enjoyed the presence of their Maker, and contemplated the unchangeable ideas and essences of things in the field of truth. In viewing and examining these eternal archetypes of order, beauty, and virtue, consisted the noblest energy, and highest perfection of celestial spirits,⁷ which, being emanations of the deity, can never rest satisfied with objects and occupations unworthy their divine original. But in their actual state, men can perceive with their corporeal senses, only the fleeting images and imperfect representations of these immutable essences of things, in the fluctuating objects of the material world, which are so little steady and permanent, that they often change their nature and properties, even while we view and examine them.⁸ Be-

side this, our senses themselves are liable to innumerable disorders; and unless we are constantly on the watch, never fail to deceive us.⁹ Hence the continual errors in our judgments of men and things; hence the improper ends we pursue; hence the very inadequate means by which we seek to attain them; hence, in one word, all the errors and misery of life. Yet even in this degraded state, to which men were condemned for past offences, their happiness ceases not to be an object of care to the Deity. As none can rise so high, none can sink so low, as to escape the eye and arm of the Almighty.¹⁰ The divine Providence observes and regulates the meanest, as well as the greatest, of its productions. But the good of the part being subordinate to that of the whole, it is necessary that each individual should be rewarded or punished, in proportion as he fulfils the task assigned him. It is by the performance of his duty alone, that man can regain the favour of his Maker;¹¹ for it is ridiculous to think that this inestimable benefit can be purchased by rich presents and expensive sacrifices. Religion cannot be a traffic of interest.¹² What can we offer to the gods, which they have not first bestowed on us? Will they thank us for restoring their own gifts? It is absurd to think it. To please the Divinity, we must obey his will concerning us; nor can we comply with the purpose of our creation, and fulfil our destiny, without aspiring at those noble powers with which we were originally endowed;¹³ and which, even in our present degenerate state, it is still possible, by proper diligence, to recover.¹⁴

Our senses give us information of external objects, which are stored up in the memory, and variously combined by the imagination.¹⁵ But it is remarkable that those ideas, thus acquired and retained, have the power of suggesting others far more accurate and perfect than themselves, and which, though excited by material objects, cannot be derived from them, unless (which is impossible) the effect were more beautiful and perfect than the cause. That we possessed, in a pre-existent state, those ideas which modern philosophers refer by an easy solution to the powers of generalization and abstraction,¹⁶ Plato thought evident from the facility with which we recalled them.¹⁷ Of this he gave an example in Meno's slave, who, when properly questioned by Socrates, easily recollected and explained many properties of numbers and figures, although he had never learned the sciences of arithmetic and geometry.¹⁸ According to Plato, therefore, all science consisted in reminiscence, in recalling the nature, proportions, and relations of those uniform and unchangeable essences, about which

λογος του θεου, the divine intellect, in which, according to Plato, these ideas resided, and from which they were communicated to other intelligences. The same visionary fanatics who discovered, in the λογος of Plato, the second person of the Trinity, recognised the Holy Spirit in his Soul of the World; but as this irrational principle of motion ill corresponded to the third person of the Godhead, they invented an hyper-cosmian soul, concerning which Plato is altogether silent. See the Encyclopédie, article *Éléctique*. Brucker. Hist. Philosoph. vol. i. p. 712, et seq. and Meiner's *Beitrag zur geschichte der denkart der ersten Jahrhunderte nach Christi geburt in einigen betrachtungen über die neu Platonische Philosophie*.

1 Timæus, Polit. l. vi.

3 Ibid. p. 480.

5 Timæus, p. 480, et 481.

7 Repub. l. vi. Phædrus, Philebus, &c.

8 Phædo, Timæus, &c.

2 Ibid. p. 477, et seq.

4 Apolog. Socratis.

6 Ibid.

9 Phædo. p. 31. et Repub. l. v.

11 Eutyphon.

13 Minos, p. 516. Timæus, p. 500.

14 Repub. l. v.

15 Theætet. p. 85. et seq. and Philem. 184, et seq.

16 The ancients were not ignorant of this philosophy. Simplicius, speaking of the origin of intelligible forms, or ideas, in the human mind, says, *ἡμῖς ἀπολαύοντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέροις ἐννοίαις κατὰ αὐτὰ νοητέσθαι*: "We ourselves, abstracting them in our thoughts, have, by this abstraction, given them an existence in themselves." Simp. in *Præd.* p. 17.

17 Menon. p. 314.

18 Ibid.

the human mind had originally been conversant, and after the model of which all created things were made.¹⁹ These intellectual forms, comprehending the true essences of things, were the only proper objects of solid and permanent science;²⁰ their fluctuating representatives in the material world, the actions and virtues of men, the order and beauty visible in the universe, were only so far real and substantial as they corresponded to their divine archetypes;²¹ but as this correspondence never became complete, the examination of the perishing objects of sense could only afford us unsteady and uncertain notions, fleeting and fugitive like themselves.²² From these observations, Plato thought it evident, that the duty and happiness of men consisted in withdrawing themselves from the material, and approaching the intellectual world,²³ to which their own natures were more congenial. To promote this purpose was the great aim of his philosophy. If we were deceived by the senses, he observed, that we were still more fatally endangered by the passions, those flimsy sails of the mind, which were expanded and agitated by every varying gust of imagined good or evil.²⁴ The pains and pleasures of the body were all of a mixed kind, and nearly allied to each other. The God who arranged the world, desirous to unite and incorporate these seemingly opposite natures, had at least joined their summits; for pleasure was nothing else but a rapid cessation of pain; and the liveliest of our bodily enjoyments were preceded by uneasiness, and follow-

ed by languor.²⁵ To illustrate the necessity of governing with a strong hand the appetites and passions, Plato compared the soul to a little republic, composed of different faculties or orders.²⁶ The judging or reasoning faculty, justly entitled to the supremacy, was seated, as in a firm citadel, in the head; the senses were its guards and servants; the various desires and affections were bound to pay it obedience.

Of these desires, which were all of them the natural subjects of the ruling faculty, Plato distinguished two orders, ever ready to rebel against their master. The first consisted of those passions which are founded in pride and resentment, or in what the schoolmen called the irascible part of the soul;²⁷ and were seated in the breast. The second consisted of those passions which are founded in the love of pleasure, or in what the schoolmen called the concupiscible²⁸ part of the soul, and were seated in the belly, and inferior parts of the body. These different orders, though commonly at variance with each other, were alike dangerous to the public interest, and unless restrained by the wisdom and authority of their sovereign, must inevitably plunge the little republic of man into the utmost disorder and misery.²⁹

Yet, according to Plato, both these sets of passions were, in the present state of things, necessary parts of our constitution; and, when properly regulated, became very useful subjects. The irascible asserted our rank and dignity, defended us against injuries, and when duly informed and tempered by reason, taught us with becoming fortitude to despise dangers and death, in pursuit of what is honourable and virtuous. The concupiscible provided for the support and necessities of the body; and, when reduced to such submission as to reject every gratification not approved by reason, gave rise to the virtue of temperance. Justice took place, according to Plato, when reason directed and passion obeyed, and when each passion performed its proper office, and acknowledged due respect towards its superior. In the strength, acuteness, and perfection of the ruling faculty, consisted the virtue of prudence, the great source and principle of all other virtues, without which temperance, fortitude, and even justice itself, were nothing but empty shadows, that deluded the ignorant vulgar. In the exercise of prudence or wisdom, man resembled his Maker, and contemplated those intellectual forms, which taught him to discern with certainty the ends proper to be pursued, and the means necessary to attain them. The wise man compares the mind with the body, eternity with time, virtue with pleasure. He thus learns to despise the inferior parts of his nature, to defy its pains, to disdain its pleasures. Without attaining this true elevation of mind, he never can be virtuous or happy, since whoever depends on the body, must consider death as an evil, the fear of which can only be overcome by some greater terror; so that in him who is not truly wise, forti-

19 Repub. i. vi.

20 *Επιστήμη*, science, in opposition to *δόξα*, opinion. The material world he called *τὸ δόξαστον*, that of which the knowledge admitted of probability only. Repub. i. v. The *ideas* of Plato, which, according to that philosopher, formed the sole objects of real and certain knowledge, were powerfully combated by his scholar and rival Aristotle. Yet the latter, who was so sharp-sighted to the faults of Plato, never accuses him of maintaining the separate and independent existence of intellectual forms. The obscure passage in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, p. 901, which has been construed into such an accusation, means nothing more, than that Socrates regarded the *τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὸν*, general ideas, as differing in no respect from our notions of the genera and species of things; whereas Plato made a distinction between them, asserting these ideas to have existed in the divine intellect before the creation, &c. as explained in the text. Aristotle discusses the doctrine of ideas more perspicuously in his *Ethics* to Nicomachus, l. i. c. vi. He regards them as mere fictions of the fancy, and the knowledge founded on them as altogether visionary. "The idea of good," he observed, "might be applied to substances, as the Deity, the mind of man; to qualities, as the virtues; to quantity, as mediocrity; to time, as the juncture or nick of time; in short, through all the categories. There is not, therefore, any one general idea of good common to all these. Were there one idea, the same in all, there could be but one science respecting it. But there are many, physic, gymnastic, the military art, &c. which all have some good in view. Things are good in themselves, or good as means to an end. But even those things which are ultimately good, as wisdom, honour, pleasure, are not comprehended under any one definition of good, though distinguished by the same epithet from some analogy or resemblance, as the understanding is called the eye of the mind. If there is any such general idea, it is surely incapable of being applied to any practical use; not as a model, otherwise the arts and sciences, all of which have some good in view, would continually have this model before them. Yet they all neglect it, and justly; for what benefit could they derive from this abstract idea? A physician, for instance, contemplates not health in that general manner, but the health of man, or rather of a particular man, who happens to be his patient; for with individuals only his art is concerned."

21 Parmen. p. 140.

23 Repub. p. 134. et Phæd. p. 26.

22 Repub. i. vii.

24 Phædrus.

25 Phæd. Philem. et Repub. i. ii. p. 262. et seq.

26 Repub. i. iv.

27 The *Τὸ θυμώδες* of Plato.

28 The *Τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν* of Plato. Both are included under what Plato and Aristotle call the *ἐπιτιμικόν* the seat of the desires and passions.

29 Ibid. p. 254.

tude itself must be the effect of timidity.¹ In the same manner, his pretended moderation and temperance will spring from the impure source of the opposite vices. He will deny himself some pleasures, to attain others which he regards as more valuable, and will submit to small pains to avoid the greater.² He thus continues through life, exchanging one trifle for another; a traffic which never can enrich him, while he rejects wisdom, the only precious merchandise.

But the temple of wisdom is, according to Plato, situate on a rock, which few men have the strength to ascend.³ This difference of ability proceeds from various causes: 1. At their creation, all minds were not alike excellent and perfect.⁴ 2. They were not alike criminal during their pre-existent state.⁵ 3. The gross bodies which they now inhabit are variously moulded, some being too strong, others too weak, and very few in just harmony with the divine principle by which they are animated.⁶ 4. Early institution and example occasion great differences among them. Such, indeed, is the power of education and habit, that the errors and crimes of men are less chargeable on those who commit them, than on their parents, guardians, and instructors;⁷ and it seems hardly possible for those who have the misfortune to be born in a licentious age and country, to attain wisdom and virtue. Even when the most favourite circumstances unite, the mind must still, however, have a tendency to degenerate, while united with matter.⁸ The body, therefore, must be continually exercised and subdued by the gymnastic, the soul must be purified and ennobled by philosophy. Without such attention, men can neither reach the perfection of their nature, or, when they have reached it, maintain that elevated post, from which they look down with compassion on the errors and misery of their fellow creatures.⁹

In the description of his imaginary sage, Plato employs the colours which were afterwards borrowed by the Stoics and Epicureans. But neither of these sects, as will appear hereafter, were so well entitled as the Platonists, to boast their philosophical happiness, and to assert their superiority to the vicissitudes of time and fortune. Plato was the first philosopher who supported the doctrine of a future state, by arguments that seemed capable to convince intelligent and thinking men. From the properties of mind, he inferred the simplicity and indestructibility of the substance in which they reside.¹⁰ He described the mental powers with an eloquence that Cicero¹¹ and Buffon¹² have not been able to surpass. And since he re-

garded the soul as the principle of life and motion, he thought it absurd to suppose that the diseases and death of the body should take from this principle such qualities as it essentially possessed in itself, and accidentally communicated to matter.¹³ It was his firm persuasion, that, according to the employment of its rational and moral powers, the soul, after its separation from the body, would be raised to a higher, or depressed to a lower state of existence.¹⁴

This belief, which raised his hopes to a higher scene, gave him not, however, that contempt, affected by a very different class of philosophers, for the perishing affairs¹⁵ of the present world. Like some others of the scholars of Socrates, he traced the plan of a perfect commonwealth; though his work, known by that title, as has been justly observed by a great genius,¹⁶ is rather a treatise of education than a system of policy. The real republic of Plato is contained in his books of laws, in which he explains, with no less acuteness than elegance, the origin and revolutions of civil society, and traces the plan of a republic nearly resembling the Spartan model.

His practical morality, which he borrowed from Socrates, is profusely scattered through his dialogues; and in his own times, Plato was not considered as that visionary speculatist which he has appeared to later ages. His scholars, Aristonymus, Phormio, and Eudoxus, were successively sent by him to regulate the republics of the Arcadians, Elians, and Cnidians,¹⁷ at the earnest request of those communities. From Xenocrates, another of his disciples, Alexander desired rules for good government.¹⁸ The fame of Aristotle is well known; and it will afterwards appear how much he was indebted to a master, whose opinions he often combated with seeming reluctance, and real satisfaction. Plato was no less capable to distinguish ideas than to combine images. He united warmth of fancy and acuteness of understanding, in a greater degree than perhaps has fallen to the share of any other man. Yet when compared with his master Socrates, his genius will appear more subtle than sagacious. He wanted that patient spirit of observation which distinguished the illustrious sage, who in all his reasonings kept facts ever in his view, and at every step he made, looked back with wary circumspection on experience. Accompanied by this faithful guide, Socrates trod securely the paths of truth and nature; but his adventurous disciple, trusting to the wings of fancy, often expatiates in imaginary worlds of his own creation.

¹ *Repub.* l. vi.

³ *Repub.* l. vi. p. 74.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 484. et *Repub.* passim.

⁹ *Timæus*, p. 484. et *Repub.* passim.

¹⁰ *Phædo*, p. 25, et seq.

¹¹ See *Cicero de Offic.* l. i. et passim.

¹² Buffon sur l'Homme.

² *Phædo*, p. 26, et seq.

⁴ *Phædrus*.

⁶ *Timæus*. ⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³ *Phædo*.

¹⁵ The Epicureans.

¹⁶ "Non res humanæ, perituraque regna." *Græc.* Of this more below.

¹⁷ Rousseau in his *Emile*.

¹⁸ Plutarch. *advers. Colot. Epicur.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER XXXIII.

History of Macedon—Reign of Archelaus—Series of Usurpations and Revolutions—Perdiccas defeated by the Illyrians—Distracted State of Macedon—First Transactions of Philip—State of Thrace and Pæonia—Philip defeats Argæus and the Athenians—His Treatment of the Prisoners—His military Arrangements—He defeats the Illyrians—His designs against Amphipolis—He prevents an Alliance between Athens and Olynthus—Amuses the Athenians—Takes Amphipolis—His Conquests in Thrace—The Mines of Crenidæ—Philip marries Olympias—His Letter to Aristotle.

FOUR hundred and sixteen years before the Christian era, and little more than half a century before Philip assumed the government of Macedon, that country, to a superficial observer, might have appeared scarcely distinguishable from the barbarous kingdoms of Thrace, Pæonia, and Illyricum, which surrounded it on the north, east, and west. Towards the south, it was excluded from the sea by a chain of Grecian republics, of which Olynthus and Amphipolis were the most flourishing and powerful. To this inland district, originally confined to the circumference of about three hundred miles, Caranus, an Argive prince of the numerous race of Hercules, eluding the dangers which proved fatal to royalty¹⁹ in most communities of Greece,²⁰ conducted a small colony of his adventurous and warlike countrymen, and, having conquered the barbarous natives, settled in Edessa, the capital of the province then named Emathia, and afterwards Macedonia, for reasons equally unknown.²¹ The establishment of this little principality, which, under Philip, grew into a powerful kingdom, and, under Alexander, swelled into the most extensive empire known in the ancient world, was adorned (could we believe historic flattery) by many extraordinary circumstances, presaging its future greatness. The gods took care of the infancy of Macedon, and sent, as oracles had announced, a herd of goats to conduct Caranus to his new capital of Edessa, which thence changed its name to *Ægæ*, the city of goats; a fiction unworthy of record, did it not explain the reason why goats were adopted as the ensigns of Macedon, and why the figures of those animals are still to be seen on the coins of Philip, and those of his successors.

Caranus, as well as the princes Cœnus²² and Thyrimas, who immediately followed him, had occasion to exercise their prudence still more than their valour. Their feeble colony of Greeks might have fallen an easy prey to the inhospitable ferocity of the barbarous tribes, by whom it was on all sides surrounded. But the policy of the first kings of Macedon, instead of vainly attempting to repel or to subdue, endeavoured, with more success, to gain, by good offices, the ancient inhabitants of Emathia and the neighbouring districts. They communicated to them the knowledge of many useful²³ arts; they gave them the Grecian reli-

gion²⁴ and government²⁵ in that state of happy simplicity which prevailed during the heroic ages; and while, to render intercourse more easy and familiar, they adopted, in some degree, the language and manners of the barbarous natives, they, in their turn, imparted to the latter a tincture of the Grecian language and civility.²⁶ By this judicious and liberal system, so unlike to that pursued by their countrymen in other parts of the world, the followers of Caranus gradually associated with the warlike tribes in their neighbourhood, whom it would have been alike impossible for them to extirpate or to enslave; and the same generous policy, being embraced by their descendants, deserves to be regarded as the primary cause of Macedonian greatness.

Perdiccas, the first of that name, so far eclipsed the fame of his three predecessors, that he is accounted the founder of the monarchy by Herodotus²⁷ and Thucydides.²⁸ His history has been magnified by fable, which has also obscured or distorted the actions of the five princes²⁹ that intervened between him and Alexander I. who filled the Macedonian throne when Xerxes invaded Greece.³⁰ Here we attain historic ground. Alexander, as related above,³¹ took an important and honourable part in the affairs of Greece and Persia, without neglecting the interest of his own kingdom, which he extended to the river Nessus on the east, and to the Axius on the west. His son, Perdiccas II. inherited the abilities of his father, without inheriting his integrity. During the Peloponnesian war, the alliance of this prince formed an object of important concern to the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. He espoused the cause of the latter, which he regarded as his own, because the Athenians, who had occasionally levied tribute on his ancestors,³² were then masters of the Greek settlements along the Macedonian coast, the vicinity of which naturally tempted the ambition of Perdiccas. Under the specious pretence of enabling Olynthus and the other cities of Chalcidicæ to recover their independence, he lent his aid to destroy the Athe-

²⁴ Arrian Exped. Alexand. l. iv. p. 83.

²⁵ Φιλίππου μιν παίδι, Ημελλομένη δὲ ἀπὸ γένους, οὗτοι οἱ πρόγονοι εἰς Ἀργεὺς εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἦλθον, οὗ δὲ ἔτι ἄλλα νόμῳ, Μακεδόνων ἀρχόντες διατίλειπον. Arrian, l. iv. p. 86. In another passage of the same book he says, the subjects of Macedon had more liberty than the citizens of Greece.

²⁶ Demosthenes, Arrian, and Curtius.

²⁷ Herodot. l. viii. c. cxxxvii.

²⁸ Thucydid. l. ii. p. 168.

²⁹ Argæus I. Philip I. Æropus I. Alcetas, Amyntas I. Justin. l. vii. c. ii.

³⁰ Herodot. l. v. c. xix.

³¹ Page 129.

³² Thucydid. ubi supra. et Demosthenes, passim.

¹⁹ Justin. l. vii. c. i. Velleius Paterculus, l. i. c. vi.

²⁰ See p. 36.

²¹ Crophius Antiquit. Macedon.

²² Justin. ubi supra. Syncell. Chronie.

²³ Pausanias Achaic. et Thucydid. l. ii.

nian influence there, expecting to establish the Macedonian in its stead. But this design failed of success. The Olynthian confederacy was broken, its members became subject to Sparta, and after the misfortunes of that republic had encouraged the Olynthians to resume their freedom, they felt themselves sufficiently powerful not only to resist the encroachments of Macedon, but to make considerable conquests in that country.¹

Archelaus I. who succeeded to the throne, displayed an enlightened policy, far more beneficial to his kingdom than the courage of Alexander, or the craft of Perdiccas. Like those

princes, Archelaus was ambitious to enlarge his dominions (having conquered Pydna and other towns in the delightful region of Pieria;)² but his main care was to cultivate and improve them. He facilitated communication between the principal towns of Macedon, by cutting straight roads through most parts of the country; he built walls and places of strength in the situations most favourable for that purpose; encouraged agriculture and the arts, particularly those subservient to war; formed magazines of arms; raised and disciplined a considerable body of cavalry; and, in a word, added more to the solid grandeur of Macedon than had been done by all his predecessors together.³ Nor was he regardless of the arts of peace. His palace was adorned by the works of Grecian painters. Euripides was long entertained at his court; Socrates was earnestly solicited to live there after the example of this philosophic poet, formed by his precepts, and cherished by his friendship: men of merit and genius, in all the various walks of literature and science, were invited to reside in Macedon, and treated with distinguished regard by a monarch duly attentive to promote his own glory and the happiness of his subjects.⁴

A reign of six years was too short a period for accomplishing the important ends which Archelaus had in view. By his death the prosperity of Macedon was interrupted for almost half a century, crowded by a succession of ten⁵ princes or usurpers, whose history forms a perpetual series of crimes and calamities. Amidst these disorders, the sceptre still remained in the family of Hercules; but almost every prince of the blood had an ambition to reign. In order to attain their purpose, the different competitors court-

ed the assistance of the Thracians, of the Illyrians, of the Thessalians, of the Olynthian confederacy, of Athens, of Sparta, and of Thebes; and each of those powers endeavoured to turn to their own immediate profit the dissensions in Macedon. Bardyllis, an active and daring chief, who by his abilities in acquiring, and his equity⁶ in dividing the spoil, had risen from the condition of a private robber to the command of the Illyrian tribes, entered Macedon at the head of a numerous army, dispossessed Amyntas II. the father of Philip, and

A. C. 385. placed Argæus on the throne, who consented to become the tributary of his benefactor.⁷ The Thracians supported the title of another prince named Pausanias: but the assistance of Thessaly and Olynthus enabled

A. C. 383. Amyntas to resume the government; the Olynthians refusing, however, to surrender several places of importance which Amyntas had entrusted to their protection, or which they had conquered from his competitor, Amyntas complained to Sparta, and that republic, for reasons above⁸ related, declared war against Olynthus, and reinstated the Macedonian king in full possession of his do-

minions. In consequence of that A. C. 380. event, Amyntas established, and thenceforth held, his court at Pella, where he enjoyed several years of tranquillity, cultivating the friendship of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians.

The short reign of his son Alexander was disturbed by a fresh invasion of the Illyrians, from whom he purchased a precarious peace.⁹ He left two brothers, Perdiccas and Philip, of whom the eldest was still a minor. Availing himself of their youth and weakness, Pausanias found means to usurp the throne, being supported not only by the Thracians, but by a considerable body of Greek mercenaries, as well as by a powerful party in Macedon.

A. C. 370. Iphicrates, the Athenian, happened at this critical juncture to return from Amphipolis, the recovery of which formed the main object of his expedition. In former journeys to the coast of Thrace, he had been treated with distinguished regard by Amyntas, whose widow Eurydicé now craved the protection of Iphicrates for the sons of his friend. This princess was descended from the Bacchiadæ, the noblest family of Corinth, who, rather than live on an equality with their fellow citizens in that republic, had become the leaders of the Lyncestæ, a barbarous tribe inhabiting the most western district of Macedon. Eurydicé inherited all the ambition of her race, and was distinguished by a bold intriguing spirit¹⁰ still more than by her beauty and accomplishments. With her young sons she suddenly appeared before Iphicrates, in the supplicating form of calamity and woe; presented the eldest to his hand, placed Philip, the younger, on his knee, and conjured him, by "the sincere friendship which Amyntas had ever entertained for Athens and for himself, to pity their tender

¹ See above, c. xxix. p. 315, et seq.

² Diodor. Sicul. l. xiii. c. xvi.

³ Thucydides says, "than the eight kings who preceded him," counting Perdiccas for the first. Αρχιλαῖος οἱ Περδίκκου υἱός, βασιλεὺς γινόμενος τῇ τειχῇ νῦν οὕτω ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ἀποδόμησεν, καὶ ὁδοὺς ἰσθμίωνας ἵσταντο, καὶ πολλὰ διακοσμήσας τὰς πόλεις τὸν πόλεμον ἔκρινεν, καὶ ὁπλοῖς καὶ πῃ ἄλλῃ περιεσκήυη χρυσίονι ἢ ξυμπάντες οἱ ἄλλοι βασιλεῖς οὕτω οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ γινόμενοι. Thucydides, p. 168.

⁴ Aristot. Rhetor. l. ii. c. xxix. Stobæus Sermon. 237.

⁵ Their names, with the dates of their accession or usurpation, are as follows:

1 Orestes,	A. C. 405	6 Argæus II.	A. C. 385
2 Æropus II.	402	Amyntas again re-	
3 Archelaus II.	394	established,	383
4 Amyntas II.	392	7 Alexander II.	379
5 Pausanias,	391	8 Perdiccas III.	371
Amyntas II.	390	9 Ptolemy,	370
Perdiccas,	368	10 Amyntas,	360
Ptolemy,	367	To him Philip succeeded	
Perdiccas,	365	in the same year.	

⁶ Cicero de Offic. l. ii.

⁷ Diodor. l. xiv. c. xcii.

⁸ See c. xxix. p. 318.

⁹ Diodorus et Justin. ubi supra.

¹⁰ Justin. l. vii. c. iv.

years, oppressed by cruel usurpation." The dignity of her sorrow prevailed with Iphicrates, who respected the sacred ties of hospitality, and who saw the advantage that might accrue to Athens by gaining an interest in Macedon. We are not informed by what means he established Perdiccas on the throne. The revolution was effected with such rapidity,¹¹ that we may suppose a sudden insurrection of the people, who, on important emergencies, were accustomed, as in the heroic ages, to assemble in arms.

A. C. 367. During the minority of the young prince, the kingdom was governed by his natural brother Ptolemy, whose ambition, unsatisfied with a delegated power, openly aspired to reign. This usurper (as we have related above) was dethroned by Pelopidas and the Thebans, who reinstated Perdiccas in his dominions; and in order to secure the dependence of Macedon on Thebes, carried into that city as hostages thirty Macedonian youths, and with them Philip, the younger brother of the king.

Perdiccas seemed proud of his chain. Elated with the protection of the Thebans, then in the height of their prosperity, he forgot the gratitude due to Iphicrates and the Athenians; disputed the right of that people to Amphipolis, which had been acknowledged by the general council of Greece;¹² and his opposition rendered fruitless their well-directed endeavours to recover that important establishment. The Athenians found an avenger in Bardyllis the Illyrian, to whom Perdiccas had denied the tribute that had been paid by his predecessors Argæus and Alexander. Bardyllis maintained his claim by force of arms. The Macedonians met him in the field, but were totally defeated with the loss of four thousand men.¹³ Perdiccas was taken prisoner, and soon after died of his wounds. His son Amyntas was an infant. Thebes having lost her pre-eminence in Greece, was unable to protect her distant allies. Athens was hostile, and Macedon, surrounded by enemies on every side, already experienced the fury of Barbarian invaders.

Not only the Illyrians and Bardyllis, who ravaged the west, but the Pæonians, a powerful and warlike tribe, having received some cause of offence from Perdiccas, now indulged their revenge, and insulted the northern frontier without interruption or control. The Thracians still supported the cause of Pausanias, whom they prepared to send back into Macedon at the head of a numerous army. Ptolemy was dead; but Argæus, the ancient competitor of king Amyntas, imboldened by the victory of the Illyrians, who had formerly placed him on the throne, renewed his pretensions to that dignity; and, grown old in intrigue, easily persuaded the Athenians, by the hopes of recovering Amphipolis, to exert themselves in his favour, especially against the son and brother of Perdiccas, by whose insolence and ingratitude they were justly provoked and disgusted. Im-

pelled by such motives, the Athenians launched their fleet, and sailed towards the coast of Macedon, with three thousand heavy-armed men, commanded by Mantias.¹⁴

Olymp. Such were the evils which threatened, and the calamities which oppressed, that unfortunate and distracted kingdom, when Philip appeared, asserting, unterrified, the rights of his infant nephew, against two candidates for the throne, and four formidable armies. A prince of less courage than Philip would have shrunk from a design seemingly desperate and impracticable; and had courage been his principal virtue, he would have only heightened the disorders which he hoped to remedy.¹⁵ But on this emergency, the young Macedonian (for he was only in his twenty-third year¹⁶) displayed those extraordinary abilities which distinguish his reign, and render it the most interesting spectacle that history can present to those who are delighted with surveying, not the vulgar revolutions of force and fortune, but the active energies and resources of a vigorous and comprehensive mind. Such was the obscurity in which his merit had hitherto lain concealed from the public, that historians¹⁷ disagree as to the place of his residence, when he was informed of the defeat and death of his brother Perdiccas. From the age of fifteen he had lived chiefly in Thebes, in the family, and under the direction of Epaminondas,¹⁸ whose lessons and example could not fail to excite, in a kindred mind, the emulation of excellence, and the ardour of patriotism.¹⁹ It is probable that, agreeably to the custom of Greece and Rome, where the youth alternately frequented the school and the camp, and might sometimes find a school of philosophy in the tent of a general, that Philip accompanied the Theban hero in many of his military expeditions. It is certain that, attended suitably to his rank, he visited the principal republics of Greece, whose institutions in peace and war he examined with a sagacity far superior to his years.²⁰ The tactics of the Lacedæmonians were the first new establishment which he introduced into Macedon. Nor was the improvement of his knowledge the only fruit of his travels. The brother of a king found an easy access to whosoever he had an interest to know and cultivate. Even in Athens, then hostile to Thebes, and naturally unfavourable to a pupil of Epaminondas, Philip acquired the friendship and esteem of Plato,²¹ Isocrates,²² and Aristotle;²³ and the early con-

14 Diodorus, ubi supra.

15 Olivier Vio de Philippe, p. 47.

16 Comp. Diodor. p. 510. et Justin. l. ix. c. viii.

17 Diodorus places him in Thebes; Athenæus, l. ii. p. 506, in Macedon; and adds, Δις τρις δὲ ἐν ταύτῃ συνέμεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς Περδίκκας, ἐξ ὁποῦ, συνάμειν ὑπὲρ χούρης, ἐπὶ τῇ τοῖς πρὸς τῆς. Words which admirably correspond to the rapid motions of Philip after the death of Perdiccas.

18 Plutarch. in Pelopida.

19 Plutarch speaks with the partiality of a Bæotian for Epaminondas, and the resentment of a native of Chæronæa against Philip. See Plutarch. in Pelopid.

20 Plutarch. in Alexand. Athenæus, l. xi. p. 506.

21 Athenæus, l. xi. Ælian, l. iv. c. xix.

22 Isocratis Epistolæ, et Oratio ad Philipp.

23 Aristotle at this time lived in the Academy with Plato, where, most probably, Philip first saw him. Dionys. Halicarnas. Epist. ad Ammæum.

11 Cornel. Nepos, in Iphicrat. *Æchin. de falsa Legatione.*

12 Demosth. de falsa Legat.

13 Diodor. l. xvi. sect 2.

nection which he formed with the principal leaders of Athens, and the neighbouring republics, contributed, perhaps, in no small degree, to the success of his future designs.¹

His seasonable appearance in Macedon, after the defeat and death of Perdiccas, suddenly changed the fortune of that seemingly devoted kingdom. Yet our admiration of Philip ought not to make us overlook the favourable circumstances which seconded his abilities, and conspired to promote his success. The places of strength built by Archelaus furnished a secure retreat to the remains of Perdiccas's army; the Macedonians, though conquered, were not subdued; they had considerable garrisons in the fortresses and walled towns scattered over the kingdom;² their whole forces had not been engaged in the unfortunate battle with the Illyrians;³ and those fierce invaders, impatient of delay, and only solicitous for plunder, having ravaged the open country, returned home to enjoy the fruits of their violence and rapine. They probably intended soon to assault Macedon with increased numbers, and to complete their devastations; but they seem to have been alike incapable to concert or to pursue any permanent plan of conquest; and being distinguished, as historians relate, by their blooming complexions, active vigour, and longevity,⁴ they were not less distinguished by that irregular and capricious mode of acting, and that inattention to remote consequences, which characterise the manners of Barbarians.

The warriors of Pæonia and Thrace⁵ were less formidable by their numbers, and equally contemptible for their ignorance and indocility. In early times, the Pæonians indeed had been regarded as a tribe less savage, and more considerable⁶ than their Macedonian neighbours; but the former had remained stationary, in the rudeness of their primitive state, while the latter had been improved by a Grecian colony, and by frequent communication and intercourse with the Grecian republics. Of the Thracians we have had occasion to speak in the preceding parts of this work. The destructive ravages of Seuthes⁷ represent the ordinary condition of that unsettled and inhospitable country, sometimes united under one chief, more frequently divided among many, whose mutual hostilities banished agriculture, industry, and every useful art. Exclusive of the Grecian settlements on the coast, Thrace contained not any city, nor even any considerable town. The Barbarian Cotys, who was dignified with the title of king, led a wandering life, encamping on the banks of rivers with his flocks and followers.⁸ War and pasturage formed the only sources of his grandeur, and even the only means of his subsistence.

Such were the first enemies with whom Philip had to contend. Their own capricious unsteadiness delivered him from the Illyrians.

To the Pæonians, who ravaged the north, he either sent a deputation, or applied in person; and partly by bribes, partly by artful promises and flattery, persuaded the invaders to retire. The same arts prevailed with the selfish king of Thrace,⁹ whose avarice readily sacrificed the cause of Pausanias, while Philip thought the remaining wealth of Macedon usefully consumed in removing those barbarous foes, that he might resist, with undivided strength, the more formidable invasion of Argæus and the Athenians.

The Athenian fleet already anchored before the harbour of Methoné; Argæus, with his numerous followers, had encamped in the province of Pieria; and their united forces prepared to march northward to Edessa, or *Ægæ*, the ancient capital of Macedon, where they expected to be joined by a powerful party, whom fear or inclination would bring to the standard of the banished king. The Macedonians who adhered to the interest of Perdiccas, or rather of his infant son, had been dispirited by the recent victory of the Illyrians, and the misfortunes consequent on that event. But the manly exhortations, and undaunted deportment of Philip, roused them from their despair. They admired the dexterity with which he had disarmed the resentment of the Thracians and Pæonians. His graceful person, insinuating address, and winning affability, qualities which he possessed in a very uncommon degree,¹⁰ gained the affections of the Macedonians, who either recollected, or were studiously reminded of, a prophecy,¹¹ that announced great glory to their nation under the reign of the son of Amyntas. In an assembly held at *Ægæ*, they exclaimed, with one consent, "This is the man whom the gods point out as the founder of the Macedonian greatness. The dangerous condition of the times admits not of an infant reign. Let us obey the celestial voice, and entrust the sceptre to hands alike worthy to hold, and able to defend it."¹² This proposal seemed not extraordinary in a country which had been long accustomed to interruptions in the lineal order of succession. Amyntas was set aside, and Philip, who had hitherto possessed only the delegated power of regent, was invested with the royal title and authority.¹³

While all ranks of men were thus animated with affectionate admiration of their young king, the obsolete claims of Argæus could only be maintained by arms. Attended by his Athenian allies, he marched towards Edessa; but that city shut its gates against him. Dispirited by this repulse, he made no farther attempts to gain admission into any of the Macedonian

9 Diodor. Sicul. l. xvi. sect. 3. Horace alludes to these events:

——— diffidit urbium

Portas vir Macedo, et subruit omnes
Reges muneribus. Lib. iii. Ode 16.

10 *Æschin. de falsa Legatione.*

11 In the Sibylline verses preserved in Pausanias (in Achaic.) Philip is named as the author of the Macedonian greatness, and the destruction of the kingdom is foretold under another Philip. These verses, though evidently composed after the event, serve to confirm the fact, that the superstition of the multitude was wrought upon for the purposes of Philip. Justin. l. vii. c. vi.

12 *Ibid. idem.*

13 Diodorus, l. xvi. sect. 3.

1 Demosthen. passim.

2 Thucyd. l. xi. p. 168.

3 Athenæus, l. xi. p. 506.

4 Lucian. in Macrobiis, et Cornel. Alexand. apud Plinium, lib. vii. cap. clvii.

5 Cornel. Nepos in Iphicrat. Xenoph. Anab. l. vii. p. 393.

6 Hippocrat. de Epidem.

7 See p. 298, et seq.

8 Athenæus, l. xii. p. 331.

cities, but directed his course backward to Methoné. Philip, who had now collected sufficient strength to take the field, harassed his retreat, cut his rear to pieces, and defeated him in a general engagement, in which Argæus himself fell, with the flower of his army. The rest, whether Greeks or Barbarians, were made prisoners of war.¹⁴

It was on this occasion that Philip first displayed that deep and artful policy, which, in the course of a long reign, gained him such a powerful ascendant over the passions of other men, and enabled him uniformly to govern his own by the interest of his ambition. In the midst of prosperity, his proud and lofty spirit must have been highly provoked by the Athenians, as well as by the followers of Argæus; and the barbarous maxims and practices which prevailed in that age, left him at full liberty to wreak his vengeance on the unhappy prisoners of both, who had fallen into his hands. But the interest of Philip required him rather to soothe than to irritate the people of Athens, and to obtain by good offices (what he could not command by force) the confidence of his Macedonian subjects. The captives of the latter nation were called into his presence, rebuked with gentleness and humanity, admitted to swear allegiance to their new master, and promiscuously distributed in the body of his army. The Athenian prisoners were treated in a manner still more extraordinary.¹⁵ Instead of demanding any ransom for their persons, he restored their baggage unexamined, and entertained them at his table with such condescending hospitality, that they returned home, full of admiration for the young king, and deeply persuaded of his attachment and respect for their republic.¹⁶

Olymp. They had only time to blaze forth
cv. 2. the praises of Philip, when his am-
A. C. 359. bassadors arrived at Athens.¹⁷ He
knew that the loss of Amphipolis
principally excited the resentment of the Athe-
nians; he knew that the interest of Macedon
required that resentment to be appeased. Im-
pressed with these ideas, he renounced all ju-
risdiction over Amphipolis, which was formerly
declared a free and independent city, subject
only to the government of its own equitable
laws.¹⁸ This measure, together with the dis-
tinguished treatment of the Athenian prisoners,
insured the success of his embassy. An ancient
treaty was renewed, that had long subsisted be-
tween his father Amyntas and the Athenians.
That capricious and unsteady people, not less
susceptible of gratitude, than prone to anger,
were thus lulled into repose, at a time when
Fortune having placed them at the head of
Greece, both their present power and ancient

glory urged them to take the front of the battle against Philip. Confiding in the insidious treaty with that prince, they engaged in a ruinous war with their allies;¹⁹ and ceased, during several years, to make any opposition to the ambitious designs of the Macedonian.

Olymp. The young king having given
cx. 2. such illustrious proofs of his abili-
A. C. 359. ties in negotiation and war, availed
himself of the affectionate admira-
tion of his subjects to establish, during a season
of tranquillity, such institutions as might main-
tain and extend his own power, and confirm the
solid grandeur of Macedon. The laws and
maxims which prevailed in the heroic ages,
and which, as we have already observed, had
been early introduced into that kingdom, cir-
cumscribed the royal authority within very nar-
row bounds. The chiefs and nobles, especially
in the more remote provinces, regarded them-
selves as the rivals and equals of their sovereign.
In foreign war they followed his standard, but
they often shook his throne by domestic sedi-
tion; and, amidst the scanty materials for ex-
plaining the internal state of Macedon in an-
cient times, we may discover several instances in
which they disavowed their allegiance, and as-
sumed independent government over consider-
able districts of the country.²⁰ The moment
of glory and success seemed the most favourable
for extinguishing this dangerous spirit, and
quashing the proud hopes of the nobles. In
this design Philip proceeded with that artful
policy which characterizes his reign. From the
bravest of the Macedonian youth, he chose a
select body of companions,²¹ who, being distin-
guished by honourable appellations, and enter-
tained at the royal table, attended the king's
person in war and in hunting. Their intimacy
with the sovereign, which was regarded as a
proof of their merit, obliged them to superior
diligence in all the severe duties of a military
life.²² The noble youth, animated with the
hope of glory, vied with each other to gain ad-
mission into this distinguished order; and while,
on one hand, they served as hostages²³ for the
allegiance of their families, they formed, on the
other, a useful seminary of future generals,²⁴
who, after conquering for Philip and Alexander,
at length conquered for themselves, and divided
the spoils of the ancient world.

It is ignorantly said by some writers,²⁵ that
Philip, in the first year of his reign, invented
the phalanx, a body of six thousand men, armed
with short swords, fit either for cutting or
thrusting; strong bucklers, four feet in length
and two and a half in breadth; and pikes four-
teen cubits long, which usually arranged sixteen
deep, formed the main battle of the Macedo-

¹⁴ Diodorus, l. xvi. s. 3. et Demosth. in Aristocrat.

¹⁵ The fair side of Philip's character is described by
Diodor. l. xvi. p. 510, et seq. and 539. By Just. l. ix. c. viii.
The most disadvantageous description of him is given by
Demosthenes, passim, and by Athenæus, l. iv. c. xix. l. vi.
c. xvii. et l. x. c. x. Cicero seems not to have regarded the
assertions of Demosthenes, when, in speaking of Philip and
Alexander, he says, "Alter semper magnus, alter sæpe tur-
pissimus." But the artificial character of Philip, which
varied with his interest, merits neither the panegyrics nor
invectives too liberally bestowed on it.

¹⁶ Demosthenes in Aristocrat.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Polyæn. Stratag. l. iv. c. 17.

¹⁹ See c. xxxii. p. 351, et seq.

²⁰ Strabo, l. vii. p. 326. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. l. v.

²¹ Arrian, et Ælian.

²² Ælian, i. xiv. c. 49.

²³ Arrian says, "τῶν ἐν τῇ Μακεδονίᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς,"
"the sons of men in office;" which well agrees with the
idea of their being hostages for the fidelity of their parents.
He also ascribes the institution to Philip. *Ex Φιλίππου
ἡδὲ καὶ οὐστῆρος.* Arrian. l. iv. p. 89.

²⁴ Curtius, l. viii. c. 6.

²⁵ Diodorus Siculus, l. xvi. s. 3, and all the Roman
writers of Greek history. It was natural for the Romans,
who began to know Greece and Macedon almost at the
same time, and who found the phalanx most complete in
the latter, to suppose it invented in that country.

nians. But this is nothing different from the armour and arrangement which had always prevailed among the Greeks, and which Philip adopted in their most perfect form; nor is there reason to think that a prince, who knew the danger of changing what the experience of ages had approved, made any alteration in the weapons or tactics of that people.¹ His attention was more judiciously directed to procure, in sufficient abundance, arms, horses, and other necessary instruments of war; in reviewing and exercising his troops; and in accustoming them to that austere and laborious life,² which is the best preparation for the field.

Olymp. The military resources which his activity had provided, his ambition
ov. 3. did not allow to remain long unem-
A. C. 358. ployed. The death of Agis, the most warlike chieftain, or, as he is called by a historian,³ king of the Pæonians, drew Philip into the field, to revenge recent injuries which those Barbarians had inflicted on Macedon. Among a people where the laws of peace or war are neglected or unknown, almost every thing depends on the precarious character of their leaders. Deprived of the valour of Agis, the Pæonians lost all hopes of defence. Philip overran their country without resistance; carried off slaves and plunder; imposed a tribute on their chiefs; took hostages; and reduced Pæonia to an absolute dependence on Macedon.

It is probable that, according to the practice of the age, he permitted or required a certain number of the vanquished to follow his standard; but the Pæonians were no sooner reduced, than Philip, to whom all seasons seemed alike proper for war, undertook a winter's campaign against Bardyllis and the Illyrians, the hereditary enemies of his family and kingdom. He marched towards the frontier of Illyria⁴ at the head of ten thousand foot and six hundred horse, and, before entering the country, animated the resentment and valour of his troops by a military oration, after the custom of the Greeks, whose manners he seemed, on every occasion, ambitious to imitate. Indignation of past injuries, the honour of his subjects, and the glory of his crown might be topics proper to influence the Macedonian soldiers,⁵ who could not fully enter into the more refined motives of their sovereign. Illyria had been extended on the

east, to the prejudice of Macedon, which it totally excluded from the excellent harbours on the Adriatic.⁶ This was an important consideration to a prince, who seems to have early meditated the raising of a naval power. Besides this, it was impossible for Philip to undertake with safety the other measures which he had in view, should he leave his kingdom exposed to the predatory incursions of a neighbouring enemy, who, unless they feared Macedon, must always be formidable to that country. Directed by such solid principles of policy, rather than governed by resentment, or allured by the splendour of victory, Philip proceeded forward, with the caution necessary to be observed in a hostile territory. After a fruitless negotiation, Bardyllis met him in the field with an adequate body of infantry, but with only four hundred horse. The precise scene of the engagement is unknown. The Macedonian phalanx attacked the Illyrian column⁷ in front, while the targeteers and light-armed troops galled its flanks, and the cavalry harassed its rear. The Illyrians, thus surrounded on every side, were crushed between two opposite assaults, without having an opportunity to exert their full strength.⁸ Their resistance, however, must have been vigorous, since seven thousand were left on the field of battle, and with them their gallant leader Bardyllis, who fell, at the age of ninety, fighting bravely on horseback. The loss of their experienced chief, and of the flower of their youthful warriors, broke the strength and courage of the Illyrian tribes, who sent a deputation to Philip, humbly craving peace, and submitting their fortune to the will of the conqueror. Philip granted them the same terms⁹ which he had lately imposed on the Pæonians. That part of their country which lies east of the lake Lychnidus he joined to Macedon; and probably built a town and settled a colony on the side of the lake, which watered a fertile country, and abounded in different kinds of fish, highly esteemed by the ancients. The town and lake of Lychnidus were fifty miles distant from the Ionian sea; but such was the ascendant that the arms and policy of Philip acquired over his neighbours, that the inhabitants of the intermediate district soon adopted the language and manners of

¹ The improvement in the countermarch, to which Philip gave the appearance of advancing, instead of retreating, mentioned by Ælian in his tactics, c. xxviii. was borrowed, as this author tells us, from the Lacedæmonians. If Philip increased this phalanx, usually less numerous, to six thousand men, this was far from an improvement; and the latter kings of Macedon, who swelled it to sixteen thousand, only rendered that order of battle more unwieldy and inconvenient. The highest perfection of Grecian tactics is to be found in Xenophon's expedition. See c. xxvi. p. 249, et seq. See also Polyb. l. xvii. p. 764. et Liv. l. xlv. c. 40.

² Polyænus, l. iv. c. 3. Frontin. Strat. l. iv. c. 1.

³ Diodorus, l. xvi. sect. 4.

⁴ The Greek name of this country is *Illyria*, but more commonly *Illyria*, from its inhabitants. Vid. Arrian, l. i. passim. The Latin name is *Illyria*; most English writers of ancient history use *Illyria*, probably from the French *Illyrie*. The Greek *Illyria* is described by Strabo, l. vii. p. 317. It comprehended the eastern shore of the Adriatic, between Epirus and Istria. The Latin *Illyria* had a signification far more extensive. See Gibbon's History, vol. i. p. 27.

⁵ The heads of the speech are given, indirectly, in the fragments of Theopompus.

⁶ Strabo says, *ἡ πᾶσις τὸν Ἰλλυρικὸν (smileet xwccv) ὑπερβαίνει τὸν Ἰταλὸν*; and adds, that the shore of Illyria is as abundant, as the opposite coast of Italy is defective, in good harbours. Strabo, l. viii.

⁷ The Illyrians were drawn up in the order of battle called *πλῆθος*, from *πλῆθος*, a brick; which clearly points out its form.

⁸ Frontinus Strateg. l. ii. c. 3.

⁹ It should seem from Diodorus, that the Illyrians had entertained the same superstitious terror of neglecting the interment of the dead, which prevailed among the Greeks. Yet Diodorus, perhaps, only used a privilege too common among historians, of transferring their own feelings to those concerning whom they write. He says, that Philip "restored their dead, and erected a trophy." Pausanias (in Boeotic.) denies that either Philip or his son Alexander ever erected any of those monuments of victory; which practice, he says, was contrary to a Macedonian maxim, established as early as the time of Caranus, when a lion having overturned one of his trophies, the wise founder of the monarchy regarded this event as a warning to forbear raising them in future. But the medals of Philip and Alexander, of which the reverse is sometimes charged with trophies, refute the assertion of Pausanias; which is likewise contradicted by Arrian, Curtius, and all the writers of the life, or expedition, of Alexander.

their conquerors; and their territory, hitherto unconnected with any foreign power, sunk into such an absolute dependence on Macedon, that many ancient geographers considered it as a province of that country.¹⁰

Olymp. Having settled the affairs of Illyria, Philip returned home, not to enjoy the sweets of victory and repose, but to pursue more important and more arduous designs than those which he had hitherto carried on with such signal success. He had secured and extended the northern and western frontier of Macedon; but the rich southern shores, chiefly inhabited by Greeks, presented at once a more tempting prize, and a more formidable enemy. The confederacy of Olynthus, having thrown off the yoke of Sparta, had become more powerful than ever. It could send into the field ten thousand heavy-armed men, and a large body of well-disciplined cavalry. Most towns of the Chalcidicé had become its allies or subjects; and this populous and wealthy province, together with Pangæus on the right, and Pieria on the left, the cities of both which were either independent, or subject to the Athenians, formed a barrier sufficient not only to guard the Grecian states against Macedon, but even to threaten the safety of that kingdom. Every motive concurred to direct the active policy of Philip towards acquisitions immediately necessary in themselves, and essential to the completion of his remote purposes. In the course of twenty years he accomplished his designs, and conquered Greece; often varying his means, never changing his end; and notwithstanding the circumstances and events that continually thwarted his ambition, we behold the opening and gradual progress of a vast plan, every step in which paved the way for that which followed, till the whole ended in the most signal triumph, perhaps, ever attained by human prudence, over courage and fortune.

The importance of Olynthus and Chalcidicé could not divert the sagacity of Philip from Amphipolis, which he regarded as a more necessary, though less splendid, conquest. The possession of Amphipolis, which would connect Macedon with the sea, and secure to that kingdom many commercial advantages, opened a road to the woods and mines of mount Pangæus, the former of which was so essential to the raising of a naval power, and the latter to the forming and keeping on foot a sufficient military force. The place itself Philip in the beginning of his reign had declared independent, to avoid a rupture with the Athenians, who still asserted their pretensions to their ancient colony. But their measures to regain Amphipolis had hitherto been rendered ineffectual by the caprice or perfidy of Charidemus, a native of Eubœa, who, from the common level of a soldier of fortune, had risen to the command of a considerable body of mercenaries, frequently employed by the indolence and licentiousness of the Athenians, a people extremely averse both to the fatigue and restraint of personal service. They determined,

however, to renew their attempts for recovering their dominion, while the Amphipolitans, having tasted the sweets of liberty, prepared to maintain their independence.

In this posture of affairs, the hostile designs of Philip, which all his artifice had not been able to conceal from the suspicious jealousy of the new republic, alarmed the magistrates of Amphipolis, and obliged them to seek protection from the Olynthians, who readily admitted them into their confederacy. Imboldened by this alliance, they set at defiance the menaces of their neighbouring, as well as of their more distant, enemy; and their imprudent insolence readily furnished Philip with specious grounds of hostility. The Olynthians perceived that the indignation of this prince must soon break forth into action, and overwhelm the Amphipolitans; while they themselves might be involved in the ruin of their new confederate. To anticipate this danger, they sent ambassadors to Athens, requesting an alliance with that republic against the natural enemy of both states, and an enemy whose successful activity rendered him a just object of terror.

This alliance, had it taken place, must have given a fatal blow to the rising greatness of Macedon, which as yet was incapable to contend with the united strength of Olynthus and Athens. The spies and emissaries of Philip (for he had already begun to employ those odious, but necessary instruments of policy) immediately gave the alarm. The prince himself was deeply sensible of the danger, and determined to repel it with equal vigour and celerity. His agents reached Athens before any thing was concluded with the Olynthian deputies. The popular leaders and orators were bribed and gained; the magistrates and senate were flattered and deceived by the most plausible declarations and promises. A negotiation was immediately set on foot, by which Philip stipulated to conquer Amphipolis for the Athenians, on condition that they surrendered to him Pydna, a place of far less importance. He promised, besides, to confer many other advantages on the republic, which it was not proper at present to mention, but which time would reveal.¹¹ Amused by the artifices of the Macedonian, deceived by the perfidy of their own magistrates, and elated with the hopes of recovering Amphipolis, the great object of their ambition, the senate of the Five Hundred (for the transaction was carried on with such haste as allowed not time for assembling the people) rejected with disdain the overtures of the Olynthians,¹² who returned home disgusted and indignant.

They had scarcely time to communicate to their countrymen the angry passions which agitated their own breasts, when the ambassadors of Philip craved audience in the assembly of Olynthus. That artful prince affected to

¹¹ Καὶ τὸ Σουλλευμένον ποτὶ ἀπορρητόν τινα. Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 6. edit. Wolff. It is strange that Wolffius has changed the order of the Olynthian orations, so distinctly marked by Dion. Halicarn. in his letter to Ammoneus.

¹² Demosthenes expresses it in the strongest terms, as if they had driven the Olynthians from Athens: "οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπηλκυσεν τινος ἐνθιδί." Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 6.

condole with the Olynthians on the affront which they had received from the insolence of Athens; but at the same time testified his surprise, that they should condescend to court the distant protection of that proud republic, when they might find in Macedon an ally near at hand, who wished for nothing more earnestly than to enter into equal and lasting engagements with their confederacy. As a proof of his moderation and sincerity, he offered immediately to put them in possession of Anthemus, a town of some importance in their neighbourhood, the jurisdiction of which had long been claimed by the kings of Macedon;¹ at the same time assuring them of his intentions to deserve their gratitude by still more important services, and particularly by employing his arms to reduce the cities of Pydna and Potidæa, commanding the opposite sides of the Thermaic gulf; places, therefore, of considerable value, which he wished to see dependent on Olynthus, rather than, as at present, subject to Athens.

Olymp. The immediate offers of Philip, his
cv. 4. professions and promises, in which,
A. C. 357. as they suited his interest, he doubtless was sincere, and still more, his secret practices with some powerful men of Olynthus, effectually prevailed with that republic to abandon the cause of Amphipolis, whose imprudent inhabitants had been at little pains to prevent those offences and complaints which naturally arise between the jealous members of an unequal confederacy. By these intrigues, the Macedonian not only removed all opposition to his views on the part of the Olynthians, but acquired the sincere friendship of that people, who were ready to assist his arms, and to second his most ambitious designs. He therefore prepared for action, because he might now act with safety; marched rapidly towards Amphipolis, and pressed that city with a vigorous siege. The inhabitants, deeply affected by the near prospect of a calamity which they had taken little care to prevent, had recourse, in their distress, to Athens. Thither they despatched Hierax and Stratocles, two of their most distinguished citizens, to represent the danger of an alliance between Philip and Olynthus; to entreat the Athenians to accept the sincere repentance of their unfortunate colony, and once more to take Amphipolis under the protection of their fleet.

At that time the Athenians were deeply engaged in the social war; yet the hopes of recovering so important a settlement might have directed their attention to Macedon, had not the vigilant policy of Philip sent them a letter, renewing the assurances of his friendship, acknowledging their pretensions to the city, which he actually besieged, and of which he artfully said, that, in terms of his recent engagement, he hoped shortly to put them in possession. Amused by these insinuating representations, the Athenians treated the deputies of Amphipolis with as little respect as they had lately done those of Olynthus. The besieged city was thus deprived of all hopes of relief; Philip pressed the attack with new vi-

Olymp. gour; a breach was made in the
cv. 4. walls; and the Amphipolitans, after
A. C. 357. an obstinacy of defence which could have no other effect than to provoke the resentment of the conqueror, at length surrendered at discretion.²

The prudent Macedonian always preferred his own profit to the punishment of his enemies. It was his interest to preserve and to aggrandize, not to depopulate, Amphipolis. He banished a few daring leaders, whose seditious or patriotic spirit might disturb the measures of his government. The bulk of the citizens were treated with sufficient mildness. Their territory was reunited to Macedon, from which Philip resolved that it should never be dismembered, notwithstanding his promises to the Athenians.

That he might arm himself against the resentment of a people, whom, if he could not deceive, he was determined to defy, he cultivated, with great earnestness, the Olynthian confederacy; and having besieged and taken the towns of Pydna and Potidæa, he readily ceded them to the Olynthians, who had but feebly assisted him in making these conquests. In the whole transaction Philip affected to act merely as an auxiliary. The Athenian garrison in Potidæa, who had surrendered themselves prisoners of war, he took under his immediate protection, and dismissed them without ransom, artfully lamenting that the necessity of his affairs, and his alliance with Olynthus, obliged him to oppose the interests of their republic, for which he entertained the most sincere respect.³

It is impossible that the Athenians, weak and credulous as they were, should have been the dupes of this gross artifice. But they could not immediately withdraw their exertions from the social war, the events of which grew continually more unprosperous. Philip, ever vigilant and active, profited of this favourable diversion, to pursue his conquests in Thrace, to which the possession of Amphipolis afforded him an opening. In the beginning of his reign, he had found it necessary to purchase a peace from Cotys, who still governed that country, but from whom Philip could not actually apprehend any formidable opposition. The late acquaintance of that Barbarian with the Grecian religion and manners, which he had adopted in consequence of his connection with Iphicrates and the Athenians, served only to deprave his faculties and to cloud his reason. We should pronounce absolutely mad, the man who fancied himself enamoured of Minerva; but the ancients, who believed that the gods often appeared in a human form, regarded with more tenderness this frantic enthusiasm. Cotys was allowed to possess his freedom and his crown, whether, with his ambulatory court, he traversed the inhospitable mountains of Thrace, or pitched his tents on the fragrant banks of the Strymon or the Nessus; or, to enjoy with more privacy the favours of his celestial mistress,

² Diodor. l. xvj. c. viii. Demosthen. Olynth. iii. sect. 4-7.

³ Diodor. l. xvi. c. viii. et Demosth. Philipp. ii. et Olynth. i.

¹ Demosthen. Philip. ii. 4.

penetrated into the deep recesses of the beautiful forests which adorned his kingdom.

Olymp. At the approach of the Macedo-
cv. 4. nians, having abandoned the grove
A. C. 357. of Onocarsis, the favourite scene of
his wild and romantic enjoyments,⁴
he endeavoured to stop the progress of the
enemy by a letter; but a letter from such a
man could excite nothing but ridicule or pity.
Philip penetrated eastward thirty miles beyond
Amphipolis, to the town of Crenidæ, situated
at the foot of Mount Pangæus, and distant
ten miles from the sea. He admired the soli-
tary beauty of the place, which being bounded
on one side by the sea, and on the other by
lofty mountains, was watered by many streams
and rivulets, which, tempering the dryness of
the soil, produced the finest and most delicious
fruit and flowers, especially roses, of a pecu-
liar hue and fragrantcy. But the attention of
Philip was attracted by objects more important,
by the gold mines in that neighbourhood, for-
merly wrought by colonies from Thasos and
from Athens, but totally neglected since the
ignorant Thracians had become masters of Cre-
nidæ. Philip expelled those Barbarians from
a possession which they seemed unworthy to
hold. Having descended into the gold mines,
he traced, by the help of torches, the decayed
labours of the ancient proprietors. By his care
the water was drained off; the canals, broken
or choked up, were repaired; and the bosom
of the earth was again opened and ransacked⁵
with eager avidity by a prince who well knew
the value of the precious metals. A Macedo-
nian colony was planted at Crenidæ, which
thenceforth assumed the name of Philippi,⁶ a
name bestowed also on the golden coins struck
by order of Philip,⁷ to the annual amount of
nearly a thousand talents, or two hundred
thousand pounds sterling.⁸

Having effected the main purpose of his
Thracian expedition, the prudence of Philip
set bounds to his conquests in that country, and
carried his arms into Thessaly, which, by the
murder of Alexander of Phœæ, had got three
tyrants instead of one. These were, Tissipho-
nus, Pitholaus, and Lycophron, the brothers-
in-law, the assassins, and the successors of Al-
exander. The resentment of the Thessalians,
and the valour of the Macedonian troops, to-
tally defeated those oppressors of their country,
who were reduced to such humiliating terms as
seemed sufficient to prevent them from being
thenceforth formidable either to their own sub-
jects or to their neighbours.⁹ The Thessalians,
who were susceptible of all impressions, but
incapable of preserving any, concluded, in the

first emotions of their gratitude, an agreement
with their deliverer, by which they surrendered
to him the revenues arising from their fairs and
towns of commerce, as well as all the con-
veniences of their harbours and shipping; and
extraordinary as this cession was, Philip found
means to render it effectual and permanent.¹⁰

Olymp. He immediately contracted an
cv. 4. alliance with Arybbas, king of Epi-
A. C. 357. rus, a small principality which
skirted the western frontier of
Thessaly. In his excursions from Thebes,
Philip had early seen Olympias, the sister of
that prince, whose wit and spirit, joined to the
lively graces of her youth and beauty, had
made a deep impression on his heart. They
were initiated, at the same time, in the myste-
ries of Ceres, during the triennial festival in
the isle of Samothrace, which had been long as
much distinguished as Eleusis¹¹ itself, by the
peculiar worship and protection of this bounti-
ful goddess. But the active ambition which
employed and engrossed the first years of
Philip's reign had probably banished the me-
mory of his love, when his expedition into
Thessaly recalled the image of Olympias.
Their first interview naturally revived his ten-
der passions; and, as the kings of Epirus were
lineally descended from Achilles, the match
appeared every way suitable; Arybbas readily
yielded his consent, and the beautiful princess
was conducted into Macedon.¹²

The nuptials of Philip were solemnized at
Pella with unusual pomp and splendour. Seve-
ral months were destined to religious shows and
processions, to gymnastic games and exercises,
to musical and dramatic entertainments. The
young and fortunate prince naturally took a
principal share in all these scenes of festivity;
and it is probable that, amidst the more elegant
amusements of his court, Philip might disco-
ver that strong propensity to vicious indul-
gence, that delight in buffoons and flatterers,
and other disgraceful ministers of his more
criminal pleasures, which, however counter-
acted and balanced by his ambition and mag-
nanimity, disgraced and tarnished the succeed-
ing glories of his reign. It is certain that the
voluptuous inactivity in which he seemed sunk,
encouraged the hopes of his enemies.¹³ The
tributary princes of Pæonia and Illyria pre-
pared to rebel; the king of Thrace engaged in
their designs, which were concerted with more
caution than is usual with Barbarians; and this
general conspiracy of neighbouring states might
have repressed for awhile the fortune of Ma-
cedon, if Philip had not been seasonably in-
formed of the danger by his faithful partisans
and emissaries in those countries.

Olymp. Early in the ensuing spring he
cvi. 1. took the field with the flower of
A. C. 356. the Macedonian troops. Parmenio,
the general in whom he had most
confidence, crushed the rebellion in Illyria.
Philip was equally successful in Pæonia and
Thrace. While he returned from the latter, he

⁴ Theopomp. apud Athenæum, l. xii. p. 531.

⁵ Senec. Natur. Quæst. l. v. p. 760. et Demosth. in Lep-
tin.

⁶ The fatal defeat and death of Brutus and Cassius have
eclipsed, in their melancholy splendour, all the preceding
events which distinguish Philippi. There liberty expired,
and virtue yielded to force.

Cum fracta virtus, et minaces
Turpe solum tetigere mento.

HORACE.

⁷ Regale numisma Philippios.

⁸ Diodor. l. xvi. c. ix. Justin. l. viii. c. iii. speaks differ-
ently; but the whole of that chapter bears evident marks
of ignorance and error.

⁹ Diodor. l. xvi. c. xiv. et Plut. in Pelopid.

¹⁰ Demosth. Philip. l. 10. Polyæn. Stratag. l. iv. c. xix.

¹¹ See c. xxi. p. 249 et seq.

¹² Diodor. l. xvi. c. xxii.

¹³ Justin. l. vii. c. vi.

was informed of the victory of Parmenio. A second messenger acquainted him that his horses had gained the prize in the chariot-races at the Olympic games; a victory which he regarded as far more honourable, and which, as it proved him a legitimate son of Greece, he carefully commemorated, by impressing a chariot on his coins. Almost at the same time a third messenger arrived to tell him that Olympias had brought forth a prince at Pella; to whom, as born amidst such auspicious circumstances, the diviners announced the greatest prosperity¹ and glory.

Such a rapid tide of good fortune did not overset the wisdom of Philip, if we may judge by the first authentic transaction which immediately followed those events. This was the correspondence with Aristotle the philosopher, whose merit Philip had early discerned at Athens, when he still resided with his master Plato. The first letter (fortunately preserved)

is written with a brevity which marks the king and the man of genius. "Know that a son is born to us. We thank the gods, not so much for the gift, as for bestowing it at a time when Aristotle lives. We assure ourselves that you will form him a prince worthy of his father, and worthy of Macedon." Aristotle commenced this illustrious employment about thirteen years afterwards,² when the opening mind of Alexander might be supposed capable of receiving the benefit of his instructions. The success of his labours will be explained in the sequel. The fortune of Alexander surpassed that of all other conquerors as much as his virtues surpassed his fortune. Yet the fame of the philosopher abundantly repays the honour reflected on him by his royal pupil, since sixteen centuries after the subversion of Alexander's empire, the writings of Aristotle still maintained an unexampled ascendant over the opinions, and even over the actions of men.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

Philip's Prosperity—Imprudent Measures of the Amphictyonic Council—The Phocian, or Sacred War—Philomelus seizes the Temple of Delphi—Takes the Field against the Thebans and their Allies—Defeat and Death of Philomelus—Affairs of Thrace, Macedon, and Attica—Onemarchus takes the Command of the Phocians—Encounters Philip in Thessaly—He is defeated and slain—Philip's Designs against Olynthus and Byzantium—Traversed by the Athenians—Phayllus takes the Command of the Phocians—Philip marches towards Thermopylae—Anticipated by the Athenians—Demosthenes' first Philippic—Philip's Occupations at Pella—His Vices—and Policy.

OLYMP. PHILIP had now reigned almost five years. He had greatly enlarged the boundaries, he had still more augmented the revenues, of his kingdom. Pæonia, no longer the rival, was become an obsequious province of Macedon. At the expense of Thrace and Illyria, he had extended his frontier on the east to the sea of Thasos; on the west to the lake Lychnidus. He was master of Thessaly without having the trouble to govern it. He secured many commercial advantages by the possession of Amphipolis. His troops were numerous and well disciplined; his large finances were regulated with economy; and the mines of Philippi fur-

nished him with an annual resource alike useful to his designs, whether he pursued the ambitious career of foreign conquest, or set himself to build up and consolidate the internal grandeur of his dominions.

The power of Philip was admired, and feared, by those who were unable to penetrate the deep principles of his policy, which alone rendered him really formidable. The first and most natural object of his desire was the territory of Olynthus, the most populous and fertile portion of the Macedonian coast. His second and far more arduous purpose was to obtain the sovereignty of Greece. But instead of discovering these designs, he had hitherto cultivated the Olynthians with a careful assiduity, and had deserved their gratitude by many solid and important services. His success had been complete, and if, elated by the many advantages which we have enumerated, he had already prepared to invade Greece, it is more than probable that the Olynthians would have consented to follow his standard. But Philip was sensible, that by snatching too eagerly at this glorious prize, he might destroy for ever his prospect of obtaining it. While the Athenians were occupied and harassed by the destructive war with their confederates, he had, indeed, embraced the opportunity to gain possession of several of their dependent settlements in Thrace and Macedon; colouring, however, these proceedings by the

¹ Plut. in Alexand.

² The chronology appears from Dionysius of Halicarnassus's letter to Ammæus, who, in order to prove that Demosthenes had attained the highest perfection in the practice, before Aristotle had delivered the theory, of eloquence, marks, with great exactness, the principal events in the lives of the philosopher and orator. Aristotle, a native of Stagira, came to Athens in his eighteenth year, 367, A. C. There he continued twenty years, as the scholar or assistant of Plato, who died 348 A. C. Aristotle left Athens on the death of his master, and spent three years at Atarnæus, and two at Mytilenê. From thence he went to Macedon, in the forty-third year of his age, and 343 A. C. He was employed eight years in the education of Alexander. He returned to Athens 335 A. C.; taught twelve years in the Lyceum, and died the year following at Chalcis, stat. sixty-three, A. C. 323, and a year after the death of Alexander. Dionysius ad Ammæum. He reckons by the Archons of Athens; I have substituted the years before Christ.

pretence of justice or necessity, and tempering even his hostilities by many partial acts of kindness and respect. Before the social war was ended, the seeds of dissension, so profusely scattered in Greece, were likely to ripen into a new quarrel far more general and important. Philip patiently waited their maturity. His hopes were founded on the domestic animosities of Greece; but the too early discovery of his system might have united a hundred thousand warriors against their common enemy; whereas, by the secret refinements of a slow and steady policy, he effected his vast purposes without being obliged, on any one occasion, to fight against thirty thousand men.

The Amphictyons having recovered their authority in consequence of the events which have formerly been described, began early to display those dangerous passions with which the exercise of uncontrolled power too naturally corrupts the heart. They pretended, that during the decline of their jurisdiction, many unwarrantable abuses had been introduced, which it became them to remedy. The rights of religion (they said,) which it was their first duty to maintain, had been materially violated by the Phocians, who, alike regardless of the decision of the oracle, and of an Amphictyonic decree, had ploughed lands consecrated to Apollo, and therefore withdrawn from agriculture.³ These lands, however, were confined to the narrow district between the river Cephissus and Mount Thurium, on the western frontier of Bœotia. The crime of the Phocians (if their useful labours deserve the name of crime) was neither great nor unprecedented, since the Locrians of Amphissa had long cultivated the Crissæan plain; a more extensive territory, and consecrated to the god by far more awful ceremonies.⁴ But the proud tyranny of the Amphictyons, careless of such distinctions, fulminated an angry decree against Phocis, commanding the sacred lands to be laid waste, and imposing a heavy fine on that community.

It is believed that the Thebans, the enemies and neighbours of Phocis, and whose influence at that time predominated in the council, were the principal abettors of this arbitrary measure;⁵ a supposition rendered probable by the ensuing deliberations of the Amphictyons. Their next sentence was directed against Sparta, to punish the injury of Phœbidæa, who, in time of peace, had surprised and seized the Theban citadel. This breach of public faith, however criminal and flagrant, had been committed so many years before, that prudence required it to be for ever buried in obscurity. But, at the instigation of the Thebans, the Amphictyons brought it once more to light; commanded the Lacedæmonians to pay a fine of five hundred talents; decreed that the fine should be doubled, unless paid

within an appointed time; and if the decree were finally disregarded, that the Lacedæmonians should be treated as public enemies to Greece.⁷

Olymp.

cv. 4.

A. C. 357.

The Phocians, singled out as the first victims of oppression, were deeply affected by their danger. To pay the money demanded of them exceeded their faculties. It would be grievous to desolate the fields which their own hands had cultivated with so much toil. The commands of the Amphictyons were indeed peremptory; but that council had not on foot any sufficient force to render them effectual, should the devoted objects of their vengeance venture to dispute their authority. This measure, daring as it seemed, was strongly recommended by Philomelus, whose popular eloquence and valour gave him a powerful ascendant in Phocis. He possessed great hereditary wealth; contemned the national superstition; and being endowed with a bold ambitious spirit, he expected to rise, amidst the tumult of action and danger, to unrivalled pre-eminence in his republic. After repeated deliberations, in which he flattered the vanity, and tempted the avarice of his countrymen, by proving, that to them of right belonged the guardianship of the Delphian temple, and the immense treasures contained within its sacred walls,⁸ he brought the majority of the senate and assembly into his opinion. As the properest instrument to execute his own measures, Philomelus was named general: the Phocian youth flocked to his standard; and his private fortune, as well as the public revenues, were consumed in purchasing the mercenary aid of those needy adventurers, who abounded in every province of Greece.

Olymp.

cvi. 1.

A. C. 358.

The following year was employed by Philomelus in providing arms, in exercising his troops, and in an embassy which he undertook in person to Sparta. As that community had not discharged the fine imposed by the Amphictyons, the penalty was doubled, and the delinquents were condemned to pay a thousand talents. The exorbitance of this imposition might have justified the Spartans in following the example of Phocis, and setting the Amphictyons at defiance. But Archidamus, who possessed all the caution and address of his father Agesilaus, was unwilling to take a principal part in the first dangerous experiment, and to post himself in the front of battle, against the revered decrees of an assembly, considered as the legal guardian of national religion and liberty. He assured Philomelus that both himself and the Spartans fully approved his cause; that reasons of a temporary nature hindered their declaring themselves openly, but that he might depend on secret supplies of men and money.⁹

³ The number is chosen as a very moderate medium between the two hundred and twenty thousand men, afterwards promised to Philip in the general convention of the States at Corinth for the service of the Persian expedition, and the eighty thousand which the Greeks actually raised against Xerxes, and which Thucydides says, that the Peloponnesian confederacy alone could send into Attica.

⁴ See c. v. p. 65.

⁵ See c. v. p. 64, et seq.

⁶ Justin. l. viii. c. i. et seq.

⁷ Diodor. l. xvi. c. xxiii. et seq.

⁸ Philomelus cited the respectable authority of Homer:

Αὐτὰρ Φοκίων Σχιδίος καὶ Ἐπιστροφὸς κελχόν,
οἱ Κυπαρίσσων ἱχθύν, Πυθωνα τε πίτρηισσαν.

"But Schedius and Epistrophus led the Phocians, who inhabited Cyparissus, and the rocky Python," the ancient name of Delphi.

⁹ Οὐ δὲ Ἀρχιδάμους ἀποδείξαμενος τὸν λόγον, φανερώς μιν, κατὰ τὸ πᾶρον, οὐκ εἴρησε βεβήκασιν, λαίρκα δὲ πάντα συμ-

Olymp. Encouraged by this assurance, and by a considerable sum¹ immediately put into his hands, Philomelus, at his return, ventured on a measure not less audacious than unexpected. The temple of Delphi, so awfully guarded by superstition, was scarcely defended by any military force. Philomelus, having prepared the imagination of his followers for this bold enterprise, immediately conducted them towards Delphi, defeated the feeble resistance of the Thracidæ, who inhabited the neighbouring district, and entered the sacred city with the calm intrepidity of a conqueror. The Delphians, who expected no mercy from a man devoid of respect for religion, prepared themselves in silent horror, for beholding the complicated guilt of sacrilege and murder. But the countenance of Philomelus re-assured them, and his discourse totally dispelled their ill-grounded fears. He declared that he had come to Delphi with no hostile disposition against the inhabitants, with no sacrilegious designs against the temple. His principal motive was to emancipate the one and the other from the arbitrary proceedings of the Amphictyons, and to assert the ancient and unalienable prerogative of Phocis to be the patron and protector of the Delphian shrine. To the same purpose he scattered declarations through the different republics of Greece; his emissaries acquainted the Spartans that he had destroyed the brazen tablets containing the unjust decrees against Sparta and Phocis; they inflamed the resentment of the Athenians, naturally hostile to Thebes; and both these republics came to the resolution of supporting the measures of Philomelus.

The Thebans, on the other hand, who directed, and the Locrians, Thessalians, with other states of less consideration, who tamely obeyed the decrees of the Amphictyons, determined to take the field in defence of their insulted religion and violated laws. Their operations were conducted with that extreme slowness natural to confederacies. Philomelus acted with more vigour. He received little assistance from his distant allies. But, first, by imposing a heavy tax on the Delphians, who had been enriched by the devotion of Greece, and then, notwithstanding his declaration, by taking very undue liberties with the treasure of Apollo,² he collected above ten thousand mercenaries, men daring and profligate as himself, who sacrificed all scruples of religion to the hopes of dividing a rich spoil. Such at least was the general character of his followers. To the few who had more piety, or less avarice, he endeavoured to justify his measures by the authority of an oracle. The Pythia at first refused to mount the sacred tripod. Philomelus sternly commanded her. She obeyed with reluctance, observing, that being already master of Delphi, he might act without sanction or control.³ Phi-

lomelus waited for no other answer, but gladly interpreted the words as an acknowledgment of his absolute authority; and, with the address suitable to his situation and character, confirmed the auspicious declaration of the priestess by the report of many favourable omens.⁴

Olymp. Having obtained the supposed sanction of religion, Philomelus proceeded to fortify the temple and city of Delphi, in which he placed a strong garrison; and, with the remainder of his forces, boldly marched forth to repel the incursions of the enemy. During two years, hostilities were carried on with various fortune against the Locrians and Thebans. Victory for the most part inclined to the Phocians; but there happened not any decisive action, nor was the war memorable on any other account but that of the excessive cruelty mutually inflicted and suffered. The Phocian prisoners were uniformly condemned to death, as wretches convicted of the most abominable sacrilege and impiety; and the resentment of their countrymen retaliated with equal severity on the unhappy captives whom the chance of war frequently put into their hands.⁵

Olymp. As both armies anxiously expected reinforcements, they were unwilling to risk a general engagement, till chance rendered that measure unavoidable. Entangled among the woods and mountains of Phocis, the inconvenience of forage attracted them to the same point. The vanguards met unexpectedly near the town of Neone, and began to skirmish. A general and fierce action followed, in which the Phocians were repelled by superior numbers. Pathless woods, abrupt rocks and precipices, obstructed their retreat. In vain Philomelus strove with his voice and arm to rally the fugitives. He himself was carried along by the torrent to the brow of a precipice, afflicted with wounds, and still more with anguish and despair. The enemy advanced; it seemed impossible to escape their vengeance; the resolution of Philomelus was prompt and terrible; with a vigorous bound he sprang from the rock, thus eluding the torment of his own guilty conscience, and the resentment of his pursuers.⁶ While the Thebans and their allies admired this spectacle as a manifest indication of divine vengeance,⁷ Onomarchus, the lieutenant and brother of the Phocian general, collected and drew off the scattered remains of the vanquished army towards Delphi. The confederates determined to expel them from that holy place, and to inflict on the enemies of Greece and heaven, a punishment similar to that to which the wrath of Apollo had driven the impious Philomelus.⁸

Different causes concurred to prevent Philip on the one hand, and Athens and Sparta on the other, from taking a principal or early part in the Phocian war. The interested policy of

περὶ αὐτὸν, χορηγῶν καὶ χρημάτων καὶ μισθοφόρους. Diodor. l. xvi. p. 426.

¹ Diodorus (l. xvi. p. 426.) says, fifteen talents.

² Diodorus sometimes acknowledges, and sometimes denies, that Philomelus meddled with the sacred treasure.

³ Αποφθιγγόμενης δ' αὐτῆς πρὸς τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ βιζανίου "ὅτι ἔστι αὐτῶν πρῶτον οὐ βούλει." Diodor. p. 428.

⁴ Diodor. p. 420.

⁵ Diodor. p. 530. et seq.

⁶ Diodorus hints, that had Philomelus been taken captive, his body would have been shockingly mangled: φοβεύμενος τὴν ἐκ τῆς πικρῆς μάχης πικρίαν. p. 432.

⁷ Such it appeared to future historians: καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τροπὸν, δεῦρ τῶ δαιμονίου δίκης κατεστρέψα τὸν βίον. Diodor. ibid.

⁸ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 432.

Archidamus, who directed with absolute authority the councils of Sparta, was less anxious to support the arms of his distant confederates, than solicitous to recover the Lacedæmonian dominion in Peloponnesus. The opportunity seemed favourable for this purpose, the Thebans being deeply engaged in another contest, and the Athenians in strict alliance with Sparta. For several years, the arms and intrigues of Archidamus were employed against the Messenians, Arcadians, and Argives. But his ambitious design failed of success; the inferior cities of Peloponnesus, roused by a common danger, confederated for their mutual defence; and Athens, though actually the ally of Sparta, was unwilling to abandon to the tyranny of that republic her more ancient and faithful allies, the Arcadians and Messenians.⁹

While the politics of the Peloponnesus formed a system apart, the sacred war shook the centre of Greece, and the affairs of Thrace occupied Philip and the Athenians. Cotys was dead; his sons, Kersobleptes, Berisades, and Amadocus, were all dissatisfied with the partition of his dominions. While their hostilities against each other exhibited the odious picture of fraternal discord, the prizes for which they contended were successively carried off by Philip. The encroachments of that prince at length engaged Kersobleptes, the most powerful of the co-heirs, to cede the Thracian Chersonesus to the Athenians, who sent Chares with a numerous fleet to take possession of that peninsula. The town of Sestos alone made resistance. It was taken by storm, and treated with great severity by Chares; while Philip besieged and took the far more important city of Methoné in Pieria. In this siege he lost an eye, a loss which he is said to have borne with impatience,¹⁰ as the circumstances attending it were alike dishonourable to his judgment and humanity.¹¹

Olymp. It appears extraordinary that the Thebans, after the defeat and death of Philomelus, should not have pursued their good fortune, without allowing the enemy time to breathe and recover strength. They probably imagined that the

fatal exit of that daring chief would deter a successor; and that the Phocians would crave peace, if not driven to despair. Such indeed was the resolution of the more respectable part of the Phocians. But the bold, impious, and needy, who composed the most numerous description of that people, were bent on continuing the war. An assembly was convened, when Onomarchus, in a set speech,¹² flattered their hopes, and encouraged them to persevere. His opinion prevailed; he was named general; and his conduct soon proved, that he equalled his brother in boldness and ambition, and surpassed him in activity and enterprise. None better knew the power of gold, or had more address in employing it. With the Delphic treasure he coined such a quantity of money as perhaps had never before circulated in Greece. The Phocian army was restored and augmented; their allies were rendered more hearty in their cause; even their enemies were not proof against the temptations which continually assailed their fidelity. By seasonable bribes, Onomarchus distracted the councils of Thebes, and kept their arms inactive. The neighbouring states were persuaded to observe a neutrality; while the Thessalians, a people at all times noted for avarice and fraud,¹³ and of whose country the proverb said, that it had never produced a bad horse or an honest man, openly embraced the cause of Phocis.

These multiplied advantages were not allowed to languish in the hands of Onomarchus, who hoped to eclipse the unjust motives of his enterprise by the sudden splendour of victory. At the head of a numerous and well-appointed army, he poured down on Locris and Doris, ravaged the country, took Thronium by storm, laid several cities under contribution, pierced into Bœotia, and made himself master of Orchomenus. The Thebans assembled their forces to stem the torrent. Onomarchus first met with a repulse before the walls of Chæronæa, and ventured not to renew the engagement, having weakened his forces by placing garrisons in the important places which he had taken, as well as by sending a detachment of seven thousand men under his brother Phayllus, into Thessaly.¹⁴

In that country, the intrigues of Philip had counteracted the gold of Onomarchus. But Lycophron, who was the chief partisan of the latter, and whom Philip had formerly divested of his authority, had again established himself in Phæræ. Pegasæ, Magnesia, and several places of less note, declared for the tyrant, and for Phocis. The Macedonian interest prevailed elsewhere; and the factions were equally balanced, when Philip, with his usual diligence, entered Thessaly, defeated Phayllus, besieged

⁹ The question appears to have occasioned warm debates in the Athenian assembly: the Spartan and Arcadian parties were animated with the utmost zeal; and, according to the lively observation of Demosthenes, the Athenian orators, had they not spoke the Attic dialect, would have appeared, the one half Spartans, the other Arcadians. Demosthen. pro Megalop. p. 83.

¹⁰ Lucian de Scribend. Hist. p. 365.

¹¹ These circumstances, however, rest on the authority of Suidas and Ulpian. It is said, that when the arrow was extracted, the following inscription appeared on it: "Aster to Philip's right eye." Aster, it seems, had offered his services to Philip, as an excellent marksman; to which Philip replied, that he would employ him when he waged war with starlings. Philip caused the arrow to be shot back into the place, with a new inscription, "That he would hang up Aster;" a threat which was executed as soon as he was master of Methoné. Fictions still more incredible were related on this subject by the fabulous writers of the age of Alexander. Philip, it was said, lost his right eye by his unseasonable curiosity in prying into the amours of Olympias and Jupiter Ammon. This ridiculous flattery to Alexander has been so widely diffused, that it was supposed to be the subject represented on the celebrated vase, which is so much better explained by Mr. D'Hancarville. See Recherches sur les Arts de la Grèce, vol. ii.

¹² Περιφροντισμενον λογον διελεον. Diodor. p. 432.

¹³ The Thessalians had the same character in Greece, as the Lyguriens in Italy:

— Vano Ligu

Nequicquam patrias tentasti lubricis artes. VIRG. Euripides speaks of the slippery deceipts of the Thessalians. Demosthenes (Olynth. i. p. 4. ex edit. Wolf.) says, εἰτα τα των Θεσσαλων ταυτη γινε απιστα μιν ην δη του φυσου, και αλλε και ανθρωποις. Philip was farther distressed by the insurrections of the Thessalians, a people faithless by nature, at all times, to all men."

¹⁴ Diodor. p. 434.

and took Pégasæ, and drove the enemy with disgrace towards the frontier of Phocis. The fear of losing his newly-acquired interest among the Thessalians, made Onomarchus evacuate Bœotia, and advance against Philip with his whole army. The Macedonians, though less numerous, did not decline the engagement. At the first charge the Phocians gave way, and retreated towards the neighbouring mountains. Philip ordered his men to pursue in their ranks. It was then that the Phocians really began the battle. Onomarchus, foreseeing that the Macedonians would follow in close order, had posted a detachment on the summit of the precipice, who were ready, on a given signal, to roll down fragments of rock, and stones of an enormous size, on the embattled phalanx. This was the only mode of attack, for which the Macedonians were not prepared. The line of march, in which the moment before they proceeded with such firmness and confidence, was converted into a dreadful scene of carnage and ruin. Before they recovered from their consternation, the flying Phocians, who had decoyed them into this ambush, returned to the charge. Philip, however, rallied his men; and while Onomarchus hesitated to advance, drew them off in good order, saying, that they did not retreat through fear, but retired like rams, in order to strike with the more impetuous vigour.¹

This saying was finally justified, although the Phocians and Lycophron first enjoyed a short triumph. The tyrant established himself, as he thought, securely, in his native city; the Phocians, reinforced by their Thessalian allies, again invaded Bœotia, assaulted and took Coroneæ, and dreadfully alarmed the Thebans, by the devastations committed in the very centre of their territory. But the time of vengeance arrived. Philip having recruited his army, returned into Thessaly. The unsteady partisans of Lycophron, had they determined to share his danger, would have proved unable to support his cause. A considerable portion of the Thessalians received the king of Macedon as their deliverer. Onomarchus was thus obliged to withdraw his forces from Bœotia. At the head of twenty thousand foot and five hundred horse, he marched to the defence of Lycophron, and was met by the enemy, still more numerous, on the level coast of Magnesia. To remind his soldiers that they fought in the cause of Delphi and of heaven, Philip crowned their heads with the laurel consecrated to Apollo, and adorned his ensigns and standards with the emblems and attributes of that divinity.² Their onset was impetuous and fierce, and their valour, animated by enthusiasm, rendered them irresistible, though the enemy, conscious of guilt, fought with the fury of despair. Three thousand Thessalian cavalry, who had signally contributed to the victory of Philip, rendered the pursuit bloody and destructive; while the Phocians, having thrown away their armour, fled towards the sea, allured by the sight of the Athenian fleet under Chares, which was re-

turning from the Chersonesus. That commander seems not to have made any attempt to protect them. Above six thousand perished in the battle, or in the pursuit. The body of Onomarchus was found among the slain; Philip ordered it to be hung on a gibbet, as a mark of peculiar infamy; the rest were thrown into the sea, as unworthy, by their impious sacrilege, of the rites of funeral. Three thousand were taken alive; but it is not absolutely certain whether they were drowned, or reduced into captivity; though the latter opinion is the more probable.³

It might be expected that such a decisive blow should have proved fatal to the Phocians. But Philip, who had conquered them in Thessaly, durst not pursue his advantages by invading Phocis; well knowing, that an attempt to pass the straits of Thermopylæ would alarm not only his enemies but his allies. It was his interest to perpetuate dissensions in Greece. For that reason he fomented the discord that reigned among the states of Peloponnesus; and though he had punished the obnoxious Phocians, he was unwilling to terminate a war which diverted the public attention from watching too studiously his own ambitious designs. His victory over an odious enemy extended his just renown. He secured the dominion of Thessaly, by planting garrisons in Phœræ, Pégasæ, and Magnesia. His army was ready to march towards Greece on the first favourable opportunity; but till that should arrive, he rejoiced to see both divisions of that country involved in war, which allowed him to accomplish, unmolested, the subordinate purposes of his reign. He had long deceived the Olynthians by good offices and promises, but now began to throw off the mask, and to show that he meant to be their master. He actually applied to Kersobleptes, whom he detached from the interest of Athens; and having raised him on the ruins of the neighbouring chieftains of Thrace, thereby obtained his confidence, and waited an occasion to destroy him with security.⁴ The dominions of that prince opened the way to Byzantium, the possession of which must have early tempted the ambition of Philip, who knew so well to estimate the importance of its situation both in commerce and in war. He began to discover his designs against Byzantium by attacking the fortress of Herseum, a place so called from the neighbouring temple

¹ Polyæn. Stratag. l. ii. c. xxviii. Diodor. l. xvi. 34, et seq.

² Justin. l. viii. 2.

³ The leaving such a circumstance at all doubtful, is very dishonourable to the accuracy of the compiler Diodorus. His words are, τέλος δὲ, τὴν Φωκίαν καὶ μισθοφόρων ἀνέριθμον μὲν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἑξακισχίλιους, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ στρατηγός. ἤλυσαν δὲ οὐκ ἱλαττοὺς τὸν τρισχίλιον. ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος τὸν μὲν Οὐνομαρχὸν ἐκρέμασεν, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ὡς ἱεροσυλοὺς κατέκοντις. Literally, "At length above six thousand of the Phocians and mercenaries were, on the one hand, taken up dead, among whom was the general. Not less than three thousand were, on the other hand, taken prisoners. Philip hung up Onomarchus, and threw the rest into the sea, as guilty of sacrilege." The learned reader will perceive, that I have given the full force of the word ἀνέριθμον; and from the precise and distinctive force of the particles μὲν and δὲ, which separate the two first clauses of the text, I am of opinion that the τοὺς ἄλλους can apply only to the rest of those who were taken up dead. There is nothing determinate to be learned from the word κατέκοντις, which signifies barely to plunge into the sea.

⁴ Justin. l. viii. 3. Demost. Olynth. 2 et 3.

of Juno, which formed its principal ornament. The town of Heræum was small, and in itself unimportant; its harbour was dangerous and deceitful; but being situate contiguous to Byzantium, it served as an outwork and defence to that rich and populous city.⁵

The Athenians had sufficient penetration to discern the drift of those enterprises. They formed an alliance with the republic of Olynthus; they warned Kersobleptes of his danger; they voted a numerous fleet to sail to the defence of Heræum, or rather of Byzantium, with which, though rendered independent of Athens by the social war, they still carried on a lucrative commerce. But these spirited exertions were not of long continuance. Philip's wound at Methoné, together with the continual labour and fatigue to which he had afterwards submitted, threw him into a dangerous malady. The report of his sickness was, before it reached Athens, magnified into his death. The Athenians rejoiced in so seasonable a deliverance, and laying aside their naval preparations, bent their principal attention to the sacred war.⁶

Olymp. That unhappy contest was renewed by Phayllus, the last surviving brother of Philomelus and Onomarchus. As his cause became more desperate, Phayllus availed himself to the utmost of the only resource which was left him. Having converted into ready money the most precious dedications of Delphi, he doubled the pay of his mercenaries. This extraordinary encouragement brought new adventurers to his standard, and soon rendered his army equal to that of either of his predecessors. The fugitive Thessalians, assembled in a body by Lycophron, entered into his pay. By means of the Delphic treasure, he acquired, likewise, the public assistance of a thousand Lacedæmonians, two thousand Achæans, five thousand Athenian foot, with four hundred cavalry. These powerful reinforcements enabled the Phocians to take the field with a good prospect of success, and rendered those who had so lately been the objects of pity, again formidable to their enemies.⁷

Philip, mean while, had recovered from his indisposition. The votes and preparations of the Athenians had taught him that his designs could no longer be concealed. He was acquainted with the alliance formed between that republic and Olynthus. His emissaries gave him intelligence of the actual commotions in Greece, where the countenance and assistance of so many powerful states abetted the sacrilege of the Phocians. The occasion required that he should appear in favour of his allies, and in defence of the pious cause which he had formerly maintained with so much glory. His trophies gained over Onomarchus were still fresh and blooming; and not only the Thebans, Dorians, and Locrians, who were principals in the war, but the sincere votaries of Apollo in every quarter of Greece, secretly expected him as their deliverer: while his ene-

mies admired his piety and trembled at his valour; and as they had been lately amused with the news of his sickness and death, they would now view with religious terror his unexpected appearance at Thermopylæ, to assert the violated rights of the Delphian temple. Such were the hopes and motives on which Philip, at the head of a numerous army, directed his march⁸ towards those celebrated straits, which we have formerly described, and so often mentioned.

But the event showed, that on this occasion he had made a false estimate of the superstition or timidity of the Greeks, and particularly had built too much on the patience and indolence of the Athenians. That people penetrated his designs, and determined to oppose them. Under the veil of religious zeal, they doubted not that he concealed the desire to invade and conquer their country; and, on the first intelligence of his expedition, their foresight and patriotism represented the Macedonians, Thessalians, and Thebans, pouring down like a destructive inundation, on Attica and Peloponnesus. With an alacrity and ardour, of which there was no recent example in their councils, they flew to arms, launched their fleet, sailed to Thermopylæ, and took possession of the straits.⁹

Never did Philip meet with a more cruel disappointment, than in being thus anticipated by a people whom he had so often deceived. He retired with deep regret, leaving the Phocian war to be carried on by the Thebans and their allies. Mean while, the Athenians placed a guard at Thermopylæ; and, elated by the first instance of their success against the Macedonian, called an assembly to deliberate on measures proper to restrain his ambition.

This assembly is rendered memorable by the first appearance of Demosthenes against Philip, whose measures from this moment he ceased not to watch, and to counteract. Two years before, this illustrious orator, whose works have been more praised than read, and more read than understood, began, in the twenty-eighth year of his age, to appear on the theatre of public life. The Athenians were then involved in the sacred war; their northern possessions were continually insulted, plundered, or conquered by Philip; yet in this situation of affairs, the mercenary partisans of that prince, in order to divert the public attention from his too aspiring designs, affected to extend their views to Asia, and to be alarmed by the motions of Artaxerxes Ochus, who was preparing to reduce the rebels of Cyprus, Egypt, and Phœnicia. In every assembly of the people, the creatures of Philip dwelt, with exaggerated terror, on the naval and military preparations of the great king, which they represented as certainly destined to revenge the recent injuries committed by the Athenian troops, under Chares, on the coast of Asia. The trophies of Miltiades, Themistocles, and Cimon, were adorned with all the pomp of eloquence; and the Athenians were exhorted to imitate those memorable exploits of their ancestors in the Persian war,

⁵ Justin. l. viii. 3. Demost. Olynth. 2 et 3.

⁶ Id. ubi supra.

⁷ Diodor. p. 436.

⁸ Id. l. xvi. p. 436.

⁹ Demosthen. de Falsa Legat. sect. 22.

which shed a lustre on all the succeeding periods of their history.

In this popular enthusiasm joined Isocrates the orator, together with the statesman and general Phocion, two men whose talents and virtues would have done honour to the most illustrious age of the republic. The unblemished integrity of Isocrates, the disinterested poverty of Phocion, afford sufficient proof that neither of these great men were corrupted by Macedonian gold. But they both perceived the indolence and unsteadiness of Athens were incapable to contend with the unceasing activity of Philip, and both exhorted their countrymen to gain and cultivate the friendship of a prince, against whom they could not make war with any reasonable prospect of success.

Isocrates, from the most accurate and extensive survey of the political history of Greece, discovered that a foreign war alone could heal the domestic dissensions which reigned in every quarter of that divided country; and from a thorough knowledge of the inherent defects in the government of Thebes, Athens, and Sparta, he regarded Macedon as the state, and Philip as the general, best entitled, and best qualified, to assume the command of a military expedition into Asia, to revenge ancient wrongs, and to deliver the Grecian colonies from the actual oppression of Barbarians. On this important subject he addressed a discourse to Philip; he repeatedly insisted on the same topic with the Athenians; and it is obscurely related, that on one occasion he reconciled those hostile powers,¹ and engaged them to concur in this extensive yet rational scheme of conquest.

The sentiments and views of Demosthenes were equally different from those of Isocrates and Phocion on the one hand, and from those of the infamous hirelings of Philip on the other. None knew better than he did the corruption and degeneracy of his countrymen; but he hoped to rouse them from their lethargy; a design, arduous as it may seem, sometimes effected by his eloquence, the most powerful, glowing, and sublime, ever employed by man; and which, of all men, he had been at most pains to acquire and cultivate.² His imagination was filled with the ancient glory of the republic; in the ardour of patriotism he forgot the moderation of philosophy; and while he sternly maintained the prerogatives and pretensions of his country, he would rather have seen Athens defeated at the head of her allies, than victorious under the standard of the Macedonians, or any standard but her own. With such sentiments and character, he was naturally a favourite of the people, and a warm partisan of popular government; while Phocion, like most men of sense and worth in that age, preferred a moderate aristocracy; and Isocrates was inclined to regard a well-regulated monarchy as the best of all governments.³

In his first speeches before the assembly, Demosthenes announced himself as the minister of the people at large, whom he exhorted to

awaken from their indolence, and at length to assume the direction of their own affairs. They had been too long governed by the incapacity of a few ambitious men, to the great detriment and disgrace of the community. First an orator at the head of all; under him a general, abetted by a faction of three or four hundred, availed themselves of the sloth and negligence of a people careless of every thing but pleasure, to domineer in the public councils, and to become masters of the state. From considerations of their present corruption and weakness, as well as of the designs and commotions of neighbouring powers, he advised them to forsake all distant and romantic schemes of ambition; and, instead of carrying their arms into remote countries, to prepare for repelling the attacks that might be made against their own dominions. He insisted earnestly on a better regulation of their finances, on the retrenching of many superfluous branches of expense, and especially on a more equitable repartition of public burdens, in proportion to the fortunes of individuals; which, though the income of the state had dwindled to four hundred talents, were actually more considerable than at any former period. While the rich cheerfully paid their contributions, the poor must be willing to forego the burdensome gratuities which they derived from the treasury; and all must be ready to take the field in person, that the public service might be no longer betrayed, or disgraced, by strangers and mercenaries.⁴

Subsequent events justified the opinions, and enforced the counsels of Demosthenes. The Athenians were delivered from their ill-grounded fears of Artaxerxes Ochus, when they beheld the preparations of that monarch directed against his rebellious subjects. The encroachments of Philip became continually more daring and more formidable; and his recent attempts to seize the straits of Thermopylæ showed the necessity of opposing him with re-united vigilance and vigour.

In this juncture, so favourable to awakening the activity of Athens, Demosthenes mounted the rostrum⁵ before any other orator, apologizing for this forwardness in a man not yet thirty years of age, by observing, "That already the usual speakers had given their opinions on the subject of Philip; and that, had *their* advices been useful and practicable, they must have precluded the necessity of any further deliberation. First of all, Athenians! you ought not to despair; no! not although your affairs seem indeed involved in equal confusion and danger. For the same circumstance which is the cause of your past misfortunes, ought to furnish the source of your present hope. What is that? Your own negligence and sloth, not the power of your enemies, have disordered the state. Had your distress arisen, notwithstanding your utmost care to prevent it, there would then be little hope of relief. But since it is occasioned by your own misconduct, you need only repair your errors, in order to retrieve your affairs.

¹ See the life of Isocrates, prefixed to my translation of his works.

² Dionys. Halicarn. et Plut. de Demost.

³ See his Nisæus, Evagoras, &c.

⁴ Vid. Oration. de Classibus, et de Ordinand. Republic.

⁵ I have used that word, because adopted in our language to express the *βήμα*, pulpit or gallery appropriated to the speakers in the Athenian assembly.

Considering the weakness of Athens, thus despoiled of her dominions, and the strength of Philip, which has increased immoderately at our expense, should you think him a formidable enemy, you doubtless think aright. Yet reflect, Athenians! that there was a time when we possessed Pydna, Potidæa, Methoné, and all the surrounding territory; that the nations in that neighbourhood, now subject to Philip, were then independent, and preferred the alliance of Athens to that of Macedon. In the infancy of his fortune, had Philip reasoned timidly, as we do now, 'How shall I, destitute of allies, attack the Athenians, whose garrisons command my frontier?' he would not have engaged in those enterprises which have been crowned with such signal success, nor raised his kingdom to such an unexampled pitch of grandeur. No, Athenians! he knew well, that towns and fortresses are but prizes of skill and valour⁶ proposed to the combatants, and belong of right to the conqueror; that the dominions of the absent are seized by those who take the field, and the possessions of the negligent and slothful by the vigilant and intrepid. Guided by these principles, he has subdued, and governs all; holding some communities by right of conquest, and others under the title of allies; for allies no prince nor state can want, who are not wanting to themselves. But should you, Athenians! imitate the example of Philip, and at length, rousing from your lethargy, apply seriously to your interest, you would speedily recover those advantages which your negligence only has lost. Favourable occasions will yet occur; for you must not imagine that Philip, like a god, enjoys his prosperity for ever fixed and immutable.⁷ No, Athenians! there are who hate him, who fear him, who envy him, even among those seemingly the most devoted to his cause. These are universal passions, from which the allies of Macedon are not, surely, exempted. They have hitherto concealed them, finding no resource in you; but it depends on your councils to call them into action. When, therefore, O my countrymen! when will you exert your vigour? when roused by some event—when urged by some necessity—What can be more urgent than the present juncture? To freemen, the most necessary of all motives is the shame of misconduct. Or say, will it still be your sole business to saunter in the public place, inquiring after news? What can be more new, than that a Macedonian should conquer Athens, and enslave Greece? Is Philip dead? No, but in great danger. How are you concerned in these rumours? What matters it to you whether he is sick or dead, since, if you thus manage your affairs, your folly will soon raise up another Philip?⁸

⁶ Ἄλλ' οἶδεν, ὡς πυνδρις Ἀθηναῖοις, τοῦτο καλῶς ἐκείνος, ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν ἴσθι πάντες τῇ χορῇ αἰὲλ τοῦ πολέμου κείμενα ἐν μίσθῳ. In ancient times the figure had more force, as well as dignity; because at the Olympic, and other sacred games, the spectators were used to behold the prizes proposed to the victors, κείμενα ἐν μίσθῳ, exposed in the middle of the field, to excite their emulation and ardour. See page 66.

⁷ The original is inimitable: μὴ γὰρ ὡς θεὸς νομιζέτ' ἔκινῃ τὰ παρόντα πειρηγῆναι πραγμάτων αἰώνια. Join the τὰ and the πραγματῶν, the article and the substantive, and the charm will be dissolved.

⁸ The sense indeed of that period, but neither its force

After this animated remonstrance, Demosthenes proposes a plan of operations calculated chiefly for defence. The Athenians, he observes, were not yet prepared to meet Philip in the field. They must begin by protecting Olynthus, and the Chersonesus, from his incursions. For this purpose, it was necessary to raise a body of two thousand men light-armed, and an adequate proportion of cavalry, which were to be transported under a proper convoy (as Philip had his fleet) with all expedition to the isles of Lemnos, Thasos, and Sciathos, contiguous to the coast of Macedon. Conveniently posted in those islands, where they would enjoy necessities in abundance, the Athenian troops might avail themselves of every favourable incident, to appear at the first summons of their allies, and either to repel the inroads of the Macedonians, or to harass the extended, and, in many parts, defenceless territory of that people. Mean while, preparations would be made at home for carrying on the war in due time, with more numerous forces, and with greater vigour. Such moderate proposals prove that Demosthenes well understood the genius of his countrymen. He required that only the fourth part of the troops should consist of Athenian citizens, and the immediate supplies were only to amount to ninety talents. He knew that higher demands would alarm their indolence and love of pleasure; and so fatally were they sunk in the dissipated amusements of the city, that it is probable the small armament proposed did not actually set sail; it is certain that no future preparations were made adequate to the public service.

The profound policy of Philip fostered the supine negligence of his enemies. For more than two years after his retreat from Thermopylæ, that crafty prince much confined himself to his dominions, and chiefly to his capital, anxious to dissipate the clamour occasioned by his too great precipitation to seize the gates of Greece. In that interval he indeed made an expedition to chastise the rebellious spirit of the Thessalians. But the greatest part of his time was spent at Pella, and A. C. 350. and 349. addicted to the arts of peace, which he judged with skill, and encouraged with munificence. That favourite city was adorned with temples, theatres, and porticoes. The most ingenious artists of Greece were summoned, by liberal rewards, to the court of Macedon;⁹ and men of talents and genius,¹⁰ who were too often exposed to envy and persecution in the former country, were received with open arms by a prince, who, amidst the tumult of war, assiduously cultivated the studies of literature and eloquence. In his domestic government, Philip administered justice with impartiality, listened with condescension to the com-

nor its harmony, can be translated. Τέθνηκε Φίλιππος; οὐ μὲν Διὶ! ἀλλ' ἀσθενεῖ· τί δὲ ὑμῖν διωφείει; καὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τί πάθῃ, ταχέως ὑμῖς ἑτέρον Φίλιππον ποιήσετε, ἐν περ οὕτω προσεχῆτε τοῖς πραγμασὶ τοῦ νουν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὗτος παρὰ τὴν ἰαυτοῦ ῥῆμην τοσούτον ἐπηξήσεται, ὅσον παρὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν κρείσσιν.

⁹ Justin. l. viii. c. 3.

¹⁰ Among other Greeks who lived at Philip's court were, Leosthenes the orator, Neoptolemus the poet, Aristodemus and Satyrus, celebrated players. Æschin. et Demogthen. passim.

plaints of his meanest subjects, and disdaining the ceremonious and forbidding pomp of tyranny, maintained an intercourse of visits and entertainments with his courtiers and generals.¹

In a prince so respectably employed, it is difficult to conceive the odious and detestable vices with which Philip is upbraided by Demosthenes;² yet the brief descriptions occasionally sketched by the orator are filled up by an ancient historian, who represents the infamies of the life of Philip in language well fitted to arraign the horrors of Nero or Heliogabalus. Could we believe the acrimony of Theopompus, a writer who flourished in the age of Alexander, by whom he was rewarded and honoured, not perhaps the less willingly because he had exposed or exaggerated the vices of his father, Philip sullied his great actions by the most enormous and detestable crimes. Alike avaricious and prodigal, the wealth which he had amassed by injustice and rapacity, he dissipated in the most flagitious gratifications, and in company with the meanest and most worthless of mankind. His companions were chosen promiscuously from Macedonians and Greeks, and especially from Thessalians, the most profligate of the Greeks, and were admitted to his familiarity and friendship, in proportion to their proficiency in the most odious and unnatural abominations³ that ever polluted the worst men

1 Plut. in Apophth. et in Demosthen. et Alexand.

2 Vid. Demosthen. ex. edit. Wolf. pp. 5, 8, 48, 66, &c.

3 The epithets given them by Theopompus are βδελυκοί, *abominabiles*; and λαστάρχοι; the last word is compounded of λᾶ, *valde*, and τάρχος, *taurus*; and translated *inseparatur mentulatus*, which corresponds to the *enormitas membrorum* of the Augustan historians. The following description of the friends of Philip is too indecent for modern language: "Horum enim quidem jam viri barbam identidem radebant et vellebantur: alii vero barbati citra pudorem vicissim se impudicabant, stupris intercutibus se flagitantes; regi vero duo vel tres circumducebantur qui paterentur muliebria, et eandem operam navarent alios subagitantes. Quamobrem illos jure aliquis non amicos regis, sed amicos esse credidisset, nec milites sed prostibula noncupasset, ingenio quidem et natura sanguinarios, moribus autem virilia scorta, &c." This passage is quoted from the forty-ninth book of Theopompus. In his twenty-sixth book he speaks to the same purpose: "Philippum cum Thessalos intemperantes esse, ac lascivæ petulantisque vitæ prospiceret, eorum conventus ac contubernia instituisse; iisque uti placeret modis omnibus fuisse conatum, cum illis saltasse, commissatum fuisse, cuivis libidini ac nequitie tradidisse." A mistaken passage of Diodorus has made some learned men doubt the authenticity of these descriptions. Diodorus (l. xvi. sect. 3.) says, that Theopompus γέγραπται ὅτι βιβλους, πρὸς τοῖς πινθηκόντα εἰς ὃν πιντε διαφώνουσι; "had written the history of Philip in fifty-eight books, five of which differ

in the most corrupt ages of the world. We must, doubtless, make allowances for the gall of a writer, noted to a proverb for severity. Yet there is sufficient collateral evidence, that Philip's strong propensity to low wit, obscenity, and drunkenness, rendered him a prey to buffoons, parasites, and flatterers, and all the worthless retinue of intemperance and folly. These disgraceful associates of the prince, formed, in time of war, a regiment apart, of about eight hundred men, whose gradual waste was continually recruited by new members, who either were, or soon became, worthy of the old; for, as we shall soon have occasion to relate, the whole band were alike cowardly and profligate.

But in whatever manner Philip employed his private hours, he at no time lost sight of those great principles of policy which regulated his public administration. Under pretence of wanting money to supply the expense of his buildings, and other public works, he employed an expedient which is well known in latter times, and which has been carried to such excess as threatens the safety of those governments which it was intended to uphold. The letting loose of the Delphic treasures had diffused near a million sterling over Greece.⁴ The unsettled state of that country rendered those who had acquired wealth very uncertain of enjoying it. With the rich and avaricious, Philip employed proper agents to take up⁵ money at high interest, which procured him two advantages of a very important kind, the attaching to his government and person a numerous and powerful band of creditors; and the enabling him to pay, under the title of debts, and therefore without suspicion, the various pensions and gratuities by which he maintained his influence among the orators and leading men in the several republics.

in style from the rest." Were we therefore to suppose the five last books spurious (for that is the inference which has been drawn,) the observation of Diodorus would not at all affect the passages above cited.

4 The sacred war lasted ten years, and cost the Phocians ten thousand talents, near two millions; it had already lasted five years, and may be supposed to have cost near the half of that sum. Diodor. l. xvi. p. 453. He says, that the gold and silver dedications (which were coined into money) υπερβαλλειν τὰ μυρία τάλαντα, "exceeded ten thousand talents;" a prodigious sum (considering the relative value of money in those days,) of which the sudden diffusion could not fail to produce most important consequences.

5 Justin. viii. 3.

CHAPTER XXXV.

Negligence and Licentiousness of the Athenians—Philip's Intrigues in Eubœa—Phocion defeats the Macedonians and Eubœans—Philip invades the Olynthian Territory—Demosthenes's Orations in favour of the Olynthians—Expedition of Chares—Philip takes Olynthus—Celebrates the Festival of the Muses at Diu—Commits naval Depredations on Attica—His Embassy to Athens—The Athenian Embassy to Philip—Character of the Ambassadors—Their Conference with the King—Differently reported to the Senate and Assembly—Philip's Conquests in Thrace—The Phocian War—Negotiations—Philip's Intrigues—Decree of the Amphictyons against Phocis—Executed by Philip—Macedon acknowledged the principal Member of the Amphictyonic Council.

Olymp.

cvii. 4.

A. C. 349.

THE Athenians, deceived by the inactivity of the king of Macedon, indulged themselves without reserve, in their favourite amusements. Their confederates, the Phocians, were abandoned; the war with Philip, in which they might well have considered themselves as principals, was neglected. Magistrates and people seemed solely attentive to regulate public festivals and processions, and to ascertain the respective merit of dramatic poets and performers. The fund originally intended for the exigences of war, had already been appropriated to the theatre; and a law was now enacted, on the motion of Eubulus, an artful flatterer of the multitude, rendering it a capital crime to propose altering this unexampled and most whimsical destination. It was in vain for Demosthenes to resist the popular torrent. He was opposed and overcome by Eubulus and Demades, the latter of whom, with talents that might have adorned his country, condescended to sell its interests to the public enemy.

Born in the lowest condition of life, Demades retained the vices of his birth; and always discovered that sordid spirit, and weltered in those brutal excesses, which betray the want of early culture. Yet the acuteness of his apprehension, the strength of his reason and memory, and, above all, the bold and copious flow of his unpremeditated eloquence, in which he was allowed to excel even Demosthenes⁶ himself, raised him to a conspicuous rank in the assembly; and it being his business, as the hireling of Philip, to sail along with the stream of popular frenzy, which the patriotism of his rival endeavoured to struggle with, and to stem, he possessed a free and ample scope for exercising his abilities.

Olymp.

cvii. 4.

A. C. 349.

The people of Athens triumphed in the victory of perfidious demagogues over the wisest and best of their fellow citizens, or rather over the laws and constitution of their country, when Philip began to play those batteries which he had patiently raised with such skill and secrecy. The island of Eubœa, which he called the fetters of Greece, was the first object of his attack. Since the expulsion of the Thebans, of which we have formerly taken notice, the Athenians had preserved their interest in the island, where they maintained a small body of troops. The different cities, however, enjoyed

the independent government of their own laws; they appointed their own magistrates; they sometimes made war against each other; and separately assumed the prerogatives of free and sovereign states, while they all collectively acknowledged their dependence on Athens. Such political arrangements made room for the intrigues of Philip. He fomented their civil discord; gained partisans in each city; and, at length, under colour of protecting his allies, landed several Macedonian battalions in the island.⁷

Matters were soon disposed to his wish. The Macedonians were allowed to occupy the most advantageous posts. The Athenian party exclaimed and threatened; but Plutarch, the leader of that party, was gained to the interests of Philip, and demanded auxiliaries from Athens only to betray them into the hands of their enemies. Demosthenes, who alone penetrated this dark scheme of villany, entreated and conjured his countrymen to put no confidence in Plutarch. But he was single in his opinion. The confidants of Philip were true to their master, and therefore urged the expedition. The friends of their country were eager to save the isle of Eubœa, and the capricious multitude, ever in extremes, rushed with as much impetuosity to an enterprise intended for their ruin, as they had long shown backwardness to engage in every other.⁸ The promptitude and vigour of their preparations much exceeded the expectation, and even alarmed the fears, of the Macedonian faction. But the latter had gone too far to retreat; nor could they foresee the consequences that happened, so contrary to their hopes. The Athenians, in fact, obtained a decisive victory, not by the strength of their arms, which was inferior to the enemy's, but by the wise choice of a general.

The consummate prudence of Phocion, who, on his arrival in Eubœa, found things in a worse state than had been represented, risked no chance of defeat, and lost no opportunity of advantage.⁹ Having chosen a favourable post, which was on all sides surrounded by broken and uneven ground, he despised the clamours of his men and the insults of the enemy. The treacherous Plutarch was quickly defeated in a mock battle, in which he fell back on the Athenian cavalry, who fled in disorder to the

⁷ Æschin. in Ctesiphont. et Demosth. de Falsa Legatione et de Pace.

⁸ Demosth. de Pace.

⁹ Plutarch. in Phocion.

⁶ Plutarch. in Demosthen.

camp of Phocion. The Eubœans and Macedonians pursued with a rash and intemperate ardour; and elated with victory, and confident in their superior numbers, prepared to assail the camp. The general, mean while, performed a sacrifice, which he studiously prolonged, either from religion or policy, until he beheld the disorder of the assailants, embarrassed by the unequal ground, and by their own rashness. He then commanded his men to stand to their arms, and sallying from his intrenchments with intrepid valour, increased the confusion of the enemy, who were repelled with great slaughter towards the plain which they had at first occupied. The activity of Cleophanes, who had rallied and formed the Athenian cavalry, rendered the victory complete. The remains of the vanquished took refuge in the fortress of Zeratra, in the northern corner of the island, which, being attacked, made a feeble resistance.¹ The garrison surrendered; but Phocion restored all the Eubœans to liberty, lest the people of Athens, inflamed by their popular leaders, might treat them with that cruelty, which, on a similar occasion, they had inflicted on the rebellious citizens of Mitylené.² Having spent a few weeks in settling the affairs of the island, he returned in triumph to Athens, his ships drawn up in line of battle, their stems crowned with garlands, and the rowers keeping time to the sound of martial music. His fellow citizens received him with acclamations of joy; but their imprudence did not allow them to reap the fruits of his success. Molossus, an obscure stranger, was appointed, by cabal, to command the troops left in the island; and Philip, having renewed his intrigues, carried them on with the same dexterity, and met with better success.³

It is worthy of attention, that Demosthenes followed the standard of Phocion to Eubœa, though he had strongly disapproved the expedition. Both he and his rival Æschines, of whom we shall soon have occasion to speak more fully, served in the cavalry. Demosthenes was reproached with being the first who deserted his rank, and among the last who returned to the charge. Æschines behaved with distinguished gallantry, and had the honour of being appointed by Phocion to carry home the first intelligence of the victory.⁴

Olymp. Philip's disappointment in Eubœa only stimulated his activity. cvii. 4. His toils were spread so widely all A. C. 349. around him, that when one part failed he could catch his prey in another. The Olynthians, against whom he seemed to have long forgotten his resentment, were astonished to observe that several of their citizens grew rich and great in a manner equally sudden and unaccountable; and that they enlarged their possessions, built stately palaces, and displayed a degree of magnificence and grandeur hitherto unknown in their frugal republic. The unexpected invasion of Philip revealed the mystery. A considerable party had grown wealthy by betraying the secrets, exposing the weakness,

and fostering the ill-timed security of their country.⁵ Their influence at home had recommended them to Philip, and the wages of their iniquity had increased that influence. It would not probably have been difficult to prove their treason, but it seemed dangerous to punish it; and the Olynthians were more immediately concerned to repel the open ravages of their territory. In this emergency they trusted not to their domestic forces of ten thousand foot and one thousand horse,⁶ but sent an embassy to Athens, inveighing in the strongest terms against Philip, who had first courted, then deceived, and at last invaded and attacked them; and craving assistance from the Athenians, in consequence of the alliance formerly concluded between the two republics, to defeat the designs of a tyrant equally daring and perfidious.

Had the people of Athens heartily undertaken the cause of Olynthus, Philip would have been exposed a second time to the danger which he had eluded with so much address in the beginning of his reign. Thebes was employed and exhausted in the Phocian war; the grandeur of Sparta had decayed as much as her principles had degenerated; the inferior states extended not their views of policy beyond their respective districts. But the Athenians, recently successful in Eubœa, and reinforced by the strength and resentment of such a republic as Olynthus, might have still rendered themselves formidable to the public enemy, especially as at this juncture the rebellious humours of the Thesalians broke out afresh, and led them capriciously to oppose, with as much eagerness as they had often helped to promote, the interest of Macedonia. But to compensate these unpromising circumstances, Philip possessed strenuous abettors of his power within the walls of Athens and Olynthus; and his garrisons actually commanded the principal posts in Thessaly. Above all, the indolence and vices of his enemies were most favourable to his cause. The late success in Eubœa, which should have animated a brave and generous people to new exertions and dangers, only replunged the Athenians into a slothful security. While they enjoyed their theatrical entertainments, their shows and festivals, and all the ease and luxury of a city life, they were little inclined to engage in any enterprise that might disturb the tranquil course of their pleasures. In this disposition they were encouraged by their perfidious orators, who strongly exhorted them to beware of involving themselves in the danger of Olynthus, or of provoking the resentment of a prince whose power they were unable to resist. The orator Demades particularly distinguished his zeal in the Macedonian interest; advising an absolute and total rejection of the demands of the Olynthian ambassadors.

Demosthenes at length arose, and as the design of calling the assembly had been already explained, entered immediately on the question under deliberation. "On⁷ many occasions,

¹ Plut. in Phocion.

² See above, c. xvi. p. 197.

³ Plut. in Phocion.

⁴ Æschin. de Falsa Legatione, et Demost. in Midiam.

⁵ Demosthen. Olynth. passim.

⁶ Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione.

⁷ I mean not a translation of Demosthenes. The inserting his speeches entire would destroy the humble uniformity of this historical work, with the design of which it would

Athenians! have the gods declared their favour to this state, but never more manifestly than in the present juncture. That enemies should be raised to Philip, on the confines of his territory, enemies not contemptible in power, and, which is more important, so determined on the war, that they regard every accommodation with Macedon, first as insidious, next as the destruction of their country, can be ascribed to nothing less than the bountiful interposition of Heaven. With every thing else on our side, let us not be wanting to ourselves; let us not be reproached with the unspeakable infamy of throwing away, not only those cities and territories which we inherited from our ancestors, but those occasions and alliances offered us by fortune and the gods. To insist on the power and greatness of Philip belongs not to the present subject. He has become great through your supine neglect, and the perfidy of traitors, whom it becomes you to punish. Such topics are not honourable for you: I wave them as superfluous, having matter more material to urge. To call the king of Macedon perjured and perfidious, without proving my assertions, would be the language of insult and reproach. But his own actions, and not my resentment, shall name him; and of these I think it necessary to speak, for two reasons; first, that he may appear, what he really is, a wicked man; and, secondly, that the weak minds who are intimidated by his power and resources, may perceive that the artifices to which he owes them are now all exhausted, and that his ruin is at hand. As to myself, Athenians! I should not only fear but admire Philip, had he attained his present height of grandeur by honourable and equitable means. But after the most serious examination I find, that at first he seduced our simplicity by the flattering promise of Amphipolis; that he next surprised the friendship of Olynthus by the deceitful gift of Potidæa; that, lastly, he enslaved the Thessalians, under the specious pretence of delivering them from tyrants. In one word, with what community hath he treated which hath not experienced his fraud? Which of his confederates hath he not shamelessly betrayed? Can it be expected, then, that those who promoted his elevation, because they thought him *their* friend, will continue to support it, when they find him a friend to his own interests alone? Impossible! When confederacies are formed on the principles of common advantage and affection, each member shares the toils with alacrity; all persevere; such confederacies endure. But when worthlessness and lawless ambition have raised a single man, the slightest accident overthrows the unstable edifice of his grandeur. It is not, no! Athenians! it is not possible to found a lasting power on treachery, fraud, and perjury. These may succeed for awhile: but time reveals their weakness. For, as in a house, a ship, and in structures of every kind, the foundation and

lower parts should be firm and solid, so the grounds and principles of action should be just and true. But such qualities belong not to the actions of Philip.⁸

"I am of opinion, then, that fearless of consequences, you ought to assist Olynthus with the utmost celerity and vigour, and to despatch an embassy to the Thessalians, to inflame their hostility. But take care, Athenians! that your ardour evaporate not in resolutions and decrees. Be ready to pay your contributions; prepare to take the field; show yourselves in earnest, and you will soon discover not only the hollow faith of the allies of Philip, but the internal and concealed infirmity of Macedon itself. That kingdom has emerged from obscurity amidst the contests of neighbouring states, during which, the smallest weight, put into either scale, is sufficient to incline the balance. But, in itself, Macedon is inconsiderable and weak, and its real weakness is increased by the splendid but ruinous expeditions of Philip. For the king and his subjects are actuated by very different sentiments. Domineered by ambition, he disregards ease and safety; but his subjects, who individually have little share in the glory of his conquests, are indignant, that, for the sake of one man, they should be harassed by continual warfare, and withdrawn from those occupations and pursuits, which afford the comforts and happiness of private life. On the great body of his people, Philip, therefore, can have no reliance; nor, whatever may be said of their valour and discipline, can he depend more on his mercenaries. For I am informed, by a man of undoubted veracity, who has just arrived from Macedon, that none of Philip's guards, even those whom he treats with the affectionate, but deceitful names of companions, and fellow soldiers, can merit his esteem, without incurring his hatred and persecution. Such is the intolerable jealousy, such the malignant envy, which crowns the other odious vices of this monster, who, defying every sentiment of virtue and decency, drives from his presence all who shudder, all who are disgusted, at the most unnatural enormities; and whose court is continually crowded by buffoons, parasites, obscene poets and drunkards; wretches who, when drunk, will dance, but such dances⁹ as modesty dare not name. Slight and trivial as these matters may to some appear, they exhibit the worthless-

⁸ The important, though trite proverb, that in public, as well as in private transactions, "honesty is the best policy," was never expressed, perhaps with such dignity, as in the following words of Demosthenes: *ὅταν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐννοίῃς τὰ πρᾶγματ' αὐτῶν, καὶ πιστὴ ταῦτα συμφέρη τοῖς μετέχουσι τοῦ πολέμου, καὶ συμπονεῖν, καὶ φέρειν τὰς συμφορὰς, καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐθελούσιον οἱ ἀνδρες ποιεῖν· ὅταν δὲ ἐκ πλεονεξίας τις, ὡς περ οὗτος, ἰσχυρῇ, ἢ πρώτῃ προφασίς καὶ μικρὸν πταίσμα, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀνιχνεύσῃ καὶ διαλύσῃ. οὐ γὰρ ἴσθι, ὡ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικούντες καὶ ἐπιπορευόμενοι καὶ ψευδομένον, δυνάμιν βασιλῆων κτησασθαι· ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς μὲν ἀπάξ, καὶ βραχὺν χρόνον, ἀντιχεῖσθαι· καὶ σφοδρὰ γὰρ ἠβδήσιν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, ἂν τύχῃ τὸ χροῖον δι' αὐτῶν, καὶ τερὶ αὐτὰ καταρρίψῃ. ὡς περ γὰρ οἰκίαις, οἰμαί, καὶ πλοίου, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ κατὰ τὸν ἰσχυροτάτη εἶναι δεῖ, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς υπαρξίστας ἀληθείας καὶ δικαιοσύνας εἶναι προσήκει· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἐνὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς πεπραγμένοις Φιλίππῳ.* Demosthen. Olynth. i. or Olynth. ii. p. 7th, in the common but incorrect edition of Wolfius.

⁹ The χορδαλισμός. Demosth. p. 8. Vid. Schol. ad Aristoph. in Nubib. From the description above given of Athenian manners, it appears that Demosthenes's delicacy was merely complimentary.

be inconsistent to transcribe what the orator found it necessary to say, repeat, and enforce so often. Besides, Demosthenes is one of the few Greek writers that has been translated, as the late Mr. Harris says in his *Philological Enquiries*, by competent persons: Drs. Leland and Francis, in English; Mr. Turreil and the Abbé Anger, in French; and the Abbé Cesarotti, in Italian.

ness of Philip, and, announce the infelicity which awaits him. The dangerous defects of his character are hid in the blaze of prosperity;¹ but when misfortune happens, his native deformity will appear. For it is easy to prove that, as in the bodily frame, men, during the season of health, are insensible of what is weak and disordered in their constitutions, which imperfections are immediately felt on the first approach of sickness; so the glory of foreign conquest conceals the vices and defects of republics and monarchies; but let calamity happen, let the war be carried to their frontiers, and those hitherto latent evils immediately become manifest.

"If there is a man among you, Athenians! who thinks that Philip is a formidable enemy, because he is fortunate, I agree with that man. Fortune² has a mighty influence, or rather Fortune alone domineers in human affairs. Yet could you be persuaded to do but the smallest part of your duty, I would greatly prefer your fortune to Philip's; for *you*, surely, have better reason to trust in the assistance of Heaven. But we remain, I think, inactive, hesitating, delaying, and deliberating, while our enemy takes the field, braving seasons and dangers, and neglecting no opportunity of advantage. And if the indolent and careless are abandoned by their best friends, can we expect that the gods, however favourable, should assist us, if we will not help ourselves?"

The people of Athens, animated to their duty, on the one hand, by Demosthenes, and seduced, on the other, by the hirelings of Philip,³ and their own deceitful passions, imprudently steered a middle course, which, in public affairs, is often the most dangerous. Convinced that the preservation of Olynthus was the best safeguard of Attica, yet unwilling to tear themselves from their beloved pleasures, they determined to send Chares, with a fleet and two thousand mercenaries, to the assistance of their allies. This commander, who was the idol of the multitude, but the disgrace of his country and of his profession,⁴ showed no solicitude to protect the dependencies of Olynthus, which successively submitted to the Macedonian arms. To gratify the rapacity of his troops, he made a descent on the fertile coast of Palléné, where, falling in with eight hundred men commanded by Audæus, called the friends of Philip, he obtained over those contemptible cowards an easy and ludicrous victory, which served only to amuse the comic poets of the times. Having gained this advantage, Chares became unwilling to try his fortune in any severer conflict; and disdain, as he affected, to follow the motions of Philip, returned home, and celebrated his triumph over the vain, boastful, and voluptuous Audæus;⁵ not, however, with the spoils of the vanquished, but with the sum of sixty talents,

which he had extorted from the Phocians, who were actually in alliance with Athens.⁶

The thoughtless multitude, who judged of the expedition of Chares by the expensive pomp with which he entertained them at his return, talked extravagantly of invading Macedon, and chastising the insolence of Philip,⁷ when a second embassy arrived from Olynthus. The inhabitants of this place had been shut up within their walls; they had lost Stagyra, Miciberna, Toroné, cities of considerable strength, besides many inferior towns, which, on the first appearance of Philip, were forward to receive his bribes, and to open their gates;⁸ and this shameful venality, in places well provided for defence, made the king of Macedon observe to his generals, that he would thenceforth consider no fortress as impregnable, which could admit a mule laden with money.⁹ Dejected by continual losses, the Olynthians turned their thoughts to negotiation, that they might at least amuse the invader till the arrival of the Athenian succours. Philip penetrated their design, and dexterously turned their arts against them; affecting to lend an ear to their proposals, but mean while continuing his approaches, till, having got within forty stadia of their walls, he declared that of two things one was necessary, either *they* must leave Olynthus, or *he* Macedon.¹⁰ This explicit declaration from an enemy, who often flattered to destroy, but who might always be believed when he threatened, convinced the Olynthians of what they had long suspected, that their utter ruin was at hand. They endeavoured to retard the fatal moment by a vigorous sally, in which their cavalry, commanded by Apollonides, particularly signalised their valour.¹¹ But they were repulsed by superior numbers, and obliged to take refuge in the city.

In this posture of affairs, the ambassadors sailed for Athens; and having arrived there, found, to their utter astonishment, the multitude still enjoying the imaginary triumph of Chares. This commander, who chiefly owed his credit to the ascendant of superficial qualities over the undiscerning folly of the people, was a warm and active partisan of democracy, and as such viewed, even by Demosthenes, with too partial eyes. The orator, besides, well knew that the irregular, useless, or destructive operations of the Athenian arms, ought not always to be charged on the misconduct of the general. The troops were always ill paid; sometimes not paid at all; and therefore disobedient and mutinous. Instead of submitting to control, they often controlled their leaders; their resolutions were prompt and ungovernable; when they could not persuade, they threatened; and compelled even prudent commanders to measures wild, ruinous, and dishonourable.

Demosthenes, therefore, who again undertook to second the demands of Olynthus, waved all

1 *Secundæ res mirè sunt vitii obtentui.* Sallust.

2 From what is said below, it appears that, by Fortune, Demosthenes here means the dispensations of Providence; and by good fortune, the Favour of Heaven.

3 Philochorus in Dionys. Epist. ad Ammonium.

4 Timotheus said of him, "that he was fitter to carry the baggage, than to command an army." Plut. in Apophth.

5 Among his contemporaries, he was nicknamed *αλεκ-τερον*, the cock. Athenæus l. xii. p. 534.

6 Athenæus l. xii. p. 534.

7 Demosthen. Olynth. ii.

8 Diodorus, l. xvi. p. 450.

9 Plutarch. ubi supra. Diodorus, p. 451, relates the matter somewhat differently. But he acknowledges that the king of Macedon boasted that he had augmented his dominions more by gold than by arms. Diodorus, p. 450.

10 Demosthen. Philipp.

11 Id. Ibid.

accusation against particular persons. After endeavouring to repress the vain confidence of his countrymen, which had been excited by the supposed advantages of Chares, and the venal breath of corrupt orators, he describes the real danger of their allies, which he persuades them to regard as their own. The crisis was now arrived; and if they neglected the present opportunity of fulfilling their engagements to Olynthus, they must soon be obliged to meet Philip in Attica. He reminds them of the various occasions, which they had already lost, of repelling this rapacious tyrant, this hostile Barbarian, this mixture of perfidy and violence, for whom he cannot find any name sufficiently reproachful. "But some perhaps will say, it is the business of a public speaker to advise, not to upbraid. We wish to assist the Olynthians, and we will assist them; but inform us how our aid may be rendered most effectual. Appoint magistrates, Athenians! for the inspection of your laws; not to enact new laws; they are already too numerous; but to repeal those whose ill effects you daily experience; I mean the laws respecting the theatrical funds (thus openly I declare it,) and some about the soldiery. By the first, the soldier's pay is consumed, as theatrical expenses, by the useless and inactive; the second screen from justice the coward who declines the service, and damp the ardour of the brave who would be ready to take the field. Till these laws be repealed, expect not that any man will urge your true interest, since his honest zeal must be repaid with destruction." After insisting still farther on this delicate and dangerous subject, Demosthenes probably observed displeasure and resentment in the countenances of his hearers, and then (as his custom was) artfully turning the discourse: "I speak thus, not with a view to give offence, for I am not so mad as wantonly to offend; but because I think it the duty of a public speaker to prefer your interest to your pleasure. Such were the maxims and conduct (you yourselves know it) of those ancient and illustrious orators whom all unite to praise, but none venture to imitate; of the virtuous Aristides, of Nicias, of Pericles, and of him whose name¹¹ I bear. But since ministers have appeared who dare not address the assembly, till they have first *consulted* you about the *counsels* which they ought to give, who ask, as it were, What shall I propose? What shall I advise? In what, Athenians! can I do you pleasure? the sweet draught of flattery has concealed a deadly poison; our strength is enervated, our glory tarnished, the public beggared and disgraced, while those smooth-tongued declaimers have acquired opulence and splendour.¹² Consider, Athenians! how briefly

the conduct of your ancestors may be contrasted with your own; for if you would pursue the road to glory and happiness, you need not foreign instructors: it will be sufficient to follow the example of those from whom you are descended. The Athenians of former times, whom the orators never courted, never treated with that indulgence to which you are accustomed, held, with general consent, the sovereignty of Greece for sixty-five years;¹³ deposited above ten thousand talents in the citadel; kept the king of Macedon in that subjection which a Barbarian owes to Greece; erected many and illustrious trophies of the exploits which their own valour had achieved by land and sea; in a word, are the only people on record whose glorious actions transcend the power of envy. Thus great in war, their civil administration was not less admirable. The stately edifices which they raised, the temples which they adorned, the dedications which they offered to the gods, will never be excelled in magnificence; but, in private life, so exemplary was their moderation, and so scrupulous their adherence to the frugal maxims of antiquity, that if any of you has examined the houses of Aristides or Miltiades, he will find them undistinguished above the contiguous buildings by superior elegance or grandeur. The ambition of those illustrious statesmen was to exalt the republic, not to enrich themselves;¹⁴ and this just moderation, accompanied by piety and patriotism, raised their country (and no wonder!) to the height of prosperity. Such was the condition of Athens under those sincere and honest men. Is it the same, or nearly the same, under the indulgence of our present ministers? I wave other topics on which I might enlarge. But you behold in what solitude we are left. The Lacedæmonians lost; the Thebans harassed by war; no other republic worthy of aspiring to the sovereignty. Yet, at this period, when we might not only have defended our own possessions, but have become the arbiters and umpires of all around us, we have been stripped of whole provinces; we have expended fifteen hundred talents fruitlessly; we have lost, in time of peace, the alliances and advantages which the arms of our ancestors had acquired; and we have raised up and armed a most formidable enemy against ourselves. If not, let the man stand forth who can show from what other cause Philip has derived his greatness. But the miserable condition of our foreign affairs, is perhaps compensated by the happiness of our domestic state, and the splendid improvements of our capital. Roads repaired, walls whitened, *fountains*, and *follies*!¹⁵ And the ministers who have procured us those magnificent advantages, pass from poverty and meanness to opulence and dignity; build private palaces which insult the

¹¹ Demosthenes, who acted such a distinguished part in the Peloponnesian war. See above, c. xvii. p. 203, et seq.

¹² It is worthy of observation that, in this discourse throughout, Demosthenes insists that the people at large enjoyed much less authority in his time than in the days of Aristides, &c. All depends, he asserts, on the popular orators and magistrates, "οἱ πολιτικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες." Yet it is well known that, since the age of Aristides, the government had become more democratical. Demosthenes himself allows this: the orators, he says, dare not address the people now with that freedom which they used formerly.—This apparent contradiction shows the nature and tendency of that species of popular government which the Greeks call ochlo-

garchy.—The populace are the slaves of their demagogues, and the demagogues of the populace. Instead of liberty, there is an interchange of servitude.

¹³ Demosthenes's chronology here is not accurate. See above, p. 259. in the note.

¹⁴ Privatus illis consensus erat brevis.
Commune magnum.. HOR. ode xv. l. ii.

¹⁵ Πηγὴ καὶ ληρὴ. Demosthenes disdained not such a jingle of words when it presented itself naturally; but as it rarely occurs in his works, it is plain that he never sought for it.

edifices of the public; grow greater as their country becomes less, and gradually rise on its ruins. What is the source of this disorder? It is, Athenians! that formerly the people did their duty, took the field in person, and thus kept the magistrates in awe."

The assembly remained insensible to the motives of interest and honour. Instead of taking the field in person, they sent to Olynthus a body of foreign infantry, amounting to four thousand, with a hundred and fifty horse, under the command of Charidemus. This unworthy general, who was the slave of his mercenaries, and of his own detestable passions, gratified the rapacity of his troops by ravaging the Macedonian province of Bottiæa, on the confines of Chalcis. At length, however, he threw his forces into Olynthus; and the besieged, encouraged by this reinforcement, hazarded another sally, in which they were defeated and repelled with considerable loss. The Athenian mercenaries were rendered every day more contemptible by their cowardice, and more dangerous by their licentiousness. The beastly Charidemus had neither inclination nor ability to restrain their irregularities. According to his custom, he drank, at every meal, to a scandalous excess: his brutality insulted the women of Olynthus; and such was his impudent and abandoned profligacy, that he demanded of the senate, as a reward for his pretended services, a beautiful Macedonian youth, then captive in the city.¹

In this state of affairs, the Olynthians a third time applied to Athens. On the present occasion, Æschines, who afterwards became such an active partisan of the Macedonian interest, particularly distinguished his zeal and his patriotism. The speech of Demosthenes, to the same purpose, is still on record. He exhorts and conjures his countrymen to send to Olynthus an army of citizens, and at the same time to make a diversion, by invading the Macedonian coast. Unless both be done, the indefatigable industry of Philip would render either ineffectual. "Have you ever considered the rapid progress of this prince? He began by taking Amphipolis, then Pydna, Potidæa, and Methoné; from thence he poured his troops into Thessaly, and became master of Phæræ, Pegassæ, and Magnesia. Then, turning towards Thrace, he overran provinces, conquered and divided kingdoms, and seated himself on the trophies of fallen crowns and broken sceptres. I speak not of his expedition against the Pæonians and Illyrians, into Epirus,—and where has not ambition conducted his arms? But why this long enumeration?—To prove the important opportunities which your negligence has lost, and the unextinguishable ardour of an adversary, whose successive conquests continually bring him nearer to your walls. For is there a man in this assembly, whose blindness perceives not that the sufferings of the Olynthians are the forerunners of our own? The present conjuncture calls you, as with a loud voice, at length to rouse from your lethargy, and to profit by this last testimony of the boun-

tiful protection of the gods. Another is not to be expected, after the many which you have despised and forgotten: I say *forgotten*; for favourable conjunctures, like riches, and other gifts of heaven, are remembered with gratitude, only by those who have understanding to preserve and to enjoy them. The spendthrift dissipates his thankfulness with his wealth;² and the same imprudent folly renders him both miserable and ungrateful." After these bold expostulations, or rather reproaches, he encourages them to relieve Olynthus, by observing, that Philip would never have undertaken the siege of that place, if he had expected such a vigorous resistance; especially at a time when his allies were ready to revolt; when the Thesalians wished to throw off the yoke; when the Thracians and Illyrians longed to recover their freedom. Thus the power of Philip, lately represented as so formidable, is by no means real and solid; one vigorous effort might yet overwhelm him; and the passion of hope, as well as that of fear, is rendered subservient to the purpose of the orator. He again touches on the article of supplies; but with such caution as shows that his former more explicit observations had been heard impatiently. "As to money for the expenses of the war (for without money nothing can be done,) you possess, Athenians! a military fund exceeding that of any other people. But you have unfortunately withdrawn it from its original destination, to which were it restored, there could not be any necessity for extraordinary contributions. What! do you purpose in form,³ that the theatrical money should be applied to the use of the soldiery? No, surely. But I affirm, that soldiers must be raised; that a fund has been allotted for their subsistence; and that in every well-regulated community, those who are paid by the public, ought to serve the public. To profit of the present conjuncture, we must act with vigour and celerity, we must despatch ambassadors, to animate the neighbouring states against Philip; we must take the field in person. If war raged on the frontiers of this country, with what rapidity would the Macedonians march hither? Why will you throw away a similar opportunity? Know, that but one alternative remains, to carry the war into Macedon, or to receive it in Attica. If Olynthus resists, we may ravage the territories of Philip; should that republic be destroyed, who will hinder him from coming hither? The Thebans! to say nothing too severe, they would rather reinforce his arms. The Phocians! they who, without our assistance, cannot defend themselves. O! but he dares not come! It is madness to think that the designs of which he already boasts with such bold imprudence, he will not venture to execute, when nothing opposes his success.⁴ I

² The observation is uncommon, but just: *ἄλλα οἱ μὲν, παρομοίον ἐστὶ, ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων κτησίως· ἂν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν τις λάβῃ καὶ σωθῇ, μὲν μὲν· ἐχέει τὴν τύχην τὴν χαρὶν, ἂν δὲ ἀνελώσῃς λαβὴν, συνανταλώσῃ καὶ τὸ μὲν μὲν· ἐχέει τὴν τύχην τὴν χαρὶν. Demosth. Olynth. iii. Olynth. i. p. 2. ex edit. Wolf.*

³ Such a proposal, the Athenians had absurdly declared punishable by death.

⁴ With all his policy, Philip seems to have had the vanity of a Greek. The vigour of the original is not to be translated: "ἂν δὲ οὐκ ἔλθῃς Φιλίππος λαβὴν, τὴν αὐτὸν ἴτι·"

¹ Theopomp. apud Athen. l. x. p. 436.

think it unnecessary to describe the difference between attacking Philip at home, and waiting for him here. Were you obliged, only for one month, to encamp without the walls, and to subsist an army in the country, your husband-men would sustain more loss than has been incurred by all the former exigences of the war. This would happen, although the enemy kept at a distance; but at the approach and entrance of an invader, what devastation must be produced! Add to this, the insult and disgrace, the most ruinous of all losses, to men capable of reflection."

Olymp. The arguments of Demosthenes prevailed; an embassy was sent cviii. 1. into Peloponnesus, to inflame the A. C. 348. hostility of that country against Philip; and it was determined to assist the Olynthians with an army of Athenian citizens. But before this resolution could be carried into effect, Olynthus was no more. The cavalry belonging to that place had acted with great spirit against the besiegers. As the works were too extensive to be completely invested, the Olynthian horsemen made frequent incursions⁵ into the surrounding territory, where they not only supplied themselves with provisions and forage, but beat up the quarters, attacked the advanced posts, and intercepted the convoys of the enemy. These advantages were chiefly owing to the merit of one man. In the various skirmishes, as well as in the two general engagements which had happened since the commencement of the siege, Philip perceived that Apollonides, who commanded the enemy's horse, displayed such valour and abilities as might long retard, perhaps altogether defeat, the success of his undertaking. His secret emissaries were therefore set to work; perfidious clamours were sown among the populace of Olynthus; Apollonides was publicly accused; and, by the malignant practices of traitors, condemned to banishment on a suspicion of treason.⁶ The command of the cavalry was bestowed on Lasthenes and Euthykrates, two wretches who had sold their country to Philip. Having obtained some previous successes, which had been concerted the better to mask their designs, they advanced against a Macedonian post; carried it at the first onset; pursued the flying garrison; and betrayed their own troops into an ambush prepared by the enemy. Surrounded on all sides, the Olynthians surrendered their arms; and this fatal disaster encouraging the Macedonian partisans within the walls, soon opened the gates of Olynthus.⁷ The conqueror entered in triumph, plundered and demolished the city, and dragged the inhabitants into servitude.⁸ Lasthenes, Euthykrates, and their associates, shared the same,

or even a worse fate. Philip is said to have abandoned them to the indignant rage of the Macedonian soldiers, who butchered them almost before his eyes. It is certain, that though his mean and blind ambition often employed treachery, his justice or his pride always detested the traitor.⁹

The conquest of Olynthus put Philip in possession of the region of Chalcis, and the northern coast of Ægean sea; an acquisition of territory, which rendered his dominions on that side round and complete. His kingdom was now bounded, on the north by the Thracian possessions of Kersobleptes, and on the south by the territory of Phocis, a province actually comprehending the straits of Thermopylæ, which had formerly belonged to a different division of Greece. Besides the general motives of interest, which prompted him to extend his dominions, he discerned the peculiar importance of acquiring the Thermopylæ and the Hellespont, since the former was emphatically styled the Gates of Greece, and the latter formed the only communication between that country and the fertile shores of the Euxine. Greece, exceeding in population the proportion of its extent and fertility, annually drew supplies of corn from those northern regions. The Athenians, in particular, had settlements even in the remote peninsula of Crim Tartary, anciently called the Taurica Chersonesus, by means of which they purchased and imported the superfluous productions of that remote climate.¹⁰ Their ships could only sail thither by the Hellespont; and should that important strait be reduced under the power of an enemy, they must be totally excluded from a useful, and even necessary, branch of commerce.

Olymp. Philip perceived these consequences. It was the general interest of all the Grecian republics cviii. 1. to assist Kersobleptes and the Phocians, which was, in other words, to defend the Hellespont and Thermopylæ. The interest of the Macedonian was diametrically opposite; nor could he expect to accomplish the great objects of his reign, unless he first rendered himself master of those important posts. This delicate situation furnished a proper exercise for the dexterity of Philip. After the destruction of Olynthus, he celebrated a public festival of gratitude and joy, at the neighbouring town of Dium; to which, as at the Olympian and other Grecian games, all the republics were promiscuously invited, whether friends or enemies.¹¹ It appears that several Athenians assisted at these magnificent entertainments, which lasted nine days, in honour of the Muses, and which wanted no object of

καλυσσε δ' αὖτε βυδίζετον; Θηβαιῶν; μη λίσσιν πικρὸν εἶπειν ἢ, καὶ σπινθίσκωλον τι τοίμως. ἀλλὰ Φωκίαι; οἱ τὴν οἰκίαν οὐχ οἶσι τε οὐτὶς φυλάττειν, ἐν ἡμῇ βοήθειᾳ τῇ οὐκ οἶσι; ἀλλ' αὐτὸν οὐχὶ βουλήσεται—τὸν ἀποστῆναι μὲν τοὺς ἀνείη, ἢ αὖν ἀνείην οὐκ οἶσι, ὅμως ἐκλάλει, ταῦτα ἐκλάλει, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ οἶσι μὴ πρὸς. I have used a little freedom with the "οὐχὶ βουλήσεται."

⁵ Diodorus, l. xvi. 53.

⁶ Demosth. de Falsa Legatione.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Four reasons conspired to produce the severe treatment of the Olynthians: 1. Philip had lost a great many men in the siege; πολλοὺς τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐν ταῖς τειχο-

μαχίαις ἀπὸ βάλαν. Diodor. p. 450. 2. The Olynthians had received his natural brothers, Aridæus and Menelaus, accused of treason. Justin, l. viii. c. iii. 3. Philip wanted money to carry on his intrigues in other cities; σιμωσάσθαι αὐτὴν (scil. Ολυνθὸν) καὶ τοὺς ἐνοικούντας ἐξ ἀνδραποδισμένους, ἐλαφύρα πωλῆσαι τούτο δὲ πρὸς, χρημάτων τε πολλῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον εὐπορήσει. 4. Diodorus immediately after adds the fourth reason, "That he might deter the neighbouring cities from opposing his measures." Diodor. p. 450.

⁹ Demosth. Olynth. iii. sect. 3.

¹⁰ Demosthen. in Leptin.

¹¹ Demosth. de Falsa Legatione, and Diodor. p. 451.

elegance or splendour, that either art could produce or wealth could purchase. The politeness and condescending affability of Philip obliterated the remembrance of his recent severity to Olynthus; and his liberal distribution of the spoils of that unfortunate city¹ gained him new friends, and confirmed the attachment of his old partisans.

Amidst these scenes of rejoicing and festivity, Philip seems not to have forgotten, one moment, that the most immediate object of his policy was to detach the Athenians from the cause of Phocis and Kersobleptes, who were both their allies. For this purpose, while he courted individuals with peculiar address, he determined to make the public feel the inconvenience of the war, the better to prepare them for the insidious proposal of a separate peace. The bad conduct of Chares left the sea open to the Macedonians, who had silently acquired a considerable naval force. Philip began to attack the Athenians on their favourite element. His fleet ravaged their tributary islands of Lemnos and Imbros; surprised and took a squadron of Athenian vessels, stationed on the southern coast of Eubœa; and, encouraged by these advantages, boldly sailed to Attica, made a descent on the shore of Marathon, repelled the Athenian cavalry, headed by Deotimus, ravaged the territory, and carried off the Salamanian galley. From thence they proceeded to the isle of Salamis, and defeated a considerable detachment commanded by Charidemus. The illustrious trophies of Marathon and Salamis were effaced by the insults of the Macedonians, whose fleet returned home in triumph, adorned with hostile spoils, and with military and naval glory.²

The activity of Philip seconded his good fortune. His intrigues were renewed in Eubœa. Under pretence of delivering the island from the tyranny and extortions of Molossus, the Athenian commander, he landed such a body of troops there, as proved sufficient, with the assistance of his adherents, to expel the Athenians. Such a multiplication of calamities might have disgusted that people with the war against Philip, whose hostility, directed against them alone, seemed to have forgotten the Phocians and Kersobleptes; when secret but zeal-

ous partisans of Macedon arrived at Athens, as ambassadors from Eubœa, commissioned to settle amicably all differences between the two countries. They observed, that Philip had left the island absolutely free and independent; and that, though constrained to take arms in defence of his allies, he was sincerely desirous of making peace with the Athenians. The representations of the Eubœan ambassadors were enforced by the influence of two Athenians, Aristodemus and Neoptolemus, the first distinguished as a player, the second as a player and poet, who having acquired fortunes in Macedon, returned to their own country, to forward the measures of their liberal protector. They affirmed that the king of Macedon earnestly wished to live on good terms with the republic; and the Athenians paid much regard to men, whose talents were then highly esteemed, and who had remitted the riches amassed in a foreign country, to purchase lands in Attica, and to supply with alacrity the exigences of the public service.

Demosthenes saw through these dark and deep artifices;³ but in vain endeavoured to alarm the unsuspecting credulity of his countrymen. On a future occasion, after the plot had become manifest, he upbraids their careless indifference and delusion at this important crisis. "Had you been spectators in the theatre, and not deliberating on matters of the highest moment, you could not have heard Neoptolemus with more indulgence, nor me with more resentment."⁴

Such was the disposition of the assembly, when Æschines returned from his Peloponnesian embassy. He had assembled the great council of the Arcadians; revealed to them the dangerous views of Philip, which threatened the liberty of Greece; and, notwithstanding the powerful opposition of Hieronymus, and other Macedonian partisans, had engaged that people to approve the patriot zeal of Athens, and to deliberate on taking arms in the common cause. In relating the success of his embassy, he inveighed with great severity against those mercenary traitors, who had sold the interests of their country to a cruel tyrant. The Greeks had full warning of their danger. The miserable fate of Olynthus ought ever to be before their eyes. At his return through Peloponnesus, he had beheld a sight sufficient to melt the most obdurate heart; thirty young Olynthians, of both sexes, driven like a herd of cattle, as a present from Philip to some of the unworthy instruments of his ambition.⁵

The susceptible and ever-varying temper of the multitude was deeply affected by the representations of Æschines; the pacific advices of Neoptolemus and his associates were forgotten; war and revenge again echoed through the assembly. At the requisition of Æschines, ambassadors were despatched to confirm the hostile resolutions of the Arcadians, and to awaken the terror of the neighbouring republics. The Athenian youth were assembled in the temple of Agraulos to swear irreconcilable hatred against

¹ Both Demosthenes and Diodorus mention an anecdote which does honour to Philip, and still more to Satyrus the player. After dinner, the king, according to his custom, was distributing his presents; amidst the general festivity, Satyrus alone wore a sad countenance. The king addressed him kindly, and in the language of the times, desired him to ask a boon. Satyrus said, that such presents as others received (cups of gold, &c.) seemed to him of little value; that he had indeed something to ask, but feared a denial. Philip having encouraged him, he proceeded: "Apollophanes of Pydna was my friend: at his death, his two daughters, both arrived at a marriageable age, were sent to Olynthus, taken captive, and subjected to all the calamities of servitude. These are the presents I request, not with any design unworthy of their father or myself, but that I may give them such portions as shall enable them to marry happily." Apollophanes had been an active opponent, and even the personal enemy, of Philip; yet this prince granted the request of Satyrus, and enabled him liberally to provide for the daughters of his friend.

² In the chronology of these events, I have followed Dr. Leland. See his life of Philip, vol. ii. p. 43. The events themselves are related in the oration of Demosthenes commonly entitled the First Philippic, but which the Doctor, with great probability, considers as two distinct orations spoken at different times.

³ Demosthen. de Chersoneso, et de Pace.

⁴ Demosthen. de Chersoneso.

⁵ Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione, sect. 5.

Philip and the Macedonians; and the most awful imprecations were denounced against the mercenary traitors who co-operated with the public enemy. This fermentation might at length have purified into strong and decisive measures; and had Philip possessed only an ordinary degree of vigilance, a confederacy might have been yet formed in Greece sufficient to repel the Macedonian arms. But that consummate politician thought nothing done while any thing was neglected; and, as he allowed not the slightest opportunity to pass unimproved, he often derived very important benefits from seemingly inconsiderable causes.

An Athenian of the name of Phrynon, a man wealthy and powerful, had been attacked, robbed, and confined by some Macedonian soldiers, who obliged him to purchase his liberty by a very considerable ransom.⁶ As this violence had been committed during the fifteen days of truce that followed the celebration of the Olympic games, Phrynon very judiciously supposed that the king of Macedon, who had long been ambitious of obtaining a place in the Grecian confederacy, would not abet this act of injustice and impiety. He had therefore requested his countrymen, who at that time prepared to negotiate with Philip an exchange of prisoners, to join him in commission with Ctesiphon, a man of experience and capacity, who had been already named to that embassy; imagining that by appearing in a public character, he might the more easily recover the ransom and other monies that had been unjustly extorted from him. Having arrived in Macedon, the ambassadors were received and treated by Philip with uncommon politeness and respect; their demands were most obligingly granted, or rather prevented; the king apologised to Phrynon for the ignorant rusticity of his soldiers, which had led them to act so unwarrantably; and he lamented both to Phrynon and Ctesiphon, the necessity of their present mission, since he had nothing more sincerely at heart than to live on good terms with their republic.⁷ At their return to Athens, the representations of such men could not be without weight; nor could they fail being extremely favourable to the king of Macedon.

Another incident followed, which was improved with no less dexterity.⁸ At the taking and sack of Olynthus, Stratocles and Eucrates, two Athenians of distinction, had been seized and carried into Macedon. By some accident these men had not been released with the other prisoners. Their relations were anxious for their safety, and therefore applied to the Athenians, that a proper person might be sent to treat of their ransom. Aristodemus was employed in this commission, but was more attentive to paying his court than performing his duty; and, at his return home neglected to give an account of his negotiation. Philip, meanwhile, whose vigilance never slept, and who well knew the hostile resolutions in agitation against him at Athens, released the prisoners without ransom, and dismissed them with the

highest expressions of regard. Moved by gratitude, Stratocles appeared in the assembly, blazoned forth the praises of the king of Macedon, and loudly complained against the careless indifference of Aristodemus, who had neglected to report his embassy.⁹

The artful player, thus called upon to act his part, excused his omitting to relate *one* example of kindness, in a man who had recently given so many proofs of the most unbounded generosity. He expatiated on the candour and benevolence of Philip, and especially on his profound respect for the republic, with which, he assured them, the king of Macedon was earnest to conclude a peace, and even to enter into an alliance, on the most honourable and advantageous terms. He probably reminded them of the misfortunes which had attended their arms since they commenced war against this prince. Fifteen hundred talents expended with disgrace; seventy-five dependent cities, including those of the Chalcidic region, lost irrecoverably; Olynthus destroyed; Eubœa revolted; Athens dishonoured and exhausted; and Macedon more powerful and more respected than at any former period. This representation did not exceed the truth; and the calamities of the war had long inclined to peace the more moderate and judicious portion of the assembly. The artificial generosity of Philip, in his treatment of Phrynon and Stratocles, blazoned by the eloquence of Aristodemus, fixed the wavering irresolution of the multitude. The military preparations were suspended. Even Demosthenes and Æschines yielded to the torrent; and imagining that a bad peace was better than a bad war (since it was impossible to expect success from the fluctuating councils of their country,) supported a decree¹⁰ of Philocrates for sending a herald and ambassadors to discover the real intentions of Philip, and to hearken to the terms of accommodation with which he had so long amused them.

The ministers appointed to this commission seem to have been purposely chosen among men of opposite principles, who might mutually be checks on each other. Phrynon, Ctesiphon, Aristodemus, and Philocrates, who had uniformly testified their confidence in the king of Macedon, were opposed by Æschines and Demosthenes, who had long discovered their suspicions of that prince. To the embassy were added Nausicles and Dercyllus, men distinguished by the public offices which they had discharged with equal patriotism and fidelity; Jatrocles, the chosen friend of Æschines; and Cimon, illustrious for the name he bore, which descended to him from the greatest and most fortunate of the Athenian commanders. The whole number amounted to ten, besides Agalocreon of Tenedos, who was sent on the part of the Greek islands in alliance with Athens.¹¹

Thus far contemporary authors agree; but in describing the events which followed the departure of the ambassadors, all is inconsistency

⁶ Æschines de Falsa Legatione.

⁷ Id. ibid.

⁸ Id. ibid.

⁹ Æschines de Falsa Legatione.

¹⁰ The decree was attacked by one Licinus. Demosthenes defended it; and both Demosthenes and Æschines, as appears from the text, were on the embassy.

¹¹ Demosthen. and Æschin. de Falsa Legatione.

and contradiction. The misunderstanding that arose between Æschines and Demosthenes, the former of whom was impeached by the latter, furnish us, in the accusation and defence, with the fullest and most diffuse, but at the same time the least authentic, materials, that present themselves in any passage of Grecian history. The whole train of the negotiation, as well as the events connected with it, are represented in colours the most discordant; facts are asserted and denied; while both parties appeal to the memory of the assembly before which they spoke, to the testimony of witnesses, and even to the evidence of public decrees and records; circumstances that must appear very extraordinary, unless we consider that suborning of witnesses, perjury, and even the falsifying of laws and records, were crimes not unusual at Athens.¹ Amidst this confusion, the discerning eye of criticism would vainly endeavour to penetrate the truth. Æschines was indeed acquitted by his countrymen. But nothing positive can be learned from a partial sentence, pronounced three years after the alleged crimes had been committed, when the power of Philip had increased to such an alarming degree, as gave his faction a decided ascendant even in the Athenian assembly.

Olymp. To disentangle such perplexity, we shall keep chiefly to those facts
cviii. 1. which are allowed on both sides,
cviii. 2. deducing from them such conse-
A. C. 348. quences as seem most natural and
and 347. probable. In the course of one year, three embassies were sent to Philip; the first to propose a peace, the second to ratify it, the third to see the conditions of it observed; and in that space of time Kersobleptes, being stripped of his dominions, was reduced into captivity, and Philip having seized Thermopylæ, invaded Phocis, and destroyed the twenty-two cities of that province in less than twenty-two days. Nor was this all: a foreign prince having made himself master of Thermopylæ and the Hellespont, the most valuable safeguards of Greece—having invaded and desolated the territory of a Grecian republic, the most respectable for its antiquity, power, and wealth, the seat of the Amphictyonic council, and of the revered oracle of Delphi—These daring measures tended so little to excite the displeasure of Greece, that the king of Macedon had no sooner accomplished them, than he threatened to attack Athens (who weakly lamented calamities which she had neither prudence nor courage to prevent) at the head of a general confederacy of the Amphictyonic states.

Such extraordinary transactions, of which history scarcely offers another example for the instruction of posterity, Demosthenes ascribes entirely to the corruption and perfidy of the Athenian ambassadors. "The felicity of Philip," he says, "consists chiefly in this; that having occasion for traitors, fortune has given him men treacherous and corrupt beyond his most sanguine hopes and prayers."² This,

doubtless, is the exaggeration of an orator, desirous by every means to blacken the character of his colleagues in the embassy, and particularly that of his adversary Æschines. Yet it will appear, from the most careful survey of the events of those times, that the incapacity and neglect, if not the treason, of the Athenian ministers, greatly contributed to the success of the Macedonian arms.

From the first moment of their departure from Athens, the ambassadors began to betray their mutual jealousies and suspicions of each other's fidelity. The dangerous character of Philocrates was equally dreaded by Æschines and Demosthenes;³ and the latter, if we may believe his rival, so much disgusted the other ambassadors, by the morose severity of his temper, that they had almost excluded him their society; a circumstance rendered credible, not merely by the partial evidence of an adversary, but by the resentment and indignation always expressed by Demosthenes against the behaviour of his colleagues. Having arrived at Pella, they were introduced to an audience; and spoke, as had been agreed on, in the order of their seniority. The discourse of Æschines was the most copious and elaborate, but seemed rather calculated for gaining merit with the Athenian assembly, than for influencing the conduct of Philip. "He recalled to the memory of the king, the favours of the Athenians towards his ancestors; the distressed condition of the children of Amyntas; the solicitations of Euridicé; and the generous interpositions of Iphicrates, to whom the family of Philip owed the crown of Macedon. Having touched slightly on the ungrateful returns made by Ptolemy and Perdiccas, he dwelt on the injustice of those hostilities which Philip had committed against the republic, especially in taking Amphipolis, which his father Amyntas had acknowledged to be a dependent colony of Athens. He insisted on the impropriety of retaining this possession, which as it could not be claimed by any ancient title, neither could it be held by the right of conquest, not being gained in any war between the two states. In the time of profound peace between Athens and Macedon, Philip had taken from the Amphipolitans an Athenian city, which it concerned his justice and his honour to restore, without delay, to its lawful and acknowledged owners."

Had Æschines wished to furnish Philip with a pretence for protracting the negotiation, he could not have done it more effectually than by such a demand. It could not possibly be expected, that a victorious monarch should set bounds to his own triumphs, in order to purchase peace by tamely surrendering one of the most important of his acquisitions. In this light the proposal appeared to Demosthenes, who thought that his colleague had totally forgotten the object of the embassy, the distressed state of Athens, how greatly the people had been harassed by the war, and how eagerly they wished for peace. It was now his own turn to speak before a prince whom he had often and highly

¹ See my Discourse on the Character and Manners of the Athenians, prefixed to Lysias and Isocrates.

² Subsequent writers have copied the language of Demosthenes, καὶ χρημάτων πλήθος διαδούς τοῖς ἐν ταῖς

πολίσιν ἰσχυροῦσι, πολλοὺς ἰσπερ προδίτας τῶν πατρίδων. Diodorus, ubi supra.

³ Demosthen. and Æschin. de Falsa Legatione

offended, whose character and actions he had ever viewed and represented with the utmost severity; but whom, on the present occasion, it was his business to soothe rather than to irritate. The novelty of the situation might have disconcerted a man of less sensibility than Demosthenes. The envious jealousy of his colleagues was prepared to listen, with a malicious ear, to those irresistible arguments which the orator is said to have promised, with a very unbecoming confidence; the Macedonian courtiers expected some prodigy of eloquence from the perpetual opponent of their admired master. Amidst the silent suspense of an unfavourable audience, Demosthenes began to speak with ungrateful hesitation, and after uttering a few obscure and interrupted sentences, his memory totally forsook him. Philip endeavoured to remove his embarrassment with a mortifying politeness, telling him that he was not now in a theatre,⁴ where such an accident might be attended with disagreeable consequences; and, exhorting him to take time for recollection, and to pursue his intended discourse. Demosthenes again began, but without better success. The assembly beheld his confusion with a malignant pleasure; and the ambassadors were ordered to withdraw.

After a proper interval, they were summoned to the royal presence. Philip received them with great dignity, and answered with precision and elegance the arguments respectively used by the several speakers, particularly those of Æschines. The confused hints of Demosthenes he passed over with merited neglect; thus proving to the world, that the man who had ever arraigned him with most severity in the tumultuous assemblies of Greece, had not dared to say any thing in his presence which deserved the smallest notice or reply. The ambassadors were then invited to an entertainment, when Demosthenes is said to have behaved with great weakness, and where Philip displayed such powers of merriment and festivity, as eclipsed his talents for negotiation and war. The ambassadors were persuaded of his candour and sincerity, and dismissed with a letter to the people of Athens, assuring them that his intentions were truly pacific, and that as soon as they consented to an alliance with him, he would freely indulge those sentiments of affection and respect which he had ever entertained for their republic.

The mortification which Demosthenes had received, made him at first vent his chagrin by condemning the conduct of his colleagues; but when he reflected, that a fair representation of facts would greatly depreciate his character at Athens, policy prevailed over resentment. He began privately to tamper with his companions on the road, freely rallied the confusion into which he had been betrayed, extolled the ready genius and memory of Æschines; and endeavoured, by promises and flattery, to ingratiate himself with those whom his recent behaviour

had justly provoked and disgusted. In a conversation at Larissa in Thessaly, he acknowledged the masterly reasoning of the king of Macedon. The ambassadors all joined in the praises of this extraordinary man. Æschines admired the strength and perspicuity with which he had answered their respective discourses; and Ctesiphon cried out in transport, that, in the course of a long life, he had never beheld a man of such a polite and engaging deportment. Demosthenes then artfully said, "he apprehended they would not venture to make such representations to the Athenian assembly; that their honour and safety required them to be consistent in their reports;" to which they all assented; and Æschines acknowledges, that he was prevailed on by the entreaties of his rival to promise, that he would give a favourable and false account of the behaviour of Demosthenes, and assure the people of Athens, that he had spoken with dignity and firmness on the affair of Amphipolis.

According to the forms of the republic, the ambassadors first reported the success of their negotiation, and delivered the letter of Philip, to the senate of the Five Hundred. They explained, in order, what each had said in presence of the king; when Demosthenes, rising up the last, affirmed with his usual oath of asseveration,⁵ "that the ambassadors had not spoken in the senate as they did before Philip; that they had spoken much better in Macedon:" he then moved, that they should be honoured with a crown of sacred olive,⁶ and invited next day to an entertainment in the Prytanæum.⁷

The day following, they made their report to the assembly of the people; when the ambassadors, finding the subject not disagreeable to their hearers, expatiated on the politeness, condescension, eloquence, and abilities of the prince, with whom their republic was ready not only to negotiate a peace, but to contract an alliance. Having allowed them to exhaust this fertile subject, Demosthenes at length arose, and, after those contortions of body, which, if we believe his adversary, were familiar to him, declared, that he was equally surprised at those who, in a deliberation of such importance, could talk of such trifles, and at those who could endure to hear them. "The negotiation may be briefly reported. Here is the decree by which we are commissioned. We have executed this commission. Here is Philip's answer (pointing to the letter.) You have only to examine its contents." A confused murmur arose in the assembly, some applauding the strength and precision of the speech, others condemning the asperity of the speaker. As soon as he could be heard, Demosthenes thus proceeded: "You shall see how I will lop off those superfluous matters. Æschines praises the memory and eloquence of Philip, in which, however, I find nothing extraordinary, since any other man, placed in the same advantageous circumstances of rank and

⁴ Notwithstanding the passion of the Athenians for dramatic entertainments, and their consideration for the character of players beyond that of any other nation, they were indecently severe against their negligences and faults on the theatre; as appears from various passages of the judicial orations of Demosthenes and Æschines.

⁵ *Μα Δία*, indecently explained "by Jove," since the expression is elliptical, and includes a short prayer, *εὐχόμενος τὸν Δία σῆζεῖν τὰ ἔμμε*; "My assertion is true, may Jove thus protect me."

⁶ See the Discourse of Lysias on an accusation for cutting down a consecrated olive.

⁷ *Æschin. de Falsa Legatione.*

fortune, would be equally attended to and admired. Ctesiphon praises the gracefulness and dignity of his person; my colleague Aristodemus does not yield to him in these particulars. Others admire his mirth and gayety at table; yet in such qualities Philocrates excels him.¹ But this is unseasonable. I shall therefore draw up a decree for convening an extraordinary assembly, to deliberate on the peace and the alliance."²

The decree was proposed on the eighth of March, and the assembly was fixed for the seventeenth of the same month. In the interval, arrived, as ambassadors from Philip, Antipater, the most respected of his ministers; Parmenio, the bravest of his generals; and Eurylochus, who united, almost in an equal degree, the praise of eloquence and valour. Parmenio had been employed in the siege of Halus, a place filled with malcontents from Thessaly, who still resisted the Macedonian power in that country. That he might have leisure to join his colleagues, Parmenio ordered the siege to be converted into a blockade; and the merit of three such ambassadors sufficiently announced the important purposes which Philip wished to effect by the present negotiation. They were received with great distinction by the senate, and (what seems extraordinary) lodged in the house of Demosthenes, who was careful to adorn their seats in the theatre, and to distinguish them by every other mark of honour.³ Having been introduced, on the appointed day, into the assembly, they declared the object of their commission, to conclude in the name of their master a peace and alliance with the people of Athens. Demosthenes, in an elaborate speech, urged the expediency of listening to their demands; but without neglecting the interest of the Athenian allies. Æschines delivered the same opinion, and severely reproached Philocrates, who urged the necessity of precipitating the treaty. The two first days were spent in debate; but on the third, the influence of Philocrates prevailed, chiefly, if we believe Demosthenes, by the unexpected accession of Æschines to that party. He, who had hitherto been a strenuous defender of the interest of Kersobleptes, declared that he had now altered his opinion. That peace was necessary for Athens, and ought not to be retarded by the slow deliberations of other powers. That the circumstances of the republic were changed; and that, in their actual situation, it was an idle vanity to attend to those who flattered them with pompous panegyrics of the magnanimity of their ancestors; since the weakness of Athens was no longer called on to undertake the protection of every state that could not defend its own cause."⁴

Demosthenes had formerly suspected the treachery of Æschines; but this speech fully convinced him, that if his adversary had not before sold himself to Philip, he had then been tampered with, and gained by the Macedonian am-

bassadors. But Demosthenes, and the assembly in general, saw the necessity of immediately ratifying the peace with that prince, who had actually taken the field in Thrace, along the coast of which the Athenians still possessed Serrium, Doriscus, and several other tributary cities. A decree was proposed for this purpose, and ambassadors were named, who might, with all convenient speed, repair to Philip, in order mutually to give and receive the oaths and ratifications of the treaty just concluded at Athens. The ambassadors were Eubulus, Æschines, Ctesiphon, Democrates, and Cleon; the principal of whom, being entirely devoted to the Macedonian interest, contrived various pretences to delay their departure. In this interval, Kersobleptes met with the unhappy fate of which we have already taken notice; and Philip, encouraged by the success of his intrigues, ventured to attack the cities of Serrium and Doriscus, which readily submitted to his arms.⁵ Upon intelligence of the latter event, the Athenians despatched Euclides to inform the king of Macedon, that the places which he had taken belonged to Athens; to which he coldly replied, that he had not been so instructed by his ambassadors, nor was there any mention of those cities in the treaty recently signed, but not yet ratified, between the two powers.

Æschines and his colleagues still delayed to set out, although the conduct of Philip continually urged the necessity of hastening their departure. They were finally ordered to be gone, in consequence of a decree proposed by Demosthenes,⁶ who was unable to prevail on the Athenians, till it was too late, to pay due regard to the interest of Kersobleptes. In twenty-five days the Athenian ministers arrived at Pella, a journey which they might have performed in six: and instead of directly proceeding to Philip, who was employed in reducing the cities on the Prepontis, they patiently waited, above three weeks, the return of that monarch to his capital. During their residence in Pella, they were joined by Demosthenes, who, at his own request, had been added to this commission, under pretence of ransoming some Athenian captives, but in reality with a view to watch the conduct of his colleagues. Philip at length arrived: the ambassadors were called to an audience. On this occasion they spoke, not as formerly, according to their respective ages, but in an order, if we believe Æschines, first established by the impudence of Demosthenes; whose discourse, as represented by his adversary, must have appeared highly ridiculous, even in an age when the decent formality of public transactions was little known or regarded.

Anticipating his more experienced colleagues, he observed, "That they were unfortunately divided in their views and sentiments. That his own were strictly conformable to those of Philip. From the beginning he had advised a peace and alliance with Macedon. That he had procured all possible honours for the ambassadors of that country during their residence in Athens, and had afterwards escorted

¹ Even by Demosthenes's testimony, it required the combination of several Athenian characters to match the various excellences of Philip.

² Æschin. de Falsa Legatione.

³ Æschin. in Ctesiphont.

⁴ Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione.

⁵ Demosthen. Orat. v. in Philipp.

⁶ Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione.

their journey as far as Thebes. He knew that his good intentions had been misrepresented to Philip, on account of some expressions that had dropped from him in the Athenian assembly. But if he had denied the superior excellence of that prince in beauty, in drinking, and in debate,⁷ it was, because he believed such qualities to belong to a woman, a sponge, and a hireling rhetorician and sophist, rather than to a warlike monarch, and mighty conqueror." This extraordinary apology excited the derision of the Macedonian courtiers, and made the Athenian ambassadors hold down their heads in confusion.⁸

Æschines first recovered his composure; and modestly addressing Philip, observed, "That the present was not a proper occasion for the Athenian ministers to praise or to defend their own conduct. They had been deemed worthy of their commission by the republic which employed them, and to which alone they were accountable.⁹ Their actual business was to receive Philip's oath in ratification of the treaty already concluded on the part of Athens. The military preparations carrying on in every part of Macedon could not but excite their fears for the unhappy Phocians. But he entreated Philip, that, if he was determined to gratify the Thebans by making war on that unfortunate people, he would make at least a proper distinction between the innocent and the guilty. The sacrilegious violators of the temple ought to be punished with due severity; the state itself must be spared; since the laws and institutions of Greece guard the safety of every Amphictyonic city. Æschines then spoke, in the severest terms, against the injustice and cruelty of the Thebans, who, he ventured to prophesy, would repay the partiality of Philip with the same falsehood and ingratitude with which they had been accustomed to requite their former allies and benefactors."

The discourse of Æschines, though it could not be expected to move the resolutions of the king, was well calculated to raise the credit of the speaker, when it should be reported in his own country. Philip confined himself to vague expressions of friendship and respect. The ambassadors of Thebes were already at Pella, a circumstance which furnished him with a pretence for declining to make an explicit declaration in favour of Phocis. But he hinted his compassionate concern for that republic; and requested the Athenians to accompany him to Thessaly, that he might avail himself of their abilities and experience to settle the affairs of that country, which required his immediate presence. Extraordinary as this demand was, the Athenians readily complied with it, notwithstanding the king, who had ordered his army to march, was attended in this expedition by the ambassadors of Thebes, who, as well as the Athenians, were daily entertained at his table, and whose views were diametri-

cally opposite to the interests both of Phocis and of Athens.¹⁰

Olymp. The unhappy and distracted situation of the former republic provoked a speedy issue to the Sacred War, which, for more than two years, had been feebly carried on between the Phocians on one side, and the Thebans and Locrians on the other, by such petty incursions and ravages as indicated the inveterate rancour of combatants, who still retained the desire of hurting, after they had lost the power.¹¹ During the greater part of that time, the Athenians, amused by their negotiation with Philip, afforded no assistance to their unfortunate allies. The treasures of Delphi, immense as they were, at length began to fail. The Phocians, thus abandoned and exhausted, reflected with terror and remorse on their past conduct; and, in order to make atonement for their sacrilegious violations of the temple, instituted a judicial inquiry against Phaleucus, their general, and his accomplices, in plundering the dedications to Apollo.¹² Several were condemned to death; Phaleucus was deposed; and the Phocians, having performed these substantial acts of justice, which tended to remove the odium that had long adhered to their cause, solicited with better hopes of success the assistance of Sparta and Athens.

But the crafty Archidamus, who had long directed the Spartan councils, considered the distress of the Phocians as a favourable opportunity to urge the claim of his own republic to the superintendence of the Delphic temple; and actually sent ambassadors into Thessaly, to confer with the king of Macedon on that subject.¹³ The Athenians paid more attention to the request of their allies, who, as an inducement to excite their activity, offered to put them in possession of the towns of Nicæa, Alpenus, and Thronium, which commanded the straits of Thermopylæ. But this salutary plan, which might have retarded the fate of Greece, was defeated by Phaleucus, who commanding eight thousand mercenaries, that acknowledged no authority but that of their general; established his head-quarters at Nicæa, and despised the menaces both of Phocis and of Athens.

Mortifying as this disappointment must have been, it was followed by a disaster in another quarter still more terrible. The Phocians had fortified the city of Abæ, to defend their northern frontier against the depredations of the Locrians. The Thebans, reinforced by some auxiliaries of Macedon, marched against that place. The Phocians, with more courage than prudence, met them in the field; but were defeated with great slaughter, and pursued, in their disordered flight, through the surrounding territory. A party of above five hundred took refuge in the temple of Abæan Apollo, where they remained for several days, sleeping under the porticoes, on beds of dried herbs, straw, and other combustible materials. An accidental

⁷ See above, p. 394.

⁸ Æschin. de Falsa Legatione.

⁹ The speech of Æschines, as reported by himself, is inimitably graceful and dignified. Διγών οτι περιψύσαντας Ἀθηναίους περιεσκεύε, &c. Vid. p. 361, et seq. edit. Wolf.

¹⁰ Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione.

¹¹ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 454.

¹² Idem. p. 453.

¹³ Demosthen. and Æschin. ubi supra.

fire, that began in the night, was communicated to the whole edifice, part of which was consumed, while the unhappy Phocians were stifled, or burnt to ashes.¹

The Thebans failed not to represent this calamity as a judgment of heaven, against the daring impiety of wretches, who had ventured to take refuge in the temple of a god whom their sacrilege had long offended. They entreated Philip to assist them in destroying the remnant of the guilty race. This was the chief purpose of their embassy to that prince, whom the Athenians, as related above, entreated to spare the nation, while he punished the criminals; and the Lacedæmonians, regardless of the fate of Phocia, thought only of making good their ancient claim to the guardianship of the Delphic temple.

Philip treated the deputies of the three republics with apparent frankness and cordiality, under the veil of which he knew so well to disguise the interests of his policy and ambition. He assured the Thebans that his arms should be employed to recover for them the towns of Orchomenus, Coronæa, and Tilphosseum, which, ever ready to rebel against a tyrannical capital, had readily submitted to the Phocians, during their invasion of Bœotia. The Phocians, he said, had rendered themselves the objects of divine displeasure; it would be as meritorious to punish, as it was impious to protect them. He was determined that both they and their allies should suffer those calamities which their crimes so justly deserved. Thus far Philip was sincere; for, in these particulars, the views of Thebes were exactly conformable to his own. But in his mind he agitated other matters, in which the interest of Thebes interfered with that of Macedon. To accomplish those purposes, without offending his allies, it was necessary to gain the ambassadors. Caresses, flattery, and promises, were lavished in vain. Money was at length tendered with a profuse liberality; but, though no man ever possessed more address than Philip in rendering his bribes acceptable, the Theban deputies remained honest and uncorrupted, firmly maintaining to the end their patriotism and their honour. Philon, the chief of the embassy, answered for his colleagues: "We are already persuaded of your friendship for us, independent of your presents. Reserve your generosity for our country, on which it will be more profitably bestowed, since your favours, conferred on Thebes, will ever excite the gratitude both of that republic and its ministers."²

Demosthenes extols the dignity of this reply, as becoming rather the ambassadors of Athens. But these ministers, though one object of their commission was to save the Grecian state which the Thebans wished to destroy, discovered neither integrity nor spirit. All of them, but Demosthenes himself, accepted the presents of the king of Macedon, who found little difficulty in persuading men, thus prepossessed in his favour, that he pitied the Phocians; that he respected Athens; that

he detested the insolence of Thebes; and that, should he ever proceed to the straits of Thermopylæ, his expedition would be more dangerous to that state than to its enemies. At present, however, he observed, that he had private reasons for managing the friendship of a people who set no bounds to their resentment. From such motives, he had hitherto declined ratifying the peace with Athens; but this measure he would no longer defer. He only entreated, that to save appearances with the Thebans, the name of the Phocians might be omitted in the treaty. This arduous work was at length brought to a conclusion; and, for the more secrecy, transacted in a place which Demosthenes calls a tavern, adjoining to the temple of Pollux, in the neighbourhood of Phæræ. The Athenian ambassadors took leave, affecting to be persuaded (perhaps persuaded in reality) of the good intentions of the king of Macedon. About the same time, the ambassadors of Sparta departed, but with far less satisfaction. They either perceived, from the beginning, the artifices of the prince with whom they came to treat, or at least made such a report to Archidamus, as convinced him that his republic had not any advantage to expect from the preponderance of the Macedonian interest, and the destruction of the Phocians; and that, should the Spartans persist in their claim to the superintendence of the Delphic temple, they must prepare to assert it by force of arms.

Archidamus raised an army for this purpose, and marched towards the straits. But the intrigues of Philip, as we shall have occasion to relate, rendered his hostility as impotent as his negotiations had been fruitless. From Thessaly that prince had already sent a letter to the Athenians, couched in the most artful terms. He expressed his profound respect for the state, and his high esteem for its ambassadors; declaring that he should omit no opportunity of proving how earnestly he desired to promote the prosperity and glory of Athens. He requested that the means might be pointed out to him, by which he could most effectually gratify the people. Of the conditions of the peace and alliance, he was careful to make no mention; but after many other general declarations of his good-will, he entrusted them "not to be offended at his detaining their ambassadors, of whose eloquence and abilities he wished to avail himself in settling the affairs of Thessaly."³

Soon afterwards these ambassadors returned home; and having given an account of their negotiation to the senate of the Five Hundred, with very little satisfaction to that select body, they next appeared before the popular assembly. Æschines first mounted the rostrum, and in an elaborate and artful discourse, set forth the advantages resulting from his successful embassy, in which he had persuaded Philip to embrace precisely those measures which the interest of Athens required. That now, the people had peace instead of war, and that, without harassing themselves by military expe-

¹ Diodorus, p. 454.

² Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione.

³ Demosthen. et Æschin. ubi supra.

ditions, they had only to remain quietly at home, enjoying the amusements of the city, and in a few days they would learn that Philip had passed Thermopylæ, to take vengeance, not on the Phocians, but on the Thebans, who had been the real authors of the war, and who, having entertained a design of seizing the temple, were not the less culpable (as had been proved to Philip) because they had failed in this impious purpose. That the Bœotian allies of Thespis and Plata, whose hatred to Thebes was as inveterate as their attachment to Athens was sincere, would be restored to their pristine strength and splendour. That the Thebans, not the Phocians, would be compelled to pay the fine imposed by the Amphictyonic council, and to repair the fatal effects of sacrilege and profanation. That the magistrates of Thebes foresaw the hostility of Philip, and well knew by whom it had been excited. "They have, therefore," said *Æschines*, "devoted me to destruction, and actually set a price upon my head. The people of Eubœa are equally alarmed by our accommodation with Philip, not doubting that their island will be restored to us, as an equivalent for Amphipolis. Nor are these the only advantages of the treaty: another point of still higher importance, a point of the most intimate concern to the public, has been secured: But of this I shall speak at another time, since at present I perceive the envy and malignity of certain persons ready to break forth." The advantage hinted at, with such significant obscurity, was the recovery of Oropus, a considerable city on the Athenian frontier, which had long been subject to Thebes.

This specious harangue, so flattering to the indolence and vain hopes of the multitude, was received with general approbation, notwithstanding the opposition of *Demosthenes*, who declared that he knew nothing of all those great advantages promised by his colleague; and that he did not expect them. *Æschines* and *Philocrates* heard him with the supercilious contempt of men who possessed a secret with which he was unacquainted. But when he endeavoured to continue his discourse, and to expose their artifice and insincerity, all was clamour, indignation, and insult. *Æschines* bade him remember, not to claim any share of the rewards due to the important services of his colleagues. *Philocrates*, with an air of pleasantry, said, it was no wonder that the hopes of *Demosthenes* were less sanguine than his own, "since he drinks water; I wine." This insipid jest was received with loud bursts of laughter and applause, which prevented the assembly from attending to the spirited remonstrances of *Demosthenes*. A motion was made, and agreed to, for thanking Philip for his equitable and friendly intentions, as well as for ratifying a perpetual peace and alliance between Athens and Macedon.⁵ In the same decree, it was determined that the Phocians should submit to the Amphictyonic council, under pain of incurring the displeasure of the republic.

These articles, together with the secret motives which produced them, were, by the emis-

saries of Philip, immediately communicated to the Phocian ambassadors then residing at Athens; who, transported with joy at the prospect of averting the calamities which long threatened their country, lost no time in transmitting the agreeable intelligence to their fellow citizens. They concluded, with a high degree of probability, that, however Philip might deceive the Phocians, the ministers of Athens could never be so bold as publicly to deceive the Athenians; and that, therefore, they could no longer entertain any reasonable doubt of the favourable disposition of the king of Macedon. This belief was so firmly established, that when *Archidamus* marched into Phocis at the head of an army in order to defend the temple against Philip, the Phocians rejected his assistance, observing, that they feared for Sparta much more than for themselves; upon which the Lacedæmonians returned into Peloponnesus.⁶

Philip was now prepared for executing his grand enterprise. Halus, long besieged, had submitted to the united arms of *Parmenio* and his own. Fresh troops had arrived from Macedon. The Athenians were appeased; the Lacedæmonians had retired; the Phocians were imposed on; the Thessalians, Thebans, and Locrians, were ready to follow his standard. One obstacle only remained, and that easy to be surmounted. *Phaleucus*, who commanded eight thousand mercenaries, still kept possession of Nicæa. But a man who had betrayed the interest of his own republic, could not be very obstinate in defending the cause of Greece. Philip entered into a negotiation with him, in order to get possession of Nicæa,⁶ without which it would have been impossible to pass the Thermopylæ; and while this transaction was going forward, wrote repeated letters to the Athenians, full of cordiality and affection.

He suspected the dangerous capriciousness of a people, whose security might yet be alarmed; and whose opposition might still prove fatal to his designs, should they either march forth to the straits, or command their admiral *Proxenus*, who was stationed in the Opuntian gulf, between Locris and Eubœa, to intercept the Macedonian convoys; for the frontiers both of Phocis and Thessaly having long lain waste in consequence of the sacred war, Philip received his provisions chiefly by sea. The seasonable professions of friendship, contained in the letters, not only kept the Athenians from listening to the remonstrances of *Demosthenes*, but prevailed on them to depute that orator, together with *Æschines*, and several others, whose advice and assistance Philip affected to desire in settling the arduous business in which he was engaged. *Demosthenes* saw through the artifice of his enemies, for withdrawing him, at this important crisis, from his duty in the assembly: he therefore absolutely refused the commission. *Æschines*, on pretence of sickness, staid at home to watch and counteract the measures of his rival. The other ambassadors departed, in compliance with the request of

Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione.

⁵ *Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione.*

⁶ *Diodor. l. xvi. p. 455.*

Philip, and the orders of their republic, and in hopes of seeing a treaty fulfilled, which they had been taught to believe, would be attended with consequences equally advantageous and honourable.¹

While the ambassadors travelled through Eubœa, in their way to join the king of Macedon, they learned, to their utter astonishment, the wonderful events that had been transacted. Phaleucus had been persuaded to evacuate Nicæa. He retired towards the Peloponnesus, and embarked at Corinth, with a view to sail to Italy, where he expected to form an establishment. But the capricious and ungovernable temper of his followers compelled him to make a descent on the coast of Elis. After this they re-embarked, and sailed to Crete, where their invasion proved fatal to their general. Having returned to the Peloponnesus, they were defeated by the Elians and Arcadians. The greater part of those who survived the battle, fell into the hands of the enemy, by whom they were shot with arrows or precipitated from rocks. A feeble remnant escaped to their ships, but perished soon afterwards in an insurrection which they had excited or fomented, in the isle of Sicily. The destruction of this numerous body of men is ascribed by ancient historians² to the divine vengeance which pursued their sacrilege and impiety. It is astonishing that those superstitious writers did not reflect on the swifter and more terrible destruction that overtook the whole Phocian nation, by whom the wickedness of Phaleucus and his followers had been so recently condemned; and by whom, had not power been wanting, it would have been punished with an exemplary rigour.

Philip having passed the straits of Thermopylæ, was received by the Phocians as their deliverer. He had promised to plead their cause before the Amphictyonic council, to the decisions of which that credulous people consented to submit, well knowing that a prince who entered Greece at the head of a numerous army might easily control the resolutions of the Amphictyons, and fondly believing that prince to be their friend. The deputies of Athens had not yet arrived; those of the southern republics had not even been summoned. The Locrians, Thebans, and Thessalians, alone composed the assembly that was to decide the fate of Phocis; a country which they had persecuted with unrelenting hostility in a war of ten years. The sentence was such as might be expected from the cruel resentment of the judges. It was decreed that the Phocians should be excluded from the general confederacy of Greece, and for ever deprived of the right to send representatives to the council of Amphictyons: that their arms and horses should be sold for the benefit of Apollo; that they should be allowed to keep possession of their lands, but compelled to pay annually from their produce the value of sixty thousand talents, till they had completely indemnified the temple; that their cities should be dismantled, and reduced to distinct villages, containing no more than sixty houses each, at the distance of a furlong from each other; and

that the Corinthians, who had recently given them some assistance, should therefore be deprived of the presidency at the Pythian games; which important prerogative, together with the superintendence of the temple of Delphi, as well as the right of suffrage in the Amphictyonic council, lost by the Phocians, should thenceforth be transferred to the king of Macedon. It was decreed that the Amphictyons, having executed these regulations, should next proceed to procure all due repairs, and expiations to the temple, and should exert their wisdom and their power to establish, on a solid foundation, the tranquillity and happiness of Greece.³

This extraordinary decree, when Olymp. cviii. 2. communicated to the Phocians, filled A. C. 347. that miserable people with such terror and dismay, as rendered them totally incapable of acting with vigour or with union. They took not any common measures for repelling the invader; a few cities only, more daring than the rest, endeavoured, with unequal strength, to defend their walls, their temples, and the revered tombs of their ancestors. Their feeble resistance was soon overcome; all opposition ceased; and the Macedonians proceeded to execute the will of the Amphictyonic council with inflexible cruelty, and with such undisturbed order and silence as seemed more dreadful than the tumultuary ravages of the fiercest war. Without dropping a tear, or heaving a sigh, since the smallest mark of regret was construed into an obstinacy of guilt, the wretched Phocians beheld the destruction of their ancient monuments and trophies, their proud walls levelled with the ground, the fertile banks of the divine Cephissus covered with ruin and desolation, and the venerable cities of Daulis, Penopeus, Lilæa, and Hyampolis, which had flourished above nine centuries in splendour and prosperity, and which will for ever flourish in the song of Homer, so totally burned or demolished as scarcely to leave a vestige of their existence.⁴ After this terrible havoc of whatever they possessed most valuable and respected, the inhabitants were driven like herds of cattle to the settlements allotted for them, and compelled to cultivate their paternal fields for the benefit of stern and unrelenting masters. At the distance of three years, travellers, who passed through Phocis to visit the temple of Delphi, melted with compassion, or shuddered with horror, at the sight of such piteous and unexampled devastation. They turned their reluctant eyes from the shattered ruins of a country, and a people, once so illustrious; the youth, and men of full age, had either perished in the war, or been dragged into captivity; the populous cities were no more; and the villages were thinly inhabited by women, children, and wretched old men, whose silent but emphatic expressions of deep-rooted misery exceeded all power of words to describe.⁵

The unexpected news of these melancholy events reached Athens in five days. The people were then assembled in the Piræus to examine the state of their harbours and shipping.

¹ Demosthen. de Falsa Legatione.

² Diodorus, l. xvi. c. xx. gives this as a general opinion.

³ Diodor. l. xvi. c. lix. et seq.

⁴ Pausanias in Phocic. et Diodor. l. xvi. c. lix. et seq.

⁵ Demosthen. et Æschin. de Falsa Legat. et de Coroa.

The dreadful intelligence filled them with consternation. They imagined that they already beheld the destructive armies of Macedon and Thessaly, excited by the inveterate hostility of Thebes, pouring in upon their northern frontier, and overwhelming the whole country with havoc and desolation. A decree immediately passed, at the motion of Callisthenes, which marked the utmost danger and dismay. It was resolved, "that the Athenians, who usually resided in the country, should be summoned to the defence of the city; that those, within the distance of twelve miles round, should, along with their persons, transport their most valuable effects into the city or the Piræus; that those at a greater distance should respectively convey themselves and their property to the nearest fortresses, particularly Eleusis, Phylé, Aphidna, and Sunium, the principal places of strength in the Attic territory."⁶

This decree shows, that terror was the first movement of the Athenians; but vengeance was the second. Reluctantly cooped up within their walls, they called aloud for arms: levies were prepared for the relief of Phocis; and their admiral Proxenus, who had lately returned from the neighbouring coast, was ordered again to direct his course towards that country. The king of Macedon was duly attentive to those transactions, of which he had been regularly informed by his emissaries. He therefore wrote a letter to the Athenians, in that style of superiority which the success of his policy and of his arms, justly entitled him to assume. After acquainting them with his treatment of the Phocians, he mentions his being informed of their preparations for supporting that impious people, who were not included in the treaty of peace recently signed and ratified between Athens and Macedon. He exhorts them to lay aside this unwarrantable design, which could have no other effect than to show the iniquity and extravagance of their conduct, in arming against a prince, with whom they had so lately concluded an alliance. "But if you persist, know that we are prepared for repelling your hostilities with equal firmness and vigour."

This mortifying letter was received at the same time that the Athenian ambassadors returned from Eubœa, and brought such accounts of the destruction of the Phocians, that it appeared scarcely possible to afford them any relief. All that remained was to save, from the unrelenting vengeance of their enemies, the miserable wreck of that unfortunate community. The Athenians passed a decree for receiving the fugitives with kindness, and for providing them with settlements in Attica, or in the foreign dependencies of the republic; a resolution which, though it was founded on the most evident duties of gratitude and humanity towards ancient and faithful allies, gave great offence to the inexorable cruelty of the Thessalians and Thebans.⁷

Amidst these transactions the Macedonian partisans, and especially Æschines and Philocrates, whose vain assurances had been attended

with such fatal effects, had just cause to dread the resentment of their country. The former, who had been the principal agent in this disgraceful scene of intrigue and delusion, no longer affected sickness; he forgot the threatenings denounced against him by Thebes; he disregarded the Athenian decree, prohibiting any citizen to stir from the walls; and having waited for, and beheld, the destruction of the Phocians with as much indifference, if we may believe his adversary, as he would have seen the conclusion of any ordinary affair, which concerned merely his pecuniary interest, he repaired to Philip to receive the wages of his iniquity. Æschines accounts for his journey at this time by a more honourable, but less probable cause, the desire of saving the feeble and unhappy remnant of the Phocian nation, who were persecuted to extremity by the barbarous vengeance of their Grecian foes, and protected at the intercession of the Athenian orator, by the clemency or compassion of the Macedonians. There is reason to believe that Æschines, in order to gain merit with his countrymen, whose resentment he had so highly provoked, opposed an inhuman resolution of precipitating from rocks all those of the Phocians who had attained the age of puberty. But the king of Macedon, whose character was not naturally flagitious, or cruel without necessity, must, of his own accord, have been inclined to avert such an atrocious and bloody sentence, which, without promoting his interest, would have for ever ruined his fame.

This conclusion appears the more probable, since, we are assured, that, upon the same principle, but with far less success, he assumed the protection of the oppressed Bœotians. Orchomenus, Coronæa, Hyampolis, with other cities of less note in Bœotia, were, in consequence of the ruin of their Phocian allies, again subjected to the dominion of Thebes; a republic, always haughty and unrelenting, who, on this occasion, prepared to treat the rebels with more than her usual insolence and cruelty. Philip espoused the cause of the injured with a generous ardour, extremely disagreeable to the Thebans. His humanity, whether real or affected, was loudly extolled by his partisans in most republics of Greece. It redounded, however, more to his own glory, than to the benefit of the afflicted Bœotians; who, being expelled from their own country by the intolerable oppression of Theban tyranny, sought refuge in the compassionate bosom of Athens.⁸

Olymp. Having finished the sacred war in a manner so favourable to his own interest and ambition, Philip convened the members of the Amphictyonic council, to the number of two hundred, and assisted in the hymns, prayers, and sacrifices offered to Apollo, in acknowledgment of his divine protection of their councils and arms. The name of the pious king of Macedon, who had been the principal instrument of their success, resounded in the sacred Pæans sung in honour of the god. The Amphictyons ratified all the transactions of that prince, erected his statue in the temple of Delphi, and acknowledged,

⁶ Demosthen. de Falsa Legat. sect. 20.

⁷ Demosthen. et Æschin. de Falsa Legat. sect. 20.

⁸ Demosthen. et Æschin. de Falsa Legat. sect. 20.

by a solemn decree, the kingdom of Macedon as the principal member of the Hellenic body.¹ Philip at the same time appointed deputies to preside at the Pythian games, the celebration of which was nearly approaching, and to which most of the Grecian states had already sent their representatives. The Athenians, stung with indignation and regret, abstained from this festival. An embassy was therefore despatched to them in the name of the Amphictyons, requiring their concurrence with measures recently embraced by the general council of Greece; and remonstrating against their displeasure at the aggrandisement of a prince with whom they had so lately contracted an alliance.

The deliberations of the Athenian assembly, on this occasion, showed the full extent of their own folly, and evinced the consummate policy of Philip. They acknowledged, with dejection and anguish, that they had neglected the many opportunities presented them by the favour of heaven, for repressing the ambition of their rival; that the time of acting, with vigour and boldness, was now no more; that the cause of Greece was an empty name, since the Greeks surrendered their dignity to the king of Macedon; and that it became their own republic to consult rather its safety than its honour, and to maintain peace with a monarch against whom they were by no means prepared to wage war. Even Demosthenes² recommended this resolution; lest, says he, we should offend those now assembled, who call themselves the Amphictyons, and thus excite a general war against ourselves. The Thebans, besides ancient causes of quarrel with us, are incensed at our harbouring their exiles; the Locrians and Thessalians resent our protecting the Phocians; the Argives, the Messenians, and Megalopolitans, are dis-

pleased at our concurring with the views of Lacedæmon. If we refuse the demands of Philip and the Amphictyons, they may assault us with the combined arms of all those states, which we are totally unable to resist. One point, therefore, is necessary, the continuance of the present peace; not that it is so very excellent, or so worthy of you; but, of what kind soever it may be, it were more for the interest of your affairs, that it never had been concluded, than that now, when it is concluded, you should infringe it. This opinion was universally approved: Macedon was acknowledged a member of the Grecian confederacy; and Isocrates, an Athenian of the highest merit and reputation, addressed a discourse to Philip, in which he exhorted him to disdain inglorious victories over his countrymen and friends, to employ his authority to extinguish, for ever, the animosities of Greece, and to direct the united efforts of that country, of which Macedon now formed a part, against the wealth and effeminacy of Persia, its ancient and natural enemy.³

Whether these exhortations proceeded from the virtuous simplicity which did not suspect, or from the insinuating and artful policy which, though it suspected, hoped to prevent, the hostile projects⁴ of Macedon, the measures of Philip were, doubtless, taken with too much care, and his plans founded too deep and firm, to be shaken by the specious eloquence of a rhetorician. He had long meditated the invasion of Asia; the conquest of the Persian empire was an object that might well tempt his ambition; but neither his own passions, nor the arguments of other men, could hasten, retard, or vary his undeviating progress in a system which could only be completed by consolidating his ancient, before he attempted new conquests.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Foundation of Philippopolis and Cabyla—Philip's Expedition to Illyria—Alexander receives the Persian Ambassadors—Affairs of Greece—Demosthenes unmasks the Designs of Philip's Expedition to the Peloponnesus—to Epirus—to Thrace—Diopithes opposes him with Vigour—The Athenians recover Eubœa—Siege of Perinthus—Philip's Letter to the Athenians—Expedition of Chares—of Phocion—who retrieves the Athenian Affairs in Thrace—Philip's Scythian Expedition—The incendiary Antiphon—Philip's Intrigues embroil the Affairs of Greece—The third Sacred War—Philip General of the Amphictyons—Confederacy against that Prince—He seizes Elatæa—Battle of Chæronæa—His Moderation in Victory—Demosthenes's Oration in Honour of the Slain.

Olymp. cviii. 4. A. C. 345. BY his intrigues Philip had obtained more important advantages, than he could have gained by a long series of victories. The conquest of Greece was his object; he had taken many preliminary measures towards effecting this purpose; while his conduct, so far from exciting the jealousy of those fierce republics, acquired their admiration and gratitude. Instead of rousing the dangerous resentment of a na-

tion whom he was ambitious to subdue, Philip disarmed the hostility of Athens, and threatened with the vengeance of combined Greece, the only republic that appeared forward to obstruct his designs. It seemed high time, therefore, to withdraw his army; to set bounds, for the present, to his own triumphs; nor to attempt, with danger, effecting by premature force, what

³ Isocrat. Orat. Philipp.

⁴ See the Life of Isocrates, prefixed to my translation of his works.

¹ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 60.

² Demosthen. de Pace.

might be safely accomplished by seasonable policy. Before evacuating Greece, he took care to place a strong garrison in Nicæa, which might thenceforth secure his free passage through the straits of Thermopylæ. Macedonian troops occupied the principal cities of Thessaly, and the strongest posts of Phocia. He conducted with him into Macedon eleven thousand Phocian captives; an acquisition which he regarded as not the least valuable fruits of his success; and of which, on his return home, he determined immediately to avail himself.

The warlike tribes of Thrace, though often vanquished had never been thoroughly subdued. In order to bridle the dangerous fury of those northern barbarians, Philip built two cities, Philippopolis and Cabyla,⁵ the first at the western extremity of the country, on the confines of mount Rhodopé, the second towards the east, at the foot of mount Hæmus, above a hundred and fifty miles distant from each other, and almost equally remote from the Macedonian capital. The Phocian captives, blended with a due proportion of Macedonian subjects, well provided with arms for their defence, were sent to people and cultivate those new settlements, whose flourishing condition soon exceeded the expectation of their founder. At the same time, Philip planted a colony in the isle of Thasos, which had formerly belonged to the Athenians; but that people having already lost possession of the gold mines at Philippi, on the neighbouring coast of Thrace, seemed now so indifferent about the possession of Thasos, that their transports were employed in conveying the Macedonians thither.⁶

Olymp. In such occupations, chiefly, Philip employed the first year of the
cix. 1. peace, not neglecting to complete
A. C. 344. the ornaments of his capital; for which purpose he borrowed, as formerly, large sums of money from the richest citizens of Greece. The year following, he made an expedition into Illyria, and, at the expense of that country, extended his dominions from the lake Lychnidus to the Ionian sea. This district, about sixty miles in breadth, was barbarous and uncultivated, but contained valuable salt-mines, which had occasioned a bloody war between two neighbouring tribes. While Philip was absent in Illyria, an embassy arrived from Ochus king of Persia, who, alarmed by the magnificent reports of the growing greatness of Macedon, sent the most trusty of his ministers, who, under pretence of offering to Philip the friendship and alliance of the great king, might examine with their own eyes the strength and resources of a monarch, which were represented as so formidable.

In the absence of his father, the young Alexander did the honours of the court; and it is said, that during an entertainment given to the Persian ambassadors, the prince, who had not yet reached his twelfth year, discovered such manly and premature wisdom, as already announced the dawn of a very extraordinary

character.⁷ Among other questions, that could not have been expected from his age, he inquired into the nature of the Persian government and art of war; the genius and disposition of the reigning sovereign; the distance of his capital from the coast, and the difficulty of the intervening roads.⁸ Such inquiries, whatever talents they announced in the young prince, seem to prove that the conquest of Persia had been a frequent subject of conversation between Alexander and his instructors; and that an unbounded ambition had already taken possession of his youthful mind. The ambassadors heard him with astonishment, and exclaimed with that freedom which so wonderfully distinguishes the public transactions of ancient, from those of modern times, "Ours is a rich and powerful, but this will be truly a wise and great king."⁹

Olymp. Philip had no sooner returned
cix. 1. from Illyria, than he made an ex-
A. C. 344. cursion to Thessaly, and finally settled the affairs of that distracted country; having taken on himself the whole management of the revenue, and having divided the territory into four separate governments, in order to weaken the force of opposition, and to render the whole province more patient and submissive under the dominion of Macedon.¹⁰ While Philip was thus employed in Thessaly, his agents were not less active in confirming the Macedonian authority in the isle of Eubœa. Nor was he satisfied with securing his former acquisitions; he aspired at new conquests. The barren and rocky territory of Megara, divided by an extent of only ten miles, the frontier of Bœotia from the isthmus of Corinth. The industrious and frugal simplicity of this little republic could not defend its virtue against the corrupt influence of the Macedonian.¹¹ Philip gained a party in Megara, which he cultivated with peculiar care; because, being already master of Bœotia, Phocia, and Thessaly, the narrow territory of the Megarians formed the chief obstacle to his free passage into the Peloponnesus, the affairs of which, at this juncture, particularly deserved his attention.

The Lacedæmonians, repulsed by Philip, whom they had condescended to solicit, rejected by the Phocians, whom they offered to assist, and having lost all hopes of obtaining the guardianship of the Delphic temple, totally deserted

⁷ Plutarch (in Alexandro.) expresses himself strongly on this subject: "ὡς τε ἀμφοτέρους (the ambassadors) θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὴν λιγυρίαν τοῦ Φιλίππου δεινότητα μὴδὲν ὑπερβαίνειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἑρμην καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείαν."—Read μεγαλοψυχίαν, and then the sentence may be literally explained; "So that the ambassadors wondered, and thought nothing of the famed abilities of Philip, compared with the spirit and magnanimity of his son." I recollect not having met with μεγαλοπρεπείαν in the writers of the Socratic age; but it is a good word to mark the character of a person "who busies himself about great objects."

⁸ Plutarch. in Alexand.

⁹ I have used a little freedom with the words of Plutarch, ὡς οἱ παῖς οὗτος βασιλεὺς μέγας· οἱ δὲ ἡμέτεροι πλουσιός. Plut. Orat. ii. de Forten. Alexand.

¹⁰ Demosth. Philipp. iii.

¹¹ Demosth. de Falsa Legatione, et Philipp. iii. In Philipp. iv. he speaks as if Philip had made some open attempt against Megara, in which he had failed: ταύτης (scil. Εὐβοίας) ἐλιγυρεύμενης, Μεγαρα οὐλοῦσα παραμικρόν, p. 54.

⁵ Strabo, l. vii. p. 118.

⁶ Demosthen. de Halonesso.

a scene of action, in which they could expect neither profit nor honour, and confined their politics and their arms within the narrow circle of their own peninsula. For almost two years, Archidamus had laboured with undivided attention, and with his usual address and activity, to extend the pretensions and the power of Sparta over the territories of Messenê, Argos, and Arcadia. His measures, planned with prudence, and conducted with vigour, were attended with success, though the inhabitants of the dependent provinces bore with much regret and indignation the yoke of a republic, which they had formerly spurned as oppressive and intolerable. Their murmurs and discontents were inflamed into hostility by the Thebans, the eternal enemies of Sparta, and, at that time, closely allied with the king of Macedon. To this monarch the Thebans applied, requesting him not to permit the destruction of their confederates in the Peloponnesus. The intrigues and money of Philip had already gained him a considerable influence in that country, which he was glad of an opportunity to increase. To justify his proceedings for this purpose, he procured a decree of the Amphictyonic council, requiring him to check the insolence of Sparta, and to protect the defenceless communities which had so often been the victims of her tyranny and cruelty. Encouraged by this resolution of the Amphictyons, and impelled by his own ambition, Philip sent troops and money into the Peloponnesus, and prepared to march thither in person, at the head of a powerful army.¹

These transactions excited new commotions and alarms throughout most countries of Greece. The Corinthians,² jealous of the power of a prince, who, at the close of the Phocian war, deprived them of their ancient prerogatives and honours, and who, still more recently, had taken possession of Leucas, a city in Acarnania, and of Ambracia in Epirus, both colonies of Corinth, determined to oppose his passage into the Peloponnesus. Weapons and defensive armour were provided, the walls and fortifications were repaired, mercenary troops were levied, the citizens exercised in arms, the whole republic glowed with the ardour of military preparation; insomuch that Diogenes the Cynic, who lost no opportunity to deride the follies of his contemporaries, beholding with just contempt the hurry and vain bustle of the effeminate Corinthians, that seemed so ill calculated to contend with the active vigour of Philip, began to roll about his tub,³ lest he should be the only person unemployed in so busy a city.

The Lacedæmonians, mean while, not less alarmed, but always better prepared for war, solicited the assistance of Athens. The latter state had received a considerable accession of strength, as well as of just honour and respect,

from its hospitable reception of the distressed exiles from Phocis and Bœotia. It derived new consideration and lustre from the general congress of ambassadors from Sparta, Thebes, Macedon, Argos, Messenê, and Arcadia, who, after a long interval of time, again condescended to assert their respective claims before the Athenian assembly. The Lacedæmonians represented the league, formed against themselves, as alike dangerous to Athens and to Sparta; that the ambition of Philip would not rest satisfied with a partial conquest; his imagination already grasped the dominion of Greece; and now was the only time for the two leading republics, who had ever mutually assisted each other in seasons of calamity, to make a firm stand, and to exert their utmost vigour in defence of their own and the public safety, so shamefully abandoned by the Thebans, and by the mob of Peloponnesus.⁴ The Thebans joined with the ministers of Philip in calling on the Athenians to adhere strictly to their treaty of peace recently concluded with that prince; they endeavoured, by art and sophistry, to varnish or to palliate such deeds of fraud or violence as could not be altogether denied; and laboured with the utmost assiduity to separate the views and interests of Athens and Lacedæmon on this important emergency. The ambassadors of the inferior states of Peloponnesus loudly complained, that the Athenians, who affected to be the patrons of liberty, should favour the views of Sparta, which had so long been the scourge of Greece. They represented this conduct as not only unjust and cruel, but contradictory and absurd; and used many plausible arguments to deter the people of Athens, who still strenuously asserted the freedom of Bœotia, from taking such a part in the present quarrel as might tend to rivet the chains of Peloponnesus.

The Athenian orators, many of them creatures of Philip, exhorted their countrymen not to break too hastily with a prince with whom they had so recently concluded an alliance, nor imprudently renew a bloody and destructive war, out of which they had been lately extricated with so much difficulty. They observed, that although the measures of Philip, since the conclusion of the peace, had indeed been more agreeable to the Thebans than to the Athenians, he had considered himself as bound in justice to chastise the sacrilege of the Phocians. Nor was he altogether at liberty to follow his own inclinations; surrounded by the Thessalian cavalry and the Theban infantry, he was compelled to treat the enemies of those states with a severity which his own feelings disapproved. But the time was arrived when he might act with more independence and dignity; and that, could any credit be given to report, he was already preparing to rebuild the ruined cities of Phocis and to fortify Elatæ, on the frontier of that territory, by which means he might thenceforth restrain and bridle the insolent cruelty of Thebes. These observations, however improbable, received great force from the peaceful, or rather indolent disposition of the people, who, though they heard with pleasure those who magnified

¹ Demosth. de Pace.

² Lucian de Conscriptis. Histor.

³ Auct. apud Brucker. in Vit. Diogen. That learned writer has collected all that is written for and against the tub of Diogenes. Were authors less explicit, the moveable habitation of this philosopher would be sufficiently attested by ancient monuments. See Winckelmann, d'Hancarville &c.

⁴ Οἱ ἄλλοι Πελοποννησίου. Isocrat. in Archidam.

their ancient grandeur, and inveighed against the injustice and ambition of Philip, were averse to employ either their money or their personal service, in such active measures, as could alone set bounds to the Macedonian encroachments.

Demosthenes, last, arose, and pronounced a discourse, which the king of Macedon is said to have read with a mixture of terror and admiration.⁵ "When you hear described, men of Athens! the continual hostilities by which Philip violates the peace, I observe that you approve the equity and patriotism of those who support the rights of the republic: but while nothing is done, on account of which it is worth while to listen to such speeches, our affairs are brought to such a pass, that the more clearly we convict Philip of perfidy towards you, and of hostile designs against Greece, the more difficult it is to propose any seasonable advice. The cause of this difficulty is, that the encroachments of ambition must be repelled, not by words, but by deeds. If speeches and reasonings sufficed, we should long ere now have prevailed over our adversary. But Philip excels in actions as much as we do in arguments; and both of us obtain the superiority in what forms respectively the chief object of our study and concern; we in our assemblies, Philip in the field.

"Immediately after the peace, the king of Macedon became master of Phocis and Thermopylæ, and made such a use of these acquisitions as suited the interest of Thebes, not of Athens. Upon what principle did he act thus? Because, governed in all his proceedings, not by the love of peace and justice, but by an insatiable lust of power, he saw the impossibility of bending the Athenians to his selfish and tyrannical purposes. He knew that the loftiness of their character would never stoop to private considerations, but prefer to any advantage that he might offer them, the dictates of justice and of honour; and that neither their penetration, nor their dignity, could ever be prevailed on to sacrifice to a partial and temporary interest, the general safety of Greece; but that they would fight for each member of the confederacy with the same ardour as for their own walls. The Thebans he judged (and he judged aright) to be more assailable; he knew their folly and their meanness to be such, that provided he heaped benefits on themselves, they would assist him to enslave their neighbours. Upon the same principle he now cultivates, in preference to yours, the friendship of the Messenians and Argives; a circumstance, Athenians! which highly redounds to your honour, since Philip thus declares his persuasion, that you alone have wisdom to understand, and virtue to oppose, his designs; that you foresee the drift of all his negotiations and wars, and are determined to be the incorruptible defenders of the common cause. Nor is it without good grounds that he entertains such an honourable opinion of you, and the contrary of the Thebans and Argives. When the liberties of Greece were threatened by Persia, as they now are by Macedon, the Thebans basely followed the standard of the invaders;

the Argives did not oppose their arms; while the magnanimous patriots, from whom you are descended, spurned offers, highly advantageous, made them by Alexander of Macedon, the ancestor of Philip, who acted as the ambassador of Persia; and, preferring the public interest to their own, provoked the devastation of their territory, and the destruction of their capital, and performed, in defence of Greece, those unrivalled exploits of heroism which can never be celebrated with due praise. For such reasons, Philip chooses for his allies, Thebes, Argos, and Messenæ, rather than Athens and Sparta. The former states possess not greater strength, wealth, fleets, harbours, and armies; they have not more *power*, but less *virtue*. Nor can Philip plead the merits of their cause; since, if Chæronæa and Orchomenus are justly subject to Thebes, Argos and Messenæ are justly subject to Lacedæmon; nor could it be equitable to enslave the inferior cities of Bœotia, and at the same time to teach those of Peloponnesus to rebel.

"But Philip was compelled to this conduct (for this is the only remaining argument that can be alleged in his defence.) 'Surrounded by the Thessalian cavalry and Theban infantry, he was obliged to assist allies whom he distrusted, and to concur with measures which he disapproved. Hence the severe treatment of Phocis, hence the cruel servitude of Orchomenus and Chæronæa. The king of Macedon, being now at liberty to consult the dictates of his own humanity and justice, is desirous to re-establish the republic of Phocis; and, in order to bridle the insolence of Thebes, actually meditates the fortifying of Elatæa.' This, indeed, he meditates, and will meditate long. But he does not *meditate* the destruction of Lacedæmon. For this purpose he has remitted money, he has sent his mercenaries, he is prepared, himself, to march at the head of a powerful army. His present transactions sufficiently explain the motives of his past conduct. It is evident that he acts from system, and that his principal batteries are erected against Athens itself. How can it be otherwise? He is ambitious to rule Greece; you alone are capable to thwart his measures. He has long treated you unworthily; and he is conscious of his injustice. He is actually contriving your destruction, and he is sensible that you see through his designs. For all these reasons he knows that you detest him, and that should he not anticipate your hostility, he must fall a victim to your just vengeance. Hence he is ever active and alert, watching a favourable moment of assault, and practising on the stupidity and selfishness of the Thebans and Peloponnesians; for if they were not stupid and blind, they might perceive the fatal aim of the Macedonian policy. I once spoke⁶ on this subject before the Messenians and Argives; my discourse, which was useless to them, may, perhaps, not unseasonably be repeated to you. "Men of Argos and Messenæ! you remember the time when Philip caressed the Olynthians, as he now does you: how highly, do you think, that infatuated people would have been offend-

5 Plut. in Vit. Demosth. in lib. de dec. Orator.

6 During his embassy to Peloponnesus, mentioned above

ed, had any man talked against the benefactor, who had generously bestowed on them Anthemus and Potidæa? Had any man warned them against the dangerous artifices of Philip, would they have listened to his advice? Yet, after enjoying for a moment the territories of their neighbours, they were for ever despoiled of their own. Inglorious was their fall; not conquered only, but betrayed and sold by one another. Turn your eyes to the Thessalians. When Philip expelled their tyrants, could the Thessalians ever conjecture that the same prince would subject them to the creatures of Macedon, still more tyrannical and oppressive? When he restored them to their seat and suffrage in the Amphictyonic council, could they have been persuaded that he would one day deprive them of the management of their own revenues? As to you, Messenians and Argives! you have beheld Philip smiling and deceiving; but beware! pray to heaven, that you may never behold him insulting, threatening, and destroying. Various are the contrivances which communities have discovered for their defence; walls, ramparts, battlements, all of which are raised by the labour of man, and supported by continual expense and toil. But there is one common bulwark, which only the prudent employ, though alike useful to all, especially to free cities against tyrants. What is that? Distrust. Of this be mindful; to this adhere; preserve this carefully, and no calamity can befall you."¹

Demosthenes then read to the assembly the schedule of an answer, which he advised to be given to the ambassadors, and which was entirely favourable to the Lacedæmonians. At the same time he exhorted his countrymen to deliberate with firmness, yet with temper, on the means by which they might resist the common enemy; "an enemy with whom he had exhorted them to maintain peace, as long as *that* seemed possible; but peace was no longer in their power; Philip gradually carried on a vast system of hostile ambition, dismembering their possessions, debauching their allies, paring their dominions all around, that he might at length attack the centre, unguarded and defenceless." Had the orator stopped here, his advice might have been followed with some useful consequences. But in declaiming against the encroachments of Macedon, his resentment was naturally inflamed against Philocrates, Æschines, and their associates, whose perfidious intrigues and machinations had produced the public danger and disgrace. He strongly recommended to the injured people to impeach, condemn, and consign to due punishment those detestable traitors. This counsel was not given in vain to the litigious Athenians, who were better pleased to attend the courts of justice at home, than to march into the Peloponnesus. The city resounded with the noise of trials and accusations. Philocrates was banished,² and Æschines nearly escaped the same fate, by exposing the profligate life of his accuser Timarchus.³

Philip, mean while, unopposed and unob-

served by his enemies, was sailing with a powerful armament towards Cape Tenarus, the most southern promontory of Laconia. Having landed there without opposition, he was joined by the Messenians, Arcadians, and Argives. The united army, after ravaging the most valuable part of the Lacedæmonian territories, besieged and took Trinasus, a maritime city of considerable strength and importance. The terror occasioned among the Spartans by these misfortunes, was heightened by extraordinary meteors in the air, whose unusual redness seemed to presage some dreadful calamity.⁴ The alarm was so general, that it has been thought worth while to record the saying of a Spartan youth, who remained unmoved amidst the public consternation. Being asked, "Whether he was not afraid of Philip?" "Why," replied the generous youth, "should I fear him? he cannot hinder me from dying for my country."⁵ But this manly resolution no longer animated the great body of the Spartan nation. Unable to meet the invader in the field, they sent Agias, the son of king Archidamus, to propose terms of accommodation, or rather to submit their whole fortune to the disposal of the Macedonians. The young prince coming alone and unattended, Philip expressed his surprise. "What, have the Spartans sent but one!" "Am I not sent to one?" was the manly reply of Agias.⁶ This was the expiring voice of Spartan pride; for the king of Macedon, though unwilling to provoke the despair of a people, whose degenerate virtue might yet be animated by the institutions of Lycurgus and the example of Leonidas, compelled them to resign their pretended authority over Argos, Messenæ, and Arcadia; and settled the boundaries of those republics in a manner highly agreeable to the wishes of his confederates. Before leaving the Peloponnesus, he solemnly renewed his engagements to protect them; and, in return, only required, on their part, that the magistracy in Argos should be entrusted to Myrtis, Teledamus, and Mnasiæ; in Arcadia, to Cercidas, Hieronymus, and Eucampidas; in Messenæ, to Neon and Thrasyluchus, the sons of Iphiades; men whose names would merit eternal oblivion, if Demosthenes had not justly branded them as traitors;⁷ but a more impartial, and not less judicious writer,⁸ that by early espousing the interest of Philip, they acquired many important advantages for their respective communities; that their sagacity having foreseen the final prevalence of the Macedonian power and policy over the weakness and folly of Greece, they acted wisely in courting the rising fortune of a prince, who was, at length, enabled to take complete vengeance on his enemies; a vengeance, which the Peloponnesians escaped by their own prudence and foresight, and from which the Athenians, after long provoking it, were finally de-

4 Plin. Hist. Nat. l. ii. c. xxxvi.

5 Frontin. l. iv. c. v.

6 Plut. Apophth.

7 Πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, οὐ τίσιν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν οἰκίαις, φόρμιν προδοτῶν καὶ δωροδοκῶν καὶ θίσις ἐχθρῶν ἀνδραπον, οὐνεβη γενισθῆναι, οὐκ ἐν οὐδαίς πᾶσι προτέρων μίμνηται γιγνυσθῆναι. These traitors are named in Philipp. iii. et in Orat. de Corona.

8 Pol. b. iii. 79.

1 Demosthen. Orat. ii. in Philipp.

2 Æschin. in Ctesiphon.

3 Argum. in Æschin. Orat. in Timarch.

livered by the love of glory and magnanimity, which regulated the conduct, and adorned the victory, of Philip.

Having settled the affairs of Peloponnesus, the king of Macedon marched through that country amidst the acclamations of the people, who vied with each other in bestowing crowns and statues, the usual marks of public gratitude and admiration, on a prince who had generously rescued them from the cruel yoke of Sparta. At Corinth he passed some days in the house of Demaratus, a man totally devoted to his service; and assisted at the games and spectacles, which were celebrated in that city, by an immense concourse of people from the neighbouring republics. The turbulent Corinthians, who, besides their innate hatred of kings, had particular causes of animosity against Philip, did not conceal their sentiments; and their inhospitable insolence was abetted by many Peloponnesians, who profited of the liberty of the place, and of the occasion, to testify their rooted aversion to the king of Macedon, and their unwillingness to owe their freedom and their safety to the interposition of a foreign tyrant. Philip was strongly urged by his courtiers to punish their ingratitude; but he knew how to digest an affront,⁹ when forgiveness was more useful than vengeance; and repressed the unseasonable indignation of his attendants, by observing, with admirable patience, "Were I to act with severity, what must I expect from men, who repay even kindness with insult."¹⁰

Olymp. Philip proceeded from Corinth by the nearest route into Macedon, cix. 1. where he continued the remainder A. C. 344. of that year, directing the improvements that were carrying on in his kingdom, and inspecting with particular care the education of his son Alexander, whose capacious and fervid mind, like a rich and luxuriant soil, producing promiscuously flowers and weeds, strongly required the hands of early culture.¹¹ But these useful occupations did not divert his attention from the politics of neighbouring states. He extended the boundaries of Epirus, then governed by his brother-in-law Alexander, the most faithful and devoted of his vassals, by adding to that little principality the province of Cassiopia, which was chiefly inhabited by Elian colonies. At the same time he exercised his fleet by wresting Halonnesus, an island near the coast of Thessaly, from the hands of corsairs, and kept possession of his conquest, without paying any regard to the claim of the Athenians, the ancient and lawful proprietors of the island.¹²

Olymp. Next year Philip was summoned cix. 2. into Upper Thrace, by a rebellion A. C. 343. of the petty princes in that country, fomented by Amadocus king of the Odrysians. The warlike tribes of that great nation, acting with little concert or union, were successively subdued; and the dexterity

of the king of Macedon seconding his usual good fortune, he soon ranked the most obstinate of his enemies in the number of his vassals or courtiers.¹³ At his return from the inhospitable wilds of Thrace, he received into his protection the city and republic of Cardia, occupying the neck of land which joins the Thracian Chersonesus to the continent. The rest of the peninsula had long been subject to the Athenians, whose authority the citizens of Cardia always set at defiance. The Athenians had lately strengthened the Chersonesites by a new colony, which had continual disputes with the Cardians about the extent of their boundaries. Matters had actually come to a crisis, and the Cardians were ready to be overwhelmed by the strength and numbers of the enemy, when they were seasonably defended by the Macedonian arms.¹⁴

The seizing of Halonnesus, the conquering of Grecian colonies for the tyrant of Epirus, above all, the open assistance given to their inveterate enemies, the Cardians, once more roused the Athenians from their lethargy. These fresh insults brought back to their recollection the ancient grounds of animosity, and the manifold injuries which they had suffered since the conclusion of the peace with Macedon. But instead of opposing Philip with arms, the only means by which he might yet be resisted with any hope of success, they employed the impotent defence of speeches, resolutions, and embassies. Their complaints were loud and violent in every country of Greece. They called the attention of the whole confederacy to the formidable encroachments of a Barbarian, to which there seemed no end; and exhorted the Greeks to unite in repressing his insolent usurpation.¹⁵

Philip, who then agitated schemes from which he wished not to be diverted by a war with the Athenians, sent proper agents throughout Greece, to counteract the inflammatory remonstrances of that people; and despatched to Athens itself, Python of Byzantium, a man of a daring and vigorous mind; but who concealed, under that passionate vehemence of language which seems to arise from conviction and sincerity, a mercenary spirit, and a perfidious heart. Python had long ago sold himself, and, as far as depended on himself, the interest of his country, to the king of Macedon, from whom he now conveyed a letter to the senate and people of Athens, written with that specious moderation and artful plausibility, which Philip knew so well to assume in all his transactions. "He offered to make a present to the Athenians of the island of Halonnesus, and invited them to join with him in purging the sea of pirates: he entreated them to refer to impartial arbitrators all the differences that had long subsisted between the two nations, and to concert amicably together such commercial regulations as would tend greatly to the advantage of both. He denied that they could produce any proof of that duplicity on his part,

⁹ Longinus has preserved the expression of Theopompus, "that Philip could easily swallow affronts."

¹⁰ Plut. in Alexand.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Demosthen. Orat. de Halon.

¹³ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 464.

¹⁴ Demosthen. Orat. de Halon. p. 34. et Plut. in Vit. Eumen.

¹⁵ Demosthen. de Chersoneso, p. 35, et seq.

of which they so loudly complained. That for himself, he was ready not only to terminate all disputes with them by a fair arbitration, but to compel the Cardians to abide by the award; and he concluded, by exhorting them to distrust those designing and turbulent demagogues, whose selfish ambition longed to embroil the two countries, and involve them in the horrors of war.¹

The subtle artifices of Philip, though supported on this occasion by the impetuous eloquence of Python, were overcome by Hegesippus and Demosthenes, who refuted the various articles of the letter with great strength and perspicuity, and unveiled the injustice of Philip with such force of evidence, that the Athenians resolved upon sending a considerable armament to the Chersonesus, to protect their subjects in that peninsula.² Diopceithes, who commanded the expedition, was a determined enemy to the Macedonians, and a man of courage and enterprise. Before he arrived in the Chersonesus, Philip, trusting to the effect of his letter and intrigues, had returned into Upper Thrace. Diopceithes availed himself of this opportunity to act with vigour. Having provided for the defence of the Athenian settlements in Thrace, he made an incursion into the neighbouring country; stormed the Macedonian settlements at Crobylé and Tiristasis; and having carried off many prisoners, and a considerable booty, lodged them in the safe retreat of the Chersonesus. On this emergency, Amphilocheus, a Macedonian of rank, was sent as ambassador, to treat of the ransom of prisoners; but Diopceithes, regardless of this character, ever held sacred in Greece, cast him in prison, the more surely to widen the breach between Athens and Macedon; and, if possible, to render it irreparable. With equal severity he treated a herald, whom he had taken in his late excursion, charged with letters from Philip; which were sent to Athens, and read in full assembly.³

The king of Macedon, when informed of these hostilities and insults, gave free scope to his complaints and threats; and his emissaries had an easier game at Athens, as Diopceithes had not only violated the peace with Macedon, but, in order to maintain his troops, which were very sparingly supplied by the republic, levied considerable contributions from the Greek settlements in Asia. The partisans of Macedon inveighed against this commander as a robber and pirate, the common enemy of Greeks and Barbarians; Philip's letters demanded vengeance from the justice of Athens; if not, he would be his own avenger; the personal enemies of Diopceithes joined in the outcry, and insisted, that such a daring offender ought immediately to be recalled, and punished for his misconduct.

On this occasion Demosthenes undertook to defend the accused general, whose measures he warmly approved; and motives of private friendship heightening the ardour of patriotism, render his discourse on the affairs of the

Chersonesus one of the most animated and interesting of his productions. The impeachment of Diopceithes he ascribes entirely to malice or perfidy, which had been too successfully employed to withdraw the attention of the Athenians from the main object of their concern, the continual encroachments of Philip, to unjust complaints and calumnies against their fellow citizens. Diopceithes, if really criminal, might be recalled, and punished whenever they thought proper. A simple mandate from the republic could, at any time, reduce him to his duty. But Philip, the public enemy, who was continually infringing the peace, who, before the expedition of Diopceithes, had oppressed the Chersonesites, had stormed Serrium and Doriscus, how was Philip to be restrained, unless they repelled force by force? Instead of recalling their troops from the Chersonesus on the remonstrance of a crafty tyrant, who would not acknowledge himself at war with them, till he assaulted the walls of Athens, they ought to exert their utmost ability in augmenting the army in that quarter. Should their forces be withdrawn, Philip would wait the approach of winter, or the setting in of the Etesian winds, to fall on the Chersonesus. Will it then be sufficient to accuse Diopceithes? Or will this save our allies? "O, but we will sail to their relief."⁴ But if the winds will not permit you? Even should our enemy attack, not the Chersonesus, but Megara or Chalcis, as he lately did Oreum, would it not be better to oppose him in Thrace, than to carry the war to the frontiers of Attica? The exactions demanded by Diopceithes from the Asiatic Greeks are justified by the example of all his predecessors, who, according to the strength of their respective armaments, have always levied proportional contributions from the colonies; and the people who grant this money, whether more or less, do not give it for nothing. It is the price for which they are furnished with convoys to protect their trading vessels from rapine and piracy. If Diopceithes had not that resource, how could he subsist his troops, he who receives nothing from you, and who has nothing of his own? From the skies? No; but from what he can collect, and beg, and borrow. Who does not perceive that this pretended concern for the colonies, in men who have no concern for their country, is one of the many artifices employed to confine and fix you to the city, while the enemy keeps the field, and manages the war at pleasure? That such traitors should exist, is less surprising than that you should patiently receive from them such counsels, as Philip himself would dictate. For what else could the king of Macedon, who understands his own interest so well, advise, but that you should remain quietly at home, decline personal service in the war, deny pay to your soldiers, revile and insult your general? When a man, hired to betray you, rises up in the assembly, and declares Chares or Diopceithes to be the cause of your calamities, such a hypocrite is heard with satisfaction. You despise the voice of him, who, animated by a sincere love for his coun-

¹ Demosthen. seu Hegesipp. de Halon. p. 33, et seq.

² Ibid.

³ Epistol. Philipp. et Liban. Argum. in Demosth. Orat. de Chersoneso.

⁴ Demosthen. Orat. de Chersoneso.

try, calls out, "Be not deceived, Athenians! Philip is the real cause of all your misfortunes and disgrace." The disagreeable truth renders the man who declares it odious; for the insidious discipline of certain ministers has so changed your principles and characters, that you are become fierce and formidable in your courts of justice, but tame and contemptible in the field. You rejoice, therefore, to hear your distress charged on those whom you can punish at home; but are unwilling to believe that it proceeds from a public enemy, whom you must oppose with arms in your hands. Yet, Athenians, if the states of Greece should thus call you to account for your conduct: 'Men of Athens, you are continually sending embassies to assure us, that Philip is projecting *our* ruin, and *that* of all the Greeks. But O, most wretched of mankind! when this common foe was detained six months abroad by sickness, the severity of winter, and the armies of his enemies, did you profit by that opportunity to recover your lost possessions? Did you restore even Eubœa to liberty, and expel those troops and tyrants who had been placed there in ambush, and directly opposite to Attica? No. You have remained insensible to your wrongs, and fully convinced us, that were Philip ten times to die, it would not inspire you with the least degree of vigour. Why then these embassies, these accusations, all this unnecessary ferment? If the Greeks should ask this, what could we answer? I know not.

"There are men who think to perplex a well-intentioned speaker by asking, What ought we to do? My answer is sincere, None of those things which you do at present. I explain my opinion at greater length, and may you be as ready to receive, as to ask, advice! First of all, you must hold it as a matter of firm belief, that Philip has broken the peace, and is at war with your republic: that he is an enemy to your city, to the ground on which it stands, to all those who inhabit it, and not least to such as are most distinguished by his favours. The fate of Euthykrates and Lasthenes,⁵ citizens of Olynthus, may teach *our* traitors the destruction that awaits them, after they have surrendered their country. But, though an enemy to your city, your soil, and your people, Philip is chiefly hostile to your government, which, though ill fitted to acquire, or to maintain, dominion over others, is admirably adapted to defend both yourselves and them, to repel usurpation, and to humble tyrants. To your democracy; therefore, Philip is an unrelenting foe, a truth, of which you ought to be deeply persuaded; and next, that wherever you repress his encroachments, you act for the safety of Athens, against which, chiefly, all his batteries are erected. For who can be so foolish as to believe, that the cottages of Thrace (Drongila, Cabyla, and Mastira,) should form an object worthy of his ambition; that, in order to acquire them, he should submit to toils and dangers; that, for the sake of the rye and millet of Thrace, he should consent to spend so many months amidst winter snows and tempests;

while, at the same time, he disregarded the riches and splendour of Athens, your harbours, arsenals, galleys, mines, and revenues? No, Athenians. It is to get possession of Athens, that he makes war in Thrace and elsewhere. What then ought we to do? Tear ourselves from our indolence; not only support, but augment, the troops which are on foot; that, as Philip has an army ever ready to attack and conquer the Greeks, you also may be ready to succour and to save them."⁶

It is worthy of observation (because nothing betrays more evidently the tyrannical spirit of democracy,) that Demosthenes does not propose the war in form, by bringing in a written bill or decree, to be approved or rejected by the votes of his countrymen. This decree must have been recorded among the Athenian archives; and, if the war should prove unfortunate, might be produced at some future time for the destruction of its author, whose enemies would not fail to allege this instrument as a proof that he had occasioned the rupture with Philip, and all the calamities consequent on that measure. The party accused would, in that case, vainly endeavour to shelter himself under the votes of the assembly, since an ordinary court of justice could call him to account for misleading the people,⁷ and punish him with banishment or death. Demosthenes artfully glances at this disagreeable subject: "Rash, impudent, and audacious, I neither am, Athenians, nor wish ever to become; yet possess more true fortitude than the boldest of your demagogues, who, capriciously distributing honours and largesses on the one hand, and as capriciously impeaching, condemning, and confiscating on the other, have, in either case, a sure pledge of impunity in the flattery and artifices by which they have long seduced the public. The courage of that minister is put to an easy trial, who is ever ready to sacrifice your permanent interest to your present pleasure. But he is truly courageous, who, for the sake of your safety and glory, opposes your most favourite inclinations, rouses you from your dream of pleasure, disdains to flatter you, and having the good of his country ever in view, assumes that post in the administration in which fortune often prevails over policy, knowing himself responsible for the issue. Such a minister am I, whose unpopular counsels tend to render, not myself, but my country great."

The arguments and remonstrances of Demosthenes not only saved Diopetides, but animated the Athenians with a degree of vigour⁸ which they had been long unaccustomed to exert. A fleet was fitted out under the command of Calias, who seized all Macedonian ships as lawful prize, and made a descent on the coast of Thessaly, after plundering the harbours in the Pelagic gulf. A considerable body of forces was sent into Acarnania to repel the incursions of Philip, assisted by his kinsman and ally, Alexander of Epirus. The inhabitants of the island of Peperathus, trusting to the protection of

⁶ Demosthen. Orat. de Chersones. p. 35, et seq.

⁷ By the γερὰν παρονομήν. Vide Demosthen. de Coron. passim.

⁸ Vid. Epist. Philip.

⁵ See above, c. xxxv.

Athens, expelled the Macedonian garrison from Halonnesus. Repeated embassies were despatched to the Peloponnesians and Eubœans, exhorting them to throw off the ignominious yoke of Macedon, and to unite with their Grecian brethren against the public enemy. Philip was not unattentive to these commotions, but his designs against the valuable cities on the Propontis and Thracian Bosphorus¹ being ripe for execution, he was unwilling to allow any secondary consideration to divert him from that important enterprise.

Olymp. His intrigues and bribery had
cix. 3. gained a considerable party in By-
A. C. 342. zantium, at the head of which was
the perfidious Python, whose vehement eloquence gave him great influence with the multitude. A conspiracy was formed to surrender one of the gates of the city; the Macedonian army of thirty thousand men hovered round; but the design was suspected or discovered, and Philip, to screen his partizans from public vengeance, seasonably withdrew his army, and invested the neighbouring city of Perinthus. The news of these transactions not only increased the activity of Athens, but alarmed Ochus king of Persia, who being no stranger to Philip's design of invading his dominions, trembled at beholding that ambitious prince gradually approach his frontier. To prevent this danger, Ochus adopted the same policy, which, in similar circumstances, had been successfully employed by his predecessors.² The Persian gold was profusely scattered among the most eminent of the Grecian demagogues. Demosthenes, whose patriotism was not always proof against an unworthy alliance³ with interest, rejoiced at being paid for doing what he considered as his duty. At Athens his invectives were louder than ever against the king of Macedon; and the affairs of Eubœa gave him an opportunity of exerting himself with equal zeal in that island.

The factious spirit of the Eubœans rendered them alike incapable of independence, and of remaining quietly under the government either of Athens or Macedon, to which they were alternately subject. The recent prevalence of the Macedonian party had been marked by many acts of violence and oppression. The cities of Chalcis, Oreum, and Eretria, prepared to rebel, having previously solicited assistance from Peloponnesus, Acarnania, Attica, and every province of Greece, which they had any reason to deem favourable to their views. From other states they brought back promises and hopes; from Athens they obtained, chiefly by the influence of Demosthenes, a considerable body of troops commanded by the brave and virtuous Phocion. The orator accompanied the expedition; and being allowed to address the popular assemblies in most of the cities of Eubœa, he inflamed them with such animosity against Philip and his partisans, that little remained to be done by the valour of the Athenian general. The Eubœans every where took arms in defence of their freedom, the Macedonian garri-

sons were expelled from the principal cities, and driven from one post to another, till they were compelled entirely to evacuate the island. This event occasioned great joy at Athens; and the principal merit was ascribed to Demosthenes, who, at the motion of Aristonicus, a man of merit and eminence, was crowned by the senate and people with a golden crown; which honour was publicly proclaimed in the theatre of Bacchus, during the representations of the new tragedies, amidst an immense concourse of people, citizens and strangers.⁴

Olymp. The loss of Eubœa was ill com-
cix. 4. pensated to Philip by the military
A. C. 341. operations against Perinthus, in
which he found an enemy worthy of his courage and perseverance. The town was situated on the sloping ridge of an isthmus, and strongly fortified both by art and nature, the houses and streets rising one above another like the seats of an amphitheatre, so that the higher edifices overlooked and defended the lower. Having scoured the neighbouring country with his cavalry, Philip exhausted, in the siege of Perinthus, all the military skill known to the ancients. He raised towers forty cubits high, which enabled his men to fight on equal ground with the besieged; his miners were busy at the foundation; at length the battering-rams advanced to the wall, in which a considerable breach was made. During this time, however, the townsmen had not been idle. The superior discharge of darts, arrows, and every kind of missile weapon from the Macedonian towers, had indeed dislodged the Perinthians from those parts of the wall and battlements, against which the principal attack had been directed. But with incessant toil, the besieged built a new wall within the former, on which they appeared in battle array, prepared to repel the enemy who entered the breaches.⁵ The Macedonians, who advanced with impetuous joy to reap the fruits of their labour, were infinitely mortified to find that their work must be begun anew. Philip employed rewards and punishments, and all the resources of his mind fertile in expedients, to restore their hopes, and to reanimate their activity. The siege recommenced with fresh ardour, and the Perinthians were twice reduced to extremity, when they were unexpectedly saved, first by a large supply of arms and provisions from Byzantium, next by a strong reinforcement of men in Persian pay, commanded by Apollodorus, a citizen of Athens; and lastly by the advantageous situation of the town, which, being built in a conical form, presenting its apex or narrow point to the besiegers, gradually rose and widened towards the remoter parts, from which it was easy to observe all the motions of the enemy, and to overwhelm them with missile weapons as they advanced to the charge. Philip, ever sparing of the lives of his men, was deterred by this circumstance from venturing an assault, though his machines had effected a breach in the new wall: he therefore determined to change the siege into a blockade. Perinthus was shut up

¹ Demosthen. de Coron. et Diodor. l. xvi. c. xxii.

² Plut. in Alex.

³ Plut. in Demosth.

⁴ Demosthen. de Coron. et Plut. in Demosth.

⁵ Diodor. p. 466, et seq.

as closely as possible by sea and land: part of the Macedonian troops who had become mutinous for want of pay (for Philip at this time owed above two hundred talents, or forty thousand pounds sterling,) were indulged in plundering the rich territory of Byzantium, while the remainder were conducted to the siege of Selymbria, and soon after of Byzantium itself, the taking of which places, it was hoped, might compensate their lost labour at Perinthus.⁶

During the military operations against the cities of the Propontis, Demosthenes did not cease exhorting his countrymen to undertake their defence, as essential to their own safety. The hostilities and devastations of Philip, he represented as the periodical returns of the pestilence and other contagious disorders, in which all men were alike threatened with their respective shares of calamity. He, who was actually sound and untainted, had an equal interest with the diseased and infirm, to root out the common evil, which, if allowed to lurk in any part, would speedily pervade and afflict the whole. The Macedonians now besieged Selymbria and Byzantium; if successful in these enterprises, they would soon appear before Sparta, Thebes, and Athens. Yet he knew not by what fatality the Greeks looked on the successive encroachments of Philip, not on events which their vigorous and united opposition might ward off and repel, but as disasters inflicted by the hand of Providence; as a tempestuous cloud of hail, so destructive to the vines in autumn, which all beheld, with horror, hovering over them, but none took any other means to prevent, than by deprecating the gods that it might not fall on his own fields.⁷ These animated and just representations of the common distress or danger, engaged the Athenians to enter into a close correspondence with the besieged cities.⁸ Demosthenes undertook a journey to Byzantium; and Leon, a Byzantine orator and patriot, the friend and fellow student of the virtuous Phocion, resided as ambassador in Athens. At the same time the principal cities of the Propontis, maintained an uninterrupted intercourse of good offices with each other, as well as with their allies of Rhodes and Chios, from whom they received repeated supplies of arms and provisions.

Philip, mean while, ceased not to assure the Athenians, by his letters and emissaries, that he was extremely desirous of maintaining peace with the republic, and gently chid them for their evident marks of partiality towards his enemies, which, however, he took care to ascribe, not to the general temper and disposition of the people, but to the prevalence of a dangerous faction, inflamed by seditious and selfish demagogues. By a rapid march he had recently surprised an Athenian detachment ravaging the territory of Cardia. Diopceithes, the Athenian

general in the Chersonesus, commanded this predatory band, who, after a slight skirmish, were repelled with the loss of their leader, slain by a dart, while he rallied his men with his voice and arm. Philip failed not, by letter, to excuse this act of hostility, to which, he assured the Athenians, that he had been compelled, much against his inclination: he affected to consider Diopceithes as the instrument of a malignant faction, headed by Demosthenes, rather than as the general of the republic; and as that commander had acted unwarrantably in plundering the Cardians, a people strictly allied with Macedon, Philip assured himself that the senate and people would not take it amiss that, provoked by repeated injuries, he had at length repelled violence, and defended the lives and fortunes of his long-injured confederates.

While the Athenians and Philip were on this footing of correspondence, the former sent twenty vessels laden with corn to the relief of the Selymbrians. Leodamas, who commanded this convoy, seems to have imagined that the treaty formerly subsisting between the two powers, would protect him from injury. But in this he was disappointed. His fleet was surrounded and taken by Amyntas, who commanded the naval force of Macedon, and who determined to retain his prize, without paying any regard to the complaints and remonstrances of Leodamas, who pretended that the convoy was not destined for Selymbria, but employed in conveying the superabundance of the fertile Chersonesus to the rocky and barren island of Lemnos.

Olymp. The news of the capture of their
cix. 4. ships occasioned much tumult and
A. C. 341. uneasiness among the Athenians.
After frequent deliberations on this subject, a decree was framed for sending ambassadors to Philip, in order to re-demand their property, and to require that Amyntas, if he had exceeded his instructions, should be punished with due severity. Cephisophon, Democritus, and Polycrates, who were named for this commission, repaired without delay to Philip in the Hellespont, who, at their request, immediately released the captured vessels, and dismissed the Athenians with the following letter; "Philip king of Macedon, to the senate and people of Athens, Health. I have received three of your citizens in quality of ambassadors, who have conferred with me about the release of certain ships, commanded by Leodamas. I cannot but admire their simplicity in thinking to persuade me that these ships were intended to convey corn from the Chersonesus to the isle of Lemnos, and not destined for the relief of the Selymbrians, actually besieged by me, and nowise included in the treaty of pacification between Athens and Macedon. This unjust commission Leodamas received, not from the people of Athens, but from certain magistrates, and others now in private stations, who are too busy in urging you to violate your engagements, and to commence hostilities against me; a matter which they have more at heart than the relief of Selymbria, fondly imagining that they may derive advantage from such a rupture. Deeply persuaded that our mutual in-

⁶ Diodor. l. vii. c. xxii.

⁷ Ἀλλὰ ὁμοῦς ταῦτ' ὀφείλεις οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀνιχνεύειν καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ὅπου οἱ τὴν χαλκίδα, ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκοῦσι διαφέρειν εὐχόμενοι μὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐκαστοὶ γινεσθῆναι, καὶ λυσιτελεῖν δι' αὐτοὺς ἐπιχειρεῖν. Demosthen. in Philip. iii. p. 48. In the country where I now write (the Pais de Vaud) the beauty and force of this comparison is too well understood. Lefty mountains covered with snow, sunny hills, and fertile valleys—Such too is the geography of Greece, which rendered the hail-storms so alarming and so destructive.

⁸ Demosthen. de Corona.

terest requires us to frustrate their wicked schemes, I have given orders to release the captured vessels; and do you, in return, remove such pernicious counsellors from the administration of your affairs; and let them feel the severity of your justice. On my part, I shall endeavour to preserve inviolate the treaty, by which we stand mutually engaged."¹

The moderate and friendly sentiments expressed in this letter afforded great advantage to the Macedonian partisans at Athens. But Demosthenes, and Leon of Byzantium, spared no pains to detect and expose the artifices and duplicity of Philip, who employed this humble and peaceful tone, during his operations against the cities of the Propontis, in order to stifle the resentment of the Athenians, at a crisis when they might act against him with peculiar advantage. In elaborate and powerful orations,² in which, without urging any new matter, Demosthenes condensed, invigorated, and enlivened his former observations and reasonings, he convinced his countrymen of the expediency of being for once before-hand with their enemy, and of anticipating his designs against themselves by a speedy and effectual assistance to their distressed brethren of Perinthus, Selymbria, and Byzantium. By his convincing eloquence the public councils were animated with a degree of energy and enthusiasm which had not appeared in them during many years, and which produced the last transitory glimpse of success and splendour, before the glory of Athens was extinguished for ever.

Olymp. It was decreed by the senate and
cx. 1. people, to fit out a fleet of a hundred and twenty galleys; but unfortunately the command was given to Chares, whose character rendered him as contemptible to the enemies, as he was formidable to the allies, of the republic. The Byzantines excluded him from their harbour, and he was defeated by Amyntus, the Macedonian admiral, off the opposite shore of Chalcedon. This disaster, which was chiefly occasioned by the incapacity of their commander, made the Athenians cast their eyes on Phocion,³ who, though ever ready to serve his country, was most frequently called for in times of danger and calamity.

Before Phocion reached the Propontis, Philip, flushed with his naval success, made an attempt to storm Byzantium. The city was environed on three sides by the sea, and defended on the fourth by a strong wall, and a large and deep trench, covered by lofty towers, separated at small intervals from each other. Confident in the strength of the place and the abundance of their magazines, the inhabitants of Byzantium, without risking a sally, allowed Philip to carry on his works, and gradually to make his approaches to their walls. During this inaction of the townsmen, Philip carefully advanced his battering engines, and seemed determined to assault the walls; but, mean while, embraced proper measures for gaining the place by surprise. For executing this design, he chose the

gloom of a tempestuous night; a determined band of Macedonians passed the ditch; the scaling-ladders were already fixed; when the sentinels of Byzantium were alarmed by the barking of mastiffs, kept in the towers even in time of peace, to secure them in the night. The alarm spread with rapidity among the several guards, who rushing tumultuously from their respective stations, as if the enemy had been already masters of the town, were on the point of blindly assaulting each other, when a bright meteor, or repeated flashes of lightning, enabled them to distinguish their friends, and to discern the danger. Having formed in some degree of order, they advanced against the Macedonians, who had already gained the rampart, from which they were with difficulty repulsed by superior numbers.⁴

Olymp. The defeat of this bold and dangerous enterprise did not discourage
cx. 1. Philip from carrying on his operations with indefatigable diligence and vigour. His perseverance must finally have prevailed over the obstinacy of the besieged, had not the Athenian fleet, under Phocion, arrived in the Thracian Bosphorus. The Byzantines received him with open arms, expecting that under such a commander, their auxiliaries would prove not less modest and inoffensive in their quarters, than active and intrepid in the field. Nor were their hopes disappointed; the arms of Philip were foiled in every rencounter; his artifices were met and eluded by similar address; nor could he expect by force or fraud to gain any advantages over an opponent alike brave and vigilant.⁵ The king of Macedon, who had as much flexibility in varying his measures, as firmness in adhering to his purposes, was unwilling any farther to press his bad fortune. In the actual state of his affairs, he judged it necessary to raise the siege of Byzantium, to withdraw his forces from Selymbria and Perinthus, and to leave the Athenians in possession of the northern shore of the Propontis. These were humiliating resolutions; but fortunately for Philip, an event fell out, which prevented the execution of them from reflecting much discredit on his arms or policy.

Phocion, to whose conduct the safety of so many important cities was principally owing, sailed from Byzantium amidst the grateful vows and acclamations of innumerable spectators. In his voyage to the Chersonesus, he captured a fleet of victuallers and transports, carrying arms and provisions for the enemy. When he arrived in that peninsula, he repressed the insolence of the Cardians, who, reinforced by a Macedonian garrison, had recently undertaken an expedition against the city of Sestos. He recovered several places on the coast of Thrace, which had reluctantly submitted to the dominion of the Macedonians; and, in concert with the inhabitants, took such measures as seemed most proper to protect the Athenian allies in those parts, from future danger. Instead of burdening the confederates with the maintenance of his army, he plentifully supplied all the wants of his soldiers from the enemy's coun-

¹ Epist. Philip. in Demosth.

² Orat. iv. in Philip. et Orat. de Epist. Philip.

³ Plutarch in Phocion.

⁴ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 468.

⁵ Plut. in Phocion.

try. He commanded in person the parties that went out to forage and to plunder; and in one of those expeditions, received a dangerous wound, yet did not embark for his return, until he had spread the terror of the Athenian name, by ravaging with fire and sword the hereditary dominions of Philip.⁶

The meritorious services of Phocion were deeply felt and acknowledged by the communities whom he had protected and relieved.⁷ The deliverance and gratitude of the Chersonesus, of Perinthus, and of Byzantium, were testified by crowns, statues, inscriptions, and altars; and are still recorded in an oration of Demosthenes,⁸ which has deservedly survived those perishing monuments of gold and marble. The decree of the Byzantines and Perinthians, after describing the ancient and recent benefits of Athens towards them, enacted, "that, in return for those favours, the Athenians should be entitled to the right of intermarriage, the privilege of purchasing lands in their territories, the freedom of their respective cities, and the first and most honourable place in all their entertainments and assemblies: that whatever Athenians chose to reside with them should be exempted from all taxes: And that, further, three statues, each sixteen cubits high, should be erected in the port of Byzantium, representing the republic of Athens, crowned by the Byzantines and Perinthians: That this crown should be proclaimed at the four principal festivals of Greece, in order to commemorate the magnanimity of Athens, and the gratitude of the Byzantines and Perinthians." The inhabitants of the Chersonesus were not less forward in their acknowledgments and rewards. After a similar preamble, setting forth the manifold favours of their great and generous allies, they resolved to crown the senate and people of Athens with a golden crown worth sixty talents; and to consecrate an altar to Gratitude and the Athenians. These public and solemn honours afforded matter of equal triumph to Phocion, who had executed, and to Demosthenes, who had advised the measures, in consequence of which such just glory had been acquired. At the distance of several years, the orator still boasted of this important service. "You have frequently, Athenians! rewarded with crowns the statesmen most successful in conducting your affairs. But name, if you can, any other counsellor, any other statesman, by whose means the state itself hath been thus honoured."⁹

The circumstance which enabled Philip to elude the violence of the storm with which the hostility of Athens, Persia, and so many other powers, had been long preparing to overwhelm him, took its rise from an error of judgment, occasioned by that boundless ambition which formed the ruling passion of the Macedonian prince. Beyond the confines of Thrace, and beyond the northern frontier of the Lower Mæsia, dwelt a powerful Scythian tribe, in the valuable peninsula contained between the western waves of the Euxine and the majestic stream of the Danube. The roving and unsettled life

of the Scythians, like that of their descendants the Tartars, had led them into this country, from their native and proper territories, embracing the six mouths of the Danube or Ister, the banks of the Boristhenes, and the shores of the Palus Mæotis, which districts in ancient times had the name of Little Scythia,¹⁰ and are still called Little Tartary.¹¹ A monarch less warlike and less ambitious than Philip, might have observed, with indignation and regret, those fierce and rapacious Barbarians, extending themselves beyond their natural limits, and enjoying an establishment on the south of the Danube; which great river, as he was already master of Thrace, and counted the Triballi of Mæsia among the number of his tributaries, Philip's proud and usurping fancy had already grasped as the frontier of his empire, and the proper line of separation between barbarous and civilized nations. It was not, therefore, without such excess of joy as transported him beyond the bounds of sound policy, that, amidst his preparations against the cities on the Propontis, he received an invitation from Atheas,¹² who styled himself king of the Scythians, to march to his assistance, and to defend his dominions, consisting in the peninsula above mentioned, against an invasion of the Istrians, which the domestic forces of Atheas were totally unable to resist. To this proposal was added a condition extremely alluring to the king of Macedon, that if his auxiliary arms enabled Atheas to vanquish and expel the invaders, Philip should be named heir to the kingdom of Scythia; for, according to the fashion of ancient times, Atheas dignified with the name of kingdom, a territory little larger than the principality of Wales.

In greedily snatching this bait laid for his ambition, Philip was not enough on his guard against the usual perfidy and levity of Barbarians; nor did he sufficiently consider, that by sending a powerful detachment into Scythia, he must greatly weaken his exertions against the cities of the Propontis. With an ardour and alacrity too rapid for reflection, he eagerly closed with the proposition of Atheas, sent a great body of forces to the north, and promised to assist them in person at the head of his whole army, should they encounter any difficulty in the execution of their purpose. Mean while the warlike chief of the Istrians, whose courage alone animated, and whose conduct rendered successful, the arms of his followers, was cut off by sudden death: the dispirited Istrians were attacked, defeated, and repelled; and, without the assistance of Macedon, Atheas once more regained possession of his kingdom. This unexpected revolution served to display the crafty and faithless Barbarian in his genuine deformity. The Macedonian troops were received coldly, treated with contempt, and absolutely denied their stipulated pay and subsistence. Their just remonstrances and complaints Atheas heard with scorn, and totally disavowed the propositions and promises of those who styled themselves his ambassadors; observing "how unlikely it was, that he should

⁶ Plut. in Phocion. and Diodor. ubi supra.
⁸ Demosthen. de Corona.

⁷ Ibid.
⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Herodotus and Strabo, passim.
¹¹ Geograph. D'Anville.
¹² Justin. l. ix. c. 2.

have solicited the assistance of the Macedonians, who, brave as they were, could fight only with men, while the Scythians could combat cold and famine; and that it would have been still more unnatural to appoint Philip his successor, since he had a son of his own, worthy to inherit his crown and dignity."¹

Upon receiving an account of the insolent behaviour of a prince, who had so recently solicited his alliance, Philip, while still busily, but unsuccessfully, employed against the cities of the Propontis, sent an embassy to Scythia, requiring Atheas to satisfy the just demands of the Macedonian troops, and to indemnify himself for the expense incurred in his defence. The ambassadors found the king of Scythia in his stable, currying his horse. When they testified surprise at seeing him engaged in such an occupation, he asked them, Whether their master did not often employ himself in the same manner? adding, that for his own part, in time of peace, he made not any distinction between himself and his groom. When they opened their commission, and explained the demands of Philip, the subtle Barbarian told them, that the poverty of Scythia could not furnish a present becoming the greatness of their master; and that, therefore, it seemed more eligible to offer nothing at all, than a present totally unworthy of his acceptance.²

This evasive and mortifying answer being brought to the king of Macedon when foiled and harassed, yet not disheartened, by his unprosperous expedition against Byzantium, furnished him with a very honourable pretence for raising the siege of that place, and conducting a powerful army into Scythia, that he might chastise the treacherous ingratitude of a prince, who, after having overreached him by policy, now mocked him with insolence. Having advanced to the frontier of Atheas's dominions, Philip had recourse to his usual arts, and sent a herald with the ensigns of peace and friendship, to announce his arrival in Scythia, in order to perform a solemn vow which he had made during the siege of Byzantium, to erect a brazen statue to Hercules on the banks of the Danube. The cunning Atheas was not the dupe of this artifice, which he knew how to encounter and elude with similar address. Without praising or blaming the pious intention of the king, he coolly desired him to forward the statue, which he himself would take care to erect in the appointed place; that should it be set up with his concurrence and direction, it would probably be allowed to stand; otherwise he could give no assurance that the Scythians would not pull it down, and melt it, to make points for their weapons.³

The return of the Macedonian herald gave the signal for hostility. Philip entered the country with fire and sword, destroying the forests and pasturage, and seizing the slaves and cattle, which formed the principal wealth of the Scythians. He seems to have employed several weeks in an expedition, the circumstances of which, were they essential to the designs of this work, could not be related with any fulness or

accuracy. Countries in a pastoral state are but thinly peopled; and Philip was obliged to divide his forces, in order to vanquish with greater rapidity the wandering hordes, separated from each other by wide intervals, according as a forest, a meadow, or a stream of fresh water, obtained their preference, and fixed their temporary abode. A party of Macedonian soldiers beat up the quarters of a numerous and warlike clan, by which they were repelled, with the loss of several slain or taken. Among the latter was Ismenias, an eminent musician, who had been invited by liberal rewards to reside at the court of Philip, after being long admired in Greece for his performance on the flute. This distinguished captive was sent as a present to Atheas, who was so little delighted with his accomplishment, that having heard him perform, he acknowledged the neighing of his horse to be to his ear far more agreeable music. The skirmish in which Ismenias was taken, seems to have been the principal advantage obtained by the Barbarians, whose constitutional courage, and impetuous ill-directed fury, was everywhere overcome by the disciplined valour of the Macedonian phalanx.⁴

Philip reaped such fruits from his expedition as might be expected by a victory over a people who had no king but their general, no god but their sword, and no cities but the ground on which they occasionally encamped with their herds and families. The spoil consisted in arms, chariots, twenty thousand robust captives, a greater number of mares, destined to replenish the studs of Pella.⁵ We are not informed whether Philip erected the promised statue to the great founder and protector of his family and kingdom. It is probable that he imposed a tribute on the Scythians, as a mark of their submission and dependence, purposing to reduce them more thoroughly, when he had effected his great designs in Greece, to which country the silent operation of his intrigues now summoned his return.

But while he marched southward at the head of an army encumbered with baggage and spoil, a very unexpected event threatened to blast his laurels, and to terminate at once his glory and his life. Allured by the hopes of sharing the warlike plunder of the Scythians, the barbarous Triballi, who had been often conquered, but never thoroughly subdued, beset by ambush, and vigorously assaulted, the Macedonians, entangled amidst the intricate windings of the mountains of Mœsia; hoping to cut off, by one stroke, the flower of a nation whose authority their own fierce spirit of independence had very reluctantly condescended to obey. The confusion and the danger was increased by a mercenary band of Greeks, who, harassed by the fatigues of war and travelling, always clamorous for pay, which was very irregularly paid them, and perhaps jealous of the Macedonians, seized the present opportunity to desert the standard of Philip, and to reinforce the arms of the Triballi.⁶

The king of Macedon, too prudent to under-

¹ Justin. l. ix. c. 2.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Justin. l. ii. c. 5.

⁵ Compar. Justin. l. ix. c. 2. et Strabo, p. 752.

⁶ Justin. l. ix. c. 3. Plut. in Alexand.

take superfluous danger, never acquired by valour what might be obtained by stratagem; but when a necessary occasion solicited his courage and his prowess, he knew how to assume the hero, and (if we may transpose an ancient proverb) "to eke out the fox's with the lion's skin."⁷ The urgency of the present emergency summoned all the firmness of his mind. With his voice and example he encouraged the astonished and disheartened Macedonians; conducted his faithful guards to the heat of the battle, and fought with unexampled bravery, till the same weapon which pierced his horse, laid the rider senseless on the ground. The young Alexander, who fought near him, derived peculiar glory from saving the life of his father, whom he covered with his shield, and defended by his sword, until his attendants conveyed him to a place of safety;⁸ the son so worthily succeeding to the command, that the tumult was fortunately appeased, and the Barbarians routed and put to flight. Philip's wound was attended with an incurable lameness, which he bore with much impatience. His magnanimous son endeavoured to remove his anxiety by asking, how he could be chagrined at an accident, which continually reminded him of his valour?⁹

Olymp. To repair the effects of this unforeseen delay, the Macedonians
 ex. 2. hastened through Thrace, where
 A. C. 339. Philip, as he had reason to expect, was met by deputies from the Amphictyonic council, appointing him general of their forces, and requesting him to march into Greece with all convenient speed. The secret practices and intrigues, which had been ripening during the Scythian expedition, produced this extraordinary message, the remote as well as immediate causes of which deserve to be distinctly unravelled, being the last knot of a tragedy which involves the fate of Greece.

Olymp. The spirited resistance of Selymbria and Byzantium, the successful
 ex. 2. expeditions of Phocion in the Hellespont and Propontis, the prodigal
 A. C. 339. terrors of Ochus king of Persia, who thought it impossible to employ his wealth more usefully than in bridling the ambition of Philip; above all, the continual expostulations and remonstrances of Demosthenes, conspired to rouse the Athenians from the lethargy in which they had been long sunk, and animated them with a desire to carry on the war with activity and effect against the common enemy of Greece. In order to save the state, they consented (though probably not without a violent struggle) to abolish the very popular law, or rather abuse, introduced by Eubulus. The theatrical amusements, so passionately idolized by the multitude, were celebrated with less pomp and splendour; and the military fund was thenceforth applied to its original and proper destination. A fleet was equipped far superior to the naval strength of Macedon.¹⁰ The troops and partisans of that kingdom were driven from their ambushes in Megara, and in the neighbouring

territories, where they had long watched an opportunity of destroying the liberty of Athens. Demosthenes, and Hyperides, an orator second only to Demosthenes, were despatched into the Peloponnesus and other parts of Greece, to persuade the several republics to second the generous ardour of the Athenians, whose recent success under Phocion added great weight to the arguments and eloquence of those illustrious statesmen.¹¹

Philip was accurately informed of all those transactions; and the alarm universally spread among his faithful emissaries, inclined them rather to exaggerate, than to conceal, the danger. Highly provoked against the Athenians, the continual opposers of his greatness, he was unable to retaliate their injuries. If he attacked them by land, he must march through the territories of the Thebans and Thessalians, who, ever selfish and capricious, would be ready to forsake him with his good fortune. His disgraceful expedition against the cities of the Propontis, rendered the present juncture extremely unfavourable to such a hazardous design. Nor could he attempt, with any prospect of success, to attack the enemy by sea, since the Athenian fleet so far exceeded his own, that it had interrupted, and almost totally destroyed, the commerce of Macedon.

Amidst this complication of difficulties, Philip showed how well he understood the unsteady temper of the Greeks, by raising the siege of Byzantium, and burying himself in the wilds of Scythia, till the fuming animosity of his adversaries had time to evaporate. Not venturing on open hostility, he, mean while, employed two secret engines, which continued to work during his absence, and from which he had reason to expect very signal advantages before his return. There lived at Athens a man of the name of Antiphon, bold, loud, and loquacious in the popular assembly, in which, however, he had not a title to vote, much less to speak, his name not being recorded in the public register of the city. This defect passed long unobserved, through that supine negligence with which Demosthenes so frequently upbraids his countrymen. At length the treason of Antiphon (for the Athenians regarded an unqualified voter in the assembly as an usurper of sovereign power) was discovered, and arraigned by one of the many citizens to whom his insolence and calumny had justly rendered him obnoxious; in consequence of which impeachment, the supposititious Athenian was divested of his borrowed character, and driven with ignominy from a country, whose most august rights and honours he had usurped and disgraced. Stung with disappointment and rage, Antiphon had recourse to the king of Macedon, and offered himself for any enterprise, however bloody or desperate, by which, in serving the interest of Philip, he might gratify his own thirst for vengeance. The ambitious Macedonian kept his ends too steadily in view, and pursued them with too much ardour and perseverance, to be very delicate in choosing the means by which he might distress his adversaries. He greedily closed, therefore, with

⁷ Vid. Plut. in Lysand.

⁸ Plut. de Fortun. Alexand. et Justin. l. ix. c. 3.

⁹ Plut. in Alexand. ¹⁰ Demosthen. de Corona.

¹¹ Demosthen. de Corona.

the proposal of Antiphon, in whom he rejoiced to find an instrument so fit for his service.

The superiority of the Athenians by sea, which their actual diligence in their docks and arsenals showed them determined to maintain and increase, formed the chief obstacle to the grandeur of Macedon. By whom the design was suggested, is unknown; but it was agreed between Philip and Antiphon, that the latter should return to Athens in disguise, insinuate himself into the Piræus, and lie there in concealment, until he found an opportunity to set fire to the Athenian docks, and thus destroy at once the main hope of the republic. While the artful king of Macedon eluded the storm of his enemies by wandering in the woods of Scythia, his perfidious accomplice lurked, like a serpent, in the bosom of Athens, being lodged without suspicion in the harbour which glowed with the ardour of naval preparation, and into which were daily accumulated new masses of tar, timber, and other materials, alike proper for a fleet, and for the purpose of Antiphon.

But the vigilance of Demosthenes discovered this desperate design, when on the point of execution. He immediately flew to the Piræus, dragged Antiphon from his concealment, divested him of his disguise, and produced him at the bar of the assembly. The capricious and deluded multitude, alike prone to anger and to compassion, were on this occasion very differently affected from what might be conjectured. Instead of execrating a wretch capable of such black deeds, they beheld, with pity, a man once regarded as their fellow citizen, brought before them after a long absence, and accused, perhaps on vain presumptions, of such a horrid crime. They knew besides the wicked artifices of their orators, who, to increase their own importance, often terrified the public with false alarms and imaginary dangers. Æschines, and other partisans of Philip, were at hand to strengthen these impressions. They represented the whole transaction of Demosthenes as a complication of fraud and cruelty; loudly inveighed against his insolent triumph over the calamities of the unfortunate; and reproached his entering by force into the house where Antiphon was concealed, as a violation of freedom pregnant with the most dangerous consequences, and as trampling on the respected maxim of Athenian law and religion, that every man's house was his sanctuary.¹ Such was the effect of these clamours, that Antiphon was dismissed without the formality of a trial, and might, perhaps, have resumed his purpose with more security than before, had not the senate of the Areopagus more carefully examined the information of Demosthenes. By the authority of that court, the traitor was again seized, and tried. Torture, which the institution of domestic slavery introduced and rendered familiar in Greece, extorted from him a late and reluctant confession; and his enormous guilt was punished with an enormous severity.²

Had the detestable enterprise of Antiphon been crowned with unmerited success, Philip

would have attained his purpose of ruining Athens, by a rude stroke of vulgar perfidy. But the engines which he set in motion for gaining the same end, at a time when he was obliged to fly the awakened resentment of Greece, and to bury in the wilds of Scythia the disgrace sustained before the walls of Byzantium, will not be easily matched by any parallel transactions in history, whether we consider the profound artifice with which the plan was contrived and combined, the nice adaptation of the several parts, or the unwearied dexterity with which the whole was carried into execution. It is on this occasion that Demosthenes might justly exclaim, "In one circumstance, chiefly, is Philip distinguished above all his ambitious predecessors, the enemies of Grecian freedom. His measures required the co-operation of traitors, and traitors he has found more corrupt and more dexterous than ever appeared in any former age; and, what is most worthy of remark, the principal instruments of his ambition flourished in the bosom of that state, whose public councils most openly opposed his greatness."³

The time approached for convening at Delphi the vernal assembly of the Amphictyons. It was evidently the interest of the Athenians, and might have been expected from their just resentment against Philip, that they should send such deputies to the city of Apollo, as were most hostile to the Macedonian, and most zealous in the cause of liberty and their country. But intrigue and cabal prevailed over every motive of public utility; and the negligent or factious multitude were persuaded, at a crisis which demanded the most faithful and incorrupt ministers, to employ, as their representatives in the Amphictyonic council, Æschines and Midias; the former of whom had so often reproached, and the latter had, on one occasion, struck Demosthenes in the public theatre;⁴ and who were both not only the declared enemies of this illustrious patriot, but, as well as their colleagues Diognetus and Thrasicles, the warm and active partisans of the king of Macedon. Soon after their arrival at Delphi, Midias and Diognetus⁵ pretended sickness, that they might allow Æschines to display, uncontrolled, his superior dexterity; and to act a part, which, requiring the deepest dissimulation, might be performed most successfully by a single traitor. The Amphictyons were employed in repairing the temple; the sacred offerings, which had been removed and sold by the impiety of the Phocians, were collected from every quarter of Greece; and new presents were made by several states, to supply the place of the old, which could not be recovered.

The Athenians particularly signalized their pious munificence, and sent, among other dedications, several golden shields, with the following inscription: "Taken from the Medes and Thebans, when they fought against Greece."

³ Demosth. de Coron.

⁴ Demosth. in Mid. and Æschin. in Ctesiphont.

¹ Lysias passim in Agorat. et Eratosth.

² Demosthenes de Coron. who gives the honourable account of his own conduct described in the text.

⁵ Æschines says, Διογενὲς πυρετὸν; "That Diognetus was seized with a fever, and that the same misfortune happened to Midias." p. 290

This offering, highly offensive to the Theban deputies, was prematurely suspended in the temple; the Thebans murmured, the Amphictyons listened to their complaints, and it was whispered in the council, that the Athenians deserved punishment for presenting their gift to the god, before it had been regularly consecrated, together with the other offerings. Pretending high indignation at these murmurs, *Æschines*⁶ rushed into the assembly, and began a formal, yet spirited defence of his countrymen; when he was rudely interrupted by a Locrian, of *Amphissa*,⁷ a city eight miles distant from Delphi, which growing populous and powerful on the ruins of *Crissa* and *Cirrha*, had ventured to cultivate the *Cirrhean* plain, which, near three centuries before, had been desolated by the Amphictyons, solemnly consecrated to *Apollo*, and devoted to perpetual sterility.⁸

The artful Locrian, affecting a religious zeal not less ardent than the patriotism of *Æschines*, clamorously interrupted that orator, calling aloud in the assembly, that it ill became the dignity of the Amphictyons to hear with patience the justification, much less the praises of Athens, a city impious and profane, which, in defiance of human and divine laws, had so recently abetted the execrable sacrilege of the *Phocians*; that if the Amphictyons followed his advice, or consulted the dictates of duty and honour, they would not allow the detested name of the Athenians to be mentioned in that august council.⁹

Æschines thus obtained an opportunity of exciting such tumults in the assembly as suited the views of Philip.¹⁰ In the ardour of patriotic indignation, which he knew so well to assume, he poured forth a torrent of impetuous invective against the insolent Locrian, and his city *Amphissa*; not only justified the innocence, but displayed with ostentation, the illustrious merit of the Athenians; and then addressing the Amphictyons with a look peculiarly earnest and expressive, "Say, ye Grecians! shall men who never knew the exalted pleasures of virtue and renown, be suffered to tear from us the inestimable rewards of glory so justly earned?¹¹ Shall men, themselves polluted by sacrilege, and already devoted to destruction by the most awful imprecations, pre-

sume to call the Athenians profane and impious? Look down, ye reverend guardians of religion! look down on that plain (pointing to the *Cirrhean* plain, which might be seen from the temple,) behold these lands anciently devoted to the god, but now appropriated and cultivated by the *Amphisceans*; behold the numerous buildings which they have erected there, and that accursed port of *Cirrha*, justly demolished by our ancestors, now rebuilt and fortified." *Æschines* here read the oracle of *Apollo*, which condemned that harbour and those lands to perpetual desolation. Then proceeding with increased vehemence: "For myself, ye Grecians! I swear, that I myself, my children, my country, will discharge our duty to heaven; and, with all the powers and faculties of mind and body, avenge the abominable violation of the consecrated territory. Do you, Amphictyons! determine as wisdom shall direct. Your offerings are prepared, your victims are brought to the altar; you are ready to offer solemn prayers for blessings on yourselves, and on the republics which you represent. But consider with what voice, with what heart, with what confidence, you can breathe out your petitions, while you suffer the profanation of the *Amphisceans* to pass unrevenged. Hear the words of the imprecation, not only against those who cultivate the consecrated ground, but against those who neglect to punish them: "May they never present an acceptable offering to *Apollo*; *Diana*, *Latona*, or *Minerva* the provident; but may all their sacrifices and religious rites be for ever rejected and abhorred!"¹²

The warmth of *Æschines* occasioned the utmost confusion in the assembly. The golden shields, irregularly dedicated by the Athenians, were no longer the subject of discourse. This slight impropriety disappeared amidst the enormous impieties of the *Amphisceans*, which had been so forcibly painted to the superstitious fancies of the terrified multitude. It was determined, after violent contentions between those who accused, and those who defended, this unhappy people, that the Amphictyons, having summoned the assistance of the citizens of Delphi, should next day repair to the *Cirrhean* plain, in order to burn, cut down, and destroy the houses and plantations, which had so long adorned and defiled that devoted territory. The ravagers met with little opposition in performing this pious devastation; but as they returned towards the temple, they were overtaken and assaulted by a numerous party of *Amphisceans*, who threw them into disorder, took several prisoners, and pursued the rest to Delphi. The signal of war was now raised; the insulted Amphictyons, in whose persons the sanctity of religion had been violated, complained to their respective republics, while the recent audacity of the *Amphisceans* aggravated their ancient crimes and enormities. But agreeably to the languor inherent in councils which possess only a delegated authority, the measures of the Amphictyons were extremely slow and irresolute; and when they at length raised an army under the command of *Cottyphus*, a

6 Αρχομένου δε μου λίσσιν, και προθυμοτέρων πως εισιληλυθός εις το συνέδριον. *Æschin.* p. 290.

7 *Æschines* varnishes the story with inimitable address: αναβοήσας τις των Αμφισσιων, ανδρώτος ασίγηστου, και ως ειμι εφαινετο ουδμιαις παιδείας μετεσχηκός, ισως δε και δουλοκρατικός εξαπαρταίνων αυτον πρβαγομένου. "He was interrupted by the vociferation of a certain *Amphiscean*, a man the most impudent, totally illiterate, and perhaps impelled to folly by some offended divinity."

8 See these events particularly related, c. v. p. 51.

9 *Æschin.* in *Ctesiphon*.

10 *Demosthen.* de *Corona*.

11 The persuasive energy with which *Æschines* defends his treachery, or rather displays his patriotism, on this occasion, is not excelled by any thing in *Demosthenes* himself. Had the works of the latter perished, the two orations of *Æschines* (de *Falsa Legatione*, and in *Ctesiphont*.) would have justly been regarded as the most perfect models of eloquence produced by human genius. But the works, and even the name of *Æschines*, are eclipsed in the fame of his rival. So disproportionate are the rewards of acting a first and a second part, and so just the poet's advice to all candidates for fame:

Ανν αριστοιτεν και υπερχον τιμηναι αλλων.

12 *Pausanias Phocic.* and *Æschin.* in *Ctesiphont*.

Thessalian, and a creature of Philip's, their operations were ill conducted and unsuccessful.¹

Affairs were thus brought to the issue which had been expected by Æschines, and the accomplices who assisted him in promoting the interest of the king of Macedon. They loudly declaimed in the council against the lukewarm indifference of the Grecian states in a war which so deeply concerned the national religion. "It became the Amphictyons, therefore, as the ministers of Apollo, and the guardians of his temple, to seek out and employ some more powerful instrument of the divine vengeance. Philip of Macedon had formerly given proof of his pious zeal in the Phocian war. That prince was now returning in triumph from his Scythian expedition. His assistance must again be demanded (nor would it be demanded in vain) to defend the cause of Apollo and the sacred shrine." This proposal being approved, a deputation of the Amphictyons met Philip in Thrace. He received their welcome message with well-affected surprise, but declared his veneration for the commands of the council, which he should be ever ready to obey.²

The vigilant prince had already taken proper measures for acting as general of the Amphictyons, and provided a sufficient number of transports to convey his army into Greece. He understood that notwithstanding the intrigues of Æschines and his associates, the Athenians had been persuaded by Demosthenes to oppose his design, and that their admirals Chares and Proxenus prepared to intercept his passage with a superior naval force. To baffle this opposition, Philip employed a stratagem. A light brigantine was despatched to Macedon with letters of such import as gave reason to believe that he purposed immediately returning into Thrace.³ Besides writing to Antipater, his principal confidant and minister, he took care to mask his artifice, by sending letters to his queen Olympias. The brigantine designedly fell into the hands of the Athenians. The despatches were seized and read; but the letter of the queen was politely forwarded to its destination.⁴ The Athenian admirals quitted their station, and Philip arrived, without opposition, on the coast of Locris, from whence he proceeded to Delphi.

Though the Macedonians alone were far more numerous than seemed necessary for the reduction of Amphissa, the king, in the month of November, despatched circular letters through most parts of Greece, requiring from the Thebans, Peloponnesians, and other states, the assistance of their combined arms to maintain the cause of the Amphictyons and Apollo. The Thebans, rather intimidated by a powerful army in their neighbourhood, than inclined to the Macedonians, of whose designs they had lately become extremely jealous, sent a small body of infantry to join the standard of Philip. The Lacedæmonians, long disgusted with the measures of Greece, and envying the power of Macedon, which they had not public spirit to oppose, beheld all recent transactions with a

contemptuous disregard, and seemed firm in their purpose of preserving a sullen neutrality. The Athenians, awakened by the activity of Demosthenes to a sense of their danger, opposed Philip with ten thousand mercenaries, despising the threats of the oracle, against those who took part with the impious Amphisseans. The orator boldly accused the Pythian priestess and her ministers of being bribed to Philippise, or to prophesy as might best suit the interest of Philip; while Æschines, on the other hand, accused his adversary of having received a thousand drachmas, and an annual pension of twenty minæ, to abet the impiety of Amphissa.⁵ The king of Macedon, without waiting for any farther reinforcement than that which he had received from the Thebans, besieged, took, and garrisoned that unfortunate city; and having routed and put to flight the Athenian mercenaries, spread the terror of his arms round all the neighbouring territory.⁶

The news of these events occasioned dreadful consternation in Athens. The terrified citizens, who could not be persuaded to tear themselves from their beloved pleasures in order to defend Amphissa,⁷ believed the moment approaching when they must defend their own walls against the victorious invader. After less altercation and delay than usually prevailed in their councils, they sent an embassy to Philip, craving a suspension of hostilities, and, at the same time, despatched their ablest orators to rouse the Greeks from their supine negligence, and to animate and unite them against a Barbarian, who, under pretence of avenging the offended divinity of Apollo, meditated the subjugation of their common country. Megara, Eubœa, Leucas, Corinth, Corcyra, and Achaia, favourably received the ambassadors, and readily entered into a league against Macedon. Thebes fluctuated in uncertainty, hating the Athenians as rivals, and dreading Philip as a tyrant. The situation of the Theban territory, through which Philip must march before he could invade Attica, rendered the decision of that people peculiarly important.⁷ To gain or to retain their friendship, the intrigues of Philip, the eloquence of Athens, had been employed with unwearied assiduity. The Thebans temporised, deliberated, resolved, and changed their resolutions. The partisans of Athens were most numerous, those of Macedon most active, while the great body of the Theban people heard the clamours and arguments of both parties with that stupid indifference, and took their measures with that lethargic slowness, which disgraced even the heavy character of Bœotians.⁸

To fix their wavering irresolution, and to awaken their sensibility, Philip at length had recourse to the strong impression of terror. From the general wreck of Phocis, his foresight and policy had spared the walls of Elatœa, a city important by its situation between two ranges of mountains, which opened into Phocis and Bœotia. The citadel was built on an eminence, washed by the river Cephissus, which flowed

1 Æschin. in Ctesiphont.
2 Ibid.

3 Polyæn. l. iv. c. ii.
4 Plut. in Demetr.

5 Æschin. in Ctesiphont.
6 Demosthen. de Corona.

7 Diodor. l. xvi. p. 473.
8 Demosthen. de Corona.

in a winding course through Bœotia into the lake Copais; a broad expanse of water, which, by certain navigable streams, communicated with Attica. This valuable post, conveniently situate for receiving reinforcements from Thessaly and Macedon, commanding the passage into Bœotia, distant only two days march from Attica, and which, being garrisoned by a powerful army, might continually alarm the safety of Thebes and Athens, Philip seized with equal boldness and celerity,⁹ drew the greater part of his troops thither, repaired and strengthened the walls of the place, and having thus secured himself from surprise, watched a favourable opportunity of inflicting punishment on the Athenians, who had given him sufficient ground to represent them as the enemies of the Amphictyonic council,¹⁰ by whose authority the king of Macedon affected to be guided in all his operations.

We are not acquainted with the immediate effect of this vigorous measure on the resolutions of the Thebans; but the terror and consternation of the uncorrupt part of the citizens, may be conjectured by what happened on the same occasion at Athens. It was late in the evening when a courier arrived with the melancholy tidings that Philip had taken possession of Elatæa. The people had retired to their houses; the magistrates supped in the Prytanæum; but in a moment all were abroad. Some hastened to the generals; others went in quest of the officer¹¹ whose business it was to summon the citizens to council; most flocked to the marketplace; and, in order to make room for the assembly, pulled down or burned the temporary wooden edifices erected by the tradesmen or artificers who exposed their wares to sale in that spacious square. Before dawn the confusion ceased; the citizens were all assembled; the senators took their places; the president reported to them the alarming intelligence that had been received. The herald then proclaimed with a loud voice, "That he who had any thing to offer on the present emergence, should mount the rostrum, and propose his advice." The invitation, though frequently repeated, was received with silence and dismay. The magistrates, the generals, the demagogues, were all present; but none obeyed the summons of the herald, which Demosthenes calls the voice of their country imploring the assistance of her children.¹²

At length that accomplished orator arose, and obtained the noblest triumph of patriotism; having proposed, amidst universal consternation, an advice equally prudent, generous, and successful. He began by darting a ray of hope into the desponding citizens, and assuring them that, were not the Thebans, the greater part at least of the Thebans, hostile to Philip, that prince would not be actually posted at Elatæa, but on

the Athenian frontier. He exhorted his countrymen to shake off the unmanly terror which had surprised them; and, instead of fearing for themselves, to fear only for their neighbours, whose territories were more immediately threatened, and who must sustain the first shock of the invasion. "Let your forces," continued he, "immediately march to Eleusis, in order to show the Thebans, and all Greece, that as those who have sold their country, are supported by the Macedonian forces at Elatæa, so you are ready to defend with your hereditary courage and fortune those who fight for liberty. Let ambassadors at the same time be sent to Thebes, to remind that republic of the good offices conferred by your ancestors; to assure the Thebans, that you do not consider them as aliens; that the people of Athens have forgot all recent hostilities with the citizens of Greece, and will never forsake the cause of their common country, which is actually, in a peculiar manner, the cause of Thebes. To this community, therefore, offer your most disinterested services. To make any demand for yourselves, would be highly improper in the present juncture. Assure them that you are deeply affected by their danger, and prepared generously to defend them to the utmost of your power."

These proposals being received with general approbation, Demosthenes drew up a formal decree for carrying them into execution; a decree which may be considered as the expiring voice of a people, who, agreeably to the magnanimous counsel of Pericles, had determined, that when every thing mortal perished, the fame of Athens should remain.¹³ Having painted in the most odious colours, the perfidy and violence of Philip; and having stigmatized with due severity, the recent instances of his injustice and lust of power, the orator concludes, "For such reasons, the senate and people of

13 See c. xv. p. 194. In defending his own conduct, notwithstanding the unfortunate consequences with which it was attended, Demosthenes seems animated by the true spirit of Pericles. Βουλομαι τι και παραδοξον ειπειν; και μου προς Διους και θεων! μηδεις την υπερβολην θαυμαση; αλλα μετ' ευνοιας ο λογος υπερησταντο· ει γαρ απασι προδηλα τα μελλοντα γενησιν, και προηδισαν παντες, και ου προυλιγε Λισχινη, και διεμαρτερου, βωον και κικερυγας, ος ουδε σφδελγω· ουδε ουτως αποστειναι τη πολει τουτον ην ειπερ η δοξης η προγονων η του μελλοντος αιωνος ειχε λογον. The beauties of such passages, depending chiefly on collocation of words and sentiments, of which Demosthenes, of all writers, was the greatest master, cannot be translated. The meaning is, "I will venture to say what is contrary to common opinion, and, in the name of the Gods! regard not its extravagance, but examine it with indulgence. Had all of you foreseen what was going to happen, had the consequences of our conduct been manifest, and had you, Æschines, repeatedly proclaimed them with a loud voice, you, who then opened not your mouth, yet the Athenians ought not to have forsaken the cause of Grecian freedom, unless they forsook their glory, their ancestors, and their renown with succeeding ages." The same thought is expressed in language still bolder, after the hearers are prepared for it, by a page of the most animated eloquence: Αλλα ουκ εστι, οπως ημετεροι, ανδρες Αθηναιοι, τον υπερ της απαντων ελευθεριας και σωτηριας κινδυνον περιμενοι· ου μη τους εν Μαραθωνι προκινδυνυσαντας των προγονων, &c. See the passage, p. 343. He swears by those who fell at Marathon, Plataea, Salamis, and Artemisium, that the Athenians did not err in defending, with unequal fortune, and against superior force, the public safety and liberty. Such passages, when detached, may appear extravagant and gigantic; but, as in the church of St. Peter's, where all is arranged with such admirable symmetry, that no figure appears beyond the natural size, so in the works of Demosthenes, nothing appears monstrous because all is great.

9 Diodor. et Demosthen. ubi supra.

10 Æschin. in Ctesiphont.

11 Τον σαλπικτην εκαλουν, p. 339.

12 Εκλουσης δε της κοινης της πατριδος φωνης τον εροντα υπερ σωτηριας· ην γαρ ο κηρυξ κατὰ τους νομους φωνησσει, ταυτην κοινην της πατριδος δικαιον εστι ηγισσιν, p. 317. The passage that follows has been often cited; and can never be too much studied, as one of the finest examples of oratorical narration.

Athens, emulating the glory of their ancestors, to whom the liberty of Greece was ever dearer than the interest of their particular republic, and humbly revering the gods and heroes, guardians of the Athenian city and territory, whose aid they now implore, have resolved to send to the coast of Boeotia a fleet of two hundred sail, to march to Eleusis with their whole military strength, to despatch ambassadors to the several states of Greece, and particularly to the Thebans, encouraging them to remain unterrified amidst the dangers which threaten them, and to exert themselves manfully in defence of the common cause, with assurance that the people of Athens, unmindful of old or later differences which have prevailed between the two republics, are determined and ready to support them with all their faculties, their treasures, their navies, and their arms; well knowing that to contend for pre-eminence with the Greeks is an honourable contest; but to be commanded by a foreigner, and to suffer a Barbarian to wrest the sovereignty from their hands, would tarnish their hereditary glory, and disgrace their country for ever."

The same undaunted spirit which dictated this decree, attended the exertions of Demosthenes in his embassy to Thebes, in which he triumphed over the intrigues of Amyntas and Clearchus, and over the eloquence of Philon of Byzantium, the emissaries employed by Philip on this important occasion. The Thebans passed a decree for receiving with gratitude the proffered assistance of Athens; and the Athenian army having soon after taken the field, were admitted within the Theban walls, and treated with all the flattering distinctions of ancient hospitality.¹

Mean while Philip having advanced towards the Boeotian frontier, his detached parties were foiled in two rencounters with the confederates. Regardless of these losses, to which, perhaps, he purposely submitted, as necessary stratagems to draw the enemy from their walls, he proceeded with his main body, thirty-two thousand strong, to the plain of Chæronæa. This place was considered by Philip as well adapted to the operations of the Macedonian phalanx; and the ground for his encampment, and afterwards the field of battle, were chosen with equal sagacity; having in view, on one side, a temple of Hercules, whom the Macedonians regarded as the author of their royal house, and the high protector of their fortune; and, on the other, the banks of the Thermodon, a small river flowing into the Cephissus, announced by the oracles of Greece as the destined scene of desolation and woe to their unhappy country.² The generals of the confederate Greeks had been much less careful to avail themselves of the powerful sanctions of superstition. Unrestrained by inauspicious sacrifices, the Athenians had left their city at the exhortation of Demosthenes, to wait no other omen but the cause of their country. Regardless of oracles, they afterwards advanced to the ill-fated Thermodon, accom-

panied by the Thebans, and the scanty reinforcements raised by the islands, the states of Peloponnesus, which had joined their alliance. Their army amounted to thirty thousand men, animated by the noblest cause for which men can fight, but commanded by the Athenians Lysicles and Chares, the first but little, and the second unfavourably, known; and by Theagenes the Theban, a person strongly suspected of treachery; all three creatures of cabal, and tools of faction, slaves of interest or voluptuousness, whose characters (especially as they had been appointed to command the only states whose shame, rather than virtue, yet opposed the public enemy) are alone sufficient to prove that Greece was ripe for ruin.

When the day approached for abolishing the tottering independence of those turbulent republics, which their own internal vices, and the arms and intrigues of Philip, had been gradually undermining for twenty-two years, both armies formed in battle array before the rising of the sun. The right wing of the Macedonians was headed by Philip, who judged proper to oppose in person the dangerous fury of the Athenians. His son Alexander, only nineteen years of age, but surrounded by experienced officers, commanded the left wing, which faced the Sacred Band of the Thebans. The auxiliaries of either army were posted in the centre. In the beginning of the action, the Athenians charged with impetuosity, and repelled the opposing divisions of the enemy; but the youthful ardour of Alexander obliged the Thebans³ to retire, the Sacred Band being cut down to a man. The activity of the young prince completed their disorder, and pursued the scattered multitude with his Thessalian cavalry.

Mean time the Athenian generals, too much elated by their first advantage, lost the opportunity to improve it; for, having repelled the centre and right wing of the Macedonians, except the phalanx, which was composed of chosen men, and immediately commanded by the king, they, instead of attempting to break this formidable body, by attacking it in flank, pressed⁴ forward against the fugitives, the insolent Lysicles exclaiming in vain triumph, "Pursue, my brave countrymen! let us drive the cowards to Macedon." Philip observed this rash folly with contempt, and saying to those around him, "our enemies know not how to conquer," commanded his phalanx, by a rapid evolution, to gain an adjacent eminence, from which they poured down, firm and collected, on the advancing Athenians, whose confidence of success had rendered them totally insensible to danger. But the irresistible shock of the Macedonian spear converted their fury into despair. Above a thousand fell, two thousand were taken prisoners; the rest escaped by a precipitate and shameful flight. Of the Thebans more were killed than taken. Few of the confederates perished, as they had little share in the action, and as Philip, perceiving his victory to be complete, gave orders to spare the vanquished, with a clemency unusual in that age, and not less honourable to his understanding than his heart;

¹ Demosthenes, who furnishes the above narrative, avoids dwelling on the following melancholy events, which are related by Diodorus, l. xvi. p. 475. et seq. Plut. in Alexand. Strabo, l. ix. p. 414. Justin. l. ix. c. iii. et Pausanias Boeotic.

² Plut. in Vit. Demosth.

³ Plutarch. in Alexand.

⁴ Polyæn. Stratagem. l. iv. c. ii.

since his humanity thus subdued the minds, and gained the affections, of his conquered enemies.⁵

According to the Grecian custom, the battle was followed by an entertainment, at which the king, presiding in person, received the congratulations of his friends, and the humble supplications of the Athenian deputies, who craved the bodies of their slain. Their request, which served as an acknowledgment of their defeat, was readily granted; but before they availed themselves of the permission to carry off their dead, Philip, who with his natural intemperance, had protracted the entertainment till morning, issued forth with his licentious companions to visit the field of battle; their heads crowned with festive garlands, their minds intoxicated with the insolence of wine and victory; yet the sight of the slaughtered Thebans, which first presented itself to their eyes, and particularly the sacred band of friends and lovers, who lay covered with honourable wounds, on the spot where they had been drawn up to fight, brought back these insolent spectators to the sentiments of reason and humanity. Philip beheld the awful scene with a mixture of admiration and pity; and, after an affecting silence, denounced a solemn curse against those who basely suspected the friendship of such brave men to be tainted with criminal and infamous passions.⁶

But this serious temper of mind did not last long; for having proceeded to that quarter of the field where the Athenians had fought and fallen, the king abandoned himself to all the levity and littleness of the most petulant joy. Instead of being impressed with a deep sense of his recent danger, and with dutiful gratitude to Heaven for the happiness of his escape, and the importance of his victory, Philip only compared the boastful pretensions, with the mean performances of his Athenian enemies; and, struck by this contrast, rehearsed, with the insolent mockery of a buffoon, the pompous declaration of war lately drawn up by the ardent patriotism and too sanguine hopes of Demosthenes. It was on this occasion that the orator Demades at once rebuked the folly, and flattered the ambition of Philip, by asking him, Why he assumed the character of Thersites, when fortune assigned him the part of Agamemnon?⁷

Whatever might be the effect of this sharp reprimand,⁸ it is certain that the king of Macedon indulged not, on any future occasion, a vain triumph over the vanquished. When advised by his generals to advance into Attica, and to render himself master of Athens, he only replied, "Have I done so much for glory, and shall I destroy the theatre of that glory?"⁹ His subsequent conduct corresponded with the moderation of this sentiment. He restored, without ransom, the Athenian prisoners; who, at departing, having demanded their baggage, were also gratified in this particular; the king pleasantly observing, that the Athenians seemed to

think he had not conquered them in earnest.¹⁰ Soon afterwards he despatched his son Alexander, and Antipater, the most trusted of his ministers, to offer them peace on such favourable terms as they had little reason to expect. They were required to send deputies to the Isthmus of Corinth, where, to adjust their respective contingents of troops for the Persian expedition, Philip purposed assembling, early in the spring, a general convention of all the Grecian states; they were ordered to surrender the isle of Samos, which actually formed the principal station of their fleet, and the main bulwark and defence of all their maritime or insular possessions; but they were allowed to enjoy, unmolested, the Attic territory, with their hereditary form of government, and flattered by the acquisition of Oropus, for which they had so long contended with the unhappy Thebans.¹¹ It was not merely in being deprived of this city, that the Thebans experienced the indignation of the conqueror. From the transactions between Macedon and Thebes, in the early part of his reign, Philip thought himself entitled to treat that people, not as open and generous enemies, whose struggle for freedom deserved his clemency, but as faithless and insidious rebels, who merited all the severity of his justice. He punished the republican party with unrelenting rigour; restored the traitors, whom they had banished, to the first honours of the republic; and, in order to support their government, placed a Macedonian garrison in the Theban citadel.¹²

In his opposite treatment of the two republics, Philip, it is probable, was swayed neither by affection nor hatred; his generosity and his rigour were alike artificial, and both directed by his interest. Besides the different characters of the Thebans and Athenians, which rendered the former as sensible to the impression of fear, as the latter were susceptible of gratitude and esteem, the Thebans had too long, and too early, abandoned the cause of Greece, and too strenuously exerted themselves in establishing the power of Macedon, to acquire much reputation by one unsuccessful attempt to resist Philip, to which they had been at length roused less by their own public spirit or courage, than by the zeal and eloquence of Demosthenes. The Athenians, on the contrary, who from the beginning had opposed the views of this prince, though with far less prudence and activity than their situation required; who, through the whole course of his reign, had continued to traverse his measures, and to spurn his authority; and who, previously to the last fatal encounter at Chaeronea, had endeavoured to form a general confederacy, and when that proved impossible, had determined, almost unassisted and alone, to resist the common foe, seemed entitled to such gratitude and applause, as compassion bestows on ill-directed valour and unfortunate patriotism; and the rigorous treatment of such a people must have shocked the sentiments, and exasperated the hatred, of every citizen of Greece, who yet retained the faintest tincture of ancient

⁵ Pausan. Achaic. Diodor. et Justin, ubi supra.

⁶ Plutarch in Pelopid.

⁷ Plutarch in Demosthen.

⁸ Plutarch ascribes to this smart observation the moderation of Philip's subsequent conduct.

⁹ Plutarch in Apophth.

¹⁰ Plutarch in Apophth.

¹¹ Pausanias Boeotic. Diodorus. ubi supra.

¹² Justin. l. ix. c. iv.

principles, or who was still animated by the smallest spark of public spirit.

Philip too well understood his interest, thus to tarnish the glory, and risk the fruits of victory, although the daring and imprudent behaviour of the Athenians, after the battle, might have served to justify the harshest measures. The first news of their defeat filled the city with tumult or consternation. But when the disorder ceased, the people showed themselves disposed to place their whole confidence in arms, none in the mercy of Philip. Upon the motion of Hyperides,¹ a decree passed for sending to the Piræus their wives, children, and most valuable effects, together with the sacred images and ornaments of their gods. By the same decree, the rights and freedom of the city were bestowed on strangers and slaves, and restored to persons declared infamous, on this one condition, that they exerted themselves in the public defence. Demosthenes, with equal success, proposed a decree for repairing the walls and fortifications, a work which, being himself appointed to superintend, he generously accomplished at the expense of his private fortune.² The orator Lycurgus undertook the more easy task of impeaching the worthless Lysicles, whose misconduct in the day of battle had been the immediate cause of the late fatal disaster. In a discourse calculated to revive the spirit of military enthusiasm, which had anciently animated the Athenians, the speaker thus warmly apostrophised the conscious guilt of the mute and trembling general: "The Athenians have been totally defeated in an engagement; the enemy have erected a trophy to the eternal dishonour of Athens; and Greece is now prepared to receive the detested yoke of servitude. You were our commander on that inglorious day; and still you breathe the vital air, enjoy the light of the sun, and appear in our public places, a living monument of the disgrace and ruin of your country." The quick resentment of the hearers supplied the consequence, and the criminal was dragged to execution.³

Neither the inflammatory decrees, nor the hostile preparations of Athens, could shake the moderation of Philip, or determine him to alter the favourable terms of accommodation, which he had already proposed by his ambassadors. The patriotic or republican party, headed by the orators just mentioned, breathed hatred and revenge; but, at the intercession of the Areopagus, which on this occasion acted suitably to the fame of its ancient wisdom, the prudent and virtuous Phocion⁴ was appointed to the chief command. The discernment of this statesman and general, whose merit had been neglected while it was yet time to perform any essential service, might easily perceive the vanity of attempting to recover the honour of a people, who, antecedently to their defeat by Philip, had been still more fatally subdued by their own pernicious vices. Amidst the important events of the Macedonian war, and amidst the dreadful misfortunes which, in consequence of its

melancholy issue, hung over their country, a set of Athenian citizens, distinguished by their rank and fortune, and known by the appellation of the Sixty, from the accidental number of their original institution, daily assembled into a club, where all serious transactions were treated with levity and ridicule, and the time totally dedicated to feasting, gaming, and the sprightly exercises of wit and pleasantry. This detestable society saw,⁵ without emotion, their countrymen arming for battle; with the most careless indifference they received accounts of their captivity or death; nor did the public calamities in any degree disturb their festivity, or interrupt, for a moment, the tranquil course of their pleasures. Their fame having reached Macedon, Philip sent them a sum of money, to support the expense of an institution so favourable to his views. But what opinion must Phocion have formed of such an establishment; or how was it possible for any dispassionate man of ordinary prudence to expect, that a republic so totally degenerate, as to foster such wretches within its bosom, could successfully wage war against a vigilant and enterprising enemy?

The arguments of the wisest portion of the community for accepting the peace proffered by Philip, were strengthened and confirmed by the return of Demades with the Athenian prisoners taken at Chæronæa, who unanimously blazed forth the praises of their generous conqueror. Ambassadors were accordingly despatched to the king of Macedon, to accept and ratify the treaty of peace, upon the terms which he had condescended to offer; and the only marks of deference shown to the violent party, who still clamoured for war, were, that Demochares, who ostentatiously affected a rude boldness of speech against Philip, was named among the ambassadors; and that Demosthenes, the irreconcilable enemy of that prince, was appointed to pronounce the funeral oration in honour of those slain at Chæronæa.

Demochares acquitted himself of his commission with that extravagant petulance which naturally flowed from his character; and which, in the Grecian commonwealths, too frequently disgraced the decency of public transactions. At their audience of leave, Philip, with less sincerity than politeness, lavished on the ambassadors his usual professions of friendship, and obligingly asked them, if there was any thing farther in which he could gratify the Athenians? "Yes," said Demochares, "hang thyself." The just indignation of all present broke forth against this unprovoked insolence, when Philip, with admirable coolness, silenced the clamour, by saying, "Let this ridiculous brawler depart unmolested;" and then turning to the other ambassadors, "Go, tell your countrymen, that those who can utter such outrages are less just and moderate, than he who can pardon them."⁶

The honourable employment conferred on Demosthenes, which showed that, notwithstanding the unfortunate issue of his councils, the Athenians still approved his principles and

¹ Plut. in Vita Hyperid.
³ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 477.

² Demosth. de Corona.
⁴ Plutarch in Phocion.

⁵ Athenæus, l. xiv. p. 614.

⁶ Seneca de Ira.

his patriotism, might have been expected to elevate his sentiments and his language to the highest strain of eloquence. But the complexion of the times no longer admitted those daring flights to which he had been accustomed to soar; and the powers of the orator seem to have declined with the fortunes of his country. With too apparent caution he avoids the mention of all recent transactions, and dwells with tiresome minuteness on the ancient, and even fabulous parts, of the Athenian story. One

transient flash of light breaks forth towards the end of his discourse, when commemorating the glory of the slain, he says, that the removal of those zealous republicans from their country was like taking the sun from the world;⁷ a figure bold, yet just; since, after the battle of Chæronæa, there remained no further hopes of resisting the conqueror—the dignity of freedom was for ever lost, and the gloom of night and tyranny descended and thickened over Greece.⁸

CHAPTER XXXVII.

Liberal Spirit of the Macedonian Government—Philip appointed General of the Greeks—Rebellion of Illyria—Assassination of Philip—His Character—Accession of Alexander—His Expedition against the Illyrians and Triballi—He passes the Danube—Rebellion in Greece—Destruction of Thebes—Heroism of Timoclea—Alexander crosses the Hellespont—State of the Persian Empire—Battle of the Granicus—Siege of Miletus and Halicarnassus—Bold Adventure of two Macedonian Soldiers—Alexander's judicious Plan of War—Arts by which he secured his Conquests—The Battle of Issus—The Virtues of Alexander expand with his prosperity.

THE Greeks acknowledged, with reluctance and sorrow, that by the decisive victory of Chæronæa, Philip became master of their country.⁹ But we should form a very erroneous notion of the Macedonian government, if we compared it with the despotism of the East, or the absolute dominion of many European monarchs. The authority of Philip, even in his hereditary realm, was modeled on that admirable system of power and liberty, which distinguished and ennobled the policies of the heroic ages.¹⁰ He administered the religion, decided the differences, and commanded the valour, of soldiers and freemen.¹¹ Personal merit entitled

him to hold the sceptre, which, being derived from Jove, could not long be swayed by unworthy hands. The superiority of his abilities, the vigilant and impartial justice of his administration, formed the main pillars of his prerogative; since, according to the principles and feelings of the Macedonians, he who infringed the rights of his subjects,¹² ceased from that moment to be a king.

Having effected the conquest of Greece, the prudence of Philip could not be supposed ambitious of introducing into that country more severe maxims of government than those which prevailed in Macedon. He affected, on the contrary, to preserve inviolate the ancient forms of the republican constitution, and determined to govern the Greeks by the same policy with which he had subdued them. While Macedonian garrisons kept possession of Thermopylæ and the other strong holds of Greece, the faithful and active partisans of Philip controlled the resolutions, and directed the measures, of each particular republic. The superintendence of the sacred games, as well as of the Delphic temple, rendered him the only visible head of the national religion: in consequence of the double right of presiding and voting in the Amphictyonic council, he appeared in the character of supreme civil magistrate of Greece; and his illustrious victory at Chæronæa over the only communities that opposed his greatness, pointed him out as the general best entitled to conduct the military force of Greece and Macedon in the long-projected invasion of Persia; an office which, as he might have assumed it without blame, he therefore solicited with applause from the impartial suffrages of the people.¹³

"Nihil potestas regum valebat nisi prius valuisset auctoritas;" scilicet populi. Curtius, l. vi. c. ix. p. 441.

¹² A very mean subject literally told Philip, "If you refuse to do me justice, cease to be a king." Plut. Apophth.

¹³ Diodor. l. xvi. p. 556. Τὸν ἑλλήνων ἐλαμμένον αὐτὸν στεφανῶν, &c.

7 Ὡς περ γὰρ εἰ τις ἐκ τοῦ καθίστητοτος κόσμου τὸ φῶς ἐξέλθοιτο, δυσχερὲς καὶ χαλεπὸς πᾶσι ὁ λειπομένους ἡμῖν βίος· οὕτω τῶνδε ἀνδρῶν ἀναριθμήτων, ἐν σκότει καὶ πολλῇ δυσκλίᾳ πᾶς ὁ πρῶτος ζῆλος τῶν ἑλλήνων γίγνεται. p. 155. "For, as if light were taken from the world, the remaining life of mortals would be involved in difficulty and misery; so by the death of those warriors, the original glory of Greece was buried in darkness and ignominy." Of his discourse, which Libanius denies to be genuine, many passages are corrupt, and many interpolated. The general debility of the whole may be explained by the observation in the text, without having recourse to the defence of Wolfius: "Orationem Libanius Demosthenis esse negat ut vilem et imbecillam omnino Quod quis miretur, cum et argumentum sit imbecille?" Demosthen. edit. Wolf. p. 152.

8 Hic dies universæ Græciæ, et gloriæ dominationis, et vetustissimam libertatem finivit. Justin. l. ix. c. iii. Demosthenes, Diodorus, Strabo, and Pausanias, all express the same sentiments, and nearly in the same words.

9 Demosth. Æschin. Diodor. Plutarch. Arrian, passim. I shall cite only the words of Strabo: "Χαιρώνεια δὲ οὗτος Φίλιππος ὁ Ἀμύντου μεγάλως νικήσας Ἀθηναίους τε καὶ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Κορινθίους, κατέστη τῆς Ἑλλάδος κύριος." "And Chæronæa, where Philip, the son of Amyntus, having conquered the Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians, in a great battle, rendered himself master of Greece." Strab. Geograph. l. ix. p. 414.

10 When Alexander, intoxicated with prosperity, claimed too exalted honours, he was told by Callisthenes the philosopher, "Οἱ πρόγονοι ἐξ Ἀργεὺς εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἦλθον, οὐδὲ βίᾳ ἀλλὰ νόμῳ Μακεδόνων ἀρχόντες διατέλεισαν." "Your ancestors came from Argos to Macedon, and continued there, governing the Macedonians, not by force, but by law." Arrian. Exped. Alexand. p. 87.

11 In capital cases, says Curtius, the soldiers judged in time of war the citizens in time of peace. He then adds,

Olymp. That this condescension must
cx. 4. have been highly flattering to the
A. C. 337. vanity of the Greeks, appears from
the transactions at Corinth, where
Philip, the year following the battle of Chæro-
næa, had assembled a general convention of the
Amphictyonic states.¹ In this assembly, Dius
of Ephesus represented, with affecting energy,
the vexations and oppression which the feeble
colonies of Asia daily experienced from the ra-
pacious cruelty of the Persian satraps. The
general voice of the assembly approved his
complaint, while they recollected, with indig-
nation, the continual outrages of a people who
had anciently invaded their country, insulted
their religion, burned their temples, and, not
satisfied with these acts of vengeance, had re-
duced and oppressed their colonies, and unint-
erruptedly excited and nourished those cruel ani-
mosities which had long filled every part of
Greece with sedition and blood.² Philip had
private wrongs to urge against the Persians,
whose hatred and jealousy had, on several oc-
casions, thwarted his measures and disturbed
his government. Yet he insisted chiefly on
their public injuries, and notorious enmity to
the whole Grecian name, the honour of which
could only be redeemed by a successful expedi-
tion into Asia.

This expedition was determined with uni-
versal consent. Philip was appointed general
of the confederacy; and (although the Lacedæ-
monians sullenly absented themselves from the
convention) when the several states came to
ascertain the contingent of troops which they
could respectively raise, the whole, exclusive
of the Macedonians, amounted to two hundred
and twenty thousand foot, and fifteen thousand
horse;³ a prodigious force, of which the do-
mestic dissensions of the Greeks had hitherto,
perhaps, prevented them from forming an ade-
quate notion. On no former occasion had the
several republics appeared so thoroughly united
in one common cause; never had they shown
themselves so sensible of their combined strength;
never had they testified such general alacrity
to take the field, or such unlimited confidence
in the abilities of their commander.

Olymp. It belongs to the biographers of
cx. 1. the king of Macedon, to examine
A. C. 336. the circumstances of the bloody
transaction which clouded this glo-
rious prospect. In the general history of Greece,
it is sufficient to mention, that Philip, having
despatched Parmenio with a body of troops to
protect the Asiatic colonies, was prevented
from immediately following that commander
by an insurrection of the Illyrian tribes.⁴ This
unseasonable diversion from the greatest enter-
prise of his reign, was rendered more formida-
ble by the domestic discord which shook the
palace of Philip. A spirit less proud and jea-
lous than that of Olympias, mother of Alexan-
der, might have been justly provoked by the
continual infidelities of her husband, who,
whether at home or abroad, in peace or in war,
never ceased to augment the number of his

wives or concubines.⁵ The generous mind of
Alexander must naturally have espoused the
cause of his mother, although his own interest
had not been deeply concerned in preventing
Philip from continually giving him so many
new rivals to the throne. The young prince
defended the rights of Olympias and his own,
with the impetuosity natural to his character;
at the nuptials of Philip with Cassandra, the
niece of Attalus, one of his generals and favour-
ites, an open rupture broke out between the im-
perious father and his more haughty son;⁶ and
the latter, concluding all those to be his own
friends who were enemies to the former, sought
refuge among the rebellious Illyrians, who were
already in arms against their sovereign.

Olymp. The dexterity of Philip extricated
cx. 1. him from these difficulties. Having
A. C. 336. conquered the Illyrians, he softened
Alexander by assuring him that his
illustrious merit, which was alike admired in
Greece and Macedon, had not escaped the
anxious vigilance of a parent, who, by giving
him many rivals to the throne, had only given
him an opportunity of surpassing them all in
glory, and in the merited affection of the Ma-
cedonians.⁷ Soothed by this condescension,
Olympias and her son again appeared at the
court with the distinction due to their rank;
and to announce and confirm this happy recon-
cilement with his family, Philip married his
beloved daughter Cleopatra to the king of Epi-
rus, maternal uncle of Alexander; and celebrat-
ed the nuptials by a magnificent festival which
lasted several days, during which the Greeks
and Macedonians vied with each other in show-
ing their obsequious respect towards their com-
mon general and master.

Amidst the tumultuous amusements of the
festivity, Philip often appeared in public with
unguarded confidence in the fidelity and attach-
ment of all his subjects: but proceeding one
day from the palace to the theatre, he was
stabbed to the heart by Pausanias,⁸ a Mace-
donian; whether the assassin was stimulated
merely by private resentment, or prompted by
the ill-appeased rage of Olympias, or instigated
to commit this atrocity by the Persian satraps;
which last is asserted by Alexander,⁹ who al-
leged the assassination of his father among his
reasons for invading the Persian empire.

Thus fell Philip of Macedon, in the forty-
seventh year of his age and twenty-fourth of
his reign; the first prince whose life and actions
history hath described with such regular accu-
racy, and circumstantial fulness, as render his
administration a matter of instruction to suc-
ceeding ages. With a reach of foresight and
sagacity peculiar to himself, he united all the
prominent features of the Grecian character,
valour, eloquence, address, flexibility to vary
his conduct without changing his purpose, the
most extraordinary powers of application and
perseverance, of cool combination and ardent
execution. Intercepted in the middle of his
career by the hand of an assassin, he was pre-
vented from undertaking the justest and noblest

1 Diodor. l. xvi. p. 556.
2 Isocrat. Orat. ad. Philip.

3 Justin. l. ix. c. v.
4 Diodor. ad Olymp.

5 Athenæus, l. xiii.

7 Plot. Apophth.

6 Plutarch. in Alexand.

8 Diodor. et Justin. ubi supra.

9 Arrian. l. ii. c. iii. et Curtius, l. iv. c. i.

design of his reign; a design which he had long meditated, and in which his near prospect of success promised to reward the labours and dangers of his toilsome life. Had not his days been shortened by a premature death, there is good reason to believe that he might have subdued the Persian empire; an enterprise more dazzling, but less difficult, than the exploits which he had already achieved. Had that event taken place, the arduous undertakings of his long and successful reign would have been ennobled and illuminated by the splendour of extensive foreign conquest; Philip would have reached the height of such renown as is obtained by the habits of activity, vigilance, and fortitude in the pursuit of unbounded greatness; and, in the opinion of posterity, would perhaps have surpassed the glory of all kings and conquerors, who either preceded or followed him. Yet, even on this supposition, there is not any man of sense and probity, who, if he allows himself time for serious reflection, would purchase the imagined grandeur and prosperity of the king of Macedon, at the price of his artifices and crimes; and to a philosopher, who considered either the means by which he had obtained his triumphs, or the probable consequences of his dominion over Greece and Asia, the busy ambition of this mighty conqueror would appear but a deceitful scene of splendid misery.

Olymp. A prince who is his own minister, and almost the sole depository of
cxi. 1. his own secrets, commonly leaves
A. C. 336. an arduous task for the labours of his successor. This difficulty presented itself to Alexander; but it was not the only circumstance that rendered his situation difficult. The regular order of succession had never been clearly established in Macedon, and was, in some measure, incompatible with the spirit of royal government, which, as then generally understood, required such qualities and accomplishments in the first magistrate, as could not be expected from a promiscuous line of hereditary princes. The numerous wives of Philip had, however, been most fruitful in female offspring. Nor had Alexander much to apprehend from the rivalry of his brothers, since Ptolemy, born of Arsinoë, and afterwards king of Egypt, was reputed to be the son of Lagus, to whom Philip had married Arsinoë, while she was with child by himself; and Aridæus, the son of Philina, who, for six years after the death of Alexander, held a pageant royalty in the East, by the terror of his brother's name, and through the discordant ambition of his lieutenants, possessed not vigour of mind eagerly to dispute the succession. But Alexander's title was contested by Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, the elder brother of Philip, in whose name the last mentioned prince originally administered the government, till the tender age of Amyntas being rejected by the Macedonians, Philip so little feared the revival of his pretensions to the throne, that he had given him his daughter Cyna in marriage. This new advantage strengthened the claim of Amyntas, which, it was probable, would be warmly supported by Attalus, a bold and enterprising commander, the personal

enemy of Olympias and her son, of whom the former had recently put to death his kinswoman Cleopatra, with shocking circumstances of cruelty. Alexander privately took measures with his friends for crushing those dangerous enemies;¹⁰ and, being acknowledged king of Macedon, hastened into Greece to reap the fruits of his father's labours, which might be lost by delay.

In his journey thither, he experienced the perfidious inconstancy of the Thessalians, whom he chastised with proper severity; and having assembled the deputies of the states at Corinth, he was invested with the same honours¹¹ which had been conferred on his predecessor. During his residence in that city there happened an incident which more clearly displays the character of Alexander, than can be done by the most elaborate description. Curiosity led him to visit Diogenes the cynic, whose singular manners and mode of life have been mentioned on a former occasion. He found him basking in the sun,¹² and, having made himself known as the master of Macedon and Greece, asked the philosopher, what he could do to oblige him? "Stand from between me and the sun," was the answer of the cynic: upon which the king observed to his attendants, "that he would choose to be Diogenes,¹³ if he were not Alexander." The observation was natural and sublime; since, under the most dissimilar veils of external circumstances and pursuits, their characters concealed a real resemblance. Both possessed that proud erect spirit which disdains authority, spurns control, and aspires to dominate over fortune. But by diminishing the number of his wants, Diogenes found, in his tub, that independence of mind, which Alexander, by the unbounded gratification of his desires, could not attain on the imperial throne of Persia.

Olymp. Alexander having returned to
cxi. 2. Macedon, prepared for his eastern
A. C. 335. expedition by diffusing the terror of his name among the northern Barbarians. The Illyrians and Triballi, mindful of the injuries of Philip, had hastily taken arms to oppose, ere it became too late, the youth and inexperience of his son. But the discernment of the young prince readily perceived the danger of leaving such formidable enemies on his frontier. With a well-appointed army, he marched from Amphipolis, and, leaving the city Philippi and Mount Orbelus on the left, arrived in ten days at the principal pass of Mount Hæmus, which led into the territory of the Triballi. There he found a new, and not less formidable enemy. The independent tribes of Thrace, having embraced the cause of the Triballi, had seized an eminence commanding the pass; and, instead of a breastwork, had fortified themselves with their carriages or wagons, which they purposed to roll down on the Macedonians. To elude this unusual attack, Alexander commanded such of his troops as could not conveniently open their ranks, and allow free

¹⁰ Diodorus, l. xvii. 2, et seq. et Justin. xi. i, et seq.

¹¹ Idem, ibid.

¹² Pausan. l. ii. p. 88.

¹³ Laertius in Vit. Diogen.

issue to the intended violence, to fall flat on the ground, and carefully close their shields, that the descending wagons might harmlessly bound over them. In consequence of this contrivance, the hostile artillery was exhausted in vain. Alexander then attacked the Thracians with admirable order and celerity. Fifteen hundred fell; their swiftness and knowledge of the country saved the greater number. The prisoners, women, and booty, were sent for sale to the maritime cities on the Euxine.¹

Alexander having entrusted this business to Lysanias and Philotas, passed the mountains, and pursued the Triballi. By galling them with his bowmen and slingers, he gradually forced them from their fastnesses, and defeated a powerful body of their warriors encamped on the woody banks of the Lyginus, distant three days' march from the Danube. The remainder of the nation, conducted by the valour of their chieftain Syrmus, and reinforced by a numerous band of Thracians, took refuge in Peucé, an island in the Danube, defended by abrupt and rugged banks, surrounded by deep and foaming streams. Alexander, though he had just received some ships of war from Byzantium, judged it too hazardous to assault the island; and the hostile appearance of the Getæ on the northern bank, furnished him with an honourable pretence for declining the siege of Peucé. On the margin of the Danube, that audacious people had drawn up four thousand horse, and above ten thousand foot, showing, by their countenance and demeanour, a determined resolution to oppose the landing of an enemy. Provoked by those signs of defiance, and animated by the glory of passing the greatest of all European rivers, and that which was surrounded with the greatest and most warlike nations, Alexander filled the hides used in encampment with straw and other buoyant materials, and collected all the boats employed by the natives of those parts in fishing, commerce, or piracy. Amidst the darkness of the ensuing night, he thus transported fifteen hundred cavalry, and four thousand infantry, to that part of the opposite bank, which was covered with high and thick corn. At the dawn of day, he commanded his foot to march through those rich fields² with transversed spears; while they remained concealed in the corn, the cavalry followed them; but as soon as they emerged into the naked plain, the horse advanced to the front, and both suddenly presenting an irresistible object of terror, the Getæ abandoned their post, and fled to their city, which was four miles distant. There, they at first purposed to make a vigorous defence; but perceiving that Alexander cautiously skirted the river, to avoid the danger of an ambush, reflecting on his astonishing boldness in passing, without a bridge, the Danube in one night, and beholding the impenetrable firmness of his phalanx, and the irresistible impetuosity of his cavalry,³ they

regarded farther opposition as vain, forsook their habitations, and retired precipitately, with their wives and children, into the northern desert.⁴

The Macedonians entered, and sacked the town. The spoil was entrusted to Philip and Meleager; Alexander, mindful of so many favours, returned sacrifices of thanks to Jupiter, Hercules, and the god of the Danube; and, encamping on the northern bank of the river, received very submissive embassies from the surrounding nations. Even Syrmus, the intrepid leader of the Triballi, sent propitiatory presents, and readily obtained pardon from a prince, who could admire virtue in a Barbarian, and an enemy.⁵

Necessity alone compelled Alexander to carry his arms into those inhospitable regions. Animated by an ambition to subdue the Asiatic plains, he turned with contempt from bleak heaths and barren mountains, not deigning to chastise the boastful arrogance of the Celtæ. The Boii and Senones, Celtic or German tribes (for those nations were often confounded by the Greeks,) sent ambassadors to Alexander, who, observing their lofty stature and haughty spirit, endeavoured to humble them by asking, "what, of all things, they most feared?" not doubting they would answer, "yourself;" but they replied, "the fall of heaven." The king declared them his friends and allies, but whispered to those around him, "the Celtæ are an arrogant people."⁶ Could we admit the truth of this narrative, and believe that ambassadors were really sent to Alexander by the nations inhabiting the northern recesses of the Ionian gulf, it would be interesting to observe the early character and first proceedings of a people who were destined to subdue the conquerors of the Macedonian empire.

In his return towards Pella, Alexander marched through the friendly country of the Pæonians, where he received the unpleasant intelligence that the Illyrian tribes were in arms, headed by Clitus, son of Bardyllis, the hereditary foe of Macedon. Glaucias, king of the Taulantii, prepared to join the arms of Clitus; the Autariadæ, likewise an Illyrian nation, had determined to obstruct the march of Alexander. Amidst these difficulties, he was encouraged by Langarus, chief of the Agrians, a warlike tribe inhabiting the ridges of Mount Hæmus. Even in the life-time of Philip, Langarus⁷ had discerned the superior merit of his son, with whom he had early entered into a confidential correspondence. Conducted by the activity of Langarus, the Agrian targeteers, who thenceforth had an important share in all the Macedonian victories, invaded the country of the Autariadæ. Their ravages were equally rapid and destructive; the Autariadæ, broken by do-

¹ Arrian. Alexand. Exposit. l. i. p. 2, et seq.

² Πλαγίως τὰς σάρισσας ἐπικλινάντες τὸν σίτον. The spears were transversed, not only for the purpose of concealment, "but to make a road through the corn."

³ Φόβου δὲ τῆς φάλαγγος ἡ ἐνὸς κλάσης, ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ τῶν ἰσπίων ἰμβόλη, Arrian, p. 4. Alexander knew the proper use of cavalry, which was so little understood in the last

century, that the three ranks fired successively before the charge; each, after firing, passing, by a caracol, behind the rest. Gustavus Adolphus allowed only his first rank to fire; which was doubtless a great improvement, and paved the way for reducing the service of cavalry to its true principle, what Arrian calls "ἡ ὥσπερ ἰμβόλη."

⁴ Arrian, l. i. p. 3 et seq.

⁵ Idem. ibid.

⁶ Idem. p. 5. et Strabo, l. vii. p. 208 et 209.

⁷ Λαγγάρου . . . καὶ Φιλίππου ζώντος ἀσπάζομενος. Ἀλεξάνδρου δὲ ἄλλος ἦν, καὶ ἴδιον ἐπὶ τὸν παῖδα παρ' αὐτὸν. Arrian, p. 5.

mestic calamity, or alarmed by private danger, abandoned the design of co-operating with the enemies of Alexander. That prince thus advanced without opposition to Pellion, the principal strong-hold of the Illyrians. His army encamped on the banks of the Eordaicus. The enemy were posted on the adjacent mountains, and concealed among thick woods, purposing to attack the Macedonians by a sudden and united assault. But their courage failed them in the moment of execution. Not daring to wait the approach of the phalanx, they precipitately retreated to their city, leaving behind them the horrid vestiges of their bloody superstition, three boys, three maids, and as many black rams, which, having just sacrificed, they wanted time to remove.⁸

Mean while Glaucias, king of the Taulantii, approached with a great force⁹ to relieve Pellion, and assist his ally. Alexander had despatched Philotas to forage at the head of a strong body of cavalry. Glaucias attempted to intercept and cut off this detachment. Alexander, leaving part of his army to awe Pellion, marched to the assistance of Philotas; Clitus reinforced Glaucias; a decisive action thus seemed inevitable, if the thickness of lofty forests, and the intricacies of winding mountains, had afforded a proper scene for a general engagement. The Barbarians excelled in knowledge of the country; the Macedonians in skill and courage. The war was widely diffused, and ably supported. But the discipline of Alexander finally prevailed. By surprise, by stratagem, by the terror of his military engines, which destroyed at a distance, and by such prompt and skilful manœuvres¹⁰ as had never been before seen, on the banks of the Apsus¹¹ and Erigoné, he totally dispersed this immense cloud of Barbarians. Many were slain, and many made captive; a remnant having burnt their city, which they despaired being able to defend, sought refuge among the Taulantian mountains.¹²

Olymp. Greece, that Alexander had perished in Illyria; and as men readily believe that which their interests make them wish,¹³ this vague rumour was greedily embraced by the partisans of Grecian independence. The Athenian demagogues resumed their usual boldness; the Lacedæmonians already fancied themselves heading the revolt;¹⁴ but the first acts of rebellion were committed by the Thebans, who, having secretly recalled their exiles, treacherously¹⁵ murdered Amyntas and Timolaus, commanders of the Cadmeæ,

and prepared to expel the Macedonian garrison from that fortress.

Olymp. Alexander, when apprised of these proceedings, relinquished the cxi. 2. pursuit of the Barbarians, descended by rapid marches along the western frontier of Macedon, traversed Thessaly, entered Bœotia, and in the space of fourteen days after his receiving the first news of the rebellion, besieged and demolished Thebes. The decisive boldness of this measure has been highly extolled by historians, because nothing could have a more direct tendency to quash the seditious spirit of the Greeks, than the rapid punishment of Thebes, which at once filled the neighbouring cities with pity and terror. A spectacle of that dreadful kind was necessary, it has been said, to secure the future tranquillity of Greece and Macedon, and to enable Alexander to undertake his Persian expedition, without the danger of being interrupted by rebellions in Europe.¹⁶ But, notwithstanding this sagacious reflection, it appears that the destruction of Thebes was the effect, not of policy, but of obstinacy and accident. In approaching that unfortunate city, Alexander repeatedly halted, to allow the insurgents time to repent of their rashness. The wiser part of the Thebans proposed to embrace the opportunity of sending ambassadors to crave his pardon. But the exiles and authors of the sedition encouraged the multitude to persevere; and instead of showing remorse for their past crimes, sent forth their cavalry and light infantry, who assaulted and slew several of the Macedonian outguards.¹⁷

Exasperated by these insults, Perdiccas, commander of an advanced party, attacked the Theban wall, without waiting the orders of Alexander. A breach was speedily effected; the brigade of Perdiccas was followed by that of Amyntas, son of Andromenes; but both were so warmly received by the enemy, that Alexander saw the necessity of reinforcing them, lest they should be surrounded and cut off. The Thebans were then repelled in their turn; but soon rallying, beat back the assailants, and pursued them with disordered ranks. Alexander then seized the decisive moment of advancing with a close phalanx. His assault was irresistible. The Thebans fled amain; and such was their trepidation, that having entered their gates, they neglected to shut them against the pursuers. The Macedonians, and their Greek auxiliaries, thus rushed tumultuously into the place. A dreadful slaughter ensued. The Phocians, Orchomenians, and Platæans, rejoiced at gaining an opportunity to gratify their implacable resentment against

⁸ Arrian, p. 5.

⁹ Μὴτε πολλὰς δυνάμεις. Idem. p. 6. Neither Thrace nor Illyria were populous in those days; but as every man was a soldier, the princes of those countries often brought numerous armies into the field.

¹⁰ These are laboriously described by Arrian, p. 6. who, it must be acknowledged, appears sometimes too fond of displaying his skill in tactics.

¹¹ Otherwise called the Eordaicus.

¹² Arrian, p. 7.

¹³ Οὐ γινώσκοντες τὰ ὄντα, τὰ μάλιστα καὶ ἡδὺν ὀφείναι βικάζον. "Not knowing the truth, hope regulated their conjectures." Idem. p. 8.

¹⁴ The Lacedæmonians, says Arrian, were γυναικίς ἀπειθήκοτες, "revolted in their minds."

¹⁵ They seized them without the garrison, οὐδὲν υποπτεύσαντες πολεμίων, "suspecting no hostility."

¹⁶ Plut. Diodor. Justin. Among the moderns, Mably sur les Græcs, and the learned author of the Examen des Historiens d'Alexandre, who says, p. 46. "Alexandre devoit assurer sa domination dans la Grèce par quelque coup d'éclat, avant que de passer en Asie; la révolte de Thebes lui presenta une occasion favorable à ses vues." Yet Arrian, whose narrative was copied from the relation of eye-witnesses, expresses, thrice in the same page, the reluctance of Alexander to attack the Thebans. Ἐπιδίδους ἐπὶ τοῖς Θεβαίοις τρεῖς ἄν, ἢ μεταγυνοῦντες ἐπὶ τοῖς πικρῶς ἐγνωσμένοις περιστάσεσιν τοῦ πρὸς αὐτοῦ. And again, Ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς Θεβαίοις διὰ φιλίας ἰδεῖν μᾶλλον τὴν δὲ πινδύνου ἡδύην. And still to the same purpose, Ἀλεξάνδρος δὲ οὐδὲ ὡς τὴν πόλιν προσέβλεπεν. Arrian, p. 8.

¹⁷ Arrian, p. 8, et seq.

Thebes. The greater part of the citizens, exceeding thirty thousand in number,¹ were either put to the sword or dragged into captivity. A feeble remnant escaped to Athens. The ancient city of Cadmus was razed to the ground; but the citadel was still garrisoned by Macedonian troops, and long maintained as a convenient post for overawing the adjacent territory.

The severities exercised against Thebes were reluctantly permitted by Alexander, at the instigation of the Grecian auxiliaries.² The few acts of forbearance or mercy, which appeared in this lamentable transaction, flowed from the humanity of his own nature. By his particular orders, the house and family of Pindar were saved from the general desolation. He commanded likewise, that the sacred families should be spared, as well as those connected with Macedon by the ties of hospitality; and as he is the only great conqueror who built many more towns than he destroyed, he took care that the demolition of Thebes should be immediately followed by the restoration of Orchomenus and Plataea. Even the gloomiest events of his reign were distinguished by some flashes of light, that displayed his magnanimity. It happened in the sack of Thebes, that a band of fierce Thracians broke into the house of Timoclea, an illustrious Theban matron, the ornament of her sex. The soldiers plundered her house; their brutal commander violated her person. Having gratified his lust, he was next stimulated by avarice, and demanded her gold and silver. She conducted him to a garden, and showed him a well, into which she pretended to have thrown her most valuable treasure. With blind avidity, he stooped to grasp it, while the woman, being behind, pushed him headlong into the cistern, and covered him with stones. Timoclea was seized by the soldiers, and carried in chains to Alexander. Her firm gait, and intrepid aspect, commanded the attention of the conqueror. Having learned her crime, Alexander asked her, "Who she was, that could venture to commit so bold a deed?" "I am," replied she, "the sister of Theagenes, who fell at Chæronea, fighting against Philip in defence of Grecian freedom." Alexander admired both her action and her answer, and desired her to depart free with her children.³ While Alexander returned towards Macedon, he received many congratulatory embassies from the Greeks. Those affected most friendship in their speeches, who had most enmity in their hearts. The Athenians sent to deprecate his wrath against themselves, and to excuse their compassionate treatment of the Theban fugitives. Alexander demanded the persons of Demosthenes, Lysurgus, Hyperides, and five other orators, to whose inflammatory speeches he ascribed the seditious spirit that had recently prevailed in Athens. An assembly was immediately summoned to deliberate on this demand; and a decree unanimously passed for trying the orators accused by Alexander, and for inflicting on them such punishment as their of-

fences should appear to merit. This pretended forwardness in the Athenians to avenge his quarrel, was highly agreeable to Alexander. The artful decree, which was immediately transmitted to him, was rendered still more acceptable, by being delivered by Demades, an avowed friend to Macedon, whom the party of Demosthenes bribed with five talents to undertake this useful service.⁴ Amidst the various embassies to the king, the Spartans alone preserved a sullen, or magnanimous silence. Alexander treated them with real, or well-affected contempt; and, without deigning to require their assistance, prepared for the greatest enterprise that ever was undertaken by the Grecian confederacy.

Olymp. cxi. 1. The arrival of the army in Macedon was celebrated with all the pomp of an elegant superstition. A faithful image of the Olympic solemnity was exhibited in the ancient city of Egæ. Continual games and sacrifices were performed in Dium, during the space of nine days, in honour of the Muses. Alexander entertained at his table the ambassadors of the Grecian states, together with the principal officers of his army, whether Greeks or Macedonians. In the interval of public representations, he discoursed with his confidential friends concerning the important expedition which chiefly occupied his thoughts. Parmenio and Antipater, the most respected of his father's counsellors, exhorted him not to march into the East, until by marriage, and the birth of a son, he had provided a successor to the monarchy. But the ardent patriotism of Alexander disdained every personal consideration. He remembered that he was elected general of the Greeks, and that he commanded the invincible troops of his father.⁵

Olymp. cxi. 3. Having entrusted to Antipater the affairs of Greece and Macedon, and committed to that general an army of above twenty thousand men,⁶ to maintain domestic tranquillity in those countries, he departed early in the spring, at the head of above five thousand horse, and somewhat more than thirty thousand infantry.⁷ In twenty days march, he arrived at Sestos, on the Hellespont. From thence the army was conveyed to Asia, in a hundred and sixty galleys, and probably a still greater number of transports. The armament landed without opposition on the Asiatic coast; the Persians, though long ago apprised of the intended invasion, having totally neglected the defence of their western frontier.

The cause of this negligence resulted, in some degree perhaps, from the character of the prince, but still more from that of the nation.

⁴ The circumstances of this transaction are differently related by all the authors who mention it. Compare Diodorus, l. xvii. p. 498. Æschin. in Ctesiphont. Plut. in Vit. Alexand. et Arrian, l. i. p. 11. In military affairs Arrian's authority stands unrivalled; but Æschines, a contemporary orator, must have been better informed concerning the civil transactions of the Athenians.

⁵ Diodor. l. xvii. p. 499.

⁶ Diodorus, who enters into some detail on this subject, says, twelve thousand infantry, and eleven thousand five hundred cavalry.

⁷ Arrian, p. 12

¹ According to the lowest computation, Thebes at that time contained above thirty thousand citizens. Comp. Diodor. Plut. ibid. Ælian. Var. Hist. l. xiii. c. vii. Agathar-chid. apud Phot. Bibl. 1337.

² Diodor. l. xvii. p. 500.

³ Plat. de Vit. Alexand. p. 7.

Codemannus had been raised by assassinations and intrigues to the throne of Persia, about the same time that Alexander succeeded his father Philip. The first year of his reign had been employed in stifling domestic rebellion, in securing, and afterwards in displaying, the fruits of victory. This prince assumed the appellation of Darius, but could not recall the principles or manners which distinguished his countrymen, during the reign of the first monarch of that name. In the space of about two hundred and thirty years, the Persians had been continually degenerating from the virtues which characterize a poor and warlike nation, without acquiring any of those arts and improvements which usually attend peace and opulence. Their empire, as extended by Darius Hystaspes, still embraced the most valuable portion of Asia and Africa. The revenue paid in money was still estimated, as during the reign of that monarch, at fourteen thousand five hundred and sixty Eubœic talents. Immense treasures had been accumulated in Damascus, Arbela, Susa, Persopolis, Ecbatan, and other great cities of the empire. The revenue paid in kind cannot be appreciated; but such was the extraordinary opulence of this great monarchy, that the conquests of Alexander are supposed to have given him an income of sixty millions sterling;⁸ a sum which will admit allowance for exaggeration, and still appear sufficiently great.

Although the extravagance and vices of Susa, Babylon, and other imperial cities, corresponded to the extent and wealth of the monarchy, yet the Persians were prepared for destruction rather by their ignorance of the arts of peace and war, than by their effeminacy and luxury. The provinces, moreover, had ceased to maintain any regular communication with the capital, or with each other. The standing military force proved insufficient to keep in awe the distant satraps, or viceroys. The ties of a common religion and language, or the sense of a public interest, had never united into one system this discordant mass of nations, which was ready to crumble into pieces at the touch of an invader. When to these unfavourable circumstances we join the reflection, that under the younger Cyrus, twelve thousand Greeks baffled the arms, and almost divided the empire of Persia, we shall not find much reason to admire the magnanimity of Alexander in undertaking his eastern expedition; unless we are at the same time apprised, that Darius was deemed a brave and generous prince, beloved by his Persian subjects, and assisted by the valour of fifty thousand Greek mercenaries.⁹

Having arrived in Asia, Alexander, than whom none ever employed more successfully the power of superstition,¹⁰ confirmed the confidence of his followers by many auspicious predictions and prodigies. While, with every military precaution, he pursued his march along the coast, Arsites, Spithridates, Memnon, and other governors of the maritime provinces, assembled in the town of Zeleia, distant sixty miles from the Hellespont. They had neglected

to oppose the invasion by their superior fleet; they had allowed the enemy to encamp, unmolested, on their coasts; fear now compelled them to reluctant union; but jealousy made them reject the most reasonable plan of defence.

This was proposed by Memnon the Rhodian, the ablest general in the service of Darius. He observed the danger of resisting the Macedonian infantry, who were superior in number, and encouraged by the presence of their king. That the invaders, fiery and impetuous, were now animated by hope, but would lose courage on the first disappointment. Destitute of magazines and resources, their safety depended on sudden victory. It was the interest of the Persians, on the other hand, to protract the war, above all to avoid a general engagement. Without risking the event of a battle, they had other means to check the progress of the invaders. For this purpose, they ought to trample down the corn with their numerous cavalry, destroy all other fruits of the ground, and desolate the whole country, without sparing the towns and villages. Some rejected this advice, as unbecoming the dignity of Persia;¹¹ Arsites, governor of Lesser Phrygia, declared with indignation, that he would never permit the property of his subjects to be ravaged with impunity. These sentiments the more easily prevailed, because many suspected the motives of Memnon. It was determined, therefore, by this council of princes, to assemble their respective forces with all possible expedition, and to encamp on the eastern bank of the Granicus, a river (midway between Zeleia and the Hellespont) which, issuing from Mount Ida, falls into the Propontis.

The scouts of Alexander having brought him intelligence of the enemy's design, he immediately advanced to give them battle. The phalanx marched by its flank in a double line,¹² the cavalry on the wings, the wagons and baggage in the rear. The advanced guard, consisting of horsemen armed with pikes, and five hundred light infantry, the whole commanded by Hegelochus, were detached to examine the fords of the Granicus, and to observe the disposition of the enemy. They returned with great celerity, to acquaint Alexander, that the Persians were advantageously posted on the opposite bank, their horse amounting to twenty thousand, and their foreign mercenaries, drawn up on the slope of a rising ground, behind the cavalry, scarcely less numerous. Notwithstanding this alarming intelligence, the young prince determined to pass the river. Having advanced within sight of the hostile ranks, his horse spread to the right and left, the massy column of infantry opened, and the whole formed along the bank in order of battle. The phalanx, divided into eight sections, composed the main body, which occupied the centre; the Macedonian cavalry formed the right wing; the Grecian, the left.

¹¹ Ασεβειαν της Περσων μεγαλοψυχιας, "Unworthy the magnanimity of Persia." Diodor. p. 501.

¹² The δισπλη φάλαγγξ is explained in this sense by Ælian and Arrian. In ordinary cases the phalanx marched by its flank, that is, with a front of sixteen men. The δισπλη φάλαγγξ, therefore, contained a front of thirty-two men.

⁸ Justin. xiii. 1.

⁹ Arrian, Diodorus, and Curtius.

¹⁰ Plut. Curtius, and Arrian, passim.

While Alexander made these dispositions, the cautious Parmenio approached, and remonstrated against passing the Granicus in the face of an enemy. The river, he observed, was deep and full of eddies; its banks abrupt and craggy; "it would be impossible, therefore, to march the Macedonians in front, and if they advanced in columns, their flanks must be exposed naked and defenceless. To try such dangerous manoeuvres seemed unnecessary in the present juncture, because the Barbarians would certainly quit their station in the night, rather than remain encamped in the neighbourhood of so formidable an army." These prudential considerations prevailed not with Alexander, who declared that, in the first conflict, the Macedonians must act with equal promptitude and vigour, and perform something worthy of the terror which they bore. Saying this, he sprung on his horse, assumed the command of the right wing, and committed the left to Parmenio.

Olymp. closing with the enemy, he dis-
cxi. 3. dained to employ his military en-
A. C. 334. gines. The balistas and catapults, by which, in a similar situation, he had repelled the Taulantii, were rejected as tedious or ineffectual. Alexander distributed his orders; a dreadful silence ensued; the hostile armies beheld each other with resentment or terror. This solemn pause was interrupted by the Macedonian trumpet, which, on a signal given by Alexander, resounded from every part of the line. His brother Ptolemy, as had been previously regulated, then rode forth at the head of a squadron of cuirassiers,¹ followed by two bodies of light dragoons, and a battalion of infantry commanded by Amyntas. While these troops boldly entered the Granicus, Alexander likewise advanced with the chosen cavalry on the right wing, followed by the archers and Agrians. In passing the river, both Alexander and Ptolemy led their troops obliquely down the current, to prevent, as much as possible, the Persians from attacking them in flank, as they successively reached the shore. The Persian cavalry behaved with courage; the first squadrons of the Macedonians were driven back into the stream. But Alexander, who animated the Companions² with his voice and arm, maintained his ground on the bank, and thought he had gained the battle, when he obtained an opportunity of fighting. In the equestrian engagement which followed, the Macedonians owed much to their skilful evolutions and discipline;³ still more to their strength and courage; and not a little to the excellence of their weapons, which being made of the cornel-

tree,⁴ far surpassed the brittle javelins of the enemy.

Mean while Parmenio crossed the Granicus, at the head of the left wing, with equal success, but unequal glory, because Alexander had already proved, by his example, that the difficulty might be overcome, which would have otherwise appeared unsurmountable. The attention of the enemy was so deeply engaged by the successive attacks of the cavalry, that they seem not to have made much opposition to the passage of the phalanx. But before this powerful body of infantry had crossed the river, the Macedonian horse had already reaped the fairest honours of the field. Alexander animated them by his presence, and, after performing all the duties of a great general, displayed such personal acts of prowess as will be more readily admired than believed by the modern reader. But in the close combats of antiquity, the forces, when once thoroughly engaged, might be safely abandoned to the direction of their own resentment and courage, while the commanders displayed the peculiar accomplishments to which they had been trained from their youth, in the more conspicuous parts of the field. Alexander was easily distinguished by the brightness of his armour, and the admirable alacrity of his attendants. The bravest of the Persian nobles impatiently waited his approach. He darted into the midst of them, and fought till he broke his spear. Having demanded a new weapon from Aretes, his master of horse, Aretes showed him his own spear, which likewise was broken. Demaratus the Corinthian supplied the king with a weapon. Thus armed, he rode up, and assaulted Mithridates, son-in-law of Darius, who exulted before the hostile ranks. While Alexander beat him to the ground, he was himself struck by Ræsaces with a hatchet. His helmet saved his life. He pierced the breast of Ræsaces; but a new danger threatened him from the scimitar of Spithridates. The instrument of death already descended on his head, when Clitus cut off the arm of Spithridates, which fell with the grasped weapon.

The heroism of Alexander animated the valour of the Companions, and the enemy first fled where the king commanded in person. In the left wing, the Grecian cavalry must have behaved with distinguished merit, since the Persians had begun on every side to give way before the Macedonian infantry had completely passed the river.⁵ The stern aspect of the phalanx, shining in steel and bristling with spears, confirmed the victory. Above a thousand Persian horse were slain in the pursuit. The foot, consisting chiefly in Greek mercenaries, still continued in their first position, not firm, but inactive; petrified by astonishment, not steady through resolution.⁶ While the

¹ I have used this word to express those troops which the Greeks called Cataphracts, from the completeness of their defensive armour. Milton mentions them in *Samson Agonistes*,

"Archers and slingers, Cataphracts and spears."

² The eight squadrons of chosen cavalry, which were of that kind called Cataphracts, were honoured with the name of Companions and friends of the king. Arrian and Diodor. passim.

³ They derived great advantages, particularly from the light infantry intermixed with their squadrons. The targeteers and Agrians proved extremely useful in helping the Macedonians to keep off the Persian cavalry, which, when too near, hindered them from the proper use of their lances.

⁴ At myrtus validis hastilibus et bona bello

Cornus.

VIRG. GEORG. II. v. 447.

⁵ Guischart, p. 208. says, "Aussitôt que la phalange fut en état d'agir contre l'ennemi, avec tout son front hérissé de piques, la victoire cessa d'être douteuse." It appears not, however, that the phalanx at all acted against the Persian cavalry. The battle of Granicus was entirely an equestrian engagement, as had been prophesied to Alexander by his namesake, a priest of Minerva in the Troade. See Diodor. I. xvii. p. 571.

⁶ Επληξεν πολλόν τι του παραλογου, η λογισμα

phalanx attacked them in front, the victorious cavalry assailed their flanks. Surrounded on all sides, they fell an easy prey; two thousand surrendered prisoners; the rest all perished, unless a few stragglers perchance lurked among the slain.

The battle of the Granicus proved fatal to most of the Persian commanders. Arsites, the chief adviser of the engagement, died in despair by his own hand. The generals Niphates and Petenes, Omars leader of the mercenaries, Spithridates satrap of Lydia, Mithrobuzanes governor of Cappadocia, Mithridates, son-in-law of Darius, and Arbupales son of Artaxerxes, were numbered among the slain. Such illustrious names might lead us to suspect, that the Persians were still more numerous than Arrian⁷ represents them; and, notwithstanding the nature of ancient weapons and tactics, which rendered every battle a rout, and commonly prevented the retreat of the vanquished, it is scarcely to be believed, that in such an important engagement, Alexander should have lost only eighty-five horsemen, and thirty light infantry.⁸ Of the former, twenty-five belonged to the royal band of Companions. By command of Alexander, their statues were formed by the art of his admired Lysippus,⁹ and erected in the Macedonian city of Dium.

This important victory enabled Alexander to display both his humanity and his prudence. He declared the parents and children of the deceased thenceforth exempted from every species of tribute.¹⁰ He carefully visited the wounded, attentively asked how each of them had received harm, and heard with patience and commendation their much boasted exploits. The Persian commanders were interred; and the Greeks, both officers and soldiers. The Grecian captives were condemned to work in the Thracian mines, as a punishment for bearing arms against the cause of their country. But even this severity Alexander softened by a very seasonable compliment to the Athenians, whose city he preferred to be the repository of his trophies and renown. Immediately after the battle, he sent three hundred suits of Persian armour, as dedications to Minerva in the

citadel. This magnificent present was inscribed with the following words: "Gained by Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks (except the Lacedæmonians,) from the Barbarians of Asia." It is remarkable, that on this occasion he omits mention of the Macedonians, whether because he wished them to be comprehended under the name of Greeks; or because, in the Persian war, he always affected rather to avenge the cause of Greece, than to gratify his own ambition; or, finally, that the Greeks being thus exclusively associated to his honours, might thenceforth continue zealous in making new levies for his service.

The battle of the Granicus opened to Alexander the conquest of Ionia, Caria, Phrygia; in a word, all the Asiatic provinces west of the river Halys, which had anciently formed the powerful monarchy of the Lydians. Many of the walled towns surrendered at his approach. Sardis, the splendid capital of Cræsus, opened its gates to a deliverer, and once more obtained the privilege of being governed by its ancient laws, after reluctantly enduring, above two centuries, the cruel yoke of Persia. The Grecian cities on the coast were delivered from the burden of tribute and the oppression of garrisons; and, under the auspices of a prince, who admired their ancient glory in arts and arms, resumed the enjoyment of their hereditary freedom. During the Persian expedition of Alexander, the Ephesians were still employed in rebuilding their temple, which had been set on fire by Herostratus, twenty years before that period, and on the same night, it is said, which gave birth to the destined conqueror of the East. Alexander encouraged their pious and honourable undertaking; and, in order to accelerate its progress, commanded the tribute which had been paid to the Persians, to be appropriated to the temple of Diana.¹¹

Miletus and Halicarnassus alone retarded the progress of the conqueror. The latter place, commanded by Memnon the Rhodian, made a memorable defence. Alexander had scarcely set down before it, when the garrison, consisting of Greeks and Persians, sallied forth, and maintained a desperate conflict. Having repelled them with much difficulty, he undertook the laborious work of filling up a ditch thirty cubits broad, and fifteen deep, which the besieged, with incredible diligence, had drawn round their wall. This being effected, he advanced wooden towers, on which the Macedonians erected their battering engines, and prepared to assault the enemy on equal ground. But a nocturnal sally attacked these preparations; a second engagement was fought with still greater fury than the first; three hundred Macedonians were wounded, darkness preventing their usual precaution in guarding their bodies.¹²

A few days afterwards, Halicarnassus, which had so obstinately resisted skill and courage, was on the point of yielding to rashness and accident. The battalion of Perdiccas happened to be posted on that side of the wall, which looked towards Miletus. Two soldiers, belong-

ΒΙΣΧΙΩΣ. Arrian. It might be suspected that the Greek mercenaries were not very hearty in the Persian cause, and had delayed declaring themselves till they beheld the issue of the equestrian engagement. This is conjectured by Guischardt in his admirable *Memoires Militaires*, p. 208. But the fidelity of their countrymen to Darius on all subsequent occasions, as well as the severe treatment they met with in the present battle, seem sufficient to remove that dishonourable suspicion. Their conduct, seemingly unaccountable, is ascribed, by Arrian, to their astonishment, that Alexander's cavalry should have passed the Granicus, and repelled the Persian horse, which was four times more numerous.

7 Diodorus. l. xvii. p. 572, makes them amount to one hundred and ten thousand. Justin is quite extravagant. The Persians, he says, were six hundred thousand.

8 Others diminished the loss to thirty-five horsemen and nine foot soldiers. Aristobul. apud Plut. in Vit. Alexand.

9 Arrian says, *ὁππῶς καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου μόνος προεβίβησεν ποιεῖν*. "Who was alone preferred to make the image of Alexander." This, doubtless, increased the honour conferred on the Companions. Arrian would have spoken more accurately, had he said, "to cast the figure of Alexander in bronze." Other artists represented him in marble, in gems, medals, &c. of which hereafter.

10 Arrian distinguishes τὴν ἑωμὴν λίστευσιν; καὶ κατὰ τὰς κτήσεις εὐφορίας, personal services; and contributions, in proportion to their property.

11 Comp. Arrian. p. 18. et Strab. p. 949

12 Arrian, p. 20.

ing to this corps, while they supped together in their tent, boasted their military exploits; each, as usual, preferring his own. Wine heated their emulation. They rushed forth to assault the wall of Halicarnassus, animated less with the mad hope of victory, than with an ambition to display their respective prowess. The sentinels perceived their audacity, and prepared to repel them, but they killed the first men who approached, and threw javelins at others who followed them. Before their boldness was overwhelmed by numbers, many soldiers belonging to the same battalion advanced to their relief. The Halicarnassians, also, hastened to the defence of their friends; a sharp conflict ensued; the garrison was repelled; the wall attacked; two towers and the intervening curtain thrown down; and had greater numbers joined in the assault, the town must have been taken by storm.¹

Olymp. The humanity of Alexander rendered him unwilling to come to
cxi. 3. that extremity. But the extraordinary
A. C. 334. success of such an unpremeditated enterprise, engaged him to ply the walls with new vigour. The defence was as obstinate as before; two desperate sallies were made, and repelled with consummate bravery. Alexander's tenderness for the Halicarnassians prevented him from entering the place with an enraged and licentious soldiery. He therefore recalled his troops in the moment of victory, hoping that the besieged would finally surrender, and thus save their lives and properties. From the various breaches in the walls, and the numbers who had perished, or been wounded, in repeated conflicts, Memnon and his colleagues perceived, that much longer resistance was impossible. In this emergency they displayed the same decisive boldness which had appeared in every part of their defence. Having summoned the bravest of their adherents, they, in the night-time, set fire to a wooden tower, which they had erected for defence against the shocks of the enemy's engines, and for protection to their arsenal and magazines, and escaped to two neighbouring castles of great strength. About midnight, Alexander perceived the raging flames, and immediately sent a detachment to punish those who had excited, or who fomented, the conflagration; but with strict orders to spare such of the townsmen as were found in their houses. Next day, he examined the castles, and perceived that they could not be taken without much loss of time; but that independent of the town, they were of themselves of little value; a circumstance which obliged him, reluctantly, to demolish Halicarnassus, that it might never thenceforth serve as a retreat to his enemies.²

The inactive season of the year was employed by Alexander in securing and improving his advantages. The inferior cities were committed to the discretion of his lieutenants; the king in person visited his more important conquests; and few places were honoured with his presence without experiencing his bounty. Before leaving Caria, where the siege of Halicar-

nassus long detained his impatient activity, he committed the administration to Ada, the hereditary governess of that province. Ada was the sister, and the wife of Hidrieus, on whose decease she was entitled to reign, both by the Carian laws and those of Upper Asia, where female succession had been established ever since the age of Semiramis. But the great king, with the usual caprice of a despot, had rejected the just claim of Ada, and seated a pretender on her tributary throne. The injured princess, however, still maintained possession of the strongly fortified city Alinda. When Alexander appeared in Caria, Ada hastened to meet him, addressed him by the name of son, and voluntarily surrendered to him Alinda. The king neither rejected her present, nor declined her friendship; and, as he always repaid favours with interest, he committed to her, at his departure, the government of the whole province, and left a body of three thousand foot and two hundred horse, to support her authority.

The measures of Alexander were equally decisive and prudent. The Persian fleet, supplied by Egypt, Phœnicia, and the maritime provinces of Lower Asia, four times outnumbered his own, which, small as it was, still appeared too expensive for his treasury. Alexander determined to discharge it, declaring to his lieutenants, that by conquering the land, he would render himself master of the sea, since every harbour that surrendered to him must diminish the naval resources of the enemy.³ Agreeably to this judicious plan of conquest, he pursued his journey through the southern provinces of the Asiatic peninsula, while Parmenio traversed the central countries of Lydia and Phrygia. At the same time Cleander was despatched into Greece to raise new levies; and such soldiers as had married shortly before the expedition, were sent home to winter with their wives; a measure which extremely endeared Alexander to the army, and ensured the utmost alacrity of his European subjects, in furnishing supplies towards the ensuing campaign.

Accompanied by such winning arts, the valour and prudence of Alexander seemed worthy to govern the world. His conduct, perhaps, often proceeded from the immediate impulse of sentiment; but it could not have been more subservient to his ambition, had it been invariably directed by the deepest policy. After the decisive battle of the Granicus, he experienced little obstinacy of resistance from the numerous forts and garrisons in Lower Asia. The tributary princes and satraps readily submitted to a milder and more magnanimous master; and the Grecian colonies on the coast eagerly espoused the interest of a prince who, on all occasions, avowed his partiality for their favourite institutions. In every province or city which he conquered, he restored to the Asiatics their hereditary laws; to the Greeks, their beloved democracy. While he allowed them to

¹ Arrian, p. 23.

² Ibid. p. 23.

³ It will appear in the sequel how faithfully Alexander adhered to this plan of war, which kept open his communication with Greece and Macedon, and enabled him to pursue, with security his conquests in the East.

assume the forms of independent government, he was careful to bridle the animosity of domestic faction. Into whatever country he marched, he encouraged useful industry, and alleviated public burdens. His taste and his piety alike prompted him to repair the sacred and venerable remains of antiquity. He considered the Barbarians, not as slaves, but as subjects; the Greeks, not as subjects, but allies; and both perceived in his government such moderation and equity as they had never experienced either from the despotism of Persia, or from the domineering ambition of Athens and Sparta.⁴

Having received the submission of Xanthus, Patara, Phaselis, and above thirty other towns or sea-ports in Lycia, Alexander, probably for the sake of greater expedition, divided the corps under his immediate command. A considerable detachment traversed the Lycian and Pamphylian mountains, while the king in person pursued the still more dangerous track, leading along the sea-coast from Phaselis to Perga. On this foaming shore, the sea commonly beats against the rocks, and renders the passage impracticable, unless when the waves are repelled by a strong north wind. When Alexander began his march, the wind blew from the south. Yet he advanced without fear, confiding in his fortune. His troops cheerfully followed him, encouraged by many artful prodigies⁵ which announced success to his undertaking. The event which next happened, was well fitted to strengthen their credulity, and confirm their implicit obedience. Before they had reached the main difficulties of the pass, the south wind gradually ceased; a brisk gale sprang up from the north; the sea retired; and their march thus became alike easy and expeditious. The authentic evidence of Arrian explains the marvellous in this occurrence, which Josephus, with no less indecency than folly, compares with the passage of the Israelites over the Red Sea. Yet even the philosophical Arrian acknowledges, that the many concurring instances of good fortune in the life of Alexander, seemed to be produced by the immediate interposition of divine power, which, in effecting an important revolution in the Eastern world, rendered the operations of nature, and the volitions of men, subservient to the secret purposes of its providence.

In proceeding eastward from Perga, Alexander was met by ambassadors from Aspendus, the principal city and sea-port of Pamphylia. The Aspendians offered to surrender their city,

but entreated, that they might not be burdened with a garrison. Alexander granted their request, on condition of their raising fifty talents to pay his soldiers, and delivering to him the horses which they reared as a tribute for Darius. The ambassadors accepted these terms; but their countrymen, who were distinguished by their ambition and rapacity, still more than by their commerce and their wealth, discovered no inclination to fulfil them. Alexander was informed of their treachery while he examined the walls of Syllius, another strong hold of Pamphylia. He immediately marched towards Aspendus, the greater part of which was situate on a high and steep rock, washed by the river Eurymedon. Several streets, however, were likewise built on the plain, surrounded only by a slight wall. At the approach of Alexander, the inhabitants of the lower part of the town ascended the mountain. Alexander entered the place, and encamped within the walls. The Aspendians, alarmed by the apprehension of a siege, entreated him to accept the former conditions. He commanded them to deliver the horses, as agreed on; to pay, instead of fifty, a hundred talents; and to surrender their principal citizens as securities, that they would thenceforth obey the governor set over them; pay an annual tribute to Macedon; and submit to arbitration a dispute concerning some lands, which they were accused of having unjustly wrested from their neighbours.⁶

Olymp.

cxl. 4.

A. C. 333.

Having chastised the insolence and treachery of Aspendus, Alexander determined to march into Phrygia, that he might join forces with Parmenio, whom he had commanded to meet him in that country. The new levies from Greece and Macedon were likewise ordered to assemble in the same province; from which it was intended, early in the spring, to proceed eastward, and achieve still more important conquests. To reach the southern frontier of Phrygia, Alexander was under a necessity of traversing the inhospitable mountains of the warlike Pisidians. Amidst those rocks and fastnesses, the Macedonians lost several brave men; but the undisciplined fury, and unarmed courage, of the Pisidians were unable to check the progress of Alexander. The city of Gordium in Phrygia, was appointed for the general rendezvous. This place is distant about seventy-five miles from the Euxine, and two hundred and forty from the Cilician sea; and was famous, in remote antiquity, as the principal residence of the Phrygian kings, and the chief seat of their opulence and grandeur.⁷ Alexander had not long arrived in that place, when a desire seized him of ascending to the ancient castle or palace of Gordius, and of beholding the famous knot on his chariot, which was believed to involve the fate of Asia. Gordius, as the story went, was a man of slender fortune among the ancient Phrygians, who had but a small piece of land, and two yokes of oxen, one of which he employed in the plough, and the other in the wagon. It happened to Gordius, while he was one day ploughing, that

⁴ Compare Plut. in Alexand. Curtius et Arrian, passim; et Thucyd. Xenoph. Isocrat. et Diodor.

⁵ While Alexander deliberated whether he should march forwards to attack Darius, a measure which promised glory and plunder to his troops, or proceed along the sea-coast, and reduce the maritime cities, which would prevent the enemy from profiting of his absence in Upper Asia, to conquer Greece or Macedon with their fleet, a fountain near the city Xanthus in Lycia, boiled up, and threw out a copper-plate, engraved with ancient characters, signifying that the time was come when the Persian empire should be overthrown by the Greeks. Plutarch adds, *τοὺς τοὺς παραλαβόντες, πείσθησαν τὴν σφαλερὰν ἀνακλινέσθαι*. "Encouraged by this prodigy, he hastened to subdue the coast." It would perhaps have been more worthy of an historian to say, "Encouraged by this prodigy, the Greeks and Macedonians readily obeyed the commands of their prudent not less than valiant general."

⁶ Arrian, p. 26.

⁷ See c. vii. p. 81.

an eagle alighted on his yoke, and sat on it till evening. Alarmed by the prodigy, Gordius had recourse to the Telmessians, a people inhabiting the loftiest mountains¹ in Pisidia, and celebrated over all the neighbouring countries for their skill in augury. At the first village of the Telmessians, he met a virgin drawing water at a fountain, to whom having communicated his errand, she ordered him to ascend the hill, and there sacrifice to Jupiter. Gordius entreated her to accompany him, that the sacrifice might be performed in due form. She obeyed. Gordius took her to wife. She bore him a son, Midas, who, when he arrived at manhood, was distinguished by his beauty and valour. It should seem that the father of Midas had, in consequence of his marriage, settled among the Telmessians, with whose arts his son would naturally become acquainted. The Phrygians, at that time, were harassed by cruel seditions; they consulted an oracle, who told them, that a chariot should soon bring them a king, who would appease their tumults. While the assembly still deliberated on the answer given them by the oracle, Midas arrived in his chariot² accompanied by his parents. The appearance of Midas justified the prediction, and announced him worthy of royalty. The Phrygians elected him king; their seditions ceased; and Midas, in gratitude to Jupiter, consecrated his father's chariot, and suspended it by a cord made of the inner rind of the cornel-tree, the knot of which was so nicely tied, that no eye could perceive where it began or ended. Whether Alexander untied, or cut the knot, is left uncertain by historians;³ but all agree that his followers retired with complete conviction that he had fulfilled the oracle. A seasonable storm of thunder confirmed their credulity;⁴ and the belief, that their master was destined to be lord of Asia, could not fail to facilitate that event.

The rapid progress of Alexander, and his continual exertions during that season of the year when armies are little accustomed to keep the field, tends to heighten our surprise at the inactivity of Darius, an ambitious prince, who had signalized his valour against the fiercest nations of Asia. But Darius, corrupted by the honours of royalty, employed very different weapons against Alexander, from those by which the champion of Ochus had defeated the warlike chief of the Cardusians.⁵ Instead of opposing the invader in the field, he hoped to destroy him by the arm of an assassin. Many

traitors were suborned for this infamous purpose, but none with greater prospect of success than Alexander, the son of Æropus. This man owed his life to the clemency of the son of Philip, when his brothers Heromenes and Arrabæus were condemned as accessory to the murder of that prince. He was numbered among the companions of Alexander, and had recently been entrusted with the command of the Thesalian cavalry, after the nomination of Calas, who held that high office, to the government of Phrygia. The promise of ten thousand talents, and of the kingdom of Macedon, obliterated his gratitude and seduced his allegiance. But his treason escaped not the vigilance of Parmenio,⁶ who communicated the intelligence to his master, while encamped in the neighbourhood of Phaselis. By the same faithful minister, the unworthy son of Æropus was seized and committed to safe custody.

Darius, without desisting from his intrigues, finally had recourse to arms. His troops were assembled in the plains of Babylon. They consisted of a hundred thousand Persians, of whom thirty thousand were cavalry. The Medes supplied almost half that number, and the Armenians almost as many as the Medes. The Barcani, the Hyrcanians, the inhabitants of the Caspian shores, and nations more obscure or more remote, sent their due proportion of cavalry and infantry for this immense army, which, including thirty thousand Greek mercenaries in the Persian service, is said to have amounted to six hundred thousand men. The magnificence of the Persians had not diminished since the days of Xerxes; neither had their military knowledge increased. Their muster was taken by the same contrivance employed by that monarch.⁷ Ten thousand men were separated from the rest, formed into a compact body, and surrounded by a palisade. The whole army passing successively into this inclosure, were rather measured than numbered by their generals. Nothing could exceed the splendour that surrounded Darius; the trappings of his horses, the rich materials and nice adjustment of his chariot, the profusion of jewels which covered his royal mantle, vest, and tiara. The dress, and even the armour of his guards, were adorned with gold, silver and precious stones. He was attended by his family, his treasures, and his concubines, all escorted by numerous bands of horse and foot. His courtiers and generals copied, as usual, too faithfully, the effeminate manners of their master.⁸

¹ Arrian. p. 27, calls it *ὕψιστον, καὶ παντοῦ*. "Exceedingly high and every where abrupt." But in Gordius's time at least, the Telmessians must have possessed some villages on the plain. See Arrian, p. 30.

² The Greek word *μαζα* expresses either a chariot or a wagon. Perhaps neither the name, nor the thing, were then distinguished in Phrygia. Curtius tells us, this *μαζα* was "cultu haud sene a vilioribus vulgatisque usu abhorrens," l. iii. c. i. p. 10.

³ Curtius l. iii. c. i. says, he cut it with his sword. Plutarch says he untied it. Vit. Alexand. p. 1236. Arrian gives both accounts; and the latter on the authority of Aristobulus, which is therefore the more probable.

⁴ Arrian. p. 31.

⁵ Darius killed a warrior of that nation who challenged the bravest of the Persians to single combat. This exploit gained him the government of Armenia, and made him be afterwards deemed worthy of the Persian throne. Diodor. l. xvii. p. 565.

⁶ According to Arrian, p. 25, a swallow shared the honour with Parmenio. While Alexander was asleep at mid-day, the swallow hovered around his head, perching sometimes on one side of his couch, and sometimes on another. Its incessant chattering roused the king from sleep: but being exceedingly fatigued, he gently removed the bird with his hand. Instead of endeavouring to escape, the swallow perched on his head, and ceased not being extremely noisy and troublesome, till he thoroughly awoke. The prodigy was immediately communicated to Aristander the Telmessian soothsayer, who declared that a conspiracy was formed against the king by one of his domestics and friends; but that it would certainly be discovered, because the swallow is a domestic bird, a friend to man, and exceedingly loquacious.

⁷ See c. ix. p. 113, et seq.

⁸ Propinquorum, amicorumque, conjuges huic agmini proxime. Q. Curtius, l. iii. c. iii. et Diodor. l. xvii. p. 566.

While this pageant, for it deserves not the name of army, slowly advanced towards Lower Asia, Alexander left Gordium, and marched to Ancyra, a city of Galatia. In that place, he received an embassy from the Paphlagonians, who surrendered to him the sovereignty of their province, but entreated that his army might not enter their borders. He granted their request, and commanded them to obey Calas, satrap of Phrygia. Alexander then marched victorious through Cappadocia; and Sabictas being appointed to the administration of that extensive province, the army encamped at the distance of six miles from the Cilician frontier, at a place which, since the memorable expedition performed and described by Zenophon, retained the name of Cyrus's Camp. Towards the south, the rich plain of Cilicia is washed by the sea, and surrounded on three sides by lofty and almost impervious mountains. Arsames, governor of that country, had sent a body of troops to guard a post called the Gates, and the only pass which leads from Cappadocia into Cilicia. Apprised of this measure, Alexander left Parmenio and the heavy-armed troops in the Camp of Cyrus. At the first watch of the night, he led the targeteers, archers, and Agrians, to surprise the Persian forces stationed at the northern Gate of Cilicia. The Barbarians fled on his approach; and the pusillanimous Arsames, to whom the whole province was entrusted by Darius, prepared to plunder, and then abandon, his own capital of Tarsus. But he had only time to save his person. The rapidity of Alexander prevented the destruction of that city, where the inhabitants received him as their deliverer.

At Tarsus, Alexander was detained by a malady, occasioned by excessive fatigue; or, as others say, by imprudently bathing, when heated, in the cold waters of the Cydnus, which flows through that city, in a clear and rocky channel.⁹ Philip the Acarnanian was the only person who despaired not of his life. While this skilful physician administered a draught to his royal patient, a letter came from Parmenio, warning Alexander to beware of Philip, who had been bribed by Darius to poison him. Alexander took the potion, and gave Philip the letter; so that the physician read, while the king drank; a transaction which proved either his contempt of death, or his unshaken confidence in his friends; but which, by the admiration of his contemporaries and posterity,¹⁰ has been construed into a proof of both.

The sickness of Alexander interrupted not the operations of the army. Parmenio was despatched to seize the only pass on Mount Amanus, which divides Cilicia from Assyria. The king soon followed, having in one day's march reached Anchialos, an ancient city of vast extent, and surrounded with walls of prodigious thickness. The greatest curiosity of Anchialos was the tomb of Sardanapalus, distinguished

by the statue of that effeminate tyrant, in the attitude of clapping his hands; and by an Assyrian inscription, breathing the true spirit of modern Epicurism. The original ran in verse to the following purpose: "Sardanapalus, son of Anacyndaraxas, built Anchialos and Tarsus in one day. As to you, stranger! eat, drink, and sport,¹¹ for other human things are not worth *this*," alluding to the clap of his hands.¹²

Having arrived at Mallos, an Argive colony at the eastern extremity of Cilicia, Alexander learned that Darius lay with his army in the extensive plain of Sochos, in the province of Comagene, distant only two days' march from the Cilician frontier. The hostile armies were separated by the mountains which divide Cilicia and Syria. Alexander hastened to pass the straits called the Syrian Gates, proceeded southwards along the bay of Issus, and encamped before the city Mariandrus. At this place he received a very extraordinary piece of intelligence. His delay in Cilicia, which had been occasioned by sickness, and by the many pious ceremonies¹³ with which he gratefully thanked Heaven for his recovery, was ascribed to very different motives by Darius and his flatterers. That perfidious race, the eternal bane of kings,¹⁴ easily persuaded the vain credulity of their master, that Alexander shunned his approach. The proud resentment of Darius was exasperated by the imagined fears of his adversary; with the impatience of a despot he longed to come to action; and not suspecting that Alexander would traverse the Syrian Gates in search of the enemy, he hastily determined to pass, in an opposite direction,¹⁵ the straits of Amanus, in quest of Alexander. This fatal measure was carried into immediate execution, notwithstanding the strong representations of Amyntas¹⁶ the Macedonian, and of all Darius's Grecian counsellors,¹⁷ who unanimously exhorted him to wait the enemy in his present advantageous position. In the language of antiquity,¹⁸ an irresistible fate, which had determined that the Greeks should conquer the Persians, as the Persians had the Medes, and the Medes the Assyrians, impelled Darius to his ruin. Having passed the defiles of Amanus, he directed his march southward to the bay of Issus, and took the city of that name, which contained, under a feeble guard, the sick and wounded Macedonians, who had not been able

11 The word translated "sport," is *παίζω* in Arrian, p. 32. But that author says, the Assyrian original had a more lascivious meaning. Plut. Orat. ii. de Fortun. Alexand. translates it, *ἀποδιδέσθαι*, "veneri indulge."

12 Mr. de Guignes, so deservedly celebrated for his Oriental learning, proves this inscription to be entirely conformable to the style and manners of the East. See Mem. de l'Acad. des Inscript. tom. xxxiv. p. 416, et seq.

13 Processions with lighted torches, sacrifices to Æsculapius, gymnastic and musical contests. Arrian, l. ii. p. 33.

14 Arrian expresses this sentiment with more than his usual energy: *Τὸν κατὰ ἡδονὴν ζυγόντων τὴ καὶ ζυγιστομένων ἐπὶ κακῷ τοῖς πρὸς βασιλεῦσι.*

15 These movements are explained only by Arrian. Diodorus, Plutarch, and Curtius, not attending to the geography of the country, are inconsistent and unintelligible.

16 Amyntas, though an exile, was not a flatterer. He assured Darius, that Alexander would certainly come to any place where the Persians encamped. Arrian, p. 34.

17 Aristomenes the Phrygian, Bianor the Arcanian, Thymonas the son of Mentor, the Rhodian, and others mentioned by Arrian, *passim*.

18 Arrian, Plut. Diodor. Curt.

9 Curtius gives another reason for its excessive coldness: "Frigidissimus quippe multa riparum amenitate inumbratus," l. iii. c. iv. From his laboured description of this river, it seems as if he imagined that water must have possessed very extraordinary qualities, which proved hurtful to Alexander.

10 See Arrian, p. 33. Curtius, l. iii. c. v.

to follow the army in its expeditious march across the mountains. The Persians put these unhappy men to death with shocking circumstances of cruelty,¹ little thinking that Alexander was now behind, prepared to avenge their fate.

That enlightened prince, who could scarcely believe the folly of Darius, sent a small flat-bottomed vessel to reconnoitre his motions. This vessel speedily returned to Alexander, and saluted him with the agreeable news that his enemies were now in his hands. Having summoned an assembly, the king forgot none of those topics of encouragement which the occasion so naturally suggested, since the meanest Macedonian soldier could discern the injudicious movements of the Persians, who had quitted a spacious plain, to entangle themselves among intricate mountains, where their numerous cavalry, in which they chiefly excelled, could perform no essential service. In preparing for this important contest, the spirits of the Macedonians were elevated by a recollection of many fortunate occurrences. Ptolemy, as they had recently learned, had made himself master of the strong fortresses in Caria. The brave Memnon indeed had escaped; but that able commander, who, to pave the way for invading Macedon, had attacked the Grecian isles with his fleet, was since dead; and his successors in command, after irritating the islanders by their insolence and oppression, were defeated in all their designs by the vigilance of Antipater. The army of Alexander had lately increased by many voluntary accessions of the Asiatics, who admired his courage, mildness, and uninterrupted good fortune; and the soldiers, who the preceding year had been sent to winter in Europe, had not only rejoined the camp, but brought with them numerous levies from Greece, Macedon, and all the adjoining countries. By men thus disposed to indulge the most sanguine hopes, the military harangue of their prince was received with a joyous ardour. They embraced each other; they embraced their admired commander; and his countenance confirming their alacrity, they entered to be led to battle.²

Alexander commanded them first to refresh their bodies: but immediately despatched some horse and archers to clear the road to Issus. In the evening he followed with his whole army, and about midnight took possession of the Syrian straits. The soldiers were then allowed a short repose, sufficient guards being posted on the surrounding eminences. At dawn, the army was in motion, marching by its flank while the passage continued narrow; and new columns being successively brought up, as the mountains gradually opened. Before reaching the river Pinarus, on the opposite bank of which the enemy were encamped, the Macedonians had formed in order of battle; Alexander leading the right wing, and the left being commanded by Parmenio. They continued to advance, till their right was flanked by a mountain, and their left by the sea, from which Par-

menio was ordered not to recede. Darius being apprised of the enemy's approach, detached a body of fifty thousand cavalry and light infantry across the Pinarus, that the remainder might have room to form without confusion. His Greek mercenaries, amounting to thirty thousand, he posted directly opposite to the Macedonian phalanx. The Greeks were flanked on both sides by double that number of Barbarians, also heavy armed. The nature of the ground admitted not more troops to be ranged in front; but as the mountain on Alexander's left, sloped inwards, Darius placed on that sinuosity twenty thousand men, who could see the enemy's rear, though it appears not that they could advance against them. Behind the first line the rest of the Barbarians were ranged, according to their various nations, in close and unserviceable ranks: Darius being every where encumbered by the vastness of a machine, which he had not skill to wield.³

His pusillanimity was more fatal than his ignorance. When he perceived the Macedonians advancing, he commanded his men to maintain their post on the Pinarus, the bank of which was in some places high and steep; where the access seemed easier, he gave orders to raise a rampart; precautions which showed the enemy, that even before the battle began, the mind of Darius was already conquered.⁴ Alexander, mean while, rode along the ranks, exhorting, by name, not only the commanders of the several brigades, but the tribunes and inferior officers, and even such captains of the auxiliaries as were distinguished by rank, or ennobled by merit. Perceiving it necessary to moderate the martial ardour that prevailed, he commanded his forces to advance with a regular and slow step, lest the phalanx should fluctuate through too eager a contention. Their motion quickened as they proceeded within reach of the enemy's darts. Alexander, with those around him, then sprung into the river. Their impetuosity frightened the Barbarians, who scarcely waited the first shock.⁵ But the Greek mercenaries, perceiving that by the rapidity and success of Alexander's assault, the Macedonians were bent towards the right wing, which was separated from the centre, seized the decisive moment of rushing into the interval, where the phalanx was disjointed. A fierce engagement ensued, the Greeks eager to regain the honour of their name, the Macedonians ambitious to maintain the unsullied glory of the phalanx. This desperate action proved fatal to Ptolemy the son of Seleucus, and other officers of distinction, to the number of a hundred and twenty. Mean while, the Macedonian right wing having repelled the enemy with great

³ Arrian, p. 36.

⁴ Καὶ ταύτην οὐδὺς δηλὺς ἔγνωτο τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου τῇ γυνάμει δειδουλωμένοις. "And thence he immediately appeared to those about Alexander to be already enslaved in his mind." In those times, slavery was the natural consequence of being conquered in battle.

⁵ They did, however, wait it; for Arrian says, οὐδὺς γὰρ ὡς ἐν χερσὶ μάχῃ ἔγνωτο. The "μάχῃ ἐν χερσὶ ἔγνωτο;" when the darts and javelins ceased, and the contending parties came to the use of manual, instead of missile, weapons.

¹ Χαλκίππος ἀνέκδοτος ἀποκτείνει, Arrian, p. 34. It is remarkable, that he ascribes this ferocity to Darius himself.

² Arrian, p. 33—36.

slaughter, wheeled to the left, and, animated by recent victory, finally prevailed against the obstinacy of the Greeks. A body of Persian horse still maintained the battle against the Thessalian cavalry; nor did they quit the field, till informed that Darius had betaken himself to flight.⁶

The overthrow of the Persians was now manifest on all sides. Their cavalry and infantry suffered equally in the rout; for their horsemen were heavy-armed, and encumbered by the narrowness of the roads, and their own terror. Ptolemy, the son of Lagus,⁷ says, that the pursuers filled up the ditches with dead bodies. The number of the slain was computed at a hundred and ten thousand, among whom were many satraps and nobles.

The great king had discovered little obstinacy in defending the important objects at stake. His left wing was no sooner repelled by Alexander, than he drove away in his chariot, accompanied by his courtiers. When the road grew rough and mountainous, he continued his flight on horseback, leaving his shield, his mantle, and his bow, which were found by the Macedonians. Alexander, who had received a troublesome wound on the thigh,⁸ judged it improper to pursue him, till the Greek mercenaries were dispersed; and the approach of night facilitated his escape.

The Persian camp afforded abundant proof of Asiatic luxury and opulence.⁹ It contained however in money but three thousand talents; the magnificent treasures, which accompanied the great king, being deposited, previous to the battle, in the neighbouring city of Damascus. This inestimable booty was afterwards seized by order of Alexander, who found in the camp a booty more precious, the wife and daughters of Darius, his mother Sysigambis, and his infant son. In an age when prisoners of war were synonymous with slaves, Alexander behaved to his royal captives with the tenderness of a parent, blended with the respect of a son.

⁶ Arrian. l. ii. p. 36, et seq.

⁷ Idem, *ibid.*

⁸ Chares, cited by Plutarch, says, that Alexander received this wound from the hand of Darius; but the silence of Alexander's letter to Antipater, in which he gave an account of the battle, and of his wound on the thigh, refutes that improbable assertion.

⁹ Among other things of value in the tent of Darius, was found a casket of exquisite workmanship, adorned with jewels. It was employed to hold Darius's perfumes.—Alexander said, "I use no perfumes, but shall put into it something more precious." This was the *Iliad* of Homer, corrected by Aristotle, and often mentioned by ancient writers; *ἡ ἐκ τοῦ ναβάρου*, "the *Iliad* of the casket." Strabo, l. xiii. p. 868. Plut. in Alexand.

In his chaste attention to Statira, the fairest beauty of the East, his conduct forms a remarkable contrast with that of his admired Achilles, whom he equalled in valour, but far surpassed in humanity. These illustrious princesses bore their own misfortunes with patience, but burst into dreadful lamentations, when informed by a eunuch that he had seen the mantle of Darius in the hands of a Macedonian soldier. Alexander sent to assure them that Darius yet lived; and next day visited them in person, accompanied by Hephestion, the most affectionate of his friends.¹⁰ Sysigambis approached to prostrate¹¹ herself before the conqueror, according to the custom of the East; but not knowing the king, as their dress was alike, she turned to Hephestion. Hephestion suddenly stepping back, Sysigambis saw her mistake, and was covered with confusion. "You mistook not, madam!" said the king, "Hephestion is likewise Alexander."¹²

The virtues of Alexander long continued to expand with his prosperity; but he was never more inimitably great, than after the battle of Issus. The city of Soli, in Cilicia, though inhabited by a Grecian colony, had discovered uncommon zeal in the cause of Darius. To punish this unnatural apostacy from Greece, Alexander demanded a heavy contribution from Soli; but, after the victory, he remitted this fine. Impelled by the same generous magnanimity, he released the Athenian captives taken at the battle of the Granicus; a favour which he had sternly refused, in the dawn of his fortune. In Damascus, several Grecian ambassadors were found among the captives. Alexander ordered them to be brought into his presence. Thessaliscus and Dionysodorus, the Thebans, he instantly declared free, observing, that the misfortunes of their country justly entitled the Thebans to apply to Darius, and to every prince from whom they might derive relief. Iphicrates, the Athenian, he treated with the respect which appeared due both to his country and to his father. Euthycles the Spartan, alone, he detained in safe custody, because Sparta sullenly rejected the friendship of Macedon. But as his forgiveness still increased with his power,¹³ he afterwards released Euthycles.

⁹ Alexander, with his usual discernment, characterized the affection of Hephestion: "Craterus loves the prince; Hephestion loves Alexander." Plut. in Alexand.

¹¹ *ἑστύχθη* καὶ *προσκύνησεν*. Arrian, ii. p. 32.

¹² Curtius, l. iii. c. xii. Arrian, p. 39.

¹³ Arrian, p. 42.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Siege of Tyre—Desperate Resistance of Gaza—Easy Conquest of Egypt—Foundation of Alexandria—Alexander visits the temple of Jupiter Ammon—Marches into Assyria—Battle of Gaugamela—Darius betrayed and slain—Alexander pursues the Murderers of Darius—Bactrian and Scythian War—Siege of the Sogdian Fortress—Surrender of Chorienes—Commotions in Greece—Checked by Antipater—The Cause of Ctesiphon and Demosthenes—Æschines banished—State of Greece during Alexander's Reign.

IN his precipitate flight across the ridges of Amanas, Darius was gradually joined by about four thousand men, chiefly Greeks. Under this feeble escort, he departed hastily from Sochos, pursued his march eastward, and crossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus, eager to interpose that deep and rapid stream between himself and the conqueror.¹ Alexander's inclination to seize the person of his adversary could not divert him from the judicious plan of war, to which he immoveably adhered. In a council of his friends, he declared his opinion, that it would be highly imprudent to attempt the conquest of Babylon, until he had thoroughly subdued the maritime provinces; because, should he be carried by an unseasonable celerity into Upper Asia, while the enemy commanded the sea, the war might be removed to Europe, where the Lacedæmopians were open enemies, and the Athenians doubtful friends. Having appointed governors of Cilicia and Cœlo-Syria, he therefore directed his march southward along the Phœnician coast. Aradus, Marathus, and Sidon,² readily opened their gates. The Tyrians sent a submissive embassy of their most illustrious citizens, among whom was the son of Azelmicum, their king, who had himself embarked with Autophradates in the Persian fleet. They humbly informed Alexander, that the community³ from which they came was prepared to obey his commands. Having complimented the city and the ambassadors, he desired them to acquaint their countrymen, that he intended shortly to enter Tyre, and to perform sacrifice there to Hercules.⁴

Upon this alarming intelligence, the Tyrians discovered equal firmness and prudence. A second embassy assured Alexander of their unalterable respect, but at the same time communicated to him their determined resolution, that neither the Persians nor the Macedonians should ever enter their walls. This boldness appears remarkable in a nation of merchants, long un-

accustomed to war.⁵ But the resources of their wealth and commerce seem to have elevated the courage, instead of softening the character, of the Tyreans. Their city, which, in the language of the East, was styled the eldest daughter of Sidon,⁶ had long reigned queen of the sea. The purple shell-fish, which is found in great abundance on their coast,⁷ early gave them possession of that lucrative trade, and confined chiefly to the Tyrians the advantage of clothing the princes and nobles in most civilized countries of antiquity.⁸ Tyre was separated from the continent by a frith half a mile broad; its walls exceeded a hundred feet⁹ in height, and extended eighteen miles in circumference. The convenience of its situation, the capaciousness of its harbours, and the industrious ingenuity of its inhabitants, rendered it the commercial capital of the world. Its magazines were plentifully provided with military and naval stores, and it was peopled by numerous and skilful artificers in stone, wood, and iron.¹⁰

Notwithstanding the strength of the city, Alexander determined to form the siege of Tyre; and the difficulty of an undertaking which seemed necessary in itself, and essential to the success of still more important enterprises, only stimulated the activity of a prince, who knew that, on many emergencies, boldness is the greatest prudence. The first operation which he directed, was to run a mole from the continent to the walls of Tyre, where the sea was about three fathom deep. The necessity of this measure arose from the imperfection of the battering engines of antiquity, which had little power, except at small distances. On the side of the continent, the work was carried on with great alacrity; but when the Macedonians approached the city, they were much-incommoded by the depth of water, and exceedingly galled by darts and missile weapons from the battlements. The Tyrians, likewise, having the command of the sea, annoyed the workmen from their galleys, and retarded the completion of their labours. To resist these assaults, Alexander erected, on the furthest projecture of the mole, two wooden towers, on which he placed his engines, and which he covered with leather

¹ Ως ταχίστα μισόν αὐτοῦ τι καὶ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὸν ἑφεστῆν ποιῆσαι. Arrian, p. 40.

² I omit the story of Abdelerninus, whom Alexander raised from the humble condition of a gardener to the throne of Sidon. Vid. Curt. l. iv. c. i. Diodor. l. xvii. relates the same story as happening in Tyre. Plutarch, de Fortun. Alexand. translates the scene to Paphos. Amidst such inconsistencies, the silence of Arrian seemed worthy of imitation.

³ Arrian says, that these ambassadors were ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινῆς ἐσταλμένοι. It should seem that the king of Tyre was a very limited prince, and the government rather republican than monarchical.

⁴ The reader may recollect, that Philip sent a similar message to Atheas, king of the Scythians. Such pious pretences were often employed by antiquity to justify very unwarrantable transactions.

⁵ Old Tyre was built on the continent, by the Sidonians, 1252 B. C. It was besieged by Salmaneser, 719 B. C.; and by Nebuchadnezzar, 572 B. C. The latter took the place after a siege of thirteen years; but the greater part of the inhabitants had previously fled with their effects to a neighbouring island, and founded the city described in the text. Vid. Joseph. l. viii. cap. ii. l. ix. cap. xiv. et l. x. cap. xi.

⁶ Isaiah, xxiii. 12.

⁷ Strabo, l. vi. p. 521.

⁸ Homer, Herodot. &c. passim. See likewise p. 80.

⁹ Arrian says one hundred and fifty feet. The copies probably are erroneous.

¹⁰ Plutarch, Curtius, Arrian.

and raw hides to resist the ignited darts and fire-ships of the enemy. This contrivance, however, the ingenuity of his adversaries soon rendered ineffectual. Having procured a huge hulk, they filled it with dry twigs, pitch, sulphur, and other combustibles. Toward the prow, they raised two masts, each of which was armed with a double yard, from whose extremities were suspended vast chaldrons, filled with whatever might add to the violence of the conflagration. Having prepared this uncommon instrument of destruction, they patiently waited a favourable wind. The hulk was then towed into the sea by two galleys. As she approached the mole, the rowers set her on fire, and escaped by swimming. The works of the Macedonians were soon thrown into a blaze. The enemy, sailing forth in boats, prevented them from extinguishing the flames; and the labour of many weeks was thus in one day reduced to ruins.¹¹

The perseverance of Alexander was proof against such accidents. He immediately commanded new engines to be made, and a new mole to be raised, stronger and broader than the preceding. The orders of a prince, who directed every operation in person, and whose bodily toils exceeded those of the meanest soldier, were always obeyed with alacrity. The ruins of old Tyre afforded abundance of stone; wood was brought from Anti-Libanus;¹² and it should seem that the Arabians, having disturbed the Macedonian workmen, were repelled by Alexander, which gave rise to the improbable fiction of his having conquered Arabia. By incredible exertions, the mole was at length built, and the battering engines were erected. The arrival of four thousand Peloponnesian forces seasonably reinforced Alexander, and revived the courage of his troops, exhausted by fatigue and dejected by defeat. At the same time the fleets of the maritime provinces which he had subdued, came to offer their assistance in an undertaking, which could scarcely have proved successful, while the Tyrians commanded the sea. The squadrons of Lower Asia were joined by the naval force of Rhodes and Cyprus. The whole armament of Alexander amounted to two hundred and twenty-four vessels,¹³ so that the Tyrians, who hitherto con-

fided in their fleet, now retired behind the defences of their ports for safety.

But these persevering islanders, though they prudently declined an unequal combat, were forsaken neither by their activity nor their courage. The hulks and galleys,¹⁴ destined to advance the battering engines against their walls, were assailed with continual showers of ignited arrows,¹⁵ and other missile weapons, which came with peculiar effect from wooden towers newly raised on their lofty battlements. This distant hostility retarded, but could not prevent, the approaches of the enemy. The purpose of the Tyrians was better effected by casting down huge stones into the sea, which hindered access to the walls. To clear these incumbrances required the perseverance of the Macedonians, and the animating presence of Alexander. Before the work could be accomplished, the enemy advanced in covered vessels, and cut the cables of the hulks employed in that laborious service. Alexander commanded a squadron to advance and repel the Tyrians. Yet even this did not facilitate the removal of the bar; for the islanders, being expert divers, plunged under water, and again cutting the cables, set the Macedonian vessels adrift. It thus became necessary to prepare chains, which were used instead of ropes; by which contrivance the hulks were secured in firm anchorage, the bank of stones was removed, and the battering engines advanced to the walls.

In this extremity, the Tyrians, still trusting to their courage, determined to attack the Cyprian squadron, stationed at the mouth of the harbour which looked towards Sidon. The boldness of this design could only be surpassed by the deliberate valour with which it was carried into execution. The mouth of the haven they had previously covered with spread sails, to conceal their operations from the enemy. The hour of attack was fixed at mid-day, at which time the Greeks and Macedonians were usually employed in private affairs, or the care of their bodies, and Alexander commonly retired to his pavilion, erected near the harbour which looked towards Egypt. The best sailing vessels were carefully selected from the whole fleet,¹⁶ and manned with the most expert rowers, and the most resolute soldiers, all inured to the sea, and well armed for fight. At first they came forth in a line, slowly and silently; but having proceeded within sight of the Cyprians, they at once clashed their oars, raised a shout, and advanced abreast of each other to the attack. Several of the enemy's ships were sunk at the first shock; others were dashed in pieces against the shore. Alexander, who had fortunately that day tarried but a short time in his pavilion, was no sooner informed of this desperate sally, than, with admirable presence of mind, he immediately ordered such vessels as were ready, to block up the mouth of the haven, and thereby prevent the remainder of the Ty-

¹¹ Arrian, p. 44. et seq.

¹² Curtius confounds Anti-Libanus with Mount Libanus. It would be endless to notice his errors, exaggerations, and fictions in the account of this siege, which is one of the most romantic passages in his history. Curtius writes to the fancy, not to the judgment; and to readers of a certain taste, the picturesque beauties of his style will atone for errors in matter of fact. He may be allowed to raise an imaginary storm, who can describe it like Curtius. "Tum inhorrescens mare paulatim levare, deinde acriori vento concitatum, fluctus cedere, et inter se navigia collidere. Jamque scindi cœperant vincula, quibus connexæ quadræmes erant, ruerent tabulata, et cum ingenti fragore in profundum secum milites trahere." It is Alexander, whose actions he disfigures and renders incredible, not the reader, whose fancy he amuses, that is entitled to condemn Curtius.

¹³ Curtius. l. iv. c. iii. says, that it consisted of one hundred and eighty sail. Plutarch. in Alexand. says, that the haven of Tyre was blocked up with two hundred triremes. Arrian distinctly mentions the number and species of ships sent by each city or province. From Macedon there came, he says, a vessel of fifty oars, πεντήκοντορος; a circumstance which proves that, on this emergency, Alexander had taken pains to collect ships from all quarters.

¹⁴ Such vessels were used for this purpose, as were the stoutest sailors. Arrian, p. 46.

¹⁵ Πυρροβοις οιστροις.

¹⁶ They consisted, says Arrian, in five choice quinqueremes, as many quadriremes, and seven triremes. See note, p. 61.

rian fleet from joining their victorious companions. Mean while, with several quinquereme, and five trireme, galleys, hastily prepared, he sailed round to attack the Tyrians. The besieged observing from their walls the approach of Alexander, endeavoured, by shouts and signals, to recall their ships. They had scarcely changed their course, when the enemy assailed, and soon rendered them unserviceable. The men saved themselves by swimming; few vessels escaped; two were taken at the very entrance of the harbour.

Olymp. The issue of these naval operations decided the fate of Tyre. Un-
cxii. 1. awed by the hostile fleet, the Macedonians now fearlessly advanced
A. C. 332. their engines on all sides. Amidst
July.

repeated assaults during two days, the besiegers displayed the ardour of enthusiasm,¹ the besieged the fury of despair. From towers equal in height to the walls, the Greeks and Macedonians fought hand to hand with the enemy. By throwing spontoons across, the bravest sometimes passed over, even to the battlements. In other parts, the Tyrians successfully employed hooks and grappling-irons to remove the assailants. On those who attempted scaling-ladders, they poured vessels of burning sand, which penetrated to the bone. The vigour of the attack was opposed by as vigorous a resistance. The shock of the battering engines was deadened by green hides and coverlets of wool, and whenever an opening was effected, the bravest combatants advanced to defend the breach. But time and fatigue, which exhausted the vigour of the enemy, only confirmed the perseverance of Alexander. On the third day, the engines assailed the walls; and the fleet, divided into two squadrons, attacked the opposite harbours. A wide breach being effected, Alexander commanded the hulks, which carried the engines, to retire, and others, bearing the scaling-ladders, to advance, that his soldiers might enter the town over the ruins. The targeteers, headed by Admetus, first mounted the breach. This gallant commander was slain by a spear; but Alexander, who was present wherever danger called, immediately followed with the royal band of *Companions*. At the same time the Phœnician fleet broke into the harbour of Egypt, and the Cyprians into that of Sidon. After their walls were taken, the townsmen still rallied, and prepared for defence. The length of the siege, and still more the cruelty of the Tyrians, who having taken some Grecian vessels from Sidon, butchered their crews on the top of their wall, and threw their bodies into

the sea, in sight of the whole Macedonian army, provoked the indignation of Alexander, and exasperated the fury of the victors. Eight thousand Tyrians were slain; thirty thousand were reduced to servitude.² The principal magistrates, together with some Carthaginians who had come to worship the gods of their mother country, took refuge in the temple of Tyrian Hercules. They were saved by the clemency or piety of Alexander, who had lost four hundred men in this obstinate siege of seven months.³

The conquest of Phœnicia was followed by the submission of the neighbouring province of Judæa.⁴ But in the road leading to Egypt, the progress of the conqueror was interrupted by the strong city of Gaza, situate on a high hill, near the confines of the Arabian desert.⁵ This place, distant about two miles from the sea, and surrounded by marshes or a deep sand, which rendered it extremely difficult of access, was held for Darius by the loyalty of Batis,⁶ a eunuch, who had prepared to resist Alexander by hiring Arabian troops, and by providing copious magazines. The Macedonian engineers declared their opinion that Gaza was impregnable. But Alexander, unwilling to incur the disgrace and danger of leaving a strong fortress behind him, commanded a rampart to be raised on the south side of the wall, which seemed least secure against an attack. His engines were scarcely erected, when the garrison made a furious sally, and threw them into flames. It required the presence of the king to save the rampart, and to prevent the total defeat of the Macedonians. Warned by a heavenly admoni-

² Curtius, l. iv. c. iv. says, that fifteen thousand Tyrians were saved by their Sidonian brethren, who clandestinely embarked them in their ships, and transported them to Sidon. This circumstance, omitted by Arrian, derives some probability from the vigorous resistance which, nineteen years afterwards, Tyre again made to the arms of Antigonius. Vid. Diodor. Sicul. p. 702—704.

³ Arrian, l. ii. p. 44—50.

⁴ All the historians of Alexander are silent concerning his journey to Jerusalem, and his extraordinary transactions there, described by Josephus, l. xi. c. viii. This story, invented by the patriotic vanity of the Jews, is totally inconsistent with the narrative of Arrian, copied in the text. As all Palestine, except Gaza, had submitted to his arms, "Τὰ μὲν ἅλλα τῆς Παλαιστίνης προσέκχησεν ἡδὴ." Alexander had no occasion to march against Jerusalem. The conversation between Alexander, Parmenio, and the high-priest Jadduah, as related by Josephus, is likewise contradictory to the best authenticated events in the reign of Alexander. When the high-priest approached to implore the clemency of the conqueror, Alexander, says the Jewish historian, prostrated himself before that venerable old man; an action which so much surprised Parmenio, that he immediately asked his master, "Why he, whom all the world adored, should himself adore the high-priest of the Jews?" It will appear in the sequel, that Alexander did not require this mark of respect (the προσκυνησις,) till long after the period alluded to by Josephus; neither could he be accompanied by the Chaldeans, as that writer alleges; much less could the high-priest with propriety, have requested Alexander to permit the Jews, settled in Babylon and Media, the free exercise of their religion, before that prince had conquered those countries, or even passed the Euphrates. See this subject further examined in Moyle's Letters, vol. ii. p. 415. and in l'Examen. Critique des Historiens d'Alexandre, p. 65—69.

⁵ Εσχάτη δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὡς ἐπ' Αἴγυπτον ἀπὸ Φοινίκης ἰσθμὸς, ἐπὶ τῇ μετὰ τῆς ἑρήμου. "It is the last inhabited place on the road from Phœnicia to Egypt, on the skirts of the desert."

⁶ Curtius, l. iv. c. vi. calls him Belis; Josephus, l. xi. c. vii. Bahamees.

⁷ Οἱ μηχανοποιοί, the engine-makers; it should seem that the same persons who made the engines, directed the application of them.

¹ From the beginning, the difficulties of the siege had appeared almost insurmountable to the soldiers. "But Alexander," says Curtius, "haudquaquam rudis tractandi militares animos, speciem sibi Herculis in somno oblatam esse pronunciat, dextram porrigentis." The diviners thence concluded, as Arrian tells us, that Tyre would be taken, but that it would be a Herculean labour. Alexander continued throughout the siege to employ the aids of superstition. At one time it was said, that Apollo was about to leave Tyre, and that the Tyrians had fastened him with golden chains to prevent his elopement. At another, Alexander dreamed that a satyr playing before him, long eluded his grasp, but finally allowed himself to be caught. The augurs divided the word Σατυρός, a Satyr, into two syllables, Σα τυρός, Tyre is thine. By such coarse artifices did Alexander conquer the world.

tion,⁸ he had hitherto kept beyond the reach of the enemy's darts; and when the danger of his troops made him forget the divine omen, a weapon, thrown from a catapult, pierced his shield and breast-plate, and wounded him in the shoulder. Soon afterwards the engines, which had been used in the siege of Tyre, arrived by sea. A wall of incredible height and breadth⁹ was run entirely round the city; the Macedonians raised their batteries; the miners¹⁰ were busy at the foundation; breaches were effected; and, after repeated assaults, the city was taken by storm. When their wall was undermined, and their gates in possession of the enemy, the inhabitants still fought desperately, and without losing ground,¹¹ perished to a man. Their wives and children were enslaved; and Gaza, being repopled from the neighbouring territory, served as a place of arms to restrain the incursions of the Arabs.

Olymp. The obstinate resistance of the
cxii. 1. obscure fortress of Gaza, was con-
A. C. 332. trasted by the ready submission of
the celebrated kingdom of Egypt.

In seven days' march, Alexander reached the maritime city of Pelusium, to which he had previously sent the fleet, with an injunction carefully to examine the neighbouring coasts, lakes, and rivers. His decisive victory at Issus, the shameful flight of Darius, the recent subjugation of Syria and Phœnicia, together with the actually defenceless state of Egypt (Mazaces, the satrap of that large province, having no Persian, and scarcely any regular troops,) opened a ready passage to the wealthy capital of Memphis. There, Alexander was received as sovereign, and immediately afterwards acknowledged by the whole nation; a nation long accustomed to fluctuate between one servitude and another, always ready to obey the first summons of an invader, and ever willing to betray him for a new master. Grateful for his unexampled success, Alexander sacrificed at Memphis to the Egyptian gods, and celebrated in that city gymnastic and musical games, which were adorned by Grecian artists, accompanying him for that purpose. Having placed sufficient garrisons both in Memphis and Pelusium, he embarked with the remainder of his forces, and sailed down the Nile to Canopus.¹²

At this place Alexander found abundant occupation for his policy, in a country where there was no opportunity for exercising his valour. Continually occupied with the thoughts, not only of extending, but of improving, his conquests, the first glance of his discerning eye

perceived what the boasted wisdom of Egypt had never been able to discover. The inspection of the Mediterranean coast, of the Red Sea, of the lake Marcotis, and of the various branches of the Nile, suggested the design of founding a city, which should derive, from nature, only, more permanent advantages than the favour of the greatest princes can bestow. Fired with this idea, he not only fixed the situation,¹³ but traced the plan of his intended capital, described the circuit of its walls, and assigned the ground for its squares, market-places, and temples.¹⁴ Such was the sagacity of his choice, that within the space of twenty years, Alexandria rose to distinguished eminence among the cities of Egypt and the East, and continued, through all subsequent ages of antiquity, the principal bond of union, the seat of correspondence and commerce, among the civilized nations of the earth.

Olymp. In Egypt, an inclination seized
cxii. 1. Alexander to traverse the southern
A. C. 332. coast of the Mediterranean, that he
might visit the revered temple and
oracle of Jupiter Ammon. This venerable shrine was situate in a cultivated spot of five miles in diameter, distant about fifty leagues from the sea, and rising with the most attractive beauty amidst the sandy deserts of Lybia. Among the African and Asiatic nations, the oracle of Ammon enjoyed a similar authority to that which Delphi had long held in Greece; and, perhaps, the conquest of the East could not have been so easily accomplished by Alexander, had he not previously obtained the sanction of this venerated shrine. Guided by prudence, or impelled by curiosity, he first proceeded two hundred miles westward, along the coast to Parætonius, through a desolate country, but not destitute of water. He then boldly penetrated towards the south, into the midland territory, despising the danger of traversing an ocean of sand, unmarked by trees, mountains, or any other object that might direct his course, or vary this gloomy scene of uniform sterility.¹⁵ The superstition of the ancients believed him to have been conducted by ravens, or serpents; which, without supposing a miracle, may, agreeably to the natural instinct of animals, have sometimes bent their course, through the desert, towards a well-watered and fertile spot, covered with palms and olives. The fountain, which was the source of this fertility, formed not the least curiosity of the place. It was exceedingly cool at mid-day, and warm at mid-night; and in the intervening time, regularly, every day, underwent all the intermediate de-

8 While Alexander was sacrificing, a bird of prey let fall a stone on his head. According to Aristander, the soothsayer, this prodigy portended that the city should be taken, but that Alexander would be exposed to danger in the siege.

9 Εὐρὺς μὲν ἐς δύο σταδίους, ὕψος δὲ ἐς ποδῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ εἰκοσίων. "Two furlongs in breadth, two hundred and fifty feet in height;" but the text is absurdly erroneous.

10 Ὑπνοῦμεν τε ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη δευσομένην. Arrian, p. 51. This was an uncommon expedient, and used only on great emergencies.

11 Καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας αὐτοῦ μάχονται ὡς ἐκαστοὶ ἐπαινοῦσαν. The highest panegyric, being the very words applied by Lysias, Herodotus, &c. to those who fell at Thermopylae.

12 Arrian, p. 51, et seq.

13 Egypt, says Baron Tott, who lately surveyed that country with the eye of an engineer and a statesman, was formed to unite the commerce of Europe, Africa, and the Indies. It stood in need of a harbour, vast, and of easy access. The mouths of the Nile afford neither of these advantages; the only proper situation was distant twelve leagues from the river, and in the heart of a desert. On this spot, which none but a great genius could have discovered, Alexander built a city, which, being joined to the Nile by a navigable canal, became the capital of nations, the metropolis of commerce. The trading nations of the earth still respect its ruins, heaped up by barbarism, and which require but the operation of a beneficent hand, to restore the boldest edifice which the human mind ever dared to conceive. Mem. du Baron de Tott. t. ii. p. 179.

14 Arrian, l. iii. sub. init.

15 Arrian, p. 53 et Curtius, l. iv. c. vii.

grees of temperature. The adjacent territory produced a fossile salt, which was often dug out in large oblong pieces, clear as crystal. The priests of Ammon inclosed it in boxes of palm-trees, and bestowed it, in presents, on kings and other illustrious personages; such salt being regarded as purer than that procured from sea water, and therefore preferred for the purpose of sacrifice, by persons curious in their worship.¹

Alexander admired the nature of the place, consulted the oracle concerning the success of his expedition, and received; as was universally reported, a very favourable answer.² Having thus effected his purpose at the temple of Ammon, he returned to Memphis, in order finally to settle the affairs of Egypt. The inhabitants of that country were reinstated in the enjoyment of their ancient religion and laws. Two Egyptians were appointed to administer the civil government; but the principal garrisons, Alexander prudently entrusted to the command of his most confidential friends;³ a policy alike recommended by the strength and importance of the country, and by the restless temper of its inhabitants.

The Macedonians had now extended their arms over Anatolia, Carmania, Syria, and Egypt; countries which anciently formed the seat of arts and empire, and which actually compose the strength and centre of the Turkish power. But Darius (after all hopes of accommodation had vanished with a conqueror who demanded unconditional submission to his clemency)⁴ still found resources in his eastern provinces, Schirvan, Gilan, Corosan, and the wide extent of territory between the Caspian and the Jaxartes. Not only the subjects of the empire, but the independent tribes in those remote regions, which in ancient and modern times have ever been the abode of courage and barbarity, rejoiced in an opportunity to signalize their restless valour. At the first summons, they poured down into the fertile plains of Assyria, and increased the army of Darius far beyond any proportion of force which he had hitherto collected.

Mean while, Alexander having received considerable reinforcements from Greece, Macedon, and Thrace, pursued his journey eastward from Phœnicia, passed the Euphrates at Thapsacus,⁵ boldly stemmed the rapid stream

of the Tigris, and hastened to meet the enemy in Assyria. Darius had pitched his tents on the level banks of the Bumadus, near the obscure village of Gaugamela; but the famous battle, which finally decided the empire of the East, derived its name from Arbela, a town in the same province, sixty miles distant from the former, better known, and of easier pronunciation.⁶

The fourth day after passing the Tigris, Alexander was informed by his scouts, that they had seen some bodies of the enemy's horse, but could not discover their numbers. Upon this intelligence he marched forward in order of battle; but had not proceeded far, when he was met by other scouts, who having penetrated deeper into the country, or examined with greater accuracy, acquainted him that the hostile cavalry scarcely exceeded a thousand. This news made him alter his measures. The heavy-armed troops were commanded to slacken their pace. At the head of the royal cohort, the Pæonians, and auxiliaries, Alexander advanced with such celerity, that several of the Barbarians fell into his hands. These prisoners gave him very alarming accounts of the strength of Darius, who was encamped within a few hours' march. Some made it amount to a million of foot, forty thousand horse, two hundred armed chariots, and fifteen elephants from the eastern banks of the Indus.⁷ Others exaggerated (if indeed it was an exaggeration) with more method and probability, reducing the infantry to six hundred thousand, and raising the cavalry to a hundred and forty-five thousand.⁸ But all agreed, that the present army was greatly more numerous, and composed of more warlike nations, than that which had fought at Issus.⁹

Alexander received this information without testifying the smallest surprise. Having commanded a halt, he encamped four days to give his men rest and refreshment. His camp being fortified by a good intrenchment, he left in it the sick and infirm, together with all the baggage; and on the evening of the fourth day, prepared to march against the enemy, with the effective part of his army, which was said to consist of forty thousand infantry, and seven thousand horse, unincumbered with any thing but their provisions and armour. The march was undertaken at the second watch of the night, that the Macedonians, by joining battle in the morning, might enjoy the important advantage of having an entire day before them, to reap the full fruits of their expected victory. About half way between the hostile camps, some eminences intercepted the view of either army. Having ascended the rising ground, Alexander first beheld the Barbarians, drawn up in battle array, and perhaps more skilfully

¹ Arrian, p. 53, et seq. et Curtius, l. iv. c. vii.

² Vid. Plut. Alexand. p. 680. The priest, or prophet, meant to address Alexander by the affectionate title of *παῖς*, child, son; but not being sufficiently acquainted with the Greek tongue, he said, *παῖς Διός*, son of Jupiter. On this wretched blunder were founded Alexander's pretensions to divinity. Plut. *ibid.* et Zonar. *Annal.* i. p. 134. The fictions of Curtius are inconsistent with Arrian, and with Strabo, l. xvii. p. 1168.

³ Arrian observes, that the Romans seem to have imitated the jealousy of Alexander respecting Egypt. Sensible of the temptations of the governors of that province to revolt, they appointed, not senators, but men of the equestrian order, to be proconsuls of Egypt. Arrian, p. 55.

⁴ In this, Arrian and Curtius agree. The letters between Alexander and Darius are differently expressed by those writers. In both their accounts, which are totally inconsistent with each other, there are internal marks of falsehood.

⁵ Darius had entrusted the defence of the pass to Mazacus, with a body of cavalry, of which two thousand were Greeks. But on the first intelligence of Alexander's ap-

proach, Mazacus abandoned his post, and drew off his forces. Arrian, p. 56.

⁶ This reason, which is given by Arrian, could scarcely have appeared valid to any but a Greek. Vid. Arrian. p. 131.

⁷ Arrian, p. 57.

⁸ Curtius, l. iv. c. xii. xiii. edit. Genev. The numbers are different in the other editions.

⁹ Arrian et Curtius, *loc. citat.* Justin. l. xi. c. xii. Diodorus, l. xvii. c. xxxix. et liii. Orasius, l. iii. c. xvii. Plut. in Alexand.

marshalled than he had reason to apprehend. Their appearance, at least, immediately determined him to change his first resolution. He again commanded a halt, summoned a council of war; and different measures being proposed, acceded to the single opinion of Parmenio, who advised that the foot should remain stationary, until a detachment of horse had explored the field of battle,¹⁰ and carefully examined the disposition of the enemy. Alexander, whose conduct was equalled by his courage, and both surpassed by his activity, performed those important duties in person, at the head of his light horse, and royal cohort. Having returned with unexampled celerity, he again assembled his captains and encouraged them by a short speech. Their ardour corresponded with his own; and the soldiers, confident of victory, were commanded to take rest and refreshment.¹¹

Mean while, Darius perceiving the enemy's approach, kept his men prepared for action. Notwithstanding the great length of the plain, he was obliged to contract his front, and form in two lines, each of which was extremely deep. According to the Persian custom, the king occupied the centre of the first line, surrounded by the princes of the blood, and the great officers of his court, and defended by his horse and foot guards, amounting to fifteen thousand chosen men. These splendid troops, who seemed fitter for parade than battle, were flanked, on either side, by the Greek mercenaries, and other warlike battalions, carefully selected from the whole army. The right wing consisted of the Medes, Parthians, Hyrcanians, and Sacæ; the left was chiefly occupied by the Bactrians, Persians, and Cardusians. The various nations composing this immense host, were differently armed, with swords, spears, clubs, and hatchets; while the horse and foot of each division were promiscuously blended, rather from the result of accident, than by the direction of design. The armed chariots fronted the first line, whose centre was farther defended by the elephants. Chosen squadrons of Scythian, Bactrian, and Cappadocian cavalry advanced before either wing, prepared to bring on the action, or after it began, to attack the enemy in flank and rear.

The unexpected approach of Alexander within sight of his tents, prevented Darius from fortifying the wide extent of his camp; and, as he dreaded a nocturnal assault, from enemies who often veiled their designs in darkness, he commanded his men to remain all night under arms. This unusual measure, the gloomy silence, the long and anxious expectation, toge-

ther with the fatigue of a restless night, discouraged the whole army, but inspired double terror into those who had witnessed the miserable disasters on the banks of the Granicus and the Issus.

At day-break, Alexander disposed his troops in a manner suggested by the superior numbers and deep order of the enemy. His main body consisted in two heavy-armed phalanxes, each amounting to above sixteen thousand men. Of these, the greater part formed into one line; behind which, he placed the heavy-armed men, reinforced by his targeteers, with orders, that when the out-spreading wings of the enemy prepared to attack the flanks and rear of his first line, the second should immediately wheel to receive them.¹² The cavalry and light infantry were so disposed on the wings, that while one part resisted the shock of the Persians in front, another, by only facing to the right or left, might take them in flank. Skilful archers and darters were posted at proper intervals, as affording the best defence against the armed chariots, which (as Alexander well knew) must immediately become useless, whenever their conductors or horses were wounded.

Having thus arranged the several parts, Alexander with equal judgment led the whole in an oblique direction towards the enemy's left; a manœuvre which enabled the Macedonians to avoid contending at once with superior numbers. When his advanced battalions, notwithstanding their nearness to the enemy, still stretched towards the right, Darius also extended his left, till fearing that by continuing this movement his men should be drawn gradually on the plain, he commanded the Scythian squadrons to advance, and prevent the further extension of the hostile line. Alexander immediately detached a body of horse to oppose them. An equestrian combat ensued, in which both parties were reinforced, and the Barbarians finally repelled. The armed chariots then issued forth with impetuous violence; but their appearance only was formidable; for the precautions taken by Alexander, rendered their assault harmless. Darius next moved his main body, but with so little order, that the horse, mixed with the infantry, advanced, and left a vacuity in the line, which his generals wanted time or vigilance to supply. Alexander seized the decisive moment, and penetrated into the void with a wedge of squadrons. He was followed by the nearest sections of the phalanx, who rushed forward with loud shouts, as if they had already pursued the enemy. In this part of the field, the victory was not long doubtful; after a feeble resistance, the Barbarians gave way; and the pusillanimous Darius was foremost in the flight.¹³

The battle, however, was not yet decided. The more remote divisions of the phalanx, upon receiving intelligence that the left wing,

10 Την χωραν πασαν ινα το ιεγον ισισθαι εμιλλαν. "The whole scene of the future action." Arrian, p. 8.

11 Δεικνυμεναισθαι και ανηκουσαισθαι εκλειναι τον στρατον. "He commanded his army to sup and rest." Arrian, p. 58. This does not well agree with what is said, p. 57. ουδεν αλλο οτι μη οπλα φερουσι, "That the soldiers carried nothing but their armour." I have therefore supplied the word "provisions." Both Arrian (loc. citat.) and Curtius, l. iv. c. xiii. say, that Parmenio exhorted Alexander to attack the enemy in the night; to which the king answered, that he disdained κλεψαι την νικην, "to steal the victory:" an answer worthy of his magnanimity and his prudence; since the day and the light were more favourable to the full exertion and display of his superior skill and courage.

12 Επιταξει δε και δευτερευταξιν ως ειναι την φαλαγγα ακριστομον. Arrian, p. 60. The φαλαγγ ακριστομος is explained by Ælian, as described in the text.

13 Εφυγε εν τοις πρωτοις αισχρος. "He fled shamefully among the foremost." Arrian, p. 60.

commanded by Parmenio, was in danger, had not immediately followed Alexander. A vacant space was thus left in the Macedonian line, through which some squadrons of Persian and Indian horse penetrated with celerity, and advanced to the hostile camp.¹ It was then that Alexander derived signal and well-earned advantages from his judicious order of battle. The heavy-armed troops and targeteers, which he had skilfully posted behind the phalanx, speedily faced about, advanced with a rapid step, and attacked the Barbarian cavalry, already entangled among the baggage. The enemy thus surprised, were destroyed, or put to flight. Mean while, the danger of his left wing recalled Alexander from the pursuit of Darius. In advancing against the enemy's right, he was met by the Parthian, Indian, and Persian horse, who maintained a sharp conflict. Sixty of the *Companions* fell; Hephæstion, Cœnus, and Menidas, were wounded. Having at length dissipated this cloud of cavalry, Alexander prepared to attack the foot in that wing. But the business was already effected, chiefly by the Thessalian horse; and nothing remained to be done, but to pursue the fugitives, and to render the victory as decisive as possible.²

1 The words of Arrian are, Ἀλλ' ἐπιστήσαντες τὴν φάλαγγα (viz. the sections on the left,) ἠγωνίζοντο, ὅτι τὸ ἰσχυρὸν ποιεῖσθαι ἠγγέλαιτο. Καὶ ταύτην παραρρηγίσης πυσσοῖς τῆς τάξης, κατὰ τὸ διεχόν, διεκπαίουσι τῶν τε Ἰνδῶν, τινὲς καὶ τῆς Περσικῆς ἰπποῦ, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ σκυοφόρα τῶν Μακεδόνων, &c. The learned Guischart's commentary is ingenious, but scarcely warranted by the text. "Les sections de la droite de la phalange ayant donné en même temps que les Peltastes, les autres sections, qui étoient par l'oblique plus ou moins en arrière, tâchèrent aussi de marcher ens avant, et de charger l'ennemi. Mais les troupes de la droite des Perses, voyant le fort de combat au centre, se pressèrent toutes vers cet endroit de la ligne, en se poussant mutuellement, et la foule embarrassa tellement les soldats de la phalange, qu'il leur fut alors impossible de s'avancer. Sur ces entrefaites, Alexandre, pour se faire jour, se jetta sur les derrières de ces ennemis. En même temps la nouvelle de la fuite de Darius, et de la deroute de toute sa gauche s'étant répandue, la consternation devint générale. L'effet en fut singulier; les Perses se voyant coupés, dans leur retraite, par les escadrons d'Alexandre, qu'ils avoient à dos, cherchèrent à se sauver, même à travers la phalange. Ils se jetterent à corps perdu sur elle. Quoique de vingt quatre de hauteur, elle ne put résister au poids de cette masse. Sa gauche étant alors plus chargée que sa droite, les sections, de celle-ci poussèrent en avant, et n'observèrent pas que, depuis la troisième section, la gauche restoit en arrière. Il en resulta que la phalange se separa, que sa droite s'avança à la poursuite de l'ennemi, et que des corps nombreux de cavalerie et d'infanterie, qui avoient été au centre Persan, entrèrent tout a-coup par la crevasse, et poussèrent jusques derrière la ligne des Macédoniens." See *Mémoires Militaires*, c. xv. p. 221.

2 Soldiers, better acquainted with the practice than with the theory of their art, have often testified a just surprise, that the battles of the ancients should be described with an order, perspicuity, and circumstantial minuteness, which are not to be found in the military writers of modern times. Scholars have endeavoured to explain this difference, by observing the immense disproportion, in point of dignity and abilities, between the military historians of modern Europe, and those of Greece and Rome. But the difficulty will be better solved, by reflecting on the changes introduced into the art of war by the change of arms; which, in military operations, form the pivot on which the whole turns. 1. From the nature of fire-arms, modern battles are involved in smoke and confusion. 2. From the same cause, modern armies occupy a much greater extent of ground, and begin to act at much greater distances; which renders it more difficult to observe and ascertain their manœuvres. 3. The immense train of artillery, ammunition, &c. required in the practice of modern war, gives a certain immobility to our armies, which renders it impossible to perform, without great danger, those rapid evolutions in sight of an enemy, which so often decided the bat-

According to the least extravagant accounts, with the loss of five hundred men, he destroyed forty thousand of the Barbarians,³ who never thenceforth assembled in sufficient numbers to dispute his dominion in the East. The invaluable provinces of Babylonia, Susiana, and Persis, with their respective capitals of Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis,⁴ formed the prize of his skill and valour. Alexander had not yet attained the summit of his fortune, but he had already reached the height of his renown.⁵ The burning of the royal palace of Persepolis,⁶ to retaliate the ravages of Xerxes in Greece, afforded the first indication of his being overcome by too much prosperity. To speak the most favourably of this transaction, an undistinguishing resentment made him forget that he destroyed his own palace, not that of his adversary.

The settlement of his important and extensive conquests, and the reduction of the warlike Uxii, those independent mountaineers, who, inhabiting the western frontier of Persia, had ever defied the Persian power, restrained Alexander from urging the pursuit of Darius. After his defeat, that unfortunate prince escaped by a precipitate and obscure⁷ flight across the Ar-

ties of the ancients. With us, almost every thing depends on the judicious choice of ground, a matter requiring great military genius, but not admitting the embellishments of historical description.

3 In the battles of the Greeks and Romans, the extraordinary disproportion between the numbers slain on the side of the victors and of the vanquished, necessarily resulted from the nature of their arms. Their principal weapons being not missile, but manual, armies could not begin to act till they had approached so nearly to each other, that the conquered found themselves cut off from all possibility of retreat. In modern times, the use of fire-arms (which often renders the action itself more bloody) furnishes the defeated party with various means of retreating with considerable safety. The sphere of military action is so widely extended in modern times, that before the victors can run over the space which separates them from the vanquished, the latter may fall back, and proceed with little loss beyond their reach; and should any village, hedge, ravine, &c. be found in their way, may often check the ardour of the pursuers. Upon these considerations, the invention of gunpowder may be said to have saved the effusion of human blood. Equestrian engagements (since the principles on which cavalry act remain nearly the same in every age) are still distinguished by similar circumstances to those which appear so extraordinary in the battles of antiquity.

4 The gold and silver found in those cities, amounted to thirty millions sterling; the jewels and other precious spoil, belonging to Darius, sufficed, according to Plutarch, to load twenty thousand mules, and five thousand camels. Plut. in *Alexand.*

5 After the battle of Arbela, many of Alexander's actions, as will appear in the text, deserve the highest praise; but, before that period, few of them can be justly blamed.

6 Arrian, l. iii. p. 66. Plut. in *Alexand.* and Strabo, l. xv. p. 502. agree with Arrian in confining the conflagration to the palace. Plutarch tells us, that only a part of that edifice was consumed. Diodorus says inaccurately, ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν τόπος, "the place around the palace;" and Curtius, l. v. c. xii. with his usual extravagance, burns the whole city of Persepolis so completely, that not a vestige of it remained. The learned author of the *Examen Critique des Historiens d'Alexandre*, is at pains to prove that Persepolis existed under the successors of Alexander, and continued to exist till the first ages of Mahometanism, when the inhabitants of Persepolis, having violated their treaty with the Musselmans, were butchered without mercy, and their city totally demolished. See *Examen Critique*, p. 125, et seq. Mr. D'Hankerville, however, alleges reasons for believing that there were two cities called Persepolis by the Greeks, situate at a considerable distance from each other, one of which was burnt by Alexander, and the other destroyed by the Musselmans. See his *Supplement to his Recherches sur les Arts, &c. de la Grèce*.

7 Arrian observes, that Darius showed great judgment in his flight, having left the populous and well-frequented roads leading to Susa and Babylon, towards which he

menian mountains into Media. Being gradually joined by the scattered remnant of his army, amounting to several thousand Barbarians, and fifteen hundred Greek mercenaries, he purposed to establish his court in Media, should Alexander remain at Susa or Babylon;⁸ but in case he were still pursued by the conqueror, his resolution was to proceed eastward, through Parthia and Hyrcania, into the valuable province of Bactria, laying waste the intermediate country, that he might thus interpose a desert between himself and the Macedonians. In this design, he despatched to the Caspian Gates the wagons conveying his women, and such instruments of convenience or luxury as still softened his misfortunes; and remained in person at Ecbatana, with his army. Alexander, when apprised of these measures, hastened into Media. In his way he subdued the Paritacæ; and having reached within three days' march of the Median capital, was met by Bisthanes, the son of Ochus, Darius's predecessor.⁹ This prince informed him, that Darius had fled from thence five days before, attended by three thousand horsemen, and six thousand foot.

Animated by this intelligence, Alexander proceeded to Ecbatana, in which place he left his treasures, and posted a strong garrison. In this city he likewise dismissed the Thessalian cavalry, and several auxiliary squadrons; paying them, besides their arrears, a gratuity of two thousand talents. Such as preferred the glory of accompanying his standard to the joy of revisiting their respective countries, were allowed again to enlist; a permission which many embraced. A strong detachment under Parmenio was sent into Hyrcania; Cænus, who had been left sick at Susa, was commanded to march with all convenient speed into Parthia; while the king, with a well-appointed army, advanced with incredible expedition¹⁰ in pursuit of Darius. Having passed the Caspian Straits, he was met by Bagistanes, a Babylonian of distinction, who acquainted him that Bessus, governor of Bactria, in conjunction with Nabarzanes, an officer in Darius's cavalry, and Barzaentes, satrap of the barbarous Drangæ and Arachoti, had thrown aside all respect for a prince, who was no longer an object of fear. Upon this intelligence, Alexander declared expedition to be more necessary than ever. Having, therefore, left the heavy-armed troops and baggage under the command of Craterus, he hastened forward

with a few select bands, encumbered only with their arms and two days' provisions. In that space of time, he reached the camp from which Bagistanes had deserted; and finding some parties of the enemy there, learned that Darius, being seized and bound, was actually carried prisoner in his chariot; that Bessus, in whose province this treason had been committed, had assumed the imperial honours; that all the Barbarians (Artabazus only and his sons excepted) already acknowledged the usurper; that the Greek mercenaries preserved their fidelity inviolate; but finding themselves unable to prevent the flagitious scenes that were transacting, had quitted the public road, and retired to the mountains, disdaining not only to participate in the designs, but even to share the same camp with the traitors. Alexander farther learned, that should he pursue Bessus and his associates, it was their intention to make peace with him by delivering up Darius; but should he cease from the pursuit, that they had determined to collect forces, and to divide the eastern provinces of the empire.

Olymp. Having received this information, cxii. 3. Alexander marched all night, and A. C. 330. next day till noon, with the utmost speed, but without overtaking the enemy. He therefore dismounted five hundred of his cavalry, placed the bravest of his foot, completely armed, on horseback; and commanded Attalus and Nicanor to pursue the great road which Bessus had followed, advance in person with his chosen band by a nearer way, which was almost desert, and entirely destitute of water. The natives of the country were his guides. From the close of the evening till day-break he had rode near fifty miles, when he first discovered the enemy flying in disorder, and unarmed. Probably to facilitate their own escape, Satibarzanes and Barzaentes stabbed Darius, and then rode away with Bessus, accompanied by six hundred horse. Notwithstanding the celerity of Alexander, the unhappy Darius expired before the conqueror beheld him.¹¹ Darius was the last king of the house of Hystaspes, and the tenth in succession to the monarchy of Cyrus. That he was neither brave nor prudent, his conduct sufficiently evinces; but the uninterrupted chain of his calamities would have prevented him (had he been otherwise inclined) from imitating the injustice and cruelty of too many of his predecessors.¹²

In this important stage of his fortune, Alexander displayed tender sympathy with afflic-

justly suspected that Alexander would march his army, and directing his course over the Armenian mountains into Media. Arrian, p. 63. Diodorus, l. xvii. p. 538. agrees with Arrian. The errors of Curtius, l. v. c. i. are too absurd to merit refutation.

8 The foundation of this hope was, that a revolt might break out in the Macedonian army; since the more and the richer provinces Alexander acquired, his lieutenants would have the greater temptation to aspire at independence. Subsequent events will justify the reasonable expectation of Darius, which was on this occasion disappointed.

9 Arrian, p. 66. speaks as if Ochus had been Darius's immediate predecessor, neglecting the short reign of Arces, the son of Ochus, who was poisoned soon after his father by the eunuch Bagoas. Diodor. xvii. 5. Ælian. Var. Hist. vi. 8.

10 His marches were thirty-eight and forty miles a day; sometimes more. Xenophon's expedition of Cyrus, and Arrian's expedition of Alexander, mutually illustrate and confirm each other.

11 Such is the simple narration of Arrian. The fictions related by Plutarch in *Alexand. et Curtius*, l. v. c. xli. et Justin, l. xi. c. xv. are inconsistent with each other, and all of them betray the desire to contrast the exultation and depression of the fortune of Darius. "He was chained," says Curtius, "with golden fetters; but laid in a dirty cart, covered with raw hides." His harangue in praise of Alexander would be moral and affecting, were it not totally improbable.

12 Arrian makes this judicious observation, which proves the futility of the Oriental traditions representing Darius as a monster of tyranny and cruelty. See D'Herbelot. *Bibl. Orientale*, art. Darab. p. 285. Should the fashionable scepticism of the times hesitate between these authorities, the reader has only to ask, what Oriental historian has related the transactions of Darius with the fulness and accuracy so conspicuous in Arrian?

tion, warm esteem of fidelity, and just hatred of treason. He gave orders, that the body of Darius should be transported to Persia, and interred in the royal mausoleum. The children of the deceased prince were uniformly treated with those distinctions which belonged to their birth; and Barciné,¹ his eldest daughter, was finally espoused by Alexander. The pardon of the Greek mercenaries, who were admitted into the Macedonian service, and the honourable reception of Artabazus and his sons, well became the character of a prince, who could discern and reward the merit of his enemies. Alexander then pursued the murderers of Darius through the inhospitable territories of the Arii and Zarangsei, and in two days accomplished a journey of six hundred furlongs. Having received the submission of Aornos² and Bactra, he passed the deep and rapid Oxus, and learned, on the eastern banks of this river, that Bessus, who had betrayed his master, had been betrayed in his turn by Spitamenes. The former was surprised by the Macedonians, and treated with a barbarity³ better merited by his own crimes, than becoming the character of Alexander.

Spitamenes succeeded to his ambition and danger. In pursuit of this daring rebel, the resentment of Alexander hurried him through the vast but undescribed⁴ provinces of Aria, Bactria, Sogdiana, and other less considerable divisions of the southern region of Tartary.

The more northern and independent tribes of that immense country, whose pastoral life formed an admirable preparation for war, ventured to take arms against a conqueror who hovered on the frontier of their plains, and whose camp tempted them with the prospect of a rich plunder. The policy of Spitamenes inflamed their courage, and animated their hopes. These rude nations, and this obscure leader, proved the most dangerous enemies with whom Alexander ever had to contend. Sometimes they faced him in the field, and after obstinately resisting, retreated skilfully. Though never vanquished, Alexander obtained many dear-bought victories. The Scythians, on several occasions, surprised his advanced parties, and interrupted his convoys. The abruptness of their attack was only equalled by the celerity of their retreat; their numbers, their courage, and their stratagems, all rendered them formidable.⁵ But the enlighten-

ed intrepidity, and inimitable discipline of the Greeks and Macedonians, finally prevailed over Barbarian craft, and desultory fury. Not contented with repelling his enemies, Alexander crossed the Iaxartes, and defeated the Scythians⁶ on the northern bank of that river. This victory was sufficient for his renown; and the urgency of his affairs soon recalled him from an inhospitable desert.

The provinces between the Caspian and the Iaxartes twice rebelled, and twice were reduced to submission. The Barbarians fighting singly were successively subdued; their bravest troops were gradually intermixed in the Macedonian ranks; and Alexander, thus continually reinforced by new numbers, was enabled to overawe those extensive countries, by dividing his army into five formidable brigades, commanded by Hephæstion, Ptolemy, Perdicas, Cænus,⁷ and himself. Near Gabæ, a fortress of Sogdiana, Cænus attacked and defeated Spitamenes. The Sogdians and Bactrians deserted their unfortunate general, and surrendered their arms to the conqueror. The Massagetæ and other Scythians, having plundered the camp of their allies, fled with Spitamenes to the desert; but being apprised, that the Macedonians prepared to pursue them, they slew this active and daring chief, whose courage deserved a better fate; and in hopes of making their own peace, sent his head to the conqueror.

After the death of Spitamenes, the enemy feebly resisted Alexander in the open country; but in the provinces of Sogdiana and Parthacene, two important fortresses, long deemed impregnable, still bade defiance to the invader. Into the former, Oxyartes the Bactrian, who headed the *rebellion* (for so the Macedonians termed the brave defence of the Bactrians,) had placed his wife and children. The rock

lesser bone of his leg. The Macedonians, however, rallied, and totally defeated the enemy. Arrian, l. iii. sub fin.

⁶ Before Alexander passed the Iaxartes, he received an embassy probably from the *Abian* Scythians. Their oration, omitted by all the Greek writers, is preserved in Curtius, l. vii. c. viii. It is remarkable for the bold elevated style, in which these Barbarians display their own advantages, and describe the destructive ambition of the invader. In both respects, it agrees with the admirable harangue of the Caledonian chieftain Galgacus, in Tacitus's *Life of Agricola*. But the glowing sentiments of those independent and high-minded nations are invigorated by the brevity of Tacitus, and weakened by the diffusiveness of Curtius. Both orations abound in metaphors. "Great trees," say the Scythians to Alexander, "require long time to grow: the labour of a few hours levels them with the ground. Take care, lest, in climbing to the top, you should fall with the branches which you have seized. Grasp Fortune with both your hands; she is slippery, and cannot be confined. Our countrymen describe her without feet, with hands only, and wings. Those to whom she stretches out her hand, she allows not to touch her wings. Rein your prosperity, that you may more easily manage it. Our poverty will be swifter than your army loaded with spoil. We range the plain and the forest; we disdain to serve, and desire not to command." The figurative style of the Scythians is sufficiently consonant to the manners of barbarous nations. See *Principii di Scienza nuova*, vol. i. p. 156, et seq. See likewise chapters fifth and sixth of the present History. Le Clerc, therefore, speaks with equal ignorance and severity, when, in arraigning the fidelity of Curtius, he says, "Scythæ ipsi, omnium literarum rudes, rhetorico calamistro inusti, in medium prodeunt." Judic. Curt. p. 326.

⁷ Artabazus, the faithful attendant of Darius, and afterwards the friend of Alexander, was joined in the command with Cænus. Arrian.

¹ Called by some writers Statira.

² We shall meet with another place of this name, between the Suastus and the Indus.

³ He was stripped naked, whipped, shamefully mutilated, &c. Arrian arraigns those cruelties as unworthy of the Grecian character: but he warmly approves the punishing of Bessus, and the other murderers of Darius.

⁴ The erroneous geography of the ancients is laboriously compared with subsequent discoveries, in the learned work entitled *Examen des Anciens Historiens d'Alexandre*; and may be seen at one glance, by comparing the maps, usually prefixed to Quintus Curtius, with the admirable maps of D'Anville.

⁵ In one action, Arrian tells us, that only forty Macedonian horsemen, and three hundred foot, escaped. Arrian, l. iv. Curtius mentions another, after which it was made death to divulge the number of the slain. Curtius, l. vii. c. vii. Alexander was not present in either of these engagements; but in a third battle, related by Arrian, the Macedonians were at first repelled, many of them wounded, and the king struck with an arrow, which broke the fibula, or

was steep, rugged, almost inaccessible, and provided with corn for a long siege. The deep snow, by which it was surrounded, increased the difficulty of assaulting it, and supplied the garrison with water. Alexander, having summoned the Bactrians to surrender, was asked in derision, Whether he had furnished himself with winged soldiers? This insolence picqued his pride; and he determined to make himself master of the place, with whatever difficulties and dangers his undertaking might be attended. This resolution was consonant to his character. His success in arms, owing to the resources of his active and comprehensive mind, sometimes encouraged him to enterprises, neither justified by necessity, nor warranted by prudence. Fond of war, not only as an instrument of ambition, but as an art in which he gloried to excel, he began to regard the means as more valuable than the end, and sacrificed the lives of his men to military experiments, alike hazardous and useless: yet, on the present occasion, sound policy seems to have directed his measures. Having determined soon to depart from those provinces, he might judge it imprudent to leave an enemy behind: it might seem necessary to destroy the seeds of future rebellion; and, by exploits unexampled and almost incredible, to impress such terror of his name, as would astonish and overawe his more distant and warlike dependencies.

Alexander carefully examined the Sogdian fortress, and proposed a reward of twelve talents⁸ to the man who should first mount the top of the rock on which it was situated. The second and third were to be proportionably rewarded, and even the last of ten was to be gratified with the sum of three hundred darics. The hopes of this recompence, which, in the conception of the Greeks and Macedonians, was equally honourable and lucrative, stimulated the love of adventure, so conspicuous in both nations. Three hundred men, carefully selected from the whole army, were furnished with ropes made of the strongest flax, and with iron pins used in pitching tents. They were likewise provided with small pieces of linen, which, being joined together, might serve as a signal. Thus equipped, they proceeded at the close of evening towards the most abrupt side of the rock, and therefore the most likely to be unguarded. By driving the iron pins into congealed snow, and then fastening to them the ropes, they gradually hoisted themselves up the mountain. In this extraordinary enterprise, thirty men perished, whose bodies were so profoundly buried in the snow, that, notwithstanding the most diligent search, they could never afterwards be recovered. By this simple contrivance, those daring adventurers gained the summit of the rocks, which overlooked the fortress; and waving their signal in the morning, were discovered by Alexander. At this joyous sight, he summoned the besieged to surrender to his winged soldiers. The Barbarians beheld and trembled; terror multiplied the number of their enemies, and represented them

as completely armed; Alexander was invited to take possession of the fortress.⁹

This obscure and even nameless castle contained Roxana, daughter of Oxyartes, and deemed, next to the spouse of Darius, the greatest beauty in the East. Alexander admired her form and her accomplishments; but even in the fervour of youth, and the intoxication of prosperity, his generous mind disdained the cruel rights of a conqueror, as justified by the maxims and example of his age and country. With a moderation and self-command, worthy the scholar of Aristotle, he declined the embraces of his captive, till his condescending affection raised her to the throne, choosing rather to offend the prejudices of the Macedonians, than to transgress the laws of humanity.¹⁰

In Bactria, Alexander learned Olymp. that the Parætacæ were in arms, cxiii. 2. and that many of his most dangerous enemies had shut themselves up in the fortress or rock of Chorienes. Upon this intelligence, he hastened to the Parætacene. The height of the rock, which was every where steep and craggy, he found to be near three miles, and its circumference above seven. It was surrounded by a broad and deep ditch, at such distance from the base as placed the garrison beyond the reach of missile weapons. Alexander gave orders that the fir trees, of extraordinary height, which surrounded the mountain, should be cut down, and formed into ladders, by means of which, his men descending the ditch, drove huge piles into the bottom. These, being placed at proper distances, were covered with hurdles of osier consolidated with earth. In this occupation his whole army were employed by turns, night and day. The Barbarians at first derided this seemingly useless labour. But their insults were soon answered by Macedonian arrows. By these, and other missile weapons, the Macedonians, who were carefully protected by their coverings, so much annoyed the besieged, that the latter became desirous to capitulate. For this purpose, Chorienes, from whom the place derived its name, desired to converse with Oxyartes the Bactrian, who, since the taking of his wife and children, had submitted to Alexander. His request being granted, Oxyartes strongly exhorted him to surrender his fortress and himself, assuring him of Alexander's goodness, of which his own treatment furnished an eminent example, and declaring that no place was impregnable to such troops and such a general. Chorienes prudently followed this advice; and, by his speedy submission, not only obtained pardon, but gained the friendship of Alexander, who again entrusted him with the command of his fortress, and the government of his province. The vast magazines of corn, meat, and wine, collected by the Parætacæ for a long siege, afforded a seasonable supply to the Macedonian army, especially during the severity of winter, in a country covered with snow many feet deep.¹¹

By such memorable achievements, Alexander subdued the nations between the Caspian sea, the river Iaxartes, and the lofty chain of moun-

⁸ Above 2000*l.* equal in value to near 20,000*l.* in the present age.

⁹ Arrian, p. 91, et seq.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 92.

tains, which supply the sources of the Indus and the Ganges. In the conduct of this remote and dangerous war, the great abilities of the general were conspicuously distinguished. His example taught the troops to despise hunger, fatigue, cold, and danger; neither rugged mountains, nor deep and rapid rivers, nor wounds, nor sickness, could interrupt his progress, or abate his activity: his courage exposed him to difficulties, from which he was extricated by new efforts of courage, which, in any other commander would have passed for temerity. Amidst the hardships of a military life, obstinate sieges, bloody battles, and dear-bought victories, he still respected the rights of mankind, and practised the mild virtues of humanity. The conquered nations enjoyed their ancient laws and privileges; the rigours of despotism were softened; arts and industry encouraged; and the proudest Macedonian governors compelled, by the authority and example of Alexander, to observe the rules of justice towards their meanest subjects.¹ To bridle the fierce inhabitants of the Scythian plains, he founded cities, and established colonies on the banks of the Iaxartes and the Oxus; and those destructive campaigns, usually ascribed to his restless activity and blind ambition, appeared to the discernment of this extraordinary man, not only essential to the security of the conquests which he had already made, but necessary preparations for more remote and splendid expeditions which he still purposed to undertake; and which, as will appear in the succeeding chapter, he performed with singular boldness and unexampled success.

Olymp. During the three first years that
cxii. 4. the invincible heroism of Alexander
A. C. 330. triumphed in the East, the firm vigilance of Antipater repressed rebellion in Greece. But the attention of that general being diverted, by a revolt in Thrace, from the affairs of the southern provinces, the Lacedæmonians, instigated by the warlike ambition of their king Agis, ventured to exert that hostility against Macedon which they had long felt and expressed. Reinforced by some communities of the Peloponnesus, which imprudently listened to their counsels, the allied army amounted to twenty-two thousand men. Antipater, having checked the insurrection in Thrace, hastened into the Grecian peninsula with a superior force, and defeated the confederates in a battle, which proved fatal to king Agis, and three thousand Peloponnesian troops. The vanquished were allowed to send ambassadors to implore the clemency of Alexander. From that generous prince, the rebellious republics received promise of pardon, on condition that they punished with due severity the authors of an unprovoked and ill-judged revolt.²

From this period, till the death of Alexander, Greece enjoyed, above eight years, an unusual degree of tranquillity and happiness. The suspicious and severe temper of Antipater was restrained by the commands of his master, who,

provided the several republics sent him their appointed contingents of men to reinforce his armies, was unwilling to exact from them any further mark of submission. Under the protection of this indulgent sovereign, to the glory of whose conquests they were associated, the Greeks still preserved the forms, and displayed the image, of that free constitution of government, whose spirit had animated their ancestors.

Olymp. While Alexander pursued the
cxii. 3. murderers of Darius, Athens was
A. C. 330. crowded with spectators from the
neighbouring republics, to behold that intellectual conflict between Æschines and Demosthenes, whose rivalry in power and fame had long divided the affections of their countrymen. In consequence of a decree proposed by Ctesiphon, Demosthenes, as above mentioned, had been honoured with a golden crown, as the reward of his political merit. His adversary had, even before the death of Philip, denounced the author of this decree as a violator of the laws of his country. 1. Because he had decreed public honours to a man actually entrusted with the public money, and who had not yet passed his accounts. 2. Because, contrary to law, he had advised that the crown conferred on Demosthenes, should be proclaimed in the theatre. 3. Because the boasted services of Demosthenes had ended in public disgrace and ruin; and that, instead of being rewarded with a crown, he ought to be punished as a traitor. Various circumstances, which it is now impossible to explain, prevented this important cause from being heard by the Athenians, till the sixth year of the reign of Alexander. The triumph of the Macedonians seemed to promise every advantage to Æschines, who had long been the partisan of Philip, and of his magnanimous son; and who, by a stroke aimed at Ctesiphon, meant chiefly to wound Demosthenes, the avowed enemy of both.

In the oration of Æschines, we find the united powers of reason and argument, combined with the most splendid eloquence. Yet the persuasive vehemence of Demosthenes prevailed in the contest. The unexampled exertions,³ by which he obtained this victory, will be admired to the latest ages of the world. To what an exalted pitch of enthusiasm must the orator have raised himself and his audience, when, to justify his advising the fatal battle of Chæronæa, he exclaimed, "No, my fellow citizens, you have not erred; No! I swear it by the manes of those heroes, who fought in the same cause at Marathon and Platea." What sublime art was required to arrive, by just degrees, at this extraordinary sentiment, which, in any other light than the inimitable blaze of eloquence with which it was surrounded, would appear altogether excessive and gigantic!

The orator not only justified Ctesiphon and himself, but procured the banishment of his adversary, as the author of a malignant and calumnious accusation. Honourable as this triumph was, Demosthenes derived more solid glory from the generous treatment of his van-

¹ Plutarch, Arrian, et Curtius, passim.

² Diodorus, l. xvii. p. 537. Curtius, l. vi. c. 1.

³ See the Orat. de Coron. throughout.

quished rival. Before Æschines set sail, he carried to him a purse of money, which he kindly compelled him to accept; a generosity which made the banished man feel severely the weight of his punishment, and affectingly observe, "How deeply must I regret the loss of a country, in which enemies are more generous than friends elsewhere!" Æschines retired to the isle of Rhodes, and instituted a school of eloquence, which flourished several centuries. It is recorded, that having read to his scholars the oration which occasioned his banishment, it was received with extraordinary applause. But when this applause was redoubled on his reading the answer of Demosthenes, he was so far from testifying envy, that he exclaimed to his audience, "What would have been your admiration, had you heard the orator himself!"

Olymp. Demosthenes survived Alexander, whose magnanimity disdained to punish an enemy whom he scarcely regarded as dangerous. But this illustrious Athenian patriot fell a prey to the more suspicious policy of Antipater. At the desire of that prince he was banished Athens, and being pursued by Macedonian assassins to the little island of Calauria, he ended his life by poison.⁴

It may be thought, that the conqueror of the Persian empire would have little leisure, or inclination, to attend to a personal dispute between two Athenian orators: and that neither the impeachment nor the defence of Demosthenes could affect his pride or his interest. It deserves to be considered, however, that this orator was the inveterate, and long the successful, opponent of the greatness of his family; and in the beginning of his own reign, had attempted, with more courage, indeed, than prudence, to overturn the yet unconsolidated pillar of his fortune. But whatever indifference Alexander, who was carefully informed of the transactions of Greece, might testify amidst the honours of Demosthenes, it cannot be believed that he heard with total unconcern the

sentence of the Athenian people; a sentence which reversed the decision of fortune, and arraigned the cruel and melancholy triumph of Philip over the liberties of Greece. That he never resented the indignity, is a proof of his moderation; and that the Athenians could venture on a measure so offensive, is a proof of the freedom and security which they enjoyed under the Macedonian government.

Deprived indeed of the honour, but also delivered from the cares, of independent sovereignty, and undisturbed by those continual and often bloody dissensions, which deform the annals of their tumultuous liberty, the Greeks indulged their natural propensity to the social embellishments of life; a propensity by which they were honourably distinguished above all other nations of antiquity. Their innumerable shows, festivals, and dramatic entertainments, were exhibited with more pomp than at any former period. The schools of philosophers and rhetoricians were frequented by all descriptions of men. Painting and statuary were cultivated with equal ardour and success. Many improvements were made in the sciences; and, as will appear more fully hereafter, the Greeks, and the Athenians in particular, still rivalled the taste and genius, though not the spirit and virtue, of their ancestors. Yet even in this degenerate state, when patriotism and true valour were extinct, and those vanquished republicans had neither liberties to love, nor country to defend, their martial honours were revived and brightened by an association with the renown of their conqueror. Under Alexander, their exploits, though directed to very different purposes, equalled, perhaps excelled, the boasted trophies of Marathon and Plataea. By a singularity peculiar to their fortune, the era of their political disgrace coincides with the most splendid period of their military glory. Alexander was himself a Greek; his kingdom had been founded by a Grecian colony; and to revenge the wrongs of his nation, he undertook and accomplished the most extraordinary enterprises recorded in the history of the world.

⁴ Plut. in Demosth. et Lucian. Demosth. Encom.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Alexander's Indian Expedition—Route pursued by the Army—Aornos taken—Nysa and Mount Meros—Alexander passes the Indus and Hydaspes—Defeats Porus—Founds Nicæa and Bucephalia—Passes the Acesines and Hydraotes—Sangala taken—Eastern boundary of Alexander's Conquests—He sails down the Hydaspes—Takes the Mallian Fortress—His March through the Gedrosian Desert—Voyage of Nearchus—Alexander improves the internal State of his Conquests—Incorporates the Barbarian Levies with the Greeks and Macedonians—Intermarriages of the Europeans and Asiatics—Artifices to prevent Alexander's Return to Babylon—His Death, and Character—Division of his Conquests—Subsequent History of Egypt and Syria—The Western Division of Alexander's Empire conquered by the Romans—State of Greece after the Age of Alexander.

By just views of policy, rather than the madness of ambition, Alexander was carried to the rugged banks of the Oxus and the Iaxartes. The fierce nations of those inhospitable regions had, in ancient times, repeatedly overrun the more wealthy and more civilized provinces of Asia. Olymp. cxiii. 2. A. C. 327. Without diffusing through the Scythian plains the terror of his name, the conqueror would not have securely enjoyed the splendour of Susa and Babylon; nor without the assistance of numerous and warlike levies, raised in those barbarous countries, could he have prudently undertaken his Indian expedition. For this remote and dangerous enterprise, he prepared early in the spring; Amyntas being appointed governor of Bactria, and entrusted with a sufficient strength to overawe the surrounding provinces.

With all the remainder of his forces, Alexander hastened southwards, and in ten days' march traversed the Paropamisus, a link of that immense chain of mountains, reaching from the coast of Cilicia to the sea of China. This southern belt, distinguished in different portions of its length by the various names of Taurus, Paropamisus, Imaus, and Edmodus, the Greeks confounded¹ with the northern chain, of which Scythian Caucasus is a part, and whose remote branches extend from the shores of the Euxine to the eastern extremity of Tartary. Such is the strong frame which supports the ponderous mass of Asia. The intermediate space, especially towards the central country of Bukaria, is far more elevated than any other portion of the Eastern continent; and the towering heights of Paropamisus had hitherto defended (if we except the obscure expedition of Darius) the feeble majesty of India against the ravagers of the earth. The difficulties of this celebrated journey have, perhaps, been rather exaggerated than described, by the historians of Alexander. Yet our indulgence may pardon the fanciful² expressions of antiquity, when we read in the work of a modern writer of acknowledged veracity, "Those mountains are covered with ice; the cold which I suffered was extreme, the country presents a melancholy image of death and horror."³

But the rugged nature of the country was not the only difficulty with which the Macedonians had to struggle. The northern regions of India were inhabited in ancient, as they are still in modern times, by men of superior strength and courage;⁴ and the vigorous resistance made by the natives of those parts, rendered it as difficult for Alexander to penetrate into the Indian peninsula by land, as it has always been found easy by the maritime powers of Europe, to invade and subdue the unwarlike inhabitants of its coasts.

The experienced leader seems to have conducted his army by the route of Candahar, well known to the caravans of Agra and Ispahan. Having reached the banks of the Cophenes, he divided his forces; the greater part he retained under his immediate command; the remainder were detached, under Hephæstion and Perdicas, to clear the road to the Indus, and to make all necessary preparations for crossing that river. After many severe conflicts, he subdued the Aspîi, Thyrræi, Arasaci, and Assaceni; scoured the banks of the Choas and Cophenes; expelled the Barbarians from their fastnesses; and drove them towards the northern mountains, which supply the sources of the Oxus and the Indus.

Near the western margin of the latter, one place, defended by the Baziri, still defied his assaults. This place, called by the Greeks Aornos, afforded refuge not only to the Baziri, but to the most warlike of their neighbours, after their other strong holds had surrendered. From its description, it appears to have been admirably adapted to the purpose of a long and vigorous defence. Mount Aornos was two hundred furlongs in circuit; eleven in height, where lowest; accessible by only one dangerous path cut in the rock by art; containing, near the top, a plentiful spring of water, a thick and lofty wood, together with a sufficient quantity of arable land to employ the labour of a thousand men. An emulation of glory prompted Alexander to make himself master of a place, which fable described as impregnable to the greatest heroes of antiquity.⁵ By

⁴ Arrian, p. 97. et seq.

⁵ Arrian, p. 98. who supplies the particulars in the text, says, that he knows not whether it was the Grecian, Tyrian, or Egyptian Hercules, who laid siege unsuccessfully to Aornos. He doubts whether any of them ever penetrated to India; adding, that the name of Hercules appears to him to have been employed, on this occasion, as on many others, "ὡς κομπήσας τὸν λόγον," "as an ostentatious fiction."

¹ The errors of Diodorus, l. xvi. p. 553. and of Curtius, l. vii. c. iii. are avoided by Arrian, l. v. p. 103. and by Strabo, l. xv. p. 724.

² Curtius, l. vii. c. iii.

³ See "le Voyage du Pere Desideri." It was performed in the year 1715. *Lettres Edifiantes*, xv. 185.

the voluntary assistance and direction of some neighbouring tribes, hostile to the Baziri, Ptolemy ascended part of the rock unperceived; Alexander, with his usual diligence, raised a mount, erected his engines, and prepared to annoy the enemy. But, before he had an opportunity to employ the resources of his genius, by which he had taken places still stronger than Aornæ, the garrison sent a herald, under pretence of surrendering on terms, but in reality with a view to spin out the negotiation during the whole day, and in the night to effect their escape. Alexander, who suspected this intention, met their art with similar address. Patiently waiting till the Indians descended the mountain, he took possession of the strong hold which they had abandoned, having previously posted a proper detachment to intercept the fugitives, and punish their perfidy.

The Macedonians proceeded southward from Aornæ, into the country between the Cophenes and the Indus. In this fertile district, the army as it advanced towards Mount Meros and the celebrated Nysa, was met by a deputation from the citizens of that place, which (could we believe historic flattery) had been founded in the heroic, or rather in the fabulous ages, by a Grecian colony established by Bacchus at the eastern extremity of his conquests. These wandering Greeks, might we indulge for a moment the supposition that the inhabitants of Nysa were really entitled to that name, appear in this Indian soil to have degenerated from the courage, while they preserved the policy, the eloquence, and the artifices, of their European brethren. Being immediately conducted to Alexander, who had just sat down in his tent, covered with sweat and dust, and still armed with his casque and lance, they testified great horror at his aspect, and threw themselves prostrate on the ground. The king having raised them from this humiliating posture, and addressed them with his usual condescension, they recovered sufficient boldness to entreat him to spare their country and their liberties for the sake of Bacchus their founder. In proof of this allegation, they insisted on the name Nysa, derived from the nurse⁶ of Bacchus, and on the abundance, not only of vines and laurel, but of ivy which grew in their territory, and in no other part of India. Alexander, willing to admit a pretension, which might attest to succeeding ages that he had carried his conquests still farther than Bacchus,⁷ readily granted their

request. Having understood that Nysa was governed by an aristocracy, he demanded, as hostages, a hundred of their principal citizens, and three hundred of their cavalry. This demand excited the smile of Acuphis, who headed the embassy. Alexander asked him, "At what he smiled?" He replied, "O king! you are welcome to three hundred of our horsemen, and more, should you think proper. But can you believe it possible that any city should long continue safe, after losing a hundred of its most virtuous citizens? Instead of one hundred of the best, should you be contented with two hundred of the worst men in Nysa, be assured that, at your return, you will find this country in as flourishing a condition as when you left it." Pleased with his address, Alexander remitted his demand of the magistrates; he was accompanied by the cavalry, and by the son and nephew of Acuphis, who were ambitious to learn the art of war under such an accomplished general.

The transactions which we have described, and a march of sixteen days from the Oxus to the Indus, allowed time for Hephæstion and Perdicas to make the preparations necessary for passing the latter river, most probably by a bridge of boats.⁸ On the eastern bank, Alexander received the submission of the neighbouring princes. Of these, Taxiles, who was the most considerable, brought, besides other valuable presents, the assistance of seven thousand Indian horse, and surrendered his capital,

Μηδων, επιδων Λαυδιαν τ' ευδαιμονα,
Ασιαν τε πικραν, η παρ' αλμυρον κλη
Κιτται, μιγυσιν Ελλησι βαρβαροις θ' ομου
Πληρεις ιχθυων καλλιπυργωτους ποταμους.

"Leaving the golden fields of the Lydians, the sun-beat plains of Phrygia and Persia, the Bactrian fortresses, and the wintry storms of the Medes—having overrun Happy Arabia, and the maritime provinces of Asia, crowned with fair turreted cities, inhabited by mingled Greeks and Barbarians." Sophocles mentions Nysa in particular. *Ερωτοισι κλειστην Νυσσαν*. Vide Strabo, l. xv. p. 687. Notwithstanding such respectable authorities for the vulgar tradition, both Strabo and Arrian treat the expedition of Bacchus to India as a fable; the geographer on the following grounds: 1. Because the relations of authors on this subject are totally inconsistent. 2. Because many of the writers who accompanied Alexander are altogether silent concerning this matter. 3. Because the intermediate countries between Greece and India, possess no monuments of this pretended expedition. Strabo, p. 688. The philosopher and historian discovers his sentiments to be the same with Strabo's, but expresses himself with more tenderness for the popular superstition, concluding, "ουκ ακριβη εξιστορην χρησιναι των υπερ του θεου, η παλαιου, μινυθιμωτων;" "that the traditions of the ancients concerning the gods ought not to be too carefully sifted." Arrian, p. 101. An observation which might have merited the attention of those who, in later times, have ventured to explain historically, or to analyze, the Grecian mythology.

8 Arrian, p. 100 and 103, leaves it uncertain in what manner the bridge was constructed. Neither that accurate writer, nor the other careless describers of the exploits of Alexander, ascertain the pass of the Indus, at which the Macedonians crossed that river. Major Rennel, late surveyor-general of Bengal, has the following observations in his excellent Memoir on the Map of Indostan: "I take it for granted, that Alexander crossed the Indus at the place where the city of Attock now stands: as it appears to have been in all ages, the pass on the Indus leading from the countries of Cabul and Candahar into India . . . Attock must then stand on the site of the Taxila of Alexander. From thence, as his intention seems to have been to penetrate by the shortest way to the Ganges, he would proceed by the ordinary road to that part of the bank of the Hydaspes (or Behat) where the fortress of Rotas now stands; and here he put in execution his stratagem for crossing the river, whilst the opposite shore was possessed by Porus." Of which more in the text.

6 The respect shown by the Greeks to their nurses is well known, and is attested by the tragedians. In this respect, the modern Greeks still imitate their ancestors. The word employed to signify a nurse, properly denotes "a second mother." See Mr. Guy's *Voyage Littéraire de la Grèce*.

7 Eratosthenes the Cyrenean, and many other ancient writers, asserted, that the fictions concerning Bacchus's expedition to the East, were invented by the flatterers of Alexander. But Strabo justly observes that the belief of that expedition long preceded the age of the son of Philip. To justify this observation, he cites the verses of Sophocles and Euripides. The latter of these poets, in the prologue to his *Bacchæ*, introduces Bacchus, saying, that he had come to Thebes, and adorned with vines the temple of Semele.

Λιπον δε Λυδων τας πολυχευτους γυνας,
Φρυγων τε, Περσων θ' ηλιοβλητους πλαγκτας,
Βακτρια τε τειχη, την τε δυσχειμον χθονα

Taxila, the most wealthy and populous city between the Indus and Hydaspes. But the king, who never allowed himself to be outdone in generosity, restored and augmented the dominions of Taxiles.

The army crossed the Indus about the time of the summer solstice, at which season the Indian rivers are swelled by heavy rains, as well as by the melted snow, which descends in torrents from Paropamisus. Trusting to this circumstance, Porus, a powerful and warlike prince, had encamped on the Shantrou, or Hydaspes, with thirty thousand foot, four thousand horse, three hundred armed chariots, and two hundred elephants. At an inconsiderable distance from the main body, his son commanded a detachment, consisting of the same kind of forces, which were all well accoutred, and excellently disciplined. Alexander perceived the difficulty of passing the Hydaspes in the face of this formidable host; a difficulty which must be greatly increased by the elephants, whose noise, and smell, and aspect, were alike terrible to cavalry. He therefore collected provisions on the opposite bank, and industriously gave out that he purposed to delay passing the river till a more favourable season. This artifice deluded not the Indians; and Porus kept his post. The king next had recourse to a different stratagem. Having posted his cavalry in separate detachments along the river, he commanded them to raise in the night loud shouts of war, and to fill the bank with agitation and tumult, as if they had determined at all hazards to effect their passage. The noise roused the enemy, and Porus conducted his elephants wherever the danger threatened. This scene was repeated several successive nights; during which the Barbarians were fatigued and harassed by perpetual alarms. Porus discovering, as he fondly believed, that nothing was intended by this vain noise, but merely to disturb his repose, at length desisted from following the motions of the Macedonian cavalry, and remained quiet in his encampment, having stationed proper guards on the bank.¹

The false security of Porus enabled Alexander to effect his long meditated purpose. At the distance of about eighteen miles from his camp, and at the principal winding of the Hydaspes, there stood a lofty rock, thickly covered with trees; and near to this rock, an island, likewise overrun with wood, and uninhabited. Such objects were favourable for concealment: they immediately suggested to Alexander the design of passing the river with a strong detachment, which he resolved to command in person, as he seldom did by others what he could himself perform; and, amidst the variety of operations, always claimed for his own the task of importance or danger. The Macedonian phalanx, the new levies from Paropamisus, together with the Indian auxiliaries, and one division of the cavalry, remained under the command of Craterus. They had orders to amuse the enemy by making fires in the night, and by preparing openly during day-time to cross the Hydaspes.

While these operations were carrying on by Craterus, Alexander, having collected hides and boats, marched up the country with a choice body of light infantry, the archers and Agrians, the Bactrian, Scythian, and Parthian² cavalry, together with a due proportion of heavy-armed troops; the whole a well-assorted brigade, adapted to every mode of war required by the nature of the ground, the arms or disposition of the enemy. Having receded from the bank to a distance sufficiently remote for eluding the observation of Porus, he advanced towards the rock and island; and in this secure post prepared to embark, after taking such precautions against the vicissitudes of war and fortune, as could be suggested only by the most profound military genius. The orders given to Craterus were precise: should the Indians perceive, and endeavour to interrupt the passage to the rock and island, he was in that case to hasten over with his cavalry; otherwise not to stir from his post, until he observed Porus advancing against Alexander, or flying from the field. At an equal distance between the bank, where Alexander meant to pass, and the camp where Craterus lay, Attalus and Meleager were posted with a powerful body of mercenaries, chiefly consisting of Indian mountaineers, who had been defeated by the Macedonians, and taken into the pay of the conqueror. To provide for any unforeseen accident, sentinels were placed along the bank, at convenient distances, to observe and repeat signals.

Fortune favoured these judicious dispositions. A violent tempest concealed from the enemy's out-guards the tumult of preparation; the clash of armour and the voice of command being overpowered by the complicated crash of rain and thunder. When the storm somewhat abated, the horse and infantry, in such proportions as both the boats and hides could convey, passed over, unperceived, into the island. Alexander led the line, accompanied in his vessel of thirty oars by Seleucus, Ptolemy, Perdicas, and Lysimachus; names destined to fill the ancient world, when their renown was no longer repressed by the irresistible diffusion of their master's glory.

The king first reached the opposite bank, in sight of the enemy's out-guards, who hastened, in trepidation, to convey the unwelcome intelligence to Porus. The Macedonians mean while formed in order of battle; but before meeting their enemies, they had to struggle with an unforeseen difficulty. The coast on which they landed was the shore of another island, disjoined from the continent by a river commonly fordable, but actually so much swelled by the rains of the preceding night, that the water reached the breasts of the men, and the necks of the horses. Having passed this dangerous stream with his cavalry and targeteers, Alexander advanced with all possible expedition, considering, that should Porus offer battle, these forces would resist till joined by the heavy infantry; but should the Indians be struck with

¹ Arrian, l. v. p. 107 et seq.

² Arrian calls them the Dahæ; they were *αρχαροὶ ἵπποι*, "archers on horseback." Arrian, l. v. p. 109.

panic at his unexpected passage of the Hydaspes, the light-armed troops would thus arrive in time to attack and pursue them with advantage.

Upon the first alarm given by his out-guards, Porus detached his son to oppose the landing of the enemy with two thousand horse, and one hundred and twenty armed chariots. These forces, arriving too late to defend the bank, were speedily broken and put to flight by the equestrian archers; their leader and four hundred horsemen were slain; most of the chariots were taken; the slime of the river, which rendered them unserviceable in the action, likewise interrupting their flight.

The sad news of this discomfiture deeply afflicted Porus; but his immediate danger allowed not time for reflection. Craterus visibly prepared to pass the river, and to attack him in front; his flanks were threatened with the shock of the Macedonian horse, elated by recent victory. In this emergency the Indian appears to have acted with equal prudence and firmness. Unable to oppose this complicated assault, he left part of the elephants under a small guard, to frighten, rather than resist, Craterus's cavalry; while, at the head of his whole army, he marched in person to meet the more formidable division of the enemy, commanded by their king. His horse amounted to four, and his foot to thirty, thousand; but the part of his strength in which he seemed most to confide, consisted of three hundred armed chariots, and two hundred elephants. With these forces, Porus advanced, until he found a plain sufficiently dry and firm for his chariots to wheel. He then arranged his elephants at intervals of a hundred feet; in these intervals he placed his infantry, a little behind the line. By this order of battle, he expected to intimidate the enemy, since their horse, he thought, would be deterred from advancing at sight of the elephants; and their infantry, he imagined, would not venture to attack the Indians in front, while they must be themselves exposed to be attacked in flank, and trampled under foot by those terrible animals. At either extremity of the line, the elephants bore huge wooden towers, filled with armed men. The cavalry formed the wings, covered in front with the armed chariots.

Alexander by this time appeared at the head of the royal cohort and equestrian archers. Perceiving that the enemy had already prepared for battle, he commanded a halt, until the heavy-armed troops should join. This being effected, he allowed them time to rest and recover strength, carefully encircling them with the cavalry; and mean while examined, with his usual diligence, the disposition of the Indians. Upon observing their order of battle, he immediately determined, not to attack them in front, in order to avoid encountering the difficulties which Porus had artfully thrown in his way; and at once resolved on an operation, which, with such troops as those whom he commanded, could scarcely fail to prove decisive. By intricate and skilful manœuvres, altogether unintelligible to the Indians, he moved imperceptibly towards their left wing with the flower of his cavalry. The remainder, con-

ducted by Cœnus, stretched towards the right, having orders to wheel at a given distance, that they might attack the Indians in rear, should they wait to receive the shock of Alexander's squadrons. A thousand equestrian archers directed their rapid course towards the same wing; while the Macedonian foot remained firm in their posts, waiting the event of this complicated assault, which appears to have been conducted with the most precise observance of time and distance.

The Indian horse, harassed by the equestrian archers, and exposed to the danger of being surrounded, were obliged to form into two divisions, of which one prepared to resist Alexander, and the other faced about to meet Cœnus. But this evolution so much disordered their ranks and dejected their courage, that they were totally unable to stand the shock of the Macedonian cavalry, which surpassed them as much in strength, as it excelled them in discipline. The fugitives took refuge, as behind a line of friendly towers, in the intervals that had been left between the elephants. These fierce animals were then conducted against the enemy's horse; which movement was no sooner observed by the infantry, than they seasonably advanced, and galled the assailants with darts and arrows. Wherever the elephants turned the Macedonians opened their ranks, finding it dangerous to resist them with a close and deep phalanx. Mean while, the Indian cavalry rallied, and were repelled with greater loss than before. They again sought the same friendly retreat; but their flight was now intercepted, and themselves almost entirely surrounded, by the Macedonian horse; at the same time that the elephants, having lost their riders, enraged at being pent up within a narrow space, and furious, through their wounds, proved more formidable to friends than foes, because the Macedonians, having the advantage of an open ground, could every where give vent to their fury.³

The battle was decided before the division, under Craterus, passed the river. But the arrival of these fresh troops rendered the pursuit peculiarly destructive. The unfortunate Porus lost both his sons, all his captains, twenty thousand foot, and three thousand horse. The elephants, spent with fatigue, were slain or taken; even the armed chariots were hacked in pieces, having proved less formidable in reality than appearance, could we believe that little more than three hundred men perished on the side of Alexander. An obvious inconsistency too often appears in the historians of that conqueror.⁴ With a view to enhance his merit, they describe and exaggerate the valour and resistance of his enemies; but, in computing the numbers of the slain, they become averse to allow this valour and resistance to have produced any adequate effects.

The Indian king having behaved with great

³ Arrian, p. 112.

⁴ See Arrian, p. 113. The observation applies not, however, to that historian, but rather to Ptolemy and Aristobulus, from whom he derived his materials; nor could it be expected that those generals should preserve perfect impartiality in relating the exploits of a master whom they admired.

gallantry in the engagement, was the last to leave the field. His flight being retarded by his wounds, he was overtaken by Taxiles, whom Alexander entrusted with the care of seizing him alive. But Porus, perceiving the approach of a man, who was his ancient and inveterate enemy, turned his elephant, and prepared to renew the combat. Alexander then despatched to him Meroe, an Indian of distinction, who, he understood, had formerly lived with Porus in habits of friendship. By the entreaties of Meroe, the high-minded prince, spent with thirst and fatigue, was finally persuaded to surrender; and being refreshed with drink and repose was conducted to the presence of the conqueror. Alexander admired his stature (for he was above seven feet high) and the majesty of his person; but he admired still more his courage and magnanimity. Having asked in what he could oblige him? Porus answered, "By acting like a king." "That," said Alexander with a smile, "I should do for my own sake, but what can I do for yours?" Porus replied, "All my wishes are contained in that one request."¹ None ever admired virtue more than Alexander. Struck with the firmness of Porus, he declared him reinstated on his throne; acknowledged him for his ally and his friend; and having soon afterwards received the submission of the Glaucæ, who possessed thirty-seven cities on his eastern frontier, the least of which contained five thousand, and many of the greatest above ten thousand inhabitants, he added this populous province to the dominions of his new confederate. Immediately after the battle, he interred the slain, performed the accustomed sacrifices, and exhibited gymnastic and equestrian games on the banks of the Hydaspes. Before leaving that river, he founded two cities, Nicæa and Bucephalia; the former was so called, to commemorate the victory gained near the place where it stood; the latter, situate on the opposite bank, was named in honour of his horse Bucephalus,² who died there, worn out by age and fatigue. A large division of the army remained under the command of Craterus, to build and fortify these new cities.

In promoting the success of Alexander, the fame of his generosity conspired with the power of his arms. Without encountering any memorable resistance, he reduced the dominions of another prince named Porus, and the valuable country between the Acesines and the Hydraotes. In effecting this conquest, the obstacles of nature were the principal, or rather the only,

enemies, with whom he had to contend. The river Acesines, fifteen furlongs broad, is deep and rapid; many parts of its channel are filled with large and sharp rocks, which, opposing the rapidity of the stream, occasion loud and foaming billows, mixed with boiling eddies and whirlpools, equally formidable, and still more dangerous. Of the Macedonians, who attempted to pass in boats, many drove against the rocks, and perished; but such as employed hides, reached the opposite shore in safety. The Hydraotes is of the same breadth with the Acesines, but flows with a gentle current. On its eastern bank, Alexander learned that the Cathæi, Malli, and other independent Indian tribes, prepared to resist his progress. They had encamped on the side of the hill, near the city Sangala, two days march from the Hydraotes; and, instead of a breast-work, had fortified themselves with a triple row of carriages. Alexander advanced with his cavalry; the Indians stirred not from their post, but, mounting their carriages, poured forth a shower of missile weapons. Alexander perceiving the cavalry unfit for such an attack, immediately dismounted, and conducted a battalion of foot against the enemy. The lines were attacked, where weakest; some passages were opened; the Macedonians rushed in; and the Indians, being successively driven from their triple barrier, fled in precipitation to Sangala.

The walls of that place were too extensive to be completely invested. On one side, the town was skirted by a lake, long and broad, but not deep. Alexander suspecting that the Indians, intimidated by their former defeat, would attempt to escape in the night, caused the lake to be surrounded with his cavalry. This precaution was attended with success. The foremost of the Indians were cut to pieces by the advanced guards of the Macedonian horse; the rest escaped with difficulty to Sangala. Alexander then invested the greatest part of the town with a rampart and a ditch, and prepared to advance his engines to batter the walls, when he was informed by some deserters, that the enemy still resolved, that very night, to steal, if possible, through the lake; if not, to force their way with their whole strength. Upon this intelligence Alexander posted Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, with three thousand targeteers, one troop of archers, and all the Agrians, upon the spot where he sagaciously conjectured that the besieged would attempt to force their passage. At the first sound of the trumpet, the other commanders were to advance to the assistance of Ptolemy. Alexander declared his intention to share the common danger. By this judicious disposition, the enemy were successfully repelled, after leaving five hundred men on the place. Mean while Porus, Alexander's principal ally in those parts, arrived in the camp with five thousand Indians, and a considerable number of elephants. Encouraged by this reinforcement, the Macedonians prepared to terminate the siege. The engines were got ready; the wall, built of brick, was undermined; the scaling-ladders were fixed; several breaches were made; and the town was taken by assault. Seventeen thousand Indians are said to have perished in

¹ The modern histories of Alexander universally misrepresent this conference. All of them, as far as I know, make Porus say, "that he desires to be treated like a king:" an explanation which cannot be reconciled with Alexander's reply, *Ταυτο μιν εστω, σοι Πωρος σπουδαιον ου δε σπουδαιον εστι μοι, τι σοι φιλονεικει;* I will act towards you, O Porus! as becomes a king, on my own account; but what do you desire that I should do on yours?

² This generous animal, who had so long shared the toils and dangers of his master, had formerly received signal marks of royal regard. Having disappeared in the country of the Uzii, Alexander issued a proclamation, commanding his horse to be restored, otherwise he would ravage the whole country with fire and sword. This command was immediately obeyed. "So dear," says Arrian, "was Bucephalus to Alexander, and so terrible was Alexander to the Barbarians." Arrian, p. 114.

the sack of Sangala; above seventy thousand were taken prisoners; Sangala was razed; its confederates submitted or fled. Above a hundred Macedonians fell in the siege or assault; twelve hundred were wounded.

The persevering intrepidity of Alexander thus rendered him master of the valuable country, now called the Punjab, watered by the five great streams whose confluence forms the Indus.³ The banks of the Hyphasis, the most eastern of these rivers, which he actually intended to cross, allured by the flattering description of the adjoining territory, were adorned by twelve Macedonian altars, equal in height, and exceeding in bulk, the greatest towers in that country. These monuments, erected midway between Delhi and Lahor,⁴ marked the extremity of Alexander's empire; an empire thus limited, not by the difficulties of the country, or the opposition of enemies, but by the immovable and unanimous resolution of his European troops.

3 The annals of the Gentoos distinguish Alexander by the epithets of Mhaahah, Dukkoyt, and Koonah, "the great robber and assassin;" but most of the Oriental traditions are highly honourable to that prince, and extol his humanity not less than his prowess. The high idea entertained of him by the Indians, appears from their ascribing to his taste and magnificence, the most remarkable monuments scattered over their immense country. See l'Examen Critique, p. 143, et seq. M. Anquetil's Zend-Avesta, t. i. p. 362. and Mr. Howell's Religion of the Gentoos, P. ii. p. 5.

4 Probably near the place where the great western road passes between these cities. See D'Anville Geogr. Ancienne, and Gibbon's Hist. vol. i. c. ii. Major Rennel, however, in his excellent Memoir on the new Map of Indostan, assigns reasons for believing that Alexander was not so high up the river. "After crossing," says he, "the Acesines, or Jenaub, and the Hydraotes or Ravee, which latter he may be supposed to cross at the place where Lahor now stands, he appears to have been drawn out of the direct route towards the Ganges, to attack the city of Sangala, most probably lying between Lahor and Moultan. From Sangala he proceeded to the Hyphasis, or Setlege, most probably between Abjodin and Debalpour, by the circumstance of the deserts lying between him and the Ganges; for the country between the Beath and the Ganges is fertile and well inhabited, but that between the lower parts of the Setlege and the Ganges, has really a desert in it, as Timur experienced in his march from Adjodin to Balnir. The distance between Alexander's position on the Hyphasis and the Jumma, as given by Pliny, accords with this opinion. He gives it as three hundred and thirty six Roman miles, which, by a proper proportional scale, formed from his distances in known places, reaches from the banks of the Jumma to a point a little below the conflux of the Beath and Setlege. But had Alexander been as high up the river as the place where the great western road crosses from Lahor to Delhi, he would have been only two hundred and fifty such miles from the Jumma. This opinion is strengthened by the account of what happened immediately after; I mean his recrossing the Hydraotes, and then encamping on the bank of the Acesines, in a low situation, and where the whole country was flooded on the coming on of the periodical rains; which circumstances obliged him to move his camp higher up the river, into a more elevated country. This agrees perfectly with the description of the country. The lower parts of the courses of the Jenaub and Ravee are really through a low country; and these are also the parts nearest to Adjodin and Debalpour, between which places, I suppose, Alexander's altars were erected." It is rather unfortunate for this ingenious conjecture, that the desert on the eastern bank of the Hyphasis, between Alexander and the Ganges, is to be found only in the inaccurate compilation of Diodorus, l. xvii. p. 612. (whose narrative of Alexander's expedition is as much inferior to Arrian's, as his imperfect and inconsistent account of the expedition of the younger Cyrus, and the retreat of the ten thousand, is inferior to the admired Anabasis of Xenophon,) and in the romantic description of Curtius, l. ix. c. ii. The existence of such a desert, at the extremity of Alexander's conquests, is contradicted by the circumstantial and satisfactory narrative of Arrian, l. v. p. 119. who says, "that the country beyond the Hyphasis was rich and fertile, the inhabitants industrious and brave; governed by a modern aristocracy; flourishing in peace and plenty; possessing a great number of elephants, and those of superior strength and stature."

Olymp.
cxiii. 3.

A. C. 326.

Invincible by his enemies, Alexander submitted to his friends, at whose desire he set bounds to his trophies in the East. But his restless curiosity prepared new toils and dangers for the army and himself. Having returned to the cities Nicæa and Bucephalia, he divided his forces, for the sake of exploring more carefully the unknown regions of India. Two divisions, respectively commanded by Craterus and Hephestion (for Cænus was now dead,) had orders to march southward along the opposite banks of the Hydaspes. Philip, to whom he had committed the government of the provinces adjacent to Bactria, was recalled with the troops under his command; and the whole Macedonian conquests in India, including seven nations and above two thousand cities, were subjected to the dominion of Porus. Mean while the Ionians, Cyprians, Phœnicians, and other maritime nations, who followed the standard of Alexander, industriously built, or collected, above two thousand vessels,⁵ for sailing down the Hydaspes till its junction with the Indus, and thence along that majestic stream to the Indian ocean. On board this fleet the king embarked in person with the third division of his forces. His navigation employed several months, being frequently retarded by hostilities with the natives, particularly the warlike tribe of the Malli. These Barbarians were driven from the open country; their cities were successively besieged and taken; but, at the storm of their capital, a scene was transacted, which would have indicated madness in any other general, and which betrayed temerity even in Alexander.

When their streets were filled with the enemy, the Malli took refuge in their citadel. This fortress was defended by a thick wall, which being thrown around the declivity of a mountain, was extremely lofty without, but towards the inner circumference of an inconsiderable height. Alexander, provoked by the

5 "It may appear extraordinary," says Mr. Rennel, "that Alexander should, in the course of a few months, prepare so vast a fleet for his voyage down the Indus; especially as it is said to be the work of his army. But the Punjab country, like that of Bengal, is full of navigable rivers, which communicating with the Indus, form an uninterrupted navigation from Cashmere to Tatta, and no doubt abounded with boats and vessels ready constructed to the conqueror's hands. I think it probable too, that the vessels in which Nearchus performed his coasting voyage to the Gulf of Persia, were found in the Indus. Vessels of one hundred and eighty tons burden are sometimes used in the Ganges; and those of one hundred not unfrequently." It is worthy of observation, that this judicious conjecture of Mr. Rennel is justified by the words of Arrian. In speaking of the number of vessels, he says, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα πλοῖα, ἢ τῶν τῶν πλοίωντων κατὰ τοὺς ποταμούς, ἢ ἐν τῇ τότε πενήντῳ, p. 124. The vessels employed by Alexander appear, therefore, to have been partly collected on the Indian rivers, and partly constructed for the occasion. They were, 1. Long ships, for the purpose of war; 2. Round ships, for carrying provisions, baggage, &c.; and 3. πταγωγά πλοῖα, vessels for transporting horses. Mr. Rennel's conjecture can only relate to the ships of burden. That the two other kinds were built by the Ionians and islanders, appears from Arrian, p. 124, and 181. The account of Alexander's embarkation, given in Arrian's expedition of Alexander, as well as in his Indian history, is inconsistent with the relation of Curtius, l. ix. c. til. with that of Diodorus, l. xvii. p. 363. and that of Justin, l. xii. c. ix. The narrative of Arrian is, however, confirmed by Strabo, l. xv. p. 1023. That accurate geographer informs us, that the fleet was constructed near the cities which Alexander had built on each side the Hydaspes; and that the timber, chiefly pine, fir, and cedar, was brought from a wood near to Mount Emodus.

obstinacy of the Indians, commanded the scaling-ladders to be applied with all possible expedition. But this service being performed more tardily than usual, the king, in his anger, snatched a ladder from one who carried it, and having fastened it to the wall, mounted with rapidity in defiance of the enemy's weapons. The Macedonians, alarmed by the danger of their general, followed in such numbers, that the ladder broke as Alexander reached the summit; the same accident happened to other ladders which were hastily applied, and injudiciously crowded. For some moments, the king thus remained alone on the wall, conspicuous by the brightness of his arms, and the extravagance¹ of his valour, exposed to thick volleys of hostile darts from the adjacent towers. His resolution was more than daring. At one bound he sprang into the place, and posting himself at the wall, slew the chief of the Malli, and three others, who ventured to assault him. Mean while Abreas, Leonnatus, and Peucestas, the only Macedonians who had got safe to the top of the wall, imitated the example of Alexander. Abreas was wounded and fell; his companions, regardless of their own safety, defended the king, whose breast had been pierced with an arrow. They were soon covered with wounds, and Alexander seemed ready to expire. By this time, the Macedonians had burst through the gates of the place. Their first concern was to carry off the king; the second to revenge his death, for they believed the wound to be mortal, as breath issued forth with his blood. Some report, that the weapon was extracted by Critodemus of Cos; others, that no surgeon being near, Perdicas, of the life-guards, opened the wound with his sword, by his master's command. The great effusion of blood threatened his immediate dissolution; but a seasonable swooning retarded the circulation of the fluids, stopped the discharge of blood, and saved the life of Alexander. The affectionate admiration in which he was held by his troops, appeared in their gloomy sadness during his danger, and their immoderate joy at his recovery.²

Having performed his intended voyage to the ocean, and provided necessaries for a long march, Alexander determined to proceed towards Persepolis, through the barren solitudes of Gedrosia. A. C. 342. This arduous design was not inspired by an idle ambition to surpass the exploits of Cyrus and Semiramis, whose armies were said to have perished in those deserts, but prompted by the necessity of supplying with water, the first European fleet which navigated the Indian sea, explored the Persian gulf, and examined the mouths of the Euphrates and the Tigris. This important voyage was performed, and afterwards related, by Nearchus,³ whose

¹ Τὸ ἀτοπὸν τῆς τολμῆς; literally, "the absurdity of his valour," could our idiom admit such an expression; ἀτοπος properly signifies "what has no place in nature." It is commonly translated *absurd*, but may here mean *super-natural*.

² The extraordinary adventure related in the text, is said by Curtius, l. ix. c. iv. to have happened in storming a city of the Oxydracæ. Lucian (Dial. mort.) et Pausan. (Attic.) agree with Curtius. But these are feeble authorities, compared with Arrian, l. vi. p. 127, et seq. et Strabo, l. xvii. p. 1096.

³ Nearchus was a native of Crete, but had long resided

enterprising genius was worthy of the master whom he served. In discovering the sea and the land, the fleet and army of Alexander mutually assisted each other. By the example of the king, both were taught to despise toil and danger. On foot, and encumbered with his armour, he traversed the tempestuous sands of the Persian coast, sharing the hunger, thirst, and fatigue of the meanest soldier;⁴ nor was it till after a march of two months, distinguished by unexampled hardships, that the army emerged into the cultivated province of Carmania.

In this country Alexander was met by a division of his forces, which he had sent under the command of Craterus through the territories of the Arii and Derangæ. Stasanor and Phrathaphernæ, governors of those warlike nations, and of the more northern provinces of Parthia and Hyrcania, brought a seasonable supply of camels and other beasts of burden, to relieve the exigencies of an army enfeebled by disease and exhausted by fatigue. The waste of men, occasioned by this destructive expedition,⁵ was repaired by the arrival of numerous battalions from Media, which rendered the standard of Alexander sufficiently respectable. Cleander and Sitalus, the commanders of those forces, were accused by the Medes of despoiling their temples, ransacking their tombs, and committing other detestable deeds of avarice and cruelty. Their own soldiers confirmed the accusation; and their crimes were punished with death. This prompt justice gave immediate satisfaction, and served as a salutary example in future; for, of all the rules of government, practised by this illustrious conqueror, none had a stronger tendency to confirm his authority, and consolidate his empire than his vigilance to restrain the rapacity of his lieutenants, and to defend his subjects from oppression.⁶

in Amphipolis. The journal of his celebrated voyage from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, is preserved in Arrian's Indian History, from c. xx. to c. xli. inclusively. Seven months were employed in this voyage, during three of which the fleet kept the sea. Nearchus sailed in the month of September, and arrived in April in the Euphrates, Plin. Nat. Hist. l. vi. c. xxiii. The relation of this illustrious admiral has been called in question by Dodwell, Hardouin, and others: but its authenticity is confirmed by the incomparable d'Anville. See Recherch. Georg. sur le Golfe Persique, Acad. des Inscript. t. xxx. p. 133.

⁴ Parties were continually employed on all sides, in searching for water. On one occasion, they were more unfortunate than usual; the heat of the sun was excessive, and reflected by the scorching sand; Alexander marched on foot, parched with thirst, exhausted by fatigue, and oppressed by care. Amidst these distressful circumstances, some soldiers discovering a small quantity of turbid water, brought it in great haste to the king. He received the present with thanks, then poured it on the ground; and the water, thus spilt, refreshed not only Alexander, but the whole army. Arrian, p. 141.

⁵ Plutarch says, that the march through Gedrosia cost Alexander near one hundred thousand men; a palpable exaggeration, since he supposes the whole army, at their departure from India, to have amounted to one hundred and twenty thousand foot, and fifteen thousand horse; of which one division embarked with Nearchus, and another marched, under the command of Craterus, through the territories of the Arii and Drangæ; little more than a third part of the whole number entered the Gedrosian deserts.

⁶ Καὶ τοῦτο, οἷός τε ἄλλο, κατισχεν ἐν κοσμῷ τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου. δορυμῶτα, ἡ ἐκόντα περισχόμεντα, τὸ παῦτα μὲν πληθεῖ οὐτα, τοσόνδε ἄλλων ἀριστηροῦσι οἱ οὐκ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῇ Ἀλεξάνδρου βασιλείᾳ ἀδικίᾳ τὸς μεχόμενους ὑπὸ τῶν μεχόντων. Arrian, l. vi. p. 143. "This, especially, kept in awe the nations that were either subdued by Alexander, or that voluntarily submitted to him (numeri-

Among the fables, which gave the air of romance to the memorable exploits of Alexander, we may reckon the triumphant procession through Carmania. In imitation of Bacchus, Alexander is said to have traversed this province, amidst dancing and music, crowned with flowers, intoxicated with wine, and allowing the utmost extravagance of disorder and folly to himself and his followers.⁷ The revel continued seven days, during which a small body of sober men might have overwhelmed this army of bacchanals, and avenged the cause of Darius and of Asia.⁸ Were not this improbable fiction discountenanced by the silence of contemporary writers,⁹ it would be refuted by its own absurdity. Instead of yielding to the transports of mad joy, Alexander, whose heart was extremely susceptible of compassion, must have been deeply afflicted by the recent loss of so many brave men; nor did the necessity of his affairs, to which he was ever duly attentive, admit of unseasonable delay.

Encouraged by the long absence of their master, and the perils to which his too adventurous character continually exposed his life, Harpalus, Orsines, and Abulites, who were respectively governors of Babylon, Persepolis, and Susa, began to despise his orders, and to act as independent princes, rather than accountable ministers. In such emergencies, Alexander knew by experience the advantage of celerity. He therefore divided his army. The greater part of the heavy-armed troops were entrusted to Hephæstion, with orders to proceed along the sea-coast, and to attend the motions of the fleet commanded by Nearchus. With the remainder the king hastened to Pasargadæ. Orsines was convicted of many enormous crimes, which were punished with as enormous severity.¹⁰ Baryaxes, a Mede, who had assumed the royal tiara, suffered death; his numerous adherents shared the same fate. The return of Alexander from the East proved fatal to Abulites, and his son Oxathres, who, during the absence of their master, had cruelly oppressed the wealthy province of Susiana, and particularly the inhabitants of the capital. Harpalus, whose conduct at Babylon had been no less flagitious, escaped with his treasures to Athens: the avarice of the Athenians engaged them to receive this wealthy fugitive; but their fears forbade them to harbour the enemy of Alexander. By a decree of the people, he was expelled from Attica, and this traitor to the most generous of princes seems himself to have been soon afterwards treacherously slain.¹¹

ous and remote as they were :) that, under the reign of this prince, the governors durst not injure the governed."

⁷ Plut. in Alexand. Diodor. p. 573.

⁸ Curtius, l. ix. c. x.

⁹ Arrian informs us, that neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus make the least mention of this extraordinary transaction, which he treats with proper contempt. Vid. Arrian, p. 143.

¹⁰ Arrian, who excuses Alexander's adopting the Persian manners, repeatedly blames him for imitating the Barbarian punishments.

¹¹ Comp. Curtius, l. x. c. ii. Plut. in Demosthen. Diodor. l. xviii. p. 19. Strabo, l. xvii. p. 576. But all these writers omit the first crime of Harpalus mentioned by Arrian, the pardon of which does great honour to the clemency of Alexander. Harpalus, even in the life-time of Philip, had gained the friendship of his illustrious son, who, soon after mounting the throne, employed him as his treasurer. But, before the battle of Issus, this unworthy minister betrayed

The brave Peucestos, who had saved Alexander's life at the assault of the Mallian fortress, was promoted to the government of Persia. In this important command, he proved his wisdom to be equal to his valour. By conforming to the customs, adopting the manners, and using the language of the vanquished, he acquired the affectionate respect of the people committed to his care. His pliant condescension, directed by sound policy, was highly approved by the discernment of Alexander; but his affectation of foreign manners greatly offended the pride of his Macedonian countrymen.

Olymp. In the central provinces of his
cxiii. 4. empire, which from time immemo-
A. C. 325. rial had been the seat of Asiatic
pomp and luxury, Alexander spent the last, and not the least glorious, year of his reign. In the nervous language of antiquity, the world was silent in his presence; and his only remaining care was to improve and consolidate his conquests. For these important purposes, he carefully examined the course of the Eulæus, the Tigris, and the Euphrates; and the indefatigable industry of his troops was judiciously employed in removing the weirs or dams, by which the timid ignorance of the Assyrian and Persian kings had obstructed the navigation of those great rivers. But Alexander, having no reason to dread fleets of war, wished to invite those of commerce. The harbours were repaired; arsenals were constructed; a bason was formed at Babylon sufficient to contain a thousand galleys. By these and similar improvements, he expected to facilitate internal intercourse among his central provinces, while, by opening new channels of communication he hoped to unite the wealthy countries of Egypt and the East, with the most remote regions of the earth. His ships were sent to explore the Persian and Arabian gulfs. Archias brought him such accounts of the former, that he determined to plant its shores with Grecian colonies. Hieron of Soli proceeded farthest in examining the Arabian coast; but he found it impossible to double the southern extremity of that immense peninsula, and still more to remount (as he had been commanded by Alexander) to the city Hieropolis in Egypt. This daring enterprise seemed to be reserved for the king in person. It is certain, that, shortly before his death, he took measures for examining this great southern gulf, as well as for discovering the shores of the Caspian Sea, which was then believed to communicate with the Northern Ocean.¹²

But objects, less remote, demanded his more immediate attention. In the winter season, the waters of the Euphrates, which produce the extraordinary fertility of Assyria,¹³ are confined

his trust, and fled to Megara. Alexander, unwilling hastily to condemn an old friend, who had for his sake incurred the resentment of Philip, ascribed the misconduct of Harpalus to the bad counsels of Tauriscus, a daring villain, who had accomplished his flight. After the death of Tauriscus, he prevailed on Harpalus again to return to his service, and again entrusted him with the custody of his treasures. Arrian, l. iii. c. vi.

¹² Arrian, l. vii. p. 154.

¹³ "This country," according to Strabo, "is more fertile than any other; producing, it is said, three hundred fold." Strabo, p. 1077.

within their lofty channel. But in spring and summer, and especially towards the summer solstice they overflow their banks, and, instead of watering, would totally deluge the adjacent territory, unless the superfluous fluid were discharged into the great canal of Pallacopas. This artificial river, formed, it is said, by Nebuchadnezzar, commences a hundred miles below Babylon. It is not fed by springs, nor replenished from mountain snows, but branching from the great trunk of the Euphrates, moderates its too impetuous stream, by diverting it into the sea, through lakes and marshes, by various, and for the most part, invisible outlets. But this useful contrivance finally defeated its own purpose. The Pallacopas gradually sunk into its soft and oozy bed, and the Euphrates, which even originally was much higher than this canal, continued to flow into the new channel, even after the season when its waters cease to rise by the melting of the Armenian snows. This diminution of the river rendered it insufficient to water the fields of Assyria; an inconvenience severely felt in a country almost unacquainted with rain. The governors of Babylon attempted unsuccessfully to remedy the evil, whose magnitude justly excited the attention of Alexander. From war, the mother of arts, he had learned to improve the benefits of peace. While preparations were making for more distant expeditions, he sailed down the Euphrates; carefully examined the nature of the soil; and having discovered, at the distance of about four miles from the inosculation of the Euphrates and Pallacopas, a hard and rocky bottom, he commanded a canal to be cut there, which served to moderate the inundations at one season, without too much draining the waters at another. Having performed this essential service to Assyria, he followed the course of the Pallacopas, and surveyed the lakes and marshes, which guard the Arabian frontiers. In the neighbourhood of this new canal, he observed a convenient situation for a city, which being built and fortified, was peopled with those superannuated Greeks, who seemed no longer capable of military service, and with such others of their countrymen as thought proper to settle in this fertile, though remote country.¹

Animated by a zeal for public happiness, Alexander thus traversed the populous provinces of the East, and successively visited the imperial cities of Persepolis, Susa, Ecbatana, and Babylon. These places, and others of inferior note, were adorned with signal marks of his taste, and respectively distinguished by transactions which discover the boldest, yet most enlightened views of policy. The important design of uniting, by laws and manners, the subjects of his extensive monarchy, was ever present to his mind. For this purpose, he took care to incorporate in his Barbarian armies the Greeks and Macedonians. In each company, or rather in each division of sixteen, he joined four Europeans to twelve Asiatics. In the Macedonian squadrons and battalions, he intermixed, on the other hand, such of the Barbarians as were most distinguished by their strength, their acti-

vity, and their merit. Soon after the battle of Arbela, he had given orders to raise new levies in the conquered provinces. The Barbarian youth delighted in the Grecian exercise and discipline, and rejoiced at being associated to the glory of their victors. On the banks of the Tigris, Alexander was joined by a powerful body of those recruits, whose improvements in arts and arms fully answered his expectations, and justly rewarded his foresight. The arrival of such numerous auxiliaries enabled him to discharge at Opis, a city on the Tigris, such Greeks and Macedonians as were tired of the service, worn out with age, or enfeebled by sickness. After an interesting scene, which we shall have occasion to describe, he dismissed those respectable veterans, loaded with wealth and honours. They were conducted by Craterus, whom he appointed to succeed Antipater in the administration of his European dominions; and Antipater, who had long executed that important trust with equal prudence and fidelity, was commanded to join his master with new levies from Greece, Thrace, and Macedon.²

At Susa, Alexander learned that his soldiers, indulging the extravagance too natural to their profession, had contracted immense debts, which they had neither ability nor inclination to pay. Upon this intelligence, he issued orders that each man should give an exact account of what he owed, with the names of his creditors, declaring, that he was determined to satisfy them at his own expense. The troops suspected an intention, merely to discover their characters, and to learn their economy or profusion. At first, therefore, many denied, and all diminished, their debts. But Alexander issued a second declaration, "That it became not a prince to deceive his people, nor a people to suppose their prince capable of deceit." Faithful lists were immediately presented, and the whole debts discharged, to the amount, it is said, of four millions sterling.

This event was accompanied by a transaction of a different kind, which discovers, however, the same spirit, and which equally endeared Alexander to his Asiatic subjects. In the royal palace of Susa, he publicly espoused Barciné,³ the daughter of Darius; and bestowed her sister Drypetis on his friend Hephæstion, saying, that he wished their children to be kinsmen. By the advice of their master, Perdicas, Seleucus, Ptolemy, and other generals, intermarried with the most illustrious of the vanquished Barbarians. The soldiers were encouraged by presents, and by the hope of royal favour, to follow the example of their leaders; and it appeared from the catalogue of their names, presented to the king, that above ten thousand Greeks and Macedonians married Asiatic women.⁴

² Arrian, ubi supra.

³ Called Statira by Curtius, Justin, and Plutarch.

⁴ Plutarch, seizing the true spirit of these regulations, exclaims, Ὁ βασιλεὺς διεξῆλθε, καὶ ἀνοήτι, καὶ μάτην πολλὰ περὶ τὴν ἑλλησποντικὴν πολεμικὴν γέφυραν, οὕτως ἰσχυροὺς βασιλῆας Ἀσίαν ἑυρώπη συνάπτουσι, οὐ ξυλοῖς, οὐδὲ σχιδίαις, οὐδὲ ἀψύχοις καὶ ἀσυμπάθεισι διασμοῖς, ἀλλ' ἰσχυρῶς νομίμῳ καὶ γάμοις σωμαροῖσι, καὶ κοινωνικαῖς παιδευταῖς γίνῃ συνάπτουσι. "O! barbarous and foolish Xerxes,

¹ Arrian, ubi supra.

Olymp. he was careful to celebrate the musical and gymnastic games; those distinguishing fruits of Grecian culture, which being adapted to gratify the senses, as well as to please the fancy, were beheld with delight even by the most ignorant Barbarians. Convinced that nothing has a more direct tendency to unite and harmonize the minds and manners of men, than public entertainments and common pleasures, Alexander determined to introduce and diffuse the amusements of the theatre. For this purpose above three thousand players and musicians, collected from all parts of Greece, assembled in Ecbatana, the capital of Media, which was chosen for the scene of those theatrical exhibitions.⁶ But the sickness and death of Hephæstion changed this magnificent spectacle into melancholy obsequies. In the moment of his triumph, the king was deprived of his dearest friend.⁶ This irreparable loss, he felt and expressed with an affectionate ardour congenial to his character, and justified his immoderate sorrow by the inconsolable⁷ grief of Achilles for the fate of his beloved Patrocles. During three days and nights after the death of Hephæstion, Alexander neither changed his apparel nor tasted food. A public mourning was observed throughout the empire. Funeral games were celebrated in the great cities; the royal cohort was commanded thenceforward to retain the name and banner of Hephæstion;⁸ and the lofty genius of Stasicrates erected at Ecbatana a monument worthy of him, whom the obsequious oracle of Ammon declared deserving of heroic worship. To appease the grief of Alexander, his lieutenants dedicated their armour at the tomb of his friend. The example was given by Eumenes, the king's secretary, who shortly before Hephæstion's death, had offended this illustrious favourite; a man who long and uninterruptedly enjoyed,

without abusing in any one instance, the confidence of his master; who exercised power without pride, and enforced discipline without severity; whose conduct merited at once public respect and royal favour, and whose virtues disarmed envy.⁹

To moderate and divert his sorrow, Alexander, who in the practice of war found at once business and amusement, undertook an expedition in person, which perhaps would otherwise have been committed to the valour of his lieutenants. The Cossæans, a fierce and untractable nation, inhabited the southern frontier of Media. Secure amidst their rocks and fastnesses, they had ever defied the arms of the Persians; and the degenerate successors of Cyrus had judged it more prudent to purchase their friendship than to repel their hostility. In their annual journey from Babylon to Ecbatana, the pride of these magnificent but pusillanimous princes condescended to bestow presents on the Cossæans, that they might procure an undisturbed passage for themselves and their train; and this impolitic meanness only increased the audacity of the mountaineers, who often ravaged the Susian plains, and often retired to their fastnesses, loaded with the richest spoils of Media. Alexander was not of a temper patiently to endure the repetition of such indignities. In forty days, he attacked, defeated, and totally subdued this rapacious and warlike tribe. The Cossæans were driven from their last retreats, and compelled to surrender their territory. After obtaining sufficient pledges of their fidelity, the conqueror allowed them to ransom their prisoners, and at his departure from their country, took care to erect such fortresses as seemed necessary for bridling, in future, the dangerous fury of this headstrong people.¹⁰

In returning from this successful expedition towards the banks of the Euphrates, Alexander was met by ambassadors from Carthage, Spain, and Italy, as well as from many inland countries of Asia and Africa, extending from Mount Imaus to the southern extremity of Æthiopia. It was then, says his historian, that he appeared master of the world, both to his followers and to himself; and, as if the known parts of it had been insufficient to satisfy his ambition, he gave orders to cut timber in the Hyrcanian forest, with a design to build ships, and explore the undiscovered shores of the Caspian and Arabian seas. But neither these lofty designs, nor the glory of war, nor the pomp of royalty, which, of all princes, Alexander enjoyed in the greatest splendour,¹¹ could appease his grief for

thou who labouredst in vain to throw a bridge over the Hellespont, it is thus that wise kings join Asia to Europe, not by boards, ships, lifeless and insensible bonds, but by lawful love, chaste nuptials, and the indissoluble tie of common progeny." Plut. Orat. i. de Fortun. Alexand. See likewise above, c. ix. p. 113.

5 It should seem from Plutarch, that the entertainments of the theatre were soon diffused through other parts of Asia. Αλεξανδρον την Ασιαν εξημερουντες, Ομηρος ην μαχνησεν, και Ηερων και Σουσιανων και Γιδρασιων παιδες τας Ευριπιδου και Σοφοκλειους τραγωδίας ηδον. "Alexander, having tamed Asia, Homer was read in the East; the children of the Persians, Susians, and Gedrosia, recited the tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides." Plut. ibid.

6 Next to Hephæstion, Craterus seems to have enjoyed the greatest share of Alexander's confidence; yet he often said, "Craterus loves the king, Hephæstion loves Alexander." Plutarch in Alexand. In passing through the Troade, Alexander crowned the tomb of Achilles, and Hephæstion that of Patrocles. Ælian, Var. Hist. xii. 7.

7 If, in the melancholy shades below,
The flames of friends and lovers cease to glow,
Yet mine shall sacred last; and, undecay'd,
Burn on through death, and animate my shade.

Pope's *Hiad*.

8 According to Plutarch, Stasicrates proposed to form Mount Athos into a statue of Alexander, grasping a city with one hand, and with the other discharging a river into the sea. Plut. in Alexand. Vitruvius, l. ii. in Proem. et Lucian, t. ii. p. 489. ascribe this design to Dinocrates. Alexander extolled the boldness of the artist, but added, Εα δε μιν τον Αθω κατα χωρον αχει γαρ ενος βασιλεως ενδυναμωτος ειναι μνημιον. "Let alone Mount Athos; it is enough that it is the monument of one king's folly already;" alluding to the event related above, c. ix. p. 113.

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9 Arrian, p. 156. tells us, that concerning the funeral honours of Hephæstion, innumerable and absurd fictions were invented by the friends and by the enemies of Alexander; nay, what is extraordinary, the same falsehoods were sometimes authorised by both; the former intending thereby to extol the warmth of his friendship, the latter to expose his extravagance and folly.

10 Such is the account of this expedition given by Arrian, l. vii. p. 157. and confirmed by Strabo, l. xi. p. 795. and by Diodorus, l. xvii. p. 577. Plutarch, on the other hand, most unwarrantably and absurdly tells us, that Alexander, to divert his grief, took the amusement of *max-lust-ing*, and massacred the whole Cossæan nation, without distinction of age or sex. Plut. p. 94.

11 Vid. Athen. l. x. p. 436. et l. xii. p. 537—541. We may believe that Alexander's tent contained a hundred

the loss of Hephestion. The death of his beloved friend is said, by Arrian, to have hastened his own. It certainly tinged his character with a deep melancholy, which rendered him susceptible of such impressions as the firmness of his manly soul would otherwise have resisted and repelled.

He, who had so often employed superstition as an instrument of policy, began himself to fall a prey to that miserable passion. The servants of princes, ever quick in discerning, and dexterous in turning to their own profit, the foibles of their masters, soon discovered and abused the weakness of Alexander. Alarmed at the severe treatment of several of his colleagues, Apollodorus, a citizen of Amphipolis, who had been entrusted with the government of Babylon, practised with his brother Pythagoras, a diviner; and the latter, ambitious to promote the greatness of his family, pretended to perceive in the victims evident marks of divine displeasure against the king, should he enter the gates of Babylon. Notwithstanding this menace, Alexander, after reducing the Cosæans, approached towards that city with his army. He was met by a long train of Chaldean priests, who conjured him to change his resolution, because they had received an oracle from Belus, declaring that his journey thither would prove fatal. The interest of the Chaldeans conspired with the views of Apollodorus. The temple of Belus, a stupendous edifice, situate in the heart of Babylon, had been very richly endowed by the Assyrian kings. But the produce of the consecrated ground, instead of being applied to its original destination of repairing the temple, and offering sacrifices to the gods, had, ever since the impious reign of Xerxes, been appropriated by the Chaldean priests. Alexander, it is well known, intended to reform this abuse; and, although his mind was not altogether unmoved by the admonition of the priests, he discerned their interested motives, and answered them by a verse of Euripides, "He's the best prophet that conjectures best." Foiled in their first attempt, the Chaldeans had recourse to another artifice. Since the king had determined at every hazard to visit Babylon, they entreated him at least not to enter it on the eastern side, but to fetch a compass round, and to march with his face towards the rising sun. He prepared to comply with this advice; but the marshiness of the soil rendered his design impracticable; and he

was thus reluctantly compelled to enter the city by the forbidden road.

During his short stay at Babylon, his mind was disturbed by superstitious fears,¹ awakened by the intrigues of Apollodorus, or the artifices of the Chaldeans, and confirmed by a circumstance well fitted to operate on a disordered fancy. In his Indian expedition, he had conversed with the Gymnosophists, or Brachmans, men who practised the philosophy which Plato taught, and whose contempt for the pomp and pleasures of the present life, was founded on the firm belief of a better and more permanent state of existence. To those sages, the fortunate ambition of Alexander appeared an object of derision or pity. At sight of the conqueror, they stamped their feet with vehemence on the ground; indicating, by an expressive action, more eloquent than words, that he, whose name now filled the world, must soon be confined within the narrow grave. The flatterers of the king rebuked them for insulting the son of Jupiter, who had the power to reward or punish them. They replied, by saying, "That all were the sons of Jupiter; that the rewards of Alexander they disdained, and set at defiance his punishments, which at last could only relieve them from the load of frail mortality." Yet Calanus, one of their number, allured by curiosity, or irresistibly captivated by the soothing condescension of the king, agreed to accompany him; for which inconsistency he was much blamed by his companions. Alexander treated this eastern sage with great respect, and when Calanus, who had passed his seventy-second year without experiencing any bodily infirmity, fell sick in Persia, the affectionate prince earnestly entreated him not to anticipate fate by a voluntary death. But finding him inflexibly bent on this purpose, he allowed a pyre to be constructed, to which the Indian (being too feeble to walk or ride on horse-back) was conveyed in a litter. In sight of the Macedonian army, who had been ordered to assist at this uncommon solemnity, Calanus composed himself decently on the pyre; the music struck up; the soldiers raised a shout of war; and the Indian, with a serene countenance, expired amidst the flames, singing a hymn to the gods of his country.

The curiosity of Alexander was unbounded; but his humanity likewise was great. This principle, which is too often a stranger to the breast of conquerors, made him decline witnessing the extraordinary death of a friend, who, for his sake, had abandoned his native land. But before Calanus was carried to the funeral pile, the king affectionately paid him the last visit. Calanus having embraced all present, refused to take leave of Alexander, saying, that "he should again see him in Babylon." The words of a dying man were considered by the Greeks as prophetic. Those of Calanus sunk deep into the mind of Alexander; and the painful impression which they made, hastened his departure from a city, in which so many concurring circumstances forbade him to reside.

couches; that the pillars which supported it were encrusted with gold; that he gave audience, surrounded with guards, and seated on a golden throne. In the language of antiquity, "the master of both continents" found it necessary to unite the pomp of the East with the arts of Greece. But when Athenæus tells us of the precious essences, the fragrant wines, the effeminacy, and vices, of Alexander, we discover the credulous, or rather criminal sophist, who has collected into one work all the vices and impurities which disgraced his country and human nature. To the unwarranted assertions of the obscure writers cited by an Ælian (l. ix. c. iii.) and an Athenæus, we can oppose the authority of an Arrian and a Plutarch.—Could he who so severely censured the effeminate and luxurious life of Agnon and Philotas, be himself effeminate and luxurious. "Of all men," says Arrian, "Alexander was the most economical in what regarded his private pleasures." Arrian, l. vii. p. 167.

¹ He became, says Plutarch, δυσκαπνιστός πρὸς τὸ βίον.

Olymp. cxiv. 1. A. C. 324. May 28th. His superstitious terrors, however, seem to have been diverted by the voyage down the Euphrates, and by directing the improvements in the canal of Pallacopas. Having resumed his courage, he ventured to return to Babylon, gave audience to some Grecian ambassadors, who presented him with golden crowns from the submissive flattery of their several republics; and having reviewed his troops and galleys, prepared to execute the enterprises which he had so long meditated. But his designs and his life were now drawing to a close. Whether to conquer his melancholy, or to triumph in the victory which he had already gained over it, he indulged, without moderation, in that banqueting and festivity to which, after the fatigues of war, he had often shown himself too much addicted; and a fever, occasioned, or at least increased, by an excessive abuse of wine, the vice of his nation and of his family, put a period to his life in the thirty-third year of his age, and in the thirteenth of his reign. After the first days of the disorder, he had been conveyed to the cool verdure of a beautiful garden; but the malady increasing, he was soon brought back to the palace. The last remains of strength, he spent in assisting at daily sacrifices to the gods. During his illness he spoke but little, and that only concerning his intended expeditions. The temples were crowded by his friends; the generals waited in the hall; the soldiers surrounded the gates. Such was the grief of many, and the respectful admiration of all, that none ventured to announce to him his approaching dissolution, none ventured to demand his last orders. When all hopes of recovery had vanished, his favourite troops were admitted to behold him. He was speechless, but had still strength to stretch forth his hand.²

Such was the reign of Alexander, whose character, being unexampled and inimitable, can only be explained by relating his actions. He was of a low stature, and somewhat deformed; but the activity and elevation of his mind animated and ennobled his frame. By a life of continual labour, and by an early and habitual practice of the gymnastic exercises, he had hardened his body against the impressions of cold and heat, hunger and thirst,³ and prepared his robust constitution for bearing such exertions of strength and activity, as have appeared incredible to the undisciplined softness of modern times. In generosity and in prowess, he rivalled the greatest heroes of antiquity; and in the race of glory, having finally outstripped all competitors, became ambitious to surpass himself. His superior skill in war gave uninterrupted success to his arms; and his natural

humanity, enlightened by the philosophy of Greece, taught him to improve his conquests to the best interests of mankind.⁴ In his extensive dominions, he built, or founded, not less than seventy cities,⁵ the situation of which being chosen with consummate wisdom, tended to facilitate communication, to promote commerce, and to diffuse civility through the greatest nations of the earth.⁶ It may be suspected, indeed, that he mistook the extent of human power, when, in the course of one reign, he undertook to change the face of the world; and that he miscalculated the stubbornness of ignorance, and the force of habit, when he attempted to enlighten barbarism, to soften servitude, and to transplant the improvements of Greece into an African and Asiatic soil, where they have never been known to flourish. Yet let not the designs of Alexander be too hastily accused of extravagance. Whoever seriously considers what he actually performed before his thirty-third year, will be cautious of determining what he might have accomplished, had he reached the ordinary term of human life. His resources were peculiar to himself; and such views, as well as actions, became him, as would have become none besides. In the language of a philosophical historian, "he seems to have been given to the world by a peculiar dispensation of Providence, being a man like to none other of the human kind."⁷

From the part which his father Philip and himself acted in the affairs of Greece, his history has been transmitted through the impure channels of exaggerated flattery, or malignant envy. The innumerable fictions, which disgrace the works of his biographers, are contradicted by the most authentic accounts of his reign, and inconsistent with those public transactions, which concurring authorities confirm. In the present work, it seemed unnecessary to expatiate on such topics, since it is less the business of history to repeat, or even to expose errors, than to select and impress useful truths. An author, ambitious of attaining that purpose, can seldom indulge the language of general panegyric. He will acknowledge, that Alexander's actions were not always blameless; but, after the most careful examination, he will affirm, that his faults were few in number, and resulted from his situation rather than from his character.

⁴ Plutarch says, the nations conquered by Alexander might adopt the language of Themistocles, when, in consequence of his banishment from Greece, he was raised to great wealth and honour in Asia. "Ὁ παῖς ἀπαλωμένη, ἢ μὴ ἀπαλωμένη." "O my children! we should have been undone, had we not been undone." In the same manner, those nations, had they not been vanquished by Alexander, had not been civilized, Egypt would not boast her Alexandria, Mesopotamia her Seleucia, &c. And again, "Alexander taught marriage to the Hyrcanians, and agriculture to the Arachosii. He taught the Sogdians to maintain, and not to kill, their parents; the Persians to respect, and not to marry, their mothers; the Scythians to bury, and not to eat, their dead." Plut. *ibid*.

⁵ Vid. Plut. de Fortun. Alexand. tit. ii. p. 327. In the language of Plutarch, he sowed Asia with Greek cities.

⁶ Plut. *ibid*. Diodor. Sicul. xvii. 83. Stephan. Byzant. in voc. Ἀλεξανδρία.

⁷ Οὐδὲ μοι εἴω του θεοῦ φυναι ἀν δόξει ἀνὴρ οὐδὲν ἄλλω ἀνθρώπων σοικως. Arrian, p. 168. How far he was an instrument in the hands of Divine Providence, belongs not to the subject of profane history to inquire. On this subject, the reader may see Bishop Lowth on Isaiah, xix. 18. and xxiv. 14.

² Arrian says, that many reports were spread concerning the death of Alexander, such as, that he had been poisoned by the emissaries of Antipater, whom, as mentioned above in the text, he had recently deprived of the government of Greece and Macedon; that when asked to whom he bequeathed the empire, he had answered, to the "strongest;" and that he had foretold his obsequies would be celebrated by bloody wars among his lieutenants. But these rumours received not the least countenance from the royal diary, which seems to have been carefully copied by Arrian, nor from the histories of Ptolemy and Aristobolus.

³ Plut. Orat. i. et ii. de Fortun. Alexand.

From the first years of his reign, he experienced the crimes of disaffection and treachery, which multiplied, and became more dangerous, with the extent of his dominions, and the difficulty to govern them. Several of his lieutenants early aspired at independence; others formed conspiracies against the life of their master. The first criminals were treated, as we have already seen, with a lenity becoming the generous spirit of Alexander. But when Olymp. Philotas, the son of Parmenio, and even Parmenio¹ himself, afforded cxii. 4. reason to suspect their fidelity; A. C. 329. when the Macedonian youths, who, according to the institution of Philip, guarded the royal Pavilion, prepared to murder their sovereign,² he found it necessary to depart from his lenient system, and to hold with a firmer hand the reins of government. Elated by unexampled prosperity, and the submissive reverence of vanquished nations, his loftiness disgusted the pride of his European troops, particularly the Macedonian nobles, who had been accustomed to regard themselves rather as his

¹ Philotas was punished in the country of the Arii; Parmenio was put to death in Media. Curtius (l. vi. c. vii. et seq.) who has given the fullest account of these executions, says, that Philotas deserved not the compassion of his friends, "*Amicorum misericordiam non meruit.*" He leaves it uncertain whether Parmenio fell a sacrifice to his own treason, or to the policy of Alexander. Arrian thinks, that the death of Parmenio was necessary to his master's safety.—Although the evidence of this general's guilt has not been handed down to posterity, Alexander, it is certain, believed him guilty. He who disdained to conquer his enemies by deceit, cannot, without proof, be supposed capable of treacherously assassinating his friends.

² This conspiracy is related by Arrian, l. iv. c. xiii. and xiv. The scene was Bactra, or Zariaspa, the capital of Bactria. At a hunting-match, the king, being ready to kill a boar, was anticipated by Hermolaus. To punish the insolence of the youth, Alexander ordered him to be whipped. The disgrace seemed intolerable to Hermolaus and his companions; a conspiracy was formed to destroy Alexander in his sleep. It was discovered by Ptolemy, the son of Lagus. The youths confessed their guilt, and declared that they had been confirmed in their purpose by Callisthenes, the scholar of Aristotle, an arrogant and morose man, who, sheltered by the cloak of philosophy, insolently brow-beat the prince, whom he was bound to respect (Arrian, p. 871.) The conspirators were stoned to death; a punishment common in that age, when persons accused were tried before numerous assemblies, whose indignation frequently burst forth and destroyed atrocious offenders on the spot, with the first instruments of death that chance offered to their hands. Callisthenes was dragged round the army in chains. Such is the best authenticated account of this affair, concerning which the variations of ancient writers are innumerable. Vid. Arrian, l. iv. c. xiv. Curtius, l. viii. c. viii. Seneca Suasor, l. Justin, l. xv. c. lii. Philostratus, l. viii. c. i. Diodor. Sicul. pp. 356 et 358. Digen. Laert. in Aristot. Suidas, ad voc. As an example of the injustice done the character of Alexander, I shall insert the passage of Seneca: "*Hoc est Alexandri, crimen meritum, quod nulla virtus, nulla bellorum felicitas redimet. Nam quoties quis dixerit, Occidit Persarum multa millia; oppositur, et Callisthenem. Quoties dictum erit, omnia oceano tenuis viciat, ipsam quoque tentavit novis classibus, et imperium ex angulo Thracie usque ad orientis terminos protulit; dicetur, sed Callisthenem occidit.*" Yet this Callisthenes was a traitor, whose writings are mentioned with contempt by Arrian. loc. citat. Polybius, t. ii. pp. 64. 335. et t. iii. p. 45. Cicero ad Quint. Frat. l. ii. epist. xiii. et Longinus, c. iii. p. 14. The patriotism of the Greeks, and the envy of the Romans, could never forgive the transcendent glory of Alexander, which eclipses their own. In speaking of Philip and his son, even Cicero, (de Offic.) says, "*Altor semper magnus, alter semper turpissimus.*" See likewise Livy, l. ix. c. xviii.) The last mentioned writer (l. ix. c. xvii.) goes out of his way to allege very inconclusive arguments for believing, that had Alexander turned his arms against Italy, he would have certainly been conquered by the Romans.

companions than subjects. The pretensions which sound policy taught him to form and to maintain, of being treated with those external honours ever claimed by the monarchs of the East, highly offended the religious prejudices of the Greeks, who deemed it impious to prostrate the body, or bend the knee, to any mortal sovereign. Yet had he remitted formalities consecrated by the practice of ages, he must insensibly have lost the respect of his Asiatic subjects. With a view to reconcile the discordant principles of the victors and vanquished, he affected an immediate descent from Jupiter Ammon, a claim liberally admitted by the avarice or fears of the Libyan priests, and which, he had reason to expect, could not be very obstinately denied by the credulity of the Greeks and Macedonians, who universally acknowledged that Philip, his reputed father, was remotely descended from the Grecian Jupiter. But the success of this design, which might have entitled him, as son of Jupiter, to the same obeisance from the Greeks, which the Barbarians readily paid him as monarch of the East, was counteracted, at first by the secret displeasure, and afterwards by the open indignation, of several of his generals and courtiers. Nor did the conduct of Alexander tend to extricate him from this difficulty. With his friends, he maintained that equal intercourse of visits and entertainments, which characterised the Macedonian manners; indulged the liberal flow of unguarded conversation; and often exceeded that intemperance in wine, which disgraced his age and country.

Olymp. On such occasions his guests, or cxiii. 1. entertainers, enjoyed and abused A. C. 328. the indecent familiarity to which they had been accustomed with their kings; but which the temper of Alexander, corrupted by prosperity and flattery, was no longer able to endure. A scene of drunken debauchery, which must appear highly disgusting to the propriety of modern manners, proved fatal to Clitus, who, emboldened by wine, daringly insulted his prince, vilified his noblest actions, and derided his pretensions to divinity. The king, being likewise intoxicated, was no longer master of himself, when Clitus, who had been once carried from his presence, returned a second time to the charge, and behaved more insolently than before. In an unhappy moment, Alexander thrust a spear into the breast of his friend;³ but instantly repenting his fury, would have destroyed himself by the same weapon, had he not been prevented by his attendants. The bitterness of his repentance, and the pungency of his remorse, which neither flattery could soften, nor sophistry appease,⁴ rendered his life burdensome,

³ Montesquieu, who (Voltaire only excepted) is the most distinguished modern apologist of Alexander, says, "*Il fit deux mauvaises actions; il brula Persepolis et tua Clitus.*" (Esprit des Loix, l. x. c. xiv.) The story of the burning of Persepolis we have already refuted. The death of Clitus, Aristobolus, cited by Arrian, ascribes entirely to the insolence and folly of Clitus himself, and totally exculpates Alexander. But Arrian observes, like a philosopher, that Alexander was justly blameable in allowing himself to be overcome by drunkenness and anger, p. 84.

⁴ Agis, an Argive poet, and Anaxarchus the Sophist, endeavoured to cure his melancholy. The latter told him,

and his actions inconsistent. At times, he assumed the Persian dress and ornaments; displayed the pomp of Oriental despotism; employed, and often preferred, the Barbarians; and, in several passages of his reign, this successful, but unhappy, conqueror appears to have been beset with flatterers, surrounded by conspirators, adored by the passive submission of his eastern subjects, and insulted by the licentious petulance of the Greeks and Macedonians.

The indignation or jealousy of the latter tinged the fairest of his actions with dark and odious colours. About a year before his death, a scene was transacted at Opis on the Tigris, which shows the difficulties of his situation, and the magnanimity by which he overcame them. Having assembled the Macedonian troops, he declared to them his pleasure, that such as felt themselves unable, through age or infirmities, to undergo the fatigues of war, should be honourably discharged from the service, and safely conducted to their respective provinces. This proposal, which ought to have been accepted with gratitude, was heard with disgust. The soldiers reflected, that the army had recently increased by an accession of thirty thousand Barbarians, armed and accoutred after the European fashion, trained to the Grecian discipline and exercises, and instructed in the arts and language of the victors. The king, they thought, no longer cared for the service of his veterans, and therefore dismissed them with contempt. The spirit of sedition seized the camp; the Macedonians unanimously demanded their discharge; some adding with scoffs, "That he had no further use for *them*; his father Ammon could fight his battles." At these words, the king sprung from the rostrum on which he stood, and commanded the most audacious to be seized by his targeteers, and conducted to immediate execution. This prompt severity appeased the rising tumult. The soldiers remained motionless and silent, doubtful or terrified. Alexander again mounted the rostrum, and spoke as follows: "It is not my design, Macedonians, to change your resolution. Return home, without hinderance from me. But, before leaving the camp, first learn to know your king and yourselves. My father Philip (for with him it is ever fit to begin) found you, at his arrival in Macedon, miserable and hopeless fugitives; covered with skins of sheep; feeding among the mountains some wretched herds, which you had neither strength nor courage to defend against the Thracians, Illyrians, and Treballi. Having repelled the ravagers of your country, he brought you from the mountains to the plain, and taught you to confide, not in your fastnesses, but in your valour. By his wisdom and discipline he trained you to arts and civility, enriched you with mines of gold, instructed you in navigation and commerce, and rendered you a terror to those na-

tions, at whose names you used to tremble. Need I mention his conquests in Upper Thracia, or those still more valuable in the maritime provinces of that country? Having opened the gates of Greece, he chastised the Phocians, reduced the Thessalians, and, while I shared the command, defeated and humbled the Athenians and Thebans, eternal foes to Macedon, to whom you had been successively tributaries, subjects, and slaves. But my father rendered you their masters; and having entered the Peloponnesus, and regulated at discretion the affairs of that peninsula, he was appointed, by universal consent, general of combined Greece; an appointment not more honourable to himself, than glorious for his country. At my accession to the throne, I found a debt of five hundred talents, and scarce sixty in the treasury. I contracted a fresh debt of eight hundred; and conducting you from Macedon, whose boundaries seemed unworthy to confine you, safely crossed the Hellespont, though the Persians still commanded the sea. By one victory we gained Ionia, Æolia, both Phrygia, and Lydia. By our courage and activity, the provinces of Cilicia and Syria, the strength of Palestine, the antiquity of Egypt, and the renown of Persia, were added to your empire. Yours now are Bactria and Aria, the productions of India, the fertility of Assyria, the wealth of Susa, and the wonders of Babylon. You are generals, princes, satraps. What have I reserved for myself, but this purple and diadem, which mark my pre-eminence in toil and danger! Where are my private treasures? Or why should I collect them? Are my pleasures expensive? You know that I fare worse than many of yourselves; and have in nothing spared my person. Let him, who dares, compare with me. Let him bare his breast, and I will bare mine. My body, the fore part of my body, is covered with honourable wounds from every sort of weapon. I often watch, that you may enjoy repose; and, to testify my unremitting attention to your happiness, had determined to send home the aged and infirm among you, loaded with wealth and honour. But since you are all desirous to leave me, Go! Report to your countrymen, that, unmindful of the signal bounty of your king, you entrusted him to the vanquished Barbarians. The report, doubtless, will bespeak your gratitude and piety."

Having thus spoken, he sprung from the rostrum, and hastened to the palace, accompanied only by his guards. During two days, none were admitted to his presence. On the third, he called the Persian nobles of distinction, and distributed among them the principal departments of military command. He then issued orders, that certain bodies of the Barbarian infantry and cavalry should be called the royal battalion, and royal cohort, and by such other names as commanded greatest respect. Ap-

that Justice was described by the ancients as seated near the throne of Jupiter, to indicate that right and wrong depended on the will of kings, all whose actions ought to be held just by themselves and others. This flagitious servility Arrian spurns with indignation, and brands with infamy. Arrian, p. 84.

5 It appears from Arrian, that Alexander speaks of these, as distinct from the military fund, and other revenues, employed in paying and rewarding his troops, and in executing such public designs as seemed conducive to the prosperity of the empire.

6 Arrian, p. 152 et seq.

prised of these innovations, the Macedonians, who had long remained in confusion before the tribunal, afraid to follow Alexander, and afraid to allow his retiring unattended, flocked around the palace, and deposited their arms at the gate, humbly requesting to see their king, and declaring that they would never stir from the place, till their tears had moved his compassion. Alexander came forth, beheld their abasement, and wept. The affecting silence, marked by alternate emotions of repentance and reconciliation, was at length broke by Callines, a man highly esteemed in the cavalry: "Thy Macedonians, O king! are grieved that the Persians alone should be called thy kindred, and entitled as such to embrace thee, while none of themselves are allowed to taste that honour."¹ Alexander replied, "From this moment you are all my kindred." Callines then stepped forward and embraced him; and several others having followed the example, they all took up their arms, and returned to the camp with shouts of joy, and songs.

Of all men (if we believe the concurring testimony of his historians) Alexander was the most mindful of his duty to the gods. To thank heaven for the happy issue of this transaction, he celebrated a solemn sacrifice, and after the sacrifice, an entertainment for the principal of his European and Asiatic subjects. The Macedonians were next to his person; the Persians next the Macedonians; the Grecian priests and Persian magi joined in common libations, invoking perpetual concord, and eternal union of empire, to the Macedonians and Persians. Soon afterwards, the invalids, whose dismissal had produced the mutiny, gladly returned home. Alexander discharged their arrears, allowed them full pay until their arrival in Macedon, and granted each soldier a gratuity of two hundred pounds sterling. He again shed tears at parting with upwards of ten thousand men, who had served him in so many glorious campaigns; and, as a testimony of his affectionate concern for their safety, appointed Craterus, whom he loved as his own life,² to be their conductor.

Such was the life of this extraordinary man, whose genius might have changed and improved the state of the ancient world. But the spirit of improvement is transient, and demands perpetual efforts; the sources of degeneracy are permanent and innumerable. It seems at first sight to be regretted, that by neglecting to provide for the succession to his throne, he left the field open for those bloody wars among his captains, which long desolated the earth. Yet the difficulties, with which he was himself obliged to struggle, might teach him the impossibility of securing the empire for the infancy of his son Hercules, or the weakness of his brother Aridæus. The principles of royal succession were never accurately ascertained in Macedon; and the camp of a conqueror could not be expected to prove a good school of moderation or justice. The first measure adopted by his

generals was, to set aside the natural claim of Hercules, born of the daughter of Darius, and to appoint Aridæus, together with the fruit of Roxana's pregnancy, if she brought forth a son, to be joint heirs of the monarchy. This whimsical destination announced little union or stability. Perdiccas, in virtue of possessing the ring or seal of his deceased master, assumed the regency: the troops and provinces were divided among Antigonus, Ptolemy, Craterus, and other chiefs, who, having been formerly the equals, disdained to remain the inferiors, of Perdiccas. Each general trusted in his sword for an independent establishment; new troops were raised and disciplined; leagues formed and broken; the children and relations of Alexander, who became successively prisoners in different hands, all perished miserably; nor was there any cessation of crimes and calamities,³ or any permanent settlement of the provinces, until the battle of Issus in A. C. 301. Phrygia confirmed Ptolemy in the possession of Egypt, and Seleucus in that of Upper Asia.⁴ The issue of the same battle gave Macedon and Greece to Cassander, and Thrace, with several provinces of Lower Asia, to Lysimachus.

The great kingdoms of Syria and Egypt, which continued thenceforward, till subdued by the Romans, to be governed by the respective families of Seleucus and Ptolemy, never generally⁵ adopted the language or manners of their Grecian sovereigns. In Egypt, the first successors of Alexander accomplished the commercial improvements planned by that prince; and the kings both of Egypt and of Syria affected, in their magnificent courts, to join the arts and elegance of Greece to the pomp and luxury of the East. But their ostentation was more remarkable than their taste; their liberal characters were effaced by the continual contact of servitude; they sunk into the softness and insignificance of hereditary despots, whose reigns are neither busy nor instructive; nor could the intrigues of women and eunuchs, or ministers equally effeminate, form a subject sufficiently interesting to succeed the memorable transactions of the Grecian republics.

In the history of those kingdoms, the most important event is their conquest by the Romans, who gradually seized all the western spoils of the empire of Alexander, comprehended between the Euphrates and the Hadri-

³ Diodor. Sicul. l. xix. et xx. passim.

⁴ Arrian, pp. 160. et 164.

⁵ Yet among the higher ranks of men, the Greek language continually gained ground. Before the Christian era, it was spoken by Jews, Romans, and Africans. It was the language of the learned and polite in Egypt and Syria, as well as in Italy and Carthage. It must have been understood by all ranks of men in Judea, since the inspired writers employed it in propagating the gospel, which was to be first preached to the Jews. For this universality, the Greek seems to have been indebted, 1. To the innumerable Greek colonies in Europe, Asia, and Africa. 2. To the conquests of Alexander, whose armies and garrisons were continually reinforced from Greece. 3. To the social and agreeable character of the Greeks. 4. To the excellence of the language itself (see above, chapters v. and 6.) whose duration is as wonderful as its extent. The Greek was spoken in the middle of the fifteenth century, when Constantinople was taken by the Turks; so that, from the time of Homer, it subsisted with little variation, as a living tongue for two thousand and four hundred years.

¹ Arrian says, "While none of themselves ever tasted that honour." *Μακιδόνων οὐκ ἔστι γένεταί τινος τῆς τιμῆς.* Arrian, p. 154.

² Arrian, p. 135.

atic sea, and successively reduced them into the form of provinces. Greece, which came to be distinguished by the name of Achaia, imparted its literature, its arts,⁶ and its vices, to Italy. The conquest of Macedon freed Rome from the weight of taxes. The acquisition of Syria doubled the revenues of that republic. The subjugation of Egypt doubled the price of commodities in Italy. Yet whatever might be the wealth⁷ of those nations, they are entitled to little regard from posterity, since, from the death of Alexander, they were not distinguished by any invention that either improved the practice of war, or increased the enjoyments of peace.

The feeble mixture of Grecian colonization diffused through the East, was sufficient, indeed, to tinge, but too inconsiderable to alter and assimilate, the vast mass of barbarism. But as the principle of degeneracy is often stronger than that of improvement, the sloth and servility of Asia gradually crept into Greece. That unfortunate country, drained of its most enterprising inhabitants, who either followed the standard, or opposed the arms, of Alexander, was equally insulted by the severity and the indulgence of his successors, since, in either case, the Greeks felt and acknowledged their dependence. Reluctantly compelled to submit to a master, they lost that elevation of

character, and that enthusiasm of valour, which had been produced by freedom, nourished by victory, and confirmed by the just sense of national pre-eminence. Their domestic dissensions, by carrying them in great numbers into the service of foreign princes, thereby diffused the knowledge of their tactics and discipline through countries far more extensive and populous than their own; and amidst all their personal animosities, the captains of Alexander, uniformly embracing the maxims of despotism which their master magnanimously disdained, firmly and unitedly resisted and crushed the rising rebellions of the Greeks, whose feeble and ill-conducted efforts for regaining their liberty, only plunged them deeper into servitude. Destitute of immediate and important objects to rouse their activity, the example of their ancestors at length ceased to animate and inspire them. The rewards of merit being withdrawn, men no longer aspired at excellence. The spirit of patriotism evaporated; the fire of genius was extinguished; exertion perished with hope; and, exclusively of the Achæan League,⁹ the unfortunate issue of which has been already explained in this work,¹⁰ Greece, from the age of Alexander, offers not any series of transactions highly memorable in the history of arts or arms.

CHAPTER XL.

State of Literature in the Age of Alexander—Poetry—Music—Arts of Design—Geography—Astronomy—Natural History—Works of Aristotle—Philosophical Sects established at Athens—Decline of Genius—Tenets of the different Sects—Peripatetic Philosophy—Estimate of that Philosophy—Its Fate in the World—Coincidence in the Opinions of Zeno and Epicurus—The Stoic Philosophy—Estimate of that Philosophy—The Epicurean Philosophy—Character of Epicurus—Philosophy of Pyrrho—Conclusion.

IN the latter years of Alexander, literature, philosophy, and the fine arts, displayed their brightest charms; yet the source of that health and vigour, from which their beauty flowed, had already begun to fail. The military expeditions of that illustrious conqueror were described, and published after his death, in the authentic and interesting narratives of Ptolemy and Aristobulus,¹⁰ who had been the witnesses

and companions of his victories. But his extraordinary exploits, and unexampled success, which far eclipsed the imaginary renown of the fabled heroes of antiquity, produced, even in his life-time, a crowd of writers, whose credulity, and love of the marvellous, could only be exceeded by their mean adulation, and servile superstition.¹¹ Exaggeration in matters of fact produced that swelling amplification of style, those meretricious ornaments, and affected graces, which characterized the puerile and frigid compositions of Callisthenes, Onesicritus, and Hegesias.¹² The false taste of these pretended historians, to whose perverse industry must be ascribed the ridiculous trappings which have too long disfigured the august form of Alexander, was admired and imitated by many of their contemporaries. The contagion infected even the orators; and it is worthy of observation, that the verbose emptiness and bombast of the Asiatic eloquence, was first introduced into Greece, in the age which had applauded the chaste and nervous compositions

⁶ Notwithstanding the degeneracy of the Greeks under the Macedonian and Roman governments, their country, and particularly Athens, was long regarded as the principal seat of arts and philosophy. But the Greek artists, as well as poets, orators, historians, and philosophers, of later times, were mere imitators, who fell infinitely short of the merit and fame of the great originals. The works of Phidias and Apelles, of Sophocles, Demosthenes, Plato, &c. not those of the Greeks their own contemporaries, were the objects of admiration to Cicero and Seneca, to the writers of the Augustan age, to Pliny, Tacitus, &c. But of this more in the next chapter.

⁷ Of which see an account extracted from the public registers, in Appian. Alexand. in Proem.

⁸ The judicious Polybius treats the Achæan league, and other collateral transactions of the Greeks and Macedonians, as episodes in his invaluable history of the progress and aggrandisement of the Roman republic.

⁹ See p. 137.

¹⁰ Arrian in Proem.

¹¹ Lucian de Scribend. Histor.

¹² Strabo, l. xix. p. 446.

of Lycurgus, Hyperides, Æschines, and Demosthenes.¹ So true it is, that in every country where the human genius has attained its highest point of perfection, a principle of degeneracy naturally carries things in a contrary direction; because those who are incapable of excellence, still covet distinction, and despairing to equal their predecessors in the beauties of truth and nature, have recourse to false conceits and artificial refinements.

Under the Macedonian government, Greece produced not any original genius in the serious kinds of poetry. The tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides still kept possession of the theatre. But no lyric, no epic poet appeared, capable to adorn the exploits of Alexander, though that prince, intoxicated with the love of fame, munificently rewarded the ignoble flattery of Agis, Cleon, Chærilus, and other contemptible encomiasts; who corrupted his heart, without vitiating his judgment, since he declared, that he would rather be the Thersites of Homer, than the Achilles of Chærilus.² Yet in the same age Philemon, Antiphanes,³ Lycon,⁴ above all, the Athenian Menander, carried comedy to the highest perfection which it ever attained in any nation of antiquity. During the republican form of government, the institutions and character of the Greeks were extremely unfavourable to this species of writing. The licentious turbulence of democracy generally converted their attempts at wit and humour into petulance and buffoonery. The change of government and manners, requiring due respect to the rules of propriety and the dictates of caution, improved their discernment, and gradually made them sensible to that refined ridicule, where more is meant than said, and to those more interesting, because juster, delineations of character, which distinguished the comic strains of Philemon and Menander.⁵

Alexander, during his early youth, took delight in dramatic entertainments. Thessalus was his favourite actor, but Athenadorus was more approved by the public. To Athenadorus, the magistrates, who, according to the Grecian custom, were appointed to decide the pretensions of rival candidates for theatrical fame, adjudged the prize of merit. The young hero declared, that this decision gave him more pain than he would have felt at the loss of his inheritance.⁶ The musicians Timotheus⁷ and Antigenides⁸ still displayed the wonderful effects of their art; but as the severity of education and manners continually relaxed in all parts of Greece, we find that music, originally destined to purify and exalt the mind, was in latter times universally employed to seduce and inflame the passions.⁹

The arts of design, painting, sculpture, and architecture, appeared in their highest lustre in

the age of Philip and Alexander, both which princes had no less taste to judge,¹⁰ than munificence to reward them. The eastern expedition of the latter introduced, or at least greatly multiplied, in Greece, those precious and durable gems, which thenceforth exhibited some of the finest specimens of Grecian ingenuity. The skill and taste of Pyrgoteles were distinguished in this valuable, though minute art.¹¹ He enjoyed the exclusive honour of representing the figure of Alexander on gems, as did Lysippus of casting it in bronze, and Apelles of painting it in colours.¹² Lysippus was justly admired for bringing back the art to a closer study, and nearer imitation, of nature, without yielding to his predecessors in ideal beauty.¹³ We have already mentioned his twenty-one equestrian statues of the Macedonian guards, slain in the battle of the Granicus. He is said to have made six hundred and ten figures in bronze;¹⁴ a number which, if not greatly exaggerated, would prove his facility of working to have far surpassed that of all statuary, ancient or modern. The numerous list of painters, contemporary with Apelles, indicates an extraordinary demand for their art; since no profession, that is not gainful, will ever be very generally followed.¹⁵ The most celebrated of these artists were Amphion and Asclepiodorus,¹⁶ whom Apelles acknowledged as his superiors in some parts of composition; Aristides the Theban, who was inimitable in expression;¹⁷ and Protogenes of Rhodes, whom Aristotle exhorted to paint the immortal exploits of Alexander.¹⁸ The inferior branches of the art, if not first cultivated in that age, were then carried to perfection. Pyreicus¹⁹ confined himself to subjects of low life, and Antiphilus²⁰ to caricatures, which the Greeks called Grylli. The theory and practice of painting was explained in many works, the loss of which is much to be regretted.²¹

Amidst the great multitude of artists, and writers on art, all acknowledged the pre-eminence of Apelles, whose works were innumerable, and each sufficient to establish his fame.²² His picture of Alexander, grasping a thunderbolt, was sold to the temple of Ephesian Diana for four thousand pounds. His Venus Anadyomené was damaged by accident; none would venture to restore the parts that had been effaced: so that the injury of the picture contributed to the glory of the artist. The model of this Venus was the beautiful Campaspé, the favourite mistress of Alexander. The sensibility of Apelles was too deeply penetrated with the charms which he so successfully expressed.

10 Judicium subtile videndis, artibus. Her. Ep. l. ii. Ep. i. v. 242.

11 Plin. l. vii. c. xxvii. et Plutarch. in Alexand.

12 Vid. Plin. edit. Berolin. i. 231. iii. 217—228.

13 Plin. iii. 194, et seq.

14 The Sieur Falconet, who made the famous statue of Peter the Great, thinks the thing impossible, and gives a different meaning to the words of Pliny. See his observations on the passage, in his translation of the books of Pliny relative to the arts. Vol. ii. Lausanne.

15 Plin. iii. 222.

16 Idem, iii. 226.

17 Idem, iii. 215—225.

18 He exhorted him to paint them "propter eternitatem rerum." Plin. ibid.

19 Plin. iii. 236.

20 Idem, iii. 229.

21 Idem, ibid.

22 Plin. iii. 223, et seq.

1 Dionys. Halicarn. de Structura Oration. Longinus de Sublim. Cicero de Orator. et de Clar. Orator. passim.

2 Acro. ad Horat. Art. Poet. v. 357. Curtius, l. viii. c. v.

3 Athenæus, l. xiii. p. 555.

4 Plut. Orat. ii. de Fortun. Alexand.

5 Vid. Plut. Comp. Aristoph. et Menand.

6 Plut. Orat. ii. de Fortun. Alexand.

7 Hephest. de Metr.

8 Plut. Orat. de Fortun. Alexand.

9 Aristot. Politic. l. viii. c. vi.

Alexander was no sooner acquainted with his passion, than, in the language of Pliny, he made him a present, not only of Campaspé, but of his own affection, too little respecting the feelings of the beloved object, at her degradation from being the mistress of a king, to become the possession of a painter. Yet this celebrated artist, who enjoyed other striking proofs of his master's partiality and friendship, lived on good terms with his brethren. With the frankness of his age and nation, he assumed the merit which belonged to him, and freely asserted, that none of his competitors could imitate the gracefulness²³ of his attitudes and figures. But in some other branches of the art, he acknowledged himself inferior to several of his contemporaries. The desire of seeing the works of Protogenes carried him to Rhodes. He there found a rival not altogether unworthy to alarm his jealousy. But instead of yielding to the dictates of this unworthy passion, he drew Protogenes from obscurity; raised the price of his pictures; and taught the Rhodians, who undervalued the same talents in their fellow citizen, which they admired in a stranger, to acknowledge and respect his merit.²⁴

Soon after the death of Alexander, painting and the kindred arts ceased.²⁵ By this expression, Pliny means not, that they ceased to be cultivated, but to make farther progress; since neither the scholars of Apelles and Lysippus, nor those who came after them, were capable to reach the glory of their predecessors. The Greek kings of Egypt and Syria seem to have bent their attention rather to literature, than to the arts. But, in both, the schools of Alexandria and Seleucia never aspired beyond the humble merit of imperfectly imitating those of Greece. In proportion to its neighbourhood to that country, the arts took firmer root in Alexandria than in Seleucia; and, from the same circumstance, they seem to have flourished longer and more abundantly in the little principalities of Pergamus and Bithynia, than in the wealthy kingdoms of Syria and Egypt.²⁶

The expedition of Alexander contributed to the improvement of the sciences, both natural and moral. His marches were carefully measured by Diognetes and Beton. Other geometers²⁷ were employed to survey the more remote parts of the countries which he traversed; and the exact description of his conquests, which, from these and other materials, he took care to have compiled by men of approved integrity and abilities, gave a new form to the science of geography.²⁸

After the conquest of Babylon, Alexander eagerly demanded the astronomical observations, which had been carefully preserved in that ancient capital above nineteen centuries. They remounted twenty-two hundred and

thirty-four years beyond the Christian era. By order of Alexander, they were faithfully transcribed, and transmitted to Aristotle,²⁹ who was probably prevented by his infirm state of health from accompanying his pupil to the East; or who, perhaps, voluntarily preferred a philosophical retirement in Athens, to the glory of attending the conqueror of the world.

Nor was this the only present to his preceptor, by which Alexander displayed at once his gratitude and love of science. Natural history was peculiarly indebted to his curiosity and munificence. At the expense of near two hundred thousand pounds, an expense equivalent to a far larger sum in the present age, he collected many rare productions of nature in different countries of Asia, and particularly that amazing variety of animals,³⁰ which Aristotle has described with such inimitable precision³¹ in his work on that subject.

But whatever obligations natural knowledge owed to Alexander, it would seem that the moral sciences were not less benefited by his discoveries and conquests.³² The study of human nature must have been greatly enlarged by such a wide survey of manners, institutions, and usages; nor was this advantage, perhaps, confined to those who performed the expedition, whose works have unfortunately perished; since the moral and political treatises of Aristotle discover not only more method in his reasonings, but a more copious fund of facts on which to reason, than the writings of all his predecessors together, not excepting those of the travellers, Xenophon and Plato.

The greatest part of the works of Aristotle were doubtless composed before the Macedonian conquest; yet it is not improbable that this extraordinary man, whose industry was equal to his genius, continually retouched and improved them; and it cannot be imagined that the rich harvest of facts and observations collected by his learned friends who accompanied Alexander, would be overlooked by a philosopher, who seems not only ambitious to eclipse his predecessors and contemporaries, but solicitous to leave no gleanings of fame to be acquired by his scholars and successors.

"Aristotle," says Lord Bacon,³³ "thought, like the Ottoman princes, that he could not reign secure, unless he destroyed all his brethren;" nor was his literary ambition more exclusive than exorbitant. He aspired to embrace the whole circle of the arts and sciences, and professed to explain whatever can be known concerning the moral, as well as the material, world. Not satisfied with extending his empire to the utmost verge of intellect, he boldly attempts questions beyond all human knowledge, with the same confidence that his pupil

²⁹ Porphyry. apud Simplicium, in Aristot. de Cælo, l. ii.

³⁰ Plin. l. viii. c. xvi.

³¹ See the admirable criticism on Aristotle's History of Animals, by Buffon, vol. i.

³² The arts and sciences not only flourished in Alexander's time; they flourished, says Plutarch, *δια Αλεξανδρον*. "He was the efficient cause of this effect." The passage which follows, *Κατασκευασεν γαρ τοις φιλοσοφουσι*, &c. should be studied by all princes who aspire to glory; a glory greater than power can give; more extensive and more permanent than conquest can confer.

³³ De Augm. Scientiarum, l. iii. c. iv.

²³ "Deesse tunc unam Venerem dicebat quam Græci charita vocant; cetera omnia contigisse; sed hac sola sibi neminem parem." Plin. iii. 222, et seq.

²⁴ Plin. *ibid*.

²⁵ "Cessavit deinde ars." Plin. *ibid*.

²⁶ Winkelmann, Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums, p. 711, et seq.

²⁷ Strabo, l. ii. p. 47.

²⁸ Cassini sur l'Origine de l'Astronomie, &c. Académ. des Sciences, t. viii. p. 12.

entered on a battle. But having to contend with enemies more stubborn than the Persians, his rashness was less successful than that of Alexander.

He divided philosophy into contemplative and practical. The contemplative or abstract philosophy, to which he first gave the name of metaphysics,¹ is obscure throughout, often unintelligible, still more chimerical, but far less agreeable, than that of his master Plato. It comprehended not only the examination of those abstract ideas, *existence, substance, quality, genus, species, &c.* which were so long and so uselessly tortured by the perverse industry of the schoolmen, but the general doctrines concerning mind or spirit, particularly the mind of the Deity. The human soul is treated in a separate work; in which it must be acknowledged, that Aristotle has made new names, rather than new discoveries; and the doctrine of the immortality is no where so fully elucidated by this philosopher, as it had been by Plato.

The natural philosophy of Aristotle deserves the name of metaphysic, in the modern sense of that word, since he explained the laws of the universe, by comparing abstract ideas, not by observation and experience. When he descends to particulars, he betrays more ignorance concerning the motions and magnitudes of the heavenly bodies, than many of his predecessors. With the anatomy of man and other animals, he was well acquainted, considering the gross errors which generally prevailed in the age in which he lived. Chemistry was not yet invented. Since the introduction of the ideal philosophy, men had ceased to observe nature; it could not therefore be expected that they should imitate her operations, and examine her by the test of experiment. In mathematics, Aristotle appears to have been less versed than his predecessors, Pythagoras and Plato; although, in the invention of the art of syllogism, he displays a perseverance of mental energy, which, had it been directed to the mathematical sciences, might have produced the greatest discoveries.

The scepticism of his contemporary Pyrrho, and still more the captious sophistry of the Eristics, might naturally engage Aristotle to examine with more attention than his predecessors, the nature of truth, and the means of defending it against the attacks of declamation and the snares of subtlety. He undertook, therefore, the arduous task, of resolving all rea-

soning into its primary elements, and of deducing from thence the rules by which every conclusion must be connected with his premises, in order to render it legitimate. This bold design he accomplished; having erected, on a single axiom, a larger system of abstract truths, all fortified by demonstration, than were ever invented and perfected by any other man. The axiom from which he sets out, and in which the whole terminates, is, that whatever is predicated of a genus, may be predicated of every species and individual contained under it. But the application of this axiom is for the most part sufficiently obvious, without the rules of Aristotle; whose logic, how successful soever it might prove against the subtleties of the Sophists and Eristics, contributes little to the formation of the understanding, and nothing to the judicious observation of man or nature, on which all useful discoveries must be founded.

From the general wreck of literature, in which many of Aristotle's writings perished,² had nothing been saved but the works above mentioned, it must be confessed that the preceptor of Alexander would not greatly merit the attention of posterity. In his abstract or metaphysical philosophy, we can only lament vast efforts mispent, and great genius misapplied. But, in his critical and moral, and above all, in his political works, we find the same penetrating and comprehensive mind, the same subtlety of reasoning, and vigour of intellect, directed to objects of great importance and extensive utility. The condition of the times in which he lived, and the opportunities peculiar to himself, conspired with the gifts of nature, and the habits of industry, to raise him to that eminence, which was acknowledged by his contemporaries, and admired by posterity.

A. C. 368. He was born in the first year of the ninety-ninth Olympiad, at Stagira, a provincial city of Macedon, and educated at the court of Pella, where his father was king's physician. In his early youth, he was sent to Athens, and remained there twenty years an assiduous scholar of Plato, in a city where literature and the fine arts were cultivated with unexampled success, and where the philosophic spirit, though often improperly directed, flourished in the utmost vigour. Selected by the discernment of Philip, to guide and confirm the promising dispositions of his admired son, he returned to his native country, and continued eight years at the Macedonian court. Whatever benefit accrued to Alexander from the instructions of Aristotle, it is certain that the latter derived great advantages from the gratitude of his royal pupil. Of this, several proofs have already occurred; and perhaps it may be ascribed to the munificence of Alexander, that his preceptor was enabled to form a library,³ a work of prodigious expense in that age, and in which he could only be rivalled by the Egyptian and Pergamenian kings. But the library of Aristotle was collected for use, not merely for ostentation.⁴

¹ By some writers it is supposed, that this title was bestowed on the fourteen books of Aristotle, immediately following his *Physics*, by Andronicus of Rhodes, a Peripatetic philosopher in the age of Augustus, who published the first complete edition of Aristotle's works. From that time, the various subjects treated in these fourteen books were conceived as constituting one branch of science. Aristotle had divided philosophy into speculative and practical. The first comprehended metaphysics, which examined the general properties of being, and the essence of things separate from matter; physics, which examined the nature of material substances, and the human soul; and mathematics, which examined certain properties of body, abstracted from body. The practical philosophy of Aristotle, which was intended to regulate the intellectual and moral operations of men, comprehended logic, under which he seems to have included rhetoric and criticism; and morals, including economics and politics. See Strabo, p. 603; and Bayle's Dictionary, article Tyrannion.

² See the fate of his works carefully related in Bayle's Dictionary, article Tyrannion.

³ Strabo.

⁴ The Egyptian and Pergamenian kings were lovers

The last fourteen years of his life he spent mostly at Athens, surrounded with every assistance which men⁵ and books could afford him, for prosecuting his philosophical inquiries. The glory of Alexander's name, which then filled the world, ensured tranquillity and respect to the man whom he distinguished as his friend; but after the premature death of that illustrious protector, the invidious jealousy of priests and sophists inflamed the malignant and superstitious fury of the Athenian populace; and the same odious passions which proved fatal to the offensive⁶ virtue of Socrates, fiercely assailed the fame and merit of Aristotle. To avoid the cruelty of persecution, he secretly withdrew himself to Chalcis, in Eubœa. This measure

Olymp. was sufficiently justified by a prudent regard to his personal safety; cxiv. 3. but lest his conduct should appear A. C. 322. unmanly, when contrasted with the Etat. 63. firmness of Socrates in a similar situation, he condescended to apologise for his flight, by saying, that he was unwilling to afford the Athenians a second opportunity "to sin against philosophy."⁷ He seems to have survived his retreat from Athens only a few months; vexation and regret probably shortened his days.⁸

Notwithstanding the occasional persecutions of speculative men, philosophy had fixed its roots too deeply in Athens, to be extirpated by the temporary frenzy of a capricious populace. Theophrastus calmly succeeded Aristotle in the Peripaton, or walk of the Lyceum, from which place their followers retained the name

Olymp. of Peripatetica.⁹ At the same time, Zeno taught virtue in the Stoa, or cxx. Portico, from which his disciples

derived the appellation of Stoics.¹⁰ Epicurus explained pleasure in those well-known gardens, which were distinguished by his name.¹¹ The followers of Diogenes, the Cynic, still assembled in the Cynosarges;¹² Speusippus and Xenocrates succeeded Plato in the Academy;¹³ and even Pyrrho, the Elian, the founder of the sceptical sect, who had accompanied Alexander in his eastern expedition, and shared the munificence of that prince,¹⁴ became, after the death of his benefactor, a citizen of Athens.¹⁵ Thus did that illustrious city, after the extinction of its freedom, and of its military glory, still maintain its pre-eminence in literature, philosophy, and the fine arts. In the age of Alex-

rather of books than of learning. They considered a great library as contributing to the superfluous magnificence of royalty. Vid. Galen. Comment. 2. in Hippocrat. de Natur. Hom.

⁵ Aristotle probably had many assistants in his philosophical inquiries and compositions. Ο δὲ σφόδρα, καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν οὐκ, δύναται διακρίνειν βέλτερον δ' ἰσως διανεργούς ἔχων. Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. vii.

⁶ Virtutem incolumen odimus

Sublatam ex oculis querimus invidi. HORACE.

⁷ Αμαρτανειν περι την φιλοσοφίαν, Ælian, l. iii. c. vi.

⁸ Laert. l. v. in Aristot. et Auctor. citat. apud Brucker. Histor. Philosoph. vol. i. p. 787, et seq.

⁹ The common opinion, that the followers of Aristotle were called peripatetica, εκ του περιπατειν, "ex deambulatione," adopted by Cicero and others, is refuted by the authors cited by Brucker, v. l. p. 787.

¹⁰ Laert. vii. 5.

¹¹ Cicero ad Attic, l. ii. epist. 94.

¹² Idem, ibid.

¹³ Suidas in Speusipp. Laert. l. iv. c. 1, et seq.

¹⁴ Sextus Empiric. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. l. i. c. iii.

¹⁵ Laert. in Pyrrhon.

ander, Athens, as the seat of learning, assumed that precise form, which it exactly preserved seven centuries, till the destructive invasion of Greece by Alaric, and the Goths.¹⁶ For it is A. D. 396. worthy of observation, that the philosophers, who, during this long interval, perpetuated the several sects, submissively followed the opinions of their respective masters. Soon after the age of Alexander, genius disappeared; literature and the arts alike degenerated; no new sect arose; few innovations, and those unsuccessful, were attempted; and thus the period, which has been assigned for the termination of the present work, seems to have bounded the progress of the human mind; whether, according to the observation of Longinus, because liberty is the best nurse of genius, and singularly adapted, by cherishing the emulation and the hopes, to excite the energies, of those born to true excellence;¹⁷ or because, in the words of a great philosopher, "there is a pitch of exaltation, as well as of depression, to which when any nation has attained, its affairs necessarily return in an opposite direction."

Instead of examining this speculative question, which the world is perhaps still too young to enable us with accuracy to determine, it will better suit the design of an historical work, to explain the tenets of the different schools of philosophy, then first established in Athens; briefly to relate their various success in the world; and to inquire, with becoming modesty, how far those artificial systems of happiness correspond with the natural dictates of unperverted sentiment, and impartial reason.

Aristotle, the founder of the Peripatetic school, recognised, like Socrates and Plato, the dignity of human nature, and placed the chief happiness of man, not in the agreeableness of his passive sensations, but in the proper exercise¹⁸ of his intellectual and moral powers. According to Aristotle, the habit of this exercise, directed by right reason, constituted the highest excellence of man, in the same manner as the excellence of other animals, and even of the vegetable and mineral kingdoms, resulted from the perfection of those qualities, by which they are respectively distinguished. Yet, as man is a compound being, consisting of mind and matter, it seemed evident that his well-being must in some measure depend on the condition of his body, and on the means necessary to maintain this inferior part of his nature in its most perfect state. The absence of disease and infirmity, and the proper constitution of all our bodily organs, are things desirable not only on their own account, but as furnishing us with the opportunity and the means to exert those mental energies, from which our principal felicity results. In the same manner, the goods of fortune, wealth, friends, and other external

¹⁶ See Gibbon's History of the Roman Empire, v. iii. c. xxx.

¹⁷ Long. de Sublim. sect. 44.

¹⁸ The Stoics adopted, on this occasion, both the sentiments and the language of Aristotle. Ο μὲν φιλοδοξὸς ἀλλοτρίων ἐνεργειῶν ἰδίῳ ἀγαθῷ προσλαμβάνει· ὁ δὲ φιληδονὸς ἰδίῳ πρᾶξιν· ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων, ἰδίῳ πράξει. M. Anton. vi. 51. "The vain-glorious man places his own happiness in the action of others: the voluptuous man, in his passive sensations; the wise man, in his own active exertions."

advantages, are desirable not only as contributing to the supply of our bodily wants, but as the instruments through which a wise man is enabled to exercise his virtues, and accomplish his purposes. Amidst great calamities,¹ Aristotle required not that perfect self-command to which some philosophers pretended. He allowed a moderate degree of perturbation, as suitable to the weakness of human nature. In the present constitution of things, he thought a certain sensibility of passion not only excusable, but necessary; since resentment enabled us to repel injuries,² and grief for past misfortunes made us vigilant to prevent the evils that might otherwise overtake us. But although this great philosopher acknowledged the influence of fortune in human affairs, and thought it impossible for the firmest of men to remain unmoved amidst the miseries of Priam;³ he maintained, however, that we ourselves were the principal architects of our own happiness. The attainment of this great object depended far more on our own thoughts and reflections, which were ever and intimately present with us, and on the constitution of our own minds, which were in some measure subject to our own direction and control, than on our external situation and circumstances, which only affected us by accident, and over which we commonly enjoyed but little power, and sometimes none. The perfection of our virtue, which was entirely our own work, shone forth with peculiar lustre amidst the gloom of unmerited calamity. When we bore it with becoming patience, we rejoiced in our own fortitude; and this inward pleasure always alleviated the smart of external wounds. Assailed by the most terrible afflictions, a wise man would not deserve indeed the epithet of *happy*; yet neither could he be called *miserable*, since he would still disdain to commit any thing odious or base. Philosophy, which professes to teach us the art of enjoying life, must therefore disregard such circumstances as we can neither govern nor change, and confine itself to that part which we can regulate and control. It must withdraw our attention from external objects, and fix it on ourselves.⁴

To know himself, man must know the powers with which he is endowed. Of those, we possess some in common with other animals,⁵ and others in common even with the inanimate parts of nature.⁶ In none of these, it is evident, can the proper employment of man consist, but rather in such faculties, as, being peculiar to himself, distinguish and ennoble humanity.

These characteristic excellencies of our species all refer, either to the understanding, or to the will;⁷ the first possesses reason essentially in itself, the second is capable of being combined and assimilated with this divine principle. From the two powers of the understanding and the will are respectively derived two classes of virtues, the intellectual and the moral. Sagacity, penetration, intelligence, wisdom, are virtues of the understanding; gentleness, temperance, fortitude, justice, are virtues of the heart. The former class consists in the proper disposition and habit⁸ of the intellectual part of the soul; the latter, in the proper disposition and habit of the desires and affections, which being formed subordinate to reason, and capable of listening to its dictates, then only perform their duty, when, like obedient subjects, they cheerfully observe the commands of their sovereign. The intellectual virtues depend chiefly on education and exercise; the moral proceed entirely from habit, from which they derive their name.⁹ It is by practising justice, that we become just; by practising temperance, that we become temperate; by practising courage, that we become courageous. Hence the wonderful power of legislation, and early institu-

⁷ I have ventured to use this word to express the *θεωρητικόν* of Aristotle, the seat of appetites, affections, and passions.

⁸ *Εκπαινούμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σφόν κατὰ τὴν εἴδη τῶν εἰδῶν δὲ τὰς ἐκπαινεύσας, ἀρετὰς λεγόμεν.* *Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. ult.*

⁹ *Ἡθικός, εἶδος; moralis, mos.* The same holds not in English. The words *ἀρετή* in Greek, and *virtus* in Latin, are of very general import, denoting any praiseworthy disposition, habit, or quality, of body or mind, intellectual or moral. The indeterminate use of these words has occasioned a strange confusion. The late ingenious Mr. Hume, in his *Inquiry into the Principles of Morals*, which in other respects, he justly considers as the most valuable of his writings, enters into a large deduction, to prove that all virtues are praised and recommended as useful or agreeable. These qualities constitute, according to him, the proper definition, the very essence of virtue; and all other distinctions are frivolous. To justify this paradox, he alleges the authority of Greek poets and philosophers, who apply the term *virtus* to bodily strength or address, to memory, judgment, sagacity, &c. as well as to justice, humanity, charity. This indeed is true; but the Greeks distinguished between the virtues of the body, and those of the mind; and the mental virtues they divided into the intellectual and moral. Aristotle characterises moral virtue as a voluntary habit, and says, that moral approbation is excited only by the praiseworthy habit of such affections and actions as originate in ourselves, and depend on no extrinsic cause. See *Aristot. Magn. Moral. l. i. c. xv.* and his commentator *Andronicus Rhodius*, p. 89. and the *Ethica* to *Nicomachus*, throughout. Mr. Hume, therefore, is justly reproved by Dr. Beattie, for saying, "that the ancient moralists made no material distinction among the different species of mental endowments and defects." See *Hume's Inquiry*, vol. ii. p. 387. But although the ancients, and Aristotle in particular, make very material distinctions between moral and intellectual virtues, yet, in his zeal for the good cause, Dr. Beattie appears to me to go too far in asserting, "that though they considered both the moral and intellectual virtues as necessary to the formation of a perfect character, and sometimes discoursed of both in the same treatise or system, yet they deemed the latter valuable only as means to qualify us for the former, and insignificant, or even odious, when they failed to answer this end." See *Essay on Truth*, p. 425. First of all, according to the Greek moralists, it is impossible ever to treat of the moral virtues as distinct from the intellectual, since the former could not exist without a mixture of reason or intellect. *Ethic. Nicom. passim*; and particularly, l. iii. c. ii. Secondly, The intellectual virtues were so far from being esteemed only as means to qualify us for the moral, that Aristotle considers the exercise of the former totally independent of the latter, as constituting our highest perfection and happiness. *Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. vii.*

¹ *Οὐτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινῆσθεται εὐδίας, οὐτε ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν.* *Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. x.*

² To bear insults tamely, was regarded as highly ungraceful, and becoming only the character of a slave. *Τὸ δὲ προσηλακίζομενον ἀνιχισθῆναι ἀνδραποδωδης.* *Ethic. Nicom. iv. 2.*

³ *Εν τυχαίς Πειραιαίαις.* *Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. p. 40.*

⁴ In explaining the Aristotelian philosophy, the learned reader will perceive that I have endeavoured to translate, as literally as possible, the energetic expressions of its author. The outline has been traced with equal perspicuity and elegance by Dr. Adam Smith, in his *Account of the Systems of Ancient Philosophy*, annexed to his admired *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. The design of my work obliges me to treat the subject more particularly.

⁵ The *τε αισθητικόν*, the powers of sensation, &c.

⁶ The *τε βρωπτικόν*, &c. the powers of nutrition, &c.

tion, by which the Cretans, the Spartans, and some other nations, were honourably distinguished among the rest of mankind; and by which such states as shall wisely imitate their example, may still reach the same elevation of character, and still acquire the same renown: "For it is not a matter of little moment, how we are accustomed in youth; much depends on that, or rather all."

The moral virtues, it is evident, are not implanted by nature; for that which is established by nature, cannot be essentially changed by custom. Heavy bodies, which, by the law of nature, descend, cannot be habituated to mount upwards; nor can fire, which naturally ascends, be taught by habit to move in a contrary direction. The same holds concerning all the other laws by which nature governs her works. Our senses, and other natural gifts, have the power of performing their several functions, before they exert it; and they retain this power, although we should allow them to remain inactive. But virtue, like all practical arts, can be acquired and preserved by practice only. It is neither natural, nor contrary to nature. We are born capable to attain it, but the invaluable attainment must be made and perfected by habit. Yet the greater part of those who aspire to this inestimable prize, have recourse to vain speculations, flattering themselves that this is philosophy. Their conduct resembles that of a patient, who should carefully listen to his physician, but do nothing which he prescribed. By such medicine it is not possible to cure the disorders of the body, nor by such philosophy, those of the mind.

Virtue, as a matter of practice, cannot be reduced to metaphysical precision. It is to be observed, however, that all the virtues depend on the propriety of the affections from which they arise; and that this propriety consists in a certain point or centre, from which the deviations may be innumerable. The vices, therefore, many of which are without names, are far more numerous than the virtues. In general, virtue may be conceived to lie in a mean betwixt the extremes of too much and too little; and this health of the mind resembles bodily health and strength, which are destroyed by excess or defect of nourishment and exercise. Thus, to fear every thing is cowardly; to fear nothing is audacious; courage requires that we should fear only such objects as are truly formidable, and only in that degree in which they ought to be feared. In the same manner, he who is too much affected by objects of pleasure, and seizes every opportunity to enjoy them, is called intemperate; he who is too little affected by such objects, and refuses every opportunity to enjoy them, may be called insensible. Temperance teaches us to pursue only such pleasures as we ought, at proper times, in proper places, and on proper occasions. According to the same view of things, generosity lies in the middle between avarice and profusion; modesty, between pride and diffidence; mildness, between irascibility and softness; magnificence, between ostentation and parsimony; popularity, between forbidding disdain and officious adulation; in a word, every virtue consists in a

mean, equally remote from two vicious extremes.¹⁰

Considered as the quality of an action, virtue consists in the propriety of that affection from which the action proceeds; when the affection is neither too strong nor too weak, but has precisely that degree of strength, which right reason teaches us to approve. As the quality of an action, virtue consists, therefore, in mediocrity; but as the quality of a person, it consists in the habit of this mediocrity, since, in judging persons and characters, we regard not particular acts and feelings, but such acts and feelings as are frequent and habitual. We may perform many virtuous actions, without being virtuous men. The most worthless of human kind sometimes indulge the propensity to pity and humanity. But whoever acts right, merely from feeling, will also, from feeling, more frequently act wrong. The sentiments of nature, which prompt us to take care of our children, to relieve objects in distress, and to perform many important duties of morality, likewise prompt us to gratify the vilest and most brutal of our passions. Besides this, there are many, and those the most important virtues, the exercise of which is not at first attended with pleasure. To support labour, to endure pain, to encounter difficulties and dangers, which wisdom and fortitude, on many occasions, require, are not obviously recommended by any natural desire; nor is the practice of such duties immediately agreeable. It is still less agreeable, in the first instance, to curb and restrain our natural appetites for pleasure, which is the proper office of temperance; nor can that vigilant circumspection, and ever watchful attention to the most remote consequences of our actions, which is essential to the virtue of prudence, be acquired without trouble and care, without many painful efforts and many difficult struggles. Yet it is the nature of all those virtues, as well as of the hardest lessons of justice, patriotism, and friendship, to become, through habit, agreeable; and the only sure test that we have acquired them, is, that they are practised with pleasure. With good reason, therefore, Plato defines education to be the art of teaching men to rejoice and grieve as they ought; for though there be three ends ultimately agreeable, the pleasant, the honourable, and useful; yet honour and utility are likewise pursued as pleasures.¹¹

The most extensive part of virtue is employed, therefore, in regulating our desire of pleasure, and aversion to pain. It is also the most difficult; for, as Heraclitus observes, it is harder to combat pleasure than anger. The irascible passions are always moved by some appearance of reason; and, in their most furious excesses, still affect some deference for their sovereign. They often, indeed, mistake his intentions; and, like hasty servants, fly into action, without waiting his last orders. But pleasure passively obeys sensation, without regarding reason at all. The mischief is the more dangerous, being produced by the first object of natural desire; for the love of pleasure is implanted in our

¹⁰ Ethic. Nicom. l. ii. c. i. et seq.

¹¹ Ibid. l. vii. c. xi. et seq.

frame; the germ expands with our nature; and unless counteracted in due time, becomes ingrained in our constitution, every part of which it impregnates and stains. Habit alone can counteract those dangerous propensities of nature. Habit can enable us to reject dishonourable or hurtful pleasures, to prefer honourable, or useful pains; for, as the poet Euenus says, "there is a long continued exercise of attention, which finally becomes nature."¹

The moral virtues cannot, according to Aristotle, subsist without some mixture of the intellectual; but the latter may subsist alone and independent; and according to both Aristotle and Plato, the purest and most permanent felicity of which man is susceptible, results from the exercise of his rational powers upon subjects of abstract speculation. The labours of the statesman or general, the exertions of the legislator or patriot, all refer to some end or purpose, the attainment of which may be prevented by fortune, or frustrated by the weakness or wickedness of man. The practice of justice, generosity, temperance, and fortitude, requires many conditions, and supposes a variety of situations, which it is not always in our power to command. The just or generous man must have objects to whom he may distribute his justice or generosity; he must possess the means by which to exercise those virtues, which all participate of frail mortality; since, though directed by prudence, they are impelled by passion, and result from the exigencies of our present corporeal state. But the energies of contemplative wisdom are pure and simple, like the intellectual source from which they spring. Not subservient to remote purposes, or contingent ends, they are immediately agreeable on their own account; and, on every side, round and complete in themselves. If the proper exercise of every member or faculty enlivens the sense of our existence, and thereby yields us a perception of pleasure, how wonderfully delightful must be the exercise of the intellect, which renders us sensible of the divine principle within us! To live according to nature, is to live according to the noblest part of our nature, which, doubtless, is the mind. To live thus, is the life of a god; for, human as we are, we ought not, according to the vulgar exhortation, to regard only human things; but, though mortal, strive to put on immortality;² assured, that as the mind chiefly forms the man, he who most cultivates his mind, is the best disposed in himself, and the most agreeable to the gods.³

Such is the philosophy of Aristotle, lofty sometimes, and imposing, but in general, less

erect and independent than that of Socrates and Plato, who preceded him; less proud and boastful than that of the Stoics, or even the Epicureans, by whom he was followed; and on the whole, perhaps as unexceptionable as that of any moralist ancient or modern.

It is commonly observed, that Aristotle attained the same authority over the opinions of men, which his pupil Alexander acquired over their persons. But the empire of Alexander was established in his own lifetime, and perished with himself. That of Aristotle did not commence till more than a thousand years after his decease, and continued several centuries. The Peripatetic school subsisted, indeed, without interruption, at Athens; but the Lyceum never attained there any pre-eminence above the Portico and Academy. When philosophy was transplanted to a more splendid theatre in Rome, men of speculation and science generally preferred Plato to Aristotle;⁴ while many of the most celebrated characters of the republic enlisted themselves under the banners of Zeno or Epicurus. With the fall of Roman liberty, philosophy, as well as literature and the fine arts, slowly declined; and under the emperors, particularly in the second and third centuries of the Christian era, the most extravagant of Plato's speculations were the doctrines best adapted to the condition of the times, and to the dark and shadowy minds of Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, and other contemplative visionaries, distinguished by the appellation of Eclectics, or later Platonists, who possessed the wildness without the fancy, and the subtilty without the genius, of Plato.⁵ During the succeeding centuries, the doctrines of Aristotle slowly gained the ascendant; but, as had happened to Plato in an earlier period, the most frivolous part of Aristotle's philosophy was the highest in esteem during the darkness of the middle ages. The decisive boldness of his logic, physic, and metaphysic, suited the genius of a church which affected to be universal, and the insolence of a man who pretended to be infallible; and, while the useful and practical works of Aristotle were neglected, his speculative philosophy being thus incorporated with the Romish superstition, they long conspired, with astonishing success, to en-
thral the human mind.

Zeno and Epicurus pretended, as well as Plato and Aristotle, to deduce their philosophy from experience; but their views of nature are less perspicuous, and less extensive; and their conclusions less convincing, and less reasonable. For the infinite variety of nature, they substituted the narrowness of their own artificial systems; and it will ever be the scandal of this abstract philosophy, that men who boasted following the same path, should have reached such opposite goals; the sect of Zeno having discovered, by all its researches, that pain was not an evil; and the sect of Epicurus, that pleasure was the only good: the Stoics, that virtue alone was truly valuable in itself, and desirable on its own account; the Epicureans, that virtue in

¹ Euenus was an elegiac poet of Paros, of whom few fragments remain. The verses translated in the text are,

Φημι πολυχρονιον μελετην εμιναι φιλε και δε
Ταυτην ανθρωποις τελευτωσαν φυσιν ειναι.

This is better expressed by another Greek proverb: Ελου-
βιον αριστον, ηδυν δε αυτον η συνηθεια ποιησει. Plat.
Moral. p. 602. "Choose the best life, and custom will ren-
der it agreeable."

² Χρη δε ου κατα τους περιουοντας, ανθρωπων φρε-
νιν, ανθρωπων οντα, ουδε θνητα τον θνητον αλλ' εφ'
ουον ενδεχεται απωδυναιτιζιν, και απαντα ποιουν κατα
το κενωιστω των εν αυτω. Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. vii.

³ Ο δε κατα νουν ανερχων, και ταυτον διεκπεριον, και
διεκπεριον αριστα, και θεοφιλοιστος ιοικεν ειναι. Id.
c. x. c. viii.

⁴ Cicero, passim.

⁵ Besides the works of Brucker and Stanley, the learned
reader may consult, on this subject, professor Meiners Bey-
trag über die Neu-Platonische Philosophie. Leipzig, 1762.

itself was really of no value, and merely desirable for the sake of pleasure. Yet, amidst the striking contradictions of these sects, they agreed in speculative pride, loudly asserting, that the philosophy which they respectively taught, was the exclusive road to happiness. Both required from their imaginary sage an absolute command over his passions; and both supposed, that in his present state of existence, he could attain this perfection. Zeno and Epicurus alike rejected the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, as unnecessary to their system; both justified suicide; both boasted of enjoying a felicity equal to that of the gods; and, in proportion as their principles receded from truth and nature, and flattered that factitious vanity incident to the human heart, they were diffused with greater rapidity, more zealously embraced, and more obstinately defended.⁶

In examining by what show of reason, men whose wisdom was revered by their contemporaries, could arrive at such extraordinary conclusions, the dignity of virtue demands the precedence for Zeno. That philosopher affected, with great accuracy, to examine the natural propensities of the human race; to observe the various changes which they underwent in their progress from infancy to manhood; to contemplate the effects produced by external causes on our internal frame; and, by comparing man with inferior animals, to display the illustrious prerogatives which he enjoyed, and the high destination which nature had assigned him. Self-preservation, he observed, was the universal and primary desire of all animals. In man, this desire respected his body, and all its different members, his mind, and all its different faculties; and prompted him to maintain the whole fabric of his complex existence in the most perfect condition of which it is capable. Nature had generally attached a pleasure to the means necessary for this purpose; but that we desired pleasure for the sake of preservation, not preservation for the sake of pleasure, he thought evident from the first motions and efforts of all animals, tending to prevent dissolution, and preceding any distinct notions of pain or pleasure.⁷

Although, in the order of time, man perhaps first felt the propensities requisite to the safety of his bodily frame, yet, at a very early period, he showed himself endowed with desires of a different, and more exalted kind. Not to mention the obscure intimations of his love of truth and knowledge during his infant state, in which he applied his senses with great activity to the examination of the objects presented to him, he naturally learned the use of words to express these objects, as well as the notions of his own mind concerning them; and had no sooner made this important acquisition, than he testified an ardent curiosity to extend his knowledge, and to enlarge his acquaintance

with the nature, the causes, and dependencies of the various classes of beings which he beheld around him. From this love and approbation of what is true and sincere, rather than of the contrary, which he felt to be congenial to his own nature, he readily believed whatever those persons, with whom he conversed, thought proper to communicate to him; a principle which, though the source of innumerable errors and prejudices, served, however, as the only foundation on which his future improvements could be built.

In examining the nature and relations of other things, he gradually became sensible of his own. His affections, he felt, carried him beyond his own person, and he derived happiness from the happiness of others, although he received from it no advantage but the pleasure of beholding it. The sentiments of justice, gratitude, and benevolence, he felt to be agreeable to his nature, to be proper and laudable; the contrary sentiments, to be disagreeable to his nature, to be improper and odious. His own good, therefore, was thus pointed out to him, by the original frame of his sentiments, to be intimately connected with the good of his family, his friends, his country, and the great society of mankind, of which he made part. Enlarging his views still farther, he perceived, that every species is relative to the element in which it lives; thus fishes have fins for the water, birds have wings for the air; and that many of these species are mutually connected with, and reciprocally subservient to, each other, while all of them essentially enter into the great plan of nature, and complete the harmony and perfection of that universal system, to the stability of which the order of particular parts, or what, in each species, and in each individual, is called private good, must necessarily be subordinate. Considering the narrowness of human capacity, it is not wonderful that many of the connections and dependencies of this universal system should escape our observation. But if we confine our view to those objects of which we have the clearest apprehension, we shall find that they all depend on each other, and are united in one scheme or constitution of things. The individuals of the human race were doubtless formed, not for themselves alone. In the different sexes, the external organization, and still more the inward frame, the correspondence of parts, and still more the sympathy of sentiments, indicate the male and female mutually destined for each other. The naked helplessness of infancy requires the tender cares of a parent. The decrepitude of age loudly demands the kind returns of filial gratitude. In early ages of the world, men, without uniting in small communities, must have fallen a prey to the savages of the desert; and, with the growth of these communities, social affection naturally makes progress; since, with the advancement of arts and civility, the bands which unite us to our country are continually multiplied and strengthened.

In thus contemplating the relations in which he stands, man becomes sensible of the duties required of him. The voice of nature teaches him (for this is her universal law) that the

⁶ Laert. in Zonon. et Epicur. Cicero de Finibus, l. i. ii, iii. Plutarch. de Commun. Concept. contra Stoicos.

⁷ The principles of the Stoical philosophy are explained in Cicero de Finibus, the works of Epictetus, Arrian, Simplicius, and Seneca. In treating of the practical duties of morality. Cicero, in his Offices chiefly follows the principles of the Stoics.

greater good is to be preferred to the lesser, and the good of the many to that of the few. In applying this rule to all the classes of objects submitted to our choice, we live consistently with nature. The goods of the mind, therefore, must be preferred to those of the body; and what is called private interest must yield to that of the public. Even in objects of the same class, the general law must be observed. We must prefer and reject, according to the rules of right reason, not according to caprice and fancy. In the primary objects of desire respecting the body, health is to be preferred to strength, and strength to agility; and in the secondary objects respecting this part of our nature, or those which may be employed as instruments to procure bodily pleasures, and ward off bodily pains, such as wealth, power, the good opinion of those with whom we live, and innumerable other circumstances of a similar kind, we must uniformly regulate our conduct by the same great principles of preference and rejection.¹ In thus appreciating the objects of desire, and when all cannot be obtained, in preferring the most valuable and honourable; in thus appreciating the objects of aversion, and when all cannot be avoided, in rejecting the most hurtful and odious, consist that order and harmony, that just balance of affection, and perfect propriety of conduct which essentially contains in it whatever is meritorious, laudable, and happy. It is concerning the primary objects of desire, indeed, and the means necessary to attain them, that this propriety of sentiment and action is exercised; but as those to whom we are recommended are often more valued by us, than those by whom we are made known to them, so the duties of wisdom and virtue, to which we have been, as it were, recommended by the original propensities of our nature, are far more estimable in themselves, than all the external advantages which they are fitted to procure. When our lives are harmonised to virtue, when we perceive the agreement of our thoughts and actions to propriety and decorum, the beauty of this concord strikes us as infinitely more desirable than all the ends which it has a tendency to promote; this concord itself becomes the great, or rather the sole, end of all our pursuits; compared with which, health and sickness, riches and poverty, pain and pleasure, are finally considered as objects of little moment, and altogether incapable of shaking the stability of our happiness.

It is in vain that men seek felicity in those objects which depend not on themselves; which, even while they possess, they fear to lose; and which fortune can neither give nor take away.² The feelings of our own minds, which are ever and intimately present to us, must always afford the principal source of our happiness or misery. To a wise man, therefore, every condition of external circumstances, and every situation in life, must be alike indifferent, since there is

none wherein he can be placed, in which he may not perform his duty, and render himself an object of approbation and applause to all rational nature. To feel in our own minds the testimony of the whole universe in our favour, and to be sensible, that whatever may be the consequences of our conduct, it has been governed by the great rules which the Divinity prescribes, affords a degree of inward satisfaction, to which the greatest outward prosperity can add nothing worthy of calculation; for as a single drop of water is lost in the broad expanse of the *Ægean*, as a single step is disregarded in the immense distance to India, as the light of a taper is eclipsed by the meridian sun,³ so the external conveniencies of life, and the advantages pertaining to the body, are overwhelmed, obscured and lost, in the transcendent excellence and incomparable splendour of virtue.

Those dangers which appear most formidable, and those calamities which appear most dreadful to the vulgar, cannot intimidate or deject the man, who has fortitude to despise the one, and constancy to bear the other. The sage delights in those clouds of adversity, through which his virtue beams forth with peculiar lustre; and rejoices in the kind cruelties of fortune, which subject him to difficult and glorious combats. Sensible of his own powers, he is happy to measure them against a vigorous antagonist. The victory is not liable to contingencies, but depends on himself alone: a consideration sufficient to support him against the number and strength of his enemies.⁴ When the firm probity of *Regulus* submitted his perishable body to be burned and lacerated by the *Carthaginians*, he well knew that those revengeful Barbarians could not torture his fortitude, his patriotism, his magnanimity. His mind, guarded by such an assemblage and attendance of virtues, bade defiance to every assault. The mind of *Regulus* still triumphed; and amidst the painful discription of his frail members, he maintained and fortified the integrity of that part of his nature which properly constitutes the man, and in which alone any permanent happiness or misery can reside.

From the enthusiasm naturally inspired by the beautiful and august forms of benevolence and magnanimity, the Stoics again returned to the speculations of abstract philosophy. In every arrangement or combination of objects, which can be called a constitution or system, the good of each part, they observed, must be relative and subordinate to that of the whole. To illustrate in the constitution most familiar to us, the body of man, the good of each limb and member, considered as something separate and independent, consisted in preserving its natural state, and in never being subjected to any fatigue or hardship, to any pain or uneasiness. But considered as the part of a system, in the good of which its own is necessarily included, this limb or member must often submit to great inconveniencies. For the sake of the whole body, the foot must often trample in the

¹ The technical terms of the Stoical philosophy, like all terms of art, sound awkward in languages in which they were not originally invented; nothing can be more natural than the Greek expressions, *οριγισθαι* and *εκκλινειν*.

² Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἴφ' ἡμῶν ἵστί φασὶ ἐλευθερία, ἀκαλυτὰ, ἀκαταμάχηστα. τὰ δὲ οὐχ ἴφ' ἡμῶν, ἀσθένη, δούλω, καλυτὰ, ἀλλοτρία. *Epictet. Enchir. c. ii.*

³ The illustrations given by *Cic. de Fin.*

⁴ Ἀνίκητος εἶναι δύνασθαι, ἵνα εἰς μέγιστον αὐτὸν καταβῇ, οὐ οὐχ ἵστί ἐπὶ σοὶ νικῶσαι. *Enchir. c. xiv.*

dirt, must often tread upon thorns, and sometimes be burned, or lacerated, or even cut off, when such operations are requisite for the safety of the whole system. In refusing to comply, the foot ceases to be a foot; in the same manner *de you* cease to be a man, in shrinking from the hardest duties required by the interest of society. But that society itself, as well as every member which it contains, are parts of a larger system, that harmonious whole, whose admirable order and beauty evince the superintendence of infinite wisdom and goodness. Under such government, no absolute evil can exist; and what appears wrong respecting particular parts, must necessarily be right respecting the whole. A wise man will therefore be alike satisfied with every situation in which he may be placed; deeply convinced, that were he acquainted with the whole connections and dependencies of events, that situation would, even to himself, appear the most proper, that could possibly be assigned him. He uses, indeed, such means as prudence directs, to avert calamity; but when that is his lot, he cheerfully submits to the wise dispensation of Providence. The established order of the universe, he knows, is not to be changed by the prayers of men. When he prays to the gods, it is not with a view to alter their wise intentions concerning him: he prays that they would show him the hardest trials with which he must contend, and the severest circumstances in which he must be placed: that by voluntarily accepting those trials, and voluntarily embracing those circumstances, he may prove his confidence in their goodness, and his perfect resignation to their sovereign will.⁵

If our own unmerited misfortunes ought never to occasion us any uneasiness, so neither ought we to be affected by those of our relations, our friends, or our country. When calamity threatens connections so dear to us, we must exert ourselves strenuously in their behalf; but should our well-meant endeavours be frustrated by circumstances not liable to our control, it would be highly ungraceful and improper to have recourse to unmanly lamentations. The same law of propriety which prompts our active exertions to the good of others, restrains our passive feelings at sight of their distress; the former alone can be useful to *them*; the latter would be both hurtful and dishonourable to *ourselves*.

The Stoical philosophy imposed therefore an absolute silence on the soft voice of pity,⁶ as well as on the boisterous dissonance of anger, and on all passions in general which were regarded as perturbations and diseases of the

mind, that a wise man ought not merely to appease, but utterly to eradicate. As they supposed their imaginary sage capable of attaining this perfection, they inferred that all duties were alike easy to him. *His* actions were continually regulated by propriety, and all of them therefore equally laudable; whereas those of a fool, or one who substituted passion and caprice in the stead of reason and principle, were all equally blameable. This doctrine, which so nearly resembles that of many Christian divines, "that the greatest virtues of the heathens were but splendid vices," is the source to which all the other paradoxes of the Stoics may be traced. Both these Christians and the Stoics considered good or bad actions as relative only to the cause which produces them, the affection or character from which they proceed, not to the consequences which flow from them, the good or bad effects which they tend to promote. These consequences and effects, it was observed by the Stoics, depended not on ourselves. With regard to us, therefore, they were altogether indifferent; and as such, could not possibly constitute any part of merit or demerit, or become the proper objects of praise or censure.

The ignorant vulgar indeed, and as such the Stoics considered all those who were unacquainted with their philosophy, allowed such contingent circumstances to influence their appreciation of actions and characters; and thence the extraordinary confusion introduced into religion and morality. Of two men, equally vicious, the one may be condemned to obscurity, and bereft of opportunity to exert his wickedness; the other may be raised to power, which he abuses, or entrusted with a sceptre, which becomes an iron rod in his hands. To the bulk of mankind, the second appears a greater monster than the first. To the philosopher, they appear equally criminal; but the first is a storm which spends its rage in vacuity; the second a cloud, not more tempestuous, that destroys the fair objects accidentally exposed to its violence. In the same manner two men may be equally meritorious; although the one, from the unfavourable circumstances in which he is placed, may resemble a clear stream rolling through a lonesome solitude, while the other, more advantageously situated with respect to external objects, may resemble a beautiful river flowing through a populous valley, supplying the wants of man and other animals, and diffusing abundance and pleasure through the adjoining country, which it fertilizes and adorns.

The injudicious estimation of virtues and vices, by the effects which they tend to produce, is the source of that extravagant admiration on the one hand, and that excessive severity on the other, which universally characterize the judgments of the vulgar. But a wise man, who examines the first principles of action in the human heart, will neither be dazzled by the splendour of heroes and patriots, nor provoked to undue revenge against illustrious criminals.⁷ The civil magistrate, who is en-

5 Λγὲ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ ἀπειροσμία, ὅπου πρὸς ὑμῖν εἰμι διατίταμαι, ὡς ἴσους ἐπιδείκνυμι καὶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον.

The reason is subjoined.

Εὐν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς, οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσους.

"We ought to be willing to obey the gods, since we must obey them whether we are willing or not."

6 Epictetus, however, allows the appearance of sympathy with objects in distress, but sternly forbids the reality. Μιχρὲν μὲν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῇ πραγματικῇ αὐτῇ (viz. the person afflicted) καὶ τυχὴ συνιπιδιστῆσαι προσήκει μὲν τοῖς, καὶ ὅταν συνιπιδιστῆσαι. Epictet. Enchir. c. xiii.

7 Σημεῖον προσηγορίας· οὐδὲν ψῆγος, οὐδὲν ἰσχυρῆς, &c. Enchir. c. lxvii.

trusted with the interest of society, and who has that interest always in view, must chiefly regard external actions, and consider them as sufficient indications of the inward affections and character. It is his business to regulate the lives, not to purify the hearts, of men. But we may be assured that He, who can penetrate deeper than an earthly judge, governs the moral world by more refined principles, and dispenses rewards and punishments according to a more accurate standard.¹ To avert his anger, superstition tells us to repair the bad consequences of our misconduct; and, as this is often impracticable, therefore commands an impossibility: to regain his approbation, and that of our own breasts, philosophy exhorts us to fix our chief attention, not on effects, which are transitory, but on the cause, which is permanent; to be less anxious about wiping off the stain of particular sins, than solicitous to stop the source from which they all flow. When we have accomplished this great purpose, we have reached the perfection of our nature. For the Deity, who has enjoined virtue as our duty, has placed our happiness in virtue. In performing the task assigned us, we necessarily attain our reward.²

Such is the philosophy of the Stoics, which, beside containing several contradictions which all the subtlety of the sect was unable to reconcile, evidently supposes a degree of perfection far beyond the weakness of humanity. The system of Epicurus is not less artificial in its texture, and, though humbler in its origin, is equally magnificent in its conclusions.³ Like the lowly plant, which, at first feebly emerging from the ground, gradually rises to a stately tree towering to the sky, the philosophy of Epicurus, at first restricting the primary objects of natural desire and aversion to bodily pleasure and pain, by degrees expands itself into the fairest forms of virtue, and enforces the severest lessons of duty. That pleasure and pain are the universal objects of desire and aversion is a truth, he observed, powerfully attested by the consenting voice of all animated nature. Not only men, but children, and even brute animals, could they emit articulate sounds, would declare and cry out, that pleasure is the sovereign good, and pain the greatest evil.⁴ That they are, not only the greatest and most universal, but the sole ultimate objects of desire and aversion, Epicurus endeavoured to prove by analyzing our passions, and actions, and virtues, all of which, he pretended, had, in the last instance, nothing farther in view than to procure bodily pleasure, and avoid bodily pain. If we desire power and wealth, it is because power and wealth furnish us with innumerable means of enjoyment. Sensible that the good-will of the society in which we live, is necessary to our security, we strive assiduously to acquire it, cultivate friendship, exer-

cise benevolence, and practise with diligence and alacrity all those social virtues essential to the public safety, in which our own is included. When it is necessary to reject a present pleasure, in order to attain a greater in future, temperance must moderate the eagerness of desire; and when it is necessary to encounter a present pain, in order to avoid a greater in future, fortitude must control the dictates of pusillanimity. Justice teaches us to abstain from injuring others, as the only condition on which we can escape being injured by them. And prudence, which, according to Epicurus, is the queen of all the virtues, and to which justice, temperance, and fortitude are barely handmaids and attendants, invariably points out to us, and enforces, that course of action which is most conducive to our private comfort and happiness. This course of action is acknowledged by all moralists to consist in the practice of virtue; so that virtue, according to Epicurus, is the only true wisdom, and vice the most shortsighted levity and folly.

To illustrate this doctrine, he observed, that though all the modifications of hope and fear ultimately refer to the sensations of bodily pleasure or pain, yet the pleasures and pains of the mind are infinitely more important than their originals. The body can only feel the sensation of the present moment, which can never be of great importance; whereas the mind recollects the past, and anticipates the future. If our mental frame, therefore, be properly adjusted, if our sentiments and judgments be duly regulated, it is a matter of little moment how our bodies be disposed; we may despise its pleasures, and even set its pains at defiance. If pain be violent, experience teaches us that it must be short; it cannot be continued long without becoming moderate, and admitting many intervals of ease; besides, death is always within our reach, and ready at a call to deliver us, whenever life becomes a burden.

By this kind of philosophical chemistry, Epicurus extracted from the grossest materials, the most sublime principles of wisdom and virtue. His philosophy imposed absolute silence on the passions; since no state, and therefore not the little republic of man, can be happy in sedition. In this tranquillity of mind, he boasted a felicity which external pleasures might vary, but could not increase; and his security of enjoyment he asserted to be equally firm and unalterable with that of the gods, since the most unbounded duration could not afford greater happiness than arose from reflecting, that all our pleasures and pains are confined within a narrow span. Having adopted the atomic philosophy of Democritus, he rendered it subservient to his morality. The phenomena of nature, he fancied might be explained by the figures and motions of the small particles of matter; and as the universe arose, so did it continue, without the interference of the gods, those celestial beings, who, enjoying complete happiness in themselves, and totally independent on the actions of men, are neither pleased with our virtues, nor offended by our crimes. Confiding in the certainty of

¹ Epictet. *Enchir.* c. xxxviii.

Quod si ita est, ut neque quisquam, nisi bonus vir, et omnes boni beati sint; quid philosophia magis colendum, aut quid est virtute divinius. Cicero de Fin. l. iii. ad fin.

³ Diogen. Laert. in Aristip. et Epicur.

⁴ Cicero de Finibus, l. i. c. ix. et passim.

these speculations, he trampled under foot the superstitious terrors of the vulgar, and fortified his mind against the fear of death.⁵

Such were the tenets of Epicurus, than whom no philosopher was ever more admired and beloved by his disciples, or more cordially attached to them in affectionate esteem. He is described as a man of the most amiable disposition, of great gentleness and humanity; and, like Eudoxus, who preceded him, and who inculcated the same loose doctrines of religion and morality, extremely temperate with regard to pleasure; a circumstance which failed not to add much reputation to his philosophy. In his character, the firm and manly, were united with the gentler, virtues. When grievously afflicted with the stone, he bore the agony incident to that disease with the greatest constancy; and in the last day of his life, when his pain had reached a degree beyond which he could conceive none greater, wrote to his friend Hermachus,⁶ and recommended to him the children of his favourite disciple Metrodorus, assuring him at the same time, that as to himself, he still was happy, since the smart of his bodily sufferings was more than compensated by the pleasures of his mind, and particularly by the agreeable remembrance of his discoveries; a declaration, however inconsistent it may be deemed with his opinions, highly honourable to the man.

Such were the philosophical systems respecting life and happiness, by which the more liberal part of mankind long affected to regulate their sentiments and conduct. The excessive scepticism of Pyrrho, which none could reduce to practice without meriting the charge of insanity, seems never, even in theory, to have had much vogue among the speculatists of antiquity. In matters of doubtful evidence, indeed, a prudent suspension of judgment had been recommended by Socrates, enforced by Plato, and extended to subjects of every kind by his followers. Arcesilas and Carneades.⁷ These philosophers, however, in denying certainty, still admitted probability, which they thought sufficient for regulating our judgments and actions. But the extravagant Pyrrho was dogmatical only in maintaining, that no one opinion was more probable than another. The non-existence of sensible qualities, which had been proved by Democritus,⁸ Protagoras,⁹ and Aristippus,¹⁰ and which is commonly supposed a

modern discovery, because the contrary opinion obtained among the schoolmen, probably led Pyrrho to deny the reality likewise of moral qualities and distinctions. As heat and cold, tastes and colours, had no external existence in bodies, and were mere ideas of the mind; in the same manner, beauty and deformity, virtue and vice, happiness and misery, had no real or permanent cause, but depended, like every thing else, on relation or comparison. Upon this principle, "that all was relative,"¹¹ Pyrrho established topics for enabling his sect readily to dispute the truth of all positions whatever, and which were reduced to ten,¹² probably in opposition to the ten categories of the dogmatists. The great patron of Pyrrhonism boasts, that while other philosophers wandered in pursuit of a false and artificial happiness, Pyrrho alone had discovered the true and natural one, and that, by an accident similar to the painter's,¹³ who, having finished the picture of a dog all to the foam of his mouth, could not, after repeated trials, satisfy himself in painting this last circumstance. Enraged by disappointment, he at length dashed against the canvas the sponge with which he wiped his pencils. Accident produced the effect which he had vainly sought from art; and the foam was represented so naturally, that the picture, though admirable in other respects, was chiefly admired on this account. Fatigued by many painful researches into the nature of truth and virtue, Pyrrho, in the same manner, had discovered that truth and virtue were nowhere to be found; a discovery, which produced that moderation and *indisturbance*,¹⁴ that happy indifference, or rather perfect insensibility, which is as naturally attended by happiness, as a body is followed by its shadow.¹⁵

In concluding this work with the scepticism of Pyrrho, it is proper to observe, for the honour of Greece, that though the doctrines which that philosopher inculcated can have no other tendency than to unhinge the moral principles, to darken and perplex the mind; yet those systems of his contemporaries, or predecessors, which have been more particularly explained in the present history, amidst all their apparent contradictions, uniformly afford such views of nature and of man, as awaken and cherish our love for both. Established on firm grounds of reason, they evince the indissoluble union of interest with duty, display the beauty of virtue in its brightest charms, and unmask the hideous spectres of fancy and superstition.

⁵ Lucretius, *passim*.

⁶ Vid. Diogen. Laert. l. x. sect. ix. et Cic. de Finibus, l. ii. c. xxx. et seq.

⁷ Because Socrates and Plato doubted some things, these philosophers doubted all. Vid. Cicer. Acad. l. i. They formed, what was called, the New Academy, which held the same tenets with the ancient, only asserting them still less positively.

⁸ See Sextus Empiricus, p. 300.

⁹ Pyrrhon. Hypot. l. i. sect. 216.

¹⁰ Præterea quoniam nequeant sine luce colores
Esse, neque in luce existant primordia rerum
Scire licet, quam sint nullo velata colore.

* * * * *

Sed ne forte putes solo spoliata colore
Corpora prima manere; etiam secreta teporis
Sunt, ac frigoris omnino, &c. LUCRETIVS, l. ii.

¹¹ ΠΑΡΤΑ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙ. Sextus Empiric.

¹² Sextus Empiric. Hypothet. Pyrrhon. l. i. c. xiv. et Diogen. Laert. in Pyrrhon.

¹³ Sextus Empiric. l. i. c. xli. Sextus calls the painter Apelles. Pliny, l. xxxv. c. xx. ascribes this accident to Protogenes, and a similar one to Nealos in painting a horse.

¹⁴ Ἀταραξία. Sextus Empiric.

¹⁵ Sextus Empiric. ubi supra, et *passim*.

INDEX.

A

- ABDELERMINUS**, story of, rejected, 436. (*Note*)
- Abe**, city of, destroyed by the Persians, 123.
- Abstraction**, faculty of, not unknown to the ancients, 362.
- Accent**, in language, its use and varieties, 70.
- Achaia** conquered, 34. Brief political history of, 62. Wisdom of its laws, 140. Revolutions, 342.
- Achilles**, opinions concerning his shield, 31. (*Note*)
- Acuphis**, his successful negotiation with Alexander, 449.
- Ada**, the government of Caria committed to her by Alexander, 430.
- Adimanthus**, his character, 257. Is taken prisoner by Lysander, 259.
- Adimantus**, his violent opposition to Themistocles, 125.
- Adonis**, festival of, at Athens, described, 223.
- Adrastus**, a fugitive Phrygian prince, his history, 85.
- Adultery**, how punished during the heroic ages of Greece, 28.
- Aegina**, island of, described, 111. Fleet of, destroyed by Themistocles, ib.
- Egos Potamos**, naval engagement there, 259.
- Aeneas**, probably contemporary with Dido, 136. (*Note*)
- Æschines**, the philosopher, his dialogues, 274.
- the orator, his embassy to Peloponnesus, 388, 390. Quarrel between him and Demosthenes, 392. His speech to Philip of Macedon, ib. Is corrupted by Philip's ambassadors, 394. His speech to Philip on another embassy, 395. Gives an account of his embassy to the Athenians, 396. Assumes the merit of softening Philip toward the Phocians, 399. Is prosecuted at the persuasion of Demosthenes, 404. Is sent as deputy to the Amphictyonic council, 414. Inveighs against the Locrians, 415. Accuses Ctesiphon for his decree in honour of Demosthenes, 446. His banishment, ib.
- Æschylus**, the tragedian, distinguishes himself at the battle of Marathon, 108. Was the father of Greek tragedy, 172.
- Æsop**, his fables, 163.
- Ætolians**, engage as auxiliaries to the Heraclidæ, 34. Establish themselves in Peloponnesus, ib. Are ravaged by the Athenians, 203. Singular mode of fighting the invaders, 204.
- Agamemnon** commands the Grecian armament collected against Troy, 21. Takes and destroys that city, 22. How he obtained the pre-eminence over the other Grecian princes, 27. His death, 32.
- Agésilas**, his character, and pretensions to the crown of Sparta, 299. Is declared king, ib. Takes the command of the Grecian forces in Asia, 300. His ill treatment of Lysander, ib. His address in counteracting the treachery of Tissaphernes, ib. His expedition to Phrygia, 301. His military preparations, and martial exercises, ib. Defeats the Persians, 302. Negotiation between him and Tithraustes for the indemnity of Lydia, ib. Is entrusted with the command of the Grecian fleet, ib. Is recalled, 305. He defeats the Thessalians on his return, ib. Defeats the confederate army at Coronæa, 307. His Asiatic victories prejudicial to Sparta, 313. Allows his colleague Cleombrotus to conduct the war in Bœotia, 321. Is supposed to have been privy to the attempt of Sphodrias on the Piræus of Athens, 321. His invasions of Bœotia, 322. Acts as the Spartan deputy in the Grecian congress, 324. Debates between him and Epaminondas, ib. Evades the law of Lycurgus with respect to the troops vanquished at Leuctra, 128. His ineffectual attempts to restore the Spartan authority in Arcadia, 332. His vigilant exertions on the invasion of Laconia by the Thebans, 333. Negotiates a defensive treaty with Athens, 334. His death and character, 350.
- Agisipolis**, king of Sparta, besieges and takes the city of Mantinée, 315. Takes Torona, 317. Dies, ib.
- Agis**, king of Sparta, commands the Spartan forces at the renewal of the Peloponnesian war, 215. Concludes a truce with the Argives, ib. Battle of Mantinée, 217. His expedition into Attica, 231. His wife Timea seduced by Alcibiades, 242. Invades the Elians, 277. His death, 299.
- Agoracritus**, his celebrated statue of Venus, 274.
- Agriculture** taught in Attica by Cecrops, 13. How practised in Greece during the heroic ages, 27, 30.
- Agrigentum**, by whom founded, 139. Its magnificence and prosperity, 278. Siege of, by the Carthaginians, 279. Miserable fate of the Agrigentines, ib.
- Ajax**, the son of Telamon, his presumption, and how punished, 24. (*Note*)
- Alcæus**, the ancient Greek poet, his character, 76.
- Alcander**, becomes a supporter of the institutions of Lycurgus, 42. (*Note*)
- Alcibiades**, his birth and education, 213. Attachment between him and Socrates, 214. His character, ib. His deceitful conduct toward the Spartan ambassadors, 214. Persuades the Athenians to enter into the Argive alliance, 215. Persuades the Argives to break their truce, 216. His ambitious views, 221. His debate with Nicias, respecting the expedition to Sicily, ib. His armament sails, 223. He takes Catana, 224. Recalled to Athens, ib. Is accused of impiety by Thessalus, 225. Flies to Sparta, 226, 231. Surprises the Athenian partisans in Chios, 241. Seduces the wife of king Agis, 242. Takes refuge with Tissaphernes, ib. Alienates that general from the Spartan interests, ib. Conspires against the democracy in Athens, 243. Frustrates the negotiation between the Athenian ambassadors and Tissaphernes, 244. Is invited by Thrasybulus to the camp at Samoa, 245. His address to his countrymen, ib. His message to the tyrants, 246. Is recalled to Athens, ib. Captures the whole Peloponnesian fleet, 247. Takes Byzantium, 249. His triumphant return to Athens, ib. Conducts the Eleusinian festival, 250. His fleet defeated during his absence, by Lysander, 253. He is impeached by Thrasybulus, and disgraced, ib. His advice for the security of the Athenian fleet rejected, 258. Retires to Phrygia, 265. Manner of his death, 266.
- Alcidas**, the Spartan naval commander, sent to the relief of Mitylene, his imprudent conduct, 196, 199. His engagement with Nicostratus at Corcyra, 201.
- Alexander**, king of Macedon, his character, 129. Is employed by Mardonius to treat with the Athenians, ib.

- Alexander the Great, his birth, 374.** His behaviour to the Persian ambassadors at his father's court, 401. Saves the life of his father Philip, 413. Routs the Thebans, 418. Quarrels with his father, and takes refuge among the Illyrians, 422. Is reconciled, *ib.* Difficulties attending his accession, 423. Is acknowledged general of the Greeks, *ib.* His interview with Diogenes, *ib.* Defeats the Thracians, 424. Passes the Danube, *ib.* Is assisted by Langarus the Agrian, *ib.* Defeats Glaucias, king of the Taulantii, 425. Revolt and destruction of Thebes, *ib.* His acts of forbearance there, 426. Receives congratulatory embassies from the Grecian states, *ib.* Prepares for his eastern expedition, *ib.* Prepares to pass the Granicus, 427. Battle there, 428. His personal gallantry, *ib.* His prudent humanity after the engagement, 429. Besieges Halicarnassus, *ib.* The town taken and demolished, 430. His judicious plan of warfare, *ib.* The arts by which he secured his conquests, *ib.* His march from Phaselis to Perga, 431. He chastises the duplicity of the citizens of Aspendus, *ib.* Enters Phrygia, *ib.* Fulfils the oracle relating to the Gordian knot, 432. Passes the northern gate of Cilicia, 433. His sickness at Tarsus, *ib.* Disposition of his army previous to the battle of Issus, 434. Defeats Darius, *ib.* His generous treatment of Darius's captive family, 435. His moderation increases with his good fortune, *ib.* Receives an amicable embassy from Tyre, 436. Besieges Tyre, *ib.* Takes the city, 438. Is wounded at the siege of Gaza, 439. His easy conquest of Egypt, *ib.* Founda the city of Alexandria, *ib.* Visits the oracle of Jupiter Ammon, *ib.* Foundation of his claim to being the son of Jupiter, 440. (*Note.*) He marches into Assyria, *ib.* Battle of Arbela, *ib.* His acquisitions by the defeat of Darius, 442. Pursues Darius, 443. Pursues the murderers of Darius, 444. Besieges the Sogdian fortress, *ib.* Reduces it, and marries Roxana, the daughter of Oxyartes, 445. Surrender of the fortress of Chorienes, *ib.* His prudent regulation of his conquests, 446. Undertakes his Indian expedition, 448. His difficult passage over the Paropamisus, *ib.* Reduces mount Aornos, 449. Receives the submission of Nysa, *ib.* Passes the Indus, 450. His passage over the Hydaspes disputed by Porus, *ib.* The passage effected, 451. Defeats Porus, and treats him generously, 452. Founda Nicæa and Bucephalia, *ib.* Passes the Acesines and Hydraotes, *ib.* Besieges and takes Sangala, *ib.* The eastern bounds of his conquests, 453. His life endangered at the siege of the Mallian fortress, 454. Marches through the Gedrosian desert, *ib.* Punishes the licentious cruelty of Cleander and Sitalus, *ib.* Romantic account of his march through Carmania, 455. Punishes the revolt of his governors of Babylon, Persopolis, and Susa, *ib.* Improves the internal state of his conquests, *ib.* Sends vessels to explore the Persian and Arabian gulfs, 456. Founda a city of retreat for his superannuated soldiers, *ib.* Discharges the debts of his army, *ib.* Promotes intermarriages with the Asiatics, *ib.* His immoderate grief for the death of Hephæstion, 457. Reduces the Cosseans, *ib.* Arts practised to prevent his return to Babylon, *ib.* His death, 459. His character, *ib.* His account of his father and himself, 461. The division of his conquests, 462.
- Alexander, king of Thessaly, his character, 338.** His treacherous seizure of Pelopidas, *ib.* Anecdotes of Pelopidas during his confinement with him, 340. Battle of Cynoscephalæ, 345. Is defeated by the Thebans, 346.
- , the son of Æropus, his treachery detected, 432.
- Alexandria, city of, founded by Alexander the Great, 439.**
- Alphabet, Phœnician, introduced into Greece, 13.**
- Allyattes, king of Lydia, his depredations on the Milesians, 83.** Concludes a peace with them, *ib.* His reign, *ib.*
- Amasis, king of Egypt, his character, 94. •**
- Amazons, 15. (*Note.*)**
- Amphæia, a Messenian city, seized by the Spartans, 50.**
- Amphictyonic council, origin of the, 15.** Its authority extended, 36. Conduct of, on the temple of Delphi being plundered by the Crisseans, 63. Summary history of, 361. Decree of, issued against the Phocians, 375 and 399. And against Sparta, 375. Philip declared general of the Amphictyons, 413. They destroy the Amphiscean plantations on the Cirrhean plain, 416.
- Amphion, the Grecian bard, who, 72.**
- Amphipolis, city of, its revolt from the Athenians, 210.** Battle of, 211. The city joins the Olynthian confederacy, 371. Is besieged by Philip of Macedon, 372. Is taken and annexed to Macedon, *ib.*
- Amphisceans accused, for cultivating the Cirrhean plain, 415.** They attack the Amphictyons, *ib.* Amphissa taken by Philip of Macedon, 416.
- Amusements of the Greeks during the heroic ages, 31.**
- Amyntas II. king of Macedonia, dethroned by Bardyllis, and restored by the Spartans, 366.**
- Amyntas, son of Philip, his pretensions to the throne of Macedonia, 423.**
- Anacreon, the poet, his character, 76.**
- Anaxagoras, the first Grecian philosopher who entertained rational ideas of the Deity, 141, (*Note.*) 169.** His doctrines counteracted by the refinements of the Sophists, *ib.* His accusation and banishment, 188.
- Anaxander, the Spartan general, defeated by Aristomenes, 55.**
- Andérica settled by the Eretrian prisoners, 108.**
- Androcles, joint king of Messenia, his contest with his associate Antiochus, 50.** Obtains the province of Hyamia from the Spartan conquerors, 53.
- Anompharetus, the Spartan commander under Pausanias, his refractory conduct, 133.**
- Antalcidas, his character, 310.** His successful negotiations, *ib.* Rouses the jealousy of Artaxerxes against the Athenians, 312. Reduces the Grecian states to the terms dictated by Artaxerxes, *ib.* Assists at a congress of the Grecian states, 340.
- Antiochus, exposes himself to a defeat by Lysander, 253.**
- Antipater, is entrusted by Alexander with the care of Macedon and Greece, during his Eastern expedition, 426.** Checks the commotions in Greece, 446. Is ordered to join his master with new levies, 456.
- Antiphon, the orator, his character, 243.**
- Antiphon, an Athenian incendiary, is employed by Philip of Macedon to burn the Athenian docks, 413.** Is detected by Demosthenes, and punished, 414.
- Antisthenes, of Athens, the great lessons of his philosophy, 274.**
- Aornos, mount, reduced by Alexander, 449.**
- Apelles, his eminence as a painter, his works, 464.**
- Apollo, his oracle at Delphi, 38.** Statue of Apollo Belvidere described, 180. Abæan temple of, burned, 395.
- Apollo, the Amyclean, account of the throne of, 177.**
- Apollodorus, the Athenian painter, the first who knew the force of light and shade, 357.**
- Apollodorus, governor of Babylon, his arts to prevent Alexander from returning to that city, 457.**
- Apollonides, the Olynthian, banished by the intrigues of Philip, 399.**
- Aracus, appointed to command the Spartan fleet, 258.**
- Arbela, battle of, 440.**
- Arcadia, situation of that country, and character of its inhabitants, 61.** State of, at the era of the peace of Antalcidas, 314. National character of the Arcadians, 337. Are defeated by Archidamus, 338. Arcadia ravaged by the Spartans, and the Achæans, 342. A peace concluded with Athens, 343. The Arcadians seize Olympia, and celebrate the games, 346. They plunder the Olympic treasure, *ib.*

- Archelaus** 1. king of Macedon, his history and character, 366.
- Archidamus**, king of Sparta, his pacific advice, 187. Is appointed to conduct the war, 190. Leads his army into Attica, ib.
- Archidamus**, son of Agesilaus, commands the Spartan forces sent against the Arcadians, 337. Defeats them at Midea, 338. His speech, on the peace with Thebes, 344. Defeats the attempt of Epaminondas to surprise the city of Sparta, 348. Endeavours to revive the Spartan power in the Peloponnesus, 377. Aims at the temple at Delphi, 395. Raises an army for that purpose, 396.
- Archilochus**, the poet, memoirs of, 74. His bitter revenge against Neobulé and her father, ib. Character of his poetry, 75. Is banished Paros, ib. Recovers credit at the Olympic games, ib. Honours paid him on his return to Paros, 76.
- Architecture**, rude state of, in the heroic ages of Greece, 31. The Doric and Ionic orders of, where invented, 176.
- Archons**, commencement of the magistracy of, at Athens, in the stead of kings, 25. Their number, office, and rank, 164.
- Areopagus**, court of, at Athens, described, 98, 164.
- Arginussa**, battle of, 255.
- Argonautic** expedition undertaken, 15. The object of this adventure, 16.
- Argos**, first settled by Danans, 13. Contests between the citizens, and those of the dependent towns, 62. War with Sparta, 89. Intestine commotions in the republic of, 158. The town of Mycenæ destroyed, 159. Conduct of the Argives during the Peloponnesian war, 212. The Argive alliance, 213. The Argives take arms on the renewal of the Peloponnesian war, 215. Conclude a truce, ib. The truce broken, 216. Tumult at Argos, 217.
- Ariæus**, succeeds to the command of Cyrus's army, 287. Concludes a truce with Artaxerxes, ib. Is detached from the Grecian allies, ib.
- Aristæus**, commands the Corinthian auxiliaries, 186. Is taken by the Athenians and put to death, 194.
- Aristagoras**, of Melitis, instigates the Ionians to revolt against the Persian government, 97. His negotiations at Sparta, ib. Applies to the Athenians for assistance, 98, 100. The remainder of his history, and death, 101.
- Aristides**, his generous deference to Miltiades, 107. Comparison between him and Themistocles, 110. Their rivalry, ib. He is banished, ib. Returns to the Grecian fleet before the battle off Salamis, 126. His speech to Mardonius, 130. Is entrusted with the finances of the confederated Greek forces, 152. His death and character, 153.
- , a Theban painter, his great power of expression, 358.
- Aristocrates**, king of Arcadia, professes to assist the Messenians against the Spartans, 57. Deserts them, ib. His second treachery, and punishment, 59.
- Aristodemus**, the Messenian, devotes his daughter to death, in obedience to oracular demand, 52. Kills her himself, 53. Becomes king, and wages successful war against the Spartans, ib. Kills himself, ib.
- Aristodemus**, an Athenian player, employed by Philip of Macedon to cultivate his interest at Athens, 390. His embassy to Philip, ib. Is sent again, 391.
- Aristomenes**, is saluted king of Messenia by the army, 55. His expedition to the city of Sparta, ib. His repeated successes against the Spartans, ib. Is defeated at the Trenches, 57. Defends the fortress of Eira, ib. Is taken prisoner, ib. His escape, 58. Is surprised by the Spartans, ib. Abandons Eira, 59. Is kindly received by the Arcadians, ib. His travels, death, and character, 60.
- Aristophanes**, a declared enemy to Socrates, 172. Nature of his comedies described, 172. Ridicules Cleon, 207. His comedy of the Clouds, the remote cause of the prosecution of Socrates, 269.
- Aristotle**, his distinctions of style in writing, 275.
- (Note.) Inquiry into Plato's doctrine of ideas, 363.
- (Note.) Presents made him by Alexander, 465. His moral and political works, ib. His philosophy, 466. His logic, ib. His great opportunities of improvement, ib. His death, 467. Tenets of the Peripatetic school, ib. Estimate and fate of his philosophy, 470.
- Armenia**, passage of the Greeks through that country, 291.
- Arrian**, remarks on his account of Alexander's passage from Phaselis to Perga, 431.
- Artabanus**, his moral reflections to Xerxes, on the review of his immense army, 114. His cautions for the safety of the Persian fleet, 115.
- Artabazus**, satrap of Ionia, revolts from the king of Persia, 355.
- Artaphernes**, the Persian governor of Sardis, commands the Athenians to reinstate Hippias, 100.
- Artaxerxes Longimanus**, king of Persia, affords protection to Themistocles on his banishment, 152, 153. His measures of defence against the Grecian invasion, 154. Cimon's victories over his fleet and army, ib. Revolt of Egypt, 155. Solicits a peace with the Athenians, 156.
- Artaxerxes** (Mnemon) is appointed successor to the throne of Persia, 281. His brother Cyrus disputes the crown with him, 282. Leads his army against him, 285. Battle of Cynaxa, ib. Concludes a truce with the Grecian army, 287. Makes war against the Spartans, 297. Orders the death of Tissaphernes, 302. His interview with Conon, 306. Is persuaded by Conon to rebuild the walls of Athens, 309. He dictates the terms of a general peace, 312. His motive for promoting the tranquillity of Greece, 322. Procures a congress to be held at Sparta, 323. Concludes a treaty with the Spartans, 336. A congress of the Grecian states at his court, 340.
- Artemisia**, of Halicarnassus, her advice to Xerxes, 124. Her artifice to save herself at the battle of Salamis, 127.
- Artemisium**, the first sea engagement there between the Grecian and Persian fleets, 121. The second, 122.
- Aspasia**, the Athenian courtesan, her character, 175, 168.
- Apendus**, inhabitants of, chastised by Alexander, 431.
- Asia Minor**, is colonized by Greeks, 35. Distinction of dialects in the new settlements, ib. Peculiar advantages of the Ionian colonies, ib.
- Assyria**, downfall of the monarchy of, 86.
- Astronomy** favoured by Alexander's conquest of Babylon, 465.
- Atheas**, king of Scythia, invites Philip of Macedon to assist him against the Istrians, 411. His perfidy, ib. Is chastised by Philip, 412.
- Athenagoras**, of Syracuse, inspires his countrymen against the Athenian armament, 226.
- Athens**, first settled by Cecrops, 13. Agriculture taught there by Cecrops, ib. The Cretan institutions introduced by Theseus, 18. The exiled descendants of Hercules received into Attica, 33. Royalty abolished, and the magistracy of Archons substituted in its room, 35. The Dorians expelled by the Athenians, ib. Political revolutions at Athens, 62. Constitution of the republic, as regulated by Solon, 98. Rapid successes of the Athenians after establishing a democracy, 99. They assist the Ionian revolters against the Persians, 100. But afterward leave them, 101. Attica invaded by the Persians, 105. Conduct of the Athenians after the battle of Marathon, 108, 109. Naval successes, 111. Strength and spirit of the republic, ib. Battle of Thermopylæ, 119. Xerxes enters Attica, and the Athenians abandon their country, 124. The Spartans desert the Athenian cause, 130. Contest between the Athenians and Tegeans, 132. They distinguish themselves at the battle of Plataeæ, 134. And at that of Mycalé, 136. Their prosperity after these victories, 147. Their attainments in the arts

of peace, *ib.* Celebrate their victory over the Persians at Salamis, 148. The city of Athens rebuilt and fortified, *ib.* The Athenians assist the revolt of Egypt from Artaxerxes, 155. Peace concluded with Artaxerxes, 156. The power of Athens viewed with discontent by the other Grecian states, 157. The famous truce of thirty years, 159. How they subdued their neighbouring states, 160. Spirit of the Athenian government, *ib.* Panegyric on the Athenian laws, 162. State of Athens at the time of Solon, *ib.* Alterations in government introduced by Clisthenes, 165. The democratic form of government completed by Pericles, 166. Progress of luxury in the republic, 167. The virtues and vices of this period compared, 167. History of philosophy, 168. Tragedy, 171. Comedy, 172. Minerva honoured as the tutelary deity of Athens, 173. Mode of celebrating the festivals, *ib.* Domestic manners of the Athenians, 174. The fine arts, 178. Great improvements made by Athenian sculptors and painters, *ib.* Origin of the Peloponnesian war, 181. The Corinthians and Corcyreans appeal to Athens, 183. A treaty of mutual defence concluded with Corcyra, 184. A reinforcement sent to the Corcyrean fleet, *ib.* Reply to the remonstrance of the Corinthians, 185. Account of the states confederated against Athens, 187. A menacing embassy received from the confederates, *ib.* Preparations for war, 190. Invasion of Attica by Archidamus, *ib.* The invasion retaliated on the confederates by sea, 191. Attica evacuated, *ib.* Athens visited by the plague, 192. Devastation of Attica by the enemy, *ib.* Ill success of the war, 193. The Athenian troops weakened by the plague, 203. Expedition to Ætolia, *ib.* Peace made with Sparta, 212. Accession of Athens to the Argive alliance, 213. Mutual discontents between Athens and Sparta, 214. Renewal of the war, 215—219. Send a fleet to Sicily, 221. Attica invaded by Agis, 231. Vigorous exertions of the Athenians, *ib.* Are finally defeated at sea before Syracuse, 235. Their disastrous retreat from that city, *ib.* General consternation, 239. Combination of the Grecian states against Athens, *ib.* The Athenians defeat the measures of the Corinthians and Chians, 241. The democracy overturned, 243. The government of the Four Hundred formed, 245. Their tyranny, *ib.* Tumults at Athens, 246. The democracy restored, 247. The Athenians become again victorious at sea, *ib.* Celebration of the Eleusian rites, 249. Celebration of the Plynteria, 250. Athens besieged by Lysander, 260. Athens surrenders to Lysander, and is dismantled, 261. Cruel treatment of the Athenians by the thirty tyrants, 263. The tyrants deposed, and decemvirs elected, 267. The internal peace of Athens effected, 268. A general amnesty, 269. State of the fine arts at this time, 274. The Athenians assist the Thebans against the Spartans, 304. The walls of Athens rebuilt, 309. The Athenians contribute to the revolt of Cyprus, 312. Accept terms of peace from Artaxerxes, *ib.* The alliance with Sparta renewed, 321. The Athenians irritated at the attempt of Sphodrias on the Piræus, *ib.* Naval successes against the Spartans, 322. The exiled inhabitants of Platæa received into the republic, 323. Deputies sent to the Grecian congress at Sparta, 324. Conduct of the Athenians after the battle of Leuctra, 328. They resolve to hold the balance of power, 329. A defensive alliance with Sparta debated, 334. Assistance sent to the Spartans against the Theban invasion, 335. The alliance with Sparta extended and confirmed, 336. Peace concluded with the Arcadians, 343. The Athenians recover many of their maritime possessions, 351. The degeneracy of the Athenians, 352. Their extreme profligacy, 353. The social war, 354. State of philosophy at this time, 356. Statuary, *ib.* Painting, *ib.* Literature, 358. The Athenians deluded by a treaty with Philip of Macedon, 369. They counteract his views upon Olynthus, 379.

They defend the straits of Thermopylæ against Philip, *ib.* Are deluded into negligence, 383. State of parties in Athens, 384. Attica insulted by Macedonian fleets, 390. Ambassadors sent to negotiate with Philip, 391. A third embassy to Philip, 394. A treaty concluded with Philip, 396. General consternation at the fate of the Phocians, 398. Pass a decree for receiving the Phocian fugitives, 399. Resolve to preserve their engagements with Philip, 400. The Athenians courted by the Spartans and Peloponnesians, 402. They endeavour to rouse the Grecian states against Philip, 405. Spirited exertions against Philip, by sea and land, 413. The Athenians raise a confederacy against Philip, 416. General consternation on Philip seizing Elateæ, 417. Moderation of Philip toward Athens, 419. The peace with Philip ratified, 420. State of, during the latter years of Alexander, 447. Philosophical sects established there, 467. Atys, son of Cræsus king of Lydia, his death, and the consequences of it, 86.

B

Babylon, the capital of Assyria, besieged by Cyrus, 94. The city, and its resources, described, *ib.* Is taken by stratagem, *ib.* Improvements made there by Alexander, 455. Scheme of Apollodorus to prevent Alexander's return thither, 458.

Bacchus, his expedition to India inquired into, 449. (*Note.*)

Bacon, lord, his character of Aristotle, 465.

Bards, Grecian, their character during the heroic ages, 71. Their high authority and influence on Society, 72. The respect attached to their character, *ib.* Peculiar advantages of the ages in which they lived, 73. The perfection and authority of their compositions, *ib.*

Bardyllis, an Illyrian chief, effects a revolution in Macedonia, 367. Defeats Perdicas, *ib.* Is defeated and killed by Philip of Macedon, 370.

Batchylès, the Magnesian, makes the throne of Amyclean Apollo, 177.

Beattie, Dr. remarks on his Essay on Truth, 468. (*Note.*)

Belus, temple of, at Babylon, account of, 458.

Bias, of Priêné, dissuades Cræsus king of Lydia from attempting naval exploits, 84.

Boeotia, revolt of the inferior cities of, from the authority of Thebes, 159. The revolters assisted by the Athenians, 159. Battle of Delium, 208.

Boges, the Persian governor of Eion, his desperate conduct and death, 153.

Boxing, how practised in the ancient gymnastic exercises, 67.

Brachmans, ancient, account of their tenets, 458.

Brasidas, a Spartan naval commander, joins the fleet of Alcidas, 199. His prudent counsel overruled, 201. His expedition to Thrace, 209. His address to the Acanthians, *ib.* Procures the revolt of Amphipolia, 210. His death, and honours paid to his memory, 211.

Bucephalus, Alexander the Great's horse, a city founded to his memory, 426.

Bythia, sufferings of the Greeks under Xenophon, in their passage through that country, 294.

Byzantium, its foundation, and peculiar situation, described, 150. Is taken from the Persians, by the Greeks, *ib.* Is taken by Alcibiades, 249. Is taken from the Athenians by Lysander, 260. Attempt of Philip of Macedon to surprise it, 410.

C

Cabyla, founded by Philip of Macedon, 401.

Cadmus, a Phœnician, the founder of Thebes, 13.

Calanus, the Brachman, his death and prophecy, 458.

Calenture, general idea of this disorder, 317.

Callias, the Athenian admiral, his exertions against Philip of Macedon, 407.

- Callicratidas**, his reception in the command of the Peloponnesian fleet, 254. His manly behaviour, *ib.* Obtains voluntary contributions from the Ionians, *ib.* Takes Methymna, 255. Defeats the Athenian fleet under Conon, *ib.* Is defeated and killed at Arginusæ, *ib.*
- Callicratides**, the Spartan, manner of his death at the battle of Platæa, 135.
- Callisthenes**, put to death for a conspiracy against Alexander the Great, 460. (*Note.*)
- Callixenus**, procures a decree against the Athenian admirals, 257.
- Cambyses**, king of Persia, pursues the conquests of his father Cyrus, 94. Reduces Egypt, 95. His death, *ib.*
- Camerina**, city of, holds a neutrality between Syracuse and Athens, 229.
- Candaules**, king of Lydia, the consequences of his imprudence, 82.
- Cappadocia**, invaded and ravaged by Croesus king of Lydia, 88.
- Caranus**, an Argive prince, establishes a principality in Macedonia, 365.
- Carthage**, the foundation and growth of, 136. Prevents the Phœceans from settling in Corsica, 137. Commercial prosperity and power of the Carthaginians, *ib.* Civil government of the republic, *ib.* (*Note.*) Ambitious and jealous spirit of the republic, 138. Learning of, *ib.* (*Note.*) Views of the Carthaginians in entering into alliance with Xerxes, *ib.* They invade Sicily, 145. Conclude a treaty of peace with Syracuse, 146. Undertake the conquest of Sicily, 278. Treat the natives cruelly, *ib.*
- Castor** of Rhodes, his character as a chronologist and historian, 81. (*Note.*)
- Cataphracts**, in the Grecian military, what, 428. (*Note.*)
- Categories**, the ten, in the ancient logic explained, 360. (*Note.*)
- Cebes** the Theban, his final conversation with Socrates, 272. Account of his celebrated Table, 274.
- Cecrops** his settlement in Attica, 13.
- Cephalus**, his character and good fortune at Athens, 263.
- Ceres**, honoured by the Athenians in the Eleusinian festival, 249.
- Chabrias**, the Athenian general of the Theban army, his address in opposing the operations of Agesilaus, in Bœotia, 322. The unusual attitude of his statue at Rome explained, *ib.* (*Note.*) Acts in the capacities of general and admiral, *ib.* Repulses Epaminondas from before Corinth, 337. Is killed in the Social war, 354.
- Chalcis**, region of, in Macedonia, described, 185.
- Chalybeans**, their opposition to the Greeks under Xenophon and Cheirisophus, 291.
- Chares** of Athens, his character, 354. Is sent out to conduct the Social war, *ib.* Abandons the siege of Chios, *ib.* Accuses his associates, 355. Engages in the service of Artabazus, *ib.* Occasion of his recall, 356. His expedition to Olynthus, 386. Is sent to Thrace, where he is defeated by Amyntas, 410. Is one of the generals at the battle of Cheronea, 418.
- Charidemus**, his character, and expedition to Olynthus, 388.
- Chariot-races**, in the ancient Grecian public games, when instituted, 67.
- Charon**, his address and fortitude during the execution of Pelopidas's conspiracy at Thebes, 319.
- Cherisophus** commands the Spartan troops sent to assist Cyrus in his Asiatic expedition, 283. His advice to the Greeks, 289. Is elected one of their generals, *ib.* Memorable retreat of the Greeks from Asia, *ib.* Leaves Trebizond, 293. His return, 294. His death, *ib.*
- Cheronea**, battle of, between Philip and the Greeks, 418.
- Cherries**, first brought from Cerasus to Italy by Lucullus, 293.
- Chersonesus**, Thracian, description of the country, 298. Is fortified by Dercyllidas, *ib.*
- Chieftains**, Grecian, during the heroic ages, their rank and authority, 27.
- Chios**, besieged by Chares, 354.
- Chiron**, the Grecian bard, brief account of, 72.
- Choriene**, his submission to Alexander the Great, 445.
- Chorus** in the Grecian theatre, its origin, and advantages, 171.
- Chronology** very loosely regarded by the ancient Greek historians, 12. (*Note.*)
- Cicero**, remarks on his account of the conduct of Callicratidas, 255. (*Note.*)
- Cimmerians**, their invasion of Asia Minor, 82.
- Cimon**, his character, 153. Succeeds to the command of the Grecian army, on the death of Aristides, *ib.* His rapid successes in Caria and Lycia, *ib.* Reduces Phaselis, *ib.* Defeats the Persian fleet, 154. Surprises the Persian camp at Ectymedon, *ib.* His successful expedition to Cyprus, 156. Is banished by the influence of Pericles, 159. Parallel between him and Pericles, 160.
- Cinadon**, his character, and conspiracy against the Spartan government, 299. His plot discovered, *ib.* He is put to death, 300.
- Cirrhæ**, a city of the Crissæans, described, 63. Is taken and destroyed by the Amphictyonic army, 65.
- Clearchus**, his address in appeasing the mutiny of Cyrus's Grecian troops, 284. His misconduct at the battle of Cynæa, 286. Concludes a truce with Tissaphernes, 287. Is perfidiously seized by Tissaphernes, *ib.*
- Cleigenes**, the Acanthian, his speech in the Spartan assembly against the Olynthian confederacy, 316.
- Cleitæles**, the Corinthian, his speech at Athens in favour of a defensive alliance with Sparta, 334.
- Cleombrotus**, his accession to the throne of Sparta, 317. Is sent to conduct the war in Bœotia, 321. Is sent a second time with that trust, 326. Is defeated and killed on the plain of Leuctra, 327.
- Cleomenes**, king of Sparta, rejects the overtures of Aristagoras, 98. His resentment against Clisthenes, 99. (*Note.*) His death, 112.
- Cleon** of Athens, his character, 197. Urges the doom of death against the captive citizens of Mitylenæ, *ib.* Prevails on the Athenians to reject the Spartan overtures for peace, 206. His seditious artifices, *ib.* Gains the credit of reducing Sphacteria, *ib.* Is ridiculed by Aristophanes, 207. Is killed before Amphipolis, 211.
- Clisthenes**, alterations made by him in the government of Athens, 165.
- Clitus**, account of the manner of his death, 460.
- Cnidus**, naval engagement there, between Conon and Pisander, 307.
- Codrus**, king of Attica, devotes himself to death for the cause of his country, 35.
- Colchos**, inhabitants of, oppose the passage of the Greeks under Xenophon and Cheirisophus, but are defeated, 292.
- Colonization**, how practised by the early Greeks, 13.
- Colours**, in painting, remarks on, 358.
- Comedy**, Greek, origin of the, 172. Its characteristic distinctions from tragedy, *ib.* And from modern comedy, 172. State of, in the age of Alexander the Great, 463.
- Companions**, a body of Macedonian youth, instituted by king Philip, 369.
- Conon**, is appointed one of the ten commanders to supersede Alcibiades, 253. Is defeated by Callicratidas, 255. His advice rejected, and the Athenian fleet captured by Lysander, 259. Entertains the hope of retrieving the fortune of Athens, 306. His interview with Artaxerxes, *ib.* Defeats Pisander by sea at Cnidus, 307. Prevails on Artaxerxes to rebuild the walls of Athens, 309. His endeavours to restore the power of Athens, 310. Is put to death by the Persians, 311.
- Corcyra**, fleet of, destroyed by Themistocles, 111. Rupture between this colony and Corinth, 182.

The fleet of, defeats that of the Corinthians, 183. The Corcyreans ravage the states allied with Corinth, *ib.* Apply to Athens, *ib.* Representations of the Corcyrean deputies, *ib.* A treaty of mutual defence concluded with Athens, 184. Are defeated by the Corinthians in an obstinate sea-fight, *ib.* Factions generated in Corcyra by Corinthian intrigues, 199. The demagogues assassinated, *ib.* Tumult between the Athenian and the Corinthian factions, 200. Arrival of Nicostratus with a squadron from Athens, *ib.* Massacre of the Lacedæmonian partizans, 201. Perfidious cruelty of the Corcyreans, 202.

Corinthians, their situation and character, 61. Their political revolutions, *ib.* Rupture between them and the Corcyreans, 182. The Corinthians undertake the cause of Epidamnus, *ib.* Their fleet defeated by the Corcyreans, 183. Appeal to Athens, *ib.* Speech of the Corinthian deputies, *ib.* Defeat the Corcyreans in an obstinate sea-engagement, 184. Remonstrance with the Athenians, *ib.* Encourage a revolt of Macedonia from the Athenians, 185. Apply to Sparta for assistance, 186. Corrupt their Corcyrean prisoners, 199. Communicate their discontents to the Argives, 212. Their designs against Athens discovered, 241. Massacre of the principal citizens, 308. The Corinthians prepare to oppose the passage of Philip of Macedon into Peloponnesus, 402. Philip insulted at Corinth, 405.

Coronæa, battle of, 307.

Cossæans reduced by Alexander the Great, 457.

Cotys, king of Thrace, his rude way of life, 368. His frantic delusion, 372.

Courtezans, Grecian, an account of, 175.

Craterus succeeds Antipater as governor of Macedonia and Greece, 431.

Crenidæ, taken by Philip of Macedon, and called from him Philippi, 373.

Crete, island of, how settled, 17. Institutions and manners of the natives, 18.

Criminal jurisdiction, how exercised during the heroic ages of Greece, 27.

Crissa, the republic of, described, 63. Impositions exacted from the pilgrims to Delphi by the Crisseans, *ib.* They plunder the shrine of Delphi, *ib.* Siege of Crissa, 64. The city taken and demolished, *ib.* The Crissean community extirpated, 65.

Critias, chief of the thirty tyrants of Athens, his character, 263. His accusation of Theramenes, 264. Orders him to be put to death, 265. Is killed in battle with Thrasybulus, 267.

Crito, his last conversation with Socrates, 272.

Croesus, the last king of Lydia, subdues the Asiatic Greeks, 84. Dissuaded from attempting naval exploits, *ib.* His character and splendour, *ib.* His conversation with Solon, 85. His extreme solicitude for the safety of his son Atya, and grief for his death, *ib.* Determines to check the progress of Cyrus, 87. Invades Persia, 88. Is defeated by Cyrus, *ib.* Is routed by him at Sardis, *ib.* Is taken at Sardis, 90. How treated by Cyrus, 90. Reproaches the oracle of Delphi, *ib.*

Crotone, when, and by whom built, 139. The citizens reformed by Pythagoras, 143. War between Crotone and Sybaris, 145. Sedition there, *ib.* The citizens defeated by the Locrians and Rhegians, 146.

Cteselaus, his principal excellence as a sculptor, 274.

Ctesiphon, is prosecuted by Æschines for his decree in honour of Demosthenes, 446.

Curtius, Quintus, character of his history of Alexander the Great, 437. (*Note.*)

Cyclades, reduced by the Persian generals, 105. Their present deplorable state, *ib.* (*Note.*)

Cynaxa, battle of, 285.

Cynoscephalæ, battle of, 345.

Cyprus, description of that island, 155. Successful expedition of Cimon to, 156.

Cyrenaica, history of the Greek inhabitants of, 95.

How withdrawn from the sphere of Grecian politics, 277.

Cyrus, king of Persia, his extraction, 86. His first exploits, 87. Defeats Cræsus king of Lydia, 88. Routs him again at Sardis, *ib.* Takes the city of Sardis, 90. His treatment of Cræsus, *ib.* His reply to the solicitations of the Ionians, 91. His reply to the Spartan deputies, 92. Besieges Babylon, 94. Reduces it by stratagem, *ib.* His character, 96.

Cyrus, son of Darius Nothus, his interview with Lysander in Asia Minor, 251. Solicits the re-appointment of Lysander to the command of the Spartan fleet, 258. Disputes the succession of his brother Artaxerxes, 281. His character, 282. State of Lower Asia under his administration, *ib.* His popular conduct, *ib.* Procures the assistance of the Greeks, 283. His expedition into Upper Asia, *ib.* His interview with Epyaxa wife of Syennesis, *ib.* He passes the Euphrates, 285. Battle of Cynaxa, *ib.* His death, 286.

Cythera, island of, subdued by the Athenians under Nicias, 208.

Cyzicus, the whole Peloponnesian fleet captured there by Alcibiades, 247.

D

Danaus, his settlement at Argos, 13.

Darius Codomanus, his accession to the throne of Persia, 427. His inactivity during the progress of Alexander accounted for, 432. Collects an immense army to oppose Alexander, *ib.* His indiscreet march to Issus, 433. Disposition of his army at the battle of Issus, 434. Is routed, *ib.* His escape, 435. Battle of Arbela, 441. His flight, *ib.* His assassination, 443.

— Hystaspes, king of Persia, his character, 95. His revenue and resources, 96. His expedition into Scythia, 97. His exertions to reduce the revolt of Ionia, 102. Takes Miletus, 103. His attention to the prosperity of Ionia after its reduction, *ib.* His resentment against the Athenians, 104. His instructions to Datis and Artaphernes, 105. His generosity to his Eretrian prisoners after the battle of Marathon, 108. His last years employed in preparations for another Grecian expedition, 112. See *Xerxes*.

— Nothus, king of Persia, his character, 239. His generals violate the Persian treaty with Athens, 240. He sends his son Cyrus into Asia Minor, 251. His death, 281.

Datis, and *Artaphernes*, Persian generals, their invasion of Greece, 104. They reduce the Cyclades, 105. Land in Attica, *ib.* Battle of Marathon, 107.

Dead, the memory of those slain in war, how celebrated by the Athenians, 190. (*Note.*)

Decelia, in Attica, fortified by Agis king of Sparta, 231.

Decemvirs chosen by the Athenians on the deposition of the thirty tyrants, 267.

Dedalus the Athenian, and *Dedalus* of Sicyon, probably confounded by the Athenian writers, 176. (*Note.*)

Delium, battle of, between the Thebans and Athenians, 208.

Delphi, oracle of, 37. Description of Delphi, 38. Mode of delivering oracles there, *ib.* Its influence in establishing the Olympic games, and the laws of Sparta, *ib.* The temple plundered by the Crisseans, 63. Command of the oracle on this occasion, 64. How rescued from the attempt of Xerxes, 123. The temple seized by the Phocians, 375.

Demades, his character and opposition to Demosthenes, 383. Reprimands the levity of Philip of Macedon after the battle of Cheronæa, 419.

Demaratus, joint king of Sparta, is reduced by Cleomenes, his associate, to take refuge at the court of Persia, 112. His character of the Greeks, 114. And of the Spartans, 117.

Demetrius, (Phalerius,) the first writer who cultivated chronology as a science, 11. (*Note.*)

Demochares, his insolence to Philip of Macedon, 420.
Demosthenes, the Athenian general, his expedition to Ætolia, 203. Storms Ægittium, *ib.* Defends Naupactus, 204. Surprises the camp of the Ambrascians, *ib.* Fortifies Pylus, *ib.* His defence of this port against the Spartans, 205. Reduces Sphacteria, 206. His operations in Bœotia disconcerted, 208. He and his troops captivated by Gylippus, 238. Is put to death, *ib.*

——, the orator, his first appearance against Philip of Macedon, 379. The motives by which he was actuated, 380. His first Philippic, *ib.* Measures proposed by him for resisting Philip, 381. His military behaviour in Eubœa, 384. His first oration in favour of the Olynthians, *ib.* Cause of his partiality to Chares, 386. His second oration in behalf of the Olynthians, *ib.* His third oration, 388. His quarrel with Æschines, 392. Dissensions between him and his colleagues, ambassadors to Philip, *ib.* Is disabled by embarrassment from addressing Philip, 393. His artful behaviour to his associates on their return, *ib.* His speech at the report of the embassy, *ib.* Procures himself to be joined an another embassy to Philip, 394. His speech to Philip, *ib.* Is prevented from declaring his sentiments to the Athenians, 397. Advises the Athenians not to break their treaty with Philip, 400. His celebrated reply to the partizans of Macedon, 403. Defends the conduct of Diopithes, 406. Receives Persian pay to encourage his opposition to Philip, 408. Honours conferred on him for his services in Eubœa, *ib.* Exhorts the Athenians to assist the cities of Propontis, 409. Renews his exhortations, 410. Detects the plot of Antiphon, 414. His oration on the seizing of Elatœa by Philip, 417. Persuades the Thebans to oppose Philip, 418. Repairs the walls and fortifications of Athens at his own charges, 420. His oration in honour of the slain at Cheronœa, 421. His masterly defence against Æschines, 446. His generosity to him, 447. His banishment and death, *ib.*

Deodatus, of Athens, opposes the cruel resolution of Cleon against the captive citizens of Mytilenê, 197.

Deræ, battle of, between the Spartans and Messenians, 55.

Dercyllidas, the Spartan general, his character, 297. Fortifies Chersonesus against the Thracians, 298. His treaty with Tissaphernes, *ib.* Defends Abydus, 309.

Design, history of the arts of, 176. State of, in the age of Alexander the Great, 464.

Dido, probably contemporary with Æneas, 136. (*Note.*)

Diogenes, the cynic, ridicules the efforts of the Corinthians to oppose Philip of Macedon, 402. Is visited by Alexander king of Macedon, 423.

Diognotus disposes Pausanias to protect Thrasybulus, 268.

Diomedon, the Athenian admiral, his speech before his execution, 257.

Dioneces, the Spartan, his memorable observation at the battle of Thermopylæ, 120.

Dionysius of Syracuse, his first rise and character, 279. His artful usurpation of the government, 280. His unsuccessful attempts for literary fame, *ib.* Reasons why his character has been held in so odious a light, *ib.*

Dionysius the younger, his character, 281. His tyranny abolished by Timoleon, *ib.*

——, a Phocæan, his advice at a council of war, 102. His ineffectual efforts to introduce active discipline in the fleet, 103. Betakes himself to piracy, *ib.*

—— of Halicarnassus, his distinctions in the qualities of style, 69. (*Note.*)

Diopithes, an Athenian general, his vigorous exertions against Philip of Macedon, 406. His conduct defended by Demosthenes, *ib.* Is defeated and killed by Philip, 409.

Dodona, origin of the oracle there, 37.

Dorians, their origin, 12. Engage as auxiliaries to

the Heracleidæ, 34. Establish themselves in Peloponnesus, *ib.* Migration of, 35. Why not alarmed at the progress of Cyrus, 92. Review of their circumstances at the time of their emigration to Magna Græcia, 140.

Draco, the lawgiver of Athens, character of him and his institutions, 162.

E

Education, the main objects of, during the heroic ages of Greece, 31. How regulated by Lycurgus at Sparta, 45. By Solon at Athens, 165. The plan of, according to the Pythagorean school, 143.

Egypt, the Egyptians, why unqualified for relishing or improving music, 68. A settlement of Grecian pirates established in Egypt, 94. Is reduced by Cambyses, 95. Revok of, under Inarus, 155. The arts of design early cultivated there, 176. Ready submission of that country to Alexander the Great, 439. History of, subsequent to Alexander, 463.

Eira, fortress of, gallantly defended by Aristomenes, 57. Is surprised by the Spartans, 58.

Elatœa seized by Philip of Macedon, 417.

Elegy, in poetry, to what purposes principally applied by the Greeks, 73.

Eleusinian mysteries, celebration of the, at Athens described, 249. Requisites for initiation into them, 250. The procession of, conducted by Alcibiades, *ib.*

Elis, republic of, contrasted with that of Sparta, 62. The Elians destroy Pisa, and adorn the temple of the Olympian Jupiter, 158. They feebly assist the Spartans against the Athenians, 277. Elis invaded by the Spartans, and subjugated, *ib.* The Elian territory invaded by the Arcadians, who seize Olympia, 346. The city restored, 347.

Enharmonic genus of Grecian music, by whom invented, 69.

Ennius, his concise enumeration of the principal Greek and Roman divinities, 26. (*Note.*)

Eolians, their origin, 12. Eolia settled by Peloponnesian fugitives, 34. Confederacy of the Eolians against Cyrus, 91.

Epaminondas, his character, 320. Appears at Sparta as the Theban deputy, 323. His demands, 324. Reflections on his conduct, *ib.* Assembles the Theban forces before the plain of Leuctra, 326. Disposition of his troops opposed to Cleombrotus, 327. Battle of Leuctra, *ib.* Ravages Laconia, and rebuilds Messene, 335. His motives for evacuating Laconia, 336. Is tried for his conduct, *ib.* Marches against Corinth, 337. Is again disgraced, *ib.* Delivers Pelopidas from the king of Thessaly, 340. Compels the Achæans to accept the Theban alliance, 342. Aims to render Thebes mistress of the sea, 345. His attempt to surprise Sparta, 348. Attempts Mantinœa, *ib.* His victory before that city, 349. His death, 350. His character, *ib.*

Ephialtes, employed by Pericles at Athens, 166.

Ephori, instituted by Lycurgus at Sparta, the nature of their office, 42.

Epialtes, his treachery to the Greek defenders of the straits of Thermopylæ, 118.

Epicides, his opposition to Themistocles silenced by a bribe, 115.

Epicurus, account of his philosophy, 474. His character, 475.

Epidamnus, citizens of, apply to Corinth for protection against the Taulanti, 182. Submits to the Corcyreans, 183.

Epode and iambic, the distinction between, 74.

Epyra, wife of Syennesis, governor of Cilicia, meditates between Cyrus and her husband, 283.

Equestrian exercises at the ancient public games, described, 67.

Erætria, naval engagement there, 246.

Esculapius engages in the Argonautic expedition, 16.

Eteocles and *Polynices*, the sons of Œdipus, history of, 17.

Eleonicus, his stratagem to preserve the Peloponne-

sian fleet after the defeat of Callicratidas, 256. His address in quelling a mutiny among his seamen, 258.

Eubœa, island of, reduced by the Persians, 105. State of, after the expulsion of the Thebans, 383. The intrigues of Philip of Macedon there, 384. Philip expels the Athenians, 390. The Macedonians expelled by Phocion and Demosthenes, 408.

Eudamidas, his expedition to Macedon, 316.

Euephrus the Lacedæmonian, his perfidy, 49.

Eumenes, secretary to Alexander the Great, his character, 457.

Euphaes, king of Messenê, his advice on the treacherous hostilities of the Spartans, 50. His exhortation to his forces, 51. His battle with the Spartans, *ib.* His exposition of the oracular demand of a virgin sacrifice, 53. His death, *ib.*

Euphemus, the orator, his reply to Hermocrates at Camerina, 229.

Euphranor, the Corinthian painter, his great character, and principal works, 357.

Euphrates, the inundations of, restrained by Alexander the Great, 456.

Euphron, usurps the government of Sicyon, 342. Is assassinated, 343.

Eupompus, the Grecian painter, forms a new school at Sicyon, 357.

Euripides completes the Grecian tragedy, by perfecting the chorus, 171. His character, 172.

Eurydice, queen of Macedonia, solicits the assistance of Iphicrates in behalf of her sons, 366.

Eurylochus, a Thessalian prince, commands the Amphictyonic army sent against Crissa, 64. His army distressed by pestilence, *ib.* Takes and destroys the city, 65.

Eurymedon conducts an Athenian fleet to the assistance of Corcyra, 201. Concurs in the cruelty of the Corcyrean parties, 202.

_____, the Persian camp there surprised and taken by Cimon, 154.

Euxine Sea, the southern coast of, 292. Xenophon proposes to settle his Grecian troops there, 294.

Evagoras, king of Cyprus, his history and character, 306. His attachment to Athens and friendship for Conon, *ib.* Revolts against the Persians, 311. Is reduced to become tributary to Persia, 312.

F

Fables, current lessons of morality in the early ages of Greece and Rome, 168.

G

Galley of the ancients, the true disposition of the rowers described, 62. (*Note.*) Skilful management of them in battle, 103.

Games, public, why instituted by the ancient Greeks, 66.

Gaza, taken by Alexander the Great, after a desperate defence, 439.

Gellias of Agrigentum, his riches and splendid mode of life, 279. His miserable death, *ib.*

Gelon, king of Syracuse, his character, 145. His stratagem to destroy Hamilcar, and the Carthaginian fleet, *ib.* Dictates the terms of peace to Carthage, 146.

Geography, improved by the expedition of Alexander the Great to the East, 465.

Germans, as described by Tacitus, compared with the Greeks as described by Homer, 23. Their superstition dark and gloomy, *ib.*

Glaucias, king of the Taulantii, takes arms against Alexander king of Macedon, 424. Is defeated by him, 425.

Gods of the ancient Greeks, origin and number of the, accounted for, 26.

Gongylus, the Corinthian, brings news of relief to the besieged Syracusans, 230.

Gordius, his history, 431. His famous knot untied or cut by Alexander the Great, 432.

Gorgias of Leontium applies to Athens for protection against the usurpations of Syracuse, 220.

Granicus, battle of, between Alexander the Great and the Persians, 428.

Gryllus, the son of Xenophon, supposed to have killed Epaminondas, 349. (*Note.*)

Guischard, his remarks on warfare, 442. (*Note.*)

Gyges, how he obtained the crown of Lydia, 82.

Gylippus, the Spartan commander, relieves the besieged Syracusans, 231. And defeats the Athenians, 232. Captures Demosthenes and his troops, 237. And Nicias, 238.

Gymnastic exercises in the Grecian games described, 66.

H

Haliartus, besieged by Lyander, but relieved by the Thebans, 304.

Halicarnassus, besieged by Alexander the Great, 429. The town taken and demolished, 430.

Hamilcar, his invasion of Sicily, and death, 145.

Hannibal, undertakes the conquest of Sicily, 278. Is, with the greatest portion of his troops, destroyed by the pestilence, *ib.*

Harmocydes, commander of the Phocian detachment sent to the army of Mardonius, his ill reception by that general, 131.

Harpagus, a Mede, his stratagem in battle, 88. Reduces the countries of Lower Asia, 92. Takes Phœcia, 93.

Harpalus, governor of Babylon, his unsuccessful treachery, 455.

Hecatonpolis, the ancient name of Laconia, 48.

Hecatus, the diviner, his politic advice to the Spartans at the surprise of Eira, 59.

Hegasandridas commands a Peloponnesian fleet sent to the Athenian coast, 246. Defeats the Athenians at Eretria, *ib.*

Hegelochus, the Athenian general, protects Mantinea, 348.

Helen, the motive that suggested the rape of, 20. History of, *ib.* Is married to Menelaus, 21. Elopes with Paris, *ib.* Is recovered on the destruction of Troy, 22. Instance of her personal attentions, 89. (*Note.*)

Hellebore, a medicinal plant cultivated at Crissa, 63.

Hellenes, their origin, 12. Diffuse their colonies and language over Greece, 14. Causes of the migrations of the Hellenic tribes, 33.

Helots, in Sparta, account of, 12. How reduced to a state of slavery, 49. Conspire with the Partheniæ, 54. Revolt of them and the Messenians, 157. They are received by the Athenians on the reduction of Ithome, *ib.* Cruel treatment of, by the Spartans, 209. Are armed by the Spartans at the renewal of the Peloponnesian war, *ib.*

Hephæstion, the favourite of Alexander the Great, is mistaken for him by Darius's mother, Sisymbria, 435. Marries Darius's daughter, Drypetis, 456. His death, 457.

Heracleidæ expelled by the Pelopidæ, and received into Attica, 33. Their establishment in Peloponnesus, 34. Their division of their conquests, *ib.*

Hermocrates, procures a general congress of the Sicilian states, 220. Animates his countrymen to defend Syracuse against the Athenians, 227. Solicits aid from Camerina, 229. His works of defence against the approaches of the besiegers, *ib.* Defeats the Athenian fleet, 231. His scheme to prevent the retreat of the Athenian galleys, 233. Another scheme to retard their final retreat, 235. Burns his ships, 247. Is banished by the Syracusans, 248. His death, 279.

Hermolaus, account of his conspiracy against Alexander the Great, 460. (*Note.*)

Herodotus, his character and rank as a writer, 11. (*Note.*) His work the intermediate shade between poetry and history, 36. (*Note.*) His account of the times of Homer and Hesiod, 71. (*Note.*) His history of Cyrus preferable to that of Xenophon, 86.

- (*Note.*) His encomium on the climate of Ionia, 91.
 (*Note.*) His account of the doctrines of Zoroaster, 95. His character as an historian, 275. Compared with Thucydides, 276.
Heroic ages of Greece, review of the, 15. In religion, 23. In policy, 27. In natural affections, 28. In war, 30. In arts, 31. Sciences, *ib.* Education, *ib.* Amusements, *ib.* General estimate of manners and institutions, 32.
Hesiod, his account of the number of the heathen divinities, 26.
Hexameter thought to be the only kind of verse known in the time of Homer, 71. (*Note.*)
Hieron, king of Syracuse, his reign, 219.
Hipparchus, tyrant of Athens, his character, 165.
Hippias, king of Athens, expelled for his oppressive government, 99. (*Note.*) Attempt of the Spartans to restore him, *ib.* He applies to the Persians, 100. Is killed at the battle of Marathon, 107.
Hippocrates, the physician, letters under his name shown to be spurious, 192. (*Note.*)
 ———, the Athenian general, defeated at Delium by the Thebans, 209.
Hippodrome, for equestrian exercises, its size, 67.
Histiæus, tyrant of Miletus, opposes the scheme of cutting off the retreat of Darius Hystaspes from Scythia, 97. Attaches himself to Darius, *ib.* His scheme to withdraw himself, *ib.* Assists in crushing the revolt in Ionia, 102. His intrigues and death, *ib.*
Homer, his poems illustrate the obscure antiquities of his country, 12. His account of the ancient Greek method of barter, 13. (*Note.*) His poems long an authority to settle disputed boundaries, 19. Inquiry into his authority as an historian, 22. His mythology conformable to popular belief, 23. Remark on his description of the shield of Achilles, 27. (*Note.*) Exhibits moving scenes of conjugal affection, 29. His account of the state of arts, 30. His poems collected by Lycurgus, and brought to Sparta, 41. The time when he lived ascertained, *ib.* (*Note.*) 71. (*Note.*)
Honour, the modern point of, unknown to the Greeks, and of Scythian origin, 79.
Horse-races, why not so early practised as chariot-races at the Grecian public games, 67.
Hume, Mr. his encomium on the Roman laws, 162. (*Note.*)
Hydaspes, passage of Alexander the Great over that river, 450. Porus defeated by Alexander, 452. Alexander's passage down that river, 453.
Hyperides, decree passed at Athens on his motion, 420.

I

- Iambic*, and epode, distinction between, 74.
Ideas, Plato's doctrine of, 361.
Inarus, a Lybian chief, heads a revolt of the Egyptians against Artaxerxes, 155.
India, an expedition to, undertaken by Alexander the Great, 448. The expedition of Bacchus to, 449. (*Note.*)
Infantry more useful in war than cavalry, 86.
Inheritance, the law of, during the heroic ages of Greece, 27.
Ionia, the original inhabitants of, 12. Is settled by Grecian fugitives, 35. Their prosperity there, *ib.*, 1. Successful cultivation of arts, 82. The Ionians solicit the friendship of Cyrus, 91. The Ionian confederacy, *ib.* Application to the mother-country for assistance, 92. Is over-run by the Persians, *ib.* Revolt of, against the Persians, 97. Are assisted by the Athenians, 100. But at length deserted by them, 101. Exertions of the Persians to suppress them, 102. Siege of Miletus, *ib.* Defeat the Grecian fleet, but lose that city, 103. The country recovers its prosperity under the Persian government, *ib.* Their ships desert from the Persians at the battle of Salamis, 126. Battle of Mycalé, 135. Great progress of the fine arts there, 177.

- Iphicrates* commands the Grecian auxiliaries sent to Persia, but returns disgusted at the service, 323. Is sent with an army to assist the Spartans against the Theban invasion, 335. His conduct censured, 336. Is tried for failure of duty, 355. Dies in exile, *ib.*
Iphitus, institutes the regular celebration of the Olympic games, 39.
Iron, its scarcity in early times, 43. The coinage of it into money at Sparta, *ib.*
Isadus, a Spartan, romantic story of, 348. (*Note.*)
Ischylus, his desperate defence of Sciritis against the Arcadians, 333.
Isocrates, his encomium on Pythagoras, 141. (*Note.*) His character of the Eleusinian mysteries, 250. (*Note.*) His character of the aristocratical factions supported by Lysander, 262. (*Note.*) His character as an orator, 360. Motives of his conduct in reference to Philip of Macedon, 361.
Issus, battle of, 434.
Ithome maintained by the Messenians against the Spartans, 52. Is reduced by the Spartans, 53. The fortress of, seized by the Helots, 157. Long siege and reduction of, *ib.*

J

- Jason* undertakes the Argonautic expedition, 15.
 ——— of Phœæ, his character and fortunes, 329. Conference between him and Polydamas, *ib.* Is declared captain-general of the Thessalians, 330. His conquests, *ib.* Courts an alliance with Thebes, *ib.* His views in mediating a truce between Thebes and Sparta, 331. His assassination, *ib.*
Josephus, the authenticity of his history of the Jews defended, 141. (*Note.*) Reasons for discrediting his account of the journey of Alexander the Great to Jerusalem, 438. (*Note.*)
Jupiter, temple of, at Olympia, described, 158. Comparison of, with other Grecian temples, *ib.* Temple of, in Agrigentum described, 279.
 ——— (Ammon,) the situation of the oracle of, described, 439. Is visited by Alexander the Great, *ib.*
Justin, his character of Arrybus, 330. (*Note.*)
Juvenal, his satires criticised, 113. (*Note.*)

K

- Knowledge*, human, Plato's account of the origin of, 362.

L

- Laconia* described, 48. See *Sparta*.
Lacines, a Spartan deputy, his declaration to Cyrus, 92.
Lamachus, his advice to the Athenian commanders of the armament sent to Sicily, 224. Is killed before Syracuse, 229.
Lampsacus is taken by Lysander, 258.
Land, an idea of property in, one of the most important steps in the progress of society, 13. Disputed boundaries of, in Greece, long settled by the authority of Homer's poems, 19. How cultivated in Greece, during the heroic ages, 27. How divided in Sparta, by the laws of Lycurgus, 42.
Langarus, chief of the Agrians, assists Alexander in his return to Pella, 424.
Language, general comparison between that of Greece and that of the Orientals, 14. (*Note.*) Causes of the perfection of the Greek language, 68. Connection between the melody of language and that of music, 69.
Laocoon, the fine expression in this piece of sculpture, 180.
Larissa, vigorous defence of, against Thimbron, 297. Is reduced by Dercyllidas, *ib.*
Leodamas, commander of an Athenian convoy of provisions to Selymbria, seized by the Macedonians, 409. The ships restored by Philip, *ib.*

- Leonidas**, succeeds to the throne of Sparta, 112. Commands the Peloponnesians in the straits of Thermopylæ, 116. Repels the attacks of the Persians, 117. His magnanimity on discovering the treachery of Epialtes, 119. Surprises the Persian camp in the night, *ib.* Is killed in the battle of Thermopylæ, 120.
- Leontides**, betrays the citadel of Thebes to Phœbidas the Spartan general, 318. Is killed by Pelopidas, 320.
- Leotychides**, the reputed son of Agis king of Sparta, his doubtful legitimacy, 242. His pretensions to the crown of Sparta disputed by Agesilaus, 299.
- Lesbos**, description and history of that island, 194. Its political connection with Athens, 195. Measures taken by the Lesbians preparatory to a revolt, *ib.* They join the confederacy against Athens, *ib.* Siege of Mytilenê, 196. The city surrenders, *ib.* Treatment of the inhabitants, 198.
- Leuctra**, battle of, 327.
- Literature**, state of, in Greece, at the close of the social war of Athens, 358. State of, in the age of Alexander the Great, 463.
- Lucian**, his encomium on the Cnidian Venus, 356.
- Lycomedes**, the leader of the Arcadians, defeats the Spartans, 332. His character, 337. His spirited address to his countrymen, *ib.* Is defeated by Archidamus, 338. His firm opposition to Pelopidas's treaty, 341. Effects a peace between the Arcadians and the Athenians, 343.
- Lycurgus**, the Spartan legislator, regulates the athletic exercises in the Olympic games, 39. State of Greece in his age, 40. Occasion of his travelling, *ib.* Collects the poems of Homer, and brings them to Sparta, 41. The main objects of his legislation, *ib.* His favourable reception at Delphi, *ib.* His regulations for the distribution of political power, 42. Institutes the Ephori, *ib.* His laws concerning property, *ib.* Introduces iron money, 43. Effects of his institutions, *ib.* His laws comprised in memorial verses, *ib.* His expedients to encourage population, 44. His care of the women, 45. Of education, *ib.* Coincidence of his institutions with those of the heroic ages, 46. Causes which undermined his institutions, 47. His expedient to bind the Spartans to preserve his laws, *ib.* Conformity between his institutions and those of Pythagoras, 144.
- Lycurgus**, the orator, stimulates the Athenians to put Lysicles to death, 420.
- Lydia**, its ancient limits, 81. Brief history of, 82. Sardis taken by Cyrus, 90.
- Lysander**, commander of the Peloponnesian forces, his character, 251. His conference with Cyrus, son of Darius, *ib.* Procures an augmentation of pay for the Grecian seamen, 252. Defeats the Athenian fleet, 253. His capacity for party intrigues, *ib.* Is succeeded by Callicratidas, 254. Resumes the command of the fleet, and takes Lampsacus, 258. Defeats and captures the Athenian fleet, 259. Puts his prisoners to death, *ib.* Reduces the coasts and islands of Asia and Europe, 260. Besieges and takes Athens, 261, 262. His cruel treatment of the conquered provinces, 262. Procures the death of Alcibiades, 266. He invests Thrasybulus in the Piræus, 267. His operations opposed by Pausanias, *ib.* Espouses the pretensions of Agesilaus to the Spartan crown, 299. Is disgusted at the treatment he receives from him, 300. His invasion of the Theban territory, 304. Is killed before Haliartus, *ib.*
- Lysias**, the orator, his account of the persecution of himself and family by the thirty tyrants of Athens, 263. Collects a body, and joins Thrasybulus to oppose them, 266. Character of his orations, 354. (*Note.*) His character as an orator, 359.
- Lysicles**, one of the Athenian generals at the battle of Cheronæa, his indiscreet conduct, 418. Is put to death, 420.
- Lysippus**, his eminence as a caster in bronze, 464.
- Lyciscus** preserves his daughter from being sacrificed by the Messenians, 52.

M

- Macedonia**, the coast of, described, 185. Revolts from the Athenian government, instigated by the Corinthians, *ib.* And the Spartans, 209. Perdiccas established on the throne of Macedon by Pelopidas, 339. The first principality founded there by Caranus, 365. Primary cause of the greatness of Macedon, *ib.* Brief history of, preceding the reign of Archelaus I. *ib.* Revolutions in, to the restoration of Amyntas II. 366. Distracted state of the country on the death of Perdiccas, 367. Philip declared king, 368. The Olynthian territory added to Macedon, 389. Macedon declared a member of the Hellenic body, 400. Liberal spirit of the Macedonian government, 421.—See *Alexander*.
- Magna Græcia**, occasion of giving this name to the southern division of Italy, 54. History of the colonization of, 138. General causes of the prosperity of these colonies, 139. Their manners and policy improved by Pythagoras, 141. Decline of, and destruction of the Pythagoreans, 146.
- Malli**, fortress of the, besieged by Alexander, 454.
- Mantinæa**, battle of, 216. Its situation described, 314. Haughty message received there, from the Spartan government, *ib.* The town besieged and taken by Agesipolis, 315. The inhabitants refuse their share of the Olympic treasure, 346. Attempt of Epaminondas to surprise this city, 348. Victory gained by Epaminondas before that city, *ib.*
- Marathon**, battle of, 107.
- Mardonius**, his character, and expedition to Greece, 104. His fleet destroyed by a storm, *ib.* Left in charge of Greece on the retreat of Xerxes, 127. Enters into a negotiation with the Athenians, 129. His address to the Athenians, *ib.* The ill success of his solicitations, 129. Ravages Attica, 130. His death, 134.
- Marriage**, the obligations and ceremonies of, during the heroic ages of Greece, 28. Conjugal affection, 29.
- Masistius**, a Persian general, killed in a skirmish with the Athenians, 132.
- Masques**, why worn by performers on the Grecian theatre, 353.
- Mauvillon**, Major, his proposed correction of Xenophon examined, 290. (*Note.*)
- Measure**, its use in regulating the rhythm of ancient music, 70. The great varieties of, *ib.*
- Mechanical arts**, state of, in the heroic ages of Greece, 31.
- Medea** carried into Greece by the Argonauts, 16.
- Megabazus**, the Persian general, raises the siege of Memphis, 155. Reduces the Grecian army in Protopis to capitulation, *ib.*
- Megacreon**, of Abdera, his remark on the rapacity of Xerxes's Persian army, 116. (*Note.*)
- Megalopolis**, the city of, founded, 338.
- Megara**, quarrel between that state and Athens, 186. (*Note.*) Invaded by Pericles, 191.
- Melampus**, the Grecian bard, who, 72.
- Melanthus**, king of Messenia, dispossessed by the Heraclidæ, 34. Becomes king of Attica, *ib.*
- Melody** of the Grecian music, 70. Distinctions under this head, *ib.* Connection between that of language and that of music, *ib.*
- Melos**, island of, described, 217. Conference between Athens and Melos, *ib.* Reduction of Melos, 219.
- Melville**, General, account of his model of the seats of the rowers in the ancient galleys, 62. (*Note.*)
- Memphis**, besieged by the Athenians, and relieved by Megabazus, 155.
- Menelaus**, his marriage with Helen of Sparta, 21. Who is seduced from him by Paris, *ib.* Animates the Grecian states to revenge his cause, *ib.*
- Messenia**, described, 48. The people, *ib.* Causes of

- the war with Sparta, 49. Amphibia seized by the Spartans, 50. And the country plundered, *ib.* An indecisive battle with the Spartans, 52. The Messenians retire to Ithome, *ib.* Ithome reduced, 53. Severe terms imposed by the Spartans, *ib.* Revolt against the Spartans, *ib.* Battle of Deræ, 55. Successful exploits against the Spartans, *ib.* Aristomenes defeated, 57. Disastrous end of the second Messenian war, 60. The third Messenian war, 157. The Messenians driven from Greece by the Spartans, 277. Messenê rebuilt by Epaminondas, 335.
- Messina*, city of, founded, 60.
- Metaphysics* of Aristotle, account of, 466.
- Methymna* taken by Callicratidas, 255.
- Midea*, battle of, 338.
- Miletus*, a city of Ionia, besieged by the Persians, 101. Is taken, 103. Battle of, 241.
- Military* discipline of the Grecians, 106. Of the Persians, 107.
- Miltiades*, king of Cardia, recommends cutting off the retreat of Darius Hystaspes from Scythia, 97. Retires to Athens, *ib.* Advises the Athenians to risk a battle with the Persian invaders, 106. Obtains the sole command of the Athenian forces, 107. Disposition of his army at the battle of Marathon, *ib.* Honours bestowed on him after this victory, 109. Is vested with the command of the fleet, *ib.* His motive for besieging Paros, *ib.* Cause of his failure, *ib.* His death, *ib.*
- Milton*, his description of the Grecian mode of marching to battle, 216. (*Note.*)
- Minerva*, the statue of, formed by Phidias, 179, 250. Anniversary of the Plynteria, how observed, *ib.*
- Minos*, the elder, his history and character, 18. —, the second, his character, 18. His generosity to Theseus, *ib.*
- Minotaur*, the fabulous accounts of, exploded, 18.
- Money*, iron, the use of, introduced in Sparta by Lycurgus, 43.
- Morals*, Plato's doctrine concerning, 362. Causes of the diversity of moral character, 364.
- Mosynæciana*, the singular structure of their habitations, 294.
- Music*, that of Greece described, 68. Why introduced at the public games, *ib.* Its extent, and the purposes to which it was applied, *ib.* Causes of its perfection, *ib.* Melody of, 69. Connection between the melody of language and of music, 70. Counterpoint not understood by the Greeks, 71. (*Note.*) Influence of the musical contests at the public games, 80. Its extensive influence over mankind, 353. State of, in the age of Alexander the Great, 464.
- Mycale*, battle of, 135.
- Mycenæ*, town of, destroyed by the Argives, 159.
- Myronides*, the Athenian general, defeats the Thebans near Tanagra, 159.
- Mythology* of the Greeks justified by popular belief, 23. Compared with that of the ancient Germans, *ib.* The powerful effects of, asserted, in opposition to late inquiries, 24. Attempts to derive the Grecian mythology from more remote sources, hitherto unsuccessful, *ib.* Philosophical deduction of, 25. Moral tendency of, 26. The abuses of, unknown during the heroic ages, *ib.* Its influence on the political state of Greece, 27.
- Mytilene*, capital of Lesbos, besieged by the Athenians, 195. Surrenders, 196. Narrow escape of the inhabitants, 198. The city demolished, *ib.*
- N
- Nature*, one universal system of, 470.
- Naupactus*, a settlement granted there by the Athenians to the Spartan Helots and Messenians, 157. Assists the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war, 203, 207. The Messenians of Naupactus driven out of Greece by the Spartans, 277.
- Navigation* generally applied by the early Greeks to piratical purposes, 15.
- Nearchus*, his famous voyage from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, 453.
- Nebros* of Cos, undertakes the cure of the pestilence in the Amphictyonic army before Crissa, 64. Poisons the water that supplied the city, 65.
- Neobule*, a Parian damsel beloved by Archilochus, her unhappy fate, 74.
- Niceratus* and his son put to death by the thirty tyrants of Athens, 263.
- Nichomachus* betrays the operations of the Athenians in Bœotia to the Spartans, 208.
- Nicias* of Athens, his character, 206. Reduces the island Cythera, 208. Accomplishes a peace with Sparta, 212. Opposes the Sicilian expedition, 221. His stratagem to deceive the Syracusans, 227. Defeats them in battle, 228. He prepares for another campaign, *ib.* His armament reinforced, 229. Applies to Athens for farther assistance, 230. Arrival of Demosthenes with a fleet, 232. Is defeated in a general engagement, *ib.* Prepares for another sea fight, 234. His address to his desponding troops, 236. His prudent order of retreat, *ib.* Is harassed by the enemy, *ib.* Surrenders himself and his men to Gylippus, 238. Is put to death, *ib.*
- Nicias*, the Athenian painter, his chief excellence, and principal works, 357.
- Nicostratus* commands the Athenian squadron sent to the relief of Corcyra, 200. His judicious conduct in an engagement with the Peloponnesian fleet at Corcyra, *ib.*
- Niobe*, the sculptured group of, described, 180.
- O
- Ode*, in Grecian poetry, the characteristics of, 78. Their want of the accompaniments of music and dancing, *ib.*
- Olympia*, description of the temple of Jupiter there, 158. The city of, seized by the Arcadians, who celebrate the games, 346. The Olympic treasure plundered, *ib.* The temple restored to the Elians, 347.
- Olympias*, sister of Aribbas king of Epirus, her first introduction to Philip of Macedon, 373. Is married to him, *ib.* Her resentment at Philip's infidelity, 422. Is reconciled to him, *ib.*
- Olympic* games, the origin of, traced, 38. The immediate causes of their establishment, 39. Nature of this institution, and its important consequences, 40. Inquiry into the physical effects of the games, 78.
- Olynthus*, strength and power attained by that city, 315. Brave resistance made by, against the Spartans, 317. Is reduced by Polybiades, 318. Revival of the Olynthian confederacy, 371. Philip invades Olynthus, 384. He besieges and takes the city, 386, 389.
- Onomarchus* conducts the retreat of the Phocian army, after the death of Philomelus, 376. Is chosen general, and renews the war, 377. Is defeated and killed by Philip, 378.
- Oracles*, Grecian, origin of the, traced, 37. Causes which gave celebrity to that at Delphi, 38. Doubtful responses of, 115.
- Oratory*, how corrupted in the age of Alexander the Great, 463.
- Orchomenus*, city of, destroyed by the Thebans, 346.
- Orpheus* engages in the Argonautic expedition, 16.
- Ostracism*, in the Athenian law, explained, 110, 165. On what occasion laid aside, 244. (*Note.*)
- Othryades*, the Spartan, story of, 89.
- Oxyartes* defends the Sogdian fortress against Alexander, 444. Is reduced, 445.
- P
- Paches* reduces Mytilenê, 197. His character, and unfortunate end, 199.
- Pæonia*, is overrun by Philip of Macedon, 370.
- Pagondas*, a Theban general, defeats the Athenians at Delium, 208.

- Painting*, state of, in Greece, at the close of the social war of Athens, 356. Great expression in the Grecian performances, 358. Colouring, *ib.* Clair obscure, *ib.* State of, in the age of Alexander the Great, 464. Declines soon after his death, 465.
- Pamphylus*, the painter of Sicyon, some account of, 357.
- Pancratium*, in the ancient gymnastic exercises, explained, 67.
- Parental affection*, very ardent during the heroic ages of Greece, 29.
- Paris*, son of Priam king of Troy, his character, 21. Seduces and carries off Helen, the wife of Menelaus, *ib.*
- Parmenio*, and his son Philotas, remarks on their deaths, 460. (*Note.*)
- Paropamisus*, this chain of mountains passed by Alexander the Great, 448.
- Paros*, island of, excellences of the marble there, 105. (*Note.*) The island relieved from the arms of Miltiades, 109.
- Parrhasius*, the Ephesian painter, his great power of expression, 358.
- Parthenia*, a class of inhabitants in Sparta, 54. Conspire with the Helots, *ib.* Form a settlement at Tarentum, *ib.*
- Passions*, human, Plato's doctrine of, 363. Are diseases of the mind, according to the Stoics, 473. How analyzed by Epicurus, 474.
- Patrocles*, his principal excellence as a sculptor, 274. —, the Phliasian, his speech at Athens in favour of a defensive alliance with Sparta, 334. Assists at a renewal of it, 336.
- Pausanias* commands the Greeks sent against Mardonius, 131. Dissensions in his army, 132. Battle of Plataea, 133. Takes Byzantium, 150. His treacherous application to Xerxes, *ib.* Is recalled, 151. His death, *ib.*
- , opposes the operations of Lysander against Thrasybulus, in the Piræus, 267. Peace of Athens effected by his negotiations, *ib.* His death, 304.
- usurps the crown of Macedon, 366. Is displaced by Iphicrates, 367.
- Pcithias*, of Corcyra, assassinated in the senate-house, 199.
- Pelasgi* and Hellenes distinguished, 12.
- Pella*, the capital of Macedon, its situation described, 317.
- Pelopidas*, his birth and character, 318. Restores the democratical government of Thebes, 320. Honours conferred on him by the Thebans, 323. Commands the Theban Band at the battle of Leuctra, 327. Is joined with Epaminondas in the command of the Theban army sent against the Spartans, 333. Is intimidated at the censure of his conduct, 336. Is sent with an army to settle the affairs of Thessaly, 339. Establishes Perdiccas on the throne of Macedon, *ib.* Is treacherously seized by Alexander king of Thessaly, *ib.* His interview with queen Thebé, 340. Conversation between him and Alexander, *ib.* Is sent to negotiate at the court of Persia, *ib.* His proposals accepted, 341. The ratification of his treaty refused by the Grecian states, *ib.* His expedition to Thessaly, 345. Is killed at the battle of Cynoscephalæ, *ib.* Honours paid to his memory, *ib.*
- Peloponnesian war*, origin and history of the, 181—261.
- Peloponnesus*, first settled by Pelops, 13. How peopled by Grecian colonies, 14. The country described, 19. Is seized by the Heraclidæ, 34. State of, after the conquest of Messenia, 61.
- Pelops*, his settlement in Greece, 13.
- Pentathlon*, in the ancient gymnastic exercises explained, 67.
- Perdiccas*, king of Macedon, prepares to repel the attacks of the Athenians, 209. Refuses the proposal of Arribæus, 210.
- Pericles*, flourishing state of the polite arts in Athens during his time, 147. Influence of his ambition and policy over the Athenian state, 154. Extends the power of Athens, 159. His character, 160. His popularity, *ib.* Parallel between him and Cimon, *ib.* Completes the democratic government of Athens, 166. Encourages Aristophanes, and other writers of the ancient comedy, 173. His attachment to Aspasia, 175. Becomes a liberal patron of the fine arts, 178. Summons deputies from all the Grecian republics to Athens, 181. Clamours excited against him, 188. His accusation and defence, *ib.* Advises the Peloponnesian war, 189. He invades Megara, 191. His magnanimity on occasion of the plague at Athens, 192. His unsuccessful naval expedition to the Peloponnesus, *ib.* His reply to the clamours raised against him, and last advice, 193. His death and character, *ib.*
- Persia*, rise of the power of that kingdom, 86. Description of the country, and its inhabitants, *ib.* The causes of the Persian grandeur, *ib.* Reduces the states of Lower Asia, 92. Assyria conquered, 94. Egypt conquered, 95. Religion of the Persians, *ib.* Their manners, 96. Vigorous measures to reduce the Ionians, 102. Three distinct periods into which the invasion of Greece may be divided, 104. The unfortunate expedition of Mardonius, *ib.* Invasion of Attica by Datis and Artaphernes, *ib.* Battle of Marathon, 107. Preparations of Xerxes for another invasion of Greece, 112. Number of his forces, *ib.* Battle of Thermopylæ, 119. Disasters attending the Persian fleet, 120. First sea-fight at Artemisium, 121. The second, 122. Battle of Salamis, 126. Battle of Mycalé, 135. See *Mardonius*. Character of Darius Nothus and the first acts of his reign, 239. Artaxerxes and Cyrus dispute the succession, 281. Expedition of Cyrus into Upper Asia, 283. Battle of Cynaxa, 285. State of the Persian empire, at the era of Alexander's eastern expedition, 427. Deliberations of the Persian satraps, *ib.* Battles of the Granicus, of Issus, and of Arbela, 428, 434, 440. Death of Darius, 443. The government of Persia intrusted to Peucestas, 455.
- Perinthus*, obstinate defence of that city against Philip of Macedon, 408.
- Peripatetics*, appellation of, whence derived, 467. Their tenets, *ib.*
- Persepolis*, the royal palace of, burnt by Alexander the great, 442.
- Peucestas* made governor of Persia, 455.
- Phalanx*, Grecian, described, 106. Not instituted by Philip king of Macedon, 369.
- Phalaris*, tyrant of Agrigentum, his history, 143. (*Note.*)
- Phaleucus*, commander of the Athenian mercenaries, disobeys orders, and seizes Nicæa, 395. The disasters of him and his followers, 397.
- Pharax*, commander of the Grecian fleet, removed by Agesilaus in favour of Pisander, 302.
- Pharnabazus*, commands the Persian fleet, 307. Obtains the daughter of Artaxerxes in marriage, 309.
- Pharsalus*, wise administration of Polydamus there, 329. Jason declared captain general of the city, 330.
- Phaselis*, city of, reduced by Cimon the Grecian commander, 153.
- Phayllus* renews the sacred war, 379.
- Phere*, great authority of Jason there, 329. See *Jason*, and *Alexander*.
- Phidias*, description of his statue of Jupiter at Olympia, 158. Is patronised by Pericles, 178. His most distinguished performances, *ib.* His statue of Minerva, 179. His accusation and banishment, 188. His principal scholars, 274.
- Philip*, afterward king of Macedon, is carried as a hostage to Thebes by Pelopidas, 367. His education, and early transactions, *ib.* His return to Macedon, *ib.*, 368. Is declared king of Macedon, 368. His kind treatment of his prisoners, 369. His treaty with the Athenians, *ib.* His military institutions, *ib.* He conquers Pæonia, 370. His motives for attacking the Illyrians, *ib.* Defeats and

- kills Bardyllis, *ib.* His motives for attacking Amphipolis, 371. His intrigues at Athens and Olynthus, *ib.* Besieges Amphipolis, 372. Takes, and annexes this city to Macedon, *ib.* Pursues his conquests in Thrace, *ib.* Takes possession of the gold mines at Crenidæ, 373. His advantageous settlement of the affairs of Thessaly, *ib.* His marriage with Olympias, *ib.* Birth of his son Alexander, 374. His prosperity, *ib.* His impenetrable policy, *ib.* His military operations in Thrace, 377. Defeats Lycophron and Onomarchus, 378. He is opposed at the straits of Thermopylæ by the Athenians, 379. Dissembles his ambition, 381. His vices, 382. His intrigues at Eubœa, 384. Invades the Olynthian territory, *ib.* Besieges Olynthus, 386. Takes that city, 389. Celebrates the festival of the Muses at Dium, *ib.* His naval depredations on Attica, 390. He seizes Eubœa, *ib.* His address in gaining partisans among the Athenians, *ib.* His rapid successes in Greece, 392. His reception and treatment of the Athenian ambassadors, *ib.* His embassy to Athens, 394. Receives a third embassy from Athens, *ib.* His reply to the Theban ambassadors, 396. Corrupts and deludes the Athenian ambassadors, *ib.* His flattering letter to the Athenians, *ib.* Is vested with the custody of the temple of Delphi by the Amphictyonic council, 398. His stern letter to the Athenians, 399. Honours decreed to him by the Amphictyonic council, *ib.* Evacuates Greece, 400. His expedition to Illyria, 401. And to Thessaly, *ib.* Undertakes to protect the Peloponnesians against the oppressions of Sparta, 402. Attacks the Spartan territories, 404. Settles the affairs of Peloponnesus, *ib.* His moderation on receiving insults at Corinth, 405. Extends the bounds of Epirus, and seizes the Mallonesus, *ib.* His letter to the Athenians, *ib.* Siege of Perinthus, 408. Defeats and kills Diopceithes, 409. Restores the convoy of provisions seized by Amyntas, *ib.* Attempts to surprise Byzantium, 410. Is invited to the assistance of Atheas, king of Scythia, 411. His expedition to chastise the perfidy of Atheas, 412. His life saved by his son Alexander, 413. He is appointed general of the Amphictyons, *ib.* A review of his difficulties at this time, *ib.* Employs Antiphon to burn the Athenian docks, 414. Is applied to by the Amphictyons to punish the Amphisæans, 416. Takes the city of Amphissa, *ib.* Seizes Elatæa, 417. Encamps his army on the plain of Cheronæa, 418. Defeats the confederated Greeks, *ib.* His levity on viewing the field of battle, 419. His moderate use of victory, *ib.* Causes of his different treatment of Athens and Thebes, *ib.* Nature and extent of his authority in Greece, 421. Is appointed general of the Grecian confederacy against Persia, 422. Quarrels with his queen and his son Alexander, *ib.* Is assassinated, *ib.* His character, *ib.*
- Philip* the Arcarnanian, physician to Alexander the Great, Alexander's confidence in him, 433.
- Philippopolis*, founded by Philip of Macedon, 401.
- Philocles*, associate of Conon in the command of the Athenian fleet, his character, 257. Instance of his presumption and cruelty, 259. Is taken prisoner by Lysander, *ib.* And put to death, *ib.*
- Philomelus*, the Phocian, instigates his countrymen to withstand the decree of the Amphictyonic council, 375. Seizes the temple of Delphi, 376. Employs the sacred treasure in raising mercenaries, *ib.* His defeat and desperate end, *ib.*
- Philosophy*, rise and decline of, at Athens, 168. State of, at the close of the social war of Athens, 356. State of, in the age of Alexander the Great, 466. Tenets of the Peripatetics, 467. Estimate of Aristotle's philosophy, 470. Tenets of the Stoics, *ib.* Philosophy of Epicurus, 474. That of Pyrrho, 475.
- Phlius*, republic of, takes arms at the renewal of the Peloponnesian war, 215. Is subjected by the Spartans, 315. Fidelity of that republic to Sparta, 344.
- Phocæa*, a city of Ionia, besieged by Harpagus the Persian general, 93. Is deserted by the inhabitants, *ib.* Who remove to Corinca, *ib.*
- Phocians* incur the censure of the Amphictyonic council, 375. They resolve to withstand the decree, *ib.* They seize the temple of Delphi, *ib.* Are defeated by the Thebans and their allies, 376. The war renewed by Onomarchus, 377. The Phocians intimidated, condemn the plunderers of the treasure of Delphi, 395. Are again defeated by the Thebans, *ib.* Are deluded into security by Philip, 397. Cruel decree of the Amphictyonic council against them, 398. Which is executed by Philip, *ib.* The fugitives received by the Athenians, 399. Philippopolis and Cabyla settled with Phocian captives by Philip, 401.
- Phocion*, the motives of his conduct in reference to Philip of Macedon, 380. Defeats the Macedonians and Eubœans, 384. Expels the Macedonians from Eubœa, 408. Arrives at Byzantium with a fleet, and saves the Thracian cities, 410. Is vested with the supreme command, after the defeat at Cheronæa, 420.
- Phœbidas*, the Spartan general, seizes the citadel of Thebes, 318. Is protected by Agesilaus, *ib.* His death, 322.
- Phœnicians*, a colony of, under Cadmus, settled at Thebes, 13. Instructed the Greeks in navigation and commerce, 14.
- Phrygia*, invasion of, by Agesilaus, 301. Character of the Phrygians, *ib.*
- Phrynichus* preserves the Athenian fleet from the superior fleet of the Peloponnesians, 241. Counteracts the intrigues of Alcibiades, 243. Assists in overturning the democracy, 244. His death, 246.
- Phrynon*, the Athenian, his embassy to Philip of Macedon, 391. Is sent again, 391.
- Phyllidas*, the Theban, his character, 319. Engages in the conspiracy of Pelopidas, *ib.*
- Pindar*, the ancient Greek poet, memoirs of, 76. His works, 77. His characteristic excellence, 78. His house and family spared by Alexander at the demolition of Thebes, 426.
- Piræus*, the harbour of Athens, built and fortified by Themistocles, 149.
- Pisa*, cause of the war between that city and Elis, and the destruction of the former, 157.
- Pisander*, his conspiracy against the democratical government of Athens, 243. Proposes the government of the four hundred, 245. Is defeated at sea, and killed by Conon, 307.
- Pisistratus*, how he acquired the supreme authority at Athens, and his character, 99, 165.
- Piso*, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, his rapacious treatment of Lysias, 263.
- Pittacus*, the lawgiver of Mitylené, 195.
- Plague* at Athens, account of the, 192.
- Platæa*, battle of, 133. The city of, surprised by the Thebans, 189. Recovered by a ready expedient of the inhabitants, 190. Is reduced by the Spartans, 194. And finally destroyed, and the inhabitants driven into exile, 323.
- Plato*, his birth and education, 360. Character of his works, *ib.* (*Note.*) His travels, and settlement in the Academy, *ib.* General character of his philosophy, *ib.* Difficulty of explaining and abridging his doctrines, 361. His great views, *ib.* His theology, *ib.* His doctrine of ideas, *ib.* His morals, 362. His account of the origin of human knowledge, *ib.* Of the powers of perception and intellect, 363. Of the passions, *ib.* Of virtue, *ib.* His doctrine of a future state, 364. His republic, *ib.* His genius and character, *ib.* Compared with Socrates, *ib.*
- Pleasure* and pain, how analyzed by Epicurus, 474.
- Pliny*, his advice to Maximus, 162. (*Note.*) Remarks on his accounts of the Grecian artists, 356. (*Note.*) 357. (*Note.*) 358. (*Note.*) *ib.* (*Note.*)
- Plutarch*, his account of the operations of the laws of Lycurgus at Sparta, 43. His character of Antiphon, 243. (*Note.*)

Plynteria, the anniversary of, how observed at Athens, 250.

Poetry, and music, early connected, 68. Ascribes wonderful power to the Grecian music, 71. Circumstances that improved the Grecian poetry, 72. Satire, how introduced, 73. Elegy, *ib.* The ode, 77. Influence of the poetical contests at the public games, 79. State of, in the age of Alexander the Great, 464.

Polemarchus, the brother of Lysias, poisoned by the thirty tyrants of Athens, 263.

Pollis, the Spartan admiral, defeated by the Athenians near Naxos, 322.

Polybiades, the Spartan general, reduces the city of Olynthus, 317.

Polybius, his erroneous representations of the Athenian history, 163. (*Note.*)

Polychares, the Messenian, how defrauded by Euphros the Lacedæmonian, 49. Fatal consequences of this transaction, 50.

Polyclitus, his great skill in statuary, 356.

Polydamus, his wise administration in Pharsalus, 329. Conference between him and Jason of Pheræ, *ib.* Procures for Jason the supreme command of Thessaly, 330.

Porus, king, disputes the passage of Alexander the Great over the Hydaspes, 450. He is defeated, 451. Is reinstated by Alexander, 452. Obtains all Alexander's Indian acquisitions, *ib.*

Potidaea, besieged by the Athenians, and assisted by the Corinthians, 186. Is reduced, 194.

Praxiteles, his great skill in statuary, 356. His two statues of Venus, *ib.*

Priam, king of Troy, his history, 20.

Property, judicial decisions of, during the heroic ages of Greece, 27.

Prosopis, the Grecian army besieged there by Megabazus, the Persian general, 155. The Grecians capitulate, *ib.*

Protagoras, the painter, patronised by Apelles, 464.

Psammenitus, king of Egypt, reduced by Cambyses king of Persia, 95.

Psyllaea, island of, occupied by the flower of the Persian infantry previous to the battle of Salamis, 126. Where they are cut to pieces by the Greeks, 127.

Pylos, fortified by Demosthenes, 204. Attack of, by the Spartans, 205.

Pyrgoteles, his eminence as an engraver on gems, 464.

Pyrro, account of his philosophy, 475.

Pythagoras, his history, 141. Cause of the fabulous relations of his travels, *ib.* His acquisitions in Egypt, *ib.* His definition of a philosopher, 142. Is highly honoured in Italy, *ib.* His manner of life, *ib.* Effects a reformation in the manners of the citizens of Crotona, 143. Forms his disciples into an exclusive society, *ib.* His politics, *ib.* His morality, *ib.* His system of education, 144. His rules for the conduct of his disciples, *ib.* Conformity of these with the institutions of Lycurgus, *ib.* Origin of the fictions concerning him, *ib.* His death, 145. His disciples in Magna Græcia destroyed, 146.

Pythia, the priestess of Apollo at Delphi, her mode of delivering the oracles there, 38.

Pythian games, description of the, 66.

Python of Byzantium, his character and embassy from Philip of Macedon to Athens, 406.

R

Rennel, major, ascertains the place where Alexander the Great crossed the Indus, 449. (*Note.*) His account of the eastern boundary of Alexander's conquests, 453. (*Note.*)

Resignation, the Stoical doctrine of, 473.

Rhapsodists of the Greeks, their high authority and influence on society, 72.

Rhégium settled by Greeks, 54, 60.

Rhythms of ancient music, how regulated, 70.

Romans, their religion more plagiarism from that of

the Greeks, 26. (*Note.*) Send deputies to Athens, to obtain a copy of Solon's laws, 162. (*Note.*) Difference between the Roman and Athenian governments, 164. (*Note.*) Conquer the western division of Alexander's empire, 462.

Rousseau, Jean Jaques, his system of education, 144. (*Note.*)

Roxana, the daughter of Oxyartes, taken prisoner by Alexander the Great, and married by him, 445.

S

Sacred band of Thebans, account of, 326.

Sacred war, origin and principal events of the, 63.

Sacred war against the Phocians, history of, 375.

Sages, the seven, peculiarly distinguished among the Greek philosophers, 168.

Salathus, a Spartan general, goes to the relief of Mytilenê, besieged by the Athenians, 196. Is put to death by the Athenians, 198.

Salamis, sea engagement off that island, 126.

Samos, favoured by the Persians, 103. Revolt of the Athenian troops there, 245. Is reduced by Lysander, 262.

Sana, a canal cut through the isthmus of, by Xerxes, 113.

Sandanis, his prudent advice to Cræsus king of Lydia, 88.

Sangala besieged and taken by Alexander the Great, 452.

Sardanapalus, king of Assyria, his tomb described, 433.

Sardis, battle of, between Cyrus and Cræsus, 88. The city taken by Cyrus, 90. Is retaken and destroyed by the Athenians, 101. But instantly recovered, *ib.*

Satire, in poetry, origin of, accounted for, 73.

Satyrus, the player, signal instance of his friendship for Apollophanes, 390. (*Note.*)

Sciences, state of, during the heroic ages of Greece, 31.

Scione, city of, reduced by the Athenians, and the inhabitants massacred, 217.

Sculpture, Greek, the most celebrated monuments of, pointed out, 178. Characteristic excellence of, 179.

Scyllias of Scionê, discovers the Persian stratagems to the commander of the Grecian fleet at Artemisium, 121.

Scytale, in the Spartan laws, explained, 151.

Seuthes, a Thracian adventurer, takes the troops under Xenophon into his service, 296. Conducts them after a feast to instant action, 296. Recovers his hereditary dominions by their assistance, *ib.* His ingratitude, *ib.*

Sicily, colonization of, by Grecians, 138. Revolutions in that island, 219. A general congress of the states of, 220. Destruction of Leontium, *ib.* Siege of Syracuse, 226. Miserable retreat of the Athenians, 235. How withdrawn from the sphere of Grecian politics, 277. Is invaded by the Carthaginians, 278. Their excessive cruelties towards the inhabitants, *ib.* The island reduced to the condition of a Roman province, 281.

Siciæus, his character, and the important enterprise he was entrusted with by Themistocles, 126. His second commission to Xerxes, 128.

Sicyon, the government of, usurped by Euphron, 342. A school of painting formed there, 357.

Sinope, its situation, and by whom built, 292.

Sixty, account of the profligate club of, at Athens, 430.

Social war of Athens, history of the, 364.

Society, the narrow sphere of human faculties and pursuits, in the infancy of, 11. An idea of property in land, one of the most important steps in the progress of, 13. Political, during the heroic ages of Greece, a review of, 27. The reciprocal obligations of, unfolded by utility, 28.

Socrates detects the arts of the Sophists, 170. His education and character, *ib.* His philosophy, 171. Is assisted by the tragic poets, *ib.* His views

counteracted by the writers of the old comedy, 172. Is seduced by the arts of Aspasia, 175. Attachment between him and Alcibiades, 213. Condemns the expedition to Sicily, 223. Opposes the irregular condemnation of the admirals accused for misconduct at Arginusæ, 257. The principal causes of his prosecution, 269. His defence, 270. Is condemned, 271. He refuses to escape from prison, 272. His conversation with his friends on the last day of his life, *ib.* His declared motive for writing a hymn to Apollo, 272. His opinion of suicide, and of the immortality of the soul, *ib.* Is warned to die, 273. His death, *ib.* The Athenians honour his memory, 274. His principal disciples and followers, *ib.* Philosophers who misrepresented his tenets, *ib.*

Solon of Athens restores and improves the institutions of Theseus, 62. Animates the Amphictyonic council to revenge the violation of the temple at Delphi, 64. Advises the consecration of the Cirrhean plain to fulfil the oracle, 65. His conversation with Croesus king of Lydia, 85. His summary of human life, *ib.* Relieves the Athenians from the laws of Draco, 162. His exalted character, *ib.* His regulations concerning property, 163. New models the government, *ib.* His institutions suited to the times, *ib.* His division of the citizens, *ib.* His system of education, 165.

Sophists of Greece, history of the, 169.

Sosicles, the Corinthian deputy at Sparta, his speech, 100.

Sparta, Lycurgus driven from thence, 40. The principal objects of his legislation, 41. Institution of the ephori, and nature of their office, 42. Laws concerning property, *ib.* The use of iron money introduced, 43. Review of Spartan manners, 44—47. Causes which undermined the felicity of Sparta, 47. Description of Laconia, 48. The people, *ib.* How Sparta gained the ascendancy over the other cities in Laconia, 49. Causes of the war with Messenia, *ib.* The Spartans seize Amphibia, 50. And ravage the country, *ib.* Indecisive battle with the Messenians, 51. End of the first Messenian war, 53. Origin of the Partheniæ, 54. Conspiracy with the Helots, *ib.* Revolt of the Messenians, *ib.* Battle of Deræ, 55. The Spartans commanded by the oracle to ask a general from Athens, and receive the poet Tyrteus, *ib.* Tyrteus animates them to pursue the war, 56. End of the second Messenian war, 60. Insolent oppression of the Messenians, 62. Alliance with Croesus king of Lydia, 87. State of, at the time of the battle of Sardis, 89. Defeat of the Argives, *ib.* Deputies sent to observe the motions of Cyrus, 92. The Spartans endeavour to form a confederacy to check the power of the Athenians, 99. Domestic dissensions between Cleomenes and Demaratus, 112. The straits of Thermopylæ defended by king Leonidas, 116. Sperties and Bulis devote themselves for their country, *ib.* The atonement refused by Xerxes, 117. Battle of Thermopylæ, 119. Address of the Spartan ambassadors to the Athenians, 129. They desert the Athenians, 130. Remonstrate with the Athenians on the fortifying of their city, 148. Artful embassy of Themistocles to Sparta, *ib.* Treachery of Pausanias, 150. The city of Sparta destroyed by an earthquake, 157. Revolt of the Helots and Messenians, *ib.* The Peloponnesians endeavour to engage the Spartans to assist them against the Athenians, 186. Pacific council of king Archidamus, 187. The Spartans engage in the Peloponnesian war, *ib.* Operations of the Spartan fleet, 199. The Spartans solicit peace at Athens, 205. Their overtures rejected, 206. They apply again, 207. They assist the revolt of Macedonia, 209. Base treatment of the Helots, *ib.* Peace concluded with Athens, 212. Mutual discontents between Sparta and Athens, 214. Renewal of the war, 215. Battle of Mantinea, 216. Battle of Egæ Potamos, 259. The city of Athens taken by Lysander, 261. Rapacity

and cruelty of the Spartan government, 262. The Spartans invade Elis, 277. Subdue the Eleans, *ib.* Assist Cyrus, 283. Incur the resentment of Artaxerxes by this measure, 297. Thembron sent to defend the Æolian cities, *ib.* Dercyllidas sent to supersede him, *ib.* Death of Agis, and disputed succession to the crown, 299. Ageilaus declared successor, *ib.* Cinadon's conspiracy, *ib.* A jealousy of the Spartan power excited, 303. The Spartans take arms against the Thebans, 304. A league formed against Sparta, 305. Pisander defeated at sea at Cnidus, 307. The Spartans solicit peace with Persia, 309. Accept the terms dictated by Artaxerxes, 312. Benefits derived from this peace, 313. Their ambitious views, 314. Their haughty message to the Mantians, *ib.* They assume a regulating power over Phlissæ, 315. War commenced in Macedon, 316. War in Boeotia, 321. Losses by sea, 322. A congress of the Grecian states held at Sparta, 323. The Spartans defeated on the plain of Leuctra, 327. Their singular behaviour on this event, 328. They in vain attempt to recover their authority in Arcadia, 332. Laconia invaded by the Thebans, 333. General consternation, *ib.* A defensive alliance negotiated at Athens, 334. This alliance extended and confirmed, 336. Treaties concluded with Sicily, and Persia, *ib.* They take the field against the Arcadians, 337. Battle of Midea, 338. The Spartan allies solicit permission to negotiate peace with Thebes for themselves, 343. Attempt of Epaminondas to surprise the city of Sparta, 348. The Spartans incur the resentment of the Amphictyonic council, 375. They claim the superintendence of the temple at Delphi, 395. Philip of Macedon required to check their insolence by the Amphictyonic council, 402. They solicit the assistance of the Athenians, *ib.* The Spartan territories ravaged by Philip, 404. The Spartans take arms against Macedon during the absence of Alexander, but are reduced by Antipater, 446.

Spelman, Mr. a mistake of, corrected, 284. (*Note.*)

Sphacteria, a body of Spartan forces blocked up there by the Athenians, 205. Is obstinately defended, 206. How reduced, *ib.*

Sphodrias, the Spartan general, attempts the Piræus of Athens, 321. Fails, and is disgraced, *ib.*

Spitamenes betrays Beasus the murderer of Darius, 444. Opposes Alexander, *ib.* His death, *ib.*

Sporades, derivation of the names of those islands, 307.

Stadium in the Grecian public games, explained, 66.

Statuary, state of, at the close of the social war of Athens, 356.

Sthenelaidas, one of the Spartan ephori, stirs up the Spartans to join in the Peloponnesian war against Athens, 187.

Stoicism, the name of, whence derived, 274. (*Note.*) 467. Tenets of, 470.

Strabo, his observation on the first historians of Attica, 11. (*Note.*)

—, justifies the report of Bacchus's expedition to India, 449. (*Note.*)

Superstition, its causes and operation in Greece, 25.

Sybaris, city of, by whom founded, and its situation, 139. Conquered by Milo of Crotona, 145.

Syennesis, governor of Cilicia, secures himself from the arms of Cyrus by the means of his wife Epyra, 283.

Syracuse founded by the Corinthians, 138. Reign of Gelon, 145. Reign of Hieron, 219. Expulsion of Thrasybulus, and establishment of a democracy, *ib.* The tyranny of this city distracts the whole island, 220. The city described, 226. Apprehensions of the citizens on the approach of the Athenian fleet, *ib.* The stratagem of Nicias to seize the city, 227. The scheme defeated, *ib.* Nicias gains a victory over them, 228. Distress and relief of the city, 229. The besiegers defeated in a general engagement, 232. Again defeated, 234. Miserable retreat of the Athenians, 236. Banishment of Hermocrates, 248. Revolutions of the city, 279. Is taken by Marcellus the Roman general, 281.

T

- Taorchians*, their desperate opposition to the Greeks under Xenophon and Cheirisophus, 291.
- Tarentum* settled by Greeks, 54.
- Tarsus*, on what occasion plundered by the Grecian troops of Cyrus, 284.
- Taurus*, mount, description of, 448.
- Taxiles*, an Indian prince, mutual generosity between him and Alexander the Great, 449.
- Tegen*, seizure of the Elean deputies there by the Arcadians, 347. Is chosen by Epaminondas as a place of rendezvous for his troops, 348.
- Tegens*, their contest with the Athenians in the confederate army, 132.
- Teians*, desert their country, when attacked by the Persians, 193.
- Teletias*, brother of Agesilaus, invests the city of Olynthus, 317. Is killed, *ib.*
- Tellus*, the Athenian, pronounced a happy man by Solon, 85.
- Tempe*, valley of, described, 114. Is occupied by Themistocles, 115. Abandoned, *ib.*
- Teribazus*, his treacherous behaviour to the Greeks, 291. His negotiations with Antalcidas, 310.
- Terpander* of Lesbos, his history, 76.
- Thales*, the poet, disposes the Spartans to receive the laws of Lycurgus, 41.
- , the Milesian, his scientific discoveries, 168. His school and successors, *ib.*
- Thasos*, some account of the colony settled there, 74.
- Theatre*, Grecian, circumstances which rendered it extremely liable to abuse, 353.
- Thebe*, queen of Thessaly, her interview with Pelopidas during his confinement, 340.
- Thebes*, founded by Cadmus, 13. Origin of the war of, 17. Revolt of the inferior cities of Bœotia from, 159. Surprise the city of Platæa, 190. The invaders destroyed, *ib.* How engaged in a war with Sparta, 304. Battle of Coronæa, 307. The Thebans agree to the terms of Artaxerxes, 312. The citadel of, betrayed to Phœbidas the Spartan, 318. Conspiracy of the Theban exiles, 319. Circumstances attending its execution, *ib.* The heads of the aristocratic party killed, 320. The democratic government restored, *ib.* The citadel recovered from the Spartans, *ib.* Scheme of the Thebans to produce a rupture between Athens and Sparta, 321. Their cruel treatment of the Bœotian cities, 323. Epaminondas sent as deputy to Sparta, *ib.* Account of the sacred band, 326. Battle of Leuctra, 327. Invasion of Laconia, 333. A neutrality granted to the Spartan allies, 344. Battle of Cynoscephalæ, *ib.* The Thebans destroy the city Orchomenus, 346. Battle of Mantinæa, 349. Engage in the sacred war against Phocis, 376. Their embassy to Philip of Macedon, 396. Their tyranny over the Bœotians, 399. The Thebans persuaded to unite against Philip, 418. Battle of Cheronæa, *ib.* Harshly treated by Philip, 419. Demolition of Thebes by Alexander the Great, 425.
- Themistocles*, his character and pretensions to the command of the Athenian forces, compared with those of Aristides, 110. Their rivalry, *ib.* Destroys the fleets of Ægina and Corcyra, 111. Exhorts his countrymen to keep up their military strength by land and sea, *ib.* Opposes Xerxes at the vale of Tempé, 115. Advises the Athenians to trust to their fleet, in obedience to the oracle, *ib.* His expedient to detach the Ionians from the Persians, 122. His prudent advice to the Grecian fleet, 125. His stratagem to draw Xerxes to a naval engagement, 126. Is joined by Aristides, *ib.* Battle of Salamis, *ib.* His scheme to accelerate the flight of Xerxes, 128. Honours conferred on him, and his conduct after his victory, 129. Persuades the Athenians to fortify their city, 148. His embassy to Sparta, *ib.* Builds the Piræus, 149. Is accused by the Spartans as an accomplice with Pausanias, 152. His banishment and death, *ib.*
- Theocles*, the Messenian diviner, devotes himself to death at Eira, to intimidate the besiegers, 59.
- Theogony*, in poetry, explained, 72. (*Note.*)
- Theopompus*, his character of the associates of Philip of Macedon, 392. (*Note.*)
- Theramenes* restores the democracy at Athens, 246. His embassy to Sparta, 260. As one of the thirty tyrants of Athens endeavours to mitigate the odious oppressions of his colleagues, 265. Is accused by Critias, *ib.* His defence, 265. Is violently dragged to death, *ib.*
- Thermopylæ*, straits of, described, 116. Are guarded by the Greeks to stem the progress of Xerxes, *ib.* An attack of the Persians repulsed, 117. Memorable battle of, 119. The Thebans desert to the Persians, 120. Monuments erected in memory of this battle, *ib.* Philip of Macedon stopped there by the Athenians, 379. Seized by Philip, 392.
- Theseus*, his voyage to Crete, and treatment by Minos, 18. Introduces the Cretan institutions into Attica, *ib.*
- Thessalus* impeaches Alcibiades of impiety, 225.
- Thessaly*, great part of, reduced under the dominion of Jason of Pheræ, 329. Revolutions of this country after the death of Jason, 338. The Thessalians apply to Thebes for protection against their king Alexander, 345. Battle of Cynoscephalæ, *ib.* The affairs of that country settled by Philip king of Macedon, 373. Why Philip selected his friends from among the Thessalians, 382. Is reduced by Philip to a Macedonian province, 401.
- Thimbron* is sent from Sparta to assist the Æolian cities against Tissaphernes, 297. Is reinforced by the Greek troops under Xenophon, *ib.* His repulse at Larissa occasions his recall, *ib.*
- Thrace*, the coast of, reduced by Cimon the Grecian commander, 153. Expedition of Brasidas the Spartan general to, 210. The commotions there settled, and the country reduced to a Macedonian province, by Philip, 406.
- Thrasybulus*, king of Syracuse, his character, and expulsion from Sicily, 220.
- , tyrant of Miletus, his expedient to dispose Alyattes king of Lydia to peace, 83.
- of Athens, heads an insurrection in the camp at Samos, 245. Conducts Alcibiades to the camp, *ib.* Gains a naval victory over the Peloponnesians, 247. He impeaches Alcibiades in the Athenian assembly, 253. His character, 266. Seizes Phrygia, and defeats the thirty tyrants, *ib.* Surprises the Piræus, 267. Gives the tyrants another defeat, *ib.* His proclamation to the vanquished fugitives, *ib.* Is invested in the Piræus by Lysander, *ib.* Returns to the city through the mediation of Pausanias, 268. Procures a general amnesty, 269. His naval enterprises and death, 311.
- Thrasyllus* encourages the revolt in the Athenian camp at Samos, 245. Suffers a defeat at Ephesus, 248. Regains his honour before the walls of Abydus, *ib.*
- Thucydides*, general remarks on his history of the Peloponnesian war, 11. (*Note.*) His activity as Athenian commander of Thasos, 210. Is banished by the Athenians, 211. His character of Hyperbolus, 244. (*Note.*) His youthful admiration of Herodotus, and his own character as an historian, 276. Comparison between him and Herodotus, *ib.* His work continued by Xenophon, *ib.*
- Thyrea*, the possession of, contested by the Spartans and the Argives, 89.
- Tigris*, contrivance for the passage of the Greeks under Xenophon over that river, 290.
- Timagoras*, the Athenian deputy at the court of Artaxerxes, 341. Is condemned to death, *ib.* (*Note.*)
- Timandra*, the mistress of Alcibiades, is spared by those who put him to death, 266.
- Timanthes*, the Grecian painter, his great power of expression, 358.
- Timoclea*, a Theban matron, her heroism, 426.
- Timoleon* puts an end to the tyranny of Dionysius the younger, in Syracuse, 281.

Tissaphernes, king of Ionia, disappointed of his dominions by the Heraclids, 34. His death, *ib.*
Tissaphernes, the Persian general, is sent by Darius Nothus to quell the revolt in Asia Minor, 239. Is from the resentment of Agis 242. Accuses Cyrus of treason, a truce with the Grecian army, *ib.* 288. Seizes the Grecian general Artaxerxes with the spoils. Attacks the Æolian cities under rament, *ib.* His treaty with Darius treacherous negotiations with, deceived by the military policy of, is put to death by Artaxerxes, 302. Is killed by Artaxerxes to put Tissaphernes, and to succeed to his command 302. Sends an embassy to Agis, leading men in the several 33. Origin of the, 173. How distinguished, *ib.* Hospitable reception of the Greeks, Ctesiphon and Chabrius, 293. Its character, *ib.* (Note.) Between the Spartans and Mæcedonians, 293. Grecian armament sent against a kingdom of, described, 30. Demetrius Treas and Ilion, *ib.* Causes, *ib.* Is besieged by the Greeks, and destroyed, *ib.* Its subsequent history, 30. Historian who arranged his narrative of the Olympiads, 11. (Note.) A history, the true import of the 13. (Note.) Established over the city of Athens, by Lyander, 263. Their rapacious conduct, *ib.* Are opposed by Thersybulus, 266. They retire to Eleusis, 267. Are defeated by Thersybulus, *ib.* Are deposed, 268. Tyre, embassies from that city to Alexander the Great, 436. Description of the city, *ib.* The city besieged by Alexander, *ib.* The inhabitants reduced, 438.
Tyrtæus, the Athenian poet, sent to command the Spartans against the Messenians, 55. Animates the Spartans to persevere in the war, 56.

U

Ulysses, king of Ithaca, his embassy to Troy on behalf of Menelaus, 31.

V

Venus, encomium on the Cnidian statue of, 356.
Victors, at the Olympic games, their emulation and rewards, 80.
Virtue, the origin and nature of, according to Plato, 361. Moral inquiry into, on the principles of the Peripatetics, 469. How to be attained, *ib.* The hardest task of, *ib.* How estimated by the Stoics, 473.

W

War, how carried on, during the heroic ages of Greece, 30. Its laws, *ib.*
Warburton, Bishop, his opinion of the necessity of the doctrine of a future state to the support of the Grecian Governments, not justified by the Grecian writers, 24.

Weapons of war, those generally used during the heroic ages of Greece, 30.
Women, their condition and rank during the heroic ages of Greece, 28. Their occupations and amusements, 29. How treated by the laws of Lycurgus at Sparta, 45. A general review of the rank they held, and their treatment, 174.
Wrestling, how practised in the ancient gymnastic exercises, 66.
Writers, the most ancient pointed out, 11. (Note.)

X

Xanthippe, the wife of Socrates, her final parting with him, 272.
Xanthippus, his persecution, the cause of the death of Miltiades, 109. Is not deemed worthy to succeed him, *ib.* Defeats the Persians at Mycalé, 136.
Xenophon, his account of the operation of the laws of Lycurgus at Sparta, 43. Of the Spartan art of war, 44. Of the Persian institutions, 86. Of the expedition of Cyrus into Upper Asia, 283. Of the death of Cyrus, 286. His reply to the imperious demands of Artaxerxes, 287. His address to the Greeks after the seizure of their generals by Tissaphernes, 288. Is elected one of their generals, 289. Memorable retreat of the Greeks from Asia under his conduct, *ib.* Proposes to settle on the coast of the Euxine sea, 294. Is vested with the sole command of the troops on the death of Chabrias, *ib.* Prevails on them not to plunder Byzantium, 295. His troops hired by Seuthæ, a Thracian adventurer, *ib.* Conducts them afterward into the service of Sparta, 297. Attends Agesilaus in his war with Persia, 303. His history ends with the battle of Mantinea, 351. (Note.) His character as a writer, 358. How he was engaged in the expedition of Cyrus, 359. His subsequent military employments and retreats, *ib.* Is driven to Corinth, *ib.* His literary performances, *ib.*
Xerxes, king of Persia, his preparations for an invasion of Greece, 112. Amount of his forces, *ib.* His passage over the Hellespont, 113. Cuts a canal through the isthmus of Sarn, *ib.* His reflection on the review of his immense army, 114. Receives the submission of the Grecian communities, *ib.* His march to the plains of Trachis, 116. His negotiation with the Spartans, 117. His inquiry into their character, *ib.* His astonishment at the repulse of his troops at Thermopyla, 118. The Greeks betrayed to him by Epialtes, *ib.* His narrow escape when Leonidas surprised his camp, 119. Battle of Thermopyla, *ib.* He advances toward Attica, 123. Ravages the territory of Phocis, *ib.* His attempt on Delphi, how frustrated, *ib.* Enters Attica, 124. Prevailed on to risk the battle of Salamis, 126. Views the engagement from Mount Egialos, *ib.* His fleet defeated, 127. His disgraceful retreat from Greece, *ib.* His flight accelerated by the artifices of Themistocles, 128.

Y


YOUTH, duties and employments of, at Athens, according to the institutions of Solon, 165.

Z

Zeno, account of his philosophy, 470.
Zenxis, the Grecian painter, account of his principal works, 357.
Zoroaster, the founder of the Persian religion, his peculiar doctrines, 96.




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
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
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


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